R. No.

168617 February 19, 2007 ordering the filing of two separate Informations for Estafa Thru
Falsification of Commercial Document by a Private Individual, under Article
BERNADETTE L. ADASA, petitioner, 315 in relation to Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as
vs. amended.
CECILLE S. ABALOS, Respondent.
Consequently, two separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner
DECISION docketed as Criminal Cases No. 8781 and No. 8782, raffled to Branches 4
and 5, Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, respectively.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This instant petition pertains only to Criminal Case No. 8782.
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by
petitioner Bernadette L. Adasa, seeks to nullify and set aside the 21 July On 8 June 2001, upon motion of the petitioner, the trial court in Criminal
2004 Decision1 and 10 June 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA- Case No. 8782 issued an order directing the Office of the City Prosecutor of
G.R. SP No. 76396 which nullified the Resolutions of the Department of Iligan City to conduct a reinvestigation.
Justice (DOJ). The Resolutions of the DOJ reversed and set aside the
Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, which found After conducting the reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
on reinvestigation probable cause against petitioner, and directed the Iligan City issued a resolution dated 30 August 2001, affirming the finding
Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to withdraw the information for of probable cause against petitioner.
Estafa against petitioner.
Meanwhile, during her arraignment on 1 October 2001 in Criminal Case
The instant case emanated from the two complaints-affidavits filed by No. 8782, petitioner entered an unconditional plea of not guilty.3
respondent Cecille S. Abalos on 18 January 2001 before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Iligan City, against petitioner for Estafa. Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan
City, petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ on 15 October
Respondent alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner, through 2001.
deceit, received and encashed two checks issued in the name of
respondent without respondent’s knowledge and consent and that despite In a Resolution dated 11 July 2002, the DOJ reversed and set aside the 30
repeated demands by the latter, petitioner failed and refused to pay the August 2001 resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City
proceeds of the checks. and directed the said office to withdraw the Information for Estafa against
petitioner.
On 23 March 2001, petitioner filed a counter-affidavit admitting that she
received and encashed the two checks issued in favor of respondent. The said DOJ resolution prompted the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iligan City to file a "Motion to Withdraw Information" on 25 July 2002.
In her Supplemental Affidavit filed on 29 March 2001, petitioner, however,
recanted and alleged instead that it was a certain Bebie Correa who On 26 July 2002, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of said
received the two checks which are the subject matter of the complaints resolution of the DOJ arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed outright
and encashed the same; and that said Bebie Correa left the country after the petition for review since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates
misappropriating the proceeds of the checks. that when an accused has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party
files a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot,
On 25 April 2001, a resolution was issued by the Office of the City and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course
Prosecutor of Iligan City finding probable cause against petitioner and thereto, but instead deny it outright. Respondent claimed Section 12
thereof mentions arraignment as one of the grounds for the dismissal of petitioner was arraigned before she filed the petition for review with the
the petition for review before the DOJ. DOJ, it was imperative for the DOJ to dismiss such petition. It added that
when petitioner pleaded to the charge, she was deemed to have waived
In a resolution dated 30 January 2003, the DOJ denied the Motion for her right to reinvestigation and right to question any irregularity that
Reconsideration opining that under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of surrounds it.
DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from
entertaining any appeal taken to him even where the accused has already Anent the second issue, the Court of Appeals declared that the existence
been arraigned in court. This is due to the permissive language "may" of probable cause or the lack of it, cannot be dealt with by it since factual
utilized in Section 12 whereby the Secretary has the discretion to entertain issues are not proper subjects of a Petition for Certiorari.
an appealed resolution notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been
arraigned. In disposing of the last issue, the Court of Appeals held that the order of
the trial court dismissing the subject criminal case pursuant to the assailed
Meanwhile, on 27 February 2003, the trial court issued an order granting resolutions of the DOJ did not render the petition moot and academic. It
petitioner’s "Motion to Withdraw Information" and dismissing Criminal said that since the trial court’s order relied solely on the resolutions of the
Case No. 8782. No action was taken by respondent or any party of the case DOJ, said order is void as it violated the rule which enjoins the trial court to
from the said order of dismissal. assess the evidence presented before it in a motion to dismiss and not to
rely solely on the prosecutor’s averment that the Secretary of Justice had
Aggrieved by the resolution of the DOJ, respondent filed a Petition for recommended the dismissal of the case.
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Respondent raised the following
issues before the appellate court: Dissatisfied by the Court of Appeals’ ruling, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration setting forth the following grounds:
1. Whether or not the Department of Justice gravely abused its
discretion in giving due course to petitioner’s petition for review 1. that the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of Department
despite its having been filed after the latter had already been Circular No. 70 is permissive and directory such that the Secretary
arraigned; of Justice may entertain an appeal despite the fact that the
accused had been arraigned;
2. Whether or not there is probable cause that the crime of estafa
has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof; 2. that the contemporaneous construction by the Secretary of
Justice should be given great weight and respect;
3. Whether or not the petition before the Court of Appeals has
been rendered moot and academic by the order of the Regional 3. that Section 7 of the Circular applies only to resolutions
Trial Court dismissing Criminal Case No. 8782. rendered pursuant to a preliminary investigation, not on a
reinvestigation;
The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated 21 July 2004 granted
respondent’s petition and reversed the Resolutions of the DOJ dated 11 4. that the trial court’s order of dismissal of the criminal case has
July 2002 and 30 January 2003. rendered the instant petition moot and academic;

