EN BANC unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in

the active service or retired.2

G.R. No. 104768 July 21, 2003
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q.
vs. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth
ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents. of Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution reads:

DECISION III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

CARPIO, J.: Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house
and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the
The Case owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of
3,327 square meters.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set
aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First Division)1 dated 18 The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated
November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first modestly at ₱700,000.00.
Resolution dismissed petitioner’s Amended Complaint and ordered the
return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in
the second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of
Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the
Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items
Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings allowing could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given
petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence. for her use by respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

Antecedent Facts Aside from the military equipment/items and communications

equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of
EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security
ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his Command, Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños,
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent.
vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house
necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when
order" and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent. That on
may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order." Accordingly, February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of
the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and
Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports of owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco
had no visible means of income and is supported by respondent for she I. Chavez filed an Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the
was formerly a mere secretary. Philippines ("petitioner"), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and
Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the Dimaano ("Dimaano") as co-defendant.
military equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without
the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of the The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding
Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano
she owns the ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army,
visible source of income. assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to
February 1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities "acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to
of respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence of these his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately
money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. Were it acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or
not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed
assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, the existence and Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the
ownership of these money would have never been known. deposed President Ferdinand Marcos."5

The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a
submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the Board’s consultant. Although previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe that respondents
the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, have violated RA No. 1379.6 The Amended Complaint prayed for, among
still it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of others, the forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and equipment in
₱104,134. 60. favor of the State.

IV. CONCLUSION: Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and
Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer,
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential house
against respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at ₱700,000, which was not
of ₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars. out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied
ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications
V. RECOMMENDATION: equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting
prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-
known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her
Acquired Property."3 house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the case for trial on the
Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No. 1379") 4 against Ramas. merits on 9-11 November 1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing prejudice to any action that private respondents might take under the
due to its lack of preparation for trial and the absence of witnesses and circumstances.
vital documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing to 17
and 18 April 1989. However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to
proceed to trial because it had no further evidence to present. Again, in
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days
complaint in order "to charge the delinquent properties with being within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan,
subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant however, warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court
Dimaano alone x x x."8 to take drastic action.

Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on
proceeded with petitioner’s presentation of evidence on the ground that Republic v. Migrino.9 The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not
the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when petitioner have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason
would file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated of mere position held without a showing that they are "subordinates" of
that the subject matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague former President Marcos.
and not related to the existing complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held
that due to the time that the case had been pending in court, petitioner On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the
should proceed to present its evidence. dispositive portion of which states:

After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended
postponement of the trial. Complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are
likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money,
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered
manifested its inability to proceed to trial because of the absence of returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present. Instead,
petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon.
the evidence already presented or to change the averments to show that Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases
Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies or properties subject of under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence
the forfeiture. warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.
for over a year mainly because of its many postponements. Moreover,
petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage when in SO ORDERED.
fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered
petitioner to prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any. On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a
to present further evidence. Giving petitioner one more chance to Joint Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its Reply on 10
present further evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to its January 1992.
evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The
Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was without
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO,
the Motion for Reconsideration. 189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan 1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and
Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable to
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following this case;
grounds:
2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or
the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan10 waived by respondents with the filing of their respective
and Republic v. Migrino11 which involve the same issues. answers with counterclaim; and

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in 3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently
criminal cases was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano. improper considering that they were filed after
commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a petitioner and even before the latter was allowed to
prima facie case against him. formally offer its evidence and rest its case;

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
confiscated. THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY,
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES
The Issues CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO
WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS
Petitioner raises the following issues: EVIDENCE.12

A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING The Court’s Ruling

THAT PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR
FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF First Issue: PCGG’s Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY
CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this
RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan13 and Republic v. Migrino.14
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS
WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the
RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition
PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER. against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.

B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE
FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth
COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v. retired.15 The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary
recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief,
be taken based on its findings.16 The PCGG gave this task to the AFP undeniably making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.
Board pursuant to the PCGG’s power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 "to
conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos
carry out the purposes of this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
responsibilities, to wit:
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the a "subordinate" as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a
President in regard to the following matters: showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos.
Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or show what is contemplated within the term ‘subordinate.’ The Whereas
abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all business Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.
advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationship. EO No. 2 freezes ‘all assets and properties in the Philippines in which
former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or
President may assign to the Commission from time to time. nominees have any interest or participation.’

x x x. Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis

that is-
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of ‘[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by
the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not
AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only
administration of former President Marcos by being the latter’s to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil.
advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x;17 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].’
or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption
provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.18 [T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who
enjoys a close association with former President Marcos and/or his wife,
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas’ similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in
case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas’ case should fall under the first EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or
category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction nominee in EO No. 2.
over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate
of former President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding xxx
General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas’ position
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private
government official or employee during the administration of former respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding
President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to
respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. amendments proves fatal to petitioner’s case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG
(Emphasis supplied) for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily its powers must be
construed to address such specific and limited purpose.
Ramas’ position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army
with the rank of Major General19 does not suffice to make him a Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended
"subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and Complaint do not show that the properties Ramas allegedly owned were
its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that accumulated by him in his capacity as a "subordinate" of his
Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties
manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that these properties were
former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income without
manifested either by Ramas’ complicity with former President Marcos in showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association with
the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board
former President Marcos’ acquiescence in Ramas’ own accumulation of resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas accumulated his wealth
ill-gotten wealth if any. because of his close association with former President Marcos, thus:

This, the PCGG failed to do. 10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the
New Armed Forces of the Philippines did not categorically find a
Petitioner’s attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully
not convince us. Petitioner argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation
Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted the with former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that
investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. such omission was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board
1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was should be read in the context of the law creating the same and the
acting within its jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft objective of the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant
and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former to Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos.
President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;21 (Emphasis supplied)
contention. Although the Resolution begins with such statement, it ends
with the following recommendation: Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie
showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a "subordinate"
V. RECOMMENDATION: of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 122
clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate
prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say
known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind
amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully the creation of the PCGG.
Acquired Property."20
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court outlined the cases that fall power to conduct preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture
under the jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,24 14,25 14- proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February
A:26 1986.28

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued
relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, shows what this case despite the absence of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a
the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute "subordinate" of former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture
covers: filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority
by the PCGG to investigate respondents since there is no prima facie
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply to respondents. The
recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act No. 1379, AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there
accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in recommended Ramas’ case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to
the Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or
through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public [But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate
office and/or using their powers, authority and influence, and cause the prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep.
connections or relationships; and Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from
proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be
(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that
in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as contemplated under an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted
Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1. to it.

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Petitioner’s argument that private respondents have waived any defect
Act not otherwise falling under the foregoing categories, require a in the filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting their respective
previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of
Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no
vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise
agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGG’s powers
assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the
state prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied) President, PCGG’s sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.29 Without these elements, the
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its
amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the
amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of PCGG to investigate and prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to
the Ombudsman, while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court in
petition rests with the Solicitor General.27 The Ombudsman Act or Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why
Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests in the Ombudsman the private respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October
1990. Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack of Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner manifested its inability to
jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding.30 Thus, we hold that there proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued
was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is vested by law an Order expressing its view on the matter, to wit:
and not by the parties to an action.31
The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by above events because this case has been ready for trial for over a year
the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of the
may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for violation of government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial
RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military to
forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan.32 The right of the State to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence thereon.
forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public
prescription, laches or estoppel.33 about its alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond the
preliminary stage, when, in view of the developments such as those of
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case today, this Court is now faced with a situation where a case already in
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month
pause where appropriate action could have been undertaken by the
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the plaintiff Republic.35
case before completion of the presentation of petitioner’s evidence.
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting
We disagree. a preliminary investigation on the unexplained wealth of private
respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379.36 The PCGG prayed for an
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The
we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of the Sandiganbayan granted this request and scheduled the presentation of
presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on the scheduled date,
years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the preliminary
Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan
evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the presentation of
its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still its evidence and to inform the court of "what lies ahead insofar as the
delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous status of the case is concerned x x x."37 Still on the date set, petitioner
motions for postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its
the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Re-Amended Complaint.38 The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a
Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.34 The motion sought "to case already pending for years would revert to its preliminary stage if
charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioner’s the court were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.
evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully
acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x." Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to
blame for failure to complete the presentation of its evidence. The
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the
petitioner’s evidence since petitioner did not state when it would file the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioner’s
amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing
continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9- of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong even more the
11 October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an
prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since the PCGG has no illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against private ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights
respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case against private the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the
respondents. monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence
against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case enjoy any constitutional right.
before completion of the presentation of petitioner’s evidence.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986,
properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house as illegally seized and the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect Constitution."41 The resulting government was indisputably a
on petitioner’s case since these properties comprise most of petitioner’s revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations
evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de
evidence to support its case against private respondents if these jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.
properties are inadmissible in evidence.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the
residence a search warrant captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by
and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the raid but the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by
Dimaano’s cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of
detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not included in the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded
the search warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one baby to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.
₱2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection
conducted the search and seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five days after accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
the successful EDSA revolution."39 Petitioner argues that a remained in effect during the interregnum.
revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary
President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the will of the government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the
Filipino people."40 Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of
effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right. municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke
any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a
constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the
explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:42 Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)

A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained
established government in any country or state by those who were operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration
previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government
in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or ("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The
at least some acts of violence." In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of
and State, it is defined as that which "occurs whenever the legal order of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action,
a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill
prescribed by the first order itself." of Rights.

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a
and more popularly known as the "people power revolution" that the revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could
Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However,
government. upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered
companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
defined as "an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change
their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission
institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and on Good Government,43 petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was
constitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate no Bill of Rights during the interregnum, questioned the continued
or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." It has been said that "the locus validity of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom
of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state" and from Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The
there is derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter Court ruled that the Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987
any existing form of government without regard to the existing Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of sequestration orders,
constitution." thus:

xxx If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing
considerations as to the validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these
due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have
the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa received constitutional approbation and sanction. As already mentioned,
resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution recognizes the power and
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve the mandate of the
Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance and her control people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and
of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people
officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts." And
officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution treats of, and ratifies the "authority to issue sequestration Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become
or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986." ingrained. The committee report asks for extraordinary exceptions from
the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening of Congress, and
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution Congress may even extend this longer.
were fully aware that the sequestration orders would clash with the Bill
of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to include specific Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice.
language recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders. The What the committee report is asking for is that we should allow the new
following discourse by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about practitioners of the vice begin to think that they have a vested right to its
the arguments in defense of the present amendment. practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That
would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salonga’s lecture in the revolution.
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of which all of us have been
given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal
Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by niceties is an argument that is very disturbing. When it comes from a
Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major portion of staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated
his lecture developing that argument. On the other hand, almost as an verbatim by another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it
afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results and not becomes doubly disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument
the legal niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to makes the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction
make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or exceptions. block. If the price is right, the search and seizure clause will be sold.
"Open your Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the search
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the and seizure clause. You can keep it in your private safe."
CONCOM for special protection? The answer is clear. What they are
doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage
asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, to the hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden
fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say grandes malos, grande y health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of
malos remedios. That is not an allowable extrapolation. Hence, we Rights, specifically the due process in the search and seizure clauses. So,
should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give there is something positively revolving about either argument. The Bill
three reasons: of Rights is not for sale to the highest bidder nor can it be used to
ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only if
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the it would become convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of
CONCOM is to hasten constitutional normalization. Very much at the a price that is beyond monetary estimation.
heart of the constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the Bill
of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional
and at the same time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of the committee report and
what is at the heart of constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is
would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of due process and rule deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and
of law. The New Society word for that is "backsliding." It is tragic when the Romulo argument — that what the PCGG has been doing has been
we begin to backslide even before we get there. completely within the pale of the law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on
and should be able to go on, even without the support of Section 8. If not as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has
sustained, however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles
bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights. of international law and binding on the State.46 Thus, the revolutionary
government was also obligated under international law to observe the
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let rights47 of individuals under the Declaration.
me conclude with what another Christian replied when asked to toy
around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
the devil benefit of law for my nation’s safety sake." I ask the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary
Commission to give the devil benefit of law for our nation’s sake. And we government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant
should delete Section 8. or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it
to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied) international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper
subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The
Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or
amendment excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As
Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape
26,44 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty
Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration obligations under international law.
orders would not stand the test of due process under the Bill of Rights.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary
force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if
excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional
render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued Constitution.48 The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation
to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers
found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. entrusted to it by the people.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed,
government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long
compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the
jurisdiction the rights45 recognized in the present Covenant." Under revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since
Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued
duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence." and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items
specifically described in the warrant.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in
its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property." Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the Atty. Banaag
warrant. As admitted by petitioner’s witnesses, the raiding team
confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus: Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this
case was applied before the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
A. Yes, sir.
AJ AMORES
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and
Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of
weapons. What else, aside from the weapons, were seized from the ammunition?
house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, sir.
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US
dollars, some jewelries, land titles, sir. xxx

Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the AJ AMORES
house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your team
also seized other properties not mentioned in said search warrant? Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance
in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was
informed that the reason why they also brought the other items not A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the
included in the search warrant was because the money and other MSU elements, your Honor.
jewelries were contained in attaché cases and cartons with markings
"Sony Trinitron", and I think three (3) vaults or steel safes. Believing that Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of
the attaché cases and the steel safes were containing firearms, they Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
forced open these containers only to find out that they contained money.
A. Yes, your Honor.
xxx
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the
reason why your team seized this money instead of weapons? A. Yes, your Honor.

A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant,
decided to bring along also the money because at that time it was any other properties or contraband which could be found in the
already dark and they felt most secured if they will bring that because residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
they might be suspected also of taking money out of those items, your
Honor.49
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items,
for instance, the communications equipment and money. However, I did
Cross-examination not include that in the application for search warrant considering that
we have not established concrete evidence about that. So when…
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to these were taken because they might get lost if they will just leave this
believe that only weapons were in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano? behind.

A. Yes, your Honor.50 xxx

xxx Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also
included in the search warrant?
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite
rifle M-16 and how many ammunition? A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money
was discovered to be contained in attaché cases.1âwphi1 These attaché
A. Forty, sir. cases were suspected to be containing pistols or other high powered
firearms, but in the course of the search the contents turned out to be
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, money. So the team leader also decided to take this considering that they
with the fiscal’s office who charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal believed that if they will just leave the money behind, it might get lost
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition? also.

A. Yes, sir. Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized
by your raiding team, like Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were
A. I think it was dismissed, sir. opened.51

Q. In the fiscal’s office? It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant
did not include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and
A. Yes, sir. land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not
particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these
had a Memorandum Receipt in the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not items without showing that these items could be the subject of
warrantless search and seizure.52 Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its
correct?
authority when it seized these items.
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are
contraband per se,53 and they are not, they must be returned to the
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the
person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare
search warrant, like for instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the
that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the
jewelries?
search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and
withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
to bring along also the jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know
where it was taken but they brought along also these articles. I do not
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned
really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25
March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to
the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may
warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent
Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and

Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result. I concur with Mr. Justice Vitug in his
concurring opinion.
Puno and Vitug, JJ., see separate opinion
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Quisumbing and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on official leave.
Ynares-Santiago, J., in the result. I concur in the separate opinion of J.
Reynato Puno.
Tinga, J., separate opinion reserved.
 EN BANC

April 18, 2017 On 1 September 2011, DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) 3
acquired a 7,716.60-square meter lot in the City of Manila, located near
G.R. No. 213948 Taft Avenue, Ermita, beside the former Manila Jai-Alai Building and
Adamson University.4 The lot was earmarked for the construction of
KNIGHTS OF RIZAL, Petitioner. DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila condominium project.
vs.
DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC., CITY OF On 2 April 2012, DMCI-PDI secured its Barangay Clearance to start the
MANILA, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CULTURE AND THE ARTS, construction of its project. It then obtained a Zoning Permit from the City
NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES, of Manila's City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) on 19 June
Respondents. 2012.5

DECISION Then, on 5 July 2012, the City of Manila's Office of the Building Official
granted DMCI-PDI a Building Permit, allowing it to build a "Forty Nine
CARPIO, J.: (49) Storey w/ Basement & 2 penthouse Level Res'l./Condominium" on
the property. 6
Bury me in the ground, place a stone and a cross over it.
My name, the date of my birth, and of my death. Nothing more. On 24 July 2012, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121
If you later wish to surround my grave with a fence, you may do so. enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the
No anniversaries. I prefer Paang Bundok. Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing among others, that "the Torre de
Manila Condominium, based on their development plans, upon
- Jose Rizal completion, will rise up high above the back of the national monument,
to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights,
would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal
Roxas Boulevard vantage point[.]"7
The Case
Building Official Melvin Q. Balagot then sought the opinion of the City of
Manila's City Legal Officer on whether he is bound to comply with
Resolution No. 121.8 In his letter dated 12 September 2012, City Legal
Officer Renato G. Dela Cruz stated that there is "no legal justification for
Before this Court is a Petition for Injunction, with Applications for
the temporary suspension of the Building Permit issued in favor of
Temporary Restraining Order, Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and
[DMCI-PDI]" since the construction "lies outside the Luneta Park" and is
Others 1 filed by the Knights of Rizal (KOR) seeking, among others, for
"simply too far to I be a repulsive distraction or have an objectionable
an order to stop the construction of respondent DMCI Homes, Inc. 's
effect on the artistic and historical significance" of the Rizal Monument. 9
condominium development project known as the Torre de Manila. In its
He also pointed out that "there is no showing that the [area of subject
Resolution dated 25 November 2014, the Court resolved to treat the
property has been officially declared as an anthropological or
petition as one for mandamus. 2
archeological area. Neither has it ' been categorically designated by the
National Historical Institute as a heritage zone, a cultural property, a
The Facts historical landmark or even a national treasure."
Subsequently, both the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI sought the opinion On 16 January 2014, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 5,
or the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP) on the Series of 2014, 17 adopting Zoning Board Resolution Nos. 06 and 06- A.
matter. In the letter10 dated 6 November 2012 from NHCP I Chairperson The City Council resolution states that "the City Council of Manila find[ s]
Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno addressed to DMCI-PDI and the letter 11 no cogent reason to deny and/or reverse the aforesaid recommendation
dated 7 November 2012 from NHCP Executive Director III Ludovico D. of the [MZBAA] and hereby ratif[ies] and confirm[s] all previously issued
Bado)f addressed to then Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim, the NHCP permits, licenses and approvals issued by the City [Council] of Manila for
maintained that the Torre de Manila project site is outside the Torre de Manila[.]"
boundaries of the Rizal f.ark and well to the rear of the Rizal Monument,
and thus, cannot possibly obstruct the frontal view of the National Arguments of the KOR
Monument.
On 12 September 2014, the KOR, a "civic, patriotic, cultural, nonpartisan,
On 26 November 2013, following an online petition against the Torre de non-sectarian and non-profit organization" 18 created under Republic
Manila project that garnered about 7,800 signatures, the City Council of Act No. 646, 19 filed a Petition for Injunction seeking a temporary
Manila issued Resolution No. 146, reiterating its directive in Resolution restraining I order, and later a permanent injunction, against the
No. 121 1 enjoining the City of Manila's building officials to temporarily construction of DMCIPDI's Torre de Manila condominium project. The
suspend ~MCI-PDI's Building Permit. 12 KOR argues that the subject matter of the present suit is one of
"transcendental importance, paramount public interest, of overarching
In a letter to Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada dated 18 December 2013, significance to society, or with far-reaching implication" involving the
DMCI-PIDI President Alfredo R. Austria sought clarification on the desecration of the Rizal Monument.
controversy surrounding its Zoning Permit. He stated that since the
CPDO granted its Zoning Permit, DMCI-PDI continued with the The KOR asserts that the completed Torre de Manila structure will
application for the Building Permit, which was granted, and did not "[stick] out like a sore thumb, [dwarf] all surrounding buildings within a
deem it necessary to go through the process of appealing to the local radius of two kilometer/s" and "forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal
zoning board. He then expressed DMCI-PDI's willingness to comply with Monument in Luneta Park: Torre de Manila building would loom at the
the process if the City of Manila deemed it necessary. 13 back I and overshadow the entire monument, whether up close or
viewed from a distance. ''20
On 23 December 2013, the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and
Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning Board Resolution No. 06, Series of 2013, Further, the KOR argues that the Rizal Monument, as a National
14 recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI's application for variance. Treasure, is entitled to "full protection of the law"21 and the national
;The MZBAA noted that the Torre de Manila project "exceeds the government must abate the act or activity that endangers the nation's
prescribed maximum Percentage of Land Occupancy (PLO) and exceeds cultural heritage "even against the wishes of the local government
the prescribeµ Floor Area Ratio (FAR) as stipulated in Article V, Section hosting it." 22
17 of City Ordinance No. 8119[.]" However, the MZBAA still
recommended the approval of the variance subject to the five conditions Next, the KOR contends that the project is a nuisance per se23 because
set under the same resolution. "[t]he despoliation of the sight view of the Rizal Monument is a situation
that annoy's or offends the senses' of every Filipino who honors the
After some clarification sought by DMCI-PDI, the MZBAA issued Zoning memory of the National Hero Jose Rizal. It is a present, continuing,
Board Resolution No. 06-A, Series of 2013, 15 on 8 January 2014, worsening and aggravating status or condition. Hence, the PROJECT is a
amending condition (c) in the earlier resolution. 16 nuisance per se. It deserves I to be abated summarily, even without need
of judicial proceeding. "24
The KOR also claims that the Torre de Manila project violates the NHCP's First, DMCI-PDI asserts that the Court has no original jurisdiction over
Guidelines on Monuments Honoring National Heroes, Illustrious Filipinos actions for injunction.29 Even assuming that the Court has concurrent
and Other Personages, which state that historic monuments should jurisdiction, DMCI-PDI maintains that the petition should still have been
assert a visual "dominance" over its surroundings,25 as well as the filed with the Regional Trial Court under the doctrine of hierarchy of
country's commitment under the International Charter for the courts and because the petition involves questions of fact. 30
Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites, otherwise known
as the Venice Charter. 26 DMCI-PDI also contends that the KOR's petition is in actuality an
opposition' or appeal from the exemption granted by the City of Manila's
Lastly, the KOR claims that the DMCI-PDI's construction was commenced MZBAA, a matter which is also not within the jurisdiction of the Court.
and continues in bad faith, and is in violation of the City of Manila's 31 DMCI-PDI claims that the proper forum should be the MZBAA, and
zoning ordinance. 27 should the KOR fail there, it should appeal the same to the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). 32
Arguments of DMCI-PDI
DMCI-PDI further argues that since the Rizal Monument has been
In its Comment, DMCI-PDI argues that the KOR's petition should be declared a National Treasure, the power to issue a cease and desist order
dismissed on the following grounds: is lodged with the "appropriate cultural agency" under Section 25 of
Republic Act No. li0066 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009. 33
I. Moreover, DMCI-PDI asserts that the KOR availed of the wrong remedy
since an action for injunction is not the proper remedy for abatement of
THXS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THIS ACTION. a nuisance. 34

II. Second, DMCI-PDI maintains that the KOR has no standing to institute
this proceeding because it is not a real party in interest in this case. The
KOR HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT OR INTEREST TO FILE OR PR0SECUTE THIS purposes of the KOR as a public corporation do not include the
ACTION. preservation of the Rizal Monument as a cultural or historical heritage
site.35 The KOR has also not shown that it suffered an actual or
III. threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal conduct of the City of
Manila. If there is any injury to the KOR at all, the same was caused by
the private conduct of a private entity and not the City of Manila. 36
TORRE DE MANILA IS NOT A NUISANCE PER SE.
Third, DMCI-PDI argues that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se.
IV.
DMCI-PDI reiterates that it obtained all the necessary permits, licenses,
clearances, and certificates for its construction. 37 It also refutes the
DMCI-PDI ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN CONSTRUCTING TORRE DE KOR's claim that the Torre de Manila would dwarf all other structures
MANILA; AND around it; considering that there are other tall buildings even closer to
the Rizal Monument itself, namely, the Eton Baypark Tower at the corner
V. of Roxas Boulevard and T.M. Kalaw Street (29 storeys; 235 meters from
the Rizal Monument) and Sunview Palace at the corner of M.H. Del Pilar
KOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORPER and T.M. Kalaw Streets (42 storeys; 250 meters from the Rizal
AND/OR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 28 Monument). 38
Fourth, DMCI-PDI next argues that it did not act in bad faith when it behind (some 789 meters away) the line of sight of the Rizal
started construction of its Torre de Manila project. Bad faith cannot be Monument."48 It adds that the City of Manila's "prevailing Land Use and
attributed to it since it was within the "lawful exercise of [its] rights." 39 Zoning Ordinance [Ordinance No. 8119] x xx allows an adjustment in
The KOR failed to present any proof that DMCI-PDI did not follow the Floor Area Ratios thru the [MZBAA] subject to further final approval of
proper procedure and zoning restrictions of the City of Manila. Aside the City Council."49 The City Council adopted the MZBAA's favorable:
from obtaining all the necessary permits from the appropriate recommendation in its Resolution No. 5, ratifying all the licenses and
government agencies,40 DMCI-PDI also sought clarification on its right permits issued to DMCI-PDI for its Torre de Manila project.
to build on its site from the Office of the City Legal Officer of Manila, the
Manila CPDO, and the NHCP.41 Moreover, even if the KOR proffered such In its Position Paper dated 15 July 2015, the City of Manila admitted that
proof, the Court would be 1 in no position to declare DMCI-PDI's acts as the Zoning Permit issued to DMCI-PDI was "in breach of certain
illegal since the Court is not a trier of facts. 42 provisions of City Ordinance No. 8119."50 It maintained, however, 1 that
the deficiency is "procedural in nature and pertains mostly td the failure
Finally, DMCI-PDI opposes the KOR's application for a Temporary of [DMCI-PDI] to comply with the stipulations that allow an excess in the
Restraining Order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction. DMCI-PDI [FAR] provisions." 51 Further, the City of Manila argued that the MZBAA,
asserts that the KOR has failed to establish "a clear and unmistakable when it recommended the allowance of the project's variance, imposed
right to enjoin I the construction of Torre de Manila, much less request certain conditions upon the Torre de Manila project in order to mitigate
its demolitior."43 DMCI-PDI further argues that it "has complied with all the possible adverse effects of an excess FAR. 52
the legal requirements for the construction of Torre de Manila x x x [and]
has violated o right of KOR that must be protected. Further, KOR stands The Issue
to suffer o damage because of its lack of direct pecuniary interest in this
petiti1 on. To grant the KOR's application for injunctive relief would The issues raised by the parties can be summed up into one main point:
constitute an unjust taking of property without due process of law. "44 Can the Court issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of
Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila project?
Arguments of the City of Manila
The Court's Ruling
In its Comment, the City of Manila argues that the writ of mandamus
cannot issue "considering that no property or substantive rights The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed.
whatsoever in favor of [the KOR] is being affected or x x x entitled to
judicial protection[.]"45 There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila.

The City of Manila also asserts that the "issuance and revocation of a In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission,53 the Court
Building Permit undoubtedly fall under the category of a discretionary held that "what is not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may
act or duty performed by the proper officer in light of his meticulous be done, except when the act is contrary to morals, customs and I
appraisal and evaluation of the pertinent supporting documents of the public order." This principle is fundamental in a democratic society, to
application in accordance with the rules laid out under the National protect the weak against the strong, the minority against the majority,
Building Code [and] Presidential Decree No. 1096,"46 while the remedy and the individual citizen against the government. In essence, this
of mandamus is available only to compel the performance of a principle, which is the foundation of a civilized society under the rule of
ministerial duty. 47 law, prescribes that the freedom to act can be curtailed only through law.
Without this principle, the rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of citizens
Further, the City of Manila maintains that the construction of the Torre can be arbitrarily and whimsically trampled upon by the shifting
de Manila did not violate any existing law, since the "edifice [is] well passions of those who can spout the loudest, or those who can gather the
biggest crowd or the most number of Internet trolls. In other satisfaction of CPDO that the proposal will not adversely impact the
instances,54 the Court has allowed or upheld actions that were not heritage significance of the property and shall submit plans for review
expressly prohibited by statutes when it determined that these acts by the CPDO in coordination with the National Historical Institute (NHI).
were not contrary to morals, customs, and public order, or that
upholding the same would lead to a more equitable solution to the 4. Any proposed alteration and/or re-use of designated heritage
controversy. However, it is the law itself - Articles 130655 and properties shall be evaluated based on criteria established by the
1409(1)56 of the Civil Code - which prescribes that acts not contrary to heritage significance of the particular property or site.
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are allowed if also
not contrary to law. 5. Where an owner of a heritage property applies for approval to
demolish a designated heritage property or properties, the owner shall
In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila be required to provide evidence to satisfaction that demonstrates that
project is "contrary to morals, customs, and public order" or that it rehabilitation and re-use of the property is not viable.
brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. On the contrary, the
City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the 6. Any designated heritage property which is to be demolished or
standards set under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct significantly altered shall be thoroughly documented for archival
its Torre de Manila project. purposes with! a history, photographic records, and measured drawings,
in accordance with accepted heritage recording guidelines, prior to
There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law demolition or alteration.
prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on
the background "view, vista, sightline, or setting" of the Rizal 7. Residential and commercial infill in heritage areas will be sensitive to
Monument. the existing scale and pattern of those areas, which maintains the
existing landscape and streetscape qualities of those areas, and which
Specifically, Section 47 reads: does not result in the loss of any heritage resources.

SEC. 47. Historical Preservation and Conservation Standards. - Historic 8. Development plans shall ensure that parking facilities (surface lots
site and facilities shall be conserved and preserved. These shall, to the residential garages, stand-alone parking garages and parking
extent possible, be made accessible for the educational and cultural components as parts of larger developments) are compatibly integrated
enrichment of the general public. into heritage areas, and/or are compatible with adjacent heritage
resources.
The following shall guide the development of historic sites and
facilities: 9. Local utility companies (hydro, gas, telephone, cable) shall be required
to place metering equipment, transformer boxes, power lines, conduit,
1. Sites with historic buildings or places shall be developed to conserve equipment boxes, piping, wireless telecommunication towers and other
and enhance their heritage values. utility equipment and devices in locations which do not detract from the
visual character of heritage resources, and which do not have a negative
2. Historic sites and facilities shall be adaptively re-used. impact on its architectural integrity.

3. Any person who proposes to add, to alter, or partially demolish a 10. Design review approval shall be secured from the CPDO for any
designated heritage property will require the approval of the City alteration of the heritage property to ensure that design guidelines and
Planning and Development Office (CPDO) and shall be required to standards are met and shall promote preservation and conservation of
prepare a heritage impact statement that will demonstrate to the the heritage property. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that the standards laid down in Section 47 of Ordinance No. 4. The capacity of parking areas/lots shall be per the minimum
8119 only serve as guides, as it expressly states that "the following shall requirements of the National Building Code. These shall be located,
guide the :development of historic sites and facilities." A guide simply developed and landscaped in order to enhance the aesthetic quality of
sets a direction 'or gives an instruction to be followed by prope1iy the facility. In no case, shall parking areas/lots encroach into street
owners and developers in order to conserve and enhance a property's rights-of-way and shall follow the Traffic Code as set by the City.
heritage values.
5. Developments that attract a significant volume of public modes of
On the other hand, Section 48 states: transportation, such as tricycles, jeepneys, buses, etc., shall provide on-
site parking for the same. These shall also provide vehicular loading and
SEC. 48. Site Performance Standards. - The City considers it in the public unloading bays so as street traffic flow will not be impeded.
interest that all projects are designed and developed in a safe, efficient
and aesthetically pleasing manner. Site development shall consider the 6. Buffers, silencers, mufflers, enclosures and other noise-absorbing I
environmental character and limitations of the site and its adjacent materials shall be provided to all noise and vibration-producing
properties. All project elements shall be in complete harmony according machinery. Noise levels shall be maintained according to levels specified
to good design principles and the subsequent development must be in DENR DA9 No. 30 - Abatement of Noise and Other Forms of Nuisance
visually pleasing as well as efficiently functioning especially in relation as Defined by Law.
to the adjacent properties and bordering streets.
7. Glare and heat from any operation or activity shall not be radiated,
The design, construction, operation and maintenance of every facility seen or felt from any point beyond the limits of the property.
shall be in harmony with the existing and intended character of its
neighborhood. It shall not change the essential character of the said area 8. No large commercial signage and/or pylon, which will be
but will be a substantial improvement to the value of the properties in detrimental to the skyline, shall be allowed.
the neighborhood in particular and the community in general.
9. Design guidelines, deeds of restriction, property management plans
Furthermore, designs should consider the following: and other regulatory tools that will ensure high quality developments
shall be required from developers of commercial subdivisions and
1. Sites, buildings and facilities shall be designed and developed with1 condominiums. These shall be submitted to the City Planning and
regard to safety, efficiency and high standards of design. The natural Development Office (CPDO) for review and approval. (Emphasis
environmental character of the site and its adjacent properties shall be supplied)
considered in the site development of each building and facility.
Se9tion 4 7 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the
2. The height and bulk of buildings and structures shall be so designed "development of historic sites and facilities." Section 48 regulates
that it does not impair the entry of light and ventilation, cause the loss I "large commercial signage and/or pylon." There is nothing in
of privacy and/or create nuisances, hazards or inconveniences to Sections 47 and 48 of Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the
adjacent developments. construction of a building outside the boundaries of a historic site or
facility, where such building may affect the1 background of a historic
3. Abutments to adjacent properties shall not be allowed without the site. In this case, the Torre de Manila stands 870 meters outside and to
neighbor's prior written consent which shall be required by the City the rear of the Rizal Monument and "cannot possibly obstruct the front
Planning and Development Office (CPDO) prior to the granting of a view of the [Rizal] Monument." 57 Likewise, ;the Torre de Manila is not
Zoning Permit (Locational Clearance). in an area that has been declared as an "anthropological or archeological
area" or in an area designated as a heritage zone, cultural property, In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any
historical landmark, or a national treasure by the NHCP. 58 law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the construction of a building
outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the
Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the subject background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no
of arts and culture, provides that "[t]he State shall conserve, promote legal duty on the part of the City of Manila "to consider," in the words of
and popularize the nation's historical and cultural heritage and the Dissenting Opinion, "the standards set under Ordinance No.
resources x x x." Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress 8119" in relation to the applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de
passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation of our Manila since under the ordinance these standards can never be
cultural heritage. applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park. While the Rizal Park
has been declared a National Historical Site, the area where Torre de
One such law is Republic Act No. 10066,59 or the National Cultural Manila is being built is a privately-owned property that is "not pap: of
Heritage Act of 2009, which empowers the National Commission for the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National Heritage Site in
Culture and the Arts and other cultural agencies to issue a cease and 1095," and the Torre de Manila area is in fact "well-beyond" the Rizal
desist order "when the physical integrity of the national cultural Park, according to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno. 62
treasures or important cultural properties [is] found to be in danger of Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been designated as a
destruction or significant alteration from its original state."60 This "heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a
law declares that the State should protect the "physical integrity" of the national treasure."63
heritage property or building if there is "danger of destruction or
significant alteration from its original state." Physical integrity refers Also, to declare that the City of Manila failed to consider the standards
to the structure itself - how strong and sound the structure is. The under Ordinance No. 8119 would involve making a finding of fact. A
same law does not mention that another project, building, or property, finding lot fact requires notice, hearing, and the submission of evidence
not itself a heritage property or building, may be the subject of a cease to ascertain compliance with the law or regulation. In such a case, it is
and desist order when it adversely affects the background view, vista, or the Regional Trial Court which has the jurisdiction to hear the case,
sightline of a heritage property or building. Thus, Republic Act No. receive evidence, make a proper finding of fact, and determine whether
10066 cannot apply to the Torre de Manila condominium project. the Torre de Manila project properly complied with the standards set by
the ordinance. In Meralco v. Public Service Commission, 64 we held that it
Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila. is the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative proceedings to
be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
The Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have
or 1property without due process of law x x x." 61 It is a fundamental such evidence presented considered by the proper court or tribunal.
principle that no property shall be taken away from an individual
without due process, whether substantive or procedural. The To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards under Ordinance
dispossession of property, or in this case the stoppage of the No. 8119 to the Torre de Manila project will be an empty exercise since
construction of a building in one's own property would violate these standards cannot apply outside of the Rizal Park - and the Torre de
substantive due process. Manila is outside the Rizal Park. Mandamus will lie only if the officials

The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues when The KOR also invokes this Court's exercise of its extraordinary certiorari
there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to power of review under Section 1, Article VIII65 of the Constitution.
be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus However, this Court can only exercise its extraordinary certiorari power
has a clear legal right to the performance of such act. if the City of Manila, in issuing the required permits and licenses,
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Tellingly, neither the majority nor minority opinion in this In the present case, the KOR elevated this case immediately to this Court
case has found that the City of Manila committed grave abuse of in an original petition for injunction which we later on treated as one for
discretion in issuing the permits and licenses to DMCI-PDI. Thus, there is mandamus under Rule 65. There is, however, no clear legal duty on the
no justification at all for this Court to exercise its extraordinary City of Manila to consider the provisions of Ordinance No. 8119 for
certiorari power. applications for permits to build outside the protected areas of the Rizal
Park. Even if there were such legal duty, the determination of whether
Moreover, the exercise of this Court's extraordinary certiorari power is the City of .Manila failed to abide by this legal duty would involve factual
limited to actual cases and controversies that necessarily involve a matters which have not been admitted or established in this case.
violation of the Constitution or the determination of the constitutionality Establishing factual matters is not within the realm of this Court.
or validity of a governmental act or issuance. Specific violation of a Findings of fact are the province of the trial courts.
statute that does not raise the issue of constitutionality or validity of the
statute cannot, as a rule, be the subject of the Court's direct exercise of There is no standard in Ordinance No. 8119 for defining or determining
its expanded certiorari power. Thus, the KOR's recourse lies with other the background sightline that is supposed to be protected or that is part
judicial remedies or proceedings allowed under the Rules of Court. of the "physical integrity" of the Rizal Monument. How far should a
building like the Torre de Manila be from the Rizal Monument - one, two,
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC three, four, or five kilometers? Even the Solicitor General, during the
Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., 66 we held that in cases Oral Arguments, conceded that the ordinance does not prescribe how
where the question of constitutionality of a governmental action is sightline is determined, neither is there any way to measure by metes
raised, the judicial power that the courts exercise is likewise identified and bounds whether al construction that is not part of the historic
as the power of judicial review - the power to review the constitutionality monument itself or is outside the protected area can be said to
of the actions of other branches of government. As a rule, as required by violate the Rizal Monument's physicalintegrity, except only to say
the hierarchy of courts principle, these cases are filed with the lowest "when you stand in front of the Rizal Monument, there can be no doubt
court with jurisdiction over the 1subject matter. The judicial review that that your view is marred and impaired." This kind of a standard has no
the courts undertake requires: parameters and can include a sightline or a construction as far as the
human eyes can see when standing in front of the Rizal Monument.
1) there be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of Obviously, this Court cannot apply such a subjective and non-uniform
judicial power; standard that adversely affects property rights several kilometers away
from a historical sight or facility.
2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he The Dissenting Opinion claims that "the City, by reason of a mistaken or
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; erroneous construction of its own Ordinance, had failed to consider its
duties under [Ordinance No. 8119] when it issued permits in DMCI-PDI's
3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest favor." However, MZBAA Zoning Board Resolution Nos. 06 and 06-A67
possible opportunity; and easily dispel this claim. According to the resolutions, the City of Manila,
through the MZBAA, acted on DMCI-PDI's application for variance under
4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lismota of the case. the powers and standards set forth in Ordinance No. 8119.

The lower court's decision under the constitutional scheme reaches the Without further proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, capriciously,
Supreme Court through the appeal process, through a petition for review or arbitrarily in issuing said resolution, the Court should respect
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. MZBAA's exercise of discretion. The Court cannot "substitute its I
judgment :for that of said officials who are in a better position to
consider and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically discretion of an officer or a court when honestly exercised and when
vested in them by law." 68 Since the Court has "no supervisory power such power and authority is not abused.
over the proceedings I and actions of the administrative departments of
the government," it "should not generally interfere with purely In exceptional cases, the Court has granted a prayer for mandamus to
administrative and discretionary functions.; 69 The power of the Court compel action in matters involving judgment and discretion, only "to act,
in mandamus petitions does not extend "to direct the exercise of but not to act lone way or the other," 72 and only in cases where there
judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or has been a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, manifest
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either."70 injustice, or palpable excess of authority.73

Still, the Dissenting Opinion insists on directing the re-evaluation by the In this case, there can be no determination by this Court that the City of
City of Manila, through the CPDO, of the permits previously issued in Manila had been negligent or remiss in its duty under Ordinance No.
favor of the Torre de Manila project to determine compliance with the 8119 considering that this determination will involve questions of fact.
standards ]under Ordinance No. 8119. It also declares that the DMCI- PDI had been issued the proper permits and had secured all
circumstances in this case warrant the prohacvice conversion of the approvals and licenses months before the actual construction began.
proceedings in the issuance of the permits into a "contested case" Even the KOR could not point to any law that respondent City of Manila
necessitating notice and hearing with all the parties involved. had violated and could only point to declarations of policies by the NHCP
and the Venice Charter which do not constitute clear legal bases for the
Prohac vice means a specific decision does not constitute a precedent issuance of a writ of mandam1s.
because the decision is for the specific case only, not to be followed in
other cases. A prohac vice decision violates statutory law - Article 8 of The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the
the Civil Code - which states that "judicial decisions applying or preservation and restoration of ancient monuments, sites, and buildings.
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal It brings I together principles in the field of historical conservation and
system of the Philippines." The decision of the Court in this case cannot restoration that have been developed, agreed upon, and and laid down
be prohac vice because by mandate bf the law everydecision of the by experts over the years. Each country, however, remains "responsible
Court forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. If another case for applying the plan within the framework of its own culture and
comes up with the same facts as the present case, that case must be traditions."74
decided in the same way as this case to comply with the constitutional
mandate of equal protection of the law. Thus, a prohac vice decision also The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. enforceable as law. The Philippines is not legally bound to follow its
directive, as in fact, these are not directives but mere guidelines - a set of
It is the policy of the courts not to interfere with the discretionary the best practices and techniques that have been proven over the years
executive acts of the executive branch unless there is a clear showing of to be the most effective in preserving and restoring historical
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. monuments, sites and buildings.
Mandamus does not lie against the legislative and executive branches or
their members acting in the exercise of their official discretionary The City of Manila concedes that DMCI-PDI's Zoning Permit was granted
functions. This emanates from the respect accorded by the judiciary to without going through the process under Ordinance No. 8119. However,
said branches as co-equal entities under the principle of separation of the same was properly rectified when, faced with mounting opposition,
powers. DMCI-PDI itself sought clarification from the City of Manila and
immediately began complying with the procedure for applying for a
In De Castro v. Salas,71 we held that no rule of law is better established variance. The MZBAA did subsequently recommend the approval of the
than the one that provides that mandamus will not issue to control the variance and the City Council of Manila approved the same, ratifying the
licenses and permits already given to DMCI-PDI. Such ratification was practice has made granting of a variance the rule rather than the
well within the right of the City Council of Manila. The City Council of exception:
Manila could have denied the application had it seen any reason to do so.
Again, the ratification is a function of the City Council of Manila, an JUSTICE CARPIO: Let's go to Ordinance 8119. For residential
exercise of its discretion1 and well within the authority granted it by law condominium that stand alone, in other words not part of a commercial
and the City's own Ordinance No. 8119. complex or an industrial complex ...

The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
convenience, and welfare. There is no indication that the Torre de
Manila project brings any harm, danger, or hazard to the people in the JUSTICE CARPIO: The [Floor Area Ratio (FAR)] is uniform for the entire
surrounding areas except that the building allegedly poses an unsightly City of Manila, the FAR 4, correct? ATTY. FLAMINIANO: I believe so, Your
view on the taking of photos or the visual appreciation of the Rizal Honor, it's FAR 4.
Monument by locals and tourists. In fact, the Court must take the
approval of the MZBAA, and its subsequent ratification by the City JUSTICE CARPIO: So it's FAR 4 for all residential condominium complex
Council of Manila, as the duly authorized exercise of discretion by the or industrial projects.
city officials. Great care must be taken that the Court does not unduly
tread upon the local government's performance of its duties. It is not for ATTY. FLAMINIANO: There might be, the FAR might be different when it
this Court to dictate upon the other branches bf the government how comes to condominiums in commercial areas, Your Honor.
their discretion must be exercised so long as these branches do not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of JUSTICE CARPIO: Yes, I'm talking of stand-alone ...
jurisdiction.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
Likewise, any violation of Ordinance No. 8119 must be determined in the
proper case and before the proper forum. It is not within the power of
JUITICE CARPIO: ... residential condominiums...
this Court in this case to make such determination. Without such
determination, this Court cannot simply declare that the City of Manila
had failed to consider its duties under Ordinance No. 8119 when it ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Uniform at FAR 4, Your Honor.
issued the permits in DMCI-PDI's favor without making a finding of fact
how the City of Manila failed "to consider" its duties with respect to JUSTICE CARPIO: And the percentage of land occupancy is always 60
areas outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park. In the first place, this percent.
Court has no jurisdiction to make findings of fact in an original action
like this before this Court. Moreover the City of Manila could not legally ATTY. FLAMINIANO: 60 percent correct, Your Honor.
apply standards to sites outside the area covered by the ordinance that
prescribed the standards. With this, I taken in light of the lack of finding JUSTICE CARPIO: Okay ... how many square meters is this Torre de
that there was grave abuse of discretion I on the part of the City of Manila?
Manila, there is no basis to issue the writ of mandamus against the City
of Manila. xxx

During the Oral Arguments, it was established that the granting of a ATTY. FLAMINIANO: The land area, Your Honor, it's almost 5,000 ...
variance neither uncommon nor irregular. On the contrary, current 5,556.
JUSTICE CARPIO: So, it's almost half a hectare. residential building that stand alone was a variance. ATTY.
FLAMINIANO: That's correct, Your Honor.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: So the rule really in the City of Manila is variance,
JUSTICE CARPIO: And at FAR 4, it can only build up to 18 storeys, I mean and the exception which is never followed is FAR 4.
at FAR 4, is that correct?
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: FAR 4, it appears to be that way, Your Honor.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: If the 60 percent of the lot...
xxxx
JUSTICE CARPIO: Yes, but that is a rule.
JUSTICE CARPIO: Every developer will have to get a variance
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: That is a rule, that's the rule, Your Honor. because it doesn't make sense to follow FAR 4 because the land is so
expensive and if you can build only two storeys on a 1,000-square
JUSTICE CARPIO: 60 percent of... meter lot, you will surely lose money, correct? ATTY. FLAMINIANO:
Exactly, Your Honor. 75 (Emphasis supplied)
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Of the land area.
This, the MZBAA's grant of the variance cannot be used as a basis to
JUSTICE CARPIO: ... buildable, the rest not buildable. grant the mandamus petition absent any clear finding that said act
amo'1nted to "grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor. palpable excess of authority."

JUSTICE CARPIO: Okay, so if you look around here in the City of Manila The KOR is Estopped from Questioning the
anywhere you go, you look at stand alone residential condominium Torre de Manila Construction.
buildings...
The KOR is now estopped from questioning the construction of the Torre
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: There's a lot of them, Your Honor. de Manila project. The KOR itself came up with the idea to build a
structure right behind the Rizal Monument that would dwarf the Rizal
JUSTICE CARPIO: It's always not FAR 4, it's more than FAR 4. Monument.

In the mid-1950s, the Jose Rizal National Centennial Commission

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
(JRNCC) l formulated a plan to build an Educational Center within the
Rizal Park. In July 1955, the KOR proposed the inclusion of a national
JUSTICE CARPIO: And the buildable area is to the edge of the property
theater on the site of the Educational Center. The JRNCC adopted the
...it's not 60 percent, correct?
proposal. The following[ year, a law - Republic Act No. 142776 -
authorized the establishment of the Jose Rizal National Cultural Shrine
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor. consisting of a national theater, a national museum, and a national
library on a single site. 77
JUSTICE CARPIO: So, if you look at all the ... residential buildings in
the last ten years, they [have] all variances. They did not follow the To be built on the open space right behind the 12.7 meter high Rizal
original FAR 4 or the 60 percent (of land occupancy). Every Monument were: the KOR's proposed nationaltheater, standing 29.25
meters high and 286 meters in distance from the Rizal Monument; the
nationallibrary, standing 25 .6 meters high and 180 meters in distance In its petition, the KOR claims that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance
from the Rizal ;Monument, with its rear along San Luis Street (now T.M. perse that deserves to be summarily abated even without judicial
Kalaw Street); and facing it, the nationalmuseum, at 19.5 meters high and proceedings. 87 However, during the Oral Arguments, counsel for the
190 meters in I distance from the Rizal Monument, with its back along P. KOR argued that the KOR now believes that the Torre de Manila is a
Burgos Street. 78 nuisance per accidens and not a nuisance perse. 88

However, several sectors voiced their objections to the construction for Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission,
various reasons. Among them, the need to preserve the open space of the establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:
park, the high cost of construction, the desecration of the park's (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or
hallowed grounds, and the fact that the proposed cultural center offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality;
including the 129.25 meter high national theater proposed by the (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway
KOR would dwarf the 12.7 meter high Rizal Monument. 79 The or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of
JRNCC revised the plan and only the National Library - which still stands property.
today - was built. 80
Thy Court recognizes two kinds of nuisances. The first, nuisance perse, is
According to the NHCP, the KOR even proposed to build a Rizal Center on "recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it
on the park as recently as 2013.81 The proposal was disapproved by the constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that
NHCR and the Department of Tourism. reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity."
89 The second, nuisance peraccidens, is that which "depends upon
Surely, as noble as the KOR's intentions were, its proposed center would certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question
have dwarfed the Rizal Monument with its size and proximity. of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal
authorized to decide whether such a thing in law constitutes a nuisance.
In contrast, the Torre de Manila is located well outside the Rizal Park, "90
and to the rear of the Rizal Monument - approximately 870 meters from
the Rizal Monument and 3 0 meters from the edge of Rizal Park. 82 It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se.
The Torre de Manila project cannot be considered as a "direct menace to
It is a basic principle that "one who seeks equity and justice must come I public health or safety." Not only is a condominium project
to court with clean hands. "83 In Jenosa v. Delariarte, 84 the Court commonplace in the City of Manila, DMCI-PDI has, according to the
reiterated ,that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes proper government agencies, complied with health and safety standards
into equity must come with clean hands. This "signifies that a litigant set by law. DMCI-PDI has been granted the following permits and
may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct clearances prior to starting the project: (1) Height Clearance Permit
has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as from the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines;91 (2) Development
to the controversy in issue. " 85 Thus, the KOR, having earlier proposed a Permit from the HLURB;92 (3) Zoning Certification from the HLURB;93
national theater a mere 286meters in distance from the back of the Rizal (4) Certificate of Environmental Compliance Commitment from the
Monument that would have dwarfed the Rizal Monument, comes to this I Environment Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
Court with unclean hands. It is now precluded from "seeking any and Natural Resources;94 (5) Barangay Clearance95 (6) Zoning
equitable refuge" 86 from the Court. The KOR's petition should be Permit;96 (7) Building Permit;97 (8) and Electrical and Mechanical
dismissed on this ground alone. Permit.98

Torre de Manila is Not a Nuisance Per Se. Later, DMCI-PDI also obtained the right to build under a variance
recommended by the MZBAA and granted by the City Council of Manila.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the Torre de Manila project is not a As we have time and again held, courts generally hesitate to review
nuisance perse. discretionary decisions or actions of administrative agencies in the
absence of proof that such decisions or actions were arrived at with
On the other hand, the KOR now claims that the Torre de Manila is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
nuisance peraccidens.
In JRS Business Corp. v. Montesa, 103 we held that mandamus is the
By definition, a nuisance peraccidens is determined based on its proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part of
surrounding conditions and circumstances. These conditions and a tribunal in the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
circumstances must be well established, not merely alleged. The Court as a duty, or there was an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and
cannot simply accept these conditions and circumstances as established enjoyment be a right to which he is clearly entitled. Only specific legal
facts as the KOR would have us do in this case. 99 The KOR itself rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the
concedes that the question of whether the Torre de Manila is a nuisance legal rights of th6 petitioner are not well-defined, definite, clear, and
peraccidens is a question of fact. 100 certain, 104 the petition must be dismissed. Stated otherwise, the writ
never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes
The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an authority to find duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed
facts, to estimate their force, and to apply rules of law to the case thus and to perform a duty already imposed. 105
made. 101 1lhis Court is no such authority. It is not a trier of facts. It
cannot simply take the allegations in the petition and accept these as In sum, bearing in mind the Court does not intervene in discretionary
facts, more so in this case where these allegations are contested by the acts of the executive department in the absence of grave abuse of
respondents. discretion, 106 and considering that mandamus may only be issued to
enforce a clear and certain legal right, 107 the present special civil action
The task to receive and evaluate evidence is lodged with the trial courts. for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO issued earlier must be
The question, then, of whether the Torre de Manila project is a nuisance lifted.
peraccidens must be settled after due proceedings brought before the
proper Regional Trial Court. The KOR cannot circumvent the process in A FINAL WORD
the guise be protecting national culture and heritage.
It had been Rizal’s wish to die facing the rising sun. In his Mi Ultimo
The TRO must be lifted. Adios, the poem he left for his family the night before he was executed,
Rizal wrote:
Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights and prevent
further injury102 until final adjudication on the merits of the case. In the Yo muero cuando veo que el cielo se colora
present case, since the legal rights of the KOR are not well-defined, clear, Y al fin anuncia el dia tras lobrego capuz 108
and certain, the petition for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO
lifted. [Ako’y mamamatay, ngayong namamalas
na sa Silanganan ay namamanaag
The general rule is that courts will not disturb the findings of I yaong maligayang araw na sisikat
administrative agencies when they are supported by substantial sa likod ng luksang nagtabing na ulap.] 109
evidence. In this case, DMCI-PDI already acquired vested rights in the
various permits, licenses, or even variances it had applied for in order to [I die just when I see the dawn break,
build a 49-storey building which is, and had been, allowed by the City of Through the gloom of night, to herald the day] 110
Manila's zoning ordinance.
Yet at the point of his execution, he was made to stand facing West SO ORDERED.
towards Manila Bay, with his back to the firing squad, like the traitor the
colonial government wished to portray him. He asked to face his ANTONIO T. CARPIO
executioners, facing the East where the sun would be rising since it was Associate Justice
early morning, but the Spanish captain did not allow it. As he was shot
and a single bullet struck his frail body, Rizal forced himself, with his last WE CONCUR:
remaining strength, to turn around to face the East and thus he fell on
his back with] his face to the sky and the rising sun. Then, the Spanish MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
captain approached Rizal and finished him off with one pistol shot to his Chief Justice
head.

