G.R. No.

184500

September 11, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PIIILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
WENCESLAO NELMIDA @ "ESLAO," and RICARDO AJOK @
"PORDOY," Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this present appeal is the Decision 1 dated 18 June 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246, affirming the Decision 2 dated 30 September
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. 21-910, finding herein appellants Wenceslao Nelmida @ "Eslao"
(Wenceslao) and Ricardo Ajok @
"Pordoy" (Ricardo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple
frustrated murder and double attempted murder, thereby sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellants were likewise ordered to indemnify,
jointly and severally, the heirs of each of the deceased victims, i.e., Police Officer 3
Hernando P. Dela Cruz (PO3 Dela Cruz) and
Technical Sergeant Ramon Dacoco (T/Sgt. Dacoco), the amount of P 50,000.00 each
as moral damages and P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for the death of each of
the said victims. Similarly, appellants were directed to pay, jointly and severally,
Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan the amount of P 50,000.00 for and as attorneys fees, as
well as the costs of the suit.
Appellants and their co-accused Samuel Cutad @ "Sammy" (Samuel), Brigido Abais
@ "Bidok" (Brigido), Pedro Serafico @ "Peter" (Pedro), Eduardo Bacong, Sr. (Eduardo,
Sr.), Eduardo Bacong, Jr. @ "Junjun" (Eduardo, Jr.), Alejandro Abarquez (Alejandro),
Ruben Bartolo @ "Yoyoy Bulhog" (Ruben), Arnel Espanola @ "Toto Ilongo" (Arnel),
Alfredo Paninsuro @ "Tambok" (Alfredo), Opao Casinillo (Opao) and other John Does,
were charged in an Amended Information3 dated 3 October 2001 with the crime of
double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 5th day of June 2001, at SAN MANUEL, Lala, Lanao del Norte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
appellants and their co-accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, armed with assorted high-powered firearms and hand-grenade, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery, evident
premidation (sic), taking advantage of their superiority in strength and in numbers,
and with intent to kill, ambush, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
persons of the following, namely:

1. PO3 Dela Cruz, Philippine National Police (PNP);

2. T/Sgt. Dacoco, Philippine Army (PA);
3. Private First Class (PFC) Haron Angni, PA;
4. PFC Gador4 Tomanto, PA;
5. Juanito Ibunalo;
6. Mosanif5 Ameril;
7. Macasubar6 Tandayao;
8. Mayor Johnny Tawantawan;7 and
9. Jun Palanas
by then and there firing and shooting them with said high-powered firearms thereby
inflicting upon the persons of PO3 De la Cruz, T/Sgt. Dacoco, PFC Haron Angni, PFC
Gapor Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo, Mosanip Ameril and Macasuba Tandayao gunshot
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of the death of PO3 De la Cruz
and T/Sgt. Dacoco and the serious wounding of said PFC Haron Angni, PFC Gapor
Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo, Mosanip Ameril and Macasuba Tandayao that without the
medical assistance would have caused their deaths, while Mayor Johnny Tawantawan and Jun Palanas were not hit.8
When arraigned, appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo, assisted by their counsel de
parte9 and counsel de oficio,10respectively; and their co-accused Samuel, likewise
assisted by counsel de oficio,11 all entered separate pleas of
NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. The rest of the accused in this case, however,
remained at large. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
Meanwhile, or on 21 January 2003, however, the prosecution filed a Motion to
Discharge Accused Samuel To Be Utilized As State Witness, 12 which the court a quo
granted in an Order dated 12 February 2003. 13 Also, upon motion of the prosecution,
the court a quo issued another Order dated 17 March 2003, 14 directing the release
of Samuel from detention following his discharge as state witness.
As such, Samuel, together with 13 more witnesses, namely, Macasuba Tandayao
(Macasuba), Mosanip Ameril (Mosanip), PFC Gapor Tomanto (PFC Tomanto), Merlina
Dela Cruz (Merlina), Senior Police Inspector Renato Salazar (Senior P/Insp. Salazar),
PFC Haron Angni (PFC Angni), Senior Police Officer 4 Raul Torres Medrano (SPO4
Medrano), Senior Police Officer 1 Ferdinand Suaring (SPO1 Suaring), Senior Police
Officer 2 Ivan Mutia Evasco (SPO2 Evasco), Senior Police Officer 4 Emmie
Subingsubing (SPO4 Subingsubing), Juanito Ibunalo (Juanito), Senior

Police Officer 3 Tommy Umpa (SPO3 Umpa), and Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan (Mayor
Tawan-tawan), testified for the prosecution.
The factual milieu of this case as culled from the testimonies of the aforesaid
prosecution witnesses is as follows:
On 5 June 2001, Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, together with his
security escorts composed of some members of the Philippine Army, Philippine
National Police (PNP) and civilian aides, to wit: (1) T/Sgt. Dacoco; (2) PFC Angni; (3)
PFC Tomanto; (4) PO3 Dela Cruz; (5) Juanito; (6) Mosanip; (7) Macasuba; and (8) a
certain Jun, respectively, were in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. In the afternoon, the group
went home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte, on board the yellow pick-up service
vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan with Plate No. JRT 818 driven by Juanito. Sitting at the
passenger seat of the aforesaid vehicle was Mayor Tawan-tawan while those at the
back seat were Mosanip, Jun, and Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind
Juanito. Those seated on a wooden bench installed at the rear (open) portion of the
said yellow pick-up service vehicle were PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, PO3 Dela Cruz
and T/Sgt. Dacoco. PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni were sitting beside each other
facing the right side of the road while PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco were both
seated behind PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni facing the left side of the road. 15
At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, appellants, together with their aforenamed
co-accused, brought Samuel to a waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao
del Norte, the one located on the left side of the road going to Salvador, Lanao del
Norte. Samuel was instructed by appellants and their co-accused to stay in the said
waiting shed while they assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides
of the road, which is more or less five (5) meters away from the shed. Then,
appellants and their co-accused surreptitiously waited for the vehicle of the group of
Mayor Tawan-tawan.16
A few minutes later, Samuel saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawantawan approaching towards the direction of Salvador, Lanao del Norte. The moment
the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan passed by the aforesaid
waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on the
vehicle using high-powered firearms.
Both Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind the driver, and PFC Tomanto,
who was then sitting on the rear (open) portion of the yellow pick-up service
vehicle, saw appellant Wenceslao on the right side of the road firing at them in a
squatting position using an M-16 armalite rifle.
Macasuba was also able to identify appellants Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo,
Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as among the ambushers. Mayor Tawan-tawan ordered
Juanito to keep on driving to avoid greater casualties. The vehicle stopped upon
reaching the army and Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU)