In resolving the first issue, the Court of Appeals, relying heavily on Section 5. that her arraignment was null and void it being conducted
7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 which states "[i]f an information has been filed in despite her protestations; and
court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given
due course if the accused had already been arraigned," ruled that since
 6. that despite her being arraigned, the supposed waiver of her meant that when an accused was already arraigned when the aggrieved
right to preliminary investigation has been nullified or recalled by party files a petition for review, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should
virtue of the trial court’s order of reinvestigation.4 not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, but
instead dismiss or deny it outright. The appellate court added that the
The Court of Appeals stood firm by its decision. This time, however, it tried word "may" in Section 12 should be read as "shall" or "must" since such
to construe Section 7 side by side with Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70 construction is absolutely necessary to give effect to the apparent
and attempted to reconcile these two provisions. According to the intention of the rule as gathered from the context.
appellate court, the phrase "shall not" in paragraph two, first sentence of
Section 7 of subject circular, to wit: As to the contemporaneous construction of the Secretary of Justice, the
Court of Appeals stated that the same should not be given weight since it
If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed was erroneous.
resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had
already been arraigned. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) Anent petitioner’s argument that Section 7 of the questioned circular
applies only to original resolutions that brought about the filing of the
employed in the circular denotes a positive prohibition. Applying the corresponding informations in court, but not to resolutions rendered
principle in statutory construction - that when a statute or provision pursuant to a motion for reinvestigation, the appellate court simply
contains words of positive prohibition, such as "shall not," "cannot," or brushed aside such contention as having no basis in the circular
"ought not" or which is couched in negative terms importing that the act questioned.
shall not be done otherwise than designated, that statute or provision is
mandatory, thus rendering the provision mandatory – it opined that the It also rejected petitioner’s protestation that her arraignment was forced
subject provision simply means that the Secretary of Justice has no other upon her since she failed to present any evidence to substantiate the
course of action but to deny or dismiss a petition before him when same.
arraignment of an accused had already taken place prior to the filing of the
petition for review. It is petitioner’s contention that despite her being arraigned, the supposed
waiver of her right to preliminary investigation has been nullified by virtue
On the other hand, reading Section 12 of the same circular which reads: of the trial court’s order or reinvestigation. On this score, the Court of
Appeals rebuffed such argument stating that there was no "supposed
The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He waiver of preliminary investigation" to speak of for the reason that
may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any petitioner had actually undergone preliminary investigation.
of the following grounds:
Petitioner remained unconvinced with the explanations of the Court of
xxxx Appeals.