Before his death, Rizal wrote a letter to his family. He asked for a simple I join the dissent of Justice
(please see concurring
tomb, marked with a cross and a stone with only his name and the date Jardeleza
opinion)
of his birth and death; no anniversary celebrations; and interment at TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Paang Bundok (now, the Manila North Cemetery). Rizal never wanted his CASTRO
Associate Justice
grave to be a burden to future generations. Associate Justice

The letter never made it to his family and his wishes were not carried I join the dissent of Justice
out. The letter was discovered many years later, in 1953. By then, his Jardeleza LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
remains had been entombed at the Rizal Monument, countless DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice
anniversaries had been . celebrated, with memorials and monuments Associate Justice
built throughout the world.
I join separate of Justice
Rizal's wish was unmistakable: to be buried without pomp or pageantry; MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Jardeleza
to the point of reaching oblivion or obscurity in the future. 111 For Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Rizal's life was never about fame or vainglory, but for the country he Associate Justice
loved dearly and for which he gave up his life.
Please see separate concurring
The Rizal Monument is expressly against Rizal' s own wishes. That opinion
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Rizal's statue now stands facing West towards Manila Bay, with Rizal's ESTELA M. PERLAS-
Associate Justice
back to the East, adds salt to the wound. If we continue the present BERNABE
orientation of Rizal's statue, with Rizal facing West, we would be like the Associate Justice
Spanish captain who refused Rizal's request to die facing the rising sun
in the East. On the other hand, if Rizal' s statue is made to face East, as I concur, see separate opinion Please see dissenting opinion
Rizal had desired when he was about to be shot, the background - the MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
blue sky above Manila Bay - would forever be clear of obstruction, and Associate Justice Associate Justice
we would be faithful to Rizal's dying wish.
I join the dissent of J. Jardeleza
I join the dissent of J. Jardeleza
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of ALFREDO BENJAMIN S.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 16 June CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
2015 is LIFTED effective immediately. Associate Justice
 Please see separate concurring opinion
NOEL G. TIJAM
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 SECOND DIVISION NOGCCI owned by private respondent Benedicto and registered in his
name or under the names of corporations he owned or controlled.
G.R. No. 129406 March 6, 2006
Following the sequestration process, PCGG representatives sat as
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the PRESIDENTIAL members of the Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which passed, sometime
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, in October 1986, a resolution effecting a corporate policy change. The
vs. change consisted of assessing a monthly membership due of P150.00 for
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO, each NOGCCI share. Prior to this resolution, an investor purchasing more
Respondents. than one NOGCCI share was exempt from paying monthly membership
due for the second and subsequent shares that he/she owned.
DECISION
Subsequently, on March 29, 1987, the NOGCCI Board passed another
GARCIA, J.: resolution, this time increasing the monthly membership due from
P150.00 to P250.00 for each share.
Before the Court is this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to nullify and set aside the March 28, 19951 and March 13, As sequestrator of the 227 shares of stock in question, PCGG did not pay
19972 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, in Civil Case the corresponding monthly membership due thereon totaling
No. 0034, insofar as said resolutions ordered the Presidential P2,959,471.00. On account thereof, the 227 sequestered shares were
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to pay private respondent declared delinquent to be disposed of in an auction sale.
Roberto S. Benedicto or his corporations the value of 227 shares of stock
of the Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI) at Apprised of the above development and evidently to prevent the
P150,000.00 per share, registered in the name of said private projected auction sale of the same shares, PCGG filed a complaint for
respondent or his corporations. injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, thereat
docketed as Civil Case No. 5348. The complaint, however, was dismissed,
The facts: paving the way for the auction sale for the delinquent 227 shares of
stock. On August 5, 1989, an auction sale was conducted.
Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v.
Roberto S. Benedicto, et al., defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private respondent
reversion, accounting, reconstitution and damages. The case is one of Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034.
several suits involving ill-gotten or unexplained wealth that petitioner The agreement contained a general release clause5 whereunder
Republic, through the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Republic agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on
private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto and others pursuant to the 227 NOGCCI shares, among other Benedicto’s properties, petitioner
Executive Order (EO) No. 14,3 series of 1986. Republic acknowledging that it was within private respondent
Benedicto’s capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from
Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1,4 series of 1986, the PCGG issued business and the exercise of his profession.6 Implied in this undertaking
writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and is the recognition by petitioner Republic that the subject shares of stock
other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of could not have been ill-gotten.
private respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared
to have controlling or majority interest. Among the properties thus In a decision dated October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan approved the
sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in Compromise Agreement and accordingly rendered judgment in
accordance with its terms.
In the process of implementing the Compromise Agreement, either of the the Order of December 6, 1994 up to this date and which Order was
parties would, from time to time, move for a ruling by the issued pursuant to the Compromise Agreement and has already become
Sandiganbayan on the proper manner of implementing or interpreting a final and executory, accordingly, the Presidential Commission on Good
specific provision therein. Government is hereby given a final extension of fifteen (15) days from
receipt hereof within which to comply with the Order of December 6,
On February 22, 1994, Benedicto filed in Civil Case No. 0034 a "Motion 1994 as stated hereinabove.
for Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered
Shares/Dividends" praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock be On April 1, 1996, PCGG filed a Manifestation with Motion for
specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid Reconsideration,10 praying for the setting aside of the Resolution of
to him as part of the parties’ Compromise Agreement in that case. In a February 23, 1996. On April 11, 1996, private respondent Benedicto
Resolution7 promulgated on December 6, 1994, the Sandiganbayan filed a Motion to Enforce Judgment Levy. Resolving these two motions,
granted Benedicto’s aforementioned motion but placed the subject the Sandiganbayan, in its second assailed Resolution11 dated March 13,
shares under the custody of its Clerk of Court, thus: 1997, denied that portion of the PCGG’s Manifestation with Motion for
Reconsideration concerning the subject 227 NOGCCI shares and granted
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the said "Motion for Release Benedicto’s Motion to Enforce Judgment Levy.
From Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends" is
hereby GRANTED and it is directed that said shares/dividends be Hence, the Republic’s present recourse on the sole issue of whether or
delivered/placed under the custody of the Clerk of Court, not the public respondent Sandiganbayan, Second Division, gravely
Sandiganbayan, Manila subject to this Court’s disposition. abused its discretion in holding that the PCGG is at fault for not paying
the membership dues on the 227 sequestered NOGCCI shares of stock, a
On March 28, 1995, the Sandiganbayan came out with the herein first failing which eventually led to the foreclosure sale thereof.
assailed Resolution,8 which clarified its aforementioned December 6,
1994 Resolution and directed the immediate implementation thereof by The petition lacks merit.
requiring PCGG, among other things:
To begin with, PCGG itself does not dispute its being considered as a
(b) To deliver to the Clerk of Court the 227 sequestered shares of receiver insofar as the sequestered 227 NOGCCI shares of stock are
[NOGCCI] registered in the name of nominees of ROBERTO S. concerned.12 PCGG also acknowledges that as such receiver, one of its
BENEDICTO free from all liens and encumbrances, or in default thereof, functions is to pay outstanding debts pertaining to the sequestered
to pay their value at P150,000.00 per share which can be deducted from entity or property,13 in this case the 227 NOGCCI shares in question. It
[the Republic’s] cash share in the Compromise Agreement. [Words in contends, however, that membership dues owing to a golf club cannot be
bracket added] (Emphasis Supplied). considered as an outstanding debt for which PCGG, as receiver, must
pay. It also claims to have exercised due diligence to prevent the loss
Owing to PCGG’s failure to comply with the above directive, Benedicto through delinquency sale of the subject NOGCCI shares, specifically
filed in Civil Case No. 0034 a Motion for Compliance dated July 25, 1995, inviting attention to the injunctive suit, i.e., Civil Case No. 5348, it filed
followed by an Ex-Parte Motion for Early Resolution dated February 12, before the RTC of Bacolod City to enjoin the foreclosure sale of the
1996. Acting thereon, the Sandiganbayan promulgated yet another shares.
Resolution9 on February 23, 1996, dispositively reading:
The filing of the injunction complaint adverted to, without more, cannot
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the instant motion for early resolution plausibly tilt the balance in favor of PCGG. To the mind of the Court, such
and considering that, indeed, the PCGG has not shown any justifiable filing is a case of acting too little and too late. It cannot be over-
ground as to why it has not complied with its obligation as set forth in emphasized that it behooved the PCGG’s fiscal agents to preserve, like a
responsible father of the family, the value of the shares of stock under findings and conclusions are beyond the corrective hand of certiorari.14
their administration. But far from acting as such father, what the fiscal The extraordinary writ of certiorari may be availed only upon a showing,
agents did under the premises was to allow the element of delinquency in the minimum, that the respondent tribunal or officer exercising
to set in before acting by embarking on a tedious process of going to judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or
court after the auction sale had been announced and scheduled. his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.15

The PCGG’s posture that to the owner of the sequestered shares rests the The term "grave abuse of discretion" connotes capricious and whimsical
burden of paying the membership dues is untenable. For one, it lost sight exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction.16
of the reality that such dues are basically obligations attached to the The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
shares, which, in the final analysis, shall be made liable, thru delinquency positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
sale in case of default in payment of the dues. For another, the PCGG as act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
sequestrator-receiver of such shares is, as stressed earlier, duty bound arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.17 Sadly,
to preserve the value of such shares. Needless to state, adopting timely this is completely absent in the present case. For, at bottom, the assailed
measures to obviate the loss of those shares forms part of such duty and resolutions of the Sandiganbayan did no more than to direct PCGG to
due diligence. comply with its part of the bargain under the compromise agreement it
freely entered into with private respondent Benedicto. Simply put, the
The Sandiganbayan, to be sure, cannot plausibly be faulted for finding assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan have firm basis in fact and in
the PCGG liable for the loss of the 227 NOGCCI shares. There can be no law.
quibbling, as indeed the graft court so declared in its assailed and related
resolutions respecting the NOGCCI shares of stock, that PCGG’s fiscal Lest it be overlooked, the issue of liability for the shares in question had,
agents, while sitting in the NOGCCI Board of Directors agreed to the as both public and private respondents asserted, long become final and
amendment of the rule pertaining to membership dues. Hence, it is not executory. Petitioner’s narration of facts in its present petition is even
amiss to state, as did the Sandiganbayan, that the PCGG-designated fiscal misleading as it conveniently fails to make reference to two (2)
agents, no less, had a direct hand in the loss of the sequestered shares resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan. We refer to that court’s
through delinquency and their eventual sale through public auction. resolutions of December 6, 199418 and February 23, 199619 as well as
While perhaps anti-climactic to so mention it at this stage, the several intervening pleadings which served as basis for the decisions
unfortunate loss of the shares ought not to have come to pass had those reached therein. As it were, the present petition questions only and
fiscal agents prudently not agreed to the passage of the NOGCCI board focuses on the March 28, 199520 and March 13, 199721 resolutions,
resolutions charging membership dues on shares without playing which merely reiterated and clarified the graft court’s underlying
representatives. resolution of December 6, 1994. And to place matters in the proper
perspective, PCGG’s failure to comply with the December 6, 1994
Given the circumstances leading to the auction sale of the subject resolution prompted the issuance of the clarificatory and/or reiteratory
NOGCCI shares, PCGG’s lament about public respondent Sandiganbayan resolutions aforementioned.
having erred or, worse still, having gravely abused its discretion in its
determination as to who is at fault for the loss of the shares in question In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through
can hardly be given cogency. the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit.22 As argued, the order for it
to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability on
For sure, even if the Sandiganbayan were wrong in its findings, which a government agency, thus necessitating the appropriation of public
does not seem to be in this case, it is a well-settled rule of jurisprudence funds to satisfy the judgment claim.23 But, as private respondent
that certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the
of judgment. Corollarily, errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government
itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State REYNATO S. PUNO
itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot Associate Justice
be effectively invoked.24 For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, Chairperson
through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a
private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA
thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
have against it.25 Petitioner Republic’s act of filing its complaint in Civil
Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity
Associate Justice
against private respondent Benedicto’s prayers in the same case.
ATTESTATION
In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private
respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its
immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to the Court’s Division.
constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal
benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may REYNATO S .PUNO
be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering Associate Justice
into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its Chairperson, Second Division
consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such
contract,26 breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to CERTIFICATION
the other party to the agreement.
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division
Finally, it is apropos to stress that the Compromise Agreement in Civil Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
Case No. 0034 envisaged the immediate recovery of alleged ill-gotten above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
wealth without further litigation by the government, and buying peace assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
on the part of the aging Benedicto.27 Sadly, that stated objective has
come to naught as not only had the litigation continued to ensue, but, ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
worse, private respondent Benedicto passed away on May 15, 2000,28 Chief Justice
with the trial of Civil Case No. 0034 still in swing, so much so that the
late Benedicto had to be substituted by the administratrix of his estate.29

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 DIVISION Later on, the municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, donated
a one thousand two hundred (1,200) square-meter parcel of land to the
[ GR No. 206484, Jun 29, 2016 ] DOTC for the implementation of the RDTP in the municipality. However,
the municipality erroneously included portions of the respondents'
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATIONS v. property in the donation. Pursuant to the FLAs, Digitel constructed a
SPOUSES ABECINA + telephone exchange on the property which encroached on the properties
of the respondent spouses.[5]
DECISION
Sometime in the mid-1990s, the spouses Abecina discovered Digitel's
occupation over portions of their properties. They required Digitel to
vacate their properties and pay damages, but the latter refused, insisting
BRION, J.: that it was occupying the property of the DOTC pursuant to their FLA.

On April 29, 2003, the respondent spouses sent a final demand letter to
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the
both the DOTC and Digitel to vacate the premises and to pay unpaid
March 20, 2013 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
rent/damages in the amount of one million two hundred thousand pesos
93795[1] affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Daet,
(P1,200,000.00). Neither the DOTC nor Digitel complied with the
Camarines Norte, Branch 39, in Civil Case No. 7355.[2] The RTC ordered
demand.
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to
vacate the respondents' properties and to pay them actual and moral
On September 3, 2003, the respondent spouses filed an accion publiciana
damages.
complaint[6] against the DOTC and Digitel for recovery of possession and
damages. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 7355.
ANTECEDENTS
In its answer, the DOTC claimed immunity from suit and ownership over
Respondent spouses Vicente and Maria Cleofe Abecina
the subject properties.[7] Nevertheless, during the pre-trial conference,
(respondents/spouses Abecina) are the registered owners of five parcels
the DOTC admitted that the Abecinas were the rightful owners of the
of land in Sitio Paltik, Barrio Sta. Rosa, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
properties and opted to rely instead on state immunity from suit.[8]
Norte. The properties are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. T-25094, T-25095, T-25096, T-25097, and T-25098.[3]
On March 12, 2007, the respondent spouses and Digitel executed a
Compromise Agreement and entered into a Contract of Lease. The RTC
In February 1993, the DOTC awarded Digitel Telecommunications
rendered a partial decision and approved the Compromise Agreement
Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) a contract for the management, operation,
on March 22, 2007.[9]
maintenance, and development of a Regional Telecommunications
Development Project (RTDP) under the National Telephone Program,
On May 20, 2009, the RTC rendered its decision against the DOTC.[10] It
Phase I, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1)[4]
brushed aside the defense of state immunity. Citing Ministerio v. Court of
First Instance[11] and Amigable v. Cuenca,[12] it held that government
The DOTC and Digitel subsequently entered into several Facilities
immunity from suit could not be used as an instrument to perpetuate an
Management Agreements (FMA) for Digitel to manage, operate,
injustice on a citizen.[13]
maintain, and develop the RTDP and NTPI-1 facilities comprising local
telephone exchange lines in various municipalities in Luzon. The FMAs
The RTC held that as the lawful owners of the properties, the respondent
were later converted into Financial Lease Agreements (FLA) in 1995.
spouses enjoyed the right to use and to possess them - rights that were
violated by the DOTC's unauthorized entry, construction, and refusal to and in the performance of its mandate, took private property without
vacate. The RTC (1) ordered the Department - as a builder in bad faith - formal expropriation proceedings, the taking was nevertheless an
to forfeit the improvements and vacate the properties; and (2) awarded exercise of eminent domain.[21]
the spouses with P1,200,000.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as
moral damages, and P200,000.00 as exemplary damages plus attorney's Citing the 2007 case of Heirs of Mateo Pidacan v. Air Transportation
fees and costs of suit. Office (ATO),[22] the Department prays that instead of allowing recovery
of the property, the case should be remanded to the RTC for
The DOTC elevated the case to the CA arguing: (1) that the RTC never determination of just compensation.
acquired jurisdiction over it due to state immunity from suit; (2) that the
suit against it should have been dismissed after the spouses Abecina and On the other hand, the respondents counter that the state immunity
Digitel executed a compromise agreement; and (3) that the RTC erred in cannot be invoked to perpetrate an injustice against its citizens.[23] They
awarding actual, moral, and exemplary damages against it.[14] The appeal also maintain that because the subject properties are titled, the DOTC is
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 93795. a builder in bad faith who is deemed to have lost the improvements it
introduced.[24] Finally, they differentiate their case from Heirs of Mateo
On March 20, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC's decision but deleted the Pidacan v. ATO because Pidacan originated from a complaint for
award of exemplary damages. The CA upheld the RTC's jurisdiction over payment of the value of the property and rentals while their case
cases for accion publiciana where the assessed value exceeds originated from a complaint for recovery of possession and damages.[25]
P20,000.00.[15] It likewise denied the DOTC's claim of state immunity
from suit, reasoning that the DOTC removed its cloak of immunity after OUR RULING
entering into a proprietary contract - the Financial Lease Agreement
with Digitel.[16] It also adopted the RTC's position that state immunity We find no merit in the petition.
cannot be used to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from an
unlawful taking without the proper expropriation proceedings.[17] The The State may not be sued without its consent.[26] This fundamental
CA affirmed the award of actual and moral damages due to the DOTC's doctrine stems from the principle that there can be no legal right against
neglect to verify the perimeter of the telephone exchange construction the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.[27] This
but found no valid justification for the award of exemplary damages.[18] generally accepted principle of law has been explicitly expressed in both
the 1973[28] and the present Constitutions.
On April 16, 2013, the DOTC filed the present petition for review on
certiorari. But as the principle itself implies, the doctrine of state immunity is not
absolute. The State may waive its cloak of immunity and the waiver may
THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS be made expressly or by implication.

The DOTC asserts that its Financial Lease Agreement with Digitel was Over the years, the State's participation in economic and commercial
entered into in pursuit of its governmental functions to promote and activities gradually expanded beyond its sovereign function as regulator
develop networks of communication systems.[19] Therefore, it cannot be and governor. The evolution of the State's activities and degree of
interpreted as a waiver of state immunity. participation in commerce demanded a parallel evolution in the
traditional rule of state immunity. Thus, it became necessary to
The DOTC also maintains that while it was regrettable that the distinguish between the State's sovereign and governmental acts (jure
construction of the telephone exchange erroneously encroached on imperii) and its private, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
portions of the respondent's properties, the RTC erred in ordering the Presently, state immunity restrictively extends only to acts jure imperii
return of the property.[20] It argues that while the DOTC, in good faith while acts jure gestionis are considered as a waiver of immunity.[29]
 would have initiated expropriation proceedings instead of insisting on
The Philippines recognizes the vital role of information and its immunity from suit. The petitioners would not have had to resort to
communication in nation building.[30] As a consequence, we have filing its complaint for reconveyance. As this Court said in Ministerio:
adopted a policy environment that aspires for the full development of It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide
communications infrastructure to facilitate the flow of information into, by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is
out of, and across the country.[31] To this end, the DOTC has been just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on
mandated with the promotion, development, and regulation of the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not
dependable and coordinated networks of communication.[32] too much to say that when the government takes any property for
public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just
The DOTC encroached on the respondents' properties when it compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it
constructed the local telephone exchange in Daet, Camarines Norte. The submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that
exchange was part of the RTDP pursuant to the National Telephone the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
Program. We have no doubt that when the DOTC constructed the invoked.[39] [emphasis supplied]
encroaching structures and subsequently entered into the FLA with We hold, therefore, that the Department's entry into and taking of
Digitel for their maintenance, it was carrying out a sovereign function. possession of the respondents' property amounted to an implied waiver
Therefore, we agree with the DOTC's contention that these are acts jure of its governmental immunity from suit.
imperii that fall within the cloak of state immunity.
We also find no merit in the DOTC's contention that the RTC should not
However, as the respondents repeatedly pointed out, this Court has long have ordered the reconveyance of the respondent spouses' property
established in Ministerio v CFI,[33] Amigable v. Cuenca,[34] the 2010 case because the property is being used for a vital governmental function,
Heirs of Pidacan v. ATO,[35] and more recently in Vigilar v. Aquino[36] that that is, the operation and maintenance of a safe and efficient
the doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an instrument for communication system.[40]
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
The exercise of eminent domain requires a genuine necessity to take the
The Constitution identifies the limitations to the awesome and near- property for public use and the consequent payment of just
limitless powers of the State. Chief among these limitations are the compensation. The property is evidently being used for a public purpose.
principles that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property However, we also note that the respondent spouses willingly entered
without due process of law and that private property shall not be taken into a lease agreement with Digitel for the use of the subject properties.
for public use without just compensation.[37] These limitations are
enshrined in no less than the Bill of Rights that guarantees the citizen If in the future the factual circumstances should change and the
protection from abuse by the State. respondents refuse to continue the lease, then the DOTC may initiate
expropriation proceedings. But as matters now stand, the respondents
Consequently, our laws[38] require that the State's power of eminent are clearly willing to lease the property. Therefore, we find no genuine
domain shall be exercised through expropriation proceedings in court. necessity for the DOTC to actually take the property at this point.
Whenever private property is taken for public use, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the concerned office or agency to initiate Lastly, we find that the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC's decision
expropriation proceedings. By necessary implication, the filing of a without deleting the forfeiture of the improvements made by the DOTC
complaint for expropriation is a waiver of State immunity. through Digitel. Contrary to the RTC's findings, the DOTC was not a
builder in bad faith when the improvements were constructed. The CA
If the DOTC had correctly followed the regular procedure upon itself found that the Department's encroachment over the respondents'
discovering that it had encroached on the respondents' property, it properties was a result of a mistaken implementation of the donation
from the municipality of Jose Panganiban.[41]

Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building
on is his and [of] his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.[42] While
the DOTC later realized its error and admitted its encroachment over the
respondents' property, there is no evidence that it acted maliciously or
in bad faith when the construction was done.

Article 527[43] of the Civil Code presumes good faith. Without proof that
the Department's mistake was made in bad faith, its construction is
presumed to have been made in good faith. Therefore, the forfeiture of
the improvements in favor of the respondent spouses is unwarranted.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The May
20, 2009 decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 7355, as
modified by the March 20, 2013 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 93795, is AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATION that the
forfeiture of the improvements made by the DOTC in favor of the
respondents is DELETED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Del Castillo, J., on leave.
 FIRST DIVISION and selling gravel, sand and cement products.7 The NHA approved his
application, and issued on December 6, 1985 the order of payment
G.R. No. 171953, October 21, 2015 respecting the lots. On December 27, 1985, the NHA issued the notice of
award for the lots in favor of Roxas,8 at P1,500.00/square meter.9 On the
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. ERNESTO ROXAS, basis of the order of payment and the notice of award, Roxas made his
Respondent. downpayment of P79,200.00.10 A relocation/reblocking survey resulted
in the renumbering of Lot 9 to Lot 5 and Lot 10 to Lot 6 (subject lots).11
DECISION He completed his payment for the subject lots on December 20, 1991.

BERSAMIN, J.: In the meanwhile, the NHA conducted a final subdivision project survey,
causing the increase in the area of the subject lots from 176 to 320
square meters. The NHA informed Roxas about the increase in the area
The National Housing Authority (NHA), a government-owned and -
controlled corporation created and existing under Presidential Decree of the subject lots, and approved the award of the additional area of 144
No. 757,1 may sue and be sued. However, no court should issue a writ of square meters to him at P3,500.00/square meter.12 Although
execution upon any monetary judgment rendered against the NHA manifesting his interest in acquiring the additional area, he appealed for
unless such monetary judgment is first submitted to and passed upon by the reduction of the price to Pl,500.00/square meter,13 pointing out that
the Commission on Audit (COA). Lot 5 and Lot 6 were a substitution unilaterally imposed by the NHA that
resulted in the increase of 144 square meters based on the technical
The Case description, and that although he desired to purchase the increased area,
the purchase must be in accordance with the terms and conditions
Being challenged on appeal by the NHA is the adverse decision contained in the order of payment and notice of award issued to him.
promulgated on February 20, 2006,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) After the NHA rejected his appeal,14 he commenced in the RTC this
dismissed the NHA's petition for certiorari brought to nullify the orders action for specific performance and damages, with prayer for the
issued in Special Civil Action No. 93-060-MN entitled Ernesto Roxas v. issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. He amended the complaint15
National Housing Authority, et al. by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), to compel the NHA to comply with the terms and conditions of the order
Branch 72, in Malabon City. The first order, dated May 3, 2002, had of payment and the notice of award.
granted the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution filed by
respondent Ernesto Roxas.3 The other order, dated January 6, 2003, had The NHA countered in its answer16 that Roxas' prayer to include in the
denied the NHA's motion for reconsideration.4 The NHA had also thereby original contract the increase in lot measurement of 144 square meters
assailed the writ of execution consequently issued on February 24, was contrary to its existing rules and regulation; that he could not claim
2003.5 In its petition for certiorari, the NHA insisted that the RTC had more than what had been originally awarded to him; and that at the very
thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or least, his right in the additional area was limited only to first refusal.
excess of jurisdiction.
On July 15, 1994, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment against the
Antecedents NHA,17 decreeing:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The NHA is charged, among others, with the development of the Dagat- WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
dagatan Development Project (project) situated in Navotas, Metro favor of plaintiff Ernesto Roxas and against defendant NHA, represented
Manila.6 On December 4, 1985, Roxas applied for commercial lots in the by its General Manager and its Dagat-dagatan Development Project
project, particularly Lot 9 and Lot 10 in Block 11, Area 3, Phase III A/B, Manager, as follows:
with an area of 176 square meters, for the use of his business of buying
1. Declaring plaintiff Ernesto Roxas the legal awardee of subject lots 5 not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
and 6 in the full total area thereof of 320 sq. meters; jurisdiction in granting Roxas' motion for the issuance of the writ of
execution and in issuing the writ of execution.22 The CA observed that
2. Ordering defendant NHA, thru its General Manager Robert the NHA was a government-owned and -controlled corporation whose
P. Balao and the project Manager for its Dagat-dagatan Development funds were not exempt from garnishment or execution; and ruled that
Project Evelyn V. Ramos, or whoever shall be the incumbents of the Roxas did not need to first file his claim in the COA.
positions at the time of the enforcement hereof to execute the
corresponding Contract to Sell for the entire area of subject lots 5 and 6 Issues
totaling to 320 sq. meters at the cost of PI,500.00 per sq. meter under the
same terms and conditions as that provided for in the Order of Payment The NHA insists that the judgment of the RTC did not lie against it
and Notice of Award (Exhs. B and D), respectively, deducting whatever because its submission to the litigation did not necessarily imply that the
has already been paid by plaintiff; Government had thereby given its consent to liability; and that the
money judgment awarded to Roxas could not be recovered by motion
3. Ordering defendant NHA to pay plaintiff P30,000.00 by way of for execution but should have been first filed in the COA.23
reasonable Attorney's Fees.
Roxas counters that the main relief under the final and executory
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued in this case on January 31,
judgment of the RTC directed the NHA to execute the contract to sell the
1994 is hereby made permanent.
subject lots at the rate of P1,500.00/square meter as provided for in the
order of payment and the notice of award. He claims that the award of
Costs against defendant NHA.
attorney's fees in his favor was only incidental to the main relief of
specific performance; and argues that the Government abandons its
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
sovereign capacity and is treated like any other corporations whenever
it enters into a commercial transaction.24
The NHA appealed in due course, but the CA affirmed the judgment of
the RTC, prompting the NHA to seek to undo the adverse decision of the Ruling of the Court
CA through its petition for certiorari. On July 5, 2000, however, the Court
dismissed the petition for certiorari. It later denied the NHA's motion for The appeal is partly meritorious.
reconsideration.18
First of all, the mantle of the State's immunity from suit did not extend to
On July 27, 2001, Roxas filed his motion for the issuance of the writ of the NHA despite its being a government-owned and -controlled
execution,19 which the RTC granted on May 3, 2002.20 The NHA sought corporation. Under Section 6(i) of Presidential Decree No. 757, which
reconsideration, but its motion was denied on January 6, 2003. was its charter, the NHA could sue and be sued. As such, the NHA was
Accordingly, on February 24, 2003, the RTC issued the writ of execution not immune from the suit of Roxas.
to enforce the final and executory decision of July 15, 1994.21
And, secondly, for purposes of the implementation of the writ of
In order to prevent the execution, the NHA brought another petition for execution, it is necessary to distinguish between, on the one hand, the
certiorari in the CA, docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 76468, imputing to the main relief adjudicated in the judgment of July 15, 1994, which was the
RTC grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction decree of specific performance as to the right of Roxas to acquire the
for ordering the execution of the judgment. subject lots at Pl,500.00/square meter as stated in the original
agreement between the parties, and, on the other, the secondary relief
On February 20, 2006, the CA dismissed the NFIA's petition for certiorari for the attorney's fees of P30,000.00 to be paid by the NHA to Roxas.
through the presently assailed decision because it found that the RTC did
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 757 has authorized the NHA to boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein
"determine, establish and maintain the most feasible and effective prescribed, including nongovernmental entities subsidized by the
program for the management or disposition of specific housing or government, those funded by donations through the government,
resettlement projects undertaken by [it]", and "[u]nless otherwise those required to pay levies or government share, and those for
decided by the Board, completed housing or resettlement projects shall which the government has put up a counterpart fund or those
be managed and administered by [it]." The execution of the contract to partly funded by the government, (bold underscoring supplied for
sell by the NHA conformably with the main relief under the judgment emphasis)
would be in the ordinary course of the management or disposition of the cralawlawlibrary
Dagat-dagatan Development Project undertaken by the NHA. In other
words, the NHA possessed the legal competence and authority to As the text of the legal provision plainly shows, the audit jurisdiction of
directly afford the main relief without Roxas needing to first submit to the COA extends to all government-owned or -controlled corporations,
the COA the contract to sell for review and approval. To maintain their subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards, commissions, or
otherwise is to unconstitutionally grant to the COA the power of judicial agencies of the Government, as well as to all non-governmental entities
review in respect of the decision of a court of law. subsidized by the Government, or funded by donations through the
Government, or required to pay levies or government share, or for which
However, settling or paying off the secondary relief for the attorney's the Government has put up a counterpart fund, or those partly funded by
fees of £30,000.00, being a monetary obligation of the NHA, would not be the Government. There is no distinction as to the class of claims. Ubi lex
in the usual course of the activities of the NHA under its charter. That non distinguish nee nos distinguere debemos.26 Indeed, a general term or
such relief was the consequence of the suit that granted the main relief phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from
did not matter. Pursuant to Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. In
Roxas should first bring it to the COA prior to its enforcement against the other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute
NHA.25 Indeed, Section 26 specifically vested in the COA the power, where none is indicated. Corollary to this rule is the principle that where
authority and duty to examine, audit and settle "all debts and claims of the law does not make any exception, the courts may not exempt
any sort" due from or owing to the Government, or any of its something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason to the
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government- contrary.27
owned and controlled corporations with original charters,
viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary There is no question that the NHA could sue or be sued, and thus could
be held liable under the judgment rendered against it. But the universal
Section 26. General jurisdiction. The authority and powers of the
rule remains to be that the State, although it gives its consent to be sued
Commission shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to
either by general or special law, may limit the claimant's action only up
auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general
to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution. In
accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining
other words, the power of the court ends when the judgment is rendered
thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the
because government funds and property may not be seized pursuant to
books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and
writs of execution or writs of garnishment to satisfy such judgments. The
settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or
functions and public services of the State cannot be allowed to be
property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public fund from their
well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and
legitimate and specific objects, and as appropriated by law. The rule is
claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of
based on obvious considerations of public policy. Indeed, the
its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said
disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled
appropriation as required by law.28
corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-governing
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTLY GRANTS the petition for review on
certiorari; and MODIFIES the writ of execution dated February 24, 2003
by enjoining the respondent to file his claim for attorney's fees with the
Commission on Audit pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1445.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., *Velasco, Leonardo-De Castro, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.c

 SECOND DIVISION obtained loans from Philippine Sugar Corporation and Philippine
National Bank, secured by its assets and properties.10
G.R. No. 174747, March 09, 2016
Under Proclamation No. 50, as amended, Administrative Order No. 14
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY PRIVATIZATION dated February 3, 1987, the Deed of Transfer dated February 27, 1987,
AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR and the Trust Agreement dated February 27, 1987,11 Philippine National
RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND Bank ceded its rights and interests over Bicolandia Sugar Development
NACUSIP/BISUDECO CHAPTER/GEORGE EMATA, DOMINGO Corporation's loans to the government through Asset Privatization
REBANCOS, NELSON BERINA, ROBERTO TIRAO, AMADO VILLOTE, Trust.12
AND BIENVENIDO FELINA, Respondents.
On November 18, 1988, Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation,
DECISION with the conformity of Asset Privatization Trust, entered into a
Supervision and Financing Agreement13 with Philippine Sugar
LEONEN, J.: Corporation for the latter to operate and manage the mill until August
31, 1992.14
Under Proclamation No. 50, Series of 1986,1 no employer-employee
relationship is created by the acquisition of Asset Privatization Trust Due to Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's continued failure to
(now Privatization and Management Office) of government assets for pay its loan obligations, Asset Privatization Trust filed a Petition for
privatization. It is not obliged to pay for any money claims arising from Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Bicolandia Sugar Development
employer-employee relations except when it voluntarily holds itself Corporation's mortgaged properties on March 26, 1990. There being no
liable to pay. These money claims, however, must be filed within the other qualified bidder, Asset Privatization Trust was issued a certificate
of sale upon payment of P1,725,063,044.00.15
three-year period under Article 2912 of the Labor Code. Once liability is
determined, a separate money claim must be brought before the
On December 15, 1990, NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter and Bicolandia
Commission on Audit, unless the funds to be used have already been
previously appropriated and disbursed. Sugar Development Corporation entered into a Collective Bargaining
Agreement to be in effect until December 15, 1996.16 Asset Privatization
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assailing the Decision4 Trust and Philippine Sugar Corporation were also joined as parties.17
dated February 27, 2004 and Resolution5 dated September 19, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals. The Decision and Resolution affirmed the National Sometime in 1992, the Asset Privatization Trust, pursuant to its mandate
to dispose of government properties for privatization, decided to sell the
Labor Relations Commission Resolutions dated May 10, 20026 and June
21, 20027 dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to file the appeal assets and properties of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation. On
September 1, 1992, it issued a Notice of Termination to Bicolandia Sugar
within the reglementary period.
Development Corporation's employees, advising them that their services
Asset Privatization Trust was a government entity created under would be terminated within 30 days. NASUCIP/BISUDECO Chapter
Proclamation No. 50 dated December 8, 1986 for the purpose of received the Notice under protest.18
conserving, provisionally managing, and disposing of assets that have
been identified for privatization or disposition. NACUSIP/BISUDECO After the employees' dismissal from service, Bicolandia Sugar
Development Corporation's assets and properties were sold to Bicol
Chapter is the exclusive bargaining agent for the rank-and-file
employees of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation, a corporation Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Incorporated-Peñafrancia Sugar
engaged in milling and producing sugar.8 Since the 1980s, Bicolandia Mill.19
Sugar Development Corporation had been incurring heavy losses.9 It
As a result, several members of the NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter20 filed Office.31
a Complaint dated April 24, 1996 charging Asset Privatization Trust,
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation, Philippine Sugar On May 10, 2002, the National Labor Relations Commission issued the
Corporation, and Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Resolution32 dismissing the Partial Appeal for failure to perfect the
Incorporated-Peñafrancia Sugar Mill with unfair labor practice, union appeal within the statutory period of appeal. Privatization and
busting, and claims for labor standard benefits.21 Management Office moved for reconsideration, but its Motion was
denied in the National Labor Relations Commission's June 21, 2002
On January 14, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered the Decision22 Resolution.33
dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter found that
there was no union busting when Asset Privatization Trust and Aggrieved, Privatization and Management Office filed before the Court of
Philippine Sugar Corporation disposed of Bicolandia Sugar Development Appeals a Petition for Certiorari34 arguing that its appeal should have
Corporation's assets and properties since Asset Privatization Trust was been decided on the merits in the interest of substantial justice.
merely disposing of a non-performing asset of government, pursuant to
its mandate under Proclamation No. 50.23 On February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision35
denying the Petition. According to the Court of Appeals, Privatization
However, the Labor Arbiter found that although Asset Privatization and Management Office failed to show that it falls under the exemption
Trust previously released funds for separation pay, 13th month pay, and for strict compliance with procedural rules. It ruled that the grant of
accrued vacation and sick leave credits for 1992, George Emata, separation pay to Emata, et al. was anchored on the finding that
Bienvenido Felina, Domingo Rebancos, Jr., Nelson Berina, Armando Privatization and Management Office had already granted the same
Villote, and Roberto Tirao (Emata, et al.) refused to receive their benefits to the other complainants in the labor case.36
checks24 "on account of their protested dismissal."25 Their refusal to
receive their checks was premised on their Complaint that Asset Privatization and Management Office moved for reconsideration, but the
Privatization Trust's sale of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation Motion was denied in the Resolution37 dated September 19, 2006.
violated their Collective Bargaining Agreement and was a method of
union busting.26 Hence, this Petition38 was filed.

While the Labor Arbiter acknowledged that Emata, et al.'s entitlement to Privatization and Management Office argues that there should have been
these benefits had already prescribed under Article 29127 of the Labor a liberal application of the procedural rules since the dismissal of its
Code,28 he nevertheless ordered Asset Privatization Trust to pay Emata, appeal would cause grave and irreparable damage to government.39 It
et al. their benefits since their co-complainants were able to claim their alleges that the money claims of the employees had already prescribed
checks.29 since their Complaint for illegal dismissal was filed beyond the three-
year prescriptive period under Article 29140 of the Labor Code.41
Pursuant to the Decision, Asset Privatization Trust deposited with the
National Labor Relations Commission a Cashier's Check in the amount of Privatization and Management Office argues further that even assuming
P116,182.20, the equivalent of the monetary award in favor of Emata, et that the action had not yet prescribed, it would still not be liable to pay
al. On February 8, 2000, it filed a Notice of Partial Appeal, together with a separation pay and other benefits since the closure of the business was
Memorandum of Partial Appeal, before the National Labor Relations due to serious losses and financial reverses.42 It also argues that the
Commission.30 transfer of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's assets and
properties to it, by virtue of a foreclosure sale, did not create an
Under Executive Order No. 323 dated December 6, 2000, Asset employer-employee relationship with Bicolandia Sugar Development
Privatization Trust was succeeded by Privatization and Management Corporation's employees.43 Moreover, since Privatization and
Management Office is an instrumentality of government, any money It is settled that appeal is not a right but a mere statutory privilege. It
claim against it should first be brought before the Commission on Audit may only be exercised within the manner provided by law.49 In labor
in view of Commonwealth Act No. 327,44 as amended by Presidential cases, the perfection of an appeal is governed by the Labor Code. Article
Decree No. 1445.45 223 provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On the other hand, Emata, et al. allege that the Petition did not raise any Art. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are
new issue that had not already been addressed by the Labor Arbiter, the final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both
National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of Appeals.46 They parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions,
argue that the issues raised involve the exercise of discretion by the awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the
Court of Appeals and the quasi-judicial agencies. They further argue that following grounds:
the Petition does not specifically mention any law relied upon by
Privatization and Management Office to support its arguments.47 ....
Petitioner received a copy of the Labor Arbiter's Decision on January 26,
In rebuttal, Privatization and Management Office insists that it was able 2000.50 It had 10 days, or until February 7, 2000,51 to file its appeal.
to point out laws and jurisprudence that the Court of Appeals and the However, it filed its Memorandum of Appeal only on February 8, 2000.52
National Labor Relations Commission failed to take into consideration Petitioner did not explain the reason for its delay.
when it dismissed the appeal on a technicality.48
Petitioner's disregard of procedural rules resulted in the denial of its
For this Court's resolution are the following issues: appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission and its
subsequent Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In its
First, whether there was an employer-employee relationship between Petition for Review before this Court, petitioner still did not explain its
petitioner Privatization and Management Office (then Asset Privatization delay in filing the Memorandum of Appeal. It merely insisted that its case
Trust) and private respondents NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter should have been resolved on the merits.
employees, and thus, whether petitioner is liable to pay the separation
benefits of private respondents George Emata, Bienvenido Felina, Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the orderly administration of
Domingo Rebancos, Jr., Nelson Berina, Armando Villote, and Roberto justice.53 In labor cases, however, procedural rules are not to be applied
Tirao; "in a very rigid and technical sense"54 if its strict application will
frustrate, rather than promote, substantial justice.55
Second, whether Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's closure
could be considered serious business losses that would exempt Liberality favors the laborer.56 However, this case is also brought against
petitioner from payment of separation benefits; and a government entity. If the government entity is found liable, its liability
will necessarily entail the dispensation of public funds. Thus, its basis for
Lastly, whether private respondents' claim for labor standard benefits liability must be subjected to strict scrutiny.
had already prescribed under Article 291 of the Labor Code.
Even assuming that we grant the plea of liberality, the Petition will still
I
be denied.
Before proceeding to the substantive issues of the case, petitioner's II
procedural misstep before the National Labor Relations Commission
must first be addressed. Initially, petitioner was not liable for the Union's claims for labor
standard benefits. Its acquisition of Bicolandia Sugar Development
Corporation's assets was not for the purpose of continuing its business. Pursuant to its mandate under Proclamation No. 50, petitioner
It was to conserve the assets in order to prepare it for privatization. provisionally took possession of assets and properties only for the
purpose of privatization or disposition. Its interest over Bicolandia Sugar
When Philippine National Bank ceded its rights and interests over Development Corporation was not the latter's continued business
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's loan to petitioner in 1987, operations.
it merely transferred its rights and interests over Bicolandia's
outstanding loan obligations. The transfer was not for the purpose of The issue of petitioner's role in the money claims of Bicolandia Sugar
continuing Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's business. Thus, Development Corporation's employees was already settled in Barayoga
petitioner never became the substitute employer of Bicolandia Sugar v. Asset Privatization Trust.59
Development Corporation's employees. It would not have been liable for
any money claim arising from an employer-employee relationship. In Barayoga, BISUDECO-PHILSUCOR Corfarm Workers Union alleged
that when Philippine Sugar Corporation took over Bicolandia Sugar
Section 24 of Proclamation No. 50 states: Development Corporation's operations in 1988, it retained the
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Corporation's existing employees until the start of the season sometime
The transfer of any asset of government directly to the national in May 1991. At the start of the 1991 season, Philippine Sugar
government as mandated herein shall be for the purpose of disposition, Corporation failed to recall some of the union's members back to work.
liquidation and/or privatization only, any import in the covering deed of For this reason, it filed a Complaint on July 23, 1991 for unfair labor
assignment to the contrary notwithstanding. Such transfer, therefore, practice, illegal dismissal, illegal deduction, and underpayment of wages
shall not operate to revert such assets automatically to the general fund and other labor standard benefits against Bicolandia Sugar Development
or the national patrimony, and shall not require specific enabling Corporation, Asset Privatization Trust, and Philippine Sugar
legislation to authorize their subsequent disposition, but shall remain as Corporation. Of the three respondents, only Asset Privatization Trust
duly appropriated public properties earmarked for assignment, transfer was held liable by the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations
or conveyance under the signature of the Minister of Finance or his duly Commission for the union members' money claims.
authorized representative, who is hereby authorized for this purpose, to
any disposition entity approved by the Committee pursuant to the The Court of Appeals reversed the Labor Arbiter's and the National
provisions of this Proclamation. (Emphasis supplied) Labor Relations Commission's rulings and held that Asset Privatization
This Court explained in Republic v. National Labor Relations Commission, Trust did not become the employer of Bicolandia Sugar Development
et al.57 that the Asset Privatization Trust is usually joined as a party Corporation's employees. The terminated employees appealed to this
respondent due to its role as the conservator of assets of the corporation Court, arguing that their claims against Asset Privatization Trust were
undergoing privatization: recognized under the law.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A matter that must not be overlooked is the fact that the inclusion of APT This Court, however, denied their Petition and held that the Asset
as a respondent in the monetary claims against [Pantranco North Privatization Trust could not be held liable for any money claims arising
Express, Inc.] is merely the consequence of its being a conservator of from an employer-employee relationship. Asset Privatization Trust,
assets, a role that APT normally plays in, or the relationship that being a mere transferee of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's
ordinarily it maintains with, corporations identified for and while under assets for the purpose of conservation, never became the union's
privatization. The liability of APT under this particular arrangement, employer. Hence, it could not be liable for their money claims:
nothing else having been shown, should be co-extensive with the chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
amount of assets taken over from the privatized The duties and liabilities of BISUDECO, including its monetary liabilities to
firm.58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary its employees, were not all automatically assumed by APT as purchaser of
the foreclosed properties at the auction sale. Any assumption of liability
must be specifically and categorically agreed upon. In Sundowner actual sale of BISUDECO assets to BAPCI on October 30, 1992, the APT
Development Corp. v. Drilon, the Court ruled that, unless expressly board of trustees had approved a Resolution on September 23, 1992. The
assumed, labor contracts like collective bargaining agreements are not Resolution authorized the payment of separation benefits to the employees
enforceable against the transferee of an enterprise. Labor contracts are of the corporation in the event of its privatization. Not included in the
in personam and thus binding only between the parties. Resolution, though, were petitioner-unions members who had not been
recalled to work in May 1991.61 (Emphasis supplied)
No succession of employment rights and obligations can be said to have This Resolution was not made part of the records of this case. However,
taken place between the two. Between the employees of BISUDECO and it is not disputed that the union members here were Bicolandia Sugar
APT, there is no privity of contract that would make the latter a substitute Development Corporation's employees at the time the Corporation was
employer that should be burdened with the obligations of the corporation. sold to Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Incorporated-
To rule otherwise would result in unduly imposing upon APT an Peñafrancia Sugar Mill. The Labor Arbiter also found that:
unwarranted assumption of accounts not contemplated in Proclamation chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
No. 50 or in the Deed of Transfer between the national government and With respect to complainants['] claim for labor standard benefits,
PNB.60 (Emphasis supplied) records show that they were paid separation pay including 13th month
For petitioner to be liable for private respondents' money claims arising pay for the year 1992 as well as conversion of their accrued vacation and
from an employer-employee relationship, it must specifically and sick leave (pp. 698 to 763, rollo) except that some complainants refused
categorically agree to be liable for these claims. to collect their checks representing said benefits whereas the payments
due complainants Domulot, de Luna, Falcon, Aguilar, Gomez, Ramos,
III Arao, de Jesus, Abonite, Bomanlag, and Parro were released by APT to
this Arbitration Branch (p. 764), rollo) in compliance with the Alias Writ
While petitioner per se is not liable for private respondents' money of Execution issued by then Executive Labor Arbiter Vito C.
claims arising from an employer-employee relationship, it voluntarily Bose.62ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
obliged itself to pay Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's
Under Section 27 of Proclamation No. 50, the employer-employee
terminated employees separation benefits in the event of the
relationship is severed upon the sale or disposition of assets of a
Corporation's privatization.
company undergoing privatization. This, however, is without prejudice
to "benefits incident to their employment or attaching to termination
In Barayoga, the aggrieved union members were those who were not
under applicable employment contracts, collective bargaining
recalled back to work by Philippine Sugar Corporation during the start
agreements, and applicable legislation":
of the season in May 1991. The union members in this case were those
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
who were recalled back to work in May 1991 but were eventually served
SECTION 27. AUTOMATIC TERMINATION OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
with a Notice of Termination on September 1, 1992.
RELATIONS. Upon the sale or other disposition of the ownership and/or
controlling interest of the government in a corporation held by the Trust,
The timeline of events in this case mirror that of Barayoga. In Barayoga,
or all or substantially all of the assets of such corporation, the employer-
Asset Privatization Trust's Board of Trustees issued the Resolution
employee relations between the government and the officers and other
dated September 23, 1992 authorizing the payment of separation pay
personnel of such corporations shall terminate by operation of law.
and other benefits to Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's
None of such officers or employees shall retain any vested right to future
employees in the event of its privatization:
employment in the privatized or disposed corporation, and the new
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
owners or controlling interest holders thereof shall have full and
In the present case, petitioner-unions members who were not recalled to
absolute discretion to retain or dismiss said officers and employees and
work by Philsucor in May 1991 seek to hold APT liable for their
to hire the replacement or replacements of any one or all of them as the
monetary claims and allegedly illegal dismissal. Significantly, prior to the
pleasure and confidence of such owners or controlling interest holders
may dictate. losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or
Nothing in this section, however, be construed to deprive said officers and financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1)
employees of their vested entitlements in accrued or due compensation month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service,
and other benefits incident to their employment or attaching to whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be
termination under applicable employment contracts, collective bargaining considered one (1) whole year.
agreements, and applicable legislation. (Emphasis supplied) The employer is exempted from having to pay separation pay if the
When petitioner's Board of Trustees issued the Resolution dated closure was due to serious business losses.65 A business suffers from
September 23, 1992, it acknowledged its contractual obligation to be serious business losses when it has operated at a loss for such a period
liable for benefits arising from an employer-employee relationship even of time that its financial standing is unlikely to improve in the future. 66
though, as a mere conservator of assets, it was not supposed to be liable.
Under Article III, Section 12(6) of Proclamation No. 50,63 Asset Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation incurred heavy loans from
Privatization Trust had the power to release claims or settle liabilities, as Philippine National Bank in the 1980s to cover its losses. The
in this case. When it issued its Resolution dated September 23, 1992, Corporation's losses were substantial. When Philippine National Bank
petitioner voluntarily bound itself to be liable for separation benefits to transferred its interests over the Corporation's loans to petitioner, it
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's terminated employees. effectively transferred all of the Corporation's assets. Petitioner
eventually sold these assets and properties to a private company,
IV pursuant to its mandate to dispose of government's non-performing
assets.
Petitioner proposes that even if it is found liable for separation benefits,
it cannot be made to pay since Bicolandia Sugar Development Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's financial standing when
Corporation's closure was due to serious business losses. petitioner took over as its conservator clearly showed that it was
suffering from serious business losses and would have been exempted
An employer may terminate employment to prevent business losses. from paying its terminated employees their separation pay. This
Article 29864 of the Labor Code allows the termination of employees exemption, however, only applies to employers. It does not apply to
provided that the employer pays the affected employees separation pay petitioner.
of one month or at least one-half month for every month of pay,
whichever is higher. The provision states: Even assuming that petitioner became NACUSIP/BISUDECO's substitute
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary employer, the exemption would still not apply if the employer
Art. 298. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The voluntarily assumes the obligation to pay terminated employees,
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to regardless of the employer's financial situation. In Benson Industries
the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to Employees Union-ALU-TUCP v. Benson Industries, Inc.:67
prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the To reiterate, an employer which closes shop due to serious business
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of losses is exempt from paying separation benefits under Article 297 of
circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the Labor Code for the reason that the said provision explicitly requires
the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) the same only when the closure is not due to serious business losses;
month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to conversely, the obligation is maintained when the employer's closure is
the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker not due to serious business losses. For a similar exemption to obtain
affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at against a contract, such as a CBA, the tenor of the parties' agreement
least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every ought to be similar to the law's tenor. When the parties, however, agree to
year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent deviate therefrom, and unqualifiedly covenant the payment of separation
benefits irrespective of the employer's financial position, then the (3) years, seven (7) months and 24 days after their termination on
obligatory force of that contract prevails and its terms should be carried September 30, 1992. Their Complaint essentially alleged that their
out to its full effect.68(Emphasis supplied) termination was illegal because it was made prior to Bicolandia Sugar
Petitioner's Board of Trustees issued the Resolution dated September Development Corporation's sale to Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers
23, 1992 authorizing the payment of separation benefits to Bicolandia Cooperative, Incorporated-Peñafrancia Sugar Mill.74 They also alleged
Sugar Development Corporation's terminated employees in the event of that the sale was illegal since it was made for the purpose of removing
the Corporation's privatization. It voluntarily bound itself to pay NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter as the sugar mill's Union.75
separation benefits regardless of the Corporation's financial standing. It
cannot now claim that it was exempted from paying such benefits due to Under the prescriptive periods stated in the Labor Code and Arriola,
serious business losses. private respondents' cause of action and any subsequent money claim
for illegal termination has not yet prescribed. Their Complaint dated
V April 24, 1996 before the Labor Arbiter was filed within the prescriptive
period.
Private respondents' claim to their separation benefits has not yet
prescribed under Article 291 of the Labor Code.69 Article 291 provides: The claim for separation pay, 13th month pay, and accrued vacation and
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary sick leaves are incidental to employer-employee relations. Under Article
Art. 291. Money claims. All money claims arising from employer- 291 of the Labor Code, these claims prescribe within three (3) years
employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be from the accrual of the cause of action:
filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
otherwise they shall be forever barred[.] Art. 291. Money Claims. All money claims arising from employer-
employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be
In Arriola v. National Labor Relations Commission,70 we have filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued;
distinguished a money claim arising from an employer-employee otherwise they shall be barred forever.
relationship and a money claim as reparation for illegal acts done by an
employer in violation of the Labor Code. The prescriptive period for the This Court has stated that "in the computation of the three-year
former is three (3) years under Article 291 of the Labor Code while the prescriptive period, a determination must be made as to the period
prescriptive period of the latter is four (4) years under Article 114671 of when the act constituting a violation of the workers' right to the benefits
the Civil Code. We also reiterated that the three-year prescriptive period being claimed was committed."76 In Barayoga, the September 23, 1992
under Article 290 of the Labor Code refers to "illegal acts penalized Resolution "authorized the payment of separation benefits to the
under the Labor Code, including committing any of the prohibited employees of the corporation in the event of its privatization."77 The
activities during strikes and lockouts, unfair labor practices, and illegal payment of these benefits, however, to private respondents was
recruitment activities."72 Article 290 provides: mandated by the Labor Arbiter in his Decision dated January 14, 2000.78
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary It was only then that private respondents' right to these benefits was
Art. 290. Offenses. Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules determined. Since the case was appealed to the National Labor Relations
and regulations pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years. Commission, the prescriptive period to claim these benefits began to run
only after the Commission's Decision had become final and executory.
All unfair labor practice arising from Book V shall be filed within one (1) The refusal to pay these benefits after the Commission's Decision had
year from accrual of such unfair labor practice; otherwise, they shall be become final and executory would be "the act constituting a violation of
forever barred. the worker's right to the benefits being claimed."79
Private respondents filed their Complaint for unfair labor practices, Under Rule VII, Section 1480 of the New Rules of Procedure of the
union busting, and labor standard benefits on April 24, 1996,73 or three National Labor Relations Commission,81 decisions of the Commission
become final and executory 10 days after the receipt of the notice of recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production
decision, order, or resolution. The three-year prescriptive period, and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to
therefore, begins from private respondents' receipt of the National Labor expansion and growth.
Relations Commission Resolution dated June 21, 2002 denying Under these provisions, workers should be granted all rights, including
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. monetary benefits, enjoyed by other workers who are similarly situated.
Thus, the separation benefits granted to Bicolandia Sugar Development
Since the Complaint, which included the claim for labor benefits, was Corporation's terminated employees as of September 30, 1992 must be
filed on April 24, 1996, private respondents' claims did not prescribe. enjoyed by all, including private respondents.
Further, the Labor Arbiter did not err in ordering the release of This case is unique, however, in that though private respondents'
separation benefits to private respondents despite their initial refusal to separation benefits were already released by petitioner, they refused to
receive them. The Constitution guarantees workers full protection of collect their checks "on account of their protested dismissal."83 Their
their rights, including that of "economic security and parity."82 Article II, refusal to receive their checks was premised on their Complaint that
Section 18 and Article XIII, Section 3 state: petitioner's sale of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation violated
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary their Collective Bargaining Agreement and was a method of union
Article II busting. It was not because of negligence or malice. It was because of
State Policies their honest belief that their rights as laborers were violated and the
grant of separation benefits would not be enough compensation for it.
SECTION 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. While private respondents' allegations have not been properly
It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. substantiated, it would be unjust to deprive them of their rightful claim
to their separation benefits.
Article XIII
Labor
Moreover, private respondents' co-complainants84 were able to collect
their checks for their separation benefits during the pendency of the
SECTION 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
Complaint85 without having to go through the Commission on Audit.
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
Under Section 26 of the State Auditing Code, the Commission on Audit
has jurisdiction over the settlement of debts and claims "of any sort"
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
against government:
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to
Section 26. General jurisdiction. The authority and powers of the
security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They
Commission shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining
thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between
books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and
workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in
settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property
settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as the
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due
from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned
or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other of sound management and fiscal administration shall be observed,
selfgoverning [sic] boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, provided that they do not contravene existing laws and regulations.
and as herein prescribed, including non-governmental entities Money claims against government include money judgments by courts,
subsidized by the government, those funded by donation through the which must be brought before the Commission on Audit before it can be
government, those required to pay levies or government share, and satisfied. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-200086 states
those for which the government has put up a counterpart fund or those the rationale for requiring claimants to file their money judgments
partly funded by the government. (Emphasis supplied) before the Commission on Audit:
The purpose of requiring a separate process with the Commission on chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Audit for money claims against government is under the principle that Republic of the Philippines
public funds may only be released upon proper appropriation and Supreme Court
disbursement: Manila
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 4. Fundamental principles. Financial transactions and operations ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 10-2000
of any government agency shall be governed by the fundamental TO : All Judges of Lower Courts
principles set forth hereunder, to wit: SUBJECT : Exercise of Utmost Caution, Prudence and Judiciousness in the
Issuance of Writs of Execution to Satisfy Money Judgments Against
(1) No money shall be paid out of any public treasury or depository Government Agencies and Local Government Units
except in pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific statutory
authority. In order to prevent possible circumvention of the rules and procedures
of the Commission on Audit, judges are hereby enjoined to observe
(2) Government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of
public purposes. execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies and
local government units.
(3) Trust funds shall be available and may be spent only for the specific
purpose for which the trust was created or the funds received. Judges should bear in mind that in Commissioner of Public Highways v.
San Diego (31 SCRA 617, 625 [1970]), this Court explicitly stated:
(4) Fiscal responsibility shall, to the greatest extent, be shared by all
those exercising authority over the financial affairs, transactions, and The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
operations of the government agency. private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's
action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
(5) Disbursements or disposition of government funds or property shall execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
invariably bear the approval of the proper officials. rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under
writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
(6) Claims against government funds shall be supported with complete obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must
documentation. be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
(7) All laws and regulations applicable to financial transactions shall be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
faithfully adhered to. legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

(8) Generally accepted principles and practices of accounting as well as Moreover, it is settled jurisprudence that upon determination of State
liability, the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still
be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in
P.D. No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
Philippines (Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, 701-02
[1993] citing Republic vs. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84 [1973]). All money claims SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
against the Government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit
which must act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on Brion, J., on leavechanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
certiorari and in effect sue the State thereby (P.D. 1445, Sections 49-50).
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in National Electrification Administration v. Morales,87 while
entitlement to claims for rice allowance, meal allowance,
medical/dental/optical allowance, children's allowance, and longevity
pay under Republic Act No. 6758 may be adjudicated by the trial court, a
separate action must be filed before the Commission on Audit for the
satisfaction of the judgment award.

Similarly, in Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency v. University of the

Philippines,88 this Court reimbursed to the University of the Philippines
its funds that were garnished upon orders of the National Labor
Relations Commission for the satisfaction of a judgment award. The
reimbursement was on the ground that the money claim must first be
filed before the Commission on Audit.

The situation in this case, however, is different from these previous

cases. Petitioner's Board of Trustees already issued the Resolution on
September 23, 1992 for the release of funds to pay separation benefits to
terminated employees of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation.89
Private respondents' checks were released by petitioner to the
Arbitration Branch of the Labor Arbiter in 1992.90 Under these
circumstances, it is presumed that the funds to be used for private
respondents' separation benefits have already been appropriated and
disbursed. This would account for why private respondents' co-
complainants were able to claim their checks without need of filing a
separate claim before the Commission on Audit.