detachment in Curva, Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Mayor Tawan-tawan then
asked assistance therefrom.17
Immediately after the ambush, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the
house of Samuels aunt located, more or less, 10 meters away from the site of the
ambush to get their bags and other stuff. The house of Samuels aunt was the place
where appellants and their co-accused stayed prior to the incident. Samuel followed
appellants and their co-accused to the house of his aunt. Thereafter, appellants and
their co-accused hurriedly ran towards Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy,
Lanao del Norte.18
On the occasion of the ambush, two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan,
namely, PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, died, while others suffered injuries. In
particular, Macasuba was slightly hit on the head by shrapnel; Mosanip sustained
injury on his shoulder that almost severed his left arm; PFC Tomanto was hit on the
right and left sides of his body, on his left leg and knee; PFC Angni was hit on his left
shoulder; and Juanito was hit on his right point finger, right head and left hip. Mayor
Tawan-tawan and Jun were not injured.19
All the victims of the ambush, except Macasuba, were brought to Bontilao Country
Clinic in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and were later transferred to Mindanao
Sanitarium and Hospital in Tibanga, Iligan City. PO3 Dela Cruz, however, died before
reaching the hospital while T/Sgt. Dacoco died in the hospital. PFC Tomanto stayed
at Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital for 13 days before he was transferred to Camp
Evangelista Hospital in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, and then in a hospital in Manila
and Quezon City. PFC Angni stayed for seven (7) days in Mindanao Sanitarium and
Hospital before he was transferred to Camp Evangelista Hospital, where he was
confined for one (1) month. PFC Angni was transferred to V. Luna Hospital in Quezon
City and was confined therein for two (2) months. 20
On the other hand, Mayor Tawan-tawan, Macasuba and the members of the CAFGU
went back to the site of the ambush but appellants and their co-accused were no
longer there. Not long after, SPO4 Medrano, Chief of Police of Salvador Municipal
Police Station, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and his troops arrived. It was while inside
the Salvador Municipal Police Station that SPO4 Medrano heard gunfire and he came
to know that the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed prompting him and
his troops to go to the scene of the crime. Mayor Tawan-tawan informed SPO4
Medrano that appellant Wenceslao was one of those responsible for the ambush.
SPO4 Medrano and his troops, then, conducted an investigation during which he
noticed Samuel at the scene of the crime. Upon interrogation Samuel denied any
involvement in the ambush. Even so, SPO4 Medrano still found Samuel suspicious,
hence, he and his fellow police officers arrested him and turned him over to a
certain SPO4 Micabalo, Chief of Police of Lala, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was then
brought to Lala Municipal Jail in Lanao del Norte.

Subsequently, SPO4 Medrano, together with the members of the CAFGU, PNP and
the rest of the troops who were at the scene of the crime, found a trail of footprints
believed to be from the culprits. They conducted a hot pursuit operation towards
Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte, where appellants and
their co-accused were believed to have fled. They were able to recover an M-16
armalite rifle caliber 5.26 concealed near a nipa hut. SPO4 Medrano then sent a
Spot Report and a follow-up report about the ambush. He did not, however, reveal
the identity of appellant Wenceslao so that with a warrant of arrest, appellant
Wenceslao could be arrested at the earliest possible time. SPO4 Medrano also
informed the provincial headquarters about the incident through a radio message. 21
The following day, or on 6 June 2001, Samuel informed SPO1 Suaring, member of
PNP Lala Municipal Police, Lala, Lanao del Norte, that there were electrical supplies
and radio antenna in San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, left by the malefactors.
SPO1 Suaring, together with Samuel, Senior P/Insp. Salazar, SPO4 Subingsubing and
a certain SPO4 Sumaylo, proceeded to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where
they found the materials near the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) canal,
which is 30 meters away from the house of Samuels aunt. These were
photographed.22
Later, SPO2 Evasco, who was assigned at Lala Police Station, received a call from
Barangay Kagawad Renato Senahon (Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon) that a black backpack
was found in Mount Curay-curay, Rebe, Lala, Lanao del Norte, which is two (2)
kilometers away from the highway. Immediately, SPO2 Evasco and Brgy. Kgwd.
Senahon went to the location. Upon inspection, they recovered from the backpack
an army camouflage with name cloth, one Garand pouch and one fragmentation
grenade cacao type. SPO2 Evasco then brought these to the police station in
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and turned it over to Senior P/Insp. Salazar. 23
On 8 June 2001, Samuel executed his sworn statement identifying appellants and
their co-accused as the persons responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan
and his companions. Samuel was, thereafter, incarcerated at the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP) in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. 24
On 29 August 2001, or more than two (2) months after the ambush, appellant
Wenceslao was arrested while he was in Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental.
Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, was arrested on 20 December 2001 while
working in Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte. It was Senior P/Insp. Salazar who
effected the arrest of the appellants.25
Appellants denied having any involvement in the ambush. Appellant Wenceslao
presented as witnesses Armida Nelmida (Armida), Jeffrey Paninsuro (Jeffrey),
Luzviminda Apolinares (Luzviminda), Rudy Alegado (Rudy), Sergeant Teofanis
Garsuta (Sgt. Garsuta) and Master Sergeant Pio Cudilla (M/Sgt. Cudilla). Appellant
Ricardo, on the other hand, did not present any witness other than himself.

Appellant Wenceslao testified that on 5 June 2001, he was in their house with his
family. At around 1:00 p.m., he went outside their house to clean the pigsty and
feed the pigs. Then, at around 2:30 p.m., Jacob Pepito, Rudy and a certain Romy,
who is a military personnel, arrived to get a copy of the election returns of the 15
May 2001 elections upon the orders of Tanny Pepito, a gubernatorial candidate. He
told them that he has no copy of the returns. He then advised them to get it to Atty.
Aldoni Umpa (Atty. Umpa) who has a copy. At that time, he, Jacob Pepito and Romy
were outside the house while his wife and nieces were just eight (8) to 10 meters
away from them. After 10 minutes, his visitors left.26 Suddenly, appellant Wenceslao
heard gunfire coming from the direction of the house of Mayor Tawan-tawan. His
nephew, Jeffrey, approached and informed him that Mayor Tawan-tawan and the
latters group were ambushed. After about one (1) or two (2) minutes, he again
heard gunfire. This time the bullets were already hitting the roof and walls of their
house. He then instructed Jeffrey, who is also a CAFGU member, to report the said
incident and to ask help from the members of the Philippine Army stationed at
Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte.27
When Jeffrey left, appellant Wenceslao stayed at their house. He did not know where
his wife and the rest of the women, who were in their house, went after the
gunburst. After more or less 15 minutes, he walked barefooted and unarmed
towards Camp Allere. There he saw M/Sgt. Cudilla and he informed the former
regarding the incident happened in their house. Not long after, a certain Captain
Esmeralda (Capt. Esmeralda), Commanding Officer of Bravo Company of the
Philippine Army, arrived. He also approached and informed Capt. Esmeralda about
the incident in their house. Capt. Esmeralda then ordered his men to board the
samba and a six-by-six truck to fetch appellant Wenceslaos wife and relatives in
Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. A six-by-six truck returned to Camp Allere
carrying appellant Wenceslaos wife and relatives. 28
On the evening of 5 June 2001, appellant Wenceslao, together with his wife and
daughter, slept in his fathers house located, more or less, 100 meters away from
Camp Allere and stayed there for five (5) days. Appellant Wenceslaos wife then
requested for transfer to their sons house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, as she
could no longer sleep because of what happened at their house. Thus, they went to
their sons house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and stayed there for eight (8)
days. During that period of time, he did not hear of any case filed against him. No
policemen even bothered to arrest him. His wife, however, was still afraid, so they
left the house of their son and moved to Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental.
They stayed there until he was arrested on 29 August 2001. 29
Appellant Wenceslao, however, disclosed that it would only take, more or less, a 15
minute-vehicle ride from his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to
the site of the ambush in San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte. Also, from his house to
Camp Allere it would only take, more or less, 5 minute-vehicle ride. Appellant
Wenceslao also admitted that he ran for the vice-mayoralty position in Salvador,