(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was Hence, the instant petition.
taken; x x x.
Again, petitioner contends that the DOJ can give due course to an appeal
the Court of Appeals opined that the permissive word "may" in Section 12 or petition for review despite its having been filed after the accused had
would seem to imply that the Secretary of Justice has discretion to already been arraigned. It asserts that the fact of arraignment of an
entertain an appeal notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been accused before the filing of an appeal or petition for review before the DOJ
arraigned. This provision should not be treated separately, but should be "is not at all relevant" as the DOJ can still take cognizance of the appeal or
read in relation to Section 7. The two provisions, taken together, simply Petition for Review before it. In support of this contention, petitioner set
her sights on the ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Mogul,5 to wit:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or filing of a motion to dismiss and the court’s discretion to deny or grant the
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or same. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the emphasized portion in
the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Crespo ruling is a parcel of the entire paragraph which relates to the
the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the duty and jurisdiction of the trial court to determine for itself whether or
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he not to dismiss a case before it, and which states that such duty comes into
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole play regardless of whether such motion is filed before or after arraignment
judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case and upon whose instructions. The allusion to the Secretary of Justice as
is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the reviewing the records of investigation and giving instructions for the filing
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the of a motion to dismiss in the cited ruling does not take into consideration
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before of whether the appeal or petition before the Secretary of Justice was filed
or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a after arraignment. Significantly, in the Crespo case, the accused had not
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who yet been arraigned when the appeal or petition for review was filed before
reviewed the records of the investigation. (Emphasis supplied.) the DOJ. Undoubtedly, petitioner’s reliance on the said case is misplaced.

To bolster her position, petitioner cites Roberts v. Court of Appeals, 6 which Also unavailing is petitioner’s invocation of the cases of Roberts v. Court of
stated: Appeals and Marcelo v. Court of Appeals. As in Crespo v. Mogul, neither
Roberts v. Court of Appeals nor Marcelo v. Court of Appeals took into
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking account of whether the appeal or petition before the Secretary of Justice
cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a was filed after arraignment. Just like in the Crespo case, the accused in
criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It both Roberts v. Court of Appeals and Marcelo v. Court of Appeals had not
merely advised the DOJ to, "as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining yet been arraigned when the appeal or petition for review was filed before
a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the the DOJ.
complaint or information has already been filed in Court. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.) Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of
the provisions of DOJ Circular No. 70 violated three basic rules in statutory
Petitioner likewise invokes Marcelo v. Court of Appeals7 where this Court construction. First, the rule that the provision that appears last in the order
declared: of position in the rule or regulation must prevail. Second, the rule that the
contemporaneous construction of a statute or regulation by the officers
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the who enforce it should be given weight. Third, petitioner lifted a portion
Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal from Agpalo’s Statutory Construction8 where the word "shall" had been
cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as construed as a permissive, and not a mandatory language.
practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. The all too-familiar rule in statutory construction, in this case, an
In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may administrative rule9 of procedure, is that when a statute or rule is clear and
file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted to.10 Since Section 7 of
to the discretion of the court. the subject circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss
outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment, no
The Court is unconvinced. resort to interpretation is necessary.

A cursory reading of Crespo v. Mogul reveals that the ruling therein does Petitioner’s reliance to the statutory principle that "the last in order of
not concern the issue of an appeal or petition for review before the DOJ position in the rule or regulation must prevail" is not applicable. In addition
after arraignment. Verily, the pronouncement therein has to do with the to the fact that Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 needs no construction, the
cited principle cannot apply because, as correctly observed by the Court of reconciled or harmonized with another part without nullifying one in favor
Appeals, there is no irreconcilable conflict between Section 7 and Section of the other." In the instant case, however, Section 7 is neither
12 of DOJ Circular No. 70. Section 7 of the circular provides: contradictory nor irreconcilable with Section 12. As can be seen above,
Section 7 pertains to the action on the petition that the DOJ must take,
SECTION 7. Action on the petition. – The Secretary of Justice may dismiss while Section 12 enumerates the options the DOJ has with regard to the
the petition outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit or disposition of a petition for review or of an appeal.
manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration. If an information has been filed in As aptly observed by respondent, Section 7 specifically applies to a
court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given situation on what the DOJ must do when confronted with an appeal or a
due course if the accused had already been arraigned. Any arraignment petition for review that is either clearly without merit, manifestly intended
made after the filing of the petition shall not bar the Secretary of Justice to delay, or filed after an accused has already been arraigned, i.e., he may
from exercising his power of review. (Italics supplied.) dismiss it outright if it is patently without merit or manifestly intended to
delay, or, if it was filed after the acccused has already been arraigned, the
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same circular states: Secretary shall not give it due course.