In this instance, private respondents' separation benefits may be

released to them without filing a separate money claim before the
Commission on Audit. It would be unjust and a violation of private
respondents' right to equal protection if they were not allowed to claim,
under the same conditions as their fellow workers, what is rightfully due
to them.chanrobleslaw
 UNITED STATES v. NIXON, (418 U.S. 683 (1974)) recordings for which transcripts had been released to the public by the
President on April 30. The District Court rejected jurisdictional
UNITED STATES v. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. challenges based on a contention that the dispute was nonjusticiable
CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF because it was between the Special Prosecutor and the Chief Executive
APPEALS FOR THE and hence "intra-executive" in character.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
No. 73-1766. The District Court held that the judiciary, not the President, was the final
arbiter of a claim of executive privilege. The court concluded that, under
Argued July 8, 1974. the circumstances of this case, the presumptive privilege was overcome
Decided July 24, 1974. * by the Special Prosecutor's prima facie "demonstration of need
[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 73-1834, Nixon, President of the United sufficiently compelling to warrant judicial examination in chambers . . . ."
States v. United States, also on certiorari before judgment to the same On May 24, 1974, the President filed a timely notice of appeal from the
court. District Court order, and the certified record from the District Court. On
May 31, the petition was granted with an expedited briefing schedule. On
FACTS: June 6, the President filed, under seal, a cross-petition for writ of
certiorari before judgment. This cross-petition was granted June 15,
1974, and the case was set for argument on July 8, 1974.
On March 1, 1974, a grand jury of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia returned an indictment charging seven named ISSUE:
individuals. with various offenses, including conspiracy to defraud the
United States and to obstruct justice. Although he was not designated as
such in the indictment, the grand jury named the President, among Whether or not the subpoena duces tecum is binding upon the President
others, as an unindicted coconspirator. On April 18, 1974, upon motion of the United States based on the principles of executive privilege and
of the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum was issued pursuant separation of powers.
to Rule 17 (c) to the President by the United States District Court and
made returnable on May 2, 1974. The subpoena required the production DECISION:
of certain tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, or other writings
relating to certain precisely identified meetings between the President
and others. Yes, the subpoena is binding upon the President of the Unites States.
Decision: Affirmed.
On April 30, the President publicly released edited transcripts of 43
conversations; portions of 20 conversations subject to subpoena in the RATIO/REASON:
present case were included. On May 1, 1974, the President's counsel
filed a "special appearance" and a motion to quash the subpoena under I. JURISDICTION
Rule 17 (c). This motion was accompanied by a formal claim of privilege.
The threshold question presented is whether the May 20, 1974, order of
On May 20, 1974, the District Court denied the motion to quash and the the District Court was an appealable order and whether this case was
motions to expunge and for protective orders., it further ordered to properly "in" the Court of Appeals when the petition for certiorari was
deliver to the District Court, on or before May 31, 1974, the originals of filed in this Court. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals encompasses
all subpoenaed items, as well as an index and analysis of those items, only “final decisions of the district courts”. In applying this principle to
together with tape copies of those portions of the subpoenaed an order denying a motion to quash and requiring the production of
evidence pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, it has been reportedly ground of his duty to preserve the confidentiality of the communications
held that the order is not final and hence not appealable. of the President. Whatever the correct answer on the merits, these
This Court has, in an earlier case: issues are "of a type which are traditionally justiciable." In light of the
"consistently held that the necessity for expedition in the administration uniqueness of the setting in which the conflict arises, the fact that both
of the criminal law justifies putting one who seeks to resist the parties are officers of the Executive Branch cannot be viewed as a
production of desired information to a choice between compliance with barrier to justiciability.
a trial court's order to produce prior to any review of that order, and
resistance to that order with the concomitant possibility of an
adjudication of contempt if his claims are rejected on appeal."
III. RULE 17(c)
This would mean that a third party who has been issued a subpoena to
produce documents would basically have only 2 options: first, to comply The subpoena duces tecum is challenged on the ground that the Special
with such order and second, to resist to the order with the possibility of Prosecutor failed to satisfy the requirements of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17
being held in contempt if the third party’s claims are rejected on appeal. (c), which governs. the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum in federal
In the case at bar, the traditional contempt avenue to immediate appeal criminal proceedings. If we sustained this challenge, there would be no
is peculiarly inappropriate due to the unique setting of the case. These occasion to reach the claim of privilege asserted with respect to the
considerations lead us to conclude that the order of the District Court subpoenaed material.
was an appealable order.
Rule 17 (c) provides:
II. JUSTICIABILITY "A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to
produce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated
In the District Court, the President’s counsel argued that the court lacked therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the
jurisdiction to issue the subpoena because the matter was an inter- subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court
branch dispute between a subordinate and superior officer of the may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the
Executive branch. Since the Executive Branch has exclusive authority subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or
and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case, it is prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon
contended that a President's decision is final in determining what their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or
evidence is to be used in a given criminal case. Although his counsel portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys."
concedes that the President has delegated certain specific powers to the A subpoena for documents may be quashed if their production would be
Special Prosecutor, he has not "waived nor delegated to the Special "unreasonable or oppressive," but not otherwise. This case recognized
Prosecutor the President's duty to claim privilege as to all materials . . . certain fundamental characteristics of the subpoena duces tecum in
which fall within the President's inherent authority to refuse to disclose criminal cases: (1) it was not intended to provide a means of discovery
to any executive officer." for criminal cases of subpoenaed materials. Under this test, in order to
require production prior to trial, the moving party must show: (1) that
However, the mere assertion of a claim of an "intra-branch dispute," the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not
without more, has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction; otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due
justiciability does not depend on such a surface inquiry. The issue is the diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without
production or nonproduction of specified evidence deemed by the such production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to
Special Prosecutor to be relevant and admissible in a pending criminal obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4)
case. It is sought by one official of the Executive Branch within the scope that the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a
of his express authority; it is resisted by the Chief Executive on the general "fishing expedition."
 The first contention is a broad claim that the separation of powers
Our conclusion is based on the record before us, much of which is under doctrine precludes judicial review of a President's claim of privilege. The
seal. Of course, the contents of the subpoenaed tapes could not at that second contention is that if he does not prevail on the claim of absolute
stage be described fully by the Special Prosecutor, but there was a privilege, the court should hold as a matter of constitutional law that the
sufficient likelihood that each of the tapes contains conversations privilege prevails over the subpoena duces tecum.
relevant to the offenses charged in the indictment. We also conclude Our system of government "requires that federal courts on occasion
there was a sufficient preliminary showing that each of the subpoenaed interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction
tapes contains evidence admissible with respect to the offenses charged given the document by another branch." Powell v. McCormack, supra, at
in the indictment. The most cogent objection to the admissibility of the 549. And in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S., at 211 , the Court stated:
taped conversations here at issue is that they are a collection of out-of- "Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the
court statements by declarants who will not be subject to cross- Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of
examination and that the statements are therefore inadmissible hearsay. that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a
Here, however, most of the tapes apparently contain conversations to delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility
which one or more of the defendants named in the indictment were of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."
party. The hearsay rule does not automatically bar all out-of-court We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court "to
statements by a defendant in a criminal case. Declarations by one say what the law is" with respect to the claim of privilege presented in
defendant may also be admissible against other defendants upon a this case.
sufficient showing, by independent evidence, of a conspiracy among one B.
or more other defendants and the declarant and if the declarations at In support of his claim of absolute privilege, the President's counsel
issue were in furtherance of that conspiracy. The same is true of urges two grounds, one of which is common to all governments and one
declarations of coconspirators who are not defendants in the case on of which is peculiar to our system of separation of powers. The first
trial. Recorded conversations may also be admissible for the limited ground is the valid need for protection of communications between high
purpose of impeaching the credibility of any defendant who testifies or Government officials and those who advise and assist them in the
any other coconspirator who testifies. Generally, the need for evidence performance of their manifold duties. Whatever the nature of the
to impeach witnesses is insufficient to require its production in advance privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in the
of trial. Here, however, there are other valid potential evidentiary uses exercise of Art. II powers, the privilege can be said to derive from the
for the same material, and the analysis and possible transcription of the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional
tapes may take a significant period of time. Accordingly, we cannot duties. Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of
conclude that the District Court erred in authorizing the issuance of the enumerated powers.
subpoena duces tecum. The second ground asserted by the President's counsel in support of the
claim of absolute privilege rests on the doctrine of separation of powers.
[w]e are persuaded that the District Court's denial of the President's Here it is argued that the independence of the Executive Branch within
motion to quash the subpoena was consistent with Rule 17 (c). We also its own sphere, it insulates a President from a judicial subpoena in an
conclude that the Special Prosecutor has made a sufficient showing to ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential
justify a subpoena for production before trial. The subpoenaed materials Presidential communications.
are not available from any other source, and their examination and Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for
processing should not await trial in the circumstances shown. confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain
an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial
IV. THE CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE process under all circumstances. When the privilege depends solely on
the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality
A. of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a
claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national D
security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the We have earlier determined that the District Court did not err in
very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential authorizing the issuance of the subpoena. If a President concludes that
communications is significantly diminished by production of such compliance with a subpoena would be injurious to the public interest he
material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district may properly, as was done here, invoke a claim of privilege on the return
court will be obliged to provide. of the subpoena. Upon receiving a claim of privilege from the Chief
To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute Executive, it became the further duty of the District Court to treat the
privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal subpoenaed material as presumptively privileged and to require the
statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest in Special Prosecutor to demonstrate that the Presidential material was
confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would "essential to the justice of the [pending criminal] case."
upset the constitutional balance of "a workable government" and gravely
impair the role of the courts under Art. III. E

C. Those issues now having been disposed of, the matter of implementation
will rest with the District Court. "[T]he guard, furnished to [the
In this case the President challenges a subpoena served on him as a third President] to protect him from being harassed by vexatious and
party requiring the production of materials for use in a criminal unnecessary subpoenas, is to be looked for in the conduct of a [district]
prosecution; he does so on the claim that he has a privilege against court after those subpoenas have issued; not in any circumstance which
disclosure of confidential communications. He does not place his claim of is to precede their being issued." Statements that meet the test of
privilege on the ground they are military or diplomatic secrets. The admissibility and relevance must be isolated; all other material must be
presumptive privilege [confidentiality of his conversations] must be excised. It is elementary that in camera inspection of evidence is always
considered with the historic commitment of the rule of law, specifically a procedure calling for scrupulous protection against any release or
the twofold aim that guilt shall not escape or innocence shall not suffer. publication of material not found by the court, at that stage, probably
The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a admissible in evidence and relevant to the issues of the trial for which it
criminal trial the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" is sought.
and "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be It is therefore necessary in the public interest to afford Presidential
deprived of liberty without due process of law. confidentiality the greatest protection consistent with the fair
administration of justice. The need for confidentiality even as to idle
In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of conversations with associates in which casual reference might be made
confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the concerning political leaders within the country or foreign statesmen is
President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the too obvious to call for further treatment.
fair administration of criminal justice. The President's broad interest in
confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a
limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some
bearing on the pending criminal cases.
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on SECTION 4.
the generalized interest in confidentiality. It cannot prevail over the THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BE ELECTED BY
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of DIRECT VOTE OF THE PEOPLE FOR A TERM OF SIX YEARS WHICH
criminal justice. SHALL BEGIN AT NOON ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JUNE NEXT
FOLLOWING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION AND SHALL END AT NOON OF QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT, AND MAY
THE SAME DATE, SIX YEARS THEREAFTER. THE PRESIDENT SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE.
NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR ANY RE-ELECTION. NO PERSON WHO HAS
SUCCEEDED AS PRESIDENT AND HAS SERVED AS SUCH FOR MORE
THAN FOUR YEARS SHALL BE QUALIFIED FOR ELECTION TO THE SAME
OFFICE AT ANY TIME.

NO VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN TWO SUCCESSIVE

TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY
LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION
IN THE CONTINUITY OF THE SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR
WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.

UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, THE REGULAR ELECTION

FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BE HELD ON THE
SECOND MONDAY OF MAY.

THE RETURNS OF EVERY ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-

PRESIDENT, DULY CERTIFIED BY THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
EACH PROVINCE OR CITY, SHALL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE
CONGRESS, DIRECTED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE. UPON
RECEIPT OF THE CERTIFICATES OF CANVASS, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE SHALL, NOT LATER THAN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DAY OF
THE ELECTION, OPEN ALL THE CERTIFICATES IN THE PRESENCE OF
THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN JOINT PUBLIC
SESSION, AND THE CONGRESS, UPON DETERMINATION OF THE
AUTHENTICITY AND DUE EXECUTION THEREOF IN THE MANNER
PROVIDED BY LAW, CANVASS THE VOTES.

THE PERSON HAVING THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES SHALL BE

PROCLAIMED ELECTED, BUT IN CASE TWO OR MORE SHALL HAVE AN
EQUAL AND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES, ONE OF THEM SHALL
FORTHWITH BE CHOSEN BY THE VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF ALL THE
MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF THE CONGRESS, VOTING SEPARATELY.

THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE

CANVASSING OF THE CERTIFICATES.

THE SUPREME COURT, SITTING EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE

OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND
G.R. No. 227757 membership in the Minority, and thereafter, vote for him as the Minority
Leader.2
REPRESENTATIVE TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REPRESENTATIVE RAUL A. On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the election of the Speaker of the
DAZA, REPRESENTATIVE EDGAR R. ERICE, REPRESENTATIVE House of Representatives, then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas and
EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, REPRESENTATIVE TOMASITO S. Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had an interchange before the Plenary,
VILLARIN, and REPRESENTATIVE GARY C. ALEJANO, Petitioners wherein the latter elicited the following from the former: (a) all those
vs. who vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and
SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, MAJORITY LEADER RODOLFO C. those who vote for the other candidates shall belong to the
FARINAS, and REPRESENTATIVE DANILO E. SUAREZ, Respondents Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be
considered part of the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall
DECISION be elected by the members of the Minority.3 Thereafter, the Elections
for the Speakership were held, "[w]ith 252 Members voting for
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: [Speaker] Alvarez, eight [(8)] voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven [(7)] voting
for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one [(l)] registering a no vote,"4 thus,
Before the Court is a petition for mandamus1 filed by petitioners resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected Speaker of the House
Representatives Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr., (Rep. Baguilat), Edcel C. of Representatives of the 17th Congress.
Lagman (Rep. Lagman), Raul A. Daza, Edgar R. Erice, Emmanuel A.
Billones, Tomasito S. Villarin, and Gary C. Alejano (collectively, Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of the House -
petitioners), all members of the House of Representatives, essentially where the candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of
praying that respondents Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez (Speaker votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader - Rep.
Alvarez), Majority Leader Rodolfo C. Farifias (Rep. Fariñas), and Baguilat would be declared and recognized as the Minority Leader.
Representative Danilo E. Suarez (Rep. Suarez; collectively, respondents), However, despite numerous follow-ups from respondents, Rep. Baguilat
also members of the House of Representatives, be compelled to was never recognized as such.5
recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the 17th Congress
of the House of Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the legitimate On August 1, 2016, one of the "abstentionists," Representative Harlin
members of the Minority. Neil Abayon, III (Rep. Abayon), manifested before the Plenary that on
July 27, 2016, those who did not vote for Speaker Alvarez (including the
The Facts 21 "abstentionists") convened and elected Rep. Suarez as the Minority
Leader.6 Thereafter, on August 15, 2016, Rep. (now, Majority Leader)
The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on July Farinas moved for the recognition of Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader.
25, 2016, several news articles surfaced about Rep. Suarez's This was opposed by Rep. Lagman essentially on the ground that various
announcement that he sought the adoption or anointment of President "irregularities" attended Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader,
Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a particularly: (a) that Rep. Suarez was a member of the Majority as he
"cooperative minority" in the House of Representatives (or the House), voted for Speaker Alvarez, and that his "transfer" to the Minority was
and even purportedly encamped himself in Davao shortly after the May irregular; and (b) that the "abstentionists" who constituted the bulk of
2016 Elections to get the endorsement of President Duterte and the votes in favor of Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader are supposed
majority partisans. The petition further claims that to ensure Rep. to be considered independent members of the House, and thus,
Suarez's election as the Minority Leader, the supermajority coalition in irregularly deemed as part of the Minority.7 However, Rep. Lagman's
the House allegedly "lent" Rep. Suarez some of its members to feign opposition was overruled, and consequently, Rep. Suarez was officially
recognized as the House Minority Leader.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an
Rep. Baguilat should be recognized as the Minority Leader in light of: (a) adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the
the "long-standing tradition" in the House where the candidate who performance of the act to be compelled.12
garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership
automatically becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that petitioners have
attending Rep. Suarez's election to said Minority Leader position. no clear legal right to the reliefs sought. Records disclose that prior to
the Speakership Election held on July 25, 2016, then-Acting Floor Leader
For his part, Rep. Suarez maintains that the election of Minority Leader Rep. Farinas responded to a parliamentary inquiry from Rep. Atienza as
is an internal matter to the House of Representatives. Thus, absent any to who would elect the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.
finding of violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion, the Rep. Farinas then articulated that: (a) all those who vote for the
Court cannot interfere with such internal matters of a coequal branch of winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote
the govemment.8 In the same vein, the Office of the Solicitor General for other candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who
(OSG), on behalf of Speaker Alvarez and Majority Leader Farinas abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the
contends, inter alia, that the election of Minority Leader is within the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the
exclusive realm of the House of Representatives, which the Court cannot members of the Minority.13 Thereafter, the election of the Speaker of
intrude in pursuant to the principle of separation of powers, as well as the House proceeded without any objection from any member of
the political question doctrine. Similarly, the OSG argues that the Congress, including herein petitioners. Notably, the election of the
recognition of Rep. Suarez as the House Minority Leader was not tainted Speaker of the House is the essential and formative step conducted at
with any violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion and, the first regular session of the 17th Congress to determine the
thus, must be sustained.9 constituency of the Majority and Minority (and later on, their respective
leaders), considering that the Majority would be comprised of those who
The Issue Before the Court voted for the winning Speaker and the Minority of those who did not.
The unobjected procession of the House at this juncture is reflected in its
The essential issue for resolution is whether or not respondents may be Journal No. 1 dated July 25, 2016,14 which, based on case law, is
compelled via a writ of mandamus to recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the conclusive15 as to what transpired in Congress:
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives; and (b) petitioners as
the only legitimate members of the House Minority. PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY OF REP. ATIENZA

The Court's Ruling Recognized by the Chair, Rep. Atienza inquired as to who would elect the
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.
The petition is without merit.
REMARKS OF REP. FARINAS
"Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation,
board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he In reply, Rep. Fariñas referred to Section 8 of the Rules of the house on
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically membership to the Majority and the Minority. He explained that the
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully Members who voted for the winning candidate for the Speaker shall
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or constitute the Majority and shall elect from among themselves the
which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and Majority Leader. while those who voted against the winning Speaker or did
adequate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw."10 In Special People, Inc. not vote at all shall belong to the Minority and would thereafter elect their
Foundation v. Canda,11 the Court explained that the peremptory writ of Minority Leader.
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme
NOMINAL VOTING ON THE NOMINEES FOR SPEAKER OF oath-taking: Reps. Eric D. Singson, Mercedes K. Alvarez, Fredenil "Fred"
H. Castro, Raneo "Ranie" E. Abu, Lucy T. Gomez, Nancy A. Catamco,
THE HOUSE Elenita Milagros "Eileen" Ermita-Buhain, Rose Marie "Baby" J. Arenas,
Mylene J. Garcia-Albano, Gwendolyn F. Garcia, Marlyn L.
Thereafter, on motion of Rep. Farinas, there being no objection, the PrimiciasAgabas, Emmeline Aglipay-Villar, Sarah Jane I. Elago and
Members proceeded to the election of the Speaker of the House of Victoria Isabel G. Noel.
Representatives. The Presiding Officer then directed Deputy Secretary
General Adasa to call the Roll for nominal voting for the Speaker of the SUSPENSION OF SESSION
House and requested each Member to state the name of the candidate he
or she will vote for. The Presiding Officer motu proprio suspended the session at
12:43p.m.16
The result of the voting was as follows:
After Speaker Alvarez took his oath of office, he administered the oath of
For Rep. Pantaleon D. Alvarez: office to all Members of the House of the 17th Congress.17 On the same
day, the Deputy Speakers, and other officers of the House (among others,
xxxx the Majority Leader) were elected and all took their respective oaths of
office.18
For Rep. Teddy Brawner Baguilat Jr.
During his privilege speech delivered on July 26, 2016, which was a full
xxxx day after all the above-mentioned proceedings had already been
commenced and completed, Rep. Lagman questioned Rep. Fariñas'
For Rep. Danilo E. Suarez interpretation of the Rules.19 Aside from the belated timing of Rep.
Lagman's query, Rep. Suarez aptly points out that the Journal for that
xxxx session does not indicate any motion made, seconded and carried to
correct the entry in the Journal of the previous session (July 25, 2016)
pertinent to any recording error that may have been made, as to indicate
Abstained
that in fact, a protest or objection was raised.20
xxxx
Logically speaking, the foregoing circumstances would show that the
House of Representatives had effectively adopted Rep. Farinas' proposal
With 252 Members voting for Rep. Alvarez (P.), eight voting for Rep. anent the new rules regarding the membership of the Minority, as well
Baguilat, seven voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one registering as the process of determining who the Minority Leader would be. More
a no vote, the Presiding Officer declared Rep. Alvarez (P.) as the duly significantly, this demonstrates the House's deviation from the "legal
elected Speaker of the House of Representatives for the 17th Congress. bases" of petitioners' claim for entitlement to the reliefs sought before
this Court, namely: (a) the "long-standing tradition" of automatically
COMMITTEE ON NOTIFICATION awarding the Minority Leadership to the second placer in the
Speakership Elections, i.e., Rep. Baguilat; and (b) the rule21 that those
On motion of Rep. Farinas, there being no objection, the Body who abstained in the Speakership Elections should be deemed as
constituted a committee composed of the following Members to notify independent Members of the House of Representatives, and thus, they
Rep. Alvarez (P.) of his election as Speaker of the House of could not have voted for a Minority Leader in the person of Rep.
Representatives and to escort the Speaker-elect to the rostrum for his
Suarez.22 As will be explained hereunder, the deviation by the Lower coequal branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal
House from the aforesaid rules is not averse to the Constitution. workings of the [House of Representatives]."28

Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: Of course, as in any general rule, there lies an exception. While the Court
in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the political
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of departments of government, will not review the wisdom, merits or
Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective propriety of such action, it will, however, strike it down on the ground of
Members. grave abuse of discretion.29 This stems from the expanded concept of
judicial power, which, under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. Constitution, expressly "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
be elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
also states that the House of Representatives may decide to have officers part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Case law
other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these decrees that "[t]he foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's
officers are chosen is something within its sole control.23 In the case of duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona,24 which involved a dispute on the any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an
rightful Senate Minority Leader during the 11th Congress (1998-2001), innovation in our political law. As explained by former Chief Justice
this Court observed that "[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the Roberto Concepcion:30
manner of electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of Representative,] it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers [of the [T]he judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a
Lower House]. All that the Charter says is that ' [e]ach House shall branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.' [As such], the jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute
method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not
of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by nature.31
the [House of Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court. "25
Accordingly, this Court "will not shirk, digress from or abandon its
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI26 of the Constitution vests in sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that
the House of Representatives the sole authority to, inter alia, "determine involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
the rules of its proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike statutory committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the
laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during government."32
their effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' Being merely matters However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to how the
of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said House had conducted the questioned proceedings and its apparent
rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon deviation from its traditional rules, the Court is hard-pressed to find any
the concurrence of a majority [of the House of Representatives]. "27 attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its intrusion in
Hence, as a general rule, "[t]his Court has no authority to interfere and this case. By and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal,
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of political branch of government which, absent any showing of grave
[C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold x x x. abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a otherwise would not only embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but
also lead to its own breach of the separation of powers doctrine.33
Verily, "[i]t would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a
coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action
as void [only] because [it] thinks [that] the House has disregarded its
own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena
to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself."34

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949 vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE
J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner, INSULAR TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
vs.
RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondents.
J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner,
x---------------------------------------------------------x vs.
RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P.
G.R. No. L-2756 August 26, 1949 BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondents.

J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners, x---------------------------------------------------------x

vs.
EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent. G.R. No. L-2756 August 26, 1949

x---------------------------------------------------------x J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners,

vs.
G.R. No. L-3054 August 26, 1949 EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent.

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido x---------------------------------------------------------x

Nacionalista, recurrente,
vs. G.R. No. L-3054 August 26, 1949
EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido.
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido
x---------------------------------------------------------x Nacionalista, recurrente,
vs.
G.R. No. L-3055 August 26, 1949 EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido.

LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner, x---------------------------------------------------------x

vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, G.R. No. L-3055 August 26, 1949
SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY, respondents. LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner,
vs.
x---------------------------------------------------------x THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR,
SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND
G.R. No. L-3056 August 26, 1949 INDUSTRY, respondents.

ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all x---------------------------------------------------------x

taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner,
G.R. No. L-3056 August 26, 1949 Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill, Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando,
ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all Ramon Sunico and Francisco A. Rodrigo; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and
taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner, Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE TUASON, J.:
INSULAR TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other two
L-2044 were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present
Paredes, Diaz and Poblador, Jesus G. Barrera, Vicente Hilado, and Araneta the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will
and Araneta for petitioner. be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Assistant Solicitor to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G. R.
General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., Solicitor Martiniano P. Vico and Assistant No. L-3054 and case G. R. No. L-3056 and the question whether
City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondents. prohibition lies in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756. No practical benefit
Claro M. Recto and Padilla, Carlos and Fernando as amici curiae. can be gained from a discussion of the procedural matters since the
decision in the cases wherein the petitioners' cause of action or the
L-2756 propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling
Araneta and Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for petitioners. authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the
Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for respondent. public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
Claro M. Recto as amici curiae. definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
(Avelino vs. Cuenco, G. R. No. L-2821.) The petitions challenge the
L-3054 validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of
Claro M. Recto, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera, Alejo Mabanag, Jose B. Laurel, Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is
Jr. and Antonio Barredo for petitioner. Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondent. residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections. prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of the
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill and Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ
Navarro as amici curiae. of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is
Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico, and Francisco A. Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the
Rodrigo also as amici curiae. Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to
compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the
L-3055 Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the
Claro M. Recto and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner. petitioner. Both official refuse to issue the required export license on the
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents. ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden
V. G. Bunuan, Administrator, Sugar Quota Office. by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No.
Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto M. Serrano, Enrique; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of
Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae. the Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to
June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez,
L-3056 Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party,
Claro M. Recto and Antonio Barredo for petitioner. applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents. Philippines from disbursing this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-
3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to Government of the Commonwealth including the determination
defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive
the national elections to be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Department; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches,
Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to departments, agencies or instrumentalities of government and to
prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force
disposing of that amount or any part of it." laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or
Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the application of those of an administrative character; (e) to impose
constitutionally of Act No. 671, the petitioners do not press the point in new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish those in
their oral argument and memorandum. They rest their case chiefly on existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or
the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds
671) has ceased to have any force and effect. This is the basic question thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or
we have referred to, and it is to this question that we will presently municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that
address ourselves and devote greater attention. For the purpose of this he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of
decision, only, the constitutionality of Act No. 671 will be taken for credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other
granted, and any dictum or statement herein which may appear contrary powers as he may deem to enable the Government to fulfill its
to that hypothesis should be understood as having been made merely in responsibities and to maintain and enforce the authority.
furtherance of the main thesis.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as
Act No. 671 in full is as follows: practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the
Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY. and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and
effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines: provide.

SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency. law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and
"SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the
existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature,
policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation
other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the to the Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions
Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We
offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the test a rule by its results.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the
thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding
mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for
restrictive in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear
3rd ed., 669; Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The words "limited manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was
period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no
mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the
delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be National Assemble failed to make a provision for this termination in the
said to be an emergency." (First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago same way that it did for the termination of the effects and incidents of
vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L. R., 937, 938.). the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the
rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make
this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already
repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the annulled by the legislature.
legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope
of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the
act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority
different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies operating over the
the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually
indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the
temporary emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session
Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be
would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the limited. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal executive orders
Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the
would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of
powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic
a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and
delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, inspired only by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a
and ought not to be, the law. Corwin, President: Office and Powers, 1948 former President promulgated an executive order regulating house
ed., p. 160, says: rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and
the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export control
It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not after Congress had refused to approve the measure.
delegate its powers signifies at the very least that the legislature
may not abdicate its powers: Yet how, in view of the scope that Quiet apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of
legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between Act No. 671 for the inference that the National Assembly restricted the
delegation and abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature
rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other
of the delegate; . . . . causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides:

Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable
No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report
 thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under foundations of democratic institutions could not have been conceived
the powers herein granted. under any circumstance short of a complete disruption and dislocation
of the normal processes of government. Anyway, if we are to uphold the
The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting constitutionality of the act on the basis of its duration, we must start
of Congress at which the President was to give an account of his with the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. As we have
trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it could very indicated, the period that best comports with constitutional
well have said if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did requirements and limitations, with the general context of the law and
not think that the report in section 3 was to be the first and last Congress with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its
Act No. 671 would lapsed, what reason could there be for its failure to enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to
provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent function, a period ending with the conventing of that body.
reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making
laws in the forms of rules, regulations and executive orders, were as It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No.
important, of as unimportant, as the initial one. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May
25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress
regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry instead of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration
much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the Act, we think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the
of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider
session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate."
Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power
be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations
Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would imposed by the organic law.
become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatical
extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the necessity of
they denote that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to deciding the question as to which department of government is
repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify that the authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the law is
same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be predicated still exists. The right of one or another department to declare
prolonged. the emergency terminated is not in issue. As a matter of fact, we have
endeavored to find the will of the National Assembly—call that will, an
What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same exercise of the police power or the war power — and, once ascertained,
paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he to apply it. Of course, the function of interpreting statutes in proper
issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts as their constitutional
became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and prerogative and duty. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief Executive
that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended, and may act on the
regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." (Emphasis ours.) strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the
It can easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of courts have construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the
enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific proposition. There is no pretense that the President has independent or
view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under review. we
factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers take it that the respondents, in sustaining the validity of these executive
so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its orders rely on Act No. 600, Act No. 620, or Act No. 671 of the former
authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of the Commonwealth and on no other source. To put it differently, the
President's authority in this connection is purely statutory, in no sense After all the criticism that have been made against the efficiency of the
political or directly derived from the Constitution. system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the
Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and
Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or
opening of the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary
600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive indication that they were government have given notice that they share the faith of other
self-liquidating. By express provision the rules and regulations to be democracy-loving people in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal.
eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, respectively The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is
approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good only up preserved for Congress all the time, not expecting periods of crisis no
to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic
the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the
Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this provision is that specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been
in the mind of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves surrendered to another department — unless we regard as legislating
would lapse not latter than the rules and regulations. The design to the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards;
provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was
necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is
simultaneous repeal of their source. Were not this the case, there would that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme
arise the curious spectacle, already painted, and easily foreseen, of the perils more than in normal circumstances "the various branches,
Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations of the President executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called
while the latter was empowered to keep or return them into force and to upon "to the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to
issue new ones independently of the National Assembly. For the rest, the them respectively."
reasoning heretofore adduced against the asserted indefinite
continuance of the operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos. These observations, though beyond the issue as formulated in this
600 and 620. decision, may, we trust, also serve to answer the vehement plea that for
the good of the Nation, the President should retain his extraordinary
The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the question powers as long asturmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to
whether war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If we were to that the late war harass the Philippines.
actual hostilities between the original belligerents are still raging, the
elusion would not be altered. After the convening of Congress new Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In
legislation had to be approved if the continuation of the emergency order to avoid any possible disruption and interruption in the normal
powers, or some of them, was desired. In the light of the conditions operation of the Government, we have deemed it best to depart in these
surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the cases from the ordinary rule to the period for the effectivity of decisions,
opinion that the "state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged and to decree, as it is hereby decreed, that this decision take effect
in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and occupation of fifteen days from the date of the entry of final judgment provided in
the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization of section 8 of Rule 53 of the Rules of Court in relation to section 2 of Rule
the Government, principally the impossibility for the National Assembly 35. No costs will be charged.
to act. The state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and
with which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The Ozaeta, J., concurs.
war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have
necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position
to operate.
Separate Opinions reorganizing the Courts of First Instance; Executive Order No. 184,
issued on November 19, 1948, controlling rice and palay to combat
MORAN, C. J., concurring: hunger; and other executive orders appropriating funds for other
purposes. The consequences of a blanket nullification of these executive
I agree with the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Tuason, except on the orders will be unquestionably serious and harmful. And I hold that
points hereunder discussed. before nullifying them, other important circumstances should be
inquired into, as for instance, whether or not they have been ratified by
I believe, on the one hand, that the emergency power of the President the Congress expressly or impliedly, whether their purposes have
had ceased not in May 1946, when Congress held its regular sessions, as already been accomplished entirely or partially, and in last instance, to
Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria maintain, but on June 9, 1945, what extent; acquiescence of litigants; de facto officers; acts and contrast
when Congress convened in a special session to consider general of parties acting in good faith; etc. It is my opinion that each executive
legislation. The emergency contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671, order must be viewed in the lights of its peculiar circumstances, and, if
is "total emergency" which means the state of actual war involving the necessary and possible, before nullifying it, precautionary measures
Philippines, with the impending invasion and occupation of our country should be taken to avoid harm to public interest and innocent parties.
by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization and paralyzation
of the Government, principally, the impossibility for the National To illustrate the foregoing proposition of individual consideration of
Assembly to act. This was the only reason and justification for the total specific cases, shall go into a brief discussion of the executive orders
relinquishment of legislative power by Congress in favor of the Chief involved in the cases now before this Court. With regard to Executive No.
Executive under Commonwealth Act No. 671. Such relinquishment was 225 on general appropriation, I hold that the court should not declare it
total because the emergency was also total. Clearly, therefore, the null and void till Congress may have an opportunity to provide a
inability of Congress to act was the soul of the law, and the moment such substitute measure for the sustenance of government. This view is
inability ceased, the total emergency also ceased and the law likewise predicated upon the principle of absolute necessity. Till Congress may
ceased to validly exist. On June 9, 1945, the Congress of the Philippines pass a valid appropriation act our government cannot survive without
convened in a special session "to adopt such measures as may be the executive order in question. It would be absurd for this court to
necessary to meet the existing emergency" and "for the purpose of declare the cessation of an emergency, and by that same declaration
considering general legislation." I hold that from that date, June 9, 1945, permit, if not abet, the formation of another emergency which would be
Congress was able and ready to act on all matters, and the emergency inevitable if, by reason of lack of appropriation, government shall cease
powers delegated to the President in Commonwealth Act No. 671, to function. In such cases, when apparently the provisions of our laws
naturally ceased to exist. and Constitution seem inadequate, the courts must go deeper even than
the very Magna Carta itself and find solution in the basic principles of
Upon the other hand, while I believe that the emergency powers had preservation of government and of national survival, which in the last
ceased in June 1945, I am not prepared to hold that all executive orders analysis, are the very reasons for the existence of a Constitution. In such
issued thereafter under Commonwealth Act No. 671, are per se null and extreme cases, as can come from the present situation, it would be the
void. It must be borne in mind that these executive orders had been height of judicial imprecision to preserve the form of the constitution,
issued in good faith and with the best of intentions of three successive and at the same time permit the disruption and cessation of the
Presidents, and some of them may have already produced extensive government which that same constitution so intricately designed and
effects in the life of the nation. We have, for instance, Executive Order firmly established. Thus, in the remedy of an evil, we shall cause a far
No. 73, issued on November 12, 1945, appropriating the sum of greater one.
P6,750,000 for public works; Executive Order No. 86, issued on January
7, 1946, amending a previous order regarding the organization of the It may be argued that the course of action I am taking is founded upon
Supreme Court; Executive Order No. 89, issued on January 1, 1946, fear, fear that Congress will again fail to act on the matter of
appropriation, and it may be asserted that the members of the Congress confronted not only with bare issues of law, but with actual anomalous
are presumed to be as patriotic as the members of this Court, if not situations pregnant with possible dangers to the nation, and it is the
more, and that, therefore, we may rest assured that they will not fail to duty of the Court, as a dispenser of justice, to find a solution that is both
fulfill their duty. I admit this to be true, and accordingly, I ask what is legal and realistic.
then the hurry and necessity for nullifying the executive order on
appropriation which we are sure will soon be substituted by a valid With reference to Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for
appropriation act? Why not defer judgment and wait until the special houses, and Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from
session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it clearly sees it? I can the Philippines, I agree that they must be held null and void upon the
find no reason against this suggestion except, perhaps, a desire to assert reason stated by Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria and also upon
judicial supremacy in a case where judicial statemanship is more those stated by Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Alex Reyes.
necessary.
My vote, therefore, is that the petitions must be granted in Araneta vs.
It is also true that the possibility that Congress will again fail to provide Dinglasan, G. R. No. L-2044; Araneta vs. Angeles, G. R. No. L-2756 and
funds for the operation of the government is a remote possibility. But Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs, G. R. No. L-3055, and that
there is no harm in providing for all the possibilities, both near and judgment must be deferred in Rodriguez vs. El Tesorero de Filipinas, G. R.
remote. If that remote possibility never comes, well and good, nothing is No. L-3054 and Barredo vs. The Commission on Election, G. R. No. L-3056.
lost and the situation is saved. However, if the remote possibility does
come, and it is not impossible, and we had already nullified the executive
order on appropriation, how will the government function and survive?
On the other hand, if we defer judgment upon the nullity of such PARAS, J., concurring:
executive order, and that remote possibility does come, we still have the
saving lifeline of that executive order which may, perhaps, be tolerated I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Tuason. I wish to add, however the
to save the country from chaos, until a more proper and adequate following observations: Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
remedy can be secured. the legislative intent is to make Commonwealth Act No. 671, effective
during the existence of the emergency contemplated therein and that it
With regard to the executive order appropriating funds for the conduct is within the exclusive province of the political departments to
of the coming elections, I uphold the same view as in the foregoing, determine whether said emergency continues or has ceased to exist, I
namely, not in abdicating the power of this court to pass upon the am of the conviction that, in view of the formal and unmistakable
validity of an executive order, but to defer judgment upon such an order declarations of both the Congress and the President, said Act No. 671,
until the legislature may provide a substitute measure. The reason for should be held as having lost its force and effect.
this is, likewise, absolute necessity. Without such Executive Order we
may have not elections in November. Elections are the very essence of It is important to remember that the kind of emergency expressly
popular government for the establishment and preservation of which, spoken of in the Act is a total emergency resulting from war and that the
our Constitution has been consecrated. To permit the unwarranted Act was passed at a time (December 16, 1941) when there was factually
abolition or even suspension of elections, will surely result either in the a state of war involving the Philippines.
denial of popular representation or in the perpetuation in power of
those already in office. Either result is revolting to our system of In section 1 of Republic Act No. 342, approved on July 26, 1948, it was
government. Briefly stated, I hold that this court should neither ratify categorically declared by the Congress that "since liberation conditions
nor nullify this executive order, but should defer judgment in the same
have gradually returned to normal, but not so with regard to those who
manner and for the same reasons stated above in connection with the have suffered the ravages of war and who have not received any relief
executive order on appropriations. The Court, in these cases, is for the loss and destruction resulting therefrom," and that "the
emergency created by the last war as regards these was sufferers being (President's fifth monthly radio chat, March 15, 1949); and the sporadic
still existent, it is the declared policy of the state that as to them the debt depredations of the outlaws in isolated areas of the country are but the
moratorium should be continued in force in a modified form." The last paroxysms of a dying movement (President's State-of-the-Nation
President, in turn, in his speech delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly Message, January 24, 1949), — all these certainly negative the existence
proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the Republic) faces today are of any real (much less total) emergency.
incidental passing pains artificially created by seasonal partisanship,
very common among democracies but will disappear with the rains that That the Congress had heretofore recognized the cessation of the
follow the thunderclaps not later than November 8 of this year." emergency is conclusively established by the fact that it had assumed the
task of directly enacting, during its past sessions, measures dealing with
We thus have a formal declaration on the part of the Congress that the all the matters covered by the specific legislative powers conceded to the
emergency created by the last war exists as regards only those debtors President in Commonwealth Act No. 671. This is in line with the
whose war damage claims have not been settled by the United States fundamental reason for the approval of said Act, as may be gathered
Philippine War Damage Commission (section 2, Republic Act No. 342), from the following statement of President Quezon: "When it became
patently meaning that said emergency is, at most, a partial emergency. It evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it
is needless to point out that only a small portion of the Philippine was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular
population are debtors and not all of those who are debtors are war session which was to open on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly
damage claimants. passed into history approving a resolution which reaffirmed the abiding
faith of the Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United States. The
We also have the solemn declaration on the part of the President that the assembly also enacted a law granting the President of the Philippines all
emergencies faced by the Republic are incidental emergencies artificially the powers that under the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to
created by seasonal partisanship, clearly meaning that such emergencies him in time of war." (The Good Fight, pp. 204-205.) When President
not only are not total but are not the result of war. Quezon said "in time of war", he undoubtedly meant factual war, a
situation that existed at the time of the passage of Commonwealth Act
If the emergency is, as admitted by the Congress, not total and, as No. 671.
admitted by the President, not the result of the war, Commonwealth Act
No. 671 has lost its basis and cannot legally give rise to the executive Indeed, the dissenters admit that any delegated power directly exercised
orders herein involved. Indeed, it is not pretended that said orders are by the principal is considered withdrawn from the agent. A cursory
intended to meet any emergency growing out of the last war. Lack of a examination of Commonwealth Act No. 671 will show that the legislative
budget, an appropriation for the elections, or an import control law, has function therein specified had been discharged by the Congress. The
been brought about by the inaction of the Congress unaffected by the following illustrates the powers delegated in the Act and the measures
last war, and such emergency, if it may be called so, is not of the kind enacted by the Congress itself covering each:
contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671.
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 —
The government has for four years since liberation been normally
functioning; election had been regularly held; a national census had been (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions,
taken; Congress had held regular and special session; "people travel branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities:
freely most everywhere and more quickly, by land, sea and air, to an
extent that was not hitherto enjoyed," and "business is more brisk than Republic Act No. 333 —
ever, goods are plentiful, our people even in the remotest communities
and barrios of the country are better dressed, their diet has been An Act to establish the Capital of the Philippines and the
immensely improved, and they look more healthy than they ever did" permanent seat of the National Government, to create a capital
 city planning commission, to appropriate funds for the Commonwealth Act No. 710 —
acquisition of private estates within the boundary limits of said
city, and to authorize the issuance of bonds of the National An Act to appropriate funds to continue the payment of
Government for the acquisition of private estates, for the Retirement gratuities or pensions under existing laws.
subdivision thereof, and for the construction of streets, bridges, (Approved, November 1, 1945.)
waterworks, sewerage and other municipal improvements in the
capital City. (Approved, July 17, 1948.) (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those
in existence:
(b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the
determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Republic Act No. 215 —
Departments:
An Act to amend Section One of the Republic Act numbered
Republic Act No. 51 — eighty-one providing a new time limit for the waiver of, and/or
extension of the period, within which to perform, accomplish or
Act authorizing the President of the Philippines to reorganize comply with, any term, condition, or stipulation required of
within one year the different Executive departments, bureaus, locators, holders, lessees, operators of mining claims or
offices, agencies and their instrumentalities of the government, concessions, and of water rights and timber concessions with the
including the corporations owned or controlled by it. (Approved, mining industry and the condonation of mining, specific and real
October 4, 1946.) estate taxes, under certain terms and conditions. (Approved,
June 1, 1948.)
(c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies
or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already Ley No. 321 de la Republica —
existing:
Ley que eleva los derechos de transferencia de ganado mayor,
Commonwealth Act No. 732 — enmendado al efecto el articulo quinientos veintiochos del
Codigo Administrativo Revisado. (Apobada, Junio 9, 1948.)
An Act to create the Department of Foreign Affairs and to
authorize the President of the Philippines to organize said (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to
department as well as the foreign service of the Republic of the authorize the expenditure of proceeds thereof:
Philippines. (Approved, July 3, 1946.)
Republic Act No. 265 —
(d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or
otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation An Act establishing the Central Bank of the Philippines . . . .
or application of those of an administrative character: (Section 87 [e] No. 7.) Approved, June 15, 1948.)

Commonwealth Act No. 709 — Republic Act No. 266 —

An Act appropriating the sum of five million pesos to enable the An Act appropriating such sums as may from time to time be
national housing commission to resume its functions" released by the Central Bank representing excess monetary
(Approved, November 1, 1945.) reserves, and authorizing the President of the Philippines to
 issue bonds, certificates or other evidences of indebtedness powers granted by the Congress cannot be interfered with by the courts,
covering such amounts. (Approved, June 15, 1948.) are not controlling. Particularly, the case of Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed.,
1883, in which the opinion of the United States Supreme Court was
Republic Act No. 85 — written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, cannot apply, for the further reason
that it merely involved the power of deportation which, even in our
An Act creating the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. (Section jurisdiction, is recognized, it being the rule here that the courts cannot
2 [f].) (Approved, Oct. 29, 1946.) control the right of the Chief Executive to determine the existence or
sufficiency of the facts justifying an order of deportation. Upon the other
(g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal government to hand, the war power of the President is separately covered by section
incur in overdrafts for the purposes that he may approve: 10, paragraph (2), of Article VII, and that of the Congress by section 25.

Various Appropriation Acts. Article VI, of the Constitution, which are not invoked for the passage of
Commonwealth Act No. 671.
(h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payments
of debts: MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:.