Lanao del Norte, against Rodolfo Oban during the 2001 elections. Way back in the
1998 elections, he ran for mayoralty position in the same locality against Mayor
Tawan-tawan but he lost. On both occasions, he and Mayor Tawan-tawan were no
longer in the same political party. Similarly, during the term of Mayor Tawan-tawan
in 1998, appellant Wenceslao revealed that he and his son were charged with illegal
possession of firearm.30
Other defense witnesses, namely, Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are
appellant Wenceslaos wife, nephew and niece, respectively, corroborated appellant
Wenceslaos testimony on all material points. They all denied that appellant
Wenceslao has something to do with the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
group. Nonetheless, Armida admitted that there is a road connecting San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte, to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. There are also vehicles for hire
plying the route of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte,
and vice-versa.31
Another defense witness, Rudy, corroborated appellant Wenceslaos testimony with
respect to the fact that on 5 June 2001, he, together with Jacob Pepito and a certain
member of the army intelligence group, went to the house of appellant Wenceslao
to get the election returns. However, he could not recall anything unusual that
happened while he was in the house of appellant Wenceslao. They left the house of
appellant Wenceslao at around 2:45 p.m. Still, no unusual incident happened
thereafter. Rudy similarly revealed that he did not go inside the house of appellant
Wenceslao but merely waited for Jacob Pepito and a member of the army
intelligence group inside their vehicle parked at a distance of, more or less, three (3)
meters from the house of appellant Wenceslao. As such, he did not hear the subject
of the conversation between appellant Wenceslao, Jacob Pepito and a member of
the army intelligence group.32
Sgt. Garsuta, who also testified for the defense, stated that in the afternoon of 5
June 2001, while he was at the legislative hall in Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del
Norte, to secure the canvass of the elections, they received a radio call from M/Sgt.
Cudilla informing them that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed and the house of
appellant Wenceslao was strafed. Thereafter, Capt. Esmeralda called them to board
a six-by-six truck and to proceed to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. As they passed by
San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, they stopped to get some information from the
police officers therein. They proceeded to Camp Allere in Salvador, Lanao del Norte.
They arrived at Camp Allere at around 4:30 p.m. to 4:35 p.m. and there he saw
appellant Wenceslao waiting and talking to 1st Sgt. Codilla. Appellant Wenceslao
then requested that his family and some personal effects be taken from his house.
Thus, Capt. Esmeralda ordered them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to
appellant Wenceslaos house. Upon reaching the house of appellant Wenceslao,
nobody was there. Suddenly, appellant Wenceslaos wife came out from the nearby
house. Then they ordered her to board a six-by-six truck after taking some personal
belongings of appellant Wenceslao in the latters house. 33

M/Sgt. Cudilla alleged that at around, more or less, 3:00 p.m. of 5 June 2001, while
he was at their command post at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, his
detachment commander, a certain T/Sgt. Quijano, called and informed him through
radio that an ambush incident happened in his area of responsibility, i.e., Curva
Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. He advised T/Sgt. Quijano to verify the incident.
M/Sgt. Cudilla then called Capt. Esmeralda to inform the latter about the said
ambush incident. He, thereafter, prepared a perimeter defense in the camp. In the
second call of T/Sgt. Quijano, the latter told him that Mayor Tawan-tawan was
ambushed. After about 15 minutes, M/Sgt. Cudilla heard gunbursts from Poblacion,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Later, more or less, 10 civilians arrived at Camp Allere.
M/Sgt. Cudilla further confirmed that on 5 June 2001, also at around 3:00 p.m., he
saw appellant Wenceslao at the back of the stage inside Camp Allere near Km. Post
one. Appellant Wenceslao then informed him of the strafing incident in his house.
When their commanding officer arrived, appellant Wenceslao approached the
former. Thereafter, a platoon was organized heading towards Poblacion, Salvador,
Lanao del Norte.34
Appellant Ricardo, for his part, maintained that on 5 June 2001, he was also in his
house in Purok 5, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, attending to his wife and
children because his wife had just given birth in April 2001. In the afternoon thereof,
he heard a gunburst somewhere in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, followed
by some commotion in the street. Later, his brother, Joji Ajok, arrived and informed
him that appellant Wenceslao was shot in his house. 35
Appellant Ricardo also confirmed that on the early evening of 5 June 2001, he and
his family transferred to the house of his parents-in-law at Camp Allere, Salvador,
Lanao del Norte. He so decided when he heard rumors that the supporters of Atty.
Umpa, the political rival of Mayor Tawan-tawan in the 2001 local elections, were
being persecuted. Being one of Atty. Umpas supporters, he got scared, prompting
him to bring his family to Camp Allere. They stayed there until the following morning
and then he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and stayed there for
three (3) months. Thereafter, he moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte,
where he worked in the farm of his friend. He stayed there until he was arrested on
20 December 2001.36
Nevertheless, appellant Ricardo divulged that there was never an instance that Atty.
Umpa was harassed or intimidated by the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He claimed
that only Atty. Umpas supporters were harassed. He also revealed that prior to the
ambush incident, there was never an instance that he was threatened by the group
of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He just presumed that Atty. Umpas supporters were being
harassed by the people of Mayor Tawan-tawan because others were already
harassed.37

Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most of whom were victims of
the ambush, to be credible, categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
consistent, coupled with their positive identification of the appellants as among the
perpetrators of the crime and their lack of ill-motive to falsely testify against them,
vis--vis the defense of denial and alibi proffered by the latter, the trial court
rendered its Decision on 30 September 2005 finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
dispositive portion of the aforesaid trial courts Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
finding herein appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder, and the Court hereby sentences them to suffer the indivisible
prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the late
PO3 Dela Cruz the amount of P 50,000.00 as moral damages and another sum
of P 50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity ex delicto; to pay, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the late T/Sgt. Dacoco the sum of P 50,000.00 as moral
damages plus P 50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity ex delicto; and to pay,
jointly and severally, Ex-Mayor Johnny Tawantawan the amount ofP 50,000.00 for
and as attorneys fees, and the costs of suit.
The Armalite rifle with defaced serial number, the hand grenade and the Garand
pouch are hereby ordered turned-over to the Firearm and Explosive Unit of the PNP
Headquarters, Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, for proper disposition as
authorized by law.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of the appellantsshall be credited to
them and deducted from their prison term provided they comply with the
requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant Wenceslao was
arrested on 29 August 2001 and detained since then up to the present. While
appellant Ricardo was arrested on 20 December 2001 and detained since then up to
the present.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the part
of the prosecution to prosecute the case against the other accused who remain atlarge, as soon as said accused are apprehended. 38[Emphasis supplied].
Unperturbed, appellants separately appealed the aforesaid trial courts Decision to
the Court of Appeals via Notice of Appeal,39 and, thereafter, submitted their
respective appeal briefs.
In his brief, appellant Wenceslao assigned the following errors:
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE

PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE CREDIBLE AND NOT ORCHESTRATED LIES INTENDED
TO FALSELY IMPUTE THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO APPELLANT WENCESLAO;
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE INCONSISTENCIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE HONEST INCONSISTENCIES ON MINOR AND TRIVIAL
POINTS;
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [APPELLANTS WENCESLAO AND
RICARDO] FAILED TO CAST ILL-MOTIVE ON THE PART OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES
AND THAT THESE WITNESSES HAD NO IMPROPER AND NEFARIOUS MOTIVE IN
TESTIFYING AGAINST THE APPELLANTS;
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE TESTIMONY OF THE MILITARY MEN
WHO ARE NEUTRAL, IMPARTIAL AND OBJECTIVE WITNESSES;
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLANT WENCESLAO ABSCONDED
AND IN IMPUTING MALICE ON THE ACT OF [APPELLANT WENCESLAO] IN
TEMPORARILY LEAVING HIS RESIDENCE;
VI.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT WENCESLAO OF THE CRIME
CHARGED BASED ON TESTIMONIES WHICH ARE OF DOUBTFUL VERACITY;
VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF [APPELLANT
WENCESLAO] BASED ON JURISPRUDENCE WHICH ARE NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE
AT BAR.40
While appellant Ricardo, in his brief, raised this lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT RICARDO DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.41
On 18 June 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision affirming
appellants conviction of the crime charged. The Court of Appeals held that the
evidence on record disclosed that the alleged inconsistencies pointed to by
appellant Wenceslao refer only to minor matters. The same did not damage the

credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly that of PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni,
Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan. Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial points
serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime.
Moreover, since the prosecution witnesses positively identified appellants in open
court as among the perpetrators of the ambush, the same must prevail over the
alleged inconsistencies, as well as the defense of denial and alibi interposed by the
appellants. Denial is a negative and self-serving assertion that cannot overcome the
victims affirmative, categorical and convincing testimony. In the same way, for alibi
to prosper, it must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it
was impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission and not merely assert that he was somewhere else. As in the present
case, the trial court took judicial notice of the distance of seven (7) kilometers
between Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where appellants reside, and San Manuel, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, where the ambush incident took place. Appellants, therefore, could
not successfully invoke alibi as a defense because it was not physically impossible
for them to have been at the scene of the crime. 42 The Court of Appeals then
decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the separate APPEALS are DENIED, and
the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.43
Still undaunted, appellants elevated the aforesaid Decision of the Court of Appeals
to this Court via Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution44 dated 19 November 2008, the Court required the parties to
simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. In lieu
thereof, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation 45 stating that it will
no longer file a supplement to its Consolidated Appellees Brief 46 dated 14
December 2006 there being no transactions, occurrences or events which have
happened since the appellate courts Decision was rendered.
Appellants, on the other hand, filed their separate Supplemental Briefs, 47 which
were a mere rehash of the arguments already discussed in their respective
Appellants Briefs48 submitted before the appellate court. In his Supplemental Brief,
appellant Wenceslao reiterates that: the trial court and the Court of Appeals
committed reversible errors when they decided a question of substance which is not
in accord with established facts and the applicable laws. 49 He, once again,
enumerated the following errors committed by the appellate court, thus:
I.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals gravely erred when they ruled that the
inconsistencies committed by the prosecution witnesses are on minor and trivial
points when these inconsistencies are indicative of the innocence of appellant
Wenceslao;

II.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider as indicative of innocence
of appellant Wenceslao the fact that the authorities did not include in the police
report the name of appellant Wenceslao and did not arrest him immediately after
the ambush, or within a couple of months from the date of the ambush;
III.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they
deliberately refused or failed to consider and appreciate the testimonies of the
military officers who are neutral, impartial, and objective witnesses;
IV.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals miserably failed to consider the
evidence for the defense despite the clear and unmistakable proof of their honesty
and integrity;
V.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals clearly and deliberately misinterpreted the
facts and misapplied the laws regarding "flight" as an alleged indication of guilt;
VI.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted appellant Wenceslaobased on
jurisprudence on "alibi" which are not applicable in the case at bar 50 [Emphasis and
italicized omitted].
Appellant Wenceslao contends that a thorough perusal of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses would show these are tainted with glaring inconsistencies,
which are badges of lies and dishonesty, thus, casting doubts on their credibility.
The inconsistencies referred to by appellant Wenceslao are as follows: (1) whether
PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni were already with Mayor Tawan-tawan from Salvador,
Lanao del Norte, to Tubod, Lanao del Norte, and vice-versa, or they merely hitched a
ride in Mayor Tawan-tawans vehicle on their way home to Salvador, Lanao del
Norte; (2) if so, the place where PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni hitched a ride in Mayor
Tawan-tawans vehicle; (3) the officer from whom PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni got
permission in order to go home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte; (4) PFC Angni
allegedly knew appellant Wenceslao prior to the ambush incident on 5 June 2001
and he even saw appellant Wenceslao as among the perpetrators of the ambush,
yet, he did not mention the name of the former in his affidavit; (5) Mayor Tawantawan should have mentioned the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of those
responsible in the ambush incident when he reported the same to SPO4 Medrano;
(6) SPO4 Medrano should have included the name of appellant Wenceslao in the

Spot Reports he transmitted to the Provincial Police Office of the PNP and should
have immediately caused his arrest if he truly participated in the ambush incident;
(7) it would no longer be necessary to discharge Samuel and to make him as state
witness if the victims of the ambush incident, indeed, saw the perpetrators of the
crime; and (8) if appellant Wenceslao was one of the ambushers, Samuel would not
have failed to mention the former in his sworn statement.
Appellant Wenceslao believes that the afore-enumerated inconsistencies only
proved that he has no participation in the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
companions. The declaration of his innocence is thus called for.
Appellant Wenceslao further imputes ill-motive and malice on the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses in testifying against him. The motive was to remove him,
being the only non-Muslim leader, in the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del Norte,
who has the courage to challenge the reign of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his clan. It
was also an act of revenge against him for opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during the
1998 elections. As to Samuels motive, appellant Wenceslao claims that it was for
self-preservation, freedom, leniency and some other consideration. Evidently, after
Samuels testimony, the latter was released from jail.
Appellant Wenceslao maintains that he was not at the ambush site on 5 June 2001
as can be gleaned from the testimonies of M/Sgt. Cudilla and Sgt. Garsuta.
Lastly, appellant Wenceslao argues that his flight was not an indication of guilt. He
justified his temporary absence from his residence by stating that it was because of
the traumatic experience of his wife, who had no peace of mind since their house
was riddled with bullets by lawless elements without any cause.
With all the foregoing, the resolution of this appeal hinges primarily on the
determination of credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Time and again, this Court held that when the issues revolve on matters of
credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as
well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether
they are telling the truth.51 Moreover, credibility, to state what is axiomatic, is the
sole province of the trial court. In the absence of any clear showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the trial court's
findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 52 A
careful perusal of the records of this case revealed that none of these circumstances
is attendant herein.

The affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the factual findings of the trial court
places this case under the rule that factual findings are final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court. No reason has been given by
appellants to deviate from the factual findings arrived at by the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In the present case, most of the prosecution witnesses, i.e., Macasuba, Mosanip,
PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan, were victims of the 5 June
2001 ambush incident. As such, they actually witnessed what exactly happened on
that fateful day, especially Macasuba and PFC Angni, who vividly saw appellant
Wenceslao on the right side of the road and in a squatting position firing at them
with his M-16 armalite rifle. Macasuba and PFC Angni, having seated behind the
driver and on the rear (open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle,
respectively, both facing the right side of the road, were in such a position to see
without any obstruction how appellant Wenceslao rained bullets on their vehicle
with his M-16 armalite rifle while they were traversing the road of San Manuel, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, on their way home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Macasuba was
also able to identify appellant Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and
Alfredo as among the perpetrators of the ambush.
It bears stressing that the ambush happened at around 3:00 p.m., in broad daylight,
such that it would not be impossible for Macasuba and PFC Angni to have seen and
identified their assailants, particularly appellant Wenceslao, who was once chief of
Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), then municipal councilor and twice elected
vice-mayor of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, i.e., 1992 and 1995 elections, and
appellant Ricardo, who is a resident of Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. 53
The aforesaid assertions of Macasuba and PFC Angni were equally confirmed by
Samuel, an accused-turned-state-witness, who, in his testimony before the open
court, narrated how appellants and their co-accused, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo,
Jr., Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao, brought him in the waiting
shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte; assembled themselves in a
diamond position on both sides of the road; surreptitiously waited for the vehicle
boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group; and executed the ambush from the
moment the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group passed by the
aforesaid waiting shed.
Samuel was in an advantageous position to substantiate the identities of the
appellants and their co-accused as the perpetrators of the ambush because he was
near the scene of the crime, i.e., merely five (5) meters away therefrom. This is
aside from the fact that appellants and their co-accused were the very same people
who brought him to the site of the ambush. Appellants and their co-accused likewise
stayed for a long period of time in the house of Samuels aunt prior to the ambush
incident and Samuel is very well-acquainted with these people for he himself
resided therein.54

Given the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that prosecution witnesses,
Macasuba, PFC Angni and Samuel, have firmly established the identities of
appellants as the perpetrators of the ambush. In addition, their testimonies on who
and how the crime was committed were characterized by the trial court as simple
and candid. Even their answers to questions were simple, straightforward and
categorical. Such simplicity and candidness in their testimonies only prove that they
were telling the truth, thus, strengthening their credibility as witnesses.
Now, as regards the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant Wenceslao that
allegedly cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, this Court finds
them frivolous, trivial, minor, irrelevant and have nothing to do with the essential
elements of the crime charged, i.e., double murder with multiple frustrated murder
and double attempted murder. In the same manner, they do not detract from the
fact that Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group, which includes PFC Tomanto and PFC
Angni, were ambushed by appellants and their co-accused on 5 June 2001 while on
board the yellow pick-up service vehicle as it passed by the waiting shed in Purok 2,
San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte. And, said ambush resulted in the death of PO3
Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco and injuries to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC
Angni and Juanito.
It is axiomatic that slight variations in the testimony of a witness as to minor details
or collateral matters do not affect his or her credibility as these variations are in fact
indicative of truth and show that the witness was not coached to fabricate or
dissemble. An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime,
is not a ground to reverse a conviction.55
Similarly, PFC Angni and Samuels failure to name appellant Wenceslao in their
affidavits/sworn statements as one of the ambushers does not necessarily render
their testimonies implausible and unworthy of belief.
Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open
court do not necessarily discredit the witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is
oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the
witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies given
during trial are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn
statements, which are usually incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of reasons.
More so, because of the partial and innocent suggestions, or for want of specific
inquiries. In addition, an extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not
prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing
the affiants statement, hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are
not infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses direct and categorical
declarations on the witness stand are superior to their extrajudicial
statements.56 Similarly, the failure of a witness to immediately disclose the name of
the culprit does not necessarily impair his or her credibility. 57

A meticulous perusal of Samuels sworn statement reveals that he categorically

mentioned therein the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of the ambushers. In his
sworn statement, Samuel specifically stated that during the ambush, he saw
appellant Wenceslao at the other side of the road, just a few meters away from the
bridge, who, at that time armed with an M-16 rifle, was likewise firing towards the
group of Mayor Tawan-tawan.58
Above all, both PFC Angni and Samuel positively identified appellant Wenceslao in
open court as one of those responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and
his group.59 Such open court declaration is much stronger than their affidavits/sworn
statements.
Mayor Tawan-tawans failure to disclose to SPO4 Medrano the name of appellant
Wenceslao as one of those responsible in the ambush and SPO4 Medranos failure to
include the name of appellant Wenceslao in the Spot Reports he transmitted to the
Provincial Police Office of the PNP would not inure to appellant Wenceslaos benefit.
As can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes, when Mayor Tawantawan and SPO4 Medrano met at the scene of the crime, the former immediately
told the latter that appellant Wenceslao was one of the ambushers. 60 This belied the
claim of appellant Wenceslao that Mayor Tawan-tawan did not tell SPO4 Medrano
that he (appellant Wenceslao) was among the ambushers. Also, SPO4 Medrano
provided an explanation61 for his failure to state in his Spot Reports the name of
appellant Wenceslao as one of the ambushers. And, even granting that his
explanation would not have been satisfactory, still, SPO4 Medranos failure to
mention appellant Wenceslaos name in his Spot Reports was not fatal to the cause
of the prosecution. More especially because appellant Wenceslao was positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Even the discharge of Samuel to become state witness does not negate the fact
that prosecution witnesses, Macasuba and PFC Angni, indeed, saw appellants as
among the perpetrators of the crime. To note, appellants were not the only persons
accused of the crime; they were many including Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr.,
Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao. In order to give justice to the
victims of the ambush, especially those who have died by reason thereof, all
persons responsible therefor must be penalized. Since Samuel knew all those who
have participated in the ambush incident, his testimony as to the other accused in
this case is material to strengthen the case of the prosecution against them.
Unfortunately, the other accused in this case remained at large until now.
As aptly observed by the trial court, thus:
x x x The Court is convinced without equivocation on the veracity of the testimonies
of the prosecution eyewitnesses who are all in one pointing to herein appellant
Wenceslao as one of those who participated in the ambush, and on the veracity of
the testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses Macasuba and Samuel to