SECTION 12. Disposition of the Appeal. – The Secretary may reverse, affirm Section 12 applies generally to the disposition of an appeal. Under said
or modify the appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon section, the DOJ may take any of four actions when disposing an appeal,
motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the following grounds: namely:

(a) That the petition was filed beyond the period prescribed in 1. reverse the appealed resolution;
Section 3 hereof;
2. modify the appealed resolution;
(b) That the procedure or any of the requirements herein
provided has not been complied with; 3. affirm the appealed resolution;

(c) That there is no showing of any reversible error; 4. dismiss the appeal altogether, depending on the circumstances
and incidents attendant thereto.
(d) That the appealed resolution is interlocutory in nature, except
when it suspends the proceedings based on the alleged existence As to the dismissal of a petition for review or an appeal, the grounds are
of a prejudicial question; provided for in Section 12 and, consequently, the DOJ must evaluate the
pertinent circumstances and the facts of the case in order to determine
(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal which ground or grounds shall apply.
was taken;
Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give
(f) That the offense has already prescribed; and the appeal or petition for review due course and must dismiss the same.
This is bolstered by the fact that arraignment of the accused prior to the
(g) That other legal or factual grounds exist to warrant a dismissal. filing of the appeal or petition for review is set forth as one of the grounds
(Emphases supplied.) for its dismissal. Therefore, in such instance, the DOJ, noting that the
arraignment of an accused prior to the filing of an appeal or petition for
review is a ground for dismissal under Section 12, must go back to Section
It is noteworthy that the principle cited by petitioner reveals that, to find
application, the same presupposes that "one part of the statute cannot be
7 and act upon as mandated therein. In other words, the DOJ must not give "shall, upon such violation being proved, be dissolved by quo warranto
due course to, and must necessarily dismiss, the appeal. proceedings" has been construed as "may."12