Republic Act No. 342, approved, July 26, 1948. The majority opinion holds that Executive Order No. 62 dated June 21,
1947; Executive Order No. 192 dated December 24, 1948; and Executive
(i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable Orders Nos. 225 and 226 both dated June 15, 1949 were issued without
the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce authority of law and therefore illegal and of no legal force and effect. I
its authority. concur only in the result. Ordinarily, such concurrence without comment
or explanation would be sufficient and satisfactory. However, in view of
the radical difference between the reasons had and given by the majority
The powers included in this subdivision (i) are of course covered by
in arriving at the result and those entertained by me, and considering
hundreds of other acts approved by the Congress which, it cannot be
denied, all tend to "enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities the transcendental importance of these cases, not only because of the
vast amounts of public funds and the rights of citizens affected but also
and to maintain and enforce its authority." Moreover, the withdrawal of
the greater and more important powers may be presumed to have of the principles of law involved, and the fact that not only the force and
carried the accessory and less important powers. the effect of a law (Commonwealth Act No. 671) but also the legality and
the force and effect of numerous executive orders issued by several
Presidents during a period of about three years, affecting as they do not
There is no merit in the contention that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was
only citizens, their interest and their properties but also the different
enacted by virtue of the war powers of the Congress. As the Act itself
departments and offices of the Government, I deem it my duty to set
expressly states, its basis is section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution
forth my views and the reasons in support of the same.
which merely authorizes delegation of legislative powers to the
President in times of war or other national emergency. The phrase "in
There is a claim made about lack of personality of some of the parties-
times of war or other national emergency" is solely indicative or
descriptive of the occasions during which the delegation may be petitioners particularly, the petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056.
extended and does not classify the act of delegating legislative functions Much could be said for and against that claim, but I am willing to brush
as a war power. It must be borne in mind that said section 26 is peculiar aside all defenses and technicalities on this point in order to be able to
to our Constitution, with the result that the decisions of the Supreme consider and decide the more important question of the legality of the
executive orders involved and whether or not Commonwealth Act No.
Court of the United States cited on behalf of the respondents,
expounding the theory that the exercise by the President of his war 671 is still in force.
The aforementioned executive orders were issued on the straight of and authority the President issued Executive Order No. 3 dated July 10, 1946,
by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. The majority holds that later amending section 2 of said Executive Order by issuing Executive
Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to have any force and effect on May Order No. 23 dated November 1, 1946, regulating the exportation of
25, 1946 when Congress first convened in regular session after certain products, materials and merchandise. The important thing to
liberation. In This, I disagree for I believe and hold that Commonwealth consider is that section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 728 provided that
Act No. 671 is still in force and in effect. But despite this view, I am not of the authority it granted to the President shall terminate on December
the opinion that the executive orders under consideration were issued 31, 1948, that is to say, that after said date the Executive could no longer
without authority. validly regulate exports under said law. The President, however,
overlooked or ignored said injunction and invoking his emergency
Starting with Executive Order No. 62, we find that it deals with and powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671, promulgated Executive
regulates houses and lot rentals. If the legislature had not already acted Order No. 192 regulating exports, to take effect on January 1, 1949. What
and legislated on this matter since the promulgation of Commonwealth was said with regard to Executive Order No. 62 is applicable to the lack
Act No. 671, this would be a proper field for Presidential action. of authority of the Executive to promulgate Executive Order No. 192,
However, the legislature had already promulgated Commonwealth Act namely, that on this matter of export control, the legislature had already
No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66, regulating house rentals and, as late as withdrawn it from the jurisdiction of the Executive under his emergency
the month of May, 1947, Congress passed House Bill No. 978 further powers after the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 728. Any
amending Commonwealth Act No. 689. In other words, in thus acting, Presidential power or authority on the subject of export control was
the Legislature had already shown its readiness and ability to legislate derived from said Act. Not only this, but when in section 4 of
on this matter, and had withdrawn it from the realm of presidential Commonwealth Act No. 728 the legislature terminated the authority
legislation or regulation under the powers delegated by Commonwealth given the President to regulate and control exports on December 31,
Act No. 671. Not only this, but in issuing rules and regulations in the 1948 and failed or refused to renew said authority, the inference or
form of executive orders under his delegated powers, the Chief conclusion and that after said date Congress deemed any presidential
Executive merely acts as an agent of the legislature, his principal which regulation on exports unnecessary and inadvisable. Therefore, in
made the delegation. As such agent, he cannot go against the policy and promulgating Executive Order No. 192 the Chief Executive acted not only
expressed desire of his principal. without legislative authority but also against the wishes and policy of
Congress. This he may not validly do.
There are radical differences between Commonwealth Act No. 689,
Republic Act No. 66, and House Bill No. 978 on one side and Executive With respect to Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the considerations
Order No. 62 on the other. That was the reason why President Roxas made with regard to Executive Orders Nos. 62 and 192 are equally
vetoed House Bill No. 978, believing in good faith that it would not solve applicable. By previously enacting necessary legislation on the yearly
and remedy the problem of house rentals as explained by him in his Government appropriation and on the appropriation of funds for the
communication to the House of Representatives of June 21, 1947, setting expenses incurred in national elections, Congress has shown its
forth his views on the bill. The President may not and could not readiness and ability to cope with the financial problems of the
substitute his opinion however excellent or superior for that of the Government on this point. Republic Act No. 80, approved October 22,
legislature on matters of legislation when Congress has already acted 1946, appropriating funds for the operation of National Government
and expressed its opinion and desire on the matter. from July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947; Republic Act No. 156 appropriating
funds for the fiscal year 1947-48 and Republic Act No. 320, the
With respect to Executive Order No. 192, it will be remembered that appropriation law for the fiscal year 1948-49 show that Congress was in
Congress passed Commonwealth Act No. 728, approved on July 2, 1946, a position and able to provide for the yearly expenditures of the
authorizing the President to regulate, curtail, control, and prohibit the Government. And Republic Act No. 73 appropriating P1,000,000 to
exportation of certain products, merchandise and materials. Under said defray election expenses on March 11, 1947; Republic Act No. 147
appropriating P1,000,000 to defray expenses for the election of 25, 1946, up to the present time. Its determination will also decide
provincial city and municipal officials and eight senators held on whether or not the President may still exercise his emergency powers in
November 11, 1947, and Republic Act No. 235 appropriating P100,000 the future on matters and subjects not heretofore withdrawn by the
for the special elections held on March 23, 1948, to fill vacancies in Legislature. Because of my disagreement with the majority on this point,
Representative District No. 4 of Iloilo and No. 1 of Leyte, demonstrated I deem it necessary to explain and elaborate on my reasons for my
the ability of the Congress to appropriate money for election purposes. disagreement.
By so doing Congress had tacitly and impliedly withdrawn this portion of
the field where the President may under his emergency power legislate For purposes of reference and to facilitate the same, I am reproducing
or promulgate rules and regulations. Commonwealth Act No. 671 in full as well as section 26, Article VI of the
Constitution on which said Act is based:
In this connection, it may be stated that in my opinion, the theory
underlying the delegation of emergency powers to the under AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A
Commonwealth Act No. 671 and the similar laws is that the legislature RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
because of the emergency resulting from the war, would be unable to AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
meet in order to legislate or although able to meet, because of the REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
emergency, the ordinary process of legislation would be too slow and
inadequate and could not cope with the emergency. So, as a remedy, the Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
power and authority of legislation are vested temporarily in the hands of
one man, the Chief Executive. But as regards Executive Orders Nos. 225 SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and
and 226, the legislature has demonstrated that not only it could meet but other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
also it could legislate on this point of appropriations by approving Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with
general appropriation laws for the different fiscal years since liberation extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
as well as appropriations for the necessary funds for the different
national and provincial elections. Consequently, there no longer was any SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the
necessity for Presidential legislation in this regard. Moreover, and this is Constitution, the President is hereby authorize, during the
not unimportant, the failure of the Legislature to pass an appropriation existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
law for the fiscal year 1949-50 and a law appropriating funds for the regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national
elections in November, 1949 was not due to any emergency resulting policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among
from the war, contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 671, but rather other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the
and possibly due to lack of time and because of the rather abrupt and Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments,
adjourning of the last session of the Legislature last May. offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the
Government of the Commonwealth including the determination
As already stated, the majority holds that Act No. 671 ceased to have of the order of precedence of the heads of the heads of Executive
force and effect on May 25, 1946. The other view is that it is still in force. Departments; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches,
To me this is the main and the more important issue involved in these departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of
cases. In fact the argument of the parties centered on this point. The government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to
importance of this issue may readily be appreciated when it is realized continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or
that on its determination is based, not only the validity or nullity otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the
(according to the theory of the majority opinion), of the four Executive operation or application of those of an administrative character;
Orders now under consideration, but also of all the Executive Orders (e) to impose new taxes to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish
promulgated under authority of Commonwealth Act No. 671 after May those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of
 bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the delegated legislative powers, there would be the serious anomaly of two
proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or legislative bodies acting at the same time, namely, the Legislature and
municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that the Executive, "mutually nullifying each other's action" ; that the limited
he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of period fixed in Commonwealth Act No. 671 for its life and effectiveness
credits or the payments of debts; and (i) to exercise such other as required by the Constitution is the interval from the passage of said
powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to Act and the moment that Congress could convene, not in special session
fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce the where its power of legislation is limited by the Chief Executive in his call
authority. for special session, but in regular session where it could be free to enact
general legislation; and that unless this automatic ending or cessation of
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as Act No. 671 is so held, there would be need of another Act or legislation
practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the by the Congress to repeal Act No. 671 in which case, the Chief Executive
Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations may by his veto power effectively block any effort in this direction.
promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
I beg to differ with the foregoing thesis. I believe that, as I already had
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules occasion to state though incidentally, the real reason for the delegation
and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and of legislative powers to the Chief Executive is not only because the
effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise Legislature is unable to meet due to a national emergency but also
provide. because although it could and does actually meet, whether in regular or
special session, it is not in a position and able to cope with the problems
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by brought about by and arising from the emergency, problems which
law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to require urgent and immediate action. Certainly, one man can act more
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and quickly and expeditiously than about one hundred members of the
regulations to carry our a declared national policy. (Section 26, Legislature, especially when they are divided into legislative chambers.
Article VI, Constitution.) That is why in times of emergency, much as we in democratic countries
dislike the system or idea of dictatorship, we hear of food dictator, fuel
I fully agree with the majority when in its opinion it says: dictator, transportation dictator, civilian evacuation dictator, etc., where
the functions which ordinarily belong to a council or board or to a
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of legislative body, are entrusted under certain limitations to one single
its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in official or individual.
its nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be sub-
served, and its relation to the Constitution. (Page 5, majority Supposing that during a national emergency and while the Legislature is
opinion.) in session, the legislators woke up one morning to find that there was
extreme scarcity of imported food, fuel, building materials, equipment
The main thesis of the majority is that the only reason for the delegation required in agriculture and industry, etc., because of a monopoly,
of legislative powers to the Chief Executive under the Constitution, such hoarding, injurious speculation, manipulation, private controls and
as was done under Commonwealth Act No. 671 was because due to the profiteering, or that there were wide-spread lockouts and strikes
emergency resulting from the war, the Legislature could not meet to paralyzing transportation, commerce and industry, or rampant
enact legislation; that the moment of Legislature could convene there espionage or sabotage endangering the very life and security of the
would no longer be any reason for the exercise by the President of nation. How much time would it take the legislature to enact the
emergency powers delegated to him; that if, when the Legislature could necessary legislation in order to cope with the situation and pass the
meet and actually is in session, the President is allowed to exercise his necessary emergency measures?
We are familiar with the practice and routine of enacting laws. A bill is (b) Commonwealth Act No. 496, authorizing the President to
introduced in the Legislature; it is referred to the corresponding take over, for use or operation by the Government, any public
committee, it is studied by said committee, which in some cases holds service or enterprise and to pay just compensation in the
public hearings; the committee discusses the bill and sometimes manner to be determined by him and to prescribe and
introduces amendments; if the bill is not killed in the committee or promulgate regulations he may deem essential to carry out the
shelved, it is submitted to the chamber for study, discussion and possible purposes of the Act;
amendment by all the members; it is finally voted and if approved, it is
sent to the other house where it undergoes the same process; and if it is (c) Commonwealth Act No. 498 declaring a state of national
finally approved by both houses of Congress, it is submitted to the Chief emergency due to a state of war among several nations and as a
Executive for his study and approval or veto. All these may consume measure to prevent scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious
weeks or months as a result of which, ordinarily, many bills finally speculations, profiteering, etc. affecting the supply, distribution
approved by the Congress could be sent to the President for approval or movement of foods, clothing, fuel, building materials, agricultural
veto only after adjournment of the legislative session. And we should not equiptments etc. authorized the President to purchase any of the
overlook the fact that in some cases for lack of time of due to articles or commodities available for storage, for re-sale or
disagreement among the legislators or between the two houses of distribution, to fix the maximum selling price of said articles or
Congress, important pieces of legislations like the annual appropriation commodities and to promulgated such rules and regulations as
law for the fiscal year 1949-50, appropriation of funds for the election to he may deem necessary; and
be held in November, 1949, contained in Executive Orders Nos. 225 and
226, involved in the present cases, and the proposed amendment to the (d) Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President in
Election Code etc. have not been passed by Congress in its last session view of the existence of a state of national emergency to reduce
ending last May, 1949, which session lasted one hundred days. If we the expenditures of the executive departments of the
were to rely on the ordinary process of legislation to meet a national Government by the suspension or abandonment of service,
emergency, by the time the necessary and needed law is passed, the activities, or operations of no immediate importance.
situation sought to be remedied, or the problem sought to be solved may
have become disastrous or ended in calamity or gone beyond legislation At the time, September, 1939 the second world war was only in Europe,
or any remedy. It would be too late. It would be like locking the stable quite far from the Philippines and had just begun. There was then no
door after the horse had been stolen. likelihood of the Philippines being involved in the war until more than
two years later, in December, 1941. The National Assembly was then
Now, for some retrospect. The Philippine National Assembly delegated free to meet either in regular or special session to enact legislation to
its legislative powers because of the existence of a state of national meet the emergency. In fact, it met in regular session in January, 1941
emergency as early as the year 1939. During its second special session of lasting 100 days and in January, 1941 for another regular session of 100
that year, it promulgated the following laws: days, excluding the several special session held during those two years.
And yet the Assembly delegated legislative powers to the President
(a) Commonwealth Act No. 494, authorizing the President of the under section 26, Article II of the Constitution. This is clear proof that,
Philippines to suspend until the time of the adjournment of the contrary to the theory of the majority opinion, the Legislature delegated
next regular session of the National Assembly, either wholly or legislative powers to the President even when it could meet and it
partially and under such conditions as he may deem proper, the actually met several times.
operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444, commonly known as
the Eight Hour Labor Law; After passing the Acts just mentioned delegating legislative powers to
the President, the Assembly in its fourthly special session on August 19,
1940 repeated and reiterated this practice and policy by passing
Commonwealth Act No. 600 delegating additional and more extensive in Commonwealth Act No. 671 ended only on May 25, 1946, then the
powers to the President in spite of the fact that the war was still far away extensive legislative powers delegated to the President under that Act
in Europe and there was no danger or prospect of involving the could be exercised and in fact they were exercised during the five special
Philippines, and the Legislature was still free to meet as in fact it met session of Congress in the year 1945, which lasted a total of 84 days.
again in regular session in January, 1941. During its regular session During those special session of 1945, President Osmeña issued several
begun that month and year, instead of stopping or ending the legislative Executive Orders in the exercise of his emergency powers.
powers delegated to the President, because according to the theory of
the majority opinion, the Legislature was able to meet, the Assembly Is there further proof needed to show that the suggested and feared
allowed them to continue by passing Commonwealth Act No. 620 which anomaly and impropriety of the Legislature and the Executive both
merely amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 600. I repeat that exercising legislative functions simultaneously, is more fancied than
all this, far from supporting the view of the majority that the Legislature real? The situation was contemplated and expressly intended by the
delegated legislative powers to the President only because it could not Legislature itself, evidently believing that said condition or state of
meet, fairly and squarely refutes said view. affairs was neither anomalous nor improper. There is to my mind really
no incompatibility. At such a time and during the period of their
Now, let us consider the theory of the majority that it would be a great simultaneous functioning, the Legislature may perform its ordinary
anomaly to have two legislative bodies, the Legislature and the President legislative duties taking its time to study, consider, amend and pass bills,
to be acting at the same time, each nullifying the acts of the other. I fail to reserving to the President matters requiring and demanding immediate
see the suggested anomaly. In fact, under the view and interpretation action.
given by the majority of the delegation of contemplated the
simultaneous functioning of the Legislature and the President, both After all, it is for the Legislature to say whether it wants the President to
exercising legislative powers. And it is a fact that there were several exercise his emergency powers at the same time that it is in session. It
instances of the legislature and the President both validly and may validly and properly stipulate in its grant of emergency powers that
simultaneously exercising legislative powers. they be exercised when the Legislature is not in session. In fact, in one
instance, in Commonwealth Act No. 500, section 2, the Notional
Under section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 496 already referred to, Assembly expressly provided "that the authority herein given shall be
approved on September 30, 1939, the power delegated to the President exercised only when the National Assembly is not in session." When in
to prescribe rules and regulations he may deem essential to carry out the its other acts of delegation, like Commonwealth Act 671, the Legislature
purposes of the Act, namely, the taking over of and operation by the not only fails to stipulate this condition, but on the contrary,
Government of any public service or enterprise and to pay for the same, contemplates Presidential exercise of legislative powers simultaneously
was to last until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session with the Legislature, it is to be presumed that the Legislature intended it
of the National Assembly. This means that, during the regular session of and saw nothing improper or anomalous in it, and it is not for the Court
the Assembly which begun in January, 1940 and lasted 100 days, the to pass upon the supposed impropriety or anomaly.
President could exercise the emergency powers delegated to him. Again,
under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 the President could and As to the possibility of the Chief Executive validly and successfully
indeed he exercised his emergency powers during the regular session of nullifying the acts of the Legislature, to me that is quite remote, if not
the Assembly which began in January, 1941, when President Quezon impossible. As already stated at the beginning of this opinion, the Chief
issued at least nine Executive Orders numbered 321, 333, 335, 337, 339, Executive acting as an agent of the Legislative under his emergency
340, 342, 344 and 345. powers, may not go against the wishes and policies of his principal. He
can only carry out its wishes and policies, and where his acts and orders
The same thing obtains under Commonwealth Act 671. Since under the run counter to those of the Legislature, or operate on a field already
view of the majority the emergency power of the President granted him withdrawn because the Legislature had already acted therein, his acts or
Executive Orders must give way and will be declared void and of no purpose and effect to legislation enacted by the Legislature; that he may
effect, by the Courts, as we are doing with the Executive Orders involved reenact his rules and regulations after being repealed by the legislature,
in these cases. and that he may even veto a bill passed by Congress repealing the Act of
delegation and ending his emergency powers. It is a fear not well
With respect to the claim of the majority opinion that unless the founded. It runs counter to the presumption that the Chief Executive like
emergency powers were made to end at the time the President made his any other public official would perform his functions and conduct
report to Congress when it convened, it would be necessary to enact new himself in every respect for the good and welfare of the people and in
legislation to repeal the act of delegation, in which case the period for accordance with the Constitution. It is fear based on the presumption
the delegation would be unlimited, indefinite, and uncertain, contrary to that the Legislature and the Chief Executive are at loggerheads, working
the constitutional provision, I may say that the President was authorized at cross purposes and that the President though acting as a mere agent
by Act 671 to exercise emergency powers "during the existence of the of his principal, the legislature, would brazenly repudiate his principal
emergency," and not a day longer. To me that is a limited period in and even challenge its authority, and that the Chief Executive is so much
contemplation of the Constitution. There would be no need for a new law in love with his emergency powers that he would perpetuate them by
to repeal the Act of delegation, for said Act is self-liquidating. The going as far as vetoing an act of Congress ending said emergency powers.
moment the emergency ceases, the law itself automatically ceases to Let it be said to the credit of and in justice to the different Chief
have force and effect, and the Presidential emergency powers also end Executives who have wielded these emergency powers, President
with it. Quezon, Osmeña, Roxas and the present incumbent President Quirino,
that no accusing finger has ever been pointed at them, accusing or even
Under my view, had the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese insinuating that they have abused their emergency powers or exercised
forces, which we feared and expected in December, 1941 failed to them for any purpose other than the welfare of the country, or that they
materialize either because the invasion was repelled or because the had maliciously acted contrary to the wishes of the Legislatures. Even
Japanese high command at the last moment decided to by-pass the after liberation there has been no claim not even from the Legislatures
Philippines and divert his forces further south to invade, say Australia, itself, to the knowledge of this Court, at least to that of the undersigned,
or if the Pacific war had ended as we all or most of us then expected it to that any Chief Executive exercised his delegated powers, knowing that
end sooner within weeks or months after its commencement and that they had ended or had abused the same.
the emergency resulting therefrom had also ceased soon thereafter,
Commonwealth Act No. 671 would have automatically ceased to have There is no charge or insinuation that any of the Executive Orders which
force and effect right in the year 1942 without any affirmative act or law we are now holding to be invalid were issued from the ulterior motives
of the Legislature. There would be no point or reason for the President or to further and favor the political interest of the President issuing
to continue exercising emergency powers when there no longer was any them. It is admitted in the majority opinion that Executive Order No. 62,
emergency. But under the view of the majority, emergency or no seeking to regulate house and lot rentals was issued in good faith by
emergency even if Congress could meet in special session to enact President Roxas. Executive Order No. 192 was issued to regulate
general legislation, the country must continue to be ruled by the exports, President Quirino presumably believing that exports at this
Presidential decree until the next regular session of Congress which may time still needed regulation and control as was formerly provided by
not come till may months later. In my opinion this is not logical. To me Congress in its Act No. 728, and that the matter was still within the field
the real and only reason and test for the continuance of the exercise of of his emergency powers as was also mistakenly believed by President
emergency powers is the continued existence of the emergency, not the Roxas in issuing Executive Order No. 52. As to Executive Order No. 226,
inability of the Congress to meet in regular session. it merely appropriated funds to defray the expenses in connection with
the holding of the national elections in November, 1949, without which,
The majority, and the parties who initiated these proceedings in court said election could not be held. With respect to Executive Order No. 225,
fear that the President may promulgate rules and regulations contrary in it merely continues in force Republic Act 320 which appropriated funds
for the last fiscal year inasmuch as Congress had failed to pass a General showing that the real reason underlying the delegation of legislative
Appropriation Act for the operation of the National Government for the powers is not inability of Legislature to meet but rather it inability to
period beginning July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950. There is no insinuation consider and pass legislation in time to meet an emergency which
that any political motives or purposes are involved in these Executive requires as it does urgent and immediate action and can be solved only
Orders. by the exercise of legislative functions by one single responsible
individual, unhamppered by study and prolonged discussion by many
I agree with the majority that since the Constitution provides that the members of the legislative body, but also by the fact that although since
delegation of legislative powers by the Legislature should be done for a 1939 when the second world war broke out in Europe and for a period
limited period, it is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was of more than two years thereafter, when the National Assembly could
approved with this limitation in view. I even agree to its definition of the still meet and in fact convened on several occasions and for hundreds of
word "limited." But I submit that Commonwealth Act No. 671 itself, days in regular and special session, nevertheless, it had been delegating
limited its operation and effectiveness to and make it coextensive with legislative powers to the President.
the duration of the emergency resulting from the war and that
furthermore, that duration is a limited period within the meaning and The majority view finds no support in the law. Section 26, Article VI of
contemplation of the Constitution. Surely the emergency resulting from the Constitution does not impose this condition or requirement. The
the war contemplated by the National Assembly when it acted Act No. only important conditions imposed by the Constitution are that there be
671 is not permanent or indefinite. It is of limited duration. It may be a national emergency and delegation be for a limited period. The same
long or it may be short; but it cannot be for always. It has an end. thing is true with Act No. 671 which makes the delegation. The only
Presumably the members of the National Assembly thought that the condition imposed by section 2 of said Act is that the delegated powers
emergency would not last as long as it did. The belief entertained at the be exercised during the emergency. Neither in the Constitution nor in
time by not a few, in fact by a great portion of the people here not Commonwealth Act No. 671 is there any hint or insinuation, much less
excluding the legislators, was that the war with Japan would be of short express mention about the inability of the Legislature to meet. When
duration, a question of months at the longest; that American every consideration for clearness and for Executive and Judicial
reinforcements would come at the beginning of the year 1942 and drive guidance loudly called for and demanded an unequivocal and clear
away the invading Japanese armies if they ever were able to occupy the expression of Constitutional and legislative intent, both laws, the source
Philippines and that, consequently, the war as far as these islands were and basis of the emergency powers are conspicuously silent on this
concerned and the resulting emergency would soon pass away. The point. The only conclusion is that neither the framers of the Constitution
wisdom or lack of wisdom of the National Assembly in limiting or rather nor the members of the National Assembly had thought of much less
making the life and effectiveness of Commonwealth Act No. 671 intended to impose this condition. To sustain the majority view would
coextensive with the resulting emergency, viewed in the light of what require reading into the law what is not there. In further support of its
had actually happened, cannot be passed upon this Court. So, as I see it, view that emergency powers may be exercised by the President only
so long as the emergency resulting from the War continues, until the Legislature could meet, the majority finds comfort in and cites
Commonwealth Act No. 671 subsists and so long the Chief Executive section 3 of Act 671 which reads as follows:
retains his emergency powers.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as
The majority believes that as already stated, Act No. 671 was in force practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the
only until Congress could meet resume its legislatives functions. Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation
Naturally, this view is based on the theory that legislative functions in promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
times of emergency are delegated only because of the inability of the
Legislative Department to meet and exercise its functions. I believe I I fail to see anything in said section that warrants a holding that upon
have successfully demonstrated the flaw in this theory, not only by filing his report with Congress, about the rules and regulation
promulgated by him under his emergency powers under Commonwealth automatically lost his emergency powers. But the majority opinion
Act 671, his emergency powers automatically ceased. I could well qualifies this convening of the Congress, for it says that it must be a
imagine that under an act of delegation of legislative powers where the regular session and not a special session, thereby extending the life of
President is authorized to perform one single act such as the suspension Commonwealth act No. 671 one year longer, to May, 1946 when
of the eight-hour labor law under Commonwealth Act No. 494, or the Congress held its first regular session after liberation. I do not quite see
reduction of the expenditures of the executive departments of the the necessity or the reason for the distinction made between the special
National Government by the suspension or abandonment of services, and regular session, for at both sessions Congress could well receive the
activities or operations of no immediate necessity under Commonwealth report of the President. The reason given is that "in a special session
Act No. 500, when the President has exercised his delegated authority Congress may consider general legislation or only such subjects as he
and made his report to the Assembly as required by said laws, the latter, (President) may designate." But as a matter of fact, the first two special
as well as his delegated authority thereunder automatically ceased, for sessions called by President Osmeña in 1945, after liberation, each for a
the simple reason that nothing remains to be performed or done. period of thirty days were both to consider general legislation. So,
However, treating of the grant of extensive emergency powers as was actually there is no reason for the distinction.
done under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671 where said laws
contemplated many different acts, rules and regulations of varied Furthermore, if it were the intention of the Legislature to fix the time at
categories and objectives and to be performed not at one at time or which Commonwealth Act No. 671 would cease in its operation as of the
instance but at different times during the existence of the emergency, as date when the President could file his report before Congress when it
the need or occasion arose, there is no reason for the belief or the first convened not in special session but in regular session, it would have
holding that upon submitting a partial report, the whole law making the expressly and unequivocally said so. In its other acts of delegation of
delegation including his powers under it automatically ended. The powers when the legislature wanted to have the report of the President
legislature during the emergency might be able to convene and at its regular session, it expressly and explicitly said so. In section 3 of
naturally, the President will immediately make his report to it of the Commonwealth Act 494, in section 5 of Commonwealth Act 496, in
rules and regulations promulgated by him up to that time; but if the section 6 of Commonwealth Act 498, in section 3 of Commonwealth Act
emergency continued or even became more serious, would it be 500 and in section 4 of Commonwealth Act 600, the National Assembly
reasonable to hold that his emergency powers ended right then and provided that the President shall report to the National Assembly within
there? Would it not be more logical and reasonable to believe that ten days after the opening of the next regular session of the said
inasmuch as the grant and the exercise of his emergency powers were Assembly of whatever acts have been taken by him under the authority
motivated by and based upon the existence of the emergency and since of those Acts. The Assembly left nothing for interpretation or
the emergency continued his work and responsibility were not ended speculation. In section 3 of Commonwealth Act 671, however, the same
and that his partial report could not possibly affect the continuance of Assembly has not specified the kind of session before which the
his emergency powers? President should make his report. It merely said that upon the convening
of the Congress the President shall report thereto all the rules and
Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 provides for the filing of a regulations promulgated by him. We should make no distinction where
report with Congress by the President as soon as that body convened. the law makes or calls for none. Here again, to support the majority
According to the majority opinion on that date the whole Act No. 671 opinion would require reading into the law, section 3 of Act 671,
ceased to have force and effect. Under that theory, as soon as the something that is not there.
Congress convened in June, 1945, and it is to be presumed that President
Osmeña, complying with his duty, must have made his report of all the In case like the present where there is room for doubt as to whether or
numerous Executive Orders he had issued so far, perhaps including not Commonwealth Act No. 671 has ceased to operate, one view (of the
those issued by his predecessor President Quezon who because of his majority) being that it automatically ceased to have any force and effect
premature death was unable to report his acts to Congress, the President on May 25, 1946, the other view being that the law operated as long as
the emergency resulting from the war existed, the opinion of and the contrary to the very view of the National Assembly which passed said
obvious interpretation given by the legislature which enacted the law Act 600. Commonwealth Act No. 620 of the National Assembly passed
and made the delegation of powers and the President to whom the during that "next regular session" and approved on June 6, 1941 merely
delegation was made and who exercised said powers, should have much amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act 600, which enumerated the
if not decisive weight. We must bear in mind that we are not passing powers delegated to the Chief Executive. It left the rest of the provisions
upon the validity or constitutionality of a law enacted by the Legislature, and sections of Commonwealth Act 600 intact. So that, under section 4
in which case, the Court may find the act invalid and unconstitutional if it (which was left intact) of Act 600, the President was still required to
is in violation of the basic law, regardless of the opinion or interpretation report to National Assembly within the first 10 days from the date of the
given by the Legislature that passed it or of the Executive Department opening of its next regular session which should have begun in January,
which may be trying to enforce it. We assume that Act No. 671 is valid 1942, despite the fact that he had already made a report to the
and constitutional. Here, we are merely trying to ascertain the intention Legislature in January, 1941. Incidentally, this answer and refutes the
of the National Assembly as to the life and period of effectiveness of contention of the majority that the law of delegation of powers
Commonwealth Act No. 671. contemplated only one meeting of the Congress at which the President
was to report his acts of emergency, and that said report was to be the
Do the study and analysis of other acts of the Legislature similar to first and the last.
Commonwealth Act 671, favor the view of the majority? The answer in
my opinion is clearly and decidedly in the negative. The majority cites Now, what inference may be drawn from this amending of section 1 only
the Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 to support the theory that of Commonwealth Act No. 600 by Commonwealth Act No. 620? The
Commonwealth Act 671 automatically ceased to operate Congress met at logical conclusion is that in promulgating Commonwealth Act 620 on
its next regular session. But the logical inference or conclusion to be June 6, 1941, the National Assembly all along regarded Commonwealth
drawn from these two acts is, in my opinion, just the reverse. It is even Act No. 600 which delegated legislative powers to the President as still
fatal to the view of the majority as I shall attempt to show. Let us in force and effect despite the report filed with the Assembly by the
consider Commonwealth Act 600 delegating extensive legislative powers President at the beginning of its regular session in January, 1941. When
to the President, approved on August 19, 1940, which like Act 671 is the Legislature merely amends a section of a law, leaving the rest of said
silent as to any express provision regarding its life or period of law intact and unchanged, the logical inference and conclusion is that the
effectiveness, and as to how long the emergency powers granted the amended law was still in force because you cannot amend a law which is
President by it will last. Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 600 like no longer in force. The only thing that could be done with a law that has
section 3 of Act 671 provides that "the President shall within the first ten ceased to operate is to reenact it. But in passing Commonwealth Act 620
days from the date of the opening of the Assembly's next regular session in July, 1941, the Assembly did not reenacted Commonwealth Act No.
report to said Assembly whatever action he had taken under the 600. By merely amending one of its sections, the Assembly, as late as
authority therein granted." Said section 4 of Act 600 is clearly and more June 1941, considered said Act 600 as still effective and in operation and
specific than section 3 of Act 671 in that it clearly specifies the next consequently, the emergency powers of the President continued and
regular session whereas the latter refers merely to the convening of subsisted despite his previously having made a report of his actions in
Congress. But let us assume arguendo as contended by the majority that January 1941. This squarely refutes the theory that as soon as the
"the convening of the Congress" mentioned in section 3 of President filed his report on the exercise of his emergency powers with
Commonwealth Act 671, referred to regular session. According to the the Legislature, the Act making the delegation ceased to operate and the
majority opinion, under section 4 of the Commonwealth Act No. 600, as President lost his emergency powers.
soon as the President made the report of the National Assembly at its
"next regular session" which was to be and was actually held in January, As I have already stated in the course of this opinion, in connection with
1941, Commonwealth Act 600 automatically ceased to operate and the another phrase of this case from January to June, 1941, President
President automatically lost his delegated legislative powers. But this Quezon had issued at least eight Executive Orders in the exercise of his
emergency powers, by authority of Commonwealth Act 600. From this it executive departments, offices, agencies, etc. and Executive Order No.
is evident that he did not share the majority view, because despite his 100 was promulgated on October 23, 1947, after the expiration of the
having made his report to the Assembly in January, 1941, and even one year period. Furthermore, it is a matter of common knowledge that
before the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 620, he believed and during the last session of Congress which ended in May, 1949, there was
considered Commonwealth Act No. 600 as still in force after that date talk if not a movement in the Congress to end the emergency powers of
and that he still retained his emergency powers. the President. Nothing concrete in the form of legislation or resolution
was done, for if we are to accept newspaper reports and comment, the
Then, let us see what was the attitude and conduct of the Chief Executive members of Congress or at least a majority of them were willing and
and of Congress after May 25, 1946, when according to the majority satisfied to have the Chief Executive continue in the exercise of his
opinion Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to operate. After May 25, emergency powers until the end of 1949. All this leads to no other
1946, two Presidents, Roxas and Quirino had issued numerous Executive conclusion but that Congress believed all along that Commonwealth Act
Orders based upon and invoking Commonwealth Act No. 671. Like No. 671 is still in force and effect.
President Quezon, they also evidently were of the opinion that despite
the meeting of the Legislature in regular session the act delegating If Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and effect the question
legislative powers to them (in the case of Roxas and Quirino— arises: how long and for what period will said Act continue to operate?
Commonwealth Act No. 671) was still in force, that they still retained As I have already stated, I believe that the delegation of emergency
their emergency powers and so proceeded to exercise them in good powers was made coextensive with the emergency resulting from the
faith. war, as long as that emergency continues and unless the Legislature
provides otherwise, Act 671 will continue to operate and the President
Congress also, evidently, believed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was may continue exercising his emergency powers.
still in force and effect after said date, May 25, 1946. In spite of the
several legislative sessions, regular and special since then and up to and The last and logical question that one will naturally ask is: has the
including the year 1949, Congress has not by law or resolution said emergency resulting from the war passed or does it still exist? This is a
anything questioning or doubting the validity of said Executive Order on fair and decisive question inasmuch as the existence of the emergency is,
the score of having been promulgated after Commonwealth Act No. 671 my opinion, the test and the only basis of the operation or cessation of
had supposedly ceased to operate. Not only this, but at least in one Act 671. The existence or non-existence of the emergency resulting from
instance, Congress had by a law promulgated by it, considered one of the war is a question of fact. It is based on conditions obtaining among
those supposed illegal Executive Orders promulgated after May 25, the people and in the country and perhaps even near and around it. It is
1946, to be valid. I refer to Republic Act No. 224 approved on June 5, highly controversial question on which people may honestly differ.
1948, creating the National Airport Corporation which considered and There are those who in all good faith believe and claim that conditions
treated as valid Executive Order No. 100, dated October 21, 1947, by have returned to normal; that the people have now enough to eat,
providing in section 7 of said Republic Act No. 224 for the abolishment of sometimes even more than they had before the war; that people
the Office of the Administrator of the Manila International Airport nowadays especially in the cities are better nourished and clothed and
established under the provisions of said Executive Order No. 100 and the transported and better compensated for their labor, and that the
transfer of the personnel and funds created under the same Executive President himself in his speeches, chats and messages had assured the
Order to the National Airport Corporation. This Executive Order No. 100 public that normal times have returned, that the problem of peace and
which appropriated public funds and therefore, was of a legislative order had been solved, that the finances of the Government and the
nature must have been issued under Commonwealth Act No. 671. It national economy are sound, and that there is an adequate food supply.
cannot possibly be regarded as having been promulgated by authority of It is therefore, claimed that there is no longer any emergency resulting
Republic Act No. 51, for said Act approved on October 4, 1946, gave the from the war.
President only one year within which to reorganize the different
On the other hand, it is asserted with equal vehemence in the opposite controversy. It does not have the facilities to obtain and acquire the
camp that conditions are still far from normal; that the picture painted necessary facts and data on which to base a valid and just decision.
by the President in cheerful and reassuring colors is based on over Neither did it have the opportunity to receive the necessary evidence as
optimism and, as to be expected, calculated to show in bold relief the in a hearing or trial at which evidence, oral or documentary, is
achievements of the administration, and so should be considered with introduced. We cannot invoked and resort to judicial notice because this
some allowance; that we are now importing more rice than before the refers to things of public knowledge, and not controverted, whereas
war for the reason that many rice farms are idle because of the farmer's things, facts and conditions necessary for the determination of whether
fear of or interference by dissidents; that the problem of peace and order or not there is still an emergency, are often not of public knowledge but
is far from solved as shown by the frequent hold-ups, kidnapping, require investigation, accurate reporting and close contact with the
loothing and killings and organized banditry not only in Luzon but also people to be able to ascertain their living conditions, their needs, their
in the Visayas and Mindanao; that whereas before the war, the fears, etc.
Constabulary force consisting of only about 6,000 officers and men could
provide complete protection to life and property and was adequate in all To me, the department of the Government equipped and in a position to
respects to enforce peace and order, now this Constabulary enlarged to decide this question of emergency are the Chief Executive and the
about 20,000 men, provided with modern weapons and equipment and Legislature. The first has at his command and beck and call all the
with the aid of thousands of civilians guards and of the Philippine Army executive officials and departments. He has the Army, the Constabulary,
and Air Force cannot solve the peace and order problem; that the Naval Patrol, the Police of the cities and towns and the barrio lieutenants
dissidents who are well organized, armed and disciplined even attack to inform him of the state of peace and order and the security of the
and sack towns and sometimes openly defy and engage the armed states. He has the Secretary of Education and all the subordinates
Government forces; that as long as more than 100,000 firearms are loose officers and the school officials under him to inform him as to whether
and in the hands of irresponsible parties, not excluding the seemingly or not there is a school crisis or emergency as a result of the war. He has
regular mysterious supply to them of additional firearms and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and his men to
ammunitions, there can be no peace and order; and as to the barrio folks advise him as to the agricultural needs and the food supply of the
in central Luzon and now, even in provinces bordering central Luzon country. He has the Secretary of Finance and all the officials under him
whose parents and relatives had been killed by dissidents, whose to inform him of the finances of the Government and the economy of the
women folk had been outraged by the same elements, whose homes had country as well as the officials to advise him of the land shipping
been looted and burned and whose very lives had been subjected to transportation situation. In other words, the President is in a position to
constant terror and peril, compelling them to leave their homes and determine whether or not there is still an emergency as a result of the
their farms and evacuate to and be concentrated in the poblaciones to war.
live there in utter discomfort and privation, it is said that it would be
difficult to convince these unfortunate people that normalcy has As to Congress, it is equally in a position and in fact it is the first to called
returned and that there is no longer any emergency resulting from the upon to decide as to the existence or non-existence of an emergency.
war. To further support the claim of the existence of an emergency, the According to the Constitution, section 24, Article VI, either House of
menace of communism not only at home, particularly in central Luzon Congress may call upon the head of any department of the Government
but from abroad, especially China, is invoked. And it is asserted that all on any matter pertaining to his departure. The members of Congress
this is a result of the war. come from all parts and the far corners of the country. They are
supposed to be in close contact with their constituents and know at first
I repeat that this question of the existence of an emergency is a hand their needs, the way they live, etc. Congress therefore should know.
controversial one, the decision on which must be based on the Moreover, it is the legislature that must first determine as to whether or
ascertainment of facts, circumstances and conditions and the situation not there is a national emergency as a condition precedent to the
obtaining in the country. This Court is not in a position to decide that
delegation of its legislative powers. Naturally, it is the one that is called The answer or answers to this question lie with the Chief Executive.
upon to say when that emergency ceases. Congress will not meet in regular session until next year. It is not for the
court, not even the undersigned to suggest the calling of a special
Now, one will ask, what does Congress think about the emergency? Does legislative session to cope with the perilous situation thus created, altho
it believe that it still exists? To me the answer is YES. What has been said one may regard that as a logical remedy. But, should the President call a
about the acts, conduct and attitude of the legislature as to its belief that special session and Congress for one reason or another fails to meet or
Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force, are all applicable and may be though it meets, for one reason or another it fails to pass an
repeated to show that the Congress believes that the emergency appropriation law, then a real crisis will have ensued. I am confident that
resulting from the war still exist. Under the theory that I maintain, the Chief Executive, conscious of his responsibility as the Chief of the
Congress must be of the opinion that the emergency still exists for the nation would not just stand supine and idle and see the Government of
reason that as I have shown Congress believes that Commonwealth Act the Republic of the Philippines disintegrate and die. He would know
No. 671 is still in force and the life and the operation of said Act depends what to do and he would do something according to his sound discretion
upon and is coextensive with the existence of the emergency. To this and in accordance with the law, statutory or otherwise and in the
may be added the attitude and the belief of the President as to the discharge of his high executive powers, express or implied.
continued existence of the emergency. It must be borne in mind that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 authorizes the President to exercise his TORRES, J., concurring:
emergency powers only during the existence of the emergency. The
inference is that before exercising his emergency powers by I concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor on the
promulgating an Executive Order he must first determine and decide existence of the emergency powers. I reserve my opinion on the validity
that the state of emergency still exists, for that is the condition precedent of Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226.
to the exercise of his delegated powers. In other words, the two
departments of the Government, the Legislative and the Executive REYES, J., concurring and dissenting:
Departments, best qualified and called upon to determine whether or
not the emergency resulting from the war still exists have made manifest The main issue in these cases is whether the emergency which on
in their acts and attitude that they believe that such emergency still December 16, 1941 prompted the approval of Commonwealth Act No.
exists. I may here state that on this question of emergency, I entertain no 671, delegating extraordinary powers to the President, still existed at the
personal opinion either way lacking as I do the means of deciding fairly time the Chief Executive exercised those powers by promulgating the
and justly. Neither has the Court. If the decision of the courts on question executive orders whose validity is now challenged.
of fact involved in a controversy are given due respect and weight and
are binding, it is because such decisions are based on evidence adduced On issue similar to the one just formulated there is a diversity of
and received after a hearing. No such hearing was held for the purpose opinions. While some courts would rather leave the determination of
and no evidence been received. In other words, we have nothing in such issues to the political department of the Government, others are for
which to decide a question of fact which is the existence or non- making the determination subject to judicial review. But the latest ruling
existence of emergency. of the United States Supreme Court on the point accords with first view
and declares that "these are matters of political judgment for which
In view of the conclusion we have arrived at, finding these Executive judges have neither technical competence nor official responsibility."
Orders to be void and of no effect, particularly Executive Orders Nos. 225 (Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883.)
and 226 with the evident result that no funds are appropriated for the
operation of the Government for the fiscal year beginning July of this In any event the existence or non-existence of an emergency is a
year and for the expenses in the coming national election next question of facts which may not always be determine without the
November, one may inquire as to what will happen or what is to be done. evidence by mere reference to facts within the judicial notice. In the
present cases, there has been no trial for the reception of proof, and I am powers only when the Legislature is not session. Much less does it say
not aware that enough facts have been shown to justify the conclusion that the emergency powers shall cease as soon as the Legislature has
that the emergency in question has already ceased. On the other hand, convened in regular session. An emergency resulting from a global war
since the exercise of the emergency powers by the President cannot end with the mere meeting of the Legislature. Neither may be
presupposes a determination of the existence of the emergency, the legislated out of existence. The Legislature, once it was convened, may, if
President must be presumed to have satisfied himself in some it so desire, revoked the emergency powers of the President, but it
appropriate manner that the emergency existed when he issued his cannot by any form of legislative action put an immediate end to the
executive orders. Under the theory of separation of powers and in emergency itself. Well known is a fact that a deliverative body, such as
accord with the latest ruling of the United States Supreme Court, it is not the Legislature, because of the time consumed in the study and
for the judiciary to review the finding of the Executive in this regard. discussion of a measure, may not always act with the promptness which
Judicial review would in such case amount to control of executive the situation requires so that in an emergency there is really need for the
discretion and place the judicial branch above a co-equal department of concentration of power in one man. This may well be the reason why Act
the Government. Only in case of a manifest abuse of the exercise of No. 671 in express terms authorizes the President to exercise the
powers by a political branch of the Government is judicial interference emergency powers "during the existence of the emergency" and not
allowable in order to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. But merely during the time that the Legislature could be in session. For one
with the cold war still going on though the shooting war has already thing to make the life of the emergency powers depend upon the
ended; with the world still in turmoil so much so that the American inability of the Legislature to meet is the same as to declare those
Secretary of the State has declared that "the world has never before in emergency powers automatically ended the moment they were
peace time been as troubled or hazardous as it is right now;" with most conferred, for at that very moment of the Legislature that conferred
of the industries of the country still unrihabilitated, so that a large them was in session.
proportion of our food and other necessaries have to be imported; with a
great portion of the population still living in temporary quarters; with The argument that, unless the emergency powers of the President were
most of the war damage claims still unpaid; and with peace and other made to cease the moment Congress convened in regular session, we
conditions in the country far from normal, it would be presumptuous for should be having two legislatures which could mutually annul each
this Court, without proof of the actual condition obtaining in all parts of other, will not stand analysis. In supposing that the President, in the
the Archipelago, to declare that the President clearly abused his exercise of the emergency powers could "repeal or modify a bill passed
discretion when he considered the emergency not ended at the time he by the Legislature," the argument overlooks the fact that the emergency
promulgated the executive orders now questioned. powers delegated to the President under Article VI, section 26 of the
Constitution could only authorize him "to promulgate rules and
The majority opinion has skirted the issue of whether or not the regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Only the Legislature
question of the existence or continuance of the emergency is one for the (with the concurrence of the President of course) may declare the
political department of the Government to determine by restricting "the President may not, under the Constitution, depart from it. Moreover,
life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature unless the Presidential veto could be overriden, no bill approved by
was prevented from holding session due to enemy action or other causes Congress could become a law if the President did not want it. And if the
brought on by the war." I cannot subscribe to this narrow interpretation President approves a bill and allows it to become a law, surely he can
of Commonwealth Act No. 671, for in my opinion it is contrary to both have no reason for repealing it; while, on the other hand, there is no
the plain language and manifest purpose of that enactment. The law point in his repealing that bill, because if there are enough votes to
invests the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the override his veto there must also be enough votes to repeal his
emergency resulting from the war and it expressly says that the emergency powers.
President is to exercise those powers "during the existence of the
emergency." The Act does not say that the President may exercise the
The majority opinion has I think placed a rather forced construction is my surmise that this provision was intended to guard not only against
upon section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671, which provides that — the inability to meet but also against its usual tardiness and inaction. We
have proof of this last in the last regular session of Congress, when this
The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable body failed to pass measures of pressing necessity, especially the annual
upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report appropriation law and the appropriation for the expenses of the coming
thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under elections.
the powers herein granted.
It is said that the need for an appropriation law for the fiscal year 1949-
As may be seen, the above provision does not say that the President has 1950 as well for the coming elections is not an emergency resulting from
to report only once, that is, the first time Congress is convened, and the war. But I say that if the emergency resulting from the war as
never again. But the majority opinion wants to read that thought into the contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671 still exists, as the President
law in order to bolster up the theory that the emergency powers of the believes it exists or he would not have issued the executive orders in
President would end as soon as Congress could convene in a regular question (and it is not for the Court to change that belief in the absence
session. of proof that the President was clearly wrong) would it not be a
dereliction of duty on his part to fall to provide, during the emergency,
Invoking the rule of contemporary construction, the majority opinion for the continuance of the functions of government, which is only
makes reference to a passage in President Quezon's book. "The Good possible with an appropriation law? What would be gained by issuing
Fight," to the effect that, according to the author, Act No. 671, was only rules and regulations to meet the emergency if there is no Government
"for a certain period" and "would become valid unless re-enacted." But I to enforce and carry them out? The mere calling of a special is no
see nothing in the quoted phrases any suggestion that the emergency guaranty that an appropriation law will be passed or that one will be
powers of the President were to end the moment Congress was passed before the thousands of officials and employees who work for the
convened in regular session regardless of the continuance of the Government have starved. It is, probably, because of these
emergency which gave birth to those powers. A more valid application of considerations that the National Assembly, in approving Commonwealth
the rule of contemporary construction may, I think, be made by citing Act No. 671, specifically empowered the President, during the existence
the executive orders promulgated by President Roxas by Commonwealth of the emergency, "to continue in force laws and appropriations which
Act No. 671. Many of those executive orders were issued after May 25, would lapse or otherwise become inoperative." And that Act has
1946 when Congress convened in regular session, an event which, authorized the President during the existence of the same emergency "to
according to the majority opinion, automatically put an end to the exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the
emergency powers. government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain in force this
authority." Under this specific provision, the appropriation for the
While we have adopted the republican form of government with its expenses of the coming elections would, naturally, come, for, without
three co-equal departments, each acting within its separate sphere, it doubt, it is a measure to enable the Government "to fulfill its
would be well to remember that we have not accepted the American responsibilities."
theory of separation of powers to its full extent. For, profiting from the
experience of America when her Supreme Court, by the application Consistently with the views above express, I am of the opinion that
many a New Deal measure which her Congress had approved to meet a Executive Order No. 225, appropriating funds for the operation of the
national crisis, our Constitutional Convention in 1935, despite the Government of the Republic for the fiscal year 1949-50, and Executive
warning of those who feared a dictatorship in his country, decided to Order No. 226, appropriating funds for the expenses of the coming
depart from the strict theory of separation of powers by embodying a national elections in November, 1949, are valid so that the petition in
provision in our Constitution, authorizing the delegation of legislative G.R. No. L-3054, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. vs. Treasurer of the Philippines,
powers to the President "in times of war or other national emergency." It and the petition in G.R. No. L-3056, Antonio Barredo, etc., vs.
Commissioner on Election, et al., in which the said two executive orders These cases could be, and should be decided separately. If they are, they
are respectively challenged, should be denied. may be disposed of without ruling on the general question whether the
President still has emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No.
But Executive Order No. 62 (regulating rents) and Executive Order No. 7671. How? This way, which is my vote.
192 (controlling exports) stand on a different footing. The validity of
Executive Order No. 62 can no longer be maintained because of the 1. L-2044, Araneta vs. Dinglasan; L-2756, Araneta vs. Angeles. The
approval by the Legislature of Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic President has presently no power to regulate rents, because his power to
Act No. 66, which regulate the same subject matter and which, as an do so is granted by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 which have
expression of the national policy, can not be deviated from by the lapsed. Under Commonwealth Act No. 671 he has no power to regulate
President in the exercise of the emergency powers delegated to him by rents.
Commonwealth Act No. 671. The same is true with respect to Executive
Order No. 192 (controlling exports) in view of the passage of 2. L-3056, Barredo vs. Commission, etc. Dismissed because petitioner has
Commonwealth Act No. 728, regulating the same subject matter, no personality to sue. According to Custodio vs. President of the Senate et
especially because section 4 of said Act terminates the power of the al., 42 Off. Gaz., 1243, a citizen and taxpayer, as such, has no legal
President thereunder on December 31, 1948, if not sooner. standing to institute proceedings for the annulment of a statute.
Consequently, since the validity of these executive orders (Nos. 62 and
192) can no longer be upheld, the petitions in G.R. Nos. L-2044, L-2756 3. L-3054, Rodriguez vs. Treasurer. Dismissed, like the Barredo case. The
and L-3055, which seek to prohibit their enforcement, should be private rights of petitioner and of his partymen are affected only as
granted. taxpayers.

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting: 4. L-3055, Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs. Supposing that the
President still has emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671,
I join in this opinion of Mr. Justice Reyes. I wish to add that I agree with and that they include regulation of exportation, inasmuch as the
Mr. Justice Bengzon that petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 Congress has chosen to legislate on exports (Commonwealth Act No.
have no personality to institute the proceedings. 728), it has thereby pro tanto withdrawn the power delegated to the
President along that field.

It is a sound rule, I believe, for the Court to determine only those

BENGZON, J., dissenting: questions which are necessary to decide a case.

The majority feels that it has to decide the question whether the Although I am favorably impressed by the considerations set forth by
President still has emergency powers; but unable to determine in which Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes on the existence of
of the above cases the issue may properly be decided, it grouped them emergency powers, I prefer to vote as herein indicated.
together. When the eye or the hand is unsure, it is best to shoot at five
birds in a group: firing at one after another may mean as many misses. I reserve the right subsequently to elaborate on the above propositions.

It does not matter that the first two cases had been submitted and voted For lack of the required number of votes, judgment was not obtained.
before the submission of the last three. Neither does it matter that, of However, after rehearing, the required number of votes was had, by
these last, two should be thrown out in accordance with our previous resolution of September 16, 1949, which follows.
rulings. The target must be large.
RESOLUTION SECTION 1. Judges: who may take part. — All matters submitted
to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be
September 16, 1949 deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by
any and all of the justices who are members of the court at the
time when such matters are taken up for consideration and
MORAN, C. J.: adjudication, whether such justices were or not members of the
court and whether they were or were not present at the date of
Petitioners filed motions asking (1) that Mr. Justice Padilla be qualified submission; . . . .
to act in these cases; (2) that the vote cast by the late Mr. Justice
Perpecto before his death be counted in their favor; and (3) that the Under this provision, one who is not a member of the court at the time
opinion of the Chief Justice be counted as a vote for the nullity of an adjudication is made cannot take part in the adjudication. The word
Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226. "adjudication" means decision. A case can be adjudicated only by means
of a decision. And a decision of this Court, to be of value and binding
I force, must be in writing duly signed and promulgated (Article VIII,
sections 11 and 12, of the Constitution; Republic Act No. 296, section 21;
As regards the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, the Court is of the Rule 53, section 7, of the Rules of Court). Promulgated means the
opinion that it must not be considered, it having been presented after delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing and publication.
Mr. Justice Padilla had given his opinion on the merits of these cases. As
we have once said "a litigant . . . cannot be permitted to speculate upon Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of this Court at the time a
the action of the court and raise an objection of this sort after decision decision is signed and promulgated, cannot validly take part in that
has been rendered." (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Heirs of decision. As above indicated, the true decision of the Court is the
Abella, 49 Phil., 374.) decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that
decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court
Furthermore, the fact that Justice Padilla, while Secretary of Justice, had to speak of. The vote cast by a member of the Court after deliberation is
advised the President on the question of emergency powers, does not always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has to
disqualify him to act in these cases, for he cannot be considered as sign the decision that is to be promulgated. That vote is of no value if it is
having acted previously in these actions as counsel of any of the parties. not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice
The President is not here a party. is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their vote,
wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they
All the members of this Court concur in the denial of the motion to have to sign the decision, so that they may take full advantage of what
disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, with the exception of Mr. Justice Ozaeta they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and
and Mr. Justice Feria who reserve their vote. deliberation. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed
and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and after
II the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breast of the Justices, binding
upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may
With respect to the motion to include the vote and opinion of the late Mr. serve for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is
Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases, it appears that Mr. Justice and for designating a member to prepare the decision binding unless
Perfecto died and ceased to be a member of this Court on August 17, and until duly signed and promulgated.
1949, and our decision in these cases was released for publication on
August 26, 1949. Rule 53, section 1, in connection with Rule 58, section And this is practically what we have said in the contempt case against
1, of the Rules of Court, is as follows: Abelardo Subido,1 promulgated on September 28, 1948:
 que un asunto o causa pendiente en esta Corte Suprema solo se this denial. Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Tuason
considera decidido una vez registrada, promulgada y publicada dissent.
la sentencia en la escribania, y que hasta entonces el resultado de
la votacion se estima como una materia absolutamente III
reservada y confidencial, perteneciente exclusivamente a las
camaras interiores de la Corte. In connection with the motion to consider the opinion of the Chief
Justice as a vote in favor of petitioners, the writer has the following to
In an earlier case we had occasion to state that the decisive point is the say:
date of promulgation of judgment. In that case a judge rendered his
decision on January 14; qualified himself as Secretary of Finance on In my previous concurring opinion, I expressed the view that the
January 16; and his decision was promulgated on January 17. We held emergency powers vested in Commonwealth Act No. 671 had ceased in
that the decision was void because at the time of its promulgation the June 1945, but I voted for a deferment of judgment in these two cases
judge who prepared it was no longer a judge. (Lino Luna vs. Rodriquez, because of two circumstances then present, namely, (1) the need of
37 Phil., 186.) sustaining the two executive orders on appropriations as the life-line of
government and (2) the fact that a special session of Congress was to be
Another reason why the vote and opinion of the Mr. Justice Perfecto can held in a few days. I then asked, "Why not defer judgment and wait until
not be considered in these cases is that his successor, Mr. Justice Torres, the special session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it clearly
has been allowed by this Court to take part in the decision on the sees it?"
question of emergency powers because of lack of majority on that
question. And Mr. Justice Torres is not bound to follow any opinion It seemed then to me unwise and inexpedient to force the Government
previously held by Mr. Justice Perfecto on that matter. There is no law or into imminent disruption by allowing the nullity of the executive orders
rule providing that a successor is a mere executor of his predecessor's to follow its reglementary consequences when Congress was soon to be
will. On the contrary, the successor must act according to his own convened for the very purpose of passing, among other urgent measures,
opinion for the simple reason that the responsibility for his action is his a valid appropriations act. Considering the facility with which Congress
and of no one else. Of course, where a valid and recorded act has been could remedy the existing anomaly, I deemed it a slavish submission to a
executed by the predecessor and only a ministerial duty remains to be constitutional formula for this Court to seize upon its power under the
performed for its completion, the act must be completed accordingly. fundamental law to nullify the executive orders in question. A deferment
For instance, where the predecessor had rendered a valid judgment duly of judgment struck me then as wise. I reasoned that judicial
filed and promulgated, the entry of that judgment which is a ministerial statesmanship, not judicial supremacy, was needed.
duty, may be ordered by the successor as a matter of course. But even in
that case, if the successor is moved to reconsider the decision, and he However, now that the holding of a special session of Congress for the
still may do so within the period provided by the rules, he is not bound purpose of remedying the nullity of the executive orders in question
to follow the opinion of his predecessor, which he may set aside appears remote and uncertain, I am compelled to, and do hereby, give
according to what he may believe to be for the best interests of justice. my unqualified concurrence in the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Tuason declaring that these two executive orders were issued without
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the motion to include the vote and authority of law.
opinion of the late Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases must be
denied. While in voting for a temporary deferment of the judgment I was moved
by the belief that the positive compliance with the Constitution by the
Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla, Mr. Justice other branches of the Government, which is our prime concern in all
Montemayor, Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes, and Mr. Justice Torres concur in these cases, would be effected, and indefinite deferment will produce the
opposite result because it would legitimize a prolonged or permanent and Article VIII, section 10 of the Constitution. This theory is made to
evasion of our organic law. Executive orders which are, in our opinion, rest on the ground that said executive orders must be considered as
repugnant to the Constitution, would be given permanent life, opening laws, they having been issued by the Chief Executive in the exercise of
the way to practices which may undermine our constitutional structure. the legislative powers delegated to him.

The harmful consequences which, as I envisioned in my concurring It is the opinion of the Court that the executive orders in question, even
opinion, would come to pass should the said executive orders be if issued within the powers validly vested in the Chief Executive, are not
immediately declared null and void, are still real. They have not laws, although they may have the force of law, in exactly the same
disappeared by reason of the fact that a special session of the Congress is manner as the judgments of this Court, municipal ordinances and
not now forthcoming. However, the remedy now lies in the hands of the ordinary executive orders cannot be considered as laws, even if they
Chief Executive and of Congress, for the Constitution vests in the former have the force of law.
the power to call a special session should the need for one arise, and in
the latter, the power to pass a valid appropriation act. Under Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the only power which, in
times of war or other national emergency, may be vested by Congress in
That Congress may again fall to pass a valid appropriations act is a the President, is the power "to promulgate rules and regulations to carry
remote possibility, for under the circumstances it fully realizes its great out a declared national policy." Consequently, the executive orders
responsibility of saving the nation from breaking down; and issued by the President in pursuance of the power delegated to him
furthermore, the President in the exercise of his constitutional powers under that provision of the Constitution, may be considered only as rules
may, if he so desires, compel Congress to remain in special session till it and regulations. There is nothing either in the Constitution or in the
approves the legislative measures most needed by the country. Judiciary Act requiring the vote of eight Justices to nullify a rule or
regulation or an executive order issued by the President. It is very
Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will emerge significant that in the previous drafts of section 10, Article VII of the
victorious as a permanent way of life in this country, if each of the great Constitution, "executive order" and "regulation" were included among
branches of the Government, within its own allocated spear, complies those that required for their nullification the vote of two thirds of all of
with its own constitutional duty, uncompromisingly and regardless of the members of the Court. But "executive order" and "regulations" were
difficulties. later deleted from the final draft (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 495, 496), and thus a mere majority of six
Our Republic is still young, and the vital principle underlying its organic members of this Court is enough to nullify them.
structure should be maintained firm and strong, hard as the best of steel,
so as to insure its growth and development along solid lines of a stable All the members of the Court concur in this view.
and vigorous democracy.
For all the foregoing, the Court denies the motion to disqualify Mr.
With my declaration that Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 are null Justice Padilla, and the motion to include the vote of the late Mr. Justice
and void, and with the vote to the effect of Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases. And it is the judgment of this
Paras, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Montemayor, Court to declare Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, null and void, with
there is a sufficient majority to pronounce a valid judgment on that the dissent of Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice
matter. Reyes, upon the grounds already stated in their respective opinions, and
with Mr. Justice Torres abstaining.
It is maintained by the Solicitor General and the amicus curiae that eight
Justices are necessary to pronounce a judgment on the nullity of the But in order to avoid a possible disruption or interruption in a normal
executive orders in question, under section 9 of Republic Act No. 296 operation of the Government, it is decreed, by the majority, of course,
that this judgment take effect upon the expiration of fifteen days from under our laws could question the validity of such laws or executive
the date of its entry. No costs to be charged. orders.

Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, After laying down the fundamental principles involved in the case at bar,
JJ., concur. we shall discuss and show that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was no
longer in force at the time the Executive Orders under consideration
were promulgated, because even the respondents in the cases G. R. Nos.
L-2044 and L-2756, in sustaining the validity of the Executive Order No.
FERIA, J., concurring: 62 rely not only on Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 620, but on Commonwealth Act No. 671; and
The respondent in the cases G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 contend that afterwards we shall refute the arguments in support of the contrary
the petitioners in said cases can not institute an action to invalidate the proposition that said Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and,
Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 promulgated by the President, therefore, the President may exercise now the legislative powers therein
because they have no interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of delegated to him.
moneys raised by taxation, and can not therefore question the validity of
said executive orders requiring expenditures of public money. PRELIMINARY

Although the Supreme Court, in the case of Custodio vs. President of the The Constitution of the Philippines, drafted by the duly elected
Senate, G. R. No. L-117 (42 Off. Gaz., 1243) held in a minute resolution representatives of the Filipino people, provides in its section 1, Article II,
"That the constitutionality of a legislative act is open to attack only by that "The Philippines is a republican states, sovereignty resides in the
person whose rights are affected thereby, that one who invokes the people and all government authority emanates from them." The people
power of the court to declare an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional have delegated the government authority to three different and separate
must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has Departments: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. In section 1, Article VI,
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as the legislative power to make laws is conferred upon Congress; the
the result of its enforcement," that ruling was laid down without a executive power to faithfully executed the laws is vested by sections 1
careful consideration and is contrary to the ruling laid down in the and 10 of Article VII, in the President; and the judicial power is vested by
majority of jurisdictions in the United States that "In the determination section 1, Article VII, in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as
of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack may be established by law, the Supreme Court having the supremacy to
the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons pass upon "the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
individually affected, but also have taxpayers, have sufficient interest in or executive order or regulations."
preventing the illegal expenditures of money raised by taxation and may
therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring The distribution by the Constitution of the powers of government to the
expenditures of public moneys." (Am. Jur., Vol. 11, p. 761) All the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departments operates, by
members of this Court, except two, in taking cognizance of those cases, implication, as an inhibition against the exercise by one department of
rejected the respondents' contention, reversed the ruling in said case the powers which belong to another, and imposes upon each of the three
and adopted the general rule above mentioned; and we believe the latter departments the duty of exercising its own peculiar powers by itself, and
is better than the one adopted in said case of Custodio, which was based prohibits the delegation of any of those powers except in cases expressly
on a doctrine adhered to only in few jurisdiction in the United States; permitted by the Constitution. The principle of the separation of the
because if a taxpayer can not attack the validity of the executive orders powers of government is fundamental to the very existence of a
in question or a law requiring the expenditure of public moneys, one constitutional government as established in the Philippines patterned
after that of the United States of America. The division of governmental
powers into legislative, executive, and judicial represents the most in said constitutions, and for that reason not a single case involving a
important principle of government that guarantees the liberties of the question similar to the one herein involved has never been submitted to
people, for it prevents a concentration of powers in the hands of one and passed upon by the courts of last resort in the United States. The
person or class of persons. provision of our Constitution reads as follows:

Under the doctrine of separation of the powers of government, the law- SEC. 26. In times of war or other national emergency, the
making functions is assigned exclusively to the legislative, and the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited
legislative branch cannot delegate the power to make laws to any other period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
authority. But it must be borne in mind that what cannot be delegated is promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
that which is purely legislative in nature, not administrative. There are policy.
powers so far legislative that may properly be exercised by the
legislature, but which may nevertheless be delegated because they may It is important to observe that what the above-quoted constitutional
be advantageously exercised in proper cases by persons belonging to the provision empowers Congress to delegate to the President, is not the
other departments of the government, such as the authority to make power to promulgate rules and regulations of administrative nature, for
rules and regulations of administrative character to carry out an this may also be delegated at any time without necessity of an express
legislative purposes or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law. authority by the Constitution, but the power to promulgate rules and
As illustrations of the proper exercise of the power of Congress to regulations purely legislative in nature, leaving to the discretion of the
delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations with the President the determination of what rules or regulations shall be or
necessary details to carry into effect a law, are Act No. 3155 empowering what acts are necessary to effectuate the so-called declared national
the Governor General then, now the President, to suspend or not, at his policy, for otherwise it would not have been necessary for the
discretion, the prohibition of the importation of foreign cattle (Cruz vs. Constitution to authorize Congress to make such delegation.
Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234; Act No. 3106 authorizing the Commissioner of
the Public Service Commission to regulate those engaged in various DEMONSTRATION
occupations or business affected with a public interest, and to prescribe
what the charges shall be for services rendered in the conduct of such The Constitution permits Congress to authorize the President of the
business (Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446); and the National Philippines to promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature
Industrial Recovery Act enacted by the Congress of the United States only (1) in times of war or (2) other national emergency, such as
authorizing the President to promulgate administrative rules and rebellion, flood, earthquake, pestilence, economic depression, famine or
regulations to carry out the emergency measure enacted by Congress, any other emergency different from war itself affecting the nation.
though a part thereof was declared unconstitutional for producing a
delegation of legislative authority which is unconfined, "and not It is obvious that it is Congress and not a particular emergency and to
canalized within banks to keep it from ever flowing." authorize the President to promulgate rules and regulations to cope with
it. Therefore, if Congress declares that there exist a war as a national
Athough, in principle, the power of the Legislature to make laws or emergency and empowers the President to promulgate rules and
perform acts purely legislative in nature may only be delegated by regulations to tide over the emergency, the latter could not, because he
Congress to another authority or officers of either the executive or believes that there is an economic emergency or depression or any
judicial department when expressly permitted by the Constitution, no emergency other than war itself, exercise the legislative power delegated
such delegation is authorized by the State constitution or Federal to meet such economic or other emergency.
Constitution of the Untied States. It is a fact admitted by the attorneys
and amici curiae for the petitioners and respondents in these case that The Constitution requires also that the delegation be for a limited period
section 26, Article VI, our Constitution is unique and has no counterpart or other authority so delegated shall cease ipso facto at the expiration of
the period, because to require an express legislation to repel or SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section
terminate the delegated legislative authority of the President might be 16, of the Constitution, the President is hereby
subversive to the constitutional separation of powers in out democratic authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to
form of government, for the President my prevent indefinitely the repeal promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem
of his delegated authority by the exercise of his veto power, since the necessary to carry out the national policy declared in
veto could be overridden only by two-thirds vote and it would be section 1 hereof. Accordingly he is, among other things,
extremely difficult to repeal it in subservient Congress dominated by the empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or
Chief Executive. Besides, to provide that the delegated legislative powers any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices,
shall continue to exist until repealed by the Congress, would be agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the
delegation not for limited, but for an unlimited period or rather without government of the Commonwealth including the
any limitation at all, because all acts enacted are always subjects to determination of the order of procedure of the heads of
repeal by the Congress, without necessity to providing so. the Executive Departments; (c) to create new
subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or
No question is raised as to the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act instrumentalities of Government and to abolish any of
No. 671 under which Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and
promulgated by the President of the Philippines according to the appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
contention of the respondents. The question involved is the validity (not inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or
constitutionality) of said executive orders, that is, whether or not the application of those of an administrative character; (e) to
President had authority to promulgate them under Commonwealth Act impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or
No. 671; and therefore the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the
of this Court required by section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution to issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the
declare a treaty or law unconstitutional is not required for adjudging the expenditure of the proceeds thereof (g) to authorize the
executive orders in question invalid or not authorized by National, provincial, city or municipal governments to
Commonwealth Act No. 671, which read as follows: incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h)
to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671 the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other
powers as he may deem necessary to enable the
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain
RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND and enforce its authority.
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY. SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as
practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines: Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations
promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United
States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which SEC. 4. This Act shall take upon its approval, and the rules
involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force
President with extraordinary powers in order to meet and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall
the resulting emergency. otherwise provide.

Approved, December 16, 1941.