the effect that appellant Ricardo was among the people who perpetrated the said
ambush.
The testimonies of these witnesses were simple and candid. The simplicity and
candidness of their testimonies only prove that they were telling the truth. Their
answers to questions were simple, straightforward and categorical; spontaneous,
frank and consistent. Thus, a witness who testifies categorically, spontaneously,
frankly and consistently is a credible witness. 62
Appellant Wenceslaos allegations of ill-motive and malice on the part of prosecution
witnesses, including Samuel, have no leg to stand on.
The records are bereft of any evidence to substantiate the claim of appellant
Wenceslao that the motive of the prosecution witnesses in testifying against him
was to remove him as the only non-Muslim leader in the Municipality of Salvador,
Lanao del Norte, and that it was an act of revenge for opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan
during the 1998 elections. Appellant Wenceslao failed to present an iota of evidence
to support his aforesaid allegations. As properly stated by the Court of Appeals,
"mere allegation or claim is not proof. Each party must prove his own affirmative
allegation." Also, it must be emphasized that during the 1998 elections, it was
Mayor Tawan-tawan who won the mayoralty position. It is, therefore, highly
implausible for Mayor Tawan-tawan, who emerged as the victor, to take revenge
against the losing candidate, appellant Wenceslao. As such, appellant Wenceslao
failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses. It is settled
that where the defense fails to prove that witnesses are moved by improper
motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved and their testimonies are
therefore entitled to full weight and credit. 63
To repeat, most of the prosecution witnesses are victims of the ambush. Being the
aggrieved parties, they all desire justice for what had happened to them, thus, it is
unnatural for them to falsely accuse someone other than the real culprits. Otherwise
stated, it is very unlikely for these prosecution witnesses to implicate an innocent
person to the crime. It has been correctly observed that the natural interest of
witnesses, who are relatives of the victims, more so, the victims themselves, in
securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons
other than the culprits, for otherwise, the culprits would gain immunity. 64
Contrary to appellant Wenceslaos assertion, this Court is convince that his and
appellant Ricardos flight from the scene of the crime immediately after the ambush
is an evidence of their guilt. It is noteworthy that after the ambush incident,
appellant Wenceslao immediately left his residence and moved to his fathers
house, then to his sons house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and lastly to Katipa,
Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental, where he was arrested. Appellant Ricardo did the
same thing. From his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, he
transferred to his parents-in-laws house, then he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis

Occidental, and thereafter, moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, until he
was arrested on 20 December 2001. If appellants were truly innocent of the crime
charged, they would not go into hiding rather they would face their accusers to
clear their names. Courts go by the biblical truism that "the wicked flee when no
man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion." 65
Appellants respective explanations regarding their flight fail to persuade this Court.
It bears emphasis that after the alleged strafing of appellant Wenceslaos house, all
he did is to move from one place to another instead of having it investigated by the
authorities. Until now, the alleged strafing of his house remains a mystery. If that
strafing incident truly happened, he would be much eager to know who caused it in
order to penalize the author thereof. Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, was
allegedly afraid of being persecuted for being one of the supporters of Mayor Tawantawans political rival. His fear, however, was more imaginary than real. The
aforesaid claim of appellant Ricardo was uncorroborated, hence, cannot be given
any considerable weight.
In light of the clear, positive and straightforward testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, coupled with their positive identification of appellants as among the
perpetrators of the ambush, appellants defense of denial and alibi cannot prosper.
As this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses that appellants committed the crime.66 For alibi to prosper, the
requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that
appellants were somewhere else when the crime happened. They must also
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for
them to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its
commission.67 Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is
negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. 68 A mere denial, like
alibi, is inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative evidence,
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 69
In this case, both appellants claimed that they were just in their respective houses
in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, when the ambush incident happened and
they have no involvement whatsoever in the commission thereof.
To corroborate appellant Wenceslaos testimony, the defense presented Armida,
Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are appellant Wenceslaos wife, nephew and niece,
respectively. This Court, however, cannot give credence to the testimonies of these
defense witnesses. Being appellant Wenceslaos relatives, their testimonies are
rendered suspect because the formers relationship to them makes it likely that they
would freely perjure themselves for his sake. The defense of alibi may not prosper if
it is established mainly by the appellant himself and his relatives, and not by

credible persons.70 This Court further quote with conformity the observation made
by the trial court, viz:
FURTHER, the testimonies of the above-named witnesses for herein appellant
Wenceslao were shattered by the testimony of Rudy, another witness for appellant
Wenceslao, who categorically told the Court that during the time he and his
companions Jacob Pepito and a certain Romy were in the house of appellant
Wenceslao in the afternoon of 5 June 2001, there was no unusual incident that took
place, as well as no unusual incident that happened when they left the house of
appellant Wenceslao at about 2:45 in the afternoon.
The foregoing testimony of Rudy clearly imparts that the visit of Rudy and his
companions to the house of appellant Wenceslao, if any, happened on another date.
This will be so because if appellant Wenceslao and his closely related witnesses are
telling the truth that Jacob Pepito, Rudy and Romy were in the house of appellant
Wenceslao talking about the said election returns during that fateful afternoon, then
definitely, Rudy should have had known of the ambush incident, said incident being
spreaded throughout or shall we say, "the talk of the town" that afternoon of 5 June
2001.
If the ambush incident occurred on the day Rudy and his companions visited
appellant Wenceslao, then, no doubt that Rudywill tell the Court about it. But his
testimony was otherwise.71 [Emphasis supplied].
In the same breath, appellant Ricardos defense of denial and alibi cannot be given
any evidentiary value as it was unsubstantiated. Appellant Ricardo never presented
any witness to support his claim that he was simply inside their house attending to
his wife and children during the time that the ambush incident happened. This Court
reiterates that mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law. Between the categorical and
positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the
accused which are uncorroborated by reliable and independent evidence, the
former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary
weight.72
Withal, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the scene of the
crime in the afternoon of 5 June 2001. As observed by the trial court and the
appellate court, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where both appellants reside,
is only about seven (7) kilometers away from San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte,
where the ambush took place. 73
All told, this Court affirms the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that,
indeed, appellants were among the perpetrators of the ambush against Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group. Prosecution witnesses categorical, positive and
straightforward testimonies, coupled with their positive identification of appellants

as among the perpetrators of the crime, prevail over appellants defense of bare
denial and alibi.
As to the crime committed. The trial court, as well as the appellate court, convicted
appellants of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted
murder. This Court believes, however, that appellants should be convicted not of a
complex crime but of separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7)
counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims in this case
were not the result of a single act but of several acts of the appellants, thus, making
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code inapplicable.
Appellants and their co-accused simultaneous act of riddling the vehicle boarded by
Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group with bullets discharged from their firearms when
the said vehicle passed by San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, resulted in the death
of two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt.
Dacoco.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure
or afford impunity.
xxxx
5. With evident premeditation. [Emphasis supplied].
Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, attended the commission of the
crime. Time and again, this Court, in a plethora of cases, has consistently held that
there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly
and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense
that the offended party might make. There are two (2) conditions that must concur
for treachery to exist, to wit: (a) the employment of means of execution gave the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means
or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. "The essence of
treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape."74
The deadly successive shots of the appellants and their co-accused did not allow
the hapless victims, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, any opportunity to put
up a decent defense. The attack was executed by appellants and their-co-accused in