Likewise, petitioner’s reliance on the principle of contemporary After a judicious scrutiny of the cited passage, it becomes apparent that
construction, i.e., the DOJ is not precluded from entertaining appeals the same is not applicable to the provision in question. In the cited
where the accused had already been arraigned, because it exercises passage, the word "shall" departed from its mandatory import connotation
discretionary power, and because it promulgated itself the circular in because it was connected to certain provisos/conditions: "subject to the
question, is unpersuasive. As aptly ratiocinated by the Court of Appeals: availability of funds" and "upon such violation being proved." No such
proviso/condition, however, can be found in Section 7 of the subject
True indeed is the principle that a contemporaneous interpretation or circular. Hence, the word "shall" retains its mandatory import.
construction by the officers charged with the enforcement of the rules and
regulations it promulgated is entitled to great weight by the court in the At this juncture, the Court of Appeals’ disquisition in this matter is
latter’s construction of such rules and regulations. That does not, however, enlightening:
make such a construction necessarily controlling or binding. For equally
settled is the rule that courts may disregard contemporaneous Indeed, if the intent of Department Circular No. 70 were to give the
construction in instances where the law or rule construed possesses no Secretary of Justice a discretionary power to dismiss or to entertain a
ambiguity, where the construction is clearly erroneous, where strong petition for review despite its being outrightly dismissible, such as when
reason to the contrary exists, and where the court has previously given the the accused has already been arraigned, or where the crime the accused is
statute a different interpretation. being charged with has already prescribed, or there is no reversible error
that has been committed, or that there are legal or factual grounds
If through misapprehension of law or a rule an executive or administrative warranting dismissal, the result would not only be incongruous but also
officer called upon to implement it has erroneously applied or executed it, irrational and even unjust. For then, the action of the Secretary of Justice
the error may be corrected when the true construction is ascertained. If a of giving due course to the petition would serve no purpose and would
contemporaneous construction is found to be erroneous, the same must only allow a great waste of time. Moreover, to give the second sentence of
be declared null and void. Such principle should be as it is applied in the Section 12 in relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application would not
case at bar.11 only subvert the avowed objectives of the Circular, that is, for the
expeditious and efficient administration of justice, but would also render
Petitioner’s posture on a supposed exception to the mandatory import of its other mandatory provisions - Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory.13
the word "shall" is misplaced. It is petitioner’s view that the language of
Section 12 is permissive and therefore the mandate in Section 7 has been In her steadfast effort to champion her case, petitioner contends that the
transformed into a matter within the discretion of the DOJ. To support this issue as to whether the DOJ rightfully entertained the instant case, despite
stance, petitioner cites a portion of Agpalo’s Statutory Construction which the arraignment of the accused prior to its filing, has been rendered moot
reads: and academic with the order of dismissal by the trial court dated 27
February 2003. Such contention deserves scant consideration.
For instance, the word "shall" in Section 2 of Republic Act 304 which states
that "banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the It must be stressed that the trial court dismissed the case precisely
Government shall, subject to availability of funds xxx, accept at a discount because of the Resolutions of the DOJ after it had, in grave abuse of its
at not more than two per centum for ten years such (backpay) certificate" discretion, took cognizance of the petition for review filed by petitioner.
implies not a mandatory, but a discretionary, meaning because of the Having been rendered in grave abuse of its discretion, the Resolutions of
phrase "subject to availability of funds." Similarly, the word "shall" in the the DOJ are void. As the order of dismissal of the trial court was made
provision to the effect that a corporation violating the corporation law pursuant to the void Resolutions of the DOJ, said order was likewise void.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a void judgment is a complete nullity and
without legal effect, and that all proceedings or actions founded thereon Besides, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
are themselves regarded as invalid and ineffective for any purpose. 14 That raised in, and be subject of, a petition for review on certiorari since this
respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration or appeal from the Court is not a trier of facts. This being the case, this Court cannot review
dismissal order of the trial court is of no moment. Since the dismissal was the evidence adduced by the parties before the prosecutor on the issue of
void, there was nothing for respondent to oppose. the absence or presence of probable cause.20

Petitioner further asserts that Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 applies only WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
to appeals from original resolution of the City Prosecutor and does not dated 21 July 2004 and its Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
apply in the instant case where an appeal is interposed by petitioner from 76396 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
the Resolution of the City Prosecutor denying her motion for
reinvestigation. This claim is baseless.1avvphi1.net SO ORDERED.

A reading of Section 7 discloses that there is no qualification given by the OPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188706
same provision to limit its application to appeals from original resolutions Appellee,
and not to resolutions on reinvestigation. Hence, the rule stating that Present:
"when the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish"15 finds
application in this regard. CORONA, J.,
Chairperson,
Petitioner asserts that her arraignment was null and void as the same was VELASCO, JR.,
improvidently conducted. Again, this contention is without merit. Records - versus - NACHURA,
reveal that petitioner’s arraignment was without any restriction, condition PERALTA, and
or reservation.16 In fact she was assisted by her counsels Atty. Arthur MENDOZA, JJ.
Abudiente and Atty. Maglinao when she pleaded to the charge. 17

Moreover, the settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, Promulgated:
he is deemed to have waived the right to preliminary investigation and the OSCAR M. DOCUMENTO,
right to question any irregularity that surrounds it. 18 This precept is also Appellant. March 17, 2010
applicable in cases of reinvestigation as well as in cases of review of such
reinvestigation. In this case, when petitioner unconditionally pleaded to x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
the charge, she effectively waived the reinvestigation of the case by the
prosecutor as well as the right to appeal the result thereof to the DOJ
Secretary. Thus, with the arraignment of the petitioner, the DOJ Secretary RESOLUTION
can no longer entertain the appeal or petition for review because
petitioner had already waived or abandoned the same. NACHURA, J.:

Lastly, while there is authority19 permitting the Court to make its own On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [1] dated August
determination of probable cause, such, however, cannot be made 13, 2008, affirming the Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC) Decision[3]dated June 9,
applicable in the instant case. As earlier stated, the arraignment of 2003, finding appellant Oscar