Taking into consideration the presumption that Congress was familiar National Assembly; (d) Commonwealth Act No. 499 providing that until
with the well-known limits of its powers under section 26, Article VI, of the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National
the Constitution and did not intend to exceed said powers in enacting Assembly, any sale, mortgage, lease, charter, delivery, transfer of vessels
Commonwealth Act No. 671, the express provisions of Commonwealth owned in whole or in part by a citizen of the Philippines or by a
Acts. Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600 as amended by 620 and 671, and corporation organizes under the laws of the Philippines, to any person
those of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended by Republic Act No. 66 not a citizen of the United States or of the Philippines, shall be null and
and Republic Acts Nos. 51 and 728, we are of the opinion, and therefore void, without the approval of the President of the Philippines; and
so hold, that the actual war in the Philippine territory and not any other Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President to reduce the
national emergency is contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671, and expenditure of the Executive Department of the National Government by
that the period of time during which the President was empowered by the suspension or abandonment of services, activities or operations of
said Commonwealth Act No. 671 to promulgate rules and regulations no immediate necessity, which authority shall be exercised only when
was limited to the existence of such war or invasion of the Philippines by the National Assembly is not in session. All these Commonwealth Acts
the enemy, which prevented the Congress to meet in a regular session. took effect upon their approval on September 30, 1939, a short time
Such emergency having ceased to exist upon the complete liberation of after the invasion of Poland by Germany.
the Philippines from the enemy's occupation, Commonwealth Act No.
671 had ceased to be in force and effect at the date of the adjournment of During the fourth special session of the second National Assembly,
the next regular session of the Congress in 1946, before the Commonwealth Act No. 600, which superseded the above-mentioned
promulgation of said executive orders, and hence they are null and void. emergency power acts, was passed and took effect on its approval on
August 19, 1940. This Act No. 600 expressly declared that the existence
In view of the existence of a state of national emergency caused by the of war in many parts of the world had created a national emergency
last world war among several nations of the world, the second National which made it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
Assembly during its second special session passed the following acts: (a) powers in order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to
Commonwealth Act No. 494 authorizing the President until the insure the tranquility of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage,
adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, to lawlessness, and all supervise activities, by preventing or relieving
suspend the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444, commonly known unemployment, by insuring to the people adequate shelter and clothing
as the "Eight-Hour Labor-Law," when in his judgment the public interest and sufficient food supply, etc. To carry out this policy the President was
so required, in order to prevent a dislocation of the productive forces of "authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the
the country; (b) Commonwealth Act No. 496 delegating to the President force and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular
the power expressly granted by section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution session of the National Assembly," which rules and regulations may
to the State "until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of embrace the objects therein enumerated. And the National Assembly in
the National Assembly, to take over solely for use or operation by the its regular session commencing in January, 1941, in view of the fact that
Government during the existence of the emergency any public service or the delegated authority granted to the President by Commonwealth Acts
enterprise and to operate the same," upon payment of just Nos. 494, 496, 498, 500, and 600 was to terminate at the date of the
compensation; (c) Commonwealth Act No. 498, authorizing the adjournment of that regular session of the National Assembly, passed
President, among others, to fix the maximum selling prices of foods, Act No. 620 which took effect upon its approval on June 6, 1941,
clothing, fuel, fertilizers, chemicals, building materials, implements, amending section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 600 by extending the
machinery, and equipment required in agriculture and industry, and delegated legislative authority of the President until the date of the
other articles or commodities of prime necessity, and to promulgate adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress of the
such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary in the public Philippines, instead of the National Assembly, the Constitution having
interest, which rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of been amended by substituting the Congress of the Philippines for the
law until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly..
Although Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth exercise his delegated powers until the date of the adjournment of the
Act No. 620, provides that "the President is authorized to promulgate next regular session of the Congress, for the reason that although during
rules and regulations which shall have the force and effect of law until the next regular session a bill may be passed, by the Congress, it would
the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress of not become a law until it was approved, expressly or impliedly, by the
the Philippines," it is evident that this limitation was intended to apply, President during the period of twenty days after it shall have been
not only to the effectivity of the rules and regulations already presented to him.
promulgated, but specially to the authority granted to the President to
promulgated them, for the following reasons: First, because The reason of the limitation is that if Congress were in position to act it
Commonwealth Act Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, and 500 had expressly would not be necessary for it to make such legislative delegation to the
limited the authority of the President to exercise the delegated power President, for Congress may in all cases act, declare its will and, after
while the Assembly was not in session until the date of the adjournment fixing a primary standard or yardstick, authorize the President to fill up
of the next regular session of then National Assembly, and there was the details by prescribing administrative rules and regulations to cope
absolutely no reason whatsoever why the National Assembly, in enacting with the actual conditions of any emergency; and it is inconceivable that
Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended, which superseded said Act, there may arise an emergency of such a nature that would require
would not impose the same limitation on the authority delegated in immediate action and can not wait, without irreparable or great injury to
Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended in compliance with the the public interest, and action of the legislative in regular or special
requirement of the Constitution; secondly, because it would have been session called by the Chief Executive for the purpose of meeting it. If in
useless to give the rules and regulations the effect and force of law only the United States they could withstand and have withstood all kinds of
until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the emergency without resorting to the delegation by the legislative body of
Congress, if the President might, after said adjournment, continue legislative power to the Executive except those of administrative nature,
exercising his delegated legislative powers to promulgate again the same because no such delegation is permitted by the States and Federal
and other rules and regulations; and lastly, because to construe constitution, as above stated, there is no reason why the same can not be
Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Act No. 620, otherwise done in the Philippines. The frames of our Constitution and the national
would be to make the delegation not for a limited but for an indefinite Assembly that enacted Commonwealth Act No. 671 are presumed to be
period of time, in violation of the express provision of section 26, Article aware of the inconvenience and chaotical consequences of having two
VI of the Constitution. legislative bodies acting at one and the same time.

All the above-mentioned Acts Nos. 494, 496, 499, 500, and 600 before its It is true that Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not expressly say that the
amendment show that it was the intention or policy of the National President is authorized to promulgates rules and regulations until the
Assembly, in delegating legislative functions to the President, to limit the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National
exercise of the latter's authority to the interregnum while the National Assembly or Congress as the above-quoted Commonwealth Acts; but it is
Assembly or Congress of the Philippines was not in session until the date also true that it clearly provides that "pursuant to the provisions of
of the adjournment of the next regular session thereof, which Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President is hereby
interregnum might have extended over a long period of time had the war authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such
in Europe involved and made the Philippines a battle ground before the rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national
next regular session of the Congress had convened. And the authority policy declared"; and that the definite and specific emergency therein
granted to the President of Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended, had referred to is no other that the "state of total emergency as a result of
to be extended over a long period of time during the occupation because, war involving the Philippines", declared in the title of said Act No. 671,
before the meeting of the next regular session of the Congress, the that was the reason for which the President was "authorize to
Philippines was involved in the war of the United States and invaded and promulgate rules and regulations to meet resulting emergency." It is
occupied by the Japanese forces. And the President was authorized to obvious that what Act No. 671 calls "total emergency" was the invasion
and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy or Japanese forces for consideration; because it is to be presumed, in order to comply with
which, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, had already the provision of section 26, Article VI of the Constitution, that it was the
landed in Philippine soil and was expected to paralyze the functioning of intention of the National Assembly to fix a limited period, independent of
the Congress during the invasion and enemy occupation of the the President's will, during which he is authorized to exercise his
Philippines. delegated legislative power.

The mere existence of the last world war in many parts of the world The object of section 3 of Act No. 671 in requiring the President to report
which had created a national emergency made it necessary to invest the "as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the
President with extraordinary powers was not called total emergency by Philippines all rules and regulations promulgated by him under the
Commonwealth Act Nos. 600 and 620, because it had not yet actually powers therein granted" is to inform the Congress of the contents of said
involved and engulfed the Philippines in the maelstrom of war. It does rules and regulations so that the latter may modify or repeal them if it
not stand to reason that the authority given to the President to sees fit to do so, inasmuch as, according to section 4 of the same Act, "the
promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature by rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600 and 620 was to until the Congress shall otherwise provide." And although said section 3
terminate at the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of does not specify whether in regular or special session, it is evident that it
the Congress of the Philippines in 1946, but those granted to the refers to the next regular and not to the special session of the Congress,
President by Commonwealth Act No. 671 under the same war because as a rule a special session is called to consider only specific
emergency should continue to exist indefinitely even after the Congress matters submitted by the President to Congress for consideration, and it
of the Philippines had regularly convened, acted, and adjourned in the would be useless to submit such report to the Congress in special
year 1946 and subsequent years. Besides to give such construction to session if the latter can not either modify or repeal such rules and
Act No. 671 would make it violative of the express provision of section regulations; and besides, it is to be presumed that it was the intention of
26, Article VIII, of the Constitution, under which said Commonwealth Act the National Assembly in enacting section 3 of Commonwealth Act No.
No. 671 was enacted, as expressly stated in said Act, and which permits 671 to require the submission of a report to the next regular session of
the Congress to authorize the President, only for a limited period during the Assembly or Congress, as provided in section 4 Commonwealth Act
a war emergency, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry into No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, which required a
effect a declared national policy. similar report, for there was absolutely no plausible reason to provide
otherwise.
By the special session of the first Congress of the Philippines
commencing on the 9th day of June, 1945, called by the President for the Our conclusion is corroborated by the fact that section 3 of Act No. 671
purpose of considering general legislation, Commonwealth Act No. 671 only requires the President to submit the report, "as soon as practicable
did not cease to operate. As we have already said, the emergency which upon the convening of the Congress" and not to submit a report to the
prompted the second National Assembly to enact Commonwealth Act Congress every time it convenes, in order to inform the Congress thereof
No. 671 delegating legislative powers to the President, was the inability so that the latter may modify or repeal any or all of them, for under
of Congress to convene in regular session in January of every during the section 4 of the same Act "such rules and regulations shall continue in
invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial forces. The National force and effect until the Congress shall otherwise provide." It is obvious
Assembly could not have in mind any special session which might have that the convening of the Congress referred to in said section 3 is the
been called by the President immediately after liberation, because the next regular session of the Congress after the passage of Act No. 671, and
calling of a special session as well as the matters which may be not any other subsequent session; because, otherwise, it would not have
submitted by the President to Congress for consideration is a contingent required that it shall be submitted to the Congress as soon as practicable
event which depend upon the possibility of convening it and the and the purpose of the law already stated in requiring the submission of
discretion of the President to call it, and the matters he will submit to it the report would be defeated; and if it were the intention of said
Commonwealth Act No. 671 to authorize the President to continue ready and able to legislate on those matters since 1946 and for that
promulgating rules and regulations after the next regular session of the reason the executive orders herein involved are null and void, there is no
Congress, it would have required the President to submit to the valid reason for not concluding that the emergency powers of the
Congress each and every time it convenes a report of the rules and President has ceased to exist it did not, legislate on all matters on which
regulations promulgated after his previous reports had been submitted. the President was granted and delegated power to legislate by the
Commonwealth Act No. 671. And if Commonwealth Act No. 671
Furthermore, our conclusion is confirmed by the legislative continues to be in force and effect in so far as it grants delegated
interpretation give to Commonwealth Act No. 671 by the same Congress legislative powers to the President and declares the national policy to be
in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 728 which took effect on July 2, carried out by the rules and regulations the President is authorize to
1946, authorizing the President to regulate, control, curtail, and prohibit promulgate, the mere promulgation of the acts above described can not
the exploration of agricultural or industrial products, merchandise, be considered as an implied repeal or withdrawal of the authority of the
articles, materials and supplies without the permit of the President until President to promulgates rules and regulations only on those matters,
December 31, 1948 as expressly provided in section 4 thereof, because it and the adoption of a contrary policy by the Congress, because implied
would not have been necessary for the Congress to promulgate said Act repeal is not favored in statutory construction, and the national policy
No. 728 if the President had authority to promulgate Executive Order No. referred to in section 26, Article VIII of the Constitution is to be declared
62 in question on January 1, 1949, under Commonwealth Act No. 671 as by the Congress in delegating the legislative powers to the President, in
contended by the respondents; and Republic Act No. 51, approved on order to establish the standard to be carried out by him in exercising his
October 4, 1946, authorizing within one year the different executive delegated functions, and not in repealing said powers.
departments, business, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of
the government, including corporations controlled by it, would not have As we have already said, section 26, Article VI of the Constitution
been passed by the Congress if Commonwealth Act No. 671 under expressly empowers Congress, in times of war and other national
consideration was then still in force, for section 2 (b) and (c) of said Act emergency, to authorize the President to promulgate rules and
No. 671 authorizes the President to reorganize the Government and to regulations to carry out a declared national policy, and therefore it is for
create new subdivisions, branches, department offices, agencies or the National Assembly to determine the existence of a particular
instrumentalities of government, and to abolish any of those already emergency declare the national policy, and authorize the President to
existing. promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature to carry out that
policy. As the Commonwealth Act No. 671 that the existence of war
REPUTATION between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia which
involves the Philippines is the emergency which made it necessary for
There is no force in the argument that the executive orders in question the National Assembly to invest the President with extraordinary
are not valid, not because the promulgation of the acts above mentioned powers to promulgate rules and regulations to meet the resulting
and of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended by the Republic Act No. emergency from the actual existence of that war which involved the
66 on rentals, the appropriation acts or Republic Act Nos. 1, 156, and Philippines, the President cannot, under said Act No. 671, determine the
320 for the years 1946-47, 1947-48 and 1948-49, and of the Republic existence of any other emergency, such as the state of cold war, the
Acts Nos. 73, 147, and 235 appropriating public finds to defray the continued military occupation of the enemy country, and the economic
expenses for the elections held in 1947 and 1948, shows that the and political instability throughout the world, cited by the respondents,
emergency powers granted by Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already and promulgate rules and regulations to meet the emergency; because
ceased to exist, but because Congress "has shown by their enactment its obviously it is not for the delegate but for the delegation to say when and
readiness and ability to legislate on those matters, and had withdrawn it under what circumstances the former may act in behalf of the latter, and
from the realm of presidential legislation or regulations under the not vice-versa.
powers delegated by Commonwealth Act No. 671." If the Congress was
The theory of those who are of the opinion that the President may enacting said Act; and because it would make the delegation of powers
determine "whether the emergency which on December 16, 1941, for an in definite period, since such an emergency may or may not
prompted the approval of Commonwealth Act No. 671 delegating become depression, effect of the first world war, took place in the year
extraordinary powers to the President, still existed at the time the Chief 1929, or about ten years after the cessation of hostilities in the year
Executive exercised those powers," is predicated upon the erroneous 1919; and by no stretch of imagination or intellectual gymnastics may
assumption that said Commonwealth Act No. 671 contemplated any the failure of the Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of the
other emergency not expressly mentioned in said Commonwealth Act. Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and to
This assumption or premise is obviously wrong. Section 1 of said Act No. defray the expenses in connection with the holding of the national
671 expressly states that "the existence of the war between the United election on the second Tuesday of November, 1949, be considered as an
States and other countries of Europe and Asia which involves the emergency resulting from the last war.
Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary power in order to meet the resulting emergency." That is In the enactment of emergency police measures, the questions as
the war emergency. Ant it is evident, and therefore no evidence is to whether an emergency exists is primarily for the legislature to
requires to prove, that the existence of the war which involved the determine. Such determination, although entitled to great
Philippines had already ceased before the promulgation of the executive respect, is not conclusive because the courts, in such cases,
orders in question, or at least, if the last war has not yet technically posses the final authority to determine whether an emergency in
terminated in so far as the United States is concerned, it did no longer fact exists. (American Jurisprudence, Vol. XI, page 980.).
involve the Republic of the Philippines since the inauguration of our
Republic or independence from the sovereignty of the United States. No case decided by the courts of last resort in the United States may be
cited in support of the proposition that it is for the President to
It is untenable to contend that the words "resulting emergency from the determine whether there exist an emergency in order to exercise his
existence of the war" as used in section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 emergency powers, and "it is not for the judiciary to review the finding
should be construed to mean any emergency resulting from or that is the of the Executive in this regard." There is none and there cannot be any.
effect of the last war, and not the war emergency itself, and that Because, as we have already stated at the beginning of this opinion, and
therefore it is for the President to determine whether at the time of the we are supported by the above quotation from American Jurisprudence,
promulgation of the executive orders under consideration such the power to pass emergency police legislation in the United States may
emergency still existed, because such contention would make Act No. be exercised only by the legislature in the exercise of the police power of
671 unconstitutional or violative of the provisions of section 26, Article the State, and it can not be delegated to the Executive because there is no
VI of the Constitution. This constitutional precept distinguishes war provision in the State and Federal constitutions authorizing such
emergency from any other national emergency, such as an economic delegation as we have in section 26, Article VI, of our Constitution. As we
depression and others which may be the effect of a war, and empowers have already said before, the only legislative power which may be
the Congress in times of war and other national emergency, to be delegated to the Executive and other administrative bodies or officers in
determined by Congress itself as we have already said and shown, to the United States is the power to promulgate rules and regulations of
authorize the President, for a limited period that may short or of the administrative nature, which does not include the exercise of the police
same duration but not longer than that of the emergency, to promulgate power of the State.
rules and regulations to carry out the policy declared by the Congress in
order to meet the emergency. To construe Commonwealth Act No. 671 The ruling laid down by the United States Supreme Court in the case of
as contended would be to leave the determination of the existence of the Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 Law ed., 1883, quoted by the respondents and
emergency to the discretion of the President, because the effects of the dissenters in support of the proposition that "only in case of a manifest
war such as those enumerated by the respondents are not determined or abuse of the exercise of powers by a political branch of the government
stated in said Act and could not have been foreseen by the Assembly in is judicial interference allowable in order to maintain the supremacy of
the Constitution," has no application to the present case; because the LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner,
question involved in the present case is not a political but a justiciable vs.
question, while the question in issue in said Ludecke case was the power THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR,
of the court to review "the determination of the President in the postwar SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND
period that an alien enemy should be deported, even though active INDUSTRY, respondents.
hostilities have ceased," and it was held that it was a political question
and, therefore, was not subject to judicial review. x---------------------------------------------------------x

CONCLUSION G.R. No. L-3056 August 26, 1949

In view of all the foregoing, we have to conclude and declare that the ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all
executive orders promulgG.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949 taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner,
vs.
J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE
vs. INSULAR TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P.
BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondents. L-2044
Paredes, Diaz and Poblador, Jesus G. Barrera, Vicente Hilado, and Araneta
x---------------------------------------------------------x and Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Assistant Solicitor
G.R. No. L-2756 August 26, 1949 General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., Solicitor Martiniano P. Vico and Assistant
City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondents.
J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners, Claro M. Recto and Padilla, Carlos and Fernando as amici curiae.
vs.
EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent. L-2756
Araneta and Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for petitioners.
x---------------------------------------------------------x Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for respondent.
Claro M. Recto as amici curiae.
G.R. No. L-3054 August 26, 1949
L-3054
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido Claro M. Recto, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera, Alejo Mabanag, Jose B. Laurel,
Nacionalista, recurrente, Jr. and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
vs. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondent.
EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido. Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill and Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R.
x---------------------------------------------------------x Navarro as amici curiae.
Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico, and Francisco A.
G.R. No. L-3055 August 26, 1949 Rodrigo also as amici curiae.

L-3055
Claro M. Recto and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents. ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden
V. G. Bunuan, Administrator, Sugar Quota Office. by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No.
Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto M. Serrano, Enrique; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of
Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae. the Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to
June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez,
L-3056 Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party,
Claro M. Recto and Antonio Barredo for petitioner. applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents. Philippines from disbursing this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections. 3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill, Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of
Ramon Sunico and Francisco A. Rodrigo; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and the national elections to be held in November, 1949. The petitioner,
Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae. Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to
prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise
TUASON, J.: disposing of that amount or any part of it."

Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other two Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the
were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present constitutionally of Act No. 671, the petitioners do not press the point in
the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will their oral argument and memorandum. They rest their case chiefly on
be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No.
to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G. R. 671) has ceased to have any force and effect. This is the basic question
No. L-3054 and case G. R. No. L-3056 and the question whether we have referred to, and it is to this question that we will presently
prohibition lies in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756. No practical benefit address ourselves and devote greater attention. For the purpose of this
can be gained from a discussion of the procedural matters since the decision, only, the constitutionality of Act No. 671 will be taken for
decision in the cases wherein the petitioners' cause of action or the granted, and any dictum or statement herein which may appear contrary
propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling to that hypothesis should be understood as having been made merely in
authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the furtherance of the main thesis.
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. Act No. 671 in full is as follows:
(Avelino vs. Cuenco, G. R. No. L-2821.) The petitions challenge the
validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A
Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of the
provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is
Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and
Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with
Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
petitioner. Both official refuse to issue the required export license on the
 "SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and
Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its
policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature,
other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation
Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, to the Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions
offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We
Government of the Commonwealth including the determination test a rule by its results.
of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive
Department; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue
departments, agencies or instrumentalities of government and to thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to
abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds;
laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise restrictive in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary,
become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or 3rd ed., 669; Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The words "limited
application of those of an administrative character; (e) to impose period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to
new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish those in mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the
existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be
otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds said to be an emergency." (First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago
thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L. R., 937, 938.).
municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that
he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with
credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law
powers as he may deem to enable the Government to fulfill its repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the
responsibities and to maintain and enforce the authority. legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope
of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and
practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for
Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited,
promulgated by him under the powers herein granted. indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a
temporary emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it
and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the
effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this
provide. would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its
powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides: a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to
delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not,
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by and ought not to be, the law. Corwin, President: Office and Powers, 1948
law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to ed., p. 160, says:
 It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export control
delegate its powers signifies at the very least that the legislature after Congress had refused to approve the measure.
may not abdicate its powers: Yet how, in view of the scope that
legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between Quiet apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of
delegation and abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by Act No. 671 for the inference that the National Assembly restricted the
rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature
of the delegate; . . . . was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other
causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides:
Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act
No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable
thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report
Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under
the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the powers herein granted.
the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear
manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting
no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no of Congress at which the President was to give an account of his
idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it could very
National Assemble failed to make a provision for this termination in the well have said if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did
same way that it did for the termination of the effects and incidents of not think that the report in section 3 was to be the first and last Congress
the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the Act No. 671 would lapsed, what reason could there be for its failure to
rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent
remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making
new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already laws in the forms of rules, regulations and executive orders, were as
annulled by the legislature. important, of as unimportant, as the initial one.

More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement
Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry
is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies operating over the much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out
same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special
nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers
President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to
and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good
limited. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal executive orders Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would
promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatical
President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together
Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic they denote that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to
apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify that the
inspired only by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be
former President promulgated an executive order regulating house prolonged.
rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and
What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same exercise of the police power or the war power — and, once ascertained,
paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he to apply it. Of course, the function of interpreting statutes in proper
issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts as their constitutional
became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and prerogative and duty. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief Executive
that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended, and may act on the
regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." (Emphasis ours.) strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the
It can easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of courts have construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the
enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific proposition. There is no pretense that the President has independent or
view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under review. we
factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers take it that the respondents, in sustaining the validity of these executive
so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its orders rely on Act No. 600, Act No. 620, or Act No. 671 of the former
authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of the Commonwealth and on no other source. To put it differently, the
foundations of democratic institutions could not have been conceived President's authority in this connection is purely statutory, in no sense
under any circumstance short of a complete disruption and dislocation political or directly derived from the Constitution.
of the normal processes of government. Anyway, if we are to uphold the
constitutionality of the act on the basis of its duration, we must start Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the
with the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. As we have opening of the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos.
indicated, the period that best comports with constitutional 600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive indication that they were
requirements and limitations, with the general context of the law and self-liquidating. By express provision the rules and regulations to be
with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, respectively
enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good only up
function, a period ending with the conventing of that body. to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of
the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National
It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this provision is that
671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May in the mind of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves
25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were would lapse not latter than the rules and regulations. The design to
issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations
instead of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best
of the Act, we think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the simultaneous repeal of their source. Were not this the case, there would
National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider arise the curious spectacle, already painted, and easily foreseen, of the
general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations of the President
(Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power while the latter was empowered to keep or return them into force and to
Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations issue new ones independently of the National Assembly. For the rest, the
imposed by the organic law. reasoning heretofore adduced against the asserted indefinite
continuance of the operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos.
Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the necessity of 600 and 620.
deciding the question as to which department of government is
authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the law is The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the question
predicated still exists. The right of one or another department to declare whether war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If we were to that
the emergency terminated is not in issue. As a matter of fact, we have actual hostilities between the original belligerents are still raging, the
endeavored to find the will of the National Assembly—call that will, an elusion would not be altered. After the convening of Congress new
legislation had to be approved if the continuation of the emergency Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In
powers, or some of them, was desired. In the light of the conditions order to avoid any possible disruption and interruption in the normal
surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the operation of the Government, we have deemed it best to depart in these
opinion that the "state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged cases from the ordinary rule to the period for the effectivity of decisions,
in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and occupation of and to decree, as it is hereby decreed, that this decision take effect
the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization of fifteen days from the date of the entry of final judgment provided in
the Government, principally the impossibility for the National Assembly section 8 of Rule 53 of the Rules of Court in relation to section 2 of Rule
to act. The state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and 35. No costs will be charged.
with which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The
war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have Ozaeta, J., concurs.
necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position
to operate.

After all the criticism that have been made against the efficiency of the Separate Opinions
system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the
Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and MORAN, C. J., concurring:
shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or
group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary I agree with the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Tuason, except on the
government have given notice that they share the faith of other points hereunder discussed.
democracy-loving people in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal.
The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is I believe, on the one hand, that the emergency power of the President
preserved for Congress all the time, not expecting periods of crisis no
had ceased not in May 1946, when Congress held its regular sessions, as
matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria maintain, but on June 9, 1945,
features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the when Congress convened in a special session to consider general
specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been
legislation. The emergency contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671,
surrendered to another department — unless we regard as legislating is "total emergency" which means the state of actual war involving the
the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; Philippines, with the impending invasion and occupation of our country
no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization and paralyzation
engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is
of the Government, principally, the impossibility for the National
that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme Assembly to act. This was the only reason and justification for the total
perils more than in normal circumstances "the various branches, relinquishment of legislative power by Congress in favor of the Chief
executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called
Executive under Commonwealth Act No. 671. Such relinquishment was
upon "to the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to total because the emergency was also total. Clearly, therefore, the
them respectively." inability of Congress to act was the soul of the law, and the moment such
inability ceased, the total emergency also ceased and the law likewise
These observations, though beyond the issue as formulated in this ceased to validly exist. On June 9, 1945, the Congress of the Philippines
decision, may, we trust, also serve to answer the vehement plea that for convened in a special session "to adopt such measures as may be
the good of the Nation, the President should retain his extraordinary necessary to meet the existing emergency" and "for the purpose of
powers as long asturmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to considering general legislation." I hold that from that date, June 9, 1945,
the late war harass the Philippines. Congress was able and ready to act on all matters, and the emergency
powers delegated to the President in Commonwealth Act No. 671, to function. In such cases, when apparently the provisions of our laws
naturally ceased to exist. and Constitution seem inadequate, the courts must go deeper even than
the very Magna Carta itself and find solution in the basic principles of
Upon the other hand, while I believe that the emergency powers had preservation of government and of national survival, which in the last
ceased in June 1945, I am not prepared to hold that all executive orders analysis, are the very reasons for the existence of a Constitution. In such
issued thereafter under Commonwealth Act No. 671, are per se null and extreme cases, as can come from the present situation, it would be the
void. It must be borne in mind that these executive orders had been height of judicial imprecision to preserve the form of the constitution,
issued in good faith and with the best of intentions of three successive and at the same time permit the disruption and cessation of the
Presidents, and some of them may have already produced extensive government which that same constitution so intricately designed and
effects in the life of the nation. We have, for instance, Executive Order firmly established. Thus, in the remedy of an evil, we shall cause a far
No. 73, issued on November 12, 1945, appropriating the sum of greater one.
P6,750,000 for public works; Executive Order No. 86, issued on January
7, 1946, amending a previous order regarding the organization of the It may be argued that the course of action I am taking is founded upon
Supreme Court; Executive Order No. 89, issued on January 1, 1946, fear, fear that Congress will again fail to act on the matter of
reorganizing the Courts of First Instance; Executive Order No. 184, appropriation, and it may be asserted that the members of the Congress
issued on November 19, 1948, controlling rice and palay to combat are presumed to be as patriotic as the members of this Court, if not
hunger; and other executive orders appropriating funds for other more, and that, therefore, we may rest assured that they will not fail to
purposes. The consequences of a blanket nullification of these executive fulfill their duty. I admit this to be true, and accordingly, I ask what is
orders will be unquestionably serious and harmful. And I hold that then the hurry and necessity for nullifying the executive order on
before nullifying them, other important circumstances should be appropriation which we are sure will soon be substituted by a valid
inquired into, as for instance, whether or not they have been ratified by appropriation act? Why not defer judgment and wait until the special
the Congress expressly or impliedly, whether their purposes have session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it clearly sees it? I can
already been accomplished entirely or partially, and in last instance, to find no reason against this suggestion except, perhaps, a desire to assert
what extent; acquiescence of litigants; de facto officers; acts and contrast judicial supremacy in a case where judicial statemanship is more
of parties acting in good faith; etc. It is my opinion that each executive necessary.
order must be viewed in the lights of its peculiar circumstances, and, if
necessary and possible, before nullifying it, precautionary measures It is also true that the possibility that Congress will again fail to provide
should be taken to avoid harm to public interest and innocent parties. funds for the operation of the government is a remote possibility. But
there is no harm in providing for all the possibilities, both near and
To illustrate the foregoing proposition of individual consideration of remote. If that remote possibility never comes, well and good, nothing is
specific cases, shall go into a brief discussion of the executive orders lost and the situation is saved. However, if the remote possibility does
involved in the cases now before this Court. With regard to Executive No. come, and it is not impossible, and we had already nullified the executive
225 on general appropriation, I hold that the court should not declare it order on appropriation, how will the government function and survive?
null and void till Congress may have an opportunity to provide a On the other hand, if we defer judgment upon the nullity of such
substitute measure for the sustenance of government. This view is executive order, and that remote possibility does come, we still have the
predicated upon the principle of absolute necessity. Till Congress may saving lifeline of that executive order which may, perhaps, be tolerated
pass a valid appropriation act our government cannot survive without to save the country from chaos, until a more proper and adequate
the executive order in question. It would be absurd for this court to remedy can be secured.
declare the cessation of an emergency, and by that same declaration
permit, if not abet, the formation of another emergency which would be With regard to the executive order appropriating funds for the conduct
inevitable if, by reason of lack of appropriation, government shall cease of the coming elections, I uphold the same view as in the foregoing,
namely, not in abdicating the power of this court to pass upon the am of the conviction that, in view of the formal and unmistakable
validity of an executive order, but to defer judgment upon such an order declarations of both the Congress and the President, said Act No. 671,
until the legislature may provide a substitute measure. The reason for should be held as having lost its force and effect.
this is, likewise, absolute necessity. Without such Executive Order we
may have not elections in November. Elections are the very essence of It is important to remember that the kind of emergency expressly
popular government for the establishment and preservation of which, spoken of in the Act is a total emergency resulting from war and that the
our Constitution has been consecrated. To permit the unwarranted Act was passed at a time (December 16, 1941) when there was factually
abolition or even suspension of elections, will surely result either in the a state of war involving the Philippines.
denial of popular representation or in the perpetuation in power of
those already in office. Either result is revolting to our system of In section 1 of Republic Act No. 342, approved on July 26, 1948, it was
government. Briefly stated, I hold that this court should neither ratify categorically declared by the Congress that "since liberation conditions
nor nullify this executive order, but should defer judgment in the same have gradually returned to normal, but not so with regard to those who
manner and for the same reasons stated above in connection with the have suffered the ravages of war and who have not received any relief
executive order on appropriations. The Court, in these cases, is for the loss and destruction resulting therefrom," and that "the
confronted not only with bare issues of law, but with actual anomalous emergency created by the last war as regards these was sufferers being
situations pregnant with possible dangers to the nation, and it is the still existent, it is the declared policy of the state that as to them the debt
duty of the Court, as a dispenser of justice, to find a solution that is both moratorium should be continued in force in a modified form." The
legal and realistic. President, in turn, in his speech delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly
proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the Republic) faces today are
With reference to Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for incidental passing pains artificially created by seasonal partisanship,
houses, and Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from very common among democracies but will disappear with the rains that
the Philippines, I agree that they must be held null and void upon the follow the thunderclaps not later than November 8 of this year."
reason stated by Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria and also upon
those stated by Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Alex Reyes. We thus have a formal declaration on the part of the Congress that the
emergency created by the last war exists as regards only those debtors
My vote, therefore, is that the petitions must be granted in Araneta vs. whose war damage claims have not been settled by the United States
Dinglasan, G. R. No. L-2044; Araneta vs. Angeles, G. R. No. L-2756 and Philippine War Damage Commission (section 2, Republic Act No. 342),
Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs, G. R. No. L-3055, and that patently meaning that said emergency is, at most, a partial emergency. It
judgment must be deferred in Rodriguez vs. El Tesorero de Filipinas, G. R. is needless to point out that only a small portion of the Philippine
No. L-3054 and Barredo vs. The Commission on Election, G. R. No. L-3056. population are debtors and not all of those who are debtors are war
damage claimants.

We also have the solemn declaration on the part of the President that the
PARAS, J., concurring: emergencies faced by the Republic are incidental emergencies artificially
created by seasonal partisanship, clearly meaning that such emergencies
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Tuason. I wish to add, however the not only are not total but are not the result of war.
following observations: Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
the legislative intent is to make Commonwealth Act No. 671, effective If the emergency is, as admitted by the Congress, not total and, as
during the existence of the emergency contemplated therein and that it admitted by the President, not the result of the war, Commonwealth Act
is within the exclusive province of the political departments to No. 671 has lost its basis and cannot legally give rise to the executive
determine whether said emergency continues or has ceased to exist, I orders herein involved. Indeed, it is not pretended that said orders are
intended to meet any emergency growing out of the last war. Lack of a examination of Commonwealth Act No. 671 will show that the legislative
budget, an appropriation for the elections, or an import control law, has function therein specified had been discharged by the Congress. The
been brought about by the inaction of the Congress unaffected by the following illustrates the powers delegated in the Act and the measures
last war, and such emergency, if it may be called so, is not of the kind enacted by the Congress itself covering each:
contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671.
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 —
The government has for four years since liberation been normally
functioning; election had been regularly held; a national census had been (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions,
taken; Congress had held regular and special session; "people travel branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities:
freely most everywhere and more quickly, by land, sea and air, to an
extent that was not hitherto enjoyed," and "business is more brisk than Republic Act No. 333 —
ever, goods are plentiful, our people even in the remotest communities
and barrios of the country are better dressed, their diet has been An Act to establish the Capital of the Philippines and the
immensely improved, and they look more healthy than they ever did" permanent seat of the National Government, to create a capital
(President's fifth monthly radio chat, March 15, 1949); and the sporadic city planning commission, to appropriate funds for the
depredations of the outlaws in isolated areas of the country are but the acquisition of private estates within the boundary limits of said
last paroxysms of a dying movement (President's State-of-the-Nation city, and to authorize the issuance of bonds of the National
Message, January 24, 1949), — all these certainly negative the existence Government for the acquisition of private estates, for the
of any real (much less total) emergency. subdivision thereof, and for the construction of streets, bridges,
waterworks, sewerage and other municipal improvements in the
That the Congress had heretofore recognized the cessation of the capital City. (Approved, July 17, 1948.)
emergency is conclusively established by the fact that it had assumed the
task of directly enacting, during its past sessions, measures dealing with (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the
all the matters covered by the specific legislative powers conceded to the determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive
President in Commonwealth Act No. 671. This is in line with the Departments:
fundamental reason for the approval of said Act, as may be gathered
from the following statement of President Quezon: "When it became Republic Act No. 51 —
evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it
was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular Act authorizing the President of the Philippines to reorganize
session which was to open on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly within one year the different Executive departments, bureaus,
passed into history approving a resolution which reaffirmed the abiding
offices, agencies and their instrumentalities of the government,
faith of the Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United States. The
including the corporations owned or controlled by it. (Approved,
assembly also enacted a law granting the President of the Philippines all October 4, 1946.)
the powers that under the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to
him in time of war." (The Good Fight, pp. 204-205.) When President
(c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies
Quezon said "in time of war", he undoubtedly meant factual war, a
or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already
situation that existed at the time of the passage of Commonwealth Act
existing:
No. 671.
Commonwealth Act No. 732 —
Indeed, the dissenters admit that any delegated power directly exercised
by the principal is considered withdrawn from the agent. A cursory
 An Act to create the Department of Foreign Affairs and to (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to
authorize the President of the Philippines to organize said authorize the expenditure of proceeds thereof:
department as well as the foreign service of the Republic of the
Philippines. (Approved, July 3, 1946.) Republic Act No. 265 —

(d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or An Act establishing the Central Bank of the Philippines . . . .
otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation (Section 87 [e] No. 7.) Approved, June 15, 1948.)
or application of those of an administrative character:
Republic Act No. 266 —
Commonwealth Act No. 709 —
An Act appropriating such sums as may from time to time be
An Act appropriating the sum of five million pesos to enable the released by the Central Bank representing excess monetary
national housing commission to resume its functions" reserves, and authorizing the President of the Philippines to
(Approved, November 1, 1945.) issue bonds, certificates or other evidences of indebtedness
covering such amounts. (Approved, June 15, 1948.)
Commonwealth Act No. 710 —
Republic Act No. 85 —
An Act to appropriate funds to continue the payment of
Retirement gratuities or pensions under existing laws. An Act creating the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. (Section
(Approved, November 1, 1945.) 2 [f].) (Approved, Oct. 29, 1946.)

(e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those (g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal government to
in existence: incur in overdrafts for the purposes that he may approve:

Republic Act No. 215 — Various Appropriation Acts.

An Act to amend Section One of the Republic Act numbered (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payments
eighty-one providing a new time limit for the waiver of, and/or of debts:
extension of the period, within which to perform, accomplish or
comply with, any term, condition, or stipulation required of Republic Act No. 342, approved, July 26, 1948.
locators, holders, lessees, operators of mining claims or
concessions, and of water rights and timber concessions with the (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable
mining industry and the condonation of mining, specific and real the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce
estate taxes, under certain terms and conditions. (Approved, its authority.
June 1, 1948.)
The powers included in this subdivision (i) are of course covered by
Ley No. 321 de la Republica — hundreds of other acts approved by the Congress which, it cannot be
denied, all tend to "enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities
Ley que eleva los derechos de transferencia de ganado mayor, and to maintain and enforce its authority." Moreover, the withdrawal of
enmendado al efecto el articulo quinientos veintiochos del
Codigo Administrativo Revisado. (Apobada, Junio 9, 1948.)
the greater and more important powers may be presumed to have of the principles of law involved, and the fact that not only the force and
carried the accessory and less important powers. the effect of a law (Commonwealth Act No. 671) but also the legality and
the force and effect of numerous executive orders issued by several
There is no merit in the contention that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was Presidents during a period of about three years, affecting as they do not
enacted by virtue of the war powers of the Congress. As the Act itself only citizens, their interest and their properties but also the different
expressly states, its basis is section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution departments and offices of the Government, I deem it my duty to set
which merely authorizes delegation of legislative powers to the forth my views and the reasons in support of the same.
President in times of war or other national emergency. The phrase "in
times of war or other national emergency" is solely indicative or There is a claim made about lack of personality of some of the parties-
descriptive of the occasions during which the delegation may be petitioners particularly, the petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056.
extended and does not classify the act of delegating legislative functions Much could be said for and against that claim, but I am willing to brush
as a war power. It must be borne in mind that said section 26 is peculiar aside all defenses and technicalities on this point in order to be able to
to our Constitution, with the result that the decisions of the Supreme consider and decide the more important question of the legality of the
Court of the United States cited on behalf of the respondents, executive orders involved and whether or not Commonwealth Act No.
expounding the theory that the exercise by the President of his war 671 is still in force.
powers granted by the Congress cannot be interfered with by the courts,
are not controlling. Particularly, the case of Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., The aforementioned executive orders were issued on the straight of and
1883, in which the opinion of the United States Supreme Court was by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. The majority holds that
written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, cannot apply, for the further reason Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to have any force and effect on May
that it merely involved the power of deportation which, even in our 25, 1946 when Congress first convened in regular session after
jurisdiction, is recognized, it being the rule here that the courts cannot liberation. In This, I disagree for I believe and hold that Commonwealth
control the right of the Chief Executive to determine the existence or Act No. 671 is still in force and in effect. But despite this view, I am not of
sufficiency of the facts justifying an order of deportation. Upon the other the opinion that the executive orders under consideration were issued
hand, the war power of the President is separately covered by section without authority.
10, paragraph (2), of Article VII, and that of the Congress by section 25.
Starting with Executive Order No. 62, we find that it deals with and
Article VI, of the Constitution, which are not invoked for the passage of regulates houses and lot rentals. If the legislature had not already acted
Commonwealth Act No. 671. and legislated on this matter since the promulgation of Commonwealth
Act No. 671, this would be a proper field for Presidential action.
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:. However, the legislature had already promulgated Commonwealth Act
No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66, regulating house rentals and, as late as
The majority opinion holds that Executive Order No. 62 dated June 21, the month of May, 1947, Congress passed House Bill No. 978 further
1947; Executive Order No. 192 dated December 24, 1948; and Executive amending Commonwealth Act No. 689. In other words, in thus acting,
Orders Nos. 225 and 226 both dated June 15, 1949 were issued without the Legislature had already shown its readiness and ability to legislate
authority of law and therefore illegal and of no legal force and effect. I on this matter, and had withdrawn it from the realm of presidential
concur only in the result. Ordinarily, such concurrence without comment legislation or regulation under the powers delegated by Commonwealth
or explanation would be sufficient and satisfactory. However, in view of Act No. 671. Not only this, but in issuing rules and regulations in the
the radical difference between the reasons had and given by the majority form of executive orders under his delegated powers, the Chief
in arriving at the result and those entertained by me, and considering Executive merely acts as an agent of the legislature, his principal which
the transcendental importance of these cases, not only because of the made the delegation. As such agent, he cannot go against the policy and
vast amounts of public funds and the rights of citizens affected but also expressed desire of his principal.
There are radical differences between Commonwealth Act No. 689, With respect to Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the considerations
Republic Act No. 66, and House Bill No. 978 on one side and Executive made with regard to Executive Orders Nos. 62 and 192 are equally
Order No. 62 on the other. That was the reason why President Roxas applicable. By previously enacting necessary legislation on the yearly
vetoed House Bill No. 978, believing in good faith that it would not solve Government appropriation and on the appropriation of funds for the
and remedy the problem of house rentals as explained by him in his expenses incurred in national elections, Congress has shown its
communication to the House of Representatives of June 21, 1947, setting readiness and ability to cope with the financial problems of the
forth his views on the bill. The President may not and could not Government on this point. Republic Act No. 80, approved October 22,
substitute his opinion however excellent or superior for that of the 1946, appropriating funds for the operation of National Government
legislature on matters of legislation when Congress has already acted from July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947; Republic Act No. 156 appropriating
and expressed its opinion and desire on the matter. funds for the fiscal year 1947-48 and Republic Act No. 320, the
appropriation law for the fiscal year 1948-49 show that Congress was in
With respect to Executive Order No. 192, it will be remembered that a position and able to provide for the yearly expenditures of the
Congress passed Commonwealth Act No. 728, approved on July 2, 1946, Government. And Republic Act No. 73 appropriating P1,000,000 to
authorizing the President to regulate, curtail, control, and prohibit the defray election expenses on March 11, 1947; Republic Act No. 147
exportation of certain products, merchandise and materials. Under said appropriating P1,000,000 to defray expenses for the election of
authority the President issued Executive Order No. 3 dated July 10, 1946, provincial city and municipal officials and eight senators held on
later amending section 2 of said Executive Order by issuing Executive November 11, 1947, and Republic Act No. 235 appropriating P100,000
Order No. 23 dated November 1, 1946, regulating the exportation of for the special elections held on March 23, 1948, to fill vacancies in
certain products, materials and merchandise. The important thing to Representative District No. 4 of Iloilo and No. 1 of Leyte, demonstrated
consider is that section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 728 provided that the ability of the Congress to appropriate money for election purposes.
the authority it granted to the President shall terminate on December By so doing Congress had tacitly and impliedly withdrawn this portion of
31, 1948, that is to say, that after said date the Executive could no longer the field where the President may under his emergency power legislate
validly regulate exports under said law. The President, however, or promulgate rules and regulations.
overlooked or ignored said injunction and invoking his emergency
powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671, promulgated Executive In this connection, it may be stated that in my opinion, the theory
Order No. 192 regulating exports, to take effect on January 1, 1949. What underlying the delegation of emergency powers to the under
was said with regard to Executive Order No. 62 is applicable to the lack Commonwealth Act No. 671 and the similar laws is that the legislature
of authority of the Executive to promulgate Executive Order No. 192, because of the emergency resulting from the war, would be unable to
namely, that on this matter of export control, the legislature had already meet in order to legislate or although able to meet, because of the
withdrawn it from the jurisdiction of the Executive under his emergency emergency, the ordinary process of legislation would be too slow and
powers after the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 728. Any inadequate and could not cope with the emergency. So, as a remedy, the
Presidential power or authority on the subject of export control was power and authority of legislation are vested temporarily in the hands of
derived from said Act. Not only this, but when in section 4 of one man, the Chief Executive. But as regards Executive Orders Nos. 225
Commonwealth Act No. 728 the legislature terminated the authority and 226, the legislature has demonstrated that not only it could meet but
given the President to regulate and control exports on December 31, also it could legislate on this point of appropriations by approving
1948 and failed or refused to renew said authority, the inference or general appropriation laws for the different fiscal years since liberation
conclusion and that after said date Congress deemed any presidential as well as appropriations for the necessary funds for the different
regulation on exports unnecessary and inadvisable. Therefore, in national and provincial elections. Consequently, there no longer was any
promulgating Executive Order No. 192 the Chief Executive acted not only necessity for Presidential legislation in this regard. Moreover, and this is
without legislative authority but also against the wishes and policy of not unimportant, the failure of the Legislature to pass an appropriation
Congress. This he may not validly do. law for the fiscal year 1949-50 and a law appropriating funds for the
elections in November, 1949 was not due to any emergency resulting policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among
from the war, contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 671, but rather other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the
and possibly due to lack of time and because of the rather abrupt and Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments,
adjourning of the last session of the Legislature last May. offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the
Government of the Commonwealth including the determination
As already stated, the majority holds that Act No. 671 ceased to have of the order of precedence of the heads of the heads of Executive
force and effect on May 25, 1946. The other view is that it is still in force. Departments; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches,
To me this is the main and the more important issue involved in these departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of
cases. In fact the argument of the parties centered on this point. The government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to
importance of this issue may readily be appreciated when it is realized continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or
that on its determination is based, not only the validity or nullity otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the
(according to the theory of the majority opinion), of the four Executive operation or application of those of an administrative character;
Orders now under consideration, but also of all the Executive Orders (e) to impose new taxes to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish
promulgated under authority of Commonwealth Act No. 671 after May those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of
25, 1946, up to the present time. Its determination will also decide bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the
whether or not the President may still exercise his emergency powers in proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or
the future on matters and subjects not heretofore withdrawn by the municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that
Legislature. Because of my disagreement with the majority on this point, he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of
I deem it necessary to explain and elaborate on my reasons for my credits or the payments of debts; and (i) to exercise such other
disagreement. powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to
fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce the
For purposes of reference and to facilitate the same, I am reproducing authority.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 in full as well as section 26, Article VI of the
Constitution on which said Act is based: SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as
practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations
RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY. SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules
and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines: effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise
provide.
SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and
other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by
Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency. such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry our a declared national policy. (Section 26,
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Article VI, Constitution.)
Constitution, the President is hereby authorize, during the
existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and I fully agree with the majority when in its opinion it says:
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national
 Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of legislative body, are entrusted under certain limitations to one single
its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in official or individual.
its nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be sub-
served, and its relation to the Constitution. (Page 5, majority Supposing that during a national emergency and while the Legislature is
opinion.) in session, the legislators woke up one morning to find that there was
extreme scarcity of imported food, fuel, building materials, equipment
The main thesis of the majority is that the only reason for the delegation required in agriculture and industry, etc., because of a monopoly,
of legislative powers to the Chief Executive under the Constitution, such hoarding, injurious speculation, manipulation, private controls and
as was done under Commonwealth Act No. 671 was because due to the profiteering, or that there were wide-spread lockouts and strikes
emergency resulting from the war, the Legislature could not meet to paralyzing transportation, commerce and industry, or rampant
enact legislation; that the moment of Legislature could convene there espionage or sabotage endangering the very life and security of the
would no longer be any reason for the exercise by the President of nation. How much time would it take the legislature to enact the
emergency powers delegated to him; that if, when the Legislature could necessary legislation in order to cope with the situation and pass the
meet and actually is in session, the President is allowed to exercise his necessary emergency measures?
delegated legislative powers, there would be the serious anomaly of two
legislative bodies acting at the same time, namely, the Legislature and We are familiar with the practice and routine of enacting laws. A bill is
the Executive, "mutually nullifying each other's action" ; that the limited introduced in the Legislature; it is referred to the corresponding
period fixed in Commonwealth Act No. 671 for its life and effectiveness committee, it is studied by said committee, which in some cases holds
as required by the Constitution is the interval from the passage of said public hearings; the committee discusses the bill and sometimes
Act and the moment that Congress could convene, not in special session introduces amendments; if the bill is not killed in the committee or
where its power of legislation is limited by the Chief Executive in his call shelved, it is submitted to the chamber for study, discussion and possible
for special session, but in regular session where it could be free to enact amendment by all the members; it is finally voted and if approved, it is
general legislation; and that unless this automatic ending or cessation of sent to the other house where it undergoes the same process; and if it is
Act No. 671 is so held, there would be need of another Act or legislation finally approved by both houses of Congress, it is submitted to the Chief
by the Congress to repeal Act No. 671 in which case, the Chief Executive Executive for his study and approval or veto. All these may consume
may by his veto power effectively block any effort in this direction. weeks or months as a result of which, ordinarily, many bills finally
approved by the Congress could be sent to the President for approval or
I beg to differ with the foregoing thesis. I believe that, as I already had veto only after adjournment of the legislative session. And we should not
occasion to state though incidentally, the real reason for the delegation overlook the fact that in some cases for lack of time of due to
of legislative powers to the Chief Executive is not only because the disagreement among the legislators or between the two houses of
Legislature is unable to meet due to a national emergency but also Congress, important pieces of legislations like the annual appropriation
because although it could and does actually meet, whether in regular or law for the fiscal year 1949-50, appropriation of funds for the election to
special session, it is not in a position and able to cope with the problems be held in November, 1949, contained in Executive Orders Nos. 225 and
brought about by and arising from the emergency, problems which 226, involved in the present cases, and the proposed amendment to the
require urgent and immediate action. Certainly, one man can act more Election Code etc. have not been passed by Congress in its last session
quickly and expeditiously than about one hundred members of the ending last May, 1949, which session lasted one hundred days. If we
Legislature, especially when they are divided into legislative chambers. were to rely on the ordinary process of legislation to meet a national
That is why in times of emergency, much as we in democratic countries emergency, by the time the necessary and needed law is passed, the
dislike the system or idea of dictatorship, we hear of food dictator, fuel situation sought to be remedied, or the problem sought to be solved may
dictator, transportation dictator, civilian evacuation dictator, etc., where have become disastrous or ended in calamity or gone beyond legislation
the functions which ordinarily belong to a council or board or to a
or any remedy. It would be too late. It would be like locking the stable likelihood of the Philippines being involved in the war until more than
door after the horse had been stolen. two years later, in December, 1941. The National Assembly was then
free to meet either in regular or special session to enact legislation to
Now, for some retrospect. The Philippine National Assembly delegated meet the emergency. In fact, it met in regular session in January, 1941
its legislative powers because of the existence of a state of national lasting 100 days and in January, 1941 for another regular session of 100
emergency as early as the year 1939. During its second special session of days, excluding the several special session held during those two years.
that year, it promulgated the following laws: And yet the Assembly delegated legislative powers to the President
under section 26, Article II of the Constitution. This is clear proof that,
(a) Commonwealth Act No. 494, authorizing the President of the contrary to the theory of the majority opinion, the Legislature delegated
Philippines to suspend until the time of the adjournment of the legislative powers to the President even when it could meet and it
next regular session of the National Assembly, either wholly or actually met several times.
partially and under such conditions as he may deem proper, the
operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444, commonly known as After passing the Acts just mentioned delegating legislative powers to
the Eight Hour Labor Law; the President, the Assembly in its fourthly special session on August 19,
1940 repeated and reiterated this practice and policy by passing
(b) Commonwealth Act No. 496, authorizing the President to Commonwealth Act No. 600 delegating additional and more extensive
take over, for use or operation by the Government, any public powers to the President in spite of the fact that the war was still far away
service or enterprise and to pay just compensation in the in Europe and there was no danger or prospect of involving the
manner to be determined by him and to prescribe and Philippines, and the Legislature was still free to meet as in fact it met
promulgate regulations he may deem essential to carry out the again in regular session in January, 1941. During its regular session
purposes of the Act; begun that month and year, instead of stopping or ending the legislative
powers delegated to the President, because according to the theory of
(c) Commonwealth Act No. 498 declaring a state of national the majority opinion, the Legislature was able to meet, the Assembly
emergency due to a state of war among several nations and as a allowed them to continue by passing Commonwealth Act No. 620 which
measure to prevent scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious merely amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 600. I repeat that
speculations, profiteering, etc. affecting the supply, distribution all this, far from supporting the view of the majority that the Legislature
movement of foods, clothing, fuel, building materials, agricultural delegated legislative powers to the President only because it could not
equiptments etc. authorized the President to purchase any of the meet, fairly and squarely refutes said view.
articles or commodities available for storage, for re-sale or
distribution, to fix the maximum selling price of said articles or Now, let us consider the theory of the majority that it would be a great
commodities and to promulgated such rules and regulations as anomaly to have two legislative bodies, the Legislature and the President
he may deem necessary; and to be acting at the same time, each nullifying the acts of the other. I fail to
see the suggested anomaly. In fact, under the view and interpretation
(d) Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President in given by the majority of the delegation of contemplated the
view of the existence of a state of national emergency to reduce simultaneous functioning of the Legislature and the President, both
the expenditures of the executive departments of the exercising legislative powers. And it is a fact that there were several
Government by the suspension or abandonment of service, instances of the legislature and the President both validly and
activities, or operations of no immediate importance. simultaneously exercising legislative powers.