such a vicious manner as to make the defense virtually impossible. Under the
circumstances, it is very apparent that appellants had murder in their hearts when
they waylaid their unwary victims. 75 Thus, as to the death of PO3 Dela Cruz and
T/Sgt. Dacoco, appellants should be held liable for murder.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however, cannot be
appreciated as it is deemed absorbed in treachery. 76
Since the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of evident
premeditation, the circumstance cannot likewise be appreciated. To prove this
aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating
that the offender clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time, between the
determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof, sufficient to allow the
offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 77 None of these elements
could be gathered from the evidence on record.
As regards the victims Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito,
although they were injured during the ambush and were all hospitalized, except for
Macasuba, it was not mentioned that their injuries and wounds were mortal or fatal
such that without the timely medical assistance accorded to them, they would have
died.78 However, it does not necessarily follow that the crimes committed against
the aforenamed victims were simply less serious physical injuries. Also, even though
Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun did not sustain any injury during the ambush, it does
not mean that no crime has been committed against them. The latter were just
fortunate enough not to have sustained any injury on the occasion thereof. Since
appellants were motivated by the same intent to kill, thus, as to Macasuba,
Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito, Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun, appellants
should be held guilty of attempted murder.
What brings this case out of the ordinary is the issue of applicability of Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code. Its resolution would determine whether the conviction of
appellants must be for the separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven
(7) counts of attempted murder or of the complex crime of double murder with
multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder.
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which explicitly states that:79
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period. [Emphasis supplied].
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the
eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one

crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The
first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as complex crime proper, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic
example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more
persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a
number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from
separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 80
Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances
present in this case do not fit exactly the description of a compound crime.
From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding of
the victims were not the result of a single discharge of firearms by the appellants
and their co-accused. To note, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and
rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. As a
result, two security escorts died while five (5) of them were wounded and injured.
The victims sustained gunshot wounds in different parts of their bodies. Therefrom,
it cannot be gainsaid that more than one bullet had hit the victims. Moreover, more
than one gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims. As held in People v.
Valdez,81 each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms,
aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and
individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime. 82
Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act but
several individual and distinct acts in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code would not apply for it speaks only of a "single act."
There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code despite the fact that several acts were performed by several accused in the
commission of the crime resulting to the death and/or injuries to their victims.
In People v. Lawas,83 the members of the Home Guard, upon order of their leader,
Lawas, simultaneously and successively fired at several victims. As a result, 50
persons died. It was there held that the killing was the result of a single impulse as
there was no intent on the part of the accused to fire at each and every victim
separately and distinctly from each other.
If the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it
constitutes a single offense. However, "single criminal impulse" was not the only
consideration in applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in the said case
because there was therein no evidence at all showing the identity or number of
persons killed by each accused. There was also no conspiracy to perpetuate the
killing, thus, collective criminal responsibility could not be imputed upon the
accused. Since it was impossible to ascertain the number of persons killed by each

of them, this Court was "forced" to find all the accused guilty of only one offense of
multiple homicide instead of holding each of them responsible for 50 deaths. 84
Significantly, there was no conspiracy in People v. Lawas. However, as this Court
held in People v. Remollino,85the Lawas doctrine is more of an exception than the
general rule.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very
instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith
decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every one of the conspirators is
made criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the
absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced
from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts
that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the
actors incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all. 86
The Information filed against appellants and their co-accused alleged conspiracy,
among others. Although the trial court did not directly state that a conspiracy
existed, such may be inferred from the concerted actions of the appellants and their
co-accused, to wit: (1) appellants and their co-accused brought Samuel to a waiting
shed located on the left side of the road where the yellow pick-up service vehicle
boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group would pass; (2) appellants and their
co-accused, thereafter, assembled themselves on both sides of the road and
surreptitiously waited for the aforesaid yellow pick-up service vehicle; (3) the
moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle passed by the waiting shed, appellants
and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets thereon resulting in the killing
and wounding of the victims; (4) immediately, appellants and their co-accused ran
towards the house of Samuels aunt to get their bags and other stuff; (5) Samuel
followed appellants and their co-accused; and (6) appellants and their co-accused
fled.
Conspiracy is very much evident from the afore-enumerated actuations of the
appellants and their co-accused. Clearly, their acts were coordinated. They were
synchronized in their approach to riddle with bullets the vehicle boarded by Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group. They were motivated by a single criminal impulse to
kill the victims. Indubitably, conspiracy is implied when the accused persons had a
common purpose and were united in its execution. Spontaneous agreement or
active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the
crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility. 87
With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their coaccused had assumed joint criminal responsibility the act of one is the act of all.
The ascertainment of who among them actually hit, killed and/or caused injury to

the victims already becomes immaterial. Collective responsibility replaced individual

responsibility. The Lawas doctrine, premised on the impossibility of determining who
killed whom, cannot, to repeat, be applied.
Interestingly, in People v. De los Santos, 88 People v. Abella,89 People v. Garcia90 and
People v. Pincalin,91 this Court also applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code even
though several acts were performed by the accused and conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime.
In People v. De los Santos,92 a prison riot occurred for two consecutive days inside
the national penitentiary between the members of two gangs, i.e., Sigue-Sigue
Sputnik and Oxo. As a result, nine (9) inmates were killed. Fourteen (14) inmates
were then convicted for the crime of multiple murder. The existence of conspiracy in
the commission of the crime was duly proven. There was, however, no discussion
why the accused were convicted of a complex crime instead of separate crimes.
In a similar case of People v. Abella,93 involving the massacre of certain prisoners in
the Davao Penal Colony and a reprise of a similar riot that occurred in the national
penitentiary on 16 February 1958 (subject of De los Santos), all the accused were
also convicted for the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Conspiracy likewise attended the commission of the crime. This Court
applied the ruling in De los Santos and elucidated that the ruling in the said case is
predicated on the theory that "when for the attainment of a single purpose which
constitutes an offense, various acts are executed, such acts must be considered
only as one offense," a complex one. The Lawas doctrine was equally applied
although conspiracy had been duly proven. This Court then stated that where a
conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose "their individual acts in
pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act the act of execution
giving rise to a complex offense. The felonious agreement produces a sole and
solidary liability: each confederate forms but a part of a single being." 94
People v. Garcia95 and People v. Pincalin96 have the same factual background as De
los Santos and Abella. They were the third and fourth cases, respectively, of prison
riots resulting to the killing of convicts by fellow convicts while inside the national
penitentiary. In Garcia, the accused were convicted for the complex crime of
multiple murder and double attempted murder, while in Pincalin the accused were
convicted for the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder. In both
cases, this Court found conspiracy to have attended the commission of the crime.
In applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in Garcia and Pincalin, this Court,
gave the same justification as in Abella: that both cases were covered by the rule
that "when for the attainment of a single purpose, which constitutes an offense
various acts are executed, such acts must be considered as only one offense, a
complex one." Correspondingly, "where a conspiracy animates several persons with
a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked

upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a complex offense. Various
acts committed under one criminal impulse may constitute a single complex
offense.97
We however found no intention by this Court to establish as doctrine, contrary to
Lawas, that Article 48 is applicable even in cases where several acts were
performed by the accused and conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. In
Pincalin, this Court has already clarified that: nonetheless, this Court further held
that "in other cases where several killings on the same occasion were perpetrated,
but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the
killings would be treated as separate offenses, as opined by Mr. Justice Makasiar and
as held in some decided cases."98
De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, therefore, were exceptions to the general
rule stated in Article 48 which exceptions were drawn by the peculiar circumstance
of the cases.
It may be mentioned that in People v. Sanidad, 99 this Court, once again, applied
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code although the circumstances of the case were
not the same as in Lawas, De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, where this
Court departed from the general rule.
In Sanidad, suddenly and without a warning, several accused unleashed a volley of
shots at the jeepney boarded by the victims. Miraculously, all passengers, except
Rolando Tugadi (Rolando), survived the ambush and suffered only minor injuries.
Conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. Accused were convicted for the
complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder. We there held that the
case comes within the purview of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Citing Lawas
and Abella, it was pronounced that although several independent acts were
performed by the accused, it was not possible to determine who among them
actually killed Rolando; and that there was no evidence that the accused intended
to fire at each and every one of the victims separately and distinctly from each
other. On the premise that the evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to
kill Marlon Tugadis group as a whole, we repeated that where a conspiracy
animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in
pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution,
giving rise to a single complex offense.100
The reliance in Sanidad, on Lawas and Abella is incorrect.
The application of the Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in Pincalin, thus:
where several killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving
prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the killings would be
treated as separate offenses. Since in Sanidad, the killings did not involve prisoners
or it was not a case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners. As such, Abella would not
apply.

To repeat, in Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code because of the impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons killed
by each accused. Since conspiracy was not proven therein, joint criminal
responsibility could not be attributed to the accused. Each accused could not be
held liable for separate crimes because of lack of clear evidence showing the
number of persons actually killed by each of them.
Proven conspiracy could have overcome the difficulty.
Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as
though each one performed the act of each one of the conspirators. Each one is
criminally responsible for each one of the deaths and injuries of the several victims.
The severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article 48. The applicability of
Article 48 depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the definitional phrase "a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies." This is not an
original reading of the law. In People v. Hon. Pineda, 101 the Court already recognized
the "deeply rooted x x x doctrine that when various victims expire from separate
shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." As we observed in People
v. Tabaco,102 clarifying the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, this
Court further stated in Hon. Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, x x x
there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not
written into the law."103
With all the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable for the separate crimes of
two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder.
As to penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposed for
the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed upon appellants is reclusion
perpetua for each count, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 63 104 of the Revised Penal
Code.105
Appellants are also guilty of seven (7) counts of attempted murder. The penalty
prescribed by law for murder, i.e., reclusion perpetua to death, should be reduced
by two degrees, conformably to Article 51106 of the Revised Penal Code. Under
paragraph 2, Article 61,107 in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a
penalty is prision mayor. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the same should be imposed in its medium period pursuant to
paragraph 1, Article 64108 of the Revised Penal Code.109 Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law in the case of attempted murder, the maximum shall be taken from
the medium period of prision mayor, which is 8 years and 1 day to 10 years, while
the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional, in any of its periods, the range of which is 6 months and 1 day to 6
years. This Court, therefore, imposed upon the appellants the indeterminate penalty

of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision

mayor, as maximum, for each count of attempted murder.
As to damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be
awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages.110
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that when death occurs as a result of a
crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to be indemnified for the death of the
victim without need of any evidence or proof thereof. Moral damages like civil
indemnity, is also mandatory upon the finding of the fact of murder. 111 Therefore,
the trial court and the appellate court properly awarded civil indemnity in the
amount of P 50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount of P 50,000.00 to the
heirs of each deceased victims.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary damages may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In this
case, treachery may no longer be considered as an aggravating circumstance since
it was already taken as a qualifying circumstance in the murder, and abuse of
superior strength which would otherwise warrant the award of exemplary damages
was already absorbed in the treachery. 112 However, in People v. Combate,113 this
Court still awards exemplary damages despite the lack of any aggravating
circumstance to deter similar conduct and to serve as an example for public good.
Thus, to deter future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award
of P 30,000.00 as exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of each deceased victims
is proper.114 The said amount is in conformity with this Courts ruling in People v.
Gutierrez.115
Actual damages cannot be awarded for failure to present the receipts covering the
expenditures for the wake, coffin, burial and other expenses for the death of the
victims. In lieu thereof, temperate damages may be recovered where it has been
shown that the victims family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof
cannot be proved with certainty as provided for under Article 2224 of the Civil
Code.116 In this case, it cannot be denied that the heirs of the deceased victims
suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved with certainty.
Thus, this Court similarly awards P 25,000.00 as temperate damages to the heirs of
each deceased victims.117
The surviving victims, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito, are
also entitled to moral, temperate and exemplary damages.
Ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that the wounds inflicted
upon the aforesaid victims would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious
anxiety, moral shock, and similar injuries. 118 It is only justifiable to grant them moral

damages in the amount of P 40,000.00 each in conformity with this Courts ruling in
People v. Mokammad.119
The award of P 25,000.00 each as temperate damages to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC
Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito is also in order. It is beyond doubt that these
victims were hospitalized and spent money for their medication. As to Macasuba,
although he was not confined in a hospital, it cannot be gainsaid that he also spent
for the treatment of the minor injuries he sustained by reason of the ambush.
However, they all failed to present any receipt therefor. Nevertheless, it could not
be denied that they suffered pecuniary loss; thus, it is only prudent to award
temperate damages in the amount of P 25,000.00 to each of them.1wphi1
The award of exemplary damages is also in order. Thus, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC
Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito are awarded exemplary damages in the amount
of P 30,000.00 to conform to current jurisprudence. 120
This Court likewise affirms the award of P 50,000.00 for and as attorneys fees, as
well as costs of the suit, in favor of Mayor Tawan-tawan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
HC No. 00246 dated 18 June 2008 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows: (1) appellants are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder thereby imposing
upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count; (2) appellants are also
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of attempted murder
thereby imposing upon them the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for
each count; (3) other than the civil indemnity and moral damages already awarded
by the trial court and the appellate court, appellants are further ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, exemplary and temperate damages in the amount
of P 30,000.00 and P 25,000.00, respectively, to the heirs of each deceased victims;
and (4) appellants are also directed to pay, jointly and severally, Macasuba,
Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito the amount of P 40,000.00 each as
moral damages, P 25,000.00 each as temperate damages and P 30,000.00 each as
exemplary damages.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.