At the time, September, 1939 the second world war was only in Europe, Under section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 496 already referred to,
quite far from the Philippines and had just begun. There was then no approved on September 30, 1939, the power delegated to the President
to prescribe rules and regulations he may deem essential to carry out the its other acts of delegation, like Commonwealth Act 671, the Legislature
purposes of the Act, namely, the taking over of and operation by the not only fails to stipulate this condition, but on the contrary,
Government of any public service or enterprise and to pay for the same, contemplates Presidential exercise of legislative powers simultaneously
was to last until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session with the Legislature, it is to be presumed that the Legislature intended it
of the National Assembly. This means that, during the regular session of and saw nothing improper or anomalous in it, and it is not for the Court
the Assembly which begun in January, 1940 and lasted 100 days, the to pass upon the supposed impropriety or anomaly.
President could exercise the emergency powers delegated to him. Again,
under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 the President could and As to the possibility of the Chief Executive validly and successfully
indeed he exercised his emergency powers during the regular session of nullifying the acts of the Legislature, to me that is quite remote, if not
the Assembly which began in January, 1941, when President Quezon impossible. As already stated at the beginning of this opinion, the Chief
issued at least nine Executive Orders numbered 321, 333, 335, 337, 339, Executive acting as an agent of the Legislative under his emergency
340, 342, 344 and 345. powers, may not go against the wishes and policies of his principal. He
can only carry out its wishes and policies, and where his acts and orders
The same thing obtains under Commonwealth Act 671. Since under the run counter to those of the Legislature, or operate on a field already
view of the majority the emergency power of the President granted him withdrawn because the Legislature had already acted therein, his acts or
in Commonwealth Act No. 671 ended only on May 25, 1946, then the Executive Orders must give way and will be declared void and of no
extensive legislative powers delegated to the President under that Act effect, by the Courts, as we are doing with the Executive Orders involved
could be exercised and in fact they were exercised during the five special in these cases.
session of Congress in the year 1945, which lasted a total of 84 days.
During those special session of 1945, President Osmeña issued several With respect to the claim of the majority opinion that unless the
Executive Orders in the exercise of his emergency powers. emergency powers were made to end at the time the President made his
report to Congress when it convened, it would be necessary to enact new
Is there further proof needed to show that the suggested and feared legislation to repeal the act of delegation, in which case the period for
anomaly and impropriety of the Legislature and the Executive both the delegation would be unlimited, indefinite, and uncertain, contrary to
exercising legislative functions simultaneously, is more fancied than the constitutional provision, I may say that the President was authorized
real? The situation was contemplated and expressly intended by the by Act 671 to exercise emergency powers "during the existence of the
Legislature itself, evidently believing that said condition or state of emergency," and not a day longer. To me that is a limited period in
affairs was neither anomalous nor improper. There is to my mind really contemplation of the Constitution. There would be no need for a new law
no incompatibility. At such a time and during the period of their to repeal the Act of delegation, for said Act is self-liquidating. The
simultaneous functioning, the Legislature may perform its ordinary moment the emergency ceases, the law itself automatically ceases to
legislative duties taking its time to study, consider, amend and pass bills, have force and effect, and the Presidential emergency powers also end
reserving to the President matters requiring and demanding immediate with it.
action.
Under my view, had the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese
After all, it is for the Legislature to say whether it wants the President to forces, which we feared and expected in December, 1941 failed to
exercise his emergency powers at the same time that it is in session. It materialize either because the invasion was repelled or because the
may validly and properly stipulate in its grant of emergency powers that Japanese high command at the last moment decided to by-pass the
they be exercised when the Legislature is not in session. In fact, in one Philippines and divert his forces further south to invade, say Australia,
instance, in Commonwealth Act No. 500, section 2, the Notional or if the Pacific war had ended as we all or most of us then expected it to
Assembly expressly provided "that the authority herein given shall be end sooner within weeks or months after its commencement and that
exercised only when the National Assembly is not in session." When in the emergency resulting therefrom had also ceased soon thereafter,
Commonwealth Act No. 671 would have automatically ceased to have There is no charge or insinuation that any of the Executive Orders which
force and effect right in the year 1942 without any affirmative act or law we are now holding to be invalid were issued from the ulterior motives
of the Legislature. There would be no point or reason for the President or to further and favor the political interest of the President issuing
to continue exercising emergency powers when there no longer was any them. It is admitted in the majority opinion that Executive Order No. 62,
emergency. But under the view of the majority, emergency or no seeking to regulate house and lot rentals was issued in good faith by
emergency even if Congress could meet in special session to enact President Roxas. Executive Order No. 192 was issued to regulate
general legislation, the country must continue to be ruled by the exports, President Quirino presumably believing that exports at this
Presidential decree until the next regular session of Congress which may time still needed regulation and control as was formerly provided by
not come till may months later. In my opinion this is not logical. To me Congress in its Act No. 728, and that the matter was still within the field
the real and only reason and test for the continuance of the exercise of of his emergency powers as was also mistakenly believed by President
emergency powers is the continued existence of the emergency, not the Roxas in issuing Executive Order No. 52. As to Executive Order No. 226,
inability of the Congress to meet in regular session. it merely appropriated funds to defray the expenses in connection with
the holding of the national elections in November, 1949, without which,
The majority, and the parties who initiated these proceedings in court said election could not be held. With respect to Executive Order No. 225,
fear that the President may promulgate rules and regulations contrary in it merely continues in force Republic Act 320 which appropriated funds
purpose and effect to legislation enacted by the Legislature; that he may for the last fiscal year inasmuch as Congress had failed to pass a General
reenact his rules and regulations after being repealed by the legislature, Appropriation Act for the operation of the National Government for the
and that he may even veto a bill passed by Congress repealing the Act of period beginning July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950. There is no insinuation
delegation and ending his emergency powers. It is a fear not well that any political motives or purposes are involved in these Executive
founded. It runs counter to the presumption that the Chief Executive like Orders.
any other public official would perform his functions and conduct
himself in every respect for the good and welfare of the people and in I agree with the majority that since the Constitution provides that the
accordance with the Constitution. It is fear based on the presumption delegation of legislative powers by the Legislature should be done for a
that the Legislature and the Chief Executive are at loggerheads, working limited period, it is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was
at cross purposes and that the President though acting as a mere agent approved with this limitation in view. I even agree to its definition of the
of his principal, the legislature, would brazenly repudiate his principal word "limited." But I submit that Commonwealth Act No. 671 itself,
and even challenge its authority, and that the Chief Executive is so much limited its operation and effectiveness to and make it coextensive with
in love with his emergency powers that he would perpetuate them by the duration of the emergency resulting from the war and that
going as far as vetoing an act of Congress ending said emergency powers. furthermore, that duration is a limited period within the meaning and
Let it be said to the credit of and in justice to the different Chief contemplation of the Constitution. Surely the emergency resulting from
Executives who have wielded these emergency powers, President the war contemplated by the National Assembly when it acted Act No.
Quezon, Osmeña, Roxas and the present incumbent President Quirino, 671 is not permanent or indefinite. It is of limited duration. It may be
that no accusing finger has ever been pointed at them, accusing or even long or it may be short; but it cannot be for always. It has an end.
insinuating that they have abused their emergency powers or exercised Presumably the members of the National Assembly thought that the
them for any purpose other than the welfare of the country, or that they emergency would not last as long as it did. The belief entertained at the
had maliciously acted contrary to the wishes of the Legislatures. Even time by not a few, in fact by a great portion of the people here not
after liberation there has been no claim not even from the Legislatures excluding the legislators, was that the war with Japan would be of short
itself, to the knowledge of this Court, at least to that of the undersigned, duration, a question of months at the longest; that American
that any Chief Executive exercised his delegated powers, knowing that reinforcements would come at the beginning of the year 1942 and drive
they had ended or had abused the same. away the invading Japanese armies if they ever were able to occupy the
Philippines and that, consequently, the war as far as these islands were
concerned and the resulting emergency would soon pass away. The point. The only conclusion is that neither the framers of the Constitution
wisdom or lack of wisdom of the National Assembly in limiting or rather nor the members of the National Assembly had thought of much less
making the life and effectiveness of Commonwealth Act No. 671 intended to impose this condition. To sustain the majority view would
coextensive with the resulting emergency, viewed in the light of what require reading into the law what is not there. In further support of its
had actually happened, cannot be passed upon this Court. So, as I see it, view that emergency powers may be exercised by the President only
so long as the emergency resulting from the War continues, until the Legislature could meet, the majority finds comfort in and cites
Commonwealth Act No. 671 subsists and so long the Chief Executive section 3 of Act 671 which reads as follows:
retains his emergency powers.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as
The majority believes that as already stated, Act No. 671 was in force practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the
only until Congress could meet resume its legislatives functions. Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation
Naturally, this view is based on the theory that legislative functions in promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
times of emergency are delegated only because of the inability of the
Legislative Department to meet and exercise its functions. I believe I I fail to see anything in said section that warrants a holding that upon
have successfully demonstrated the flaw in this theory, not only by filing his report with Congress, about the rules and regulation
showing that the real reason underlying the delegation of legislative promulgated by him under his emergency powers under Commonwealth
powers is not inability of Legislature to meet but rather it inability to Act 671, his emergency powers automatically ceased. I could well
consider and pass legislation in time to meet an emergency which imagine that under an act of delegation of legislative powers where the
requires as it does urgent and immediate action and can be solved only President is authorized to perform one single act such as the suspension
by the exercise of legislative functions by one single responsible of the eight-hour labor law under Commonwealth Act No. 494, or the
individual, unhamppered by study and prolonged discussion by many reduction of the expenditures of the executive departments of the
members of the legislative body, but also by the fact that although since National Government by the suspension or abandonment of services,
1939 when the second world war broke out in Europe and for a period activities or operations of no immediate necessity under Commonwealth
of more than two years thereafter, when the National Assembly could Act No. 500, when the President has exercised his delegated authority
still meet and in fact convened on several occasions and for hundreds of and made his report to the Assembly as required by said laws, the latter,
days in regular and special session, nevertheless, it had been delegating as well as his delegated authority thereunder automatically ceased, for
legislative powers to the President. the simple reason that nothing remains to be performed or done.
However, treating of the grant of extensive emergency powers as was
The majority view finds no support in the law. Section 26, Article VI of done under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671 where said laws
the Constitution does not impose this condition or requirement. The contemplated many different acts, rules and regulations of varied
only important conditions imposed by the Constitution are that there be categories and objectives and to be performed not at one at time or
a national emergency and delegation be for a limited period. The same instance but at different times during the existence of the emergency, as
thing is true with Act No. 671 which makes the delegation. The only the need or occasion arose, there is no reason for the belief or the
condition imposed by section 2 of said Act is that the delegated powers holding that upon submitting a partial report, the whole law making the
be exercised during the emergency. Neither in the Constitution nor in delegation including his powers under it automatically ended. The
Commonwealth Act No. 671 is there any hint or insinuation, much less legislature during the emergency might be able to convene and
express mention about the inability of the Legislature to meet. When naturally, the President will immediately make his report to it of the
every consideration for clearness and for Executive and Judicial rules and regulations promulgated by him up to that time; but if the
guidance loudly called for and demanded an unequivocal and clear emergency continued or even became more serious, would it be
expression of Constitutional and legislative intent, both laws, the source reasonable to hold that his emergency powers ended right then and
and basis of the emergency powers are conspicuously silent on this there? Would it not be more logical and reasonable to believe that
inasmuch as the grant and the exercise of his emergency powers were Assembly of whatever acts have been taken by him under the authority
motivated by and based upon the existence of the emergency and since of those Acts. The Assembly left nothing for interpretation or
the emergency continued his work and responsibility were not ended speculation. In section 3 of Commonwealth Act 671, however, the same
and that his partial report could not possibly affect the continuance of Assembly has not specified the kind of session before which the
his emergency powers? President should make his report. It merely said that upon the convening
of the Congress the President shall report thereto all the rules and
Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 provides for the filing of a regulations promulgated by him. We should make no distinction where
report with Congress by the President as soon as that body convened. the law makes or calls for none. Here again, to support the majority
According to the majority opinion on that date the whole Act No. 671 opinion would require reading into the law, section 3 of Act 671,
ceased to have force and effect. Under that theory, as soon as the something that is not there.
Congress convened in June, 1945, and it is to be presumed that President
Osmeña, complying with his duty, must have made his report of all the In case like the present where there is room for doubt as to whether or
numerous Executive Orders he had issued so far, perhaps including not Commonwealth Act No. 671 has ceased to operate, one view (of the
those issued by his predecessor President Quezon who because of his majority) being that it automatically ceased to have any force and effect
premature death was unable to report his acts to Congress, the President on May 25, 1946, the other view being that the law operated as long as
automatically lost his emergency powers. But the majority opinion the emergency resulting from the war existed, the opinion of and the
qualifies this convening of the Congress, for it says that it must be a obvious interpretation given by the legislature which enacted the law
regular session and not a special session, thereby extending the life of and made the delegation of powers and the President to whom the
Commonwealth act No. 671 one year longer, to May, 1946 when delegation was made and who exercised said powers, should have much
Congress held its first regular session after liberation. I do not quite see if not decisive weight. We must bear in mind that we are not passing
the necessity or the reason for the distinction made between the special upon the validity or constitutionality of a law enacted by the Legislature,
and regular session, for at both sessions Congress could well receive the in which case, the Court may find the act invalid and unconstitutional if it
report of the President. The reason given is that "in a special session is in violation of the basic law, regardless of the opinion or interpretation
Congress may consider general legislation or only such subjects as he given by the Legislature that passed it or of the Executive Department
(President) may designate." But as a matter of fact, the first two special which may be trying to enforce it. We assume that Act No. 671 is valid
sessions called by President Osmeña in 1945, after liberation, each for a and constitutional. Here, we are merely trying to ascertain the intention
period of thirty days were both to consider general legislation. So, of the National Assembly as to the life and period of effectiveness of
actually there is no reason for the distinction. Commonwealth Act No. 671.

Furthermore, if it were the intention of the Legislature to fix the time at Do the study and analysis of other acts of the Legislature similar to
which Commonwealth Act No. 671 would cease in its operation as of the Commonwealth Act 671, favor the view of the majority? The answer in
date when the President could file his report before Congress when it my opinion is clearly and decidedly in the negative. The majority cites
first convened not in special session but in regular session, it would have the Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 to support the theory that
expressly and unequivocally said so. In its other acts of delegation of Commonwealth Act 671 automatically ceased to operate Congress met at
powers when the legislature wanted to have the report of the President its next regular session. But the logical inference or conclusion to be
at its regular session, it expressly and explicitly said so. In section 3 of drawn from these two acts is, in my opinion, just the reverse. It is even
Commonwealth Act 494, in section 5 of Commonwealth Act 496, in fatal to the view of the majority as I shall attempt to show. Let us
section 6 of Commonwealth Act 498, in section 3 of Commonwealth Act consider Commonwealth Act 600 delegating extensive legislative powers
500 and in section 4 of Commonwealth Act 600, the National Assembly to the President, approved on August 19, 1940, which like Act 671 is
provided that the President shall report to the National Assembly within silent as to any express provision regarding its life or period of
ten days after the opening of the next regular session of the said effectiveness, and as to how long the emergency powers granted the
President by it will last. Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 600 like no longer in force. The only thing that could be done with a law that has
section 3 of Act 671 provides that "the President shall within the first ten ceased to operate is to reenact it. But in passing Commonwealth Act 620
days from the date of the opening of the Assembly's next regular session in July, 1941, the Assembly did not reenacted Commonwealth Act No.
report to said Assembly whatever action he had taken under the 600. By merely amending one of its sections, the Assembly, as late as
authority therein granted." Said section 4 of Act 600 is clearly and more June 1941, considered said Act 600 as still effective and in operation and
specific than section 3 of Act 671 in that it clearly specifies the next consequently, the emergency powers of the President continued and
regular session whereas the latter refers merely to the convening of subsisted despite his previously having made a report of his actions in
Congress. But let us assume arguendo as contended by the majority that January 1941. This squarely refutes the theory that as soon as the
"the convening of the Congress" mentioned in section 3 of President filed his report on the exercise of his emergency powers with
Commonwealth Act 671, referred to regular session. According to the the Legislature, the Act making the delegation ceased to operate and the
majority opinion, under section 4 of the Commonwealth Act No. 600, as President lost his emergency powers.
soon as the President made the report of the National Assembly at its
"next regular session" which was to be and was actually held in January, As I have already stated in the course of this opinion, in connection with
1941, Commonwealth Act 600 automatically ceased to operate and the another phrase of this case from January to June, 1941, President
President automatically lost his delegated legislative powers. But this Quezon had issued at least eight Executive Orders in the exercise of his
contrary to the very view of the National Assembly which passed said emergency powers, by authority of Commonwealth Act 600. From this it
Act 600. Commonwealth Act No. 620 of the National Assembly passed is evident that he did not share the majority view, because despite his
during that "next regular session" and approved on June 6, 1941 merely having made his report to the Assembly in January, 1941, and even
amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act 600, which enumerated the before the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 620, he believed and
powers delegated to the Chief Executive. It left the rest of the provisions considered Commonwealth Act No. 600 as still in force after that date
and sections of Commonwealth Act 600 intact. So that, under section 4 and that he still retained his emergency powers.
(which was left intact) of Act 600, the President was still required to
report to National Assembly within the first 10 days from the date of the Then, let us see what was the attitude and conduct of the Chief Executive
opening of its next regular session which should have begun in January, and of Congress after May 25, 1946, when according to the majority
1942, despite the fact that he had already made a report to the opinion Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to operate. After May 25,
Legislature in January, 1941. Incidentally, this answer and refutes the 1946, two Presidents, Roxas and Quirino had issued numerous Executive
contention of the majority that the law of delegation of powers Orders based upon and invoking Commonwealth Act No. 671. Like
contemplated only one meeting of the Congress at which the President President Quezon, they also evidently were of the opinion that despite
was to report his acts of emergency, and that said report was to be the the meeting of the Legislature in regular session the act delegating
first and the last. legislative powers to them (in the case of Roxas and Quirino—
Commonwealth Act No. 671) was still in force, that they still retained
Now, what inference may be drawn from this amending of section 1 only their emergency powers and so proceeded to exercise them in good
of Commonwealth Act No. 600 by Commonwealth Act No. 620? The faith.
logical conclusion is that in promulgating Commonwealth Act 620 on
June 6, 1941, the National Assembly all along regarded Commonwealth Congress also, evidently, believed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was
Act No. 600 which delegated legislative powers to the President as still still in force and effect after said date, May 25, 1946. In spite of the
in force and effect despite the report filed with the Assembly by the several legislative sessions, regular and special since then and up to and
President at the beginning of its regular session in January, 1941. When including the year 1949, Congress has not by law or resolution said
the Legislature merely amends a section of a law, leaving the rest of said anything questioning or doubting the validity of said Executive Order on
law intact and unchanged, the logical inference and conclusion is that the the score of having been promulgated after Commonwealth Act No. 671
amended law was still in force because you cannot amend a law which is had supposedly ceased to operate. Not only this, but at least in one
instance, Congress had by a law promulgated by it, considered one of the war is a question of fact. It is based on conditions obtaining among
those supposed illegal Executive Orders promulgated after May 25, the people and in the country and perhaps even near and around it. It is
1946, to be valid. I refer to Republic Act No. 224 approved on June 5, highly controversial question on which people may honestly differ.
1948, creating the National Airport Corporation which considered and There are those who in all good faith believe and claim that conditions
treated as valid Executive Order No. 100, dated October 21, 1947, by have returned to normal; that the people have now enough to eat,
providing in section 7 of said Republic Act No. 224 for the abolishment of sometimes even more than they had before the war; that people
the Office of the Administrator of the Manila International Airport nowadays especially in the cities are better nourished and clothed and
established under the provisions of said Executive Order No. 100 and the transported and better compensated for their labor, and that the
transfer of the personnel and funds created under the same Executive President himself in his speeches, chats and messages had assured the
Order to the National Airport Corporation. This Executive Order No. 100 public that normal times have returned, that the problem of peace and
which appropriated public funds and therefore, was of a legislative order had been solved, that the finances of the Government and the
nature must have been issued under Commonwealth Act No. 671. It national economy are sound, and that there is an adequate food supply.
cannot possibly be regarded as having been promulgated by authority of It is therefore, claimed that there is no longer any emergency resulting
Republic Act No. 51, for said Act approved on October 4, 1946, gave the from the war.
President only one year within which to reorganize the different
executive departments, offices, agencies, etc. and Executive Order No. On the other hand, it is asserted with equal vehemence in the opposite
100 was promulgated on October 23, 1947, after the expiration of the camp that conditions are still far from normal; that the picture painted
one year period. Furthermore, it is a matter of common knowledge that by the President in cheerful and reassuring colors is based on over
during the last session of Congress which ended in May, 1949, there was optimism and, as to be expected, calculated to show in bold relief the
talk if not a movement in the Congress to end the emergency powers of achievements of the administration, and so should be considered with
the President. Nothing concrete in the form of legislation or resolution some allowance; that we are now importing more rice than before the
was done, for if we are to accept newspaper reports and comment, the war for the reason that many rice farms are idle because of the farmer's
members of Congress or at least a majority of them were willing and fear of or interference by dissidents; that the problem of peace and order
satisfied to have the Chief Executive continue in the exercise of his is far from solved as shown by the frequent hold-ups, kidnapping,
emergency powers until the end of 1949. All this leads to no other loothing and killings and organized banditry not only in Luzon but also
conclusion but that Congress believed all along that Commonwealth Act in the Visayas and Mindanao; that whereas before the war, the
No. 671 is still in force and effect. Constabulary force consisting of only about 6,000 officers and men could
provide complete protection to life and property and was adequate in all
If Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and effect the question respects to enforce peace and order, now this Constabulary enlarged to
arises: how long and for what period will said Act continue to operate? about 20,000 men, provided with modern weapons and equipment and
As I have already stated, I believe that the delegation of emergency with the aid of thousands of civilians guards and of the Philippine Army
powers was made coextensive with the emergency resulting from the and Air Force cannot solve the peace and order problem; that the
war, as long as that emergency continues and unless the Legislature dissidents who are well organized, armed and disciplined even attack
provides otherwise, Act 671 will continue to operate and the President and sack towns and sometimes openly defy and engage the armed
may continue exercising his emergency powers. Government forces; that as long as more than 100,000 firearms are loose
and in the hands of irresponsible parties, not excluding the seemingly
The last and logical question that one will naturally ask is: has the regular mysterious supply to them of additional firearms and
emergency resulting from the war passed or does it still exist? This is a ammunitions, there can be no peace and order; and as to the barrio folks
fair and decisive question inasmuch as the existence of the emergency is, in central Luzon and now, even in provinces bordering central Luzon
my opinion, the test and the only basis of the operation or cessation of whose parents and relatives had been killed by dissidents, whose
Act 671. The existence or non-existence of the emergency resulting from women folk had been outraged by the same elements, whose homes had
been looted and burned and whose very lives had been subjected to transportation situation. In other words, the President is in a position to
constant terror and peril, compelling them to leave their homes and determine whether or not there is still an emergency as a result of the
their farms and evacuate to and be concentrated in the poblaciones to war.
live there in utter discomfort and privation, it is said that it would be
difficult to convince these unfortunate people that normalcy has As to Congress, it is equally in a position and in fact it is the first to called
returned and that there is no longer any emergency resulting from the upon to decide as to the existence or non-existence of an emergency.
war. To further support the claim of the existence of an emergency, the According to the Constitution, section 24, Article VI, either House of
menace of communism not only at home, particularly in central Luzon Congress may call upon the head of any department of the Government
but from abroad, especially China, is invoked. And it is asserted that all on any matter pertaining to his departure. The members of Congress
this is a result of the war. come from all parts and the far corners of the country. They are
supposed to be in close contact with their constituents and know at first
I repeat that this question of the existence of an emergency is a hand their needs, the way they live, etc. Congress therefore should know.
controversial one, the decision on which must be based on the Moreover, it is the legislature that must first determine as to whether or
ascertainment of facts, circumstances and conditions and the situation not there is a national emergency as a condition precedent to the
obtaining in the country. This Court is not in a position to decide that delegation of its legislative powers. Naturally, it is the one that is called
controversy. It does not have the facilities to obtain and acquire the upon to say when that emergency ceases.
necessary facts and data on which to base a valid and just decision.
Neither did it have the opportunity to receive the necessary evidence as Now, one will ask, what does Congress think about the emergency? Does
in a hearing or trial at which evidence, oral or documentary, is it believe that it still exists? To me the answer is YES. What has been said
introduced. We cannot invoked and resort to judicial notice because this about the acts, conduct and attitude of the legislature as to its belief that
refers to things of public knowledge, and not controverted, whereas Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force, are all applicable and may be
things, facts and conditions necessary for the determination of whether repeated to show that the Congress believes that the emergency
or not there is still an emergency, are often not of public knowledge but resulting from the war still exist. Under the theory that I maintain,
require investigation, accurate reporting and close contact with the Congress must be of the opinion that the emergency still exists for the
people to be able to ascertain their living conditions, their needs, their reason that as I have shown Congress believes that Commonwealth Act
fears, etc. No. 671 is still in force and the life and the operation of said Act depends
upon and is coextensive with the existence of the emergency. To this
To me, the department of the Government equipped and in a position to may be added the attitude and the belief of the President as to the
decide this question of emergency are the Chief Executive and the continued existence of the emergency. It must be borne in mind that
Legislature. The first has at his command and beck and call all the Commonwealth Act No. 671 authorizes the President to exercise his
executive officials and departments. He has the Army, the Constabulary, emergency powers only during the existence of the emergency. The
Naval Patrol, the Police of the cities and towns and the barrio lieutenants inference is that before exercising his emergency powers by
to inform him of the state of peace and order and the security of the promulgating an Executive Order he must first determine and decide
states. He has the Secretary of Education and all the subordinates that the state of emergency still exists, for that is the condition precedent
officers and the school officials under him to inform him as to whether to the exercise of his delegated powers. In other words, the two
or not there is a school crisis or emergency as a result of the war. He has departments of the Government, the Legislative and the Executive
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and his men to Departments, best qualified and called upon to determine whether or
advise him as to the agricultural needs and the food supply of the not the emergency resulting from the war still exists have made manifest
country. He has the Secretary of Finance and all the officials under him in their acts and attitude that they believe that such emergency still
to inform him of the finances of the Government and the economy of the exists. I may here state that on this question of emergency, I entertain no
country as well as the officials to advise him of the land shipping personal opinion either way lacking as I do the means of deciding fairly
and justly. Neither has the Court. If the decision of the courts on question time the Chief Executive exercised those powers by promulgating the
of fact involved in a controversy are given due respect and weight and executive orders whose validity is now challenged.
are binding, it is because such decisions are based on evidence adduced
and received after a hearing. No such hearing was held for the purpose On issue similar to the one just formulated there is a diversity of
and no evidence been received. In other words, we have nothing in opinions. While some courts would rather leave the determination of
which to decide a question of fact which is the existence or non- such issues to the political department of the Government, others are for
existence of emergency. making the determination subject to judicial review. But the latest ruling
of the United States Supreme Court on the point accords with first view
In view of the conclusion we have arrived at, finding these Executive and declares that "these are matters of political judgment for which
Orders to be void and of no effect, particularly Executive Orders Nos. 225 judges have neither technical competence nor official responsibility."
and 226 with the evident result that no funds are appropriated for the (Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883.)
operation of the Government for the fiscal year beginning July of this
year and for the expenses in the coming national election next In any event the existence or non-existence of an emergency is a
November, one may inquire as to what will happen or what is to be done. question of facts which may not always be determine without the
The answer or answers to this question lie with the Chief Executive. evidence by mere reference to facts within the judicial notice. In the
Congress will not meet in regular session until next year. It is not for the present cases, there has been no trial for the reception of proof, and I am
court, not even the undersigned to suggest the calling of a special not aware that enough facts have been shown to justify the conclusion
legislative session to cope with the perilous situation thus created, altho that the emergency in question has already ceased. On the other hand,
one may regard that as a logical remedy. But, should the President call a since the exercise of the emergency powers by the President
special session and Congress for one reason or another fails to meet or presupposes a determination of the existence of the emergency, the
though it meets, for one reason or another it fails to pass an President must be presumed to have satisfied himself in some
appropriation law, then a real crisis will have ensued. I am confident that appropriate manner that the emergency existed when he issued his
the Chief Executive, conscious of his responsibility as the Chief of the executive orders. Under the theory of separation of powers and in
nation would not just stand supine and idle and see the Government of accord with the latest ruling of the United States Supreme Court, it is not
the Republic of the Philippines disintegrate and die. He would know for the judiciary to review the finding of the Executive in this regard.
what to do and he would do something according to his sound discretion Judicial review would in such case amount to control of executive
and in accordance with the law, statutory or otherwise and in the discretion and place the judicial branch above a co-equal department of
discharge of his high executive powers, express or implied. the Government. Only in case of a manifest abuse of the exercise of
powers by a political branch of the Government is judicial interference
TORRES, J., concurring: allowable in order to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. But
with the cold war still going on though the shooting war has already
I concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor on the ended; with the world still in turmoil so much so that the American
existence of the emergency powers. I reserve my opinion on the validity Secretary of the State has declared that "the world has never before in
of Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226. peace time been as troubled or hazardous as it is right now;" with most
of the industries of the country still unrihabilitated, so that a large
REYES, J., concurring and dissenting: proportion of our food and other necessaries have to be imported; with a
great portion of the population still living in temporary quarters; with
The main issue in these cases is whether the emergency which on most of the war damage claims still unpaid; and with peace and other
December 16, 1941 prompted the approval of Commonwealth Act No. conditions in the country far from normal, it would be presumptuous for
671, delegating extraordinary powers to the President, still existed at the this Court, without proof of the actual condition obtaining in all parts of
the Archipelago, to declare that the President clearly abused his
discretion when he considered the emergency not ended at the time he by the Legislature," the argument overlooks the fact that the emergency
promulgated the executive orders now questioned. powers delegated to the President under Article VI, section 26 of the
Constitution could only authorize him "to promulgate rules and
The majority opinion has skirted the issue of whether or not the regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Only the Legislature
question of the existence or continuance of the emergency is one for the (with the concurrence of the President of course) may declare the
political department of the Government to determine by restricting "the President may not, under the Constitution, depart from it. Moreover,
life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature unless the Presidential veto could be overriden, no bill approved by
was prevented from holding session due to enemy action or other causes Congress could become a law if the President did not want it. And if the
brought on by the war." I cannot subscribe to this narrow interpretation President approves a bill and allows it to become a law, surely he can
of Commonwealth Act No. 671, for in my opinion it is contrary to both have no reason for repealing it; while, on the other hand, there is no
the plain language and manifest purpose of that enactment. The law point in his repealing that bill, because if there are enough votes to
invests the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the override his veto there must also be enough votes to repeal his
emergency resulting from the war and it expressly says that the emergency powers.
President is to exercise those powers "during the existence of the
emergency." The Act does not say that the President may exercise the The majority opinion has I think placed a rather forced construction
powers only when the Legislature is not session. Much less does it say upon section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671, which provides that —
that the emergency powers shall cease as soon as the Legislature has
convened in regular session. An emergency resulting from a global war The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable
cannot end with the mere meeting of the Legislature. Neither may be upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report
legislated out of existence. The Legislature, once it was convened, may, if thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under
it so desire, revoked the emergency powers of the President, but it the powers herein granted.
cannot by any form of legislative action put an immediate end to the
emergency itself. Well known is a fact that a deliverative body, such as As may be seen, the above provision does not say that the President has
the Legislature, because of the time consumed in the study and to report only once, that is, the first time Congress is convened, and
discussion of a measure, may not always act with the promptness which never again. But the majority opinion wants to read that thought into the
the situation requires so that in an emergency there is really need for the law in order to bolster up the theory that the emergency powers of the
concentration of power in one man. This may well be the reason why Act President would end as soon as Congress could convene in a regular
No. 671 in express terms authorizes the President to exercise the session.
emergency powers "during the existence of the emergency" and not
merely during the time that the Legislature could be in session. For one Invoking the rule of contemporary construction, the majority opinion
thing to make the life of the emergency powers depend upon the makes reference to a passage in President Quezon's book. "The Good
inability of the Legislature to meet is the same as to declare those Fight," to the effect that, according to the author, Act No. 671, was only
emergency powers automatically ended the moment they were "for a certain period" and "would become valid unless re-enacted." But I
conferred, for at that very moment of the Legislature that conferred see nothing in the quoted phrases any suggestion that the emergency
them was in session. powers of the President were to end the moment Congress was
convened in regular session regardless of the continuance of the
The argument that, unless the emergency powers of the President were emergency which gave birth to those powers. A more valid application of
made to cease the moment Congress convened in regular session, we the rule of contemporary construction may, I think, be made by citing
should be having two legislatures which could mutually annul each the executive orders promulgated by President Roxas by Commonwealth
other, will not stand analysis. In supposing that the President, in the Act No. 671. Many of those executive orders were issued after May 25,
exercise of the emergency powers could "repeal or modify a bill passed 1946 when Congress convened in regular session, an event which,
according to the majority opinion, automatically put an end to the exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the
emergency powers. government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain in force this
authority." Under this specific provision, the appropriation for the
While we have adopted the republican form of government with its expenses of the coming elections would, naturally, come, for, without
three co-equal departments, each acting within its separate sphere, it doubt, it is a measure to enable the Government "to fulfill its
would be well to remember that we have not accepted the American responsibilities."
theory of separation of powers to its full extent. For, profiting from the
experience of America when her Supreme Court, by the application Consistently with the views above express, I am of the opinion that
many a New Deal measure which her Congress had approved to meet a Executive Order No. 225, appropriating funds for the operation of the
national crisis, our Constitutional Convention in 1935, despite the Government of the Republic for the fiscal year 1949-50, and Executive
warning of those who feared a dictatorship in his country, decided to Order No. 226, appropriating funds for the expenses of the coming
depart from the strict theory of separation of powers by embodying a national elections in November, 1949, are valid so that the petition in
provision in our Constitution, authorizing the delegation of legislative G.R. No. L-3054, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. vs. Treasurer of the Philippines,
powers to the President "in times of war or other national emergency." It and the petition in G.R. No. L-3056, Antonio Barredo, etc., vs.
is my surmise that this provision was intended to guard not only against Commissioner on Election, et al., in which the said two executive orders
the inability to meet but also against its usual tardiness and inaction. We are respectively challenged, should be denied.
have proof of this last in the last regular session of Congress, when this
body failed to pass measures of pressing necessity, especially the annual But Executive Order No. 62 (regulating rents) and Executive Order No.
appropriation law and the appropriation for the expenses of the coming 192 (controlling exports) stand on a different footing. The validity of
elections. Executive Order No. 62 can no longer be maintained because of the
approval by the Legislature of Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic
It is said that the need for an appropriation law for the fiscal year 1949- Act No. 66, which regulate the same subject matter and which, as an
1950 as well for the coming elections is not an emergency resulting from expression of the national policy, can not be deviated from by the
the war. But I say that if the emergency resulting from the war as President in the exercise of the emergency powers delegated to him by
contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671 still exists, as the President Commonwealth Act No. 671. The same is true with respect to Executive
believes it exists or he would not have issued the executive orders in Order No. 192 (controlling exports) in view of the passage of
question (and it is not for the Court to change that belief in the absence Commonwealth Act No. 728, regulating the same subject matter,
of proof that the President was clearly wrong) would it not be a especially because section 4 of said Act terminates the power of the
dereliction of duty on his part to fall to provide, during the emergency, President thereunder on December 31, 1948, if not sooner.
for the continuance of the functions of government, which is only Consequently, since the validity of these executive orders (Nos. 62 and
possible with an appropriation law? What would be gained by issuing 192) can no longer be upheld, the petitions in G.R. Nos. L-2044, L-2756
rules and regulations to meet the emergency if there is no Government and L-3055, which seek to prohibit their enforcement, should be
to enforce and carry them out? The mere calling of a special is no granted.
guaranty that an appropriation law will be passed or that one will be
passed before the thousands of officials and employees who work for the PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
Government have starved. It is, probably, because of these
considerations that the National Assembly, in approving Commonwealth I join in this opinion of Mr. Justice Reyes. I wish to add that I agree with
Act No. 671, specifically empowered the President, during the existence Mr. Justice Bengzon that petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056
of the emergency, "to continue in force laws and appropriations which have no personality to institute the proceedings.
would lapse or otherwise become inoperative." And that Act has
authorized the President during the existence of the same emergency "to
BENGZON, J., dissenting: It is a sound rule, I believe, for the Court to determine only those
questions which are necessary to decide a case.
The majority feels that it has to decide the question whether the
President still has emergency powers; but unable to determine in which Although I am favorably impressed by the considerations set forth by
of the above cases the issue may properly be decided, it grouped them Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes on the existence of
together. When the eye or the hand is unsure, it is best to shoot at five emergency powers, I prefer to vote as herein indicated.
birds in a group: firing at one after another may mean as many misses.
I reserve the right subsequently to elaborate on the above propositions.
It does not matter that the first two cases had been submitted and voted
before the submission of the last three. Neither does it matter that, of For lack of the required number of votes, judgment was not obtained.
these last, two should be thrown out in accordance with our previous However, after rehearing, the required number of votes was had, by
rulings. The target must be large. resolution of September 16, 1949, which follows.

These cases could be, and should be decided separately. If they are, they
may be disposed of without ruling on the general question whether the
President still has emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. RESOLUTION
7671. How? This way, which is my vote.
September 16, 1949
1. L-2044, Araneta vs. Dinglasan; L-2756, Araneta vs. Angeles. The
President has presently no power to regulate rents, because his power to
do so is granted by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 which have MORAN, C. J.:
lapsed. Under Commonwealth Act No. 671 he has no power to regulate
rents. Petitioners filed motions asking (1) that Mr. Justice Padilla be qualified
to act in these cases; (2) that the vote cast by the late Mr. Justice
2. L-3056, Barredo vs. Commission, etc. Dismissed because petitioner has Perpecto before his death be counted in their favor; and (3) that the
no personality to sue. According to Custodio vs. President of the Senate et opinion of the Chief Justice be counted as a vote for the nullity of
al., 42 Off. Gaz., 1243, a citizen and taxpayer, as such, has no legal Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226.
standing to institute proceedings for the annulment of a statute.
I
3. L-3054, Rodriguez vs. Treasurer. Dismissed, like the Barredo case. The
private rights of petitioner and of his partymen are affected only as As regards the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, the Court is of the
taxpayers. opinion that it must not be considered, it having been presented after
Mr. Justice Padilla had given his opinion on the merits of these cases. As
4. L-3055, Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs. Supposing that the we have once said "a litigant . . . cannot be permitted to speculate upon
President still has emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671, the action of the court and raise an objection of this sort after decision
and that they include regulation of exportation, inasmuch as the has been rendered." (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Heirs of
Congress has chosen to legislate on exports (Commonwealth Act No. Abella, 49 Phil., 374.)
728), it has thereby pro tanto withdrawn the power delegated to the
President along that field. Furthermore, the fact that Justice Padilla, while Secretary of Justice, had
advised the President on the question of emergency powers, does not
disqualify him to act in these cases, for he cannot be considered as
having acted previously in these actions as counsel of any of the parties. sign the decision that is to be promulgated. That vote is of no value if it is
The President is not here a party. not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice
is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their vote,
All the members of this Court concur in the denial of the motion to wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they
disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, with the exception of Mr. Justice Ozaeta have to sign the decision, so that they may take full advantage of what
and Mr. Justice Feria who reserve their vote. they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and
deliberation. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed
II and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and after
the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breast of the Justices, binding
With respect to the motion to include the vote and opinion of the late Mr. upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may
Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases, it appears that Mr. Justice serve for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is
Perfecto died and ceased to be a member of this Court on August 17, and for designating a member to prepare the decision binding unless
1949, and our decision in these cases was released for publication on and until duly signed and promulgated.
August 26, 1949. Rule 53, section 1, in connection with Rule 58, section
1, of the Rules of Court, is as follows: And this is practically what we have said in the contempt case against
Abelardo Subido,1 promulgated on September 28, 1948:
SECTION 1. Judges: who may take part. — All matters submitted
to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be que un asunto o causa pendiente en esta Corte Suprema solo se
deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by considera decidido una vez registrada, promulgada y publicada
any and all of the justices who are members of the court at the la sentencia en la escribania, y que hasta entonces el resultado de
time when such matters are taken up for consideration and la votacion se estima como una materia absolutamente
adjudication, whether such justices were or not members of the reservada y confidencial, perteneciente exclusivamente a las
court and whether they were or were not present at the date of camaras interiores de la Corte.
submission; . . . .
In an earlier case we had occasion to state that the decisive point is the
Under this provision, one who is not a member of the court at the time date of promulgation of judgment. In that case a judge rendered his
an adjudication is made cannot take part in the adjudication. The word decision on January 14; qualified himself as Secretary of Finance on
"adjudication" means decision. A case can be adjudicated only by means January 16; and his decision was promulgated on January 17. We held
of a decision. And a decision of this Court, to be of value and binding that the decision was void because at the time of its promulgation the
force, must be in writing duly signed and promulgated (Article VIII, judge who prepared it was no longer a judge. (Lino Luna vs. Rodriquez,
sections 11 and 12, of the Constitution; Republic Act No. 296, section 21; 37 Phil., 186.)
Rule 53, section 7, of the Rules of Court). Promulgated means the
delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing and publication. Another reason why the vote and opinion of the Mr. Justice Perfecto can
not be considered in these cases is that his successor, Mr. Justice Torres,
Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of this Court at the time a has been allowed by this Court to take part in the decision on the
decision is signed and promulgated, cannot validly take part in that question of emergency powers because of lack of majority on that
decision. As above indicated, the true decision of the Court is the question. And Mr. Justice Torres is not bound to follow any opinion
decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that previously held by Mr. Justice Perfecto on that matter. There is no law or
decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court rule providing that a successor is a mere executor of his predecessor's
to speak of. The vote cast by a member of the Court after deliberation is will. On the contrary, the successor must act according to his own
always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has to opinion for the simple reason that the responsibility for his action is his
and of no one else. Of course, where a valid and recorded act has been could remedy the existing anomaly, I deemed it a slavish submission to a
executed by the predecessor and only a ministerial duty remains to be constitutional formula for this Court to seize upon its power under the
performed for its completion, the act must be completed accordingly. fundamental law to nullify the executive orders in question. A deferment
For instance, where the predecessor had rendered a valid judgment duly of judgment struck me then as wise. I reasoned that judicial
filed and promulgated, the entry of that judgment which is a ministerial statesmanship, not judicial supremacy, was needed.
duty, may be ordered by the successor as a matter of course. But even in
that case, if the successor is moved to reconsider the decision, and he However, now that the holding of a special session of Congress for the
still may do so within the period provided by the rules, he is not bound purpose of remedying the nullity of the executive orders in question
to follow the opinion of his predecessor, which he may set aside appears remote and uncertain, I am compelled to, and do hereby, give
according to what he may believe to be for the best interests of justice. my unqualified concurrence in the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Tuason declaring that these two executive orders were issued without
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the motion to include the vote and authority of law.
opinion of the late Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases must be
denied. While in voting for a temporary deferment of the judgment I was moved
by the belief that the positive compliance with the Constitution by the
Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla, Mr. Justice other branches of the Government, which is our prime concern in all
Montemayor, Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes, and Mr. Justice Torres concur in these cases, would be effected, and indefinite deferment will produce the
this denial. Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Tuason opposite result because it would legitimize a prolonged or permanent
dissent. evasion of our organic law. Executive orders which are, in our opinion,
repugnant to the Constitution, would be given permanent life, opening
III the way to practices which may undermine our constitutional structure.

In connection with the motion to consider the opinion of the Chief The harmful consequences which, as I envisioned in my concurring
Justice as a vote in favor of petitioners, the writer has the following to opinion, would come to pass should the said executive orders be
say: immediately declared null and void, are still real. They have not
disappeared by reason of the fact that a special session of the Congress is
In my previous concurring opinion, I expressed the view that the not now forthcoming. However, the remedy now lies in the hands of the
emergency powers vested in Commonwealth Act No. 671 had ceased in Chief Executive and of Congress, for the Constitution vests in the former
June 1945, but I voted for a deferment of judgment in these two cases the power to call a special session should the need for one arise, and in
because of two circumstances then present, namely, (1) the need of the latter, the power to pass a valid appropriation act.
sustaining the two executive orders on appropriations as the life-line of
government and (2) the fact that a special session of Congress was to be That Congress may again fall to pass a valid appropriations act is a
held in a few days. I then asked, "Why not defer judgment and wait until remote possibility, for under the circumstances it fully realizes its great
the special session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it clearly responsibility of saving the nation from breaking down; and
sees it?" furthermore, the President in the exercise of his constitutional powers
may, if he so desires, compel Congress to remain in special session till it
It seemed then to me unwise and inexpedient to force the Government approves the legislative measures most needed by the country.
into imminent disruption by allowing the nullity of the executive orders
to follow its reglementary consequences when Congress was soon to be Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will emerge
convened for the very purpose of passing, among other urgent measures, victorious as a permanent way of life in this country, if each of the great
a valid appropriations act. Considering the facility with which Congress branches of the Government, within its own allocated spear, complies
with its own constitutional duty, uncompromisingly and regardless of the members of the Court. But "executive order" and "regulations" were
difficulties. later deleted from the final draft (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 495, 496), and thus a mere majority of six
Our Republic is still young, and the vital principle underlying its organic members of this Court is enough to nullify them.
structure should be maintained firm and strong, hard as the best of steel,
so as to insure its growth and development along solid lines of a stable All the members of the Court concur in this view.
and vigorous democracy.
For all the foregoing, the Court denies the motion to disqualify Mr.
With my declaration that Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 are null Justice Padilla, and the motion to include the vote of the late Mr. Justice
and void, and with the vote to the effect of Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases. And it is the judgment of this
Paras, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Montemayor, Court to declare Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, null and void, with
there is a sufficient majority to pronounce a valid judgment on that the dissent of Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice
matter. Reyes, upon the grounds already stated in their respective opinions, and
with Mr. Justice Torres abstaining.
It is maintained by the Solicitor General and the amicus curiae that eight
Justices are necessary to pronounce a judgment on the nullity of the But in order to avoid a possible disruption or interruption in a normal
executive orders in question, under section 9 of Republic Act No. 296 operation of the Government, it is decreed, by the majority, of course,
and Article VIII, section 10 of the Constitution. This theory is made to that this judgment take effect upon the expiration of fifteen days from
rest on the ground that said executive orders must be considered as the date of its entry. No costs to be charged.
laws, they having been issued by the Chief Executive in the exercise of
the legislative powers delegated to him. Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres,
JJ., concur.
It is the opinion of the Court that the executive orders in question, even
if issued within the powers validly vested in the Chief Executive, are not
laws, although they may have the force of law, in exactly the same
manner as the judgments of this Court, municipal ordinances and FERIA, J., concurring:
ordinary executive orders cannot be considered as laws, even if they
have the force of law. The respondent in the cases G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 contend that
the petitioners in said cases can not institute an action to invalidate the
Under Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the only power which, in Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 promulgated by the President,
times of war or other national emergency, may be vested by Congress in because they have no interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of
the President, is the power "to promulgate rules and regulations to carry moneys raised by taxation, and can not therefore question the validity of
out a declared national policy." Consequently, the executive orders said executive orders requiring expenditures of public money.
issued by the President in pursuance of the power delegated to him
under that provision of the Constitution, may be considered only as rules Although the Supreme Court, in the case of Custodio vs. President of the
and regulations. There is nothing either in the Constitution or in the Senate, G. R. No. L-117 (42 Off. Gaz., 1243) held in a minute resolution
Judiciary Act requiring the vote of eight Justices to nullify a rule or "That the constitutionality of a legislative act is open to attack only by
regulation or an executive order issued by the President. It is very person whose rights are affected thereby, that one who invokes the
significant that in the previous drafts of section 10, Article VII of the power of the court to declare an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional
Constitution, "executive order" and "regulation" were included among must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has
those that required for their nullification the vote of two thirds of all of sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as
the result of its enforcement," that ruling was laid down without a and 10 of Article VII, in the President; and the judicial power is vested by
careful consideration and is contrary to the ruling laid down in the section 1, Article VII, in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as
majority of jurisdictions in the United States that "In the determination may be established by law, the Supreme Court having the supremacy to
of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack pass upon "the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons or executive order or regulations."
individually affected, but also have taxpayers, have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditures of money raised by taxation and may The distribution by the Constitution of the powers of government to the
therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departments operates, by
expenditures of public moneys." (Am. Jur., Vol. 11, p. 761) All the implication, as an inhibition against the exercise by one department of
members of this Court, except two, in taking cognizance of those cases, the powers which belong to another, and imposes upon each of the three
rejected the respondents' contention, reversed the ruling in said case departments the duty of exercising its own peculiar powers by itself, and
and adopted the general rule above mentioned; and we believe the latter prohibits the delegation of any of those powers except in cases expressly
is better than the one adopted in said case of Custodio, which was based permitted by the Constitution. The principle of the separation of the
on a doctrine adhered to only in few jurisdiction in the United States; powers of government is fundamental to the very existence of a
because if a taxpayer can not attack the validity of the executive orders constitutional government as established in the Philippines patterned
in question or a law requiring the expenditure of public moneys, one after that of the United States of America. The division of governmental
under our laws could question the validity of such laws or executive powers into legislative, executive, and judicial represents the most
orders. important principle of government that guarantees the liberties of the
people, for it prevents a concentration of powers in the hands of one
After laying down the fundamental principles involved in the case at bar, person or class of persons.
we shall discuss and show that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was no
longer in force at the time the Executive Orders under consideration Under the doctrine of separation of the powers of government, the law-
were promulgated, because even the respondents in the cases G. R. Nos. making functions is assigned exclusively to the legislative, and the
L-2044 and L-2756, in sustaining the validity of the Executive Order No. legislative branch cannot delegate the power to make laws to any other
62 rely not only on Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended by authority. But it must be borne in mind that what cannot be delegated is
Commonwealth Act No. 620, but on Commonwealth Act No. 671; and that which is purely legislative in nature, not administrative. There are
afterwards we shall refute the arguments in support of the contrary powers so far legislative that may properly be exercised by the
proposition that said Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and, legislature, but which may nevertheless be delegated because they may
therefore, the President may exercise now the legislative powers therein be advantageously exercised in proper cases by persons belonging to the
delegated to him. other departments of the government, such as the authority to make
rules and regulations of administrative character to carry out an
PRELIMINARY legislative purposes or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law.
As illustrations of the proper exercise of the power of Congress to
The Constitution of the Philippines, drafted by the duly elected delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations with the
representatives of the Filipino people, provides in its section 1, Article II, necessary details to carry into effect a law, are Act No. 3155 empowering
that "The Philippines is a republican states, sovereignty resides in the the Governor General then, now the President, to suspend or not, at his
people and all government authority emanates from them." The people discretion, the prohibition of the importation of foreign cattle (Cruz vs.
have delegated the government authority to three different and separate Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234; Act No. 3106 authorizing the Commissioner of
Departments: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. In section 1, Article VI, the Public Service Commission to regulate those engaged in various
the legislative power to make laws is conferred upon Congress; the occupations or business affected with a public interest, and to prescribe
executive power to faithfully executed the laws is vested by sections 1 what the charges shall be for services rendered in the conduct of such
business (Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446); and the National The Constitution permits Congress to authorize the President of the
Industrial Recovery Act enacted by the Congress of the United States Philippines to promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature
authorizing the President to promulgate administrative rules and only (1) in times of war or (2) other national emergency, such as
regulations to carry out the emergency measure enacted by Congress, rebellion, flood, earthquake, pestilence, economic depression, famine or
though a part thereof was declared unconstitutional for producing a any other emergency different from war itself affecting the nation.
delegation of legislative authority which is unconfined, "and not
canalized within banks to keep it from ever flowing." It is obvious that it is Congress and not a particular emergency and to
authorize the President to promulgate rules and regulations to cope with
Athough, in principle, the power of the Legislature to make laws or it. Therefore, if Congress declares that there exist a war as a national
perform acts purely legislative in nature may only be delegated by emergency and empowers the President to promulgate rules and
Congress to another authority or officers of either the executive or regulations to tide over the emergency, the latter could not, because he
judicial department when expressly permitted by the Constitution, no believes that there is an economic emergency or depression or any
such delegation is authorized by the State constitution or Federal emergency other than war itself, exercise the legislative power delegated
Constitution of the Untied States. It is a fact admitted by the attorneys to meet such economic or other emergency.
and amici curiae for the petitioners and respondents in these case that
section 26, Article VI, our Constitution is unique and has no counterpart The Constitution requires also that the delegation be for a limited period
in said constitutions, and for that reason not a single case involving a or other authority so delegated shall cease ipso facto at the expiration of
question similar to the one herein involved has never been submitted to the period, because to require an express legislation to repel or
and passed upon by the courts of last resort in the United States. The terminate the delegated legislative authority of the President might be
provision of our Constitution reads as follows: subversive to the constitutional separation of powers in out democratic
form of government, for the President my prevent indefinitely the repeal
SEC. 26. In times of war or other national emergency, the of his delegated authority by the exercise of his veto power, since the
Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited veto could be overridden only by two-thirds vote and it would be
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to extremely difficult to repeal it in subservient Congress dominated by the
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national Chief Executive. Besides, to provide that the delegated legislative powers
policy. shall continue to exist until repealed by the Congress, would be
delegation not for limited, but for an unlimited period or rather without
It is important to observe that what the above-quoted constitutional any limitation at all, because all acts enacted are always subjects to
provision empowers Congress to delegate to the President, is not the repeal by the Congress, without necessity to providing so.
power to promulgate rules and regulations of administrative nature, for
this may also be delegated at any time without necessity of an express No question is raised as to the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act
authority by the Constitution, but the power to promulgate rules and No. 671 under which Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
regulations purely legislative in nature, leaving to the discretion of the promulgated by the President of the Philippines according to the
President the determination of what rules or regulations shall be or contention of the respondents. The question involved is the validity (not
what acts are necessary to effectuate the so-called declared national constitutionality) of said executive orders, that is, whether or not the
policy, for otherwise it would not have been necessary for the President had authority to promulgate them under Commonwealth Act
Constitution to authorize Congress to make such delegation. No. 671; and therefore the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members
of this Court required by section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution to
DEMONSTRATION declare a treaty or law unconstitutional is not required for adjudging the
executive orders in question invalid or not authorized by
Commonwealth Act No. 671, which read as follows:
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671 powers as he may deem necessary to enable the
Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A and enforce its authority.
RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY. practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the
Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines: promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.

SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United SEC. 4. This Act shall take upon its approval, and the rules
States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force
involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall
President with extraordinary powers in order to meet otherwise provide.
the resulting emergency.
Approved, December 16, 1941.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section
16, of the Constitution, the President is hereby Taking into consideration the presumption that Congress was familiar
authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to with the well-known limits of its powers under section 26, Article VI, of
promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem the Constitution and did not intend to exceed said powers in enacting
necessary to carry out the national policy declared in Commonwealth Act No. 671, the express provisions of Commonwealth
section 1 hereof. Accordingly he is, among other things, Acts. Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600 as amended by 620 and 671, and
empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or those of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended by Republic Act No. 66
any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, and Republic Acts Nos. 51 and 728, we are of the opinion, and therefore
agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the so hold, that the actual war in the Philippine territory and not any other
government of the Commonwealth including the national emergency is contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671, and
determination of the order of procedure of the heads of that the period of time during which the President was empowered by
the Executive Departments; (c) to create new said Commonwealth Act No. 671 to promulgate rules and regulations
subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or was limited to the existence of such war or invasion of the Philippines by
instrumentalities of Government and to abolish any of the enemy, which prevented the Congress to meet in a regular session.
those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and Such emergency having ceased to exist upon the complete liberation of
appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become the Philippines from the enemy's occupation, Commonwealth Act No.
inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or 671 had ceased to be in force and effect at the date of the adjournment of
application of those of an administrative character; (e) to the next regular session of the Congress in 1946, before the
impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or promulgation of said executive orders, and hence they are null and void.
abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the
issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the In view of the existence of a state of national emergency caused by the
expenditure of the proceeds thereof (g) to authorize the last world war among several nations of the world, the second National
National, provincial, city or municipal governments to Assembly during its second special session passed the following acts: (a)
incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) Commonwealth Act No. 494 authorizing the President until the
to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, to
the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other suspend the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444, commonly known
as the "Eight-Hour Labor-Law," when in his judgment the public interest and sufficient food supply, etc. To carry out this policy the President was
so required, in order to prevent a dislocation of the productive forces of "authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the
the country; (b) Commonwealth Act No. 496 delegating to the President force and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular
the power expressly granted by section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution session of the National Assembly," which rules and regulations may
to the State "until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of embrace the objects therein enumerated. And the National Assembly in
the National Assembly, to take over solely for use or operation by the its regular session commencing in January, 1941, in view of the fact that
Government during the existence of the emergency any public service or the delegated authority granted to the President by Commonwealth Acts
enterprise and to operate the same," upon payment of just Nos. 494, 496, 498, 500, and 600 was to terminate at the date of the
compensation; (c) Commonwealth Act No. 498, authorizing the adjournment of that regular session of the National Assembly, passed
President, among others, to fix the maximum selling prices of foods, Act No. 620 which took effect upon its approval on June 6, 1941,
clothing, fuel, fertilizers, chemicals, building materials, implements, amending section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 600 by extending the
machinery, and equipment required in agriculture and industry, and delegated legislative authority of the President until the date of the
other articles or commodities of prime necessity, and to promulgate adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress of the
such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary in the public Philippines, instead of the National Assembly, the Constitution having
interest, which rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of been amended by substituting the Congress of the Philippines for the
law until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly..
National Assembly; (d) Commonwealth Act No. 499 providing that until
the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National Although Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth
Assembly, any sale, mortgage, lease, charter, delivery, transfer of vessels Act No. 620, provides that "the President is authorized to promulgate
owned in whole or in part by a citizen of the Philippines or by a rules and regulations which shall have the force and effect of law until
corporation organizes under the laws of the Philippines, to any person the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress of
not a citizen of the United States or of the Philippines, shall be null and the Philippines," it is evident that this limitation was intended to apply,
void, without the approval of the President of the Philippines; and not only to the effectivity of the rules and regulations already
Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President to reduce the promulgated, but specially to the authority granted to the President to
expenditure of the Executive Department of the National Government by promulgated them, for the following reasons: First, because
the suspension or abandonment of services, activities or operations of Commonwealth Act Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, and 500 had expressly
no immediate necessity, which authority shall be exercised only when limited the authority of the President to exercise the delegated power
the National Assembly is not in session. All these Commonwealth Acts while the Assembly was not in session until the date of the adjournment
took effect upon their approval on September 30, 1939, a short time of the next regular session of then National Assembly, and there was
after the invasion of Poland by Germany. absolutely no reason whatsoever why the National Assembly, in enacting
Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended, which superseded said Act,
During the fourth special session of the second National Assembly, would not impose the same limitation on the authority delegated in
Commonwealth Act No. 600, which superseded the above-mentioned Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended in compliance with the
emergency power acts, was passed and took effect on its approval on requirement of the Constitution; secondly, because it would have been
August 19, 1940. This Act No. 600 expressly declared that the existence useless to give the rules and regulations the effect and force of law only
of war in many parts of the world had created a national emergency until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the
which made it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary Congress, if the President might, after said adjournment, continue
powers in order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to exercising his delegated legislative powers to promulgate again the same
insure the tranquility of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage, and other rules and regulations; and lastly, because to construe
lawlessness, and all supervise activities, by preventing or relieving Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Act No. 620, otherwise
unemployment, by insuring to the people adequate shelter and clothing would be to make the delegation not for a limited but for an indefinite
period of time, in violation of the express provision of section 26, Article aware of the inconvenience and chaotical consequences of having two
VI of the Constitution. legislative bodies acting at one and the same time.

All the above-mentioned Acts Nos. 494, 496, 499, 500, and 600 before its It is true that Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not expressly say that the
amendment show that it was the intention or policy of the National President is authorized to promulgates rules and regulations until the
Assembly, in delegating legislative functions to the President, to limit the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National
exercise of the latter's authority to the interregnum while the National Assembly or Congress as the above-quoted Commonwealth Acts; but it is
Assembly or Congress of the Philippines was not in session until the date also true that it clearly provides that "pursuant to the provisions of
of the adjournment of the next regular session thereof, which Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President is hereby
interregnum might have extended over a long period of time had the war authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such
in Europe involved and made the Philippines a battle ground before the rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national
next regular session of the Congress had convened. And the authority policy declared"; and that the definite and specific emergency therein
granted to the President of Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended, had referred to is no other that the "state of total emergency as a result of
to be extended over a long period of time during the occupation because, war involving the Philippines", declared in the title of said Act No. 671,
before the meeting of the next regular session of the Congress, the that was the reason for which the President was "authorize to
Philippines was involved in the war of the United States and invaded and promulgate rules and regulations to meet resulting emergency." It is
occupied by the Japanese forces. And the President was authorized to obvious that what Act No. 671 calls "total emergency" was the invasion
exercise his delegated powers until the date of the adjournment of the and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy or Japanese forces
next regular session of the Congress, for the reason that although during which, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, had already
the next regular session a bill may be passed, by the Congress, it would landed in Philippine soil and was expected to paralyze the functioning of
not become a law until it was approved, expressly or impliedly, by the the Congress during the invasion and enemy occupation of the
President during the period of twenty days after it shall have been Philippines.
presented to him.
The mere existence of the last world war in many parts of the world
The reason of the limitation is that if Congress were in position to act it which had created a national emergency made it necessary to invest the
would not be necessary for it to make such legislative delegation to the President with extraordinary powers was not called total emergency by
President, for Congress may in all cases act, declare its will and, after Commonwealth Act Nos. 600 and 620, because it had not yet actually
fixing a primary standard or yardstick, authorize the President to fill up involved and engulfed the Philippines in the maelstrom of war. It does
the details by prescribing administrative rules and regulations to cope not stand to reason that the authority given to the President to
with the actual conditions of any emergency; and it is inconceivable that promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature by
there may arise an emergency of such a nature that would require Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600 and 620 was to
immediate action and can not wait, without irreparable or great injury to terminate at the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of
the public interest, and action of the legislative in regular or special the Congress of the Philippines in 1946, but those granted to the
session called by the Chief Executive for the purpose of meeting it. If in President by Commonwealth Act No. 671 under the same war
the United States they could withstand and have withstood all kinds of emergency should continue to exist indefinitely even after the Congress
emergency without resorting to the delegation by the legislative body of of the Philippines had regularly convened, acted, and adjourned in the
legislative power to the Executive except those of administrative nature, year 1946 and subsequent years. Besides to give such construction to
because no such delegation is permitted by the States and Federal Act No. 671 would make it violative of the express provision of section
constitution, as above stated, there is no reason why the same can not be 26, Article VIII, of the Constitution, under which said Commonwealth Act
done in the Philippines. The frames of our Constitution and the national No. 671 was enacted, as expressly stated in said Act, and which permits
Assembly that enacted Commonwealth Act No. 671 are presumed to be the Congress to authorize the President, only for a limited period during
a war emergency, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry into No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, which required a
effect a declared national policy. similar report, for there was absolutely no plausible reason to provide
otherwise.
By the special session of the first Congress of the Philippines
commencing on the 9th day of June, 1945, called by the President for the Our conclusion is corroborated by the fact that section 3 of Act No. 671
purpose of considering general legislation, Commonwealth Act No. 671 only requires the President to submit the report, "as soon as practicable
did not cease to operate. As we have already said, the emergency which upon the convening of the Congress" and not to submit a report to the
prompted the second National Assembly to enact Commonwealth Act Congress every time it convenes, in order to inform the Congress thereof
No. 671 delegating legislative powers to the President, was the inability so that the latter may modify or repeal any or all of them, for under
of Congress to convene in regular session in January of every during the section 4 of the same Act "such rules and regulations shall continue in
invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial forces. The National force and effect until the Congress shall otherwise provide." It is obvious
Assembly could not have in mind any special session which might have that the convening of the Congress referred to in said section 3 is the
been called by the President immediately after liberation, because the next regular session of the Congress after the passage of Act No. 671, and
calling of a special session as well as the matters which may be not any other subsequent session; because, otherwise, it would not have
submitted by the President to Congress for consideration is a contingent required that it shall be submitted to the Congress as soon as practicable
event which depend upon the possibility of convening it and the and the purpose of the law already stated in requiring the submission of
discretion of the President to call it, and the matters he will submit to it the report would be defeated; and if it were the intention of said
for consideration; because it is to be presumed, in order to comply with Commonwealth Act No. 671 to authorize the President to continue
the provision of section 26, Article VI of the Constitution, that it was the promulgating rules and regulations after the next regular session of the
intention of the National Assembly to fix a limited period, independent of Congress, it would have required the President to submit to the
the President's will, during which he is authorized to exercise his Congress each and every time it convenes a report of the rules and
delegated legislative power. regulations promulgated after his previous reports had been submitted.

The object of section 3 of Act No. 671 in requiring the President to report Furthermore, our conclusion is confirmed by the legislative
"as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the interpretation give to Commonwealth Act No. 671 by the same Congress
Philippines all rules and regulations promulgated by him under the in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 728 which took effect on July 2,
powers therein granted" is to inform the Congress of the contents of said 1946, authorizing the President to regulate, control, curtail, and prohibit
rules and regulations so that the latter may modify or repeal them if it the exploration of agricultural or industrial products, merchandise,
sees fit to do so, inasmuch as, according to section 4 of the same Act, "the articles, materials and supplies without the permit of the President until
rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect December 31, 1948 as expressly provided in section 4 thereof, because it
until the Congress shall otherwise provide." And although said section 3 would not have been necessary for the Congress to promulgate said Act
does not specify whether in regular or special session, it is evident that it No. 728 if the President had authority to promulgate Executive Order No.
refers to the next regular and not to the special session of the Congress, 62 in question on January 1, 1949, under Commonwealth Act No. 671 as
because as a rule a special session is called to consider only specific contended by the respondents; and Republic Act No. 51, approved on
matters submitted by the President to Congress for consideration, and it October 4, 1946, authorizing within one year the different executive
would be useless to submit such report to the Congress in special departments, business, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of
session if the latter can not either modify or repeal such rules and the government, including corporations controlled by it, would not have
regulations; and besides, it is to be presumed that it was the intention of been passed by the Congress if Commonwealth Act No. 671 under
the National Assembly in enacting section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. consideration was then still in force, for section 2 (b) and (c) of said Act
671 to require the submission of a report to the next regular session of No. 671 authorizes the President to reorganize the Government and to
the Assembly or Congress, as provided in section 4 Commonwealth Act create new subdivisions, branches, department offices, agencies or
instrumentalities of government, and to abolish any of those already emergency declare the national policy, and authorize the President to
existing. promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature to carry out that
policy. As the Commonwealth Act No. 671 that the existence of war
REPUTATION between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia which
involves the Philippines is the emergency which made it necessary for
There is no force in the argument that the executive orders in question the National Assembly to invest the President with extraordinary
are not valid, not because the promulgation of the acts above mentioned powers to promulgate rules and regulations to meet the resulting
and of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended by the Republic Act No. emergency from the actual existence of that war which involved the
66 on rentals, the appropriation acts or Republic Act Nos. 1, 156, and Philippines, the President cannot, under said Act No. 671, determine the
320 for the years 1946-47, 1947-48 and 1948-49, and of the Republic existence of any other emergency, such as the state of cold war, the
Acts Nos. 73, 147, and 235 appropriating public finds to defray the continued military occupation of the enemy country, and the economic
expenses for the elections held in 1947 and 1948, shows that the and political instability throughout the world, cited by the respondents,
emergency powers granted by Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already and promulgate rules and regulations to meet the emergency; because
ceased to exist, but because Congress "has shown by their enactment its obviously it is not for the delegate but for the delegation to say when and
readiness and ability to legislate on those matters, and had withdrawn it under what circumstances the former may act in behalf of the latter, and
from the realm of presidential legislation or regulations under the not vice-versa.
powers delegated by Commonwealth Act No. 671." If the Congress was
ready and able to legislate on those matters since 1946 and for that The theory of those who are of the opinion that the President may
reason the executive orders herein involved are null and void, there is no determine "whether the emergency which on December 16, 1941,
valid reason for not concluding that the emergency powers of the prompted the approval of Commonwealth Act No. 671 delegating
President has ceased to exist it did not, legislate on all matters on which extraordinary powers to the President, still existed at the time the Chief
the President was granted and delegated power to legislate by the Executive exercised those powers," is predicated upon the erroneous
Commonwealth Act No. 671. And if Commonwealth Act No. 671 assumption that said Commonwealth Act No. 671 contemplated any
continues to be in force and effect in so far as it grants delegated other emergency not expressly mentioned in said Commonwealth Act.
legislative powers to the President and declares the national policy to be This assumption or premise is obviously wrong. Section 1 of said Act No.
carried out by the rules and regulations the President is authorize to 671 expressly states that "the existence of the war between the United
promulgate, the mere promulgation of the acts above described can not States and other countries of Europe and Asia which involves the
be considered as an implied repeal or withdrawal of the authority of the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with
President to promulgates rules and regulations only on those matters, extraordinary power in order to meet the resulting emergency." That is
and the adoption of a contrary policy by the Congress, because implied the war emergency. Ant it is evident, and therefore no evidence is
repeal is not favored in statutory construction, and the national policy requires to prove, that the existence of the war which involved the
referred to in section 26, Article VIII of the Constitution is to be declared Philippines had already ceased before the promulgation of the executive
by the Congress in delegating the legislative powers to the President, in orders in question, or at least, if the last war has not yet technically
order to establish the standard to be carried out by him in exercising his terminated in so far as the United States is concerned, it did no longer
delegated functions, and not in repealing said powers. involve the Republic of the Philippines since the inauguration of our
Republic or independence from the sovereignty of the United States.
As we have already said, section 26, Article VI of the Constitution
expressly empowers Congress, in times of war and other national It is untenable to contend that the words "resulting emergency from the
emergency, to authorize the President to promulgate rules and existence of the war" as used in section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 671
regulations to carry out a declared national policy, and therefore it is for should be construed to mean any emergency resulting from or that is the
the National Assembly to determine the existence of a particular effect of the last war, and not the war emergency itself, and that
therefore it is for the President to determine whether at the time of the we are supported by the above quotation from American Jurisprudence,
promulgation of the executive orders under consideration such the power to pass emergency police legislation in the United States may
emergency still existed, because such contention would make Act No. be exercised only by the legislature in the exercise of the police power of
671 unconstitutional or violative of the provisions of section 26, Article the State, and it can not be delegated to the Executive because there is no
VI of the Constitution. This constitutional precept distinguishes war provision in the State and Federal constitutions authorizing such
emergency from any other national emergency, such as an economic delegation as we have in section 26, Article VI, of our Constitution. As we
depression and others which may be the effect of a war, and empowers have already said before, the only legislative power which may be
the Congress in times of war and other national emergency, to be delegated to the Executive and other administrative bodies or officers in
determined by Congress itself as we have already said and shown, to the United States is the power to promulgate rules and regulations of
authorize the President, for a limited period that may short or of the administrative nature, which does not include the exercise of the police
same duration but not longer than that of the emergency, to promulgate power of the State.
rules and regulations to carry out the policy declared by the Congress in
order to meet the emergency. To construe Commonwealth Act No. 671 The ruling laid down by the United States Supreme Court in the case of
as contended would be to leave the determination of the existence of the Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 Law ed., 1883, quoted by the respondents and
emergency to the discretion of the President, because the effects of the dissenters in support of the proposition that "only in case of a manifest
war such as those enumerated by the respondents are not determined or abuse of the exercise of powers by a political branch of the government
stated in said Act and could not have been foreseen by the Assembly in is judicial interference allowable in order to maintain the supremacy of
enacting said Act; and because it would make the delegation of powers the Constitution," has no application to the present case; because the
for an in definite period, since such an emergency may or may not question involved in the present case is not a political but a justiciable
become depression, effect of the first world war, took place in the year question, while the question in issue in said Ludecke case was the power
1929, or about ten years after the cessation of hostilities in the year of the court to review "the determination of the President in the postwar
1919; and by no stretch of imagination or intellectual gymnastics may period that an alien enemy should be deported, even though active
the failure of the Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of the hostilities have ceased," and it was held that it was a political question
Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and to and, therefore, was not subject to judicial review.
defray the expenses in connection with the holding of the national
election on the second Tuesday of November, 1949, be considered as an CONCLUSION
emergency resulting from the last war.
In view of all the foregoing, we have to conclude and declare that the
In the enactment of emergency police measures, the questions as executive orders promulgated by the President under Commonwealth
to whether an emergency exists is primarily for the legislature to Act 671 before the date of the adjournment of the regular session of the
determine. Such determination, although entitled to great Congress on the Philippines in 1946 are valid, because said
respect, is not conclusive because the courts, in such cases, Commonwealth Act was then still in force; but the executive orders
posses the final authority to determine whether an emergency in promulgated after the said date are null and void, because
fact exists. (American Jurisprudence, Vol. XI, page 980.). Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already ceased to be in force in so far as
the delegation of powers was concerned. Therefore, are null and void the
No case decided by the courts of last resort in the United States may be Executive Order No. 192 promulgated on December 24, 1948, on the
cited in support of the proposition that it is for the President to control of exports from the Philippines; the Executive Order No. 225
determine whether there exist an emergency in order to exercise his dated June 15, 1949, appropriating funds for the operation of the
emergency powers, and "it is not for the judiciary to review the finding Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the period from
of the Executive in this regard." There is none and there cannot be any. July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950; and the Executive Order No. 226
Because, as we have already stated at the beginning of this opinion, and promulgated on June 15, 1949, appropriating the sum of six million
pesos to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the
holding of the national election to be held on the second Tuesday of Government of the Commonwealth including the determination
November, 1949. of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive
Department; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches,
ated by the President under Commonwealth Act 671 before the date of departments, agencies or instrumentalities of government and to
the adjournment of the regular session of the Congress on the abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force
Philippines in 1946 are valid, because said Commonwealth Act was then laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
still in force; but the executive orders promulgated after the said date become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or
are null and void, because Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already application of those of an administrative character; (e) to impose
ceased to be in force in so far as the delegation of powers was concerned. new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish those in
Therefore, are null and void the Executive Order No. 192 promulgated existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or
on December 24, 1948, on the control of exports from the Philippines; otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds
the Executive Order No. 225 dated June 15, 1949, appropriating funds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or
for the operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that
during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950; and the Executive he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of
Order No. 226 promulgated on June 15, 1949, appropriating the sum of credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other
six million pesos to defray the expenses in connection with, and powers as he may deem to enable the Government to fulfill its
incidental to, the holding of the national election to be held on the responsibities and to maintain and enforce the authority.
second Tuesday of November, 1949.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as
Act No. 671 in full is as follows: practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the
Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY. and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and
effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines: provide.

SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency. law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and
"SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the
existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature,
policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation
other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the to the Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions
Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments,
offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act
test a rule by its results. No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding
thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for
mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear
restrictive in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was
3rd ed., 669; Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The words "limited no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no
period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the
mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the National Assemble failed to make a provision for this termination in the
delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be same way that it did for the termination of the effects and incidents of
said to be an emergency." (First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the
vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L. R., 937, 938.). rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to
remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already
this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law annulled by the legislature.
repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the
legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the
of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority
act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies operating over the
different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually
the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the
indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session
temporary emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be
Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it limited. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal executive orders
would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the
Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of
would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic
powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and
a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to inspired only by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a
delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, former President promulgated an executive order regulating house
and ought not to be, the law. Corwin, President: Office and Powers, 1948 rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and
ed., p. 160, says: the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export control
after Congress had refused to approve the measure.
It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not
delegate its powers signifies at the very least that the legislature Quiet apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of
may not abdicate its powers: Yet how, in view of the scope that Act No. 671 for the inference that the National Assembly restricted the
legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature
delegation and abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other
rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides:
of the delegate; . . . .
 The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its
upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of the
thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under foundations of democratic institutions could not have been conceived
the powers herein granted. under any circumstance short of a complete disruption and dislocation
of the normal processes of government. Anyway, if we are to uphold the
The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting constitutionality of the act on the basis of its duration, we must start
of Congress at which the President was to give an account of his with the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. As we have
trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it could very indicated, the period that best comports with constitutional
well have said if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did requirements and limitations, with the general context of the law and
not think that the report in section 3 was to be the first and last Congress with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its
Act No. 671 would lapsed, what reason could there be for its failure to enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to
provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent function, a period ending with the conventing of that body.
reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making
laws in the forms of rules, regulations and executive orders, were as It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No.
important, of as unimportant, as the initial one. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May
25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress
regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry instead of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration
much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the Act, we think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the
of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider
session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate."
Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power
be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations
Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would imposed by the organic law.
become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatical
extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the necessity of
they denote that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to deciding the question as to which department of government is
repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify that the authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the law is
same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be predicated still exists. The right of one or another department to declare
prolonged. the emergency terminated is not in issue. As a matter of fact, we have
endeavored to find the will of the National Assembly—call that will, an
What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same exercise of the police power or the war power — and, once ascertained,
paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he to apply it. Of course, the function of interpreting statutes in proper
issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts as their constitutional
became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and prerogative and duty. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief Executive
that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended, and may act on the
regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." (Emphasis ours.) strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the
It can easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of courts have construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the
enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific proposition. There is no pretense that the President has independent or
view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under review. we
factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers take it that the respondents, in sustaining the validity of these executive
orders rely on Act No. 600, Act No. 620, or Act No. 671 of the former necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position
Commonwealth and on no other source. To put it differently, the to operate.
President's authority in this connection is purely statutory, in no sense
political or directly derived from the Constitution. After all the criticism that have been made against the efficiency of the
system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the
Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and
opening of the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or
600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive indication that they were group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary
self-liquidating. By express provision the rules and regulations to be government have given notice that they share the faith of other
eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, respectively democracy-loving people in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal.
approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good only up The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is
to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of preserved for Congress all the time, not expecting periods of crisis no
the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic
Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this provision is that features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the
in the mind of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been
would lapse not latter than the rules and regulations. The design to surrendered to another department — unless we regard as legislating
provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards;
necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was
simultaneous repeal of their source. Were not this the case, there would engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is
arise the curious spectacle, already painted, and easily foreseen, of the that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme
Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations of the President perils more than in normal circumstances "the various branches,
while the latter was empowered to keep or return them into force and to executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called
issue new ones independently of the National Assembly. For the rest, the upon "to the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to
reasoning heretofore adduced against the asserted indefinite them respectively."
continuance of the operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos.
600 and 620. These observations, though beyond the issue as formulated in this
decision, may, we trust, also serve to answer the vehement plea that for
The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the question the good of the Nation, the President should retain his extraordinary
whether war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If we were to that powers as long asturmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to
actual hostilities between the original belligerents are still raging, the the late war harass the Philippines.
elusion would not be altered. After the convening of Congress new
legislation had to be approved if the continuation of the emergency Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In
powers, or some of them, was desired. In the light of the conditions order to avoid any possible disruption and interruption in the normal
surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the operation of the Government, we have deemed it best to depart in these
opinion that the "state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged cases from the ordinary rule to the period for the effectivity of decisions,
in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and occupation of and to decree, as it is hereby decreed, that this decision take effect
the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization of fifteen days from the date of the entry of final judgment provided in
the Government, principally the impossibility for the National Assembly section 8 of Rule 53 of the Rules of Court in relation to section 2 of Rule
to act. The state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and 35. No costs will be charged.
with which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The
war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have Ozaeta, J., concurs.
 7, 1946, amending a previous order regarding the organization of the
Supreme Court; Executive Order No. 89, issued on January 1, 1946,
Separate Opinions reorganizing the Courts of First Instance; Executive Order No. 184,
issued on November 19, 1948, controlling rice and palay to combat
MORAN, C. J., concurring: hunger; and other executive orders appropriating funds for other
purposes. The consequences of a blanket nullification of these executive
I agree with the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Tuason, except on the orders will be unquestionably serious and harmful. And I hold that
points hereunder discussed. before nullifying them, other important circumstances should be
inquired into, as for instance, whether or not they have been ratified by
I believe, on the one hand, that the emergency power of the President the Congress expressly or impliedly, whether their purposes have
had ceased not in May 1946, when Congress held its regular sessions, as already been accomplished entirely or partially, and in last instance, to
Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria maintain, but on June 9, 1945, what extent; acquiescence of litigants; de facto officers; acts and contrast
when Congress convened in a special session to consider general of parties acting in good faith; etc. It is my opinion that each executive
legislation. The emergency contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671, order must be viewed in the lights of its peculiar circumstances, and, if
is "total emergency" which means the state of actual war involving the necessary and possible, before nullifying it, precautionary measures
Philippines, with the impending invasion and occupation of our country should be taken to avoid harm to public interest and innocent parties.
by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization and paralyzation
of the Government, principally, the impossibility for the National To illustrate the foregoing proposition of individual consideration of
Assembly to act. This was the only reason and justification for the total specific cases, shall go into a brief discussion of the executive orders
relinquishment of legislative power by Congress in favor of the Chief involved in the cases now before this Court. With regard to Executive No.
Executive under Commonwealth Act No. 671. Such relinquishment was 225 on general appropriation, I hold that the court should not declare it
total because the emergency was also total. Clearly, therefore, the null and void till Congress may have an opportunity to provide a
inability of Congress to act was the soul of the law, and the moment such substitute measure for the sustenance of government. This view is
inability ceased, the total emergency also ceased and the law likewise predicated upon the principle of absolute necessity. Till Congress may
ceased to validly exist. On June 9, 1945, the Congress of the Philippines pass a valid appropriation act our government cannot survive without
convened in a special session "to adopt such measures as may be the executive order in question. It would be absurd for this court to
necessary to meet the existing emergency" and "for the purpose of declare the cessation of an emergency, and by that same declaration
considering general legislation." I hold that from that date, June 9, 1945, permit, if not abet, the formation of another emergency which would be
Congress was able and ready to act on all matters, and the emergency inevitable if, by reason of lack of appropriation, government shall cease
powers delegated to the President in Commonwealth Act No. 671, to function. In such cases, when apparently the provisions of our laws
naturally ceased to exist. and Constitution seem inadequate, the courts must go deeper even than
the very Magna Carta itself and find solution in the basic principles of
Upon the other hand, while I believe that the emergency powers had preservation of government and of national survival, which in the last
ceased in June 1945, I am not prepared to hold that all executive orders analysis, are the very reasons for the existence of a Constitution. In such
issued thereafter under Commonwealth Act No. 671, are per se null and extreme cases, as can come from the present situation, it would be the
void. It must be borne in mind that these executive orders had been height of judicial imprecision to preserve the form of the constitution,
issued in good faith and with the best of intentions of three successive and at the same time permit the disruption and cessation of the
Presidents, and some of them may have already produced extensive government which that same constitution so intricately designed and
effects in the life of the nation. We have, for instance, Executive Order firmly established. Thus, in the remedy of an evil, we shall cause a far
No. 73, issued on November 12, 1945, appropriating the sum of greater one.
P6,750,000 for public works; Executive Order No. 86, issued on January
It may be argued that the course of action I am taking is founded upon manner and for the same reasons stated above in connection with the
fear, fear that Congress will again fail to act on the matter of executive order on appropriations. The Court, in these cases, is
appropriation, and it may be asserted that the members of the Congress confronted not only with bare issues of law, but with actual anomalous
are presumed to be as patriotic as the members of this Court, if not situations pregnant with possible dangers to the nation, and it is the
more, and that, therefore, we may rest assured that they will not fail to duty of the Court, as a dispenser of justice, to find a solution that is both
fulfill their duty. I admit this to be true, and accordingly, I ask what is legal and realistic.
then the hurry and necessity for nullifying the executive order on
appropriation which we are sure will soon be substituted by a valid With reference to Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for
appropriation act? Why not defer judgment and wait until the special houses, and Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from
session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it clearly sees it? I can the Philippines, I agree that they must be held null and void upon the
find no reason against this suggestion except, perhaps, a desire to assert reason stated by Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria and also upon
judicial supremacy in a case where judicial statemanship is more those stated by Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Alex Reyes.
necessary.
My vote, therefore, is that the petitions must be granted in Araneta vs.
It is also true that the possibility that Congress will again fail to provide Dinglasan, G. R. No. L-2044; Araneta vs. Angeles, G. R. No. L-2756 and
funds for the operation of the government is a remote possibility. But Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs, G. R. No. L-3055, and that
there is no harm in providing for all the possibilities, both near and judgment must be deferred in Rodriguez vs. El Tesorero de Filipinas, G. R.
remote. If that remote possibility never comes, well and good, nothing is No. L-3054 and Barredo vs. The Commission on Election, G. R. No. L-3056.
lost and the situation is saved. However, if the remote possibility does
come, and it is not impossible, and we had already nullified the executive
order on appropriation, how will the government function and survive?
On the other hand, if we defer judgment upon the nullity of such PARAS, J., concurring:
executive order, and that remote possibility does come, we still have the
saving lifeline of that executive order which may, perhaps, be tolerated I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Tuason. I wish to add, however the
to save the country from chaos, until a more proper and adequate following observations: Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
remedy can be secured. the legislative intent is to make Commonwealth Act No. 671, effective
during the existence of the emergency contemplated therein and that it
With regard to the executive order appropriating funds for the conduct is within the exclusive province of the political departments to
of the coming elections, I uphold the same view as in the foregoing, determine whether said emergency continues or has ceased to exist, I
namely, not in abdicating the power of this court to pass upon the am of the conviction that, in view of the formal and unmistakable
validity of an executive order, but to defer judgment upon such an order declarations of both the Congress and the President, said Act No. 671,
until the legislature may provide a substitute measure. The reason for should be held as having lost its force and effect.
this is, likewise, absolute necessity. Without such Executive Order we
may have not elections in November. Elections are the very essence of It is important to remember that the kind of emergency expressly
popular government for the establishment and preservation of which, spoken of in the Act is a total emergency resulting from war and that the
our Constitution has been consecrated. To permit the unwarranted Act was passed at a time (December 16, 1941) when there was factually
abolition or even suspension of elections, will surely result either in the a state of war involving the Philippines.
denial of popular representation or in the perpetuation in power of
those already in office. Either result is revolting to our system of
In section 1 of Republic Act No. 342, approved on July 26, 1948, it was
government. Briefly stated, I hold that this court should neither ratify categorically declared by the Congress that "since liberation conditions
nor nullify this executive order, but should defer judgment in the same have gradually returned to normal, but not so with regard to those who
have suffered the ravages of war and who have not received any relief and barrios of the country are better dressed, their diet has been
for the loss and destruction resulting therefrom," and that "the immensely improved, and they look more healthy than they ever did"
emergency created by the last war as regards these was sufferers being (President's fifth monthly radio chat, March 15, 1949); and the sporadic
still existent, it is the declared policy of the state that as to them the debt depredations of the outlaws in isolated areas of the country are but the
moratorium should be continued in force in a modified form." The last paroxysms of a dying movement (President's State-of-the-Nation
President, in turn, in his speech delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly Message, January 24, 1949), — all these certainly negative the existence
proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the Republic) faces today are of any real (much less total) emergency.
incidental passing pains artificially created by seasonal partisanship,
very common among democracies but will disappear with the rains that That the Congress had heretofore recognized the cessation of the
follow the thunderclaps not later than November 8 of this year." emergency is conclusively established by the fact that it had assumed the
task of directly enacting, during its past sessions, measures dealing with
We thus have a formal declaration on the part of the Congress that the all the matters covered by the specific legislative powers conceded to the
emergency created by the last war exists as regards only those debtors President in Commonwealth Act No. 671. This is in line with the
whose war damage claims have not been settled by the United States fundamental reason for the approval of said Act, as may be gathered
Philippine War Damage Commission (section 2, Republic Act No. 342), from the following statement of President Quezon: "When it became
patently meaning that said emergency is, at most, a partial emergency. It evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it
is needless to point out that only a small portion of the Philippine was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular
population are debtors and not all of those who are debtors are war session which was to open on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly
damage claimants. passed into history approving a resolution which reaffirmed the abiding
faith of the Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United States. The
We also have the solemn declaration on the part of the President that the assembly also enacted a law granting the President of the Philippines all
emergencies faced by the Republic are incidental emergencies artificially the powers that under the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to
created by seasonal partisanship, clearly meaning that such emergencies him in time of war." (The Good Fight, pp. 204-205.) When President
not only are not total but are not the result of war. Quezon said "in time of war", he undoubtedly meant factual war, a
situation that existed at the time of the passage of Commonwealth Act
If the emergency is, as admitted by the Congress, not total and, as No. 671.
admitted by the President, not the result of the war, Commonwealth Act
No. 671 has lost its basis and cannot legally give rise to the executive Indeed, the dissenters admit that any delegated power directly exercised
orders herein involved. Indeed, it is not pretended that said orders are by the principal is considered withdrawn from the agent. A cursory
intended to meet any emergency growing out of the last war. Lack of a examination of Commonwealth Act No. 671 will show that the legislative
budget, an appropriation for the elections, or an import control law, has function therein specified had been discharged by the Congress. The
been brought about by the inaction of the Congress unaffected by the following illustrates the powers delegated in the Act and the measures
last war, and such emergency, if it may be called so, is not of the kind enacted by the Congress itself covering each:
contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671.
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 —
The government has for four years since liberation been normally
functioning; election had been regularly held; a national census had been (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions,
taken; Congress had held regular and special session; "people travel branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities:
freely most everywhere and more quickly, by land, sea and air, to an
extent that was not hitherto enjoyed," and "business is more brisk than Republic Act No. 333 —
ever, goods are plentiful, our people even in the remotest communities
 An Act to establish the Capital of the Philippines and the An Act appropriating the sum of five million pesos to enable the
permanent seat of the National Government, to create a capital national housing commission to resume its functions"
city planning commission, to appropriate funds for the (Approved, November 1, 1945.)
acquisition of private estates within the boundary limits of said
city, and to authorize the issuance of bonds of the National Commonwealth Act No. 710 —
Government for the acquisition of private estates, for the
subdivision thereof, and for the construction of streets, bridges, An Act to appropriate funds to continue the payment of
waterworks, sewerage and other municipal improvements in the Retirement gratuities or pensions under existing laws.
capital City. (Approved, July 17, 1948.) (Approved, November 1, 1945.)

(b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those
determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive in existence:
Departments:
Republic Act No. 215 —
Republic Act No. 51 —
An Act to amend Section One of the Republic Act numbered
Act authorizing the President of the Philippines to reorganize eighty-one providing a new time limit for the waiver of, and/or
within one year the different Executive departments, bureaus, extension of the period, within which to perform, accomplish or
offices, agencies and their instrumentalities of the government, comply with, any term, condition, or stipulation required of
including the corporations owned or controlled by it. (Approved, locators, holders, lessees, operators of mining claims or
October 4, 1946.) concessions, and of water rights and timber concessions with the
mining industry and the condonation of mining, specific and real
(c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies estate taxes, under certain terms and conditions. (Approved,
or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already June 1, 1948.)
existing:
Ley No. 321 de la Republica —
Commonwealth Act No. 732 —
Ley que eleva los derechos de transferencia de ganado mayor,
An Act to create the Department of Foreign Affairs and to enmendado al efecto el articulo quinientos veintiochos del
authorize the President of the Philippines to organize said Codigo Administrativo Revisado. (Apobada, Junio 9, 1948.)
department as well as the foreign service of the Republic of the
Philippines. (Approved, July 3, 1946.) (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to
authorize the expenditure of proceeds thereof:
(d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or
otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation Republic Act No. 265 —
or application of those of an administrative character:
An Act establishing the Central Bank of the Philippines . . . .
Commonwealth Act No. 709 — (Section 87 [e] No. 7.) Approved, June 15, 1948.)

Republic Act No. 266 —

 An Act appropriating such sums as may from time to time be to our Constitution, with the result that the decisions of the Supreme
released by the Central Bank representing excess monetary Court of the United States cited on behalf of the respondents,
reserves, and authorizing the President of the Philippines to expounding the theory that the exercise by the President of his war
issue bonds, certificates or other evidences of indebtedness powers granted by the Congress cannot be interfered with by the courts,
covering such amounts. (Approved, June 15, 1948.) are not controlling. Particularly, the case of Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed.,
1883, in which the opinion of the United States Supreme Court was
Republic Act No. 85 — written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, cannot apply, for the further reason
that it merely involved the power of deportation which, even in our
An Act creating the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. (Section jurisdiction, is recognized, it being the rule here that the courts cannot
2 [f].) (Approved, Oct. 29, 1946.) control the right of the Chief Executive to determine the existence or
sufficiency of the facts justifying an order of deportation. Upon the other
(g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal government to hand, the war power of the President is separately covered by section
incur in overdrafts for the purposes that he may approve: 10, paragraph (2), of Article VII, and that of the Congress by section 25.

Various Appropriation Acts. Article VI, of the Constitution, which are not invoked for the passage of
Commonwealth Act No. 671.
(h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payments
of debts: MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:.

Republic Act No. 342, approved, July 26, 1948. The majority opinion holds that Executive Order No. 62 dated June 21,
1947; Executive Order No. 192 dated December 24, 1948; and Executive
(i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable Orders Nos. 225 and 226 both dated June 15, 1949 were issued without
the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce authority of law and therefore illegal and of no legal force and effect. I
its authority. concur only in the result. Ordinarily, such concurrence without comment
or explanation would be sufficient and satisfactory. However, in view of
the radical difference between the reasons had and given by the majority
The powers included in this subdivision (i) are of course covered by
hundreds of other acts approved by the Congress which, it cannot be in arriving at the result and those entertained by me, and considering
denied, all tend to "enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities the transcendental importance of these cases, not only because of the
vast amounts of public funds and the rights of citizens affected but also
and to maintain and enforce its authority." Moreover, the withdrawal of
the greater and more important powers may be presumed to have of the principles of law involved, and the fact that not only the force and
carried the accessory and less important powers. the effect of a law (Commonwealth Act No. 671) but also the legality and
the force and effect of numerous executive orders issued by several
Presidents during a period of about three years, affecting as they do not
There is no merit in the contention that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was
only citizens, their interest and their properties but also the different
enacted by virtue of the war powers of the Congress. As the Act itself
departments and offices of the Government, I deem it my duty to set
expressly states, its basis is section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution
forth my views and the reasons in support of the same.
which merely authorizes delegation of legislative powers to the
President in times of war or other national emergency. The phrase "in
times of war or other national emergency" is solely indicative or There is a claim made about lack of personality of some of the parties-
descriptive of the occasions during which the delegation may be petitioners particularly, the petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056.
Much could be said for and against that claim, but I am willing to brush
extended and does not classify the act of delegating legislative functions
as a war power. It must be borne in mind that said section 26 is peculiar aside all defenses and technicalities on this point in order to be able to
consider and decide the more important question of the legality of the With respect to Executive Order No. 192, it will be remembered that
executive orders involved and whether or not Commonwealth Act No. Congress passed Commonwealth Act No. 728, approved on July 2, 1946,
671 is still in force. authorizing the President to regulate, curtail, control, and prohibit the
exportation of certain products, merchandise and materials. Under said
The aforementioned executive orders were issued on the straight of and authority the President issued Executive Order No. 3 dated July 10, 1946,
by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. The majority holds that later amending section 2 of said Executive Order by issuing Executive
Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to have any force and effect on May Order No. 23 dated November 1, 1946, regulating the exportation of
25, 1946 when Congress first convened in regular session after certain products, materials and merchandise. The important thing to
liberation. In This, I disagree for I believe and hold that Commonwealth consider is that section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 728 provided that
Act No. 671 is still in force and in effect. But despite this view, I am not of the authority it granted to the President shall terminate on December
the opinion that the executive orders under consideration were issued 31, 1948, that is to say, that after said date the Executive could no longer
without authority. validly regulate exports under said law. The President, however,
overlooked or ignored said injunction and invoking his emergency
Starting with Executive Order No. 62, we find that it deals with and powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671, promulgated Executive
regulates houses and lot rentals. If the legislature had not already acted Order No. 192 regulating exports, to take effect on January 1, 1949. What
and legislated on this matter since the promulgation of Commonwealth was said with regard to Executive Order No. 62 is applicable to the lack
Act No. 671, this would be a proper field for Presidential action. of authority of the Executive to promulgate Executive Order No. 192,
However, the legislature had already promulgated Commonwealth Act namely, that on this matter of export control, the legislature had already
No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66, regulating house rentals and, as late as withdrawn it from the jurisdiction of the Executive under his emergency
the month of May, 1947, Congress passed House Bill No. 978 further powers after the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 728. Any
amending Commonwealth Act No. 689. In other words, in thus acting, Presidential power or authority on the subject of export control was
the Legislature had already shown its readiness and ability to legislate derived from said Act. Not only this, but when in section 4 of
on this matter, and had withdrawn it from the realm of presidential Commonwealth Act No. 728 the legislature terminated the authority
legislation or regulation under the powers delegated by Commonwealth given the President to regulate and control exports on December 31,
Act No. 671. Not only this, but in issuing rules and regulations in the 1948 and failed or refused to renew said authority, the inference or
form of executive orders under his delegated powers, the Chief conclusion and that after said date Congress deemed any presidential
Executive merely acts as an agent of the legislature, his principal which regulation on exports unnecessary and inadvisable. Therefore, in
made the delegation. As such agent, he cannot go against the policy and promulgating Executive Order No. 192 the Chief Executive acted not only
expressed desire of his principal. without legislative authority but also against the wishes and policy of
Congress. This he may not validly do.
There are radical differences between Commonwealth Act No. 689,
Republic Act No. 66, and House Bill No. 978 on one side and Executive With respect to Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the considerations
Order No. 62 on the other. That was the reason why President Roxas made with regard to Executive Orders Nos. 62 and 192 are equally
vetoed House Bill No. 978, believing in good faith that it would not solve applicable. By previously enacting necessary legislation on the yearly
and remedy the problem of house rentals as explained by him in his Government appropriation and on the appropriation of funds for the
communication to the House of Representatives of June 21, 1947, setting expenses incurred in national elections, Congress has shown its
forth his views on the bill. The President may not and could not readiness and ability to cope with the financial problems of the
substitute his opinion however excellent or superior for that of the Government on this point. Republic Act No. 80, approved October 22,
legislature on matters of legislation when Congress has already acted 1946, appropriating funds for the operation of National Government
and expressed its opinion and desire on the matter. from July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947; Republic Act No. 156 appropriating
funds for the fiscal year 1947-48 and Republic Act No. 320, the
appropriation law for the fiscal year 1948-49 show that Congress was in that on its determination is based, not only the validity or nullity
a position and able to provide for the yearly expenditures of the (according to the theory of the majority opinion), of the four Executive
Government. And Republic Act No. 73 appropriating P1,000,000 to Orders now under consideration, but also of all the Executive Orders
defray election expenses on March 11, 1947; Republic Act No. 147 promulgated under authority of Commonwealth Act No. 671 after May
appropriating P1,000,000 to defray expenses for the election of 25, 1946, up to the present time. Its determination will also decide
provincial city and municipal officials and eight senators held on whether or not the President may still exercise his emergency powers in
November 11, 1947, and Republic Act No. 235 appropriating P100,000 the future on matters and subjects not heretofore withdrawn by the
for the special elections held on March 23, 1948, to fill vacancies in Legislature. Because of my disagreement with the majority on this point,
Representative District No. 4 of Iloilo and No. 1 of Leyte, demonstrated I deem it necessary to explain and elaborate on my reasons for my
the ability of the Congress to appropriate money for election purposes. disagreement.
By so doing Congress had tacitly and impliedly withdrawn this portion of
the field where the President may under his emergency power legislate For purposes of reference and to facilitate the same, I am reproducing
or promulgate rules and regulations. Commonwealth Act No. 671 in full as well as section 26, Article VI of the
Constitution on which said Act is based:
In this connection, it may be stated that in my opinion, the theory
underlying the delegation of emergency powers to the under AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A
Commonwealth Act No. 671 and the similar laws is that the legislature RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
because of the emergency resulting from the war, would be unable to AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
meet in order to legislate or although able to meet, because of the REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
emergency, the ordinary process of legislation would be too slow and
inadequate and could not cope with the emergency. So, as a remedy, the Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
power and authority of legislation are vested temporarily in the hands of
one man, the Chief Executive. But as regards Executive Orders Nos. 225 SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and
and 226, the legislature has demonstrated that not only it could meet but other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
also it could legislate on this point of appropriations by approving Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with
general appropriation laws for the different fiscal years since liberation extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
as well as appropriations for the necessary funds for the different
national and provincial elections. Consequently, there no longer was any SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the
necessity for Presidential legislation in this regard. Moreover, and this is Constitution, the President is hereby authorize, during the
not unimportant, the failure of the Legislature to pass an appropriation existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
law for the fiscal year 1949-50 and a law appropriating funds for the regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national
elections in November, 1949 was not due to any emergency resulting policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among
from the war, contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 671, but rather other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the
and possibly due to lack of time and because of the rather abrupt and Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments,
adjourning of the last session of the Legislature last May. offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the
Government of the Commonwealth including the determination
As already stated, the majority holds that Act No. 671 ceased to have of the order of precedence of the heads of the heads of Executive
force and effect on May 25, 1946. The other view is that it is still in force. Departments; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches,
To me this is the main and the more important issue involved in these departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of
cases. In fact the argument of the parties centered on this point. The government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to
importance of this issue may readily be appreciated when it is realized continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or
 otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the enact legislation; that the moment of Legislature could convene there
operation or application of those of an administrative character; would no longer be any reason for the exercise by the President of
(e) to impose new taxes to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish emergency powers delegated to him; that if, when the Legislature could
those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of meet and actually is in session, the President is allowed to exercise his
bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the delegated legislative powers, there would be the serious anomaly of two
proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or legislative bodies acting at the same time, namely, the Legislature and
municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that the Executive, "mutually nullifying each other's action" ; that the limited
he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of period fixed in Commonwealth Act No. 671 for its life and effectiveness
credits or the payments of debts; and (i) to exercise such other as required by the Constitution is the interval from the passage of said
powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to Act and the moment that Congress could convene, not in special session
fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce the where its power of legislation is limited by the Chief Executive in his call
authority. for special session, but in regular session where it could be free to enact
general legislation; and that unless this automatic ending or cessation of
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as Act No. 671 is so held, there would be need of another Act or legislation
practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the by the Congress to repeal Act No. 671 in which case, the Chief Executive
Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations may by his veto power effectively block any effort in this direction.
promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
I beg to differ with the foregoing thesis. I believe that, as I already had
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules occasion to state though incidentally, the real reason for the delegation
and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and of legislative powers to the Chief Executive is not only because the
effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise Legislature is unable to meet due to a national emergency but also
provide. because although it could and does actually meet, whether in regular or
special session, it is not in a position and able to cope with the problems
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by brought about by and arising from the emergency, problems which
law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to require urgent and immediate action. Certainly, one man can act more
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and quickly and expeditiously than about one hundred members of the
regulations to carry our a declared national policy. (Section 26, Legislature, especially when they are divided into legislative chambers.
Article VI, Constitution.) That is why in times of emergency, much as we in democratic countries
dislike the system or idea of dictatorship, we hear of food dictator, fuel
I fully agree with the majority when in its opinion it says: dictator, transportation dictator, civilian evacuation dictator, etc., where
the functions which ordinarily belong to a council or board or to a
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of legislative body, are entrusted under certain limitations to one single
its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in official or individual.
its nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be sub-
served, and its relation to the Constitution. (Page 5, majority Supposing that during a national emergency and while the Legislature is
opinion.) in session, the legislators woke up one morning to find that there was
extreme scarcity of imported food, fuel, building materials, equipment
The main thesis of the majority is that the only reason for the delegation required in agriculture and industry, etc., because of a monopoly,
of legislative powers to the Chief Executive under the Constitution, such hoarding, injurious speculation, manipulation, private controls and
as was done under Commonwealth Act No. 671 was because due to the profiteering, or that there were wide-spread lockouts and strikes
emergency resulting from the war, the Legislature could not meet to paralyzing transportation, commerce and industry, or rampant
espionage or sabotage endangering the very life and security of the partially and under such conditions as he may deem proper, the
nation. How much time would it take the legislature to enact the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444, commonly known as
necessary legislation in order to cope with the situation and pass the the Eight Hour Labor Law;
necessary emergency measures?
(b) Commonwealth Act No. 496, authorizing the President to
We are familiar with the practice and routine of enacting laws. A bill is take over, for use or operation by the Government, any public
introduced in the Legislature; it is referred to the corresponding service or enterprise and to pay just compensation in the
committee, it is studied by said committee, which in some cases holds manner to be determined by him and to prescribe and
public hearings; the committee discusses the bill and sometimes promulgate regulations he may deem essential to carry out the
introduces amendments; if the bill is not killed in the committee or purposes of the Act;
shelved, it is submitted to the chamber for study, discussion and possible
amendment by all the members; it is finally voted and if approved, it is (c) Commonwealth Act No. 498 declaring a state of national
sent to the other house where it undergoes the same process; and if it is emergency due to a state of war among several nations and as a
finally approved by both houses of Congress, it is submitted to the Chief measure to prevent scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious
Executive for his study and approval or veto. All these may consume speculations, profiteering, etc. affecting the supply, distribution
weeks or months as a result of which, ordinarily, many bills finally movement of foods, clothing, fuel, building materials, agricultural
approved by the Congress could be sent to the President for approval or equiptments etc. authorized the President to purchase any of the
veto only after adjournment of the legislative session. And we should not articles or commodities available for storage, for re-sale or
overlook the fact that in some cases for lack of time of due to distribution, to fix the maximum selling price of said articles or
disagreement among the legislators or between the two houses of commodities and to promulgated such rules and regulations as
Congress, important pieces of legislations like the annual appropriation he may deem necessary; and
law for the fiscal year 1949-50, appropriation of funds for the election to
be held in November, 1949, contained in Executive Orders Nos. 225 and (d) Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President in
226, involved in the present cases, and the proposed amendment to the view of the existence of a state of national emergency to reduce
Election Code etc. have not been passed by Congress in its last session the expenditures of the executive departments of the
ending last May, 1949, which session lasted one hundred days. If we Government by the suspension or abandonment of service,
were to rely on the ordinary process of legislation to meet a national activities, or operations of no immediate importance.
emergency, by the time the necessary and needed law is passed, the
situation sought to be remedied, or the problem sought to be solved may At the time, September, 1939 the second world war was only in Europe,
have become disastrous or ended in calamity or gone beyond legislation quite far from the Philippines and had just begun. There was then no
or any remedy. It would be too late. It would be like locking the stable likelihood of the Philippines being involved in the war until more than
door after the horse had been stolen. two years later, in December, 1941. The National Assembly was then
free to meet either in regular or special session to enact legislation to
Now, for some retrospect. The Philippine National Assembly delegated meet the emergency. In fact, it met in regular session in January, 1941
its legislative powers because of the existence of a state of national lasting 100 days and in January, 1941 for another regular session of 100
emergency as early as the year 1939. During its second special session of days, excluding the several special session held during those two years.
that year, it promulgated the following laws: And yet the Assembly delegated legislative powers to the President
under section 26, Article II of the Constitution. This is clear proof that,
(a) Commonwealth Act No. 494, authorizing the President of the contrary to the theory of the majority opinion, the Legislature delegated
Philippines to suspend until the time of the adjournment of the legislative powers to the President even when it could meet and it
next regular session of the National Assembly, either wholly or actually met several times.
After passing the Acts just mentioned delegating legislative powers to The same thing obtains under Commonwealth Act 671. Since under the
the President, the Assembly in its fourthly special session on August 19, view of the majority the emergency power of the President granted him
1940 repeated and reiterated this practice and policy by passing in Commonwealth Act No. 671 ended only on May 25, 1946, then the
Commonwealth Act No. 600 delegating additional and more extensive extensive legislative powers delegated to the President under that Act
powers to the President in spite of the fact that the war was still far away could be exercised and in fact they were exercised during the five special
in Europe and there was no danger or prospect of involving the session of Congress in the year 1945, which lasted a total of 84 days.
Philippines, and the Legislature was still free to meet as in fact it met During those special session of 1945, President Osmeña issued several
again in regular session in January, 1941. During its regular session Executive Orders in the exercise of his emergency powers.
begun that month and year, instead of stopping or ending the legislative
powers delegated to the President, because according to the theory of Is there further proof needed to show that the suggested and feared
the majority opinion, the Legislature was able to meet, the Assembly anomaly and impropriety of the Legislature and the Executive both
allowed them to continue by passing Commonwealth Act No. 620 which exercising legislative functions simultaneously, is more fancied than
merely amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 600. I repeat that real? The situation was contemplated and expressly intended by the
all this, far from supporting the view of the majority that the Legislature Legislature itself, evidently believing that said condition or state of
delegated legislative powers to the President only because it could not affairs was neither anomalous nor improper. There is to my mind really
meet, fairly and squarely refutes said view. no incompatibility. At such a time and during the period of their
simultaneous functioning, the Legislature may perform its ordinary
Now, let us consider the theory of the majority that it would be a great legislative duties taking its time to study, consider, amend and pass bills,
anomaly to have two legislative bodies, the Legislature and the President reserving to the President matters requiring and demanding immediate
to be acting at the same time, each nullifying the acts of the other. I fail to action.
see the suggested anomaly. In fact, under the view and interpretation
given by the majority of the delegation of contemplated the After all, it is for the Legislature to say whether it wants the President to
simultaneous functioning of the Legislature and the President, both exercise his emergency powers at the same time that it is in session. It
exercising legislative powers. And it is a fact that there were several may validly and properly stipulate in its grant of emergency powers that
instances of the legislature and the President both validly and they be exercised when the Legislature is not in session. In fact, in one
simultaneously exercising legislative powers. instance, in Commonwealth Act No. 500, section 2, the Notional
Assembly expressly provided "that the authority herein given shall be
Under section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 496 already referred to, exercised only when the National Assembly is not in session." When in
approved on September 30, 1939, the power delegated to the President its other acts of delegation, like Commonwealth Act 671, the Legislature
to prescribe rules and regulations he may deem essential to carry out the not only fails to stipulate this condition, but on the contrary,
purposes of the Act, namely, the taking over of and operation by the contemplates Presidential exercise of legislative powers simultaneously
Government of any public service or enterprise and to pay for the same, with the Legislature, it is to be presumed that the Legislature intended it
was to last until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session and saw nothing improper or anomalous in it, and it is not for the Court
of the National Assembly. This means that, during the regular session of to pass upon the supposed impropriety or anomaly.
the Assembly which begun in January, 1940 and lasted 100 days, the
President could exercise the emergency powers delegated to him. Again, As to the possibility of the Chief Executive validly and successfully
under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 the President could and nullifying the acts of the Legislature, to me that is quite remote, if not
indeed he exercised his emergency powers during the regular session of impossible. As already stated at the beginning of this opinion, the Chief
the Assembly which began in January, 1941, when President Quezon Executive acting as an agent of the Legislative under his emergency
issued at least nine Executive Orders numbered 321, 333, 335, 337, 339, powers, may not go against the wishes and policies of his principal. He
340, 342, 344 and 345. can only carry out its wishes and policies, and where his acts and orders
run counter to those of the Legislature, or operate on a field already The majority, and the parties who initiated these proceedings in court
withdrawn because the Legislature had already acted therein, his acts or fear that the President may promulgate rules and regulations contrary in
Executive Orders must give way and will be declared void and of no purpose and effect to legislation enacted by the Legislature; that he may
effect, by the Courts, as we are doing with the Executive Orders involved reenact his rules and regulations after being repealed by the legislature,
in these cases. and that he may even veto a bill passed by Congress repealing the Act of
delegation and ending his emergency powers. It is a fear not well
With respect to the claim of the majority opinion that unless the founded. It runs counter to the presumption that the Chief Executive like
emergency powers were made to end at the time the President made his any other public official would perform his functions and conduct
report to Congress when it convened, it would be necessary to enact new himself in every respect for the good and welfare of the people and in
legislation to repeal the act of delegation, in which case the period for accordance with the Constitution. It is fear based on the presumption
the delegation would be unlimited, indefinite, and uncertain, contrary to that the Legislature and the Chief Executive are at loggerheads, working
the constitutional provision, I may say that the President was authorized at cross purposes and that the President though acting as a mere agent
by Act 671 to exercise emergency powers "during the existence of the of his principal, the legislature, would brazenly repudiate his principal
emergency," and not a day longer. To me that is a limited period in and even challenge its authority, and that the Chief Executive is so much
contemplation of the Constitution. There would be no need for a new law in love with his emergency powers that he would perpetuate them by
to repeal the Act of delegation, for said Act is self-liquidating. The going as far as vetoing an act of Congress ending said emergency powers.
moment the emergency ceases, the law itself automatically ceases to Let it be said to the credit of and in justice to the different Chief
have force and effect, and the Presidential emergency powers also end Executives who have wielded these emergency powers, President
with it. Quezon, Osmeña, Roxas and the present incumbent President Quirino,
that no accusing finger has ever been pointed at them, accusing or even
Under my view, had the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese insinuating that they have abused their emergency powers or exercised
forces, which we feared and expected in December, 1941 failed to them for any purpose other than the welfare of the country, or that they
materialize either because the invasion was repelled or because the had maliciously acted contrary to the wishes of the Legislatures. Even
Japanese high command at the last moment decided to by-pass the after liberation there has been no claim not even from the Legislatures
Philippines and divert his forces further south to invade, say Australia, itself, to the knowledge of this Court, at least to that of the undersigned,
or if the Pacific war had ended as we all or most of us then expected it to that any Chief Executive exercised his delegated powers, knowing that
end sooner within weeks or months after its commencement and that they had ended or had abused the same.
the emergency resulting therefrom had also ceased soon thereafter,
Commonwealth Act No. 671 would have automatically ceased to have There is no charge or insinuation that any of the Executive Orders which
force and effect right in the year 1942 without any affirmative act or law we are now holding to be invalid were issued from the ulterior motives
of the Legislature. There would be no point or reason for the President or to further and favor the political interest of the President issuing
to continue exercising emergency powers when there no longer was any them. It is admitted in the majority opinion that Executive Order No. 62,
emergency. But under the view of the majority, emergency or no seeking to regulate house and lot rentals was issued in good faith by
emergency even if Congress could meet in special session to enact President Roxas. Executive Order No. 192 was issued to regulate
general legislation, the country must continue to be ruled by the exports, President Quirino presumably believing that exports at this
Presidential decree until the next regular session of Congress which may time still needed regulation and control as was formerly provided by
not come till may months later. In my opinion this is not logical. To me Congress in its Act No. 728, and that the matter was still within the field
the real and only reason and test for the continuance of the exercise of of his emergency powers as was also mistakenly believed by President
emergency powers is the continued existence of the emergency, not the Roxas in issuing Executive Order No. 52. As to Executive Order No. 226,
inability of the Congress to meet in regular session. it merely appropriated funds to defray the expenses in connection with
the holding of the national elections in November, 1949, without which,
said election could not be held. With respect to Executive Order No. 225, Legislative Department to meet and exercise its functions. I believe I
it merely continues in force Republic Act 320 which appropriated funds have successfully demonstrated the flaw in this theory, not only by
for the last fiscal year inasmuch as Congress had failed to pass a General showing that the real reason underlying the delegation of legislative
Appropriation Act for the operation of the National Government for the powers is not inability of Legislature to meet but rather it inability to
period beginning July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950. There is no insinuation consider and pass legislation in time to meet an emergency which
that any political motives or purposes are involved in these Executive requires as it does urgent and immediate action and can be solved only
Orders. by the exercise of legislative functions by one single responsible
individual, unhamppered by study and prolonged discussion by many
I agree with the majority that since the Constitution provides that the members of the legislative body, but also by the fact that although since
delegation of legislative powers by the Legislature should be done for a 1939 when the second world war broke out in Europe and for a period
limited period, it is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was of more than two years thereafter, when the National Assembly could
approved with this limitation in view. I even agree to its definition of the still meet and in fact convened on several occasions and for hundreds of
word "limited." But I submit that Commonwealth Act No. 671 itself, days in regular and special session, nevertheless, it had been delegating
limited its operation and effectiveness to and make it coextensive with legislative powers to the President.
the duration of the emergency resulting from the war and that
furthermore, that duration is a limited period within the meaning and The majority view finds no support in the law. Section 26, Article VI of
contemplation of the Constitution. Surely the emergency resulting from the Constitution does not impose this condition or requirement. The
the war contemplated by the National Assembly when it acted Act No. only important conditions imposed by the Constitution are that there be
671 is not permanent or indefinite. It is of limited duration. It may be a national emergency and delegation be for a limited period. The same
long or it may be short; but it cannot be for always. It has an end. thing is true with Act No. 671 which makes the delegation. The only
Presumably the members of the National Assembly thought that the condition imposed by section 2 of said Act is that the delegated powers
emergency would not last as long as it did. The belief entertained at the be exercised during the emergency. Neither in the Constitution nor in
time by not a few, in fact by a great portion of the people here not Commonwealth Act No. 671 is there any hint or insinuation, much less
excluding the legislators, was that the war with Japan would be of short express mention about the inability of the Legislature to meet. When
duration, a question of months at the longest; that American every consideration for clearness and for Executive and Judicial
reinforcements would come at the beginning of the year 1942 and drive guidance loudly called for and demanded an unequivocal and clear
away the invading Japanese armies if they ever were able to occupy the expression of Constitutional and legislative intent, both laws, the source
Philippines and that, consequently, the war as far as these islands were and basis of the emergency powers are conspicuously silent on this
concerned and the resulting emergency would soon pass away. The point. The only conclusion is that neither the framers of the Constitution
wisdom or lack of wisdom of the National Assembly in limiting or rather nor the members of the National Assembly had thought of much less
making the life and effectiveness of Commonwealth Act No. 671 intended to impose this condition. To sustain the majority view would
coextensive with the resulting emergency, viewed in the light of what require reading into the law what is not there. In further support of its
had actually happened, cannot be passed upon this Court. So, as I see it, view that emergency powers may be exercised by the President only
so long as the emergency resulting from the War continues, until the Legislature could meet, the majority finds comfort in and cites
Commonwealth Act No. 671 subsists and so long the Chief Executive section 3 of Act 671 which reads as follows:
retains his emergency powers.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as
The majority believes that as already stated, Act No. 671 was in force practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the
only until Congress could meet resume its legislatives functions. Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation
Naturally, this view is based on the theory that legislative functions in promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
times of emergency are delegated only because of the inability of the
I fail to see anything in said section that warrants a holding that upon those issued by his predecessor President Quezon who because of his
filing his report with Congress, about the rules and regulation premature death was unable to report his acts to Congress, the President
promulgated by him under his emergency powers under Commonwealth automatically lost his emergency powers. But the majority opinion
Act 671, his emergency powers automatically ceased. I could well qualifies this convening of the Congress, for it says that it must be a
imagine that under an act of delegation of legislative powers where the regular session and not a special session, thereby extending the life of
President is authorized to perform one single act such as the suspension Commonwealth act No. 671 one year longer, to May, 1946 when
of the eight-hour labor law under Commonwealth Act No. 494, or the Congress held its first regular session after liberation. I do not quite see
reduction of the expenditures of the executive departments of the the necessity or the reason for the distinction made between the special
National Government by the suspension or abandonment of services, and regular session, for at both sessions Congress could well receive the
activities or operations of no immediate necessity under Commonwealth report of the President. The reason given is that "in a special session
Act No. 500, when the President has exercised his delegated authority Congress may consider general legislation or only such subjects as he
and made his report to the Assembly as required by said laws, the latter, (President) may designate." But as a matter of fact, the first two special
as well as his delegated authority thereunder automatically ceased, for sessions called by President Osmeña in 1945, after liberation, each for a
the simple reason that nothing remains to be performed or done. period of thirty days were both to consider general legislation. So,
However, treating of the grant of extensive emergency powers as was actually there is no reason for the distinction.
done under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671 where said laws
contemplated many different acts, rules and regulations of varied Furthermore, if it were the intention of the Legislature to fix the time at
categories and objectives and to be performed not at one at time or which Commonwealth Act No. 671 would cease in its operation as of the
instance but at different times during the existence of the emergency, as date when the President could file his report before Congress when it
the need or occasion arose, there is no reason for the belief or the first convened not in special session but in regular session, it would have
holding that upon submitting a partial report, the whole law making the expressly and unequivocally said so. In its other acts of delegation of
delegation including his powers under it automatically ended. The powers when the legislature wanted to have the report of the President
legislature during the emergency might be able to convene and at its regular session, it expressly and explicitly said so. In section 3 of
naturally, the President will immediately make his report to it of the Commonwealth Act 494, in section 5 of Commonwealth Act 496, in
rules and regulations promulgated by him up to that time; but if the section 6 of Commonwealth Act 498, in section 3 of Commonwealth Act
emergency continued or even became more serious, would it be 500 and in section 4 of Commonwealth Act 600, the National Assembly
reasonable to hold that his emergency powers ended right then and provided that the President shall report to the National Assembly within
there? Would it not be more logical and reasonable to believe that ten days after the opening of the next regular session of the said
inasmuch as the grant and the exercise of his emergency powers were Assembly of whatever acts have been taken by him under the authority
motivated by and based upon the existence of the emergency and since of those Acts. The Assembly left nothing for interpretation or
the emergency continued his work and responsibility were not ended speculation. In section 3 of Commonwealth Act 671, however, the same
and that his partial report could not possibly affect the continuance of Assembly has not specified the kind of session before which the
his emergency powers? President should make his report. It merely said that upon the convening
of the Congress the President shall report thereto all the rules and
Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 provides for the filing of a regulations promulgated by him. We should make no distinction where
report with Congress by the President as soon as that body convened. the law makes or calls for none. Here again, to support the majority
According to the majority opinion on that date the whole Act No. 671 opinion would require reading into the law, section 3 of Act 671,
ceased to have force and effect. Under that theory, as soon as the something that is not there.
Congress convened in June, 1945, and it is to be presumed that President
Osmeña, complying with his duty, must have made his report of all the In case like the present where there is room for doubt as to whether or
numerous Executive Orders he had issued so far, perhaps including not Commonwealth Act No. 671 has ceased to operate, one view (of the
majority) being that it automatically ceased to have any force and effect 1941, Commonwealth Act 600 automatically ceased to operate and the
on May 25, 1946, the other view being that the law operated as long as President automatically lost his delegated legislative powers. But this
the emergency resulting from the war existed, the opinion of and the contrary to the very view of the National Assembly which passed said
obvious interpretation given by the legislature which enacted the law Act 600. Commonwealth Act No. 620 of the National Assembly passed
and made the delegation of powers and the President to whom the during that "next regular session" and approved on June 6, 1941 merely
delegation was made and who exercised said powers, should have much amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act 600, which enumerated the
if not decisive weight. We must bear in mind that we are not passing powers delegated to the Chief Executive. It left the rest of the provisions
upon the validity or constitutionality of a law enacted by the Legislature, and sections of Commonwealth Act 600 intact. So that, under section 4
in which case, the Court may find the act invalid and unconstitutional if it (which was left intact) of Act 600, the President was still required to
is in violation of the basic law, regardless of the opinion or interpretation report to National Assembly within the first 10 days from the date of the
given by the Legislature that passed it or of the Executive Department opening of its next regular session which should have begun in January,
which may be trying to enforce it. We assume that Act No. 671 is valid 1942, despite the fact that he had already made a report to the
and constitutional. Here, we are merely trying to ascertain the intention Legislature in January, 1941. Incidentally, this answer and refutes the
of the National Assembly as to the life and period of effectiveness of contention of the majority that the law of delegation of powers
Commonwealth Act No. 671. contemplated only one meeting of the Congress at which the President
was to report his acts of emergency, and that said report was to be the
Do the study and analysis of other acts of the Legislature similar to first and the last.
Commonwealth Act 671, favor the view of the majority? The answer in
my opinion is clearly and decidedly in the negative. The majority cites Now, what inference may be drawn from this amending of section 1 only
the Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 to support the theory that of Commonwealth Act No. 600 by Commonwealth Act No. 620? The
Commonwealth Act 671 automatically ceased to operate Congress met at logical conclusion is that in promulgating Commonwealth Act 620 on
its next regular session. But the logical inference or conclusion to be June 6, 1941, the National Assembly all along regarded Commonwealth
drawn from these two acts is, in my opinion, just the reverse. It is even Act No. 600 which delegated legislative powers to the President as still
fatal to the view of the majority as I shall attempt to show. Let us in force and effect despite the report filed with the Assembly by the
consider Commonwealth Act 600 delegating extensive legislative powers President at the beginning of its regular session in January, 1941. When
to the President, approved on August 19, 1940, which like Act 671 is the Legislature merely amends a section of a law, leaving the rest of said
silent as to any express provision regarding its life or period of law intact and unchanged, the logical inference and conclusion is that the
effectiveness, and as to how long the emergency powers granted the amended law was still in force because you cannot amend a law which is
President by it will last. Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 600 like no longer in force. The only thing that could be done with a law that has
section 3 of Act 671 provides that "the President shall within the first ten ceased to operate is to reenact it. But in passing Commonwealth Act 620
days from the date of the opening of the Assembly's next regular session in July, 1941, the Assembly did not reenacted Commonwealth Act No.
report to said Assembly whatever action he had taken under the 600. By merely amending one of its sections, the Assembly, as late as
authority therein granted." Said section 4 of Act 600 is clearly and more June 1941, considered said Act 600 as still effective and in operation and
specific than section 3 of Act 671 in that it clearly specifies the next consequently, the emergency powers of the President continued and
regular session whereas the latter refers merely to the convening of subsisted despite his previously having made a report of his actions in
Congress. But let us assume arguendo as contended by the majority that January 1941. This squarely refutes the theory that as soon as the
"the convening of the Congress" mentioned in section 3 of President filed his report on the exercise of his emergency powers with
Commonwealth Act 671, referred to regular session. According to the the Legislature, the Act making the delegation ceased to operate and the
majority opinion, under section 4 of the Commonwealth Act No. 600, as President lost his emergency powers.
soon as the President made the report of the National Assembly at its
"next regular session" which was to be and was actually held in January,
As I have already stated in the course of this opinion, in connection with cannot possibly be regarded as having been promulgated by authority of
another phrase of this case from January to June, 1941, President Republic Act No. 51, for said Act approved on October 4, 1946, gave the
Quezon had issued at least eight Executive Orders in the exercise of his President only one year within which to reorganize the different
emergency powers, by authority of Commonwealth Act 600. From this it executive departments, offices, agencies, etc. and Executive Order No.
is evident that he did not share the majority view, because despite his 100 was promulgated on October 23, 1947, after the expiration of the
having made his report to the Assembly in January, 1941, and even one year period. Furthermore, it is a matter of common knowledge that
before the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 620, he believed and during the last session of Congress which ended in May, 1949, there was
considered Commonwealth Act No. 600 as still in force after that date talk if not a movement in the Congress to end the emergency powers of
and that he still retained his emergency powers. the President. Nothing concrete in the form of legislation or resolution
was done, for if we are to accept newspaper reports and comment, the
Then, let us see what was the attitude and conduct of the Chief Executive members of Congress or at least a majority of them were willing and
and of Congress after May 25, 1946, when according to the majority satisfied to have the Chief Executive continue in the exercise of his
opinion Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to operate. After May 25, emergency powers until the end of 1949. All this leads to no other
1946, two Presidents, Roxas and Quirino had issued numerous Executive conclusion but that Congress believed all along that Commonwealth Act
Orders based upon and invoking Commonwealth Act No. 671. Like No. 671 is still in force and effect.
President Quezon, they also evidently were of the opinion that despite
the meeting of the Legislature in regular session the act delegating If Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and effect the question
legislative powers to them (in the case of Roxas and Quirino— arises: how long and for what period will said Act continue to operate?
Commonwealth Act No. 671) was still in force, that they still retained As I have already stated, I believe that the delegation of emergency
their emergency powers and so proceeded to exercise them in good powers was made coextensive with the emergency resulting from the
faith. war, as long as that emergency continues and unless the Legislature
provides otherwise, Act 671 will continue to operate and the President
Congress also, evidently, believed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was may continue exercising his emergency powers.
still in force and effect after said date, May 25, 1946. In spite of the
several legislative sessions, regular and special since then and up to and The last and logical question that one will naturally ask is: has the
including the year 1949, Congress has not by law or resolution said emergency resulting from the war passed or does it still exist? This is a
anything questioning or doubting the validity of said Executive Order on fair and decisive question inasmuch as the existence of the emergency is,
the score of having been promulgated after Commonwealth Act No. 671 my opinion, the test and the only basis of the operation or cessation of
had supposedly ceased to operate. Not only this, but at least in one Act 671. The existence or non-existence of the emergency resulting from
instance, Congress had by a law promulgated by it, considered one of the war is a question of fact. It is based on conditions obtaining among
those supposed illegal Executive Orders promulgated after May 25, the people and in the country and perhaps even near and around it. It is
1946, to be valid. I refer to Republic Act No. 224 approved on June 5, highly controversial question on which people may honestly differ.
1948, creating the National Airport Corporation which considered and There are those who in all good faith believe and claim that conditions
treated as valid Executive Order No. 100, dated October 21, 1947, by have returned to normal; that the people have now enough to eat,
providing in section 7 of said Republic Act No. 224 for the abolishment of sometimes even more than they had before the war; that people
the Office of the Administrator of the Manila International Airport nowadays especially in the cities are better nourished and clothed and
established under the provisions of said Executive Order No. 100 and the transported and better compensated for their labor, and that the
transfer of the personnel and funds created under the same Executive President himself in his speeches, chats and messages had assured the
Order to the National Airport Corporation. This Executive Order No. 100 public that normal times have returned, that the problem of peace and
which appropriated public funds and therefore, was of a legislative order had been solved, that the finances of the Government and the
nature must have been issued under Commonwealth Act No. 671. It national economy are sound, and that there is an adequate food supply.
It is therefore, claimed that there is no longer any emergency resulting I repeat that this question of the existence of an emergency is a
from the war. controversial one, the decision on which must be based on the
ascertainment of facts, circumstances and conditions and the situation
On the other hand, it is asserted with equal vehemence in the opposite obtaining in the country. This Court is not in a position to decide that
camp that conditions are still far from normal; that the picture painted controversy. It does not have the facilities to obtain and acquire the
by the President in cheerful and reassuring colors is based on over necessary facts and data on which to base a valid and just decision.
optimism and, as to be expected, calculated to show in bold relief the Neither did it have the opportunity to receive the necessary evidence as
achievements of the administration, and so should be considered with in a hearing or trial at which evidence, oral or documentary, is
some allowance; that we are now importing more rice than before the introduced. We cannot invoked and resort to judicial notice because this
war for the reason that many rice farms are idle because of the farmer's refers to things of public knowledge, and not controverted, whereas
fear of or interference by dissidents; that the problem of peace and order things, facts and conditions necessary for the determination of whether
is far from solved as shown by the frequent hold-ups, kidnapping, or not there is still an emergency, are often not of public knowledge but
loothing and killings and organized banditry not only in Luzon but also require investigation, accurate reporting and close contact with the
in the Visayas and Mindanao; that whereas before the war, the people to be able to ascertain their living conditions, their needs, their
Constabulary force consisting of only about 6,000 officers and men could fears, etc.
provide complete protection to life and property and was adequate in all
respects to enforce peace and order, now this Constabulary enlarged to To me, the department of the Government equipped and in a position to
about 20,000 men, provided with modern weapons and equipment and decide this question of emergency are the Chief Executive and the
with the aid of thousands of civilians guards and of the Philippine Army Legislature. The first has at his command and beck and call all the
and Air Force cannot solve the peace and order problem; that the executive officials and departments. He has the Army, the Constabulary,
dissidents who are well organized, armed and disciplined even attack Naval Patrol, the Police of the cities and towns and the barrio lieutenants
and sack towns and sometimes openly defy and engage the armed to inform him of the state of peace and order and the security of the
Government forces; that as long as more than 100,000 firearms are loose states. He has the Secretary of Education and all the subordinates
and in the hands of irresponsible parties, not excluding the seemingly officers and the school officials under him to inform him as to whether
regular mysterious supply to them of additional firearms and or not there is a school crisis or emergency as a result of the war. He has
ammunitions, there can be no peace and order; and as to the barrio folks the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and his men to
in central Luzon and now, even in provinces bordering central Luzon advise him as to the agricultural needs and the food supply of the
whose parents and relatives had been killed by dissidents, whose country. He has the Secretary of Finance and all the officials under him
women folk had been outraged by the same elements, whose homes had to inform him of the finances of the Government and the economy of the
been looted and burned and whose very lives had been subjected to country as well as the officials to advise him of the land shipping
constant terror and peril, compelling them to leave their homes and transportation situation. In other words, the President is in a position to
their farms and evacuate to and be concentrated in the poblaciones to determine whether or not there is still an emergency as a result of the
live there in utter discomfort and privation, it is said that it would be war.
difficult to convince these unfortunate people that normalcy has
returned and that there is no longer any emergency resulting from the As to Congress, it is equally in a position and in fact it is the first to called
war. To further support the claim of the existence of an emergency, the upon to decide as to the existence or non-existence of an emergency.
menace of communism not only at home, particularly in central Luzon According to the Constitution, section 24, Article VI, either House of
but from abroad, especially China, is invoked. And it is asserted that all Congress may call upon the head of any department of the Government
this is a result of the war. on any matter pertaining to his departure. The members of Congress
come from all parts and the far corners of the country. They are
supposed to be in close contact with their constituents and know at first
hand their needs, the way they live, etc. Congress therefore should know. operation of the Government for the fiscal year beginning July of this
Moreover, it is the legislature that must first determine as to whether or year and for the expenses in the coming national election next
not there is a national emergency as a condition precedent to the November, one may inquire as to what will happen or what is to be done.
delegation of its legislative powers. Naturally, it is the one that is called The answer or answers to this question lie with the Chief Executive.
upon to say when that emergency ceases. Congress will not meet in regular session until next year. It is not for the
court, not even the undersigned to suggest the calling of a special
Now, one will ask, what does Congress think about the emergency? Does legislative session to cope with the perilous situation thus created, altho
it believe that it still exists? To me the answer is YES. What has been said one may regard that as a logical remedy. But, should the President call a
about the acts, conduct and attitude of the legislature as to its belief that special session and Congress for one reason or another fails to meet or
Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force, are all applicable and may be though it meets, for one reason or another it fails to pass an
repeated to show that the Congress believes that the emergency appropriation law, then a real crisis will have ensued. I am confident that
resulting from the war still exist. Under the theory that I maintain, the Chief Executive, conscious of his responsibility as the Chief of the
Congress must be of the opinion that the emergency still exists for the nation would not just stand supine and idle and see the Government of
reason that as I have shown Congress believes that Commonwealth Act the Republic of the Philippines disintegrate and die. He would know
No. 671 is still in force and the life and the operation of said Act depends what to do and he would do something according to his sound discretion
upon and is coextensive with the existence of the emergency. To this and in accordance with the law, statutory or otherwise and in the
may be added the attitude and the belief of the President as to the discharge of his high executive powers, express or implied.
continued existence of the emergency. It must be borne in mind that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 authorizes the President to exercise his TORRES, J., concurring:
emergency powers only during the existence of the emergency. The
inference is that before exercising his emergency powers by I concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor on the
promulgating an Executive Order he must first determine and decide existence of the emergency powers. I reserve my opinion on the validity
that the state of emergency still exists, for that is the condition precedent of Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226.
to the exercise of his delegated powers. In other words, the two
departments of the Government, the Legislative and the Executive REYES, J., concurring and dissenting:
Departments, best qualified and called upon to determine whether or
not the emergency resulting from the war still exists have made manifest The main issue in these cases is whether the emergency which on
in their acts and attitude that they believe that such emergency still December 16, 1941 prompted the approval of Commonwealth Act No.
exists. I may here state that on this question of emergency, I entertain no 671, delegating extraordinary powers to the President, still existed at the
personal opinion either way lacking as I do the means of deciding fairly time the Chief Executive exercised those powers by promulgating the
and justly. Neither has the Court. If the decision of the courts on question executive orders whose validity is now challenged.
of fact involved in a controversy are given due respect and weight and
are binding, it is because such decisions are based on evidence adduced On issue similar to the one just formulated there is a diversity of
and received after a hearing. No such hearing was held for the purpose opinions. While some courts would rather leave the determination of
and no evidence been received. In other words, we have nothing in such issues to the political department of the Government, others are for
which to decide a question of fact which is the existence or non- making the determination subject to judicial review. But the latest ruling
existence of emergency. of the United States Supreme Court on the point accords with first view
and declares that "these are matters of political judgment for which
In view of the conclusion we have arrived at, finding these Executive judges have neither technical competence nor official responsibility."
Orders to be void and of no effect, particularly Executive Orders Nos. 225 (Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883.)
and 226 with the evident result that no funds are appropriated for the
In any event the existence or non-existence of an emergency is a emergency resulting from the war and it expressly says that the
question of facts which may not always be determine without the President is to exercise those powers "during the existence of the
evidence by mere reference to facts within the judicial notice. In the emergency." The Act does not say that the President may exercise the
present cases, there has been no trial for the reception of proof, and I am powers only when the Legislature is not session. Much less does it say
not aware that enough facts have been shown to justify the conclusion that the emergency powers shall cease as soon as the Legislature has
that the emergency in question has already ceased. On the other hand, convened in regular session. An emergency resulting from a global war
since the exercise of the emergency powers by the President cannot end with the mere meeting of the Legislature. Neither may be
presupposes a determination of the existence of the emergency, the legislated out of existence. The Legislature, once it was convened, may, if
President must be presumed to have satisfied himself in some it so desire, revoked the emergency powers of the President, but it
appropriate manner that the emergency existed when he issued his cannot by any form of legislative action put an immediate end to the
executive orders. Under the theory of separation of powers and in emergency itself. Well known is a fact that a deliverative body, such as
accord with the latest ruling of the United States Supreme Court, it is not the Legislature, because of the time consumed in the study and
for the judiciary to review the finding of the Executive in this regard. discussion of a measure, may not always act with the promptness which
Judicial review would in such case amount to control of executive the situation requires so that in an emergency there is really need for the
discretion and place the judicial branch above a co-equal department of concentration of power in one man. This may well be the reason why Act
the Government. Only in case of a manifest abuse of the exercise of No. 671 in express terms authorizes the President to exercise the
powers by a political branch of the Government is judicial interference emergency powers "during the existence of the emergency" and not
allowable in order to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. But merely during the time that the Legislature could be in session. For one
with the cold war still going on though the shooting war has already thing to make the life of the emergency powers depend upon the
ended; with the world still in turmoil so much so that the American inability of the Legislature to meet is the same as to declare those
Secretary of the State has declared that "the world has never before in emergency powers automatically ended the moment they were
peace time been as troubled or hazardous as it is right now;" with most conferred, for at that very moment of the Legislature that conferred
of the industries of the country still unrihabilitated, so that a large them was in session.
proportion of our food and other necessaries have to be imported; with a
great portion of the population still living in temporary quarters; with The argument that, unless the emergency powers of the President were
most of the war damage claims still unpaid; and with peace and other made to cease the moment Congress convened in regular session, we
conditions in the country far from normal, it would be presumptuous for should be having two legislatures which could mutually annul each
this Court, without proof of the actual condition obtaining in all parts of other, will not stand analysis. In supposing that the President, in the
the Archipelago, to declare that the President clearly abused his exercise of the emergency powers could "repeal or modify a bill passed
discretion when he considered the emergency not ended at the time he by the Legislature," the argument overlooks the fact that the emergency
promulgated the executive orders now questioned. powers delegated to the President under Article VI, section 26 of the
Constitution could only authorize him "to promulgate rules and
The majority opinion has skirted the issue of whether or not the regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Only the Legislature
question of the existence or continuance of the emergency is one for the (with the concurrence of the President of course) may declare the
political department of the Government to determine by restricting "the President may not, under the Constitution, depart from it. Moreover,
life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature unless the Presidential veto could be overriden, no bill approved by
was prevented from holding session due to enemy action or other causes Congress could become a law if the President did not want it. And if the
brought on by the war." I cannot subscribe to this narrow interpretation President approves a bill and allows it to become a law, surely he can
of Commonwealth Act No. 671, for in my opinion it is contrary to both have no reason for repealing it; while, on the other hand, there is no
the plain language and manifest purpose of that enactment. The law point in his repealing that bill, because if there are enough votes to
invests the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the
override his veto there must also be enough votes to repeal his depart from the strict theory of separation of powers by embodying a
emergency powers. provision in our Constitution, authorizing the delegation of legislative
powers to the President "in times of war or other national emergency." It
The majority opinion has I think placed a rather forced construction is my surmise that this provision was intended to guard not only against
upon section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671, which provides that — the inability to meet but also against its usual tardiness and inaction. We
have proof of this last in the last regular session of Congress, when this
The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable body failed to pass measures of pressing necessity, especially the annual
upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report appropriation law and the appropriation for the expenses of the coming
thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under elections.
the powers herein granted.
It is said that the need for an appropriation law for the fiscal year 1949-
As may be seen, the above provision does not say that the President has 1950 as well for the coming elections is not an emergency resulting from
to report only once, that is, the first time Congress is convened, and the war. But I say that if the emergency resulting from the war as
never again. But the majority opinion wants to read that thought into the contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671 still exists, as the President
law in order to bolster up the theory that the emergency powers of the believes it exists or he would not have issued the executive orders in
President would end as soon as Congress could convene in a regular question (and it is not for the Court to change that belief in the absence
session. of proof that the President was clearly wrong) would it not be a
dereliction of duty on his part to fall to provide, during the emergency,
Invoking the rule of contemporary construction, the majority opinion for the continuance of the functions of government, which is only
makes reference to a passage in President Quezon's book. "The Good possible with an appropriation law? What would be gained by issuing
Fight," to the effect that, according to the author, Act No. 671, was only rules and regulations to meet the emergency if there is no Government
"for a certain period" and "would become valid unless re-enacted." But I to enforce and carry them out? The mere calling of a special is no
see nothing in the quoted phrases any suggestion that the emergency guaranty that an appropriation law will be passed or that one will be
powers of the President were to end the moment Congress was passed before the thousands of officials and employees who work for the
convened in regular session regardless of the continuance of the Government have starved. It is, probably, because of these
emergency which gave birth to those powers. A more valid application of considerations that the National Assembly, in approving Commonwealth
the rule of contemporary construction may, I think, be made by citing Act No. 671, specifically empowered the President, during the existence
the executive orders promulgated by President Roxas by Commonwealth of the emergency, "to continue in force laws and appropriations which
Act No. 671. Many of those executive orders were issued after May 25, would lapse or otherwise become inoperative." And that Act has
1946 when Congress convened in regular session, an event which, authorized the President during the existence of the same emergency "to
according to the majority opinion, automatically put an end to the exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the
emergency powers. government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain in force this
authority." Under this specific provision, the appropriation for the
While we have adopted the republican form of government with its expenses of the coming elections would, naturally, come, for, without
three co-equal departments, each acting within its separate sphere, it doubt, it is a measure to enable the Government "to fulfill its
would be well to remember that we have not accepted the American responsibilities."
theory of separation of powers to its full extent. For, profiting from the
experience of America when her Supreme Court, by the application Consistently with the views above express, I am of the opinion that
many a New Deal measure which her Congress had approved to meet a Executive Order No. 225, appropriating funds for the operation of the
national crisis, our Constitutional Convention in 1935, despite the Government of the Republic for the fiscal year 1949-50, and Executive
warning of those who feared a dictatorship in his country, decided to Order No. 226, appropriating funds for the expenses of the coming
national elections in November, 1949, are valid so that the petition in these last, two should be thrown out in accordance with our previous
G.R. No. L-3054, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. vs. Treasurer of the Philippines, rulings. The target must be large.
and the petition in G.R. No. L-3056, Antonio Barredo, etc., vs.
Commissioner on Election, et al., in which the said two executive orders These cases could be, and should be decided separately. If they are, they
are respectively challenged, should be denied. may be disposed of without ruling on the general question whether the
President still has emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No.
But Executive Order No. 62 (regulating rents) and Executive Order No. 7671. How? This way, which is my vote.
192 (controlling exports) stand on a different footing. The validity of
Executive Order No. 62 can no longer be maintained because of the 1. L-2044, Araneta vs. Dinglasan; L-2756, Araneta vs. Angeles. The
approval by the Legislature of Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic President has presently no power to regulate rents, because his power to
Act No. 66, which regulate the same subject matter and which, as an do so is granted by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 which have
expression of the national policy, can not be deviated from by the lapsed. Under Commonwealth Act No. 671 he has no power to regulate
President in the exercise of the emergency powers delegated to him by rents.
Commonwealth Act No. 671. The same is true with respect to Executive
Order No. 192 (controlling exports) in view of the passage of 2. L-3056, Barredo vs. Commission, etc. Dismissed because petitioner has
Commonwealth Act No. 728, regulating the same subject matter, no personality to sue. According to Custodio vs. President of the Senate et
especially because section 4 of said Act terminates the power of the al., 42 Off. Gaz., 1243, a citizen and taxpayer, as such, has no legal
President thereunder on December 31, 1948, if not sooner. standing to institute proceedings for the annulment of a statute.
Consequently, since the validity of these executive orders (Nos. 62 and
192) can no longer be upheld, the petitions in G.R. Nos. L-2044, L-2756 3. L-3054, Rodriguez vs. Treasurer. Dismissed, like the Barredo case. The
and L-3055, which seek to prohibit their enforcement, should be private rights of petitioner and of his partymen are affected only as
granted. taxpayers.

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting: 4. L-3055, Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs. Supposing that the
President still has emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671,
I join in this opinion of Mr. Justice Reyes. I wish to add that I agree with and that they include regulation of exportation, inasmuch as the
Mr. Justice Bengzon that petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 Congress has chosen to legislate on exports (Commonwealth Act No.
have no personality to institute the proceedings. 728), it has thereby pro tanto withdrawn the power delegated to the
President along that field.

It is a sound rule, I believe, for the Court to determine only those

BENGZON, J., dissenting: questions which are necessary to decide a case.

The majority feels that it has to decide the question whether the Although I am favorably impressed by the considerations set forth by
President still has emergency powers; but unable to determine in which Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes on the existence of
of the above cases the issue may properly be decided, it grouped them emergency powers, I prefer to vote as herein indicated.
together. When the eye or the hand is unsure, it is best to shoot at five
birds in a group: firing at one after another may mean as many misses. I reserve the right subsequently to elaborate on the above propositions.

It does not matter that the first two cases had been submitted and voted
before the submission of the last three. Neither does it matter that, of
For lack of the required number of votes, judgment was not obtained. With respect to the motion to include the vote and opinion of the late Mr.
However, after rehearing, the required number of votes was had, by Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases, it appears that Mr. Justice
resolution of September 16, 1949, which follows. Perfecto died and ceased to be a member of this Court on August 17,
1949, and our decision in these cases was released for publication on
August 26, 1949. Rule 53, section 1, in connection with Rule 58, section
1, of the Rules of Court, is as follows:
RESOLUTION
SECTION 1. Judges: who may take part. — All matters submitted
to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be
September 16, 1949
deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by
any and all of the justices who are members of the court at the
MORAN, C. J.: time when such matters are taken up for consideration and
adjudication, whether such justices were or not members of the
Petitioners filed motions asking (1) that Mr. Justice Padilla be qualified court and whether they were or were not present at the date of
to act in these cases; (2) that the vote cast by the late Mr. Justice submission; . . . .
Perpecto before his death be counted in their favor; and (3) that the
opinion of the Chief Justice be counted as a vote for the nullity of Under this provision, one who is not a member of the court at the time
Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226. an adjudication is made cannot take part in the adjudication. The word
"adjudication" means decision. A case can be adjudicated only by means
I of a decision. And a decision of this Court, to be of value and binding
force, must be in writing duly signed and promulgated (Article VIII,
As regards the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, the Court is of the sections 11 and 12, of the Constitution; Republic Act No. 296, section 21;
opinion that it must not be considered, it having been presented after Rule 53, section 7, of the Rules of Court). Promulgated means the
Mr. Justice Padilla had given his opinion on the merits of these cases. As delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing and publication.
we have once said "a litigant . . . cannot be permitted to speculate upon
the action of the court and raise an objection of this sort after decision Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of this Court at the time a
has been rendered." (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Heirs of decision is signed and promulgated, cannot validly take part in that
Abella, 49 Phil., 374.) decision. As above indicated, the true decision of the Court is the
decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that
Furthermore, the fact that Justice Padilla, while Secretary of Justice, had decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court
advised the President on the question of emergency powers, does not to speak of. The vote cast by a member of the Court after deliberation is
disqualify him to act in these cases, for he cannot be considered as always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has to
having acted previously in these actions as counsel of any of the parties. sign the decision that is to be promulgated. That vote is of no value if it is
The President is not here a party. not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice
is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their vote,
All the members of this Court concur in the denial of the motion to wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they
disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, with the exception of Mr. Justice Ozaeta have to sign the decision, so that they may take full advantage of what
and Mr. Justice Feria who reserve their vote. they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and
deliberation. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed
II and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and after
the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breast of the Justices, binding
upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may to follow the opinion of his predecessor, which he may set aside
serve for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is according to what he may believe to be for the best interests of justice.
and for designating a member to prepare the decision binding unless
and until duly signed and promulgated. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the motion to include the vote and
opinion of the late Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases must be
And this is practically what we have said in the contempt case against denied.
Abelardo Subido,1 promulgated on September 28, 1948:
Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla, Mr. Justice
que un asunto o causa pendiente en esta Corte Suprema solo se Montemayor, Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes, and Mr. Justice Torres concur in
considera decidido una vez registrada, promulgada y publicada this denial. Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Tuason
la sentencia en la escribania, y que hasta entonces el resultado de dissent.
la votacion se estima como una materia absolutamente
reservada y confidencial, perteneciente exclusivamente a las III
camaras interiores de la Corte.
In connection with the motion to consider the opinion of the Chief
In an earlier case we had occasion to state that the decisive point is the Justice as a vote in favor of petitioners, the writer has the following to
date of promulgation of judgment. In that case a judge rendered his say:
decision on January 14; qualified himself as Secretary of Finance on
January 16; and his decision was promulgated on January 17. We held In my previous concurring opinion, I expressed the view that the
that the decision was void because at the time of its promulgation the emergency powers vested in Commonwealth Act No. 671 had ceased in
judge who prepared it was no longer a judge. (Lino Luna vs. Rodriquez, June 1945, but I voted for a deferment of judgment in these two cases
37 Phil., 186.) because of two circumstances then present, namely, (1) the need of
sustaining the two executive orders on appropriations as the life-line of
Another reason why the vote and opinion of the Mr. Justice Perfecto can government and (2) the fact that a special session of Congress was to be
not be considered in these cases is that his successor, Mr. Justice Torres, held in a few days. I then asked, "Why not defer judgment and wait until
has been allowed by this Court to take part in the decision on the the special session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it clearly
question of emergency powers because of lack of majority on that sees it?"
question. And Mr. Justice Torres is not bound to follow any opinion
previously held by Mr. Justice Perfecto on that matter. There is no law or It seemed then to me unwise and inexpedient to force the Government
rule providing that a successor is a mere executor of his predecessor's into imminent disruption by allowing the nullity of the executive orders
will. On the contrary, the successor must act according to his own to follow its reglementary consequences when Congress was soon to be
opinion for the simple reason that the responsibility for his action is his convened for the very purpose of passing, among other urgent measures,
and of no one else. Of course, where a valid and recorded act has been a valid appropriations act. Considering the facility with which Congress
executed by the predecessor and only a ministerial duty remains to be could remedy the existing anomaly, I deemed it a slavish submission to a
performed for its completion, the act must be completed accordingly. constitutional formula for this Court to seize upon its power under the
For instance, where the predecessor had rendered a valid judgment duly fundamental law to nullify the executive orders in question. A deferment
filed and promulgated, the entry of that judgment which is a ministerial of judgment struck me then as wise. I reasoned that judicial
duty, may be ordered by the successor as a matter of course. But even in statesmanship, not judicial supremacy, was needed.
that case, if the successor is moved to reconsider the decision, and he
still may do so within the period provided by the rules, he is not bound However, now that the holding of a special session of Congress for the
purpose of remedying the nullity of the executive orders in question
appears remote and uncertain, I am compelled to, and do hereby, give With my declaration that Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 are null
my unqualified concurrence in the decision penned by Mr. Justice and void, and with the vote to the effect of Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice
Tuason declaring that these two executive orders were issued without Paras, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Montemayor,
authority of law. there is a sufficient majority to pronounce a valid judgment on that
matter.
While in voting for a temporary deferment of the judgment I was moved
by the belief that the positive compliance with the Constitution by the It is maintained by the Solicitor General and the amicus curiae that eight
other branches of the Government, which is our prime concern in all Justices are necessary to pronounce a judgment on the nullity of the
these cases, would be effected, and indefinite deferment will produce the executive orders in question, under section 9 of Republic Act No. 296
opposite result because it would legitimize a prolonged or permanent and Article VIII, section 10 of the Constitution. This theory is made to
evasion of our organic law. Executive orders which are, in our opinion, rest on the ground that said executive orders must be considered as
repugnant to the Constitution, would be given permanent life, opening laws, they having been issued by the Chief Executive in the exercise of
the way to practices which may undermine our constitutional structure. the legislative powers delegated to him.

The harmful consequences which, as I envisioned in my concurring It is the opinion of the Court that the executive orders in question, even
opinion, would come to pass should the said executive orders be if issued within the powers validly vested in the Chief Executive, are not
immediately declared null and void, are still real. They have not laws, although they may have the force of law, in exactly the same
disappeared by reason of the fact that a special session of the Congress is manner as the judgments of this Court, municipal ordinances and
not now forthcoming. However, the remedy now lies in the hands of the ordinary executive orders cannot be considered as laws, even if they
Chief Executive and of Congress, for the Constitution vests in the former have the force of law.
the power to call a special session should the need for one arise, and in
the latter, the power to pass a valid appropriation act. Under Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the only power which, in
times of war or other national emergency, may be vested by Congress in
That Congress may again fall to pass a valid appropriations act is a the President, is the power "to promulgate rules and regulations to carry
remote possibility, for under the circumstances it fully realizes its great out a declared national policy." Consequently, the executive orders
responsibility of saving the nation from breaking down; and issued by the President in pursuance of the power delegated to him
furthermore, the President in the exercise of his constitutional powers under that provision of the Constitution, may be considered only as rules
may, if he so desires, compel Congress to remain in special session till it and regulations. There is nothing either in the Constitution or in the
approves the legislative measures most needed by the country. Judiciary Act requiring the vote of eight Justices to nullify a rule or
regulation or an executive order issued by the President. It is very
Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will emerge significant that in the previous drafts of section 10, Article VII of the
victorious as a permanent way of life in this country, if each of the great Constitution, "executive order" and "regulation" were included among
branches of the Government, within its own allocated spear, complies those that required for their nullification the vote of two thirds of all of
with its own constitutional duty, uncompromisingly and regardless of the members of the Court. But "executive order" and "regulations" were
difficulties. later deleted from the final draft (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 495, 496), and thus a mere majority of six
Our Republic is still young, and the vital principle underlying its organic members of this Court is enough to nullify them.
structure should be maintained firm and strong, hard as the best of steel,
so as to insure its growth and development along solid lines of a stable All the members of the Court concur in this view.
and vigorous democracy.
For all the foregoing, the Court denies the motion to disqualify Mr. therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
Justice Padilla, and the motion to include the vote of the late Mr. Justice expenditures of public moneys." (Am. Jur., Vol. 11, p. 761) All the
Perfecto in the decision of these cases. And it is the judgment of this members of this Court, except two, in taking cognizance of those cases,
Court to declare Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, null and void, with rejected the respondents' contention, reversed the ruling in said case
the dissent of Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice and adopted the general rule above mentioned; and we believe the latter
Reyes, upon the grounds already stated in their respective opinions, and is better than the one adopted in said case of Custodio, which was based
with Mr. Justice Torres abstaining. on a doctrine adhered to only in few jurisdiction in the United States;
because if a taxpayer can not attack the validity of the executive orders
But in order to avoid a possible disruption or interruption in a normal in question or a law requiring the expenditure of public moneys, one
operation of the Government, it is decreed, by the majority, of course, under our laws could question the validity of such laws or executive
that this judgment take effect upon the expiration of fifteen days from orders.
the date of its entry. No costs to be charged.
After laying down the fundamental principles involved in the case at bar,
Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, we shall discuss and show that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was no
JJ., concur. longer in force at the time the Executive Orders under consideration
were promulgated, because even the respondents in the cases G. R. Nos.
L-2044 and L-2756, in sustaining the validity of the Executive Order No.
62 rely not only on Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended by
FERIA, J., concurring: Commonwealth Act No. 620, but on Commonwealth Act No. 671; and
afterwards we shall refute the arguments in support of the contrary
The respondent in the cases G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 contend that proposition that said Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and,
the petitioners in said cases can not institute an action to invalidate the therefore, the President may exercise now the legislative powers therein
Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 promulgated by the President, delegated to him.
because they have no interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of
moneys raised by taxation, and can not therefore question the validity of PRELIMINARY
said executive orders requiring expenditures of public money.
The Constitution of the Philippines, drafted by the duly elected
Although the Supreme Court, in the case of Custodio vs. President of the representatives of the Filipino people, provides in its section 1, Article II,
Senate, G. R. No. L-117 (42 Off. Gaz., 1243) held in a minute resolution that "The Philippines is a republican states, sovereignty resides in the
"That the constitutionality of a legislative act is open to attack only by people and all government authority emanates from them." The people
person whose rights are affected thereby, that one who invokes the have delegated the government authority to three different and separate
power of the court to declare an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional Departments: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. In section 1, Article VI,
must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has the legislative power to make laws is conferred upon Congress; the
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as executive power to faithfully executed the laws is vested by sections 1
the result of its enforcement," that ruling was laid down without a and 10 of Article VII, in the President; and the judicial power is vested by
careful consideration and is contrary to the ruling laid down in the section 1, Article VII, in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as
majority of jurisdictions in the United States that "In the determination may be established by law, the Supreme Court having the supremacy to
of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack pass upon "the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons or executive order or regulations."
individually affected, but also have taxpayers, have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditures of money raised by taxation and may
The distribution by the Constitution of the powers of government to the delegation of legislative authority which is unconfined, "and not
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departments operates, by canalized within banks to keep it from ever flowing."
implication, as an inhibition against the exercise by one department of
the powers which belong to another, and imposes upon each of the three Athough, in principle, the power of the Legislature to make laws or
departments the duty of exercising its own peculiar powers by itself, and perform acts purely legislative in nature may only be delegated by
prohibits the delegation of any of those powers except in cases expressly Congress to another authority or officers of either the executive or
permitted by the Constitution. The principle of the separation of the judicial department when expressly permitted by the Constitution, no
powers of government is fundamental to the very existence of a such delegation is authorized by the State constitution or Federal
constitutional government as established in the Philippines patterned Constitution of the Untied States. It is a fact admitted by the attorneys
after that of the United States of America. The division of governmental and amici curiae for the petitioners and respondents in these case that
powers into legislative, executive, and judicial represents the most section 26, Article VI, our Constitution is unique and has no counterpart
important principle of government that guarantees the liberties of the in said constitutions, and for that reason not a single case involving a
people, for it prevents a concentration of powers in the hands of one question similar to the one herein involved has never been submitted to
person or class of persons. and passed upon by the courts of last resort in the United States. The
provision of our Constitution reads as follows:
Under the doctrine of separation of the powers of government, the law-
making functions is assigned exclusively to the legislative, and the SEC. 26. In times of war or other national emergency, the
legislative branch cannot delegate the power to make laws to any other Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited
authority. But it must be borne in mind that what cannot be delegated is period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
that which is purely legislative in nature, not administrative. There are promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
powers so far legislative that may properly be exercised by the policy.
legislature, but which may nevertheless be delegated because they may
be advantageously exercised in proper cases by persons belonging to the It is important to observe that what the above-quoted constitutional
other departments of the government, such as the authority to make provision empowers Congress to delegate to the President, is not the
rules and regulations of administrative character to carry out an power to promulgate rules and regulations of administrative nature, for
legislative purposes or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law. this may also be delegated at any time without necessity of an express
As illustrations of the proper exercise of the power of Congress to authority by the Constitution, but the power to promulgate rules and
delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations with the regulations purely legislative in nature, leaving to the discretion of the
necessary details to carry into effect a law, are Act No. 3155 empowering President the determination of what rules or regulations shall be or
the Governor General then, now the President, to suspend or not, at his what acts are necessary to effectuate the so-called declared national
discretion, the prohibition of the importation of foreign cattle (Cruz vs. policy, for otherwise it would not have been necessary for the
Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234; Act No. 3106 authorizing the Commissioner of Constitution to authorize Congress to make such delegation.
the Public Service Commission to regulate those engaged in various
occupations or business affected with a public interest, and to prescribe DEMONSTRATION
what the charges shall be for services rendered in the conduct of such
business (Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446); and the National The Constitution permits Congress to authorize the President of the
Industrial Recovery Act enacted by the Congress of the United States Philippines to promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature
authorizing the President to promulgate administrative rules and only (1) in times of war or (2) other national emergency, such as
regulations to carry out the emergency measure enacted by Congress, rebellion, flood, earthquake, pestilence, economic depression, famine or
though a part thereof was declared unconstitutional for producing a any other emergency different from war itself affecting the nation.
It is obvious that it is Congress and not a particular emergency and to AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
authorize the President to promulgate rules and regulations to cope with REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
it. Therefore, if Congress declares that there exist a war as a national
emergency and empowers the President to promulgate rules and Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
regulations to tide over the emergency, the latter could not, because he
believes that there is an economic emergency or depression or any SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United
emergency other than war itself, exercise the legislative power delegated States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which
to meet such economic or other emergency. involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the
President with extraordinary powers in order to meet
The Constitution requires also that the delegation be for a limited period the resulting emergency.
or other authority so delegated shall cease ipso facto at the expiration of
the period, because to require an express legislation to repel or SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section
terminate the delegated legislative authority of the President might be 16, of the Constitution, the President is hereby
subversive to the constitutional separation of powers in out democratic authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to
form of government, for the President my prevent indefinitely the repeal promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem
of his delegated authority by the exercise of his veto power, since the necessary to carry out the national policy declared in
veto could be overridden only by two-thirds vote and it would be section 1 hereof. Accordingly he is, among other things,
extremely difficult to repeal it in subservient Congress dominated by the empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or
Chief Executive. Besides, to provide that the delegated legislative powers any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices,
shall continue to exist until repealed by the Congress, would be agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the
delegation not for limited, but for an unlimited period or rather without government of the Commonwealth including the
any limitation at all, because all acts enacted are always subjects to determination of the order of procedure of the heads of
repeal by the Congress, without necessity to providing so. the Executive Departments; (c) to create new
subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or
No question is raised as to the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act instrumentalities of Government and to abolish any of
No. 671 under which Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and
promulgated by the President of the Philippines according to the appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
contention of the respondents. The question involved is the validity (not inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or
constitutionality) of said executive orders, that is, whether or not the application of those of an administrative character; (e) to
President had authority to promulgate them under Commonwealth Act impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or
No. 671; and therefore the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the
of this Court required by section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution to issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the
declare a treaty or law unconstitutional is not required for adjudging the expenditure of the proceeds thereof (g) to authorize the
executive orders in question invalid or not authorized by National, provincial, city or municipal governments to
Commonwealth Act No. 671, which read as follows: incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h)
to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671 the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other
powers as he may deem necessary to enable the
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain
RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND and enforce its authority.
 SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as to the State "until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of
practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the the National Assembly, to take over solely for use or operation by the
Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations Government during the existence of the emergency any public service or
promulgated by him under the powers herein granted. enterprise and to operate the same," upon payment of just
compensation; (c) Commonwealth Act No. 498, authorizing the
SEC. 4. This Act shall take upon its approval, and the rules President, among others, to fix the maximum selling prices of foods,
and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force clothing, fuel, fertilizers, chemicals, building materials, implements,
and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall machinery, and equipment required in agriculture and industry, and
otherwise provide. other articles or commodities of prime necessity, and to promulgate
such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary in the public
Approved, December 16, 1941. interest, which rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of
law until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the
Taking into consideration the presumption that Congress was familiar National Assembly; (d) Commonwealth Act No. 499 providing that until
with the well-known limits of its powers under section 26, Article VI, of the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National
the Constitution and did not intend to exceed said powers in enacting Assembly, any sale, mortgage, lease, charter, delivery, transfer of vessels
Commonwealth Act No. 671, the express provisions of Commonwealth owned in whole or in part by a citizen of the Philippines or by a
Acts. Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600 as amended by 620 and 671, and corporation organizes under the laws of the Philippines, to any person
those of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended by Republic Act No. 66 not a citizen of the United States or of the Philippines, shall be null and
and Republic Acts Nos. 51 and 728, we are of the opinion, and therefore void, without the approval of the President of the Philippines; and
so hold, that the actual war in the Philippine territory and not any other Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President to reduce the
national emergency is contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671, and expenditure of the Executive Department of the National Government by
that the period of time during which the President was empowered by the suspension or abandonment of services, activities or operations of
said Commonwealth Act No. 671 to promulgate rules and regulations no immediate necessity, which authority shall be exercised only when
was limited to the existence of such war or invasion of the Philippines by the National Assembly is not in session. All these Commonwealth Acts
the enemy, which prevented the Congress to meet in a regular session. took effect upon their approval on September 30, 1939, a short time
Such emergency having ceased to exist upon the complete liberation of after the invasion of Poland by Germany.
the Philippines from the enemy's occupation, Commonwealth Act No.
671 had ceased to be in force and effect at the date of the adjournment of During the fourth special session of the second National Assembly,
the next regular session of the Congress in 1946, before the Commonwealth Act No. 600, which superseded the above-mentioned
promulgation of said executive orders, and hence they are null and void. emergency power acts, was passed and took effect on its approval on
August 19, 1940. This Act No. 600 expressly declared that the existence
In view of the existence of a state of national emergency caused by the of war in many parts of the world had created a national emergency
last world war among several nations of the world, the second National which made it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
Assembly during its second special session passed the following acts: (a) powers in order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to
Commonwealth Act No. 494 authorizing the President until the insure the tranquility of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage,
adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, to lawlessness, and all supervise activities, by preventing or relieving
suspend the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444, commonly known unemployment, by insuring to the people adequate shelter and clothing
as the "Eight-Hour Labor-Law," when in his judgment the public interest and sufficient food supply, etc. To carry out this policy the President was
so required, in order to prevent a dislocation of the productive forces of "authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the
the country; (b) Commonwealth Act No. 496 delegating to the President force and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular
the power expressly granted by section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution session of the National Assembly," which rules and regulations may
embrace the objects therein enumerated. And the National Assembly in All the above-mentioned Acts Nos. 494, 496, 499, 500, and 600 before its
its regular session commencing in January, 1941, in view of the fact that amendment show that it was the intention or policy of the National
the delegated authority granted to the President by Commonwealth Acts Assembly, in delegating legislative functions to the President, to limit the
Nos. 494, 496, 498, 500, and 600 was to terminate at the date of the exercise of the latter's authority to the interregnum while the National
adjournment of that regular session of the National Assembly, passed Assembly or Congress of the Philippines was not in session until the date
Act No. 620 which took effect upon its approval on June 6, 1941, of the adjournment of the next regular session thereof, which
amending section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 600 by extending the interregnum might have extended over a long period of time had the war
delegated legislative authority of the President until the date of the in Europe involved and made the Philippines a battle ground before the
adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress of the next regular session of the Congress had convened. And the authority
Philippines, instead of the National Assembly, the Constitution having granted to the President of Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended, had
been amended by substituting the Congress of the Philippines for the to be extended over a long period of time during the occupation because,
National Assembly.. before the meeting of the next regular session of the Congress, the
Philippines was involved in the war of the United States and invaded and
Although Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth occupied by the Japanese forces. And the President was authorized to
Act No. 620, provides that "the President is authorized to promulgate exercise his delegated powers until the date of the adjournment of the
rules and regulations which shall have the force and effect of law until next regular session of the Congress, for the reason that although during
the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress of the next regular session a bill may be passed, by the Congress, it would
the Philippines," it is evident that this limitation was intended to apply, not become a law until it was approved, expressly or impliedly, by the
not only to the effectivity of the rules and regulations already President during the period of twenty days after it shall have been
promulgated, but specially to the authority granted to the President to presented to him.
promulgated them, for the following reasons: First, because
Commonwealth Act Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, and 500 had expressly The reason of the limitation is that if Congress were in position to act it
limited the authority of the President to exercise the delegated power would not be necessary for it to make such legislative delegation to the
while the Assembly was not in session until the date of the adjournment President, for Congress may in all cases act, declare its will and, after
of the next regular session of then National Assembly, and there was fixing a primary standard or yardstick, authorize the President to fill up
absolutely no reason whatsoever why the National Assembly, in enacting the details by prescribing administrative rules and regulations to cope
Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended, which superseded said Act, with the actual conditions of any emergency; and it is inconceivable that
would not impose the same limitation on the authority delegated in there may arise an emergency of such a nature that would require
Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended in compliance with the immediate action and can not wait, without irreparable or great injury to
requirement of the Constitution; secondly, because it would have been the public interest, and action of the legislative in regular or special
useless to give the rules and regulations the effect and force of law only session called by the Chief Executive for the purpose of meeting it. If in
until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the the United States they could withstand and have withstood all kinds of
Congress, if the President might, after said adjournment, continue emergency without resorting to the delegation by the legislative body of
exercising his delegated legislative powers to promulgate again the same legislative power to the Executive except those of administrative nature,
and other rules and regulations; and lastly, because to construe because no such delegation is permitted by the States and Federal
Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Act No. 620, otherwise constitution, as above stated, there is no reason why the same can not be
would be to make the delegation not for a limited but for an indefinite done in the Philippines. The frames of our Constitution and the national
period of time, in violation of the express provision of section 26, Article Assembly that enacted Commonwealth Act No. 671 are presumed to be
VI of the Constitution. aware of the inconvenience and chaotical consequences of having two
legislative bodies acting at one and the same time.
It is true that Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not expressly say that the By the special session of the first Congress of the Philippines
President is authorized to promulgates rules and regulations until the commencing on the 9th day of June, 1945, called by the President for the
date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National purpose of considering general legislation, Commonwealth Act No. 671
Assembly or Congress as the above-quoted Commonwealth Acts; but it is did not cease to operate. As we have already said, the emergency which
also true that it clearly provides that "pursuant to the provisions of prompted the second National Assembly to enact Commonwealth Act
Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President is hereby No. 671 delegating legislative powers to the President, was the inability
authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such of Congress to convene in regular session in January of every during the
rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial forces. The National
policy declared"; and that the definite and specific emergency therein Assembly could not have in mind any special session which might have
referred to is no other that the "state of total emergency as a result of been called by the President immediately after liberation, because the
war involving the Philippines", declared in the title of said Act No. 671, calling of a special session as well as the matters which may be
that was the reason for which the President was "authorize to submitted by the President to Congress for consideration is a contingent
promulgate rules and regulations to meet resulting emergency." It is event which depend upon the possibility of convening it and the
obvious that what Act No. 671 calls "total emergency" was the invasion discretion of the President to call it, and the matters he will submit to it
and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy or Japanese forces for consideration; because it is to be presumed, in order to comply with
which, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, had already the provision of section 26, Article VI of the Constitution, that it was the
landed in Philippine soil and was expected to paralyze the functioning of intention of the National Assembly to fix a limited period, independent of
the Congress during the invasion and enemy occupation of the the President's will, during which he is authorized to exercise his
Philippines. delegated legislative power.

The mere existence of the last world war in many parts of the world The object of section 3 of Act No. 671 in requiring the President to report
which had created a national emergency made it necessary to invest the "as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the
President with extraordinary powers was not called total emergency by Philippines all rules and regulations promulgated by him under the
Commonwealth Act Nos. 600 and 620, because it had not yet actually powers therein granted" is to inform the Congress of the contents of said
involved and engulfed the Philippines in the maelstrom of war. It does rules and regulations so that the latter may modify or repeal them if it
not stand to reason that the authority given to the President to sees fit to do so, inasmuch as, according to section 4 of the same Act, "the
promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature by rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600 and 620 was to until the Congress shall otherwise provide." And although said section 3
terminate at the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of does not specify whether in regular or special session, it is evident that it
the Congress of the Philippines in 1946, but those granted to the refers to the next regular and not to the special session of the Congress,
President by Commonwealth Act No. 671 under the same war because as a rule a special session is called to consider only specific
emergency should continue to exist indefinitely even after the Congress matters submitted by the President to Congress for consideration, and it
of the Philippines had regularly convened, acted, and adjourned in the would be useless to submit such report to the Congress in special
year 1946 and subsequent years. Besides to give such construction to session if the latter can not either modify or repeal such rules and
Act No. 671 would make it violative of the express provision of section regulations; and besides, it is to be presumed that it was the intention of
26, Article VIII, of the Constitution, under which said Commonwealth Act the National Assembly in enacting section 3 of Commonwealth Act No.
No. 671 was enacted, as expressly stated in said Act, and which permits 671 to require the submission of a report to the next regular session of
the Congress to authorize the President, only for a limited period during the Assembly or Congress, as provided in section 4 Commonwealth Act
a war emergency, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry into No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, which required a
effect a declared national policy. similar report, for there was absolutely no plausible reason to provide
otherwise.
Our conclusion is corroborated by the fact that section 3 of Act No. 671 There is no force in the argument that the executive orders in question
only requires the President to submit the report, "as soon as practicable are not valid, not because the promulgation of the acts above mentioned
upon the convening of the Congress" and not to submit a report to the and of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended by the Republic Act No.
Congress every time it convenes, in order to inform the Congress thereof 66 on rentals, the appropriation acts or Republic Act Nos. 1, 156, and
so that the latter may modify or repeal any or all of them, for under 320 for the years 1946-47, 1947-48 and 1948-49, and of the Republic
section 4 of the same Act "such rules and regulations shall continue in Acts Nos. 73, 147, and 235 appropriating public finds to defray the
force and effect until the Congress shall otherwise provide." It is obvious expenses for the elections held in 1947 and 1948, shows that the
that the convening of the Congress referred to in said section 3 is the emergency powers granted by Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already
next regular session of the Congress after the passage of Act No. 671, and ceased to exist, but because Congress "has shown by their enactment its
not any other subsequent session; because, otherwise, it would not have readiness and ability to legislate on those matters, and had withdrawn it
required that it shall be submitted to the Congress as soon as practicable from the realm of presidential legislation or regulations under the
and the purpose of the law already stated in requiring the submission of powers delegated by Commonwealth Act No. 671." If the Congress was
the report would be defeated; and if it were the intention of said ready and able to legislate on those matters since 1946 and for that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 to authorize the President to continue reason the executive orders herein involved are null and void, there is no
promulgating rules and regulations after the next regular session of the valid reason for not concluding that the emergency powers of the
Congress, it would have required the President to submit to the President has ceased to exist it did not, legislate on all matters on which
Congress each and every time it convenes a report of the rules and the President was granted and delegated power to legislate by the
regulations promulgated after his previous reports had been submitted. Commonwealth Act No. 671. And if Commonwealth Act No. 671
continues to be in force and effect in so far as it grants delegated
Furthermore, our conclusion is confirmed by the legislative legislative powers to the President and declares the national policy to be
interpretation give to Commonwealth Act No. 671 by the same Congress carried out by the rules and regulations the President is authorize to
in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 728 which took effect on July 2, promulgate, the mere promulgation of the acts above described can not
1946, authorizing the President to regulate, control, curtail, and prohibit be considered as an implied repeal or withdrawal of the authority of the
the exploration of agricultural or industrial products, merchandise, President to promulgates rules and regulations only on those matters,
articles, materials and supplies without the permit of the President until and the adoption of a contrary policy by the Congress, because implied
December 31, 1948 as expressly provided in section 4 thereof, because it repeal is not favored in statutory construction, and the national policy
would not have been necessary for the Congress to promulgate said Act referred to in section 26, Article VIII of the Constitution is to be declared
No. 728 if the President had authority to promulgate Executive Order No. by the Congress in delegating the legislative powers to the President, in
62 in question on January 1, 1949, under Commonwealth Act No. 671 as order to establish the standard to be carried out by him in exercising his
contended by the respondents; and Republic Act No. 51, approved on delegated functions, and not in repealing said powers.
October 4, 1946, authorizing within one year the different executive
departments, business, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of As we have already said, section 26, Article VI of the Constitution
the government, including corporations controlled by it, would not have expressly empowers Congress, in times of war and other national
been passed by the Congress if Commonwealth Act No. 671 under emergency, to authorize the President to promulgate rules and
consideration was then still in force, for section 2 (b) and (c) of said Act regulations to carry out a declared national policy, and therefore it is for
No. 671 authorizes the President to reorganize the Government and to the National Assembly to determine the existence of a particular
create new subdivisions, branches, department offices, agencies or emergency declare the national policy, and authorize the President to
instrumentalities of government, and to abolish any of those already promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature to carry out that
existing. policy. As the Commonwealth Act No. 671 that the existence of war
between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia which
REPUTATION involves the Philippines is the emergency which made it necessary for
the National Assembly to invest the President with extraordinary emergency from any other national emergency, such as an economic
powers to promulgate rules and regulations to meet the resulting depression and others which may be the effect of a war, and empowers
emergency from the actual existence of that war which involved the the Congress in times of war and other national emergency, to be
Philippines, the President cannot, under said Act No. 671, determine the determined by Congress itself as we have already said and shown, to
existence of any other emergency, such as the state of cold war, the authorize the President, for a limited period that may short or of the
continued military occupation of the enemy country, and the economic same duration but not longer than that of the emergency, to promulgate
and political instability throughout the world, cited by the respondents, rules and regulations to carry out the policy declared by the Congress in
and promulgate rules and regulations to meet the emergency; because order to meet the emergency. To construe Commonwealth Act No. 671
obviously it is not for the delegate but for the delegation to say when and as contended would be to leave the determination of the existence of the
under what circumstances the former may act in behalf of the latter, and emergency to the discretion of the President, because the effects of the
not vice-versa. war such as those enumerated by the respondents are not determined or
stated in said Act and could not have been foreseen by the Assembly in
The theory of those who are of the opinion that the President may enacting said Act; and because it would make the delegation of powers
determine "whether the emergency which on December 16, 1941, for an in definite period, since such an emergency may or may not
prompted the approval of Commonwealth Act No. 671 delegating become depression, effect of the first world war, took place in the year
extraordinary powers to the President, still existed at the time the Chief 1929, or about ten years after the cessation of hostilities in the year
Executive exercised those powers," is predicated upon the erroneous 1919; and by no stretch of imagination or intellectual gymnastics may
assumption that said Commonwealth Act No. 671 contemplated any the failure of the Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of the
other emergency not expressly mentioned in said Commonwealth Act. Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and to
This assumption or premise is obviously wrong. Section 1 of said Act No. defray the expenses in connection with the holding of the national
671 expressly states that "the existence of the war between the United election on the second Tuesday of November, 1949, be considered as an
States and other countries of Europe and Asia which involves the emergency resulting from the last war.
Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary power in order to meet the resulting emergency." That is In the enactment of emergency police measures, the questions as
the war emergency. Ant it is evident, and therefore no evidence is to whether an emergency exists is primarily for the legislature to
requires to prove, that the existence of the war which involved the determine. Such determination, although entitled to great
Philippines had already ceased before the promulgation of the executive respect, is not conclusive because the courts, in such cases,
orders in question, or at least, if the last war has not yet technically posses the final authority to determine whether an emergency in
terminated in so far as the United States is concerned, it did no longer fact exists. (American Jurisprudence, Vol. XI, page 980.).
involve the Republic of the Philippines since the inauguration of our
Republic or independence from the sovereignty of the United States. No case decided by the courts of last resort in the United States may be
cited in support of the proposition that it is for the President to
It is untenable to contend that the words "resulting emergency from the determine whether there exist an emergency in order to exercise his
existence of the war" as used in section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 emergency powers, and "it is not for the judiciary to review the finding
should be construed to mean any emergency resulting from or that is the of the Executive in this regard." There is none and there cannot be any.
effect of the last war, and not the war emergency itself, and that Because, as we have already stated at the beginning of this opinion, and
therefore it is for the President to determine whether at the time of the we are supported by the above quotation from American Jurisprudence,
promulgation of the executive orders under consideration such the power to pass emergency police legislation in the United States may
emergency still existed, because such contention would make Act No. be exercised only by the legislature in the exercise of the police power of
671 unconstitutional or violative of the provisions of section 26, Article the State, and it can not be delegated to the Executive because there is no
VI of the Constitution. This constitutional precept distinguishes war provision in the State and Federal constitutions authorizing such
delegation as we have in section 26, Article VI, of our Constitution. As we
have already said before, the only legislative power which may be
delegated to the Executive and other administrative bodies or officers in
the United States is the power to promulgate rules and regulations of
administrative nature, which does not include the exercise of the police
power of the State.

The ruling laid down by the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 Law ed., 1883, quoted by the respondents and
dissenters in support of the proposition that "only in case of a manifest
abuse of the exercise of powers by a political branch of the government
is judicial interference allowable in order to maintain the supremacy of
the Constitution," has no application to the present case; because the
question involved in the present case is not a political but a justiciable
question, while the question in issue in said Ludecke case was the power
of the court to review "the determination of the President in the postwar
period that an alien enemy should be deported, even though active
hostilities have ceased," and it was held that it was a political question
and, therefore, was not subject to judicial review.

CONCLUSION

In view of all the foregoing, we have to conclude and declare that the
executive orders promulgated by the President under Commonwealth
Act 671 before the date of the adjournment of the regular session of the
Congress on the Philippines in 1946 are valid, because said
Commonwealth Act was then still in force; but the executive orders
promulgated after the said date are null and void, because
Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already ceased to be in force in so far as
the delegation of powers was concerned. Therefore, are null and void the
Executive Order No. 192 promulgated on December 24, 1948, on the
control of exports from the Philippines; the Executive Order No. 225
dated June 15, 1949, appropriating funds for the operation of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the period from
July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950; and the Executive Order No. 226
promulgated on June 15, 1949, appropriating the sum of six million
pesos to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the
holding of the national election to be held on the second Tuesday of
November, 1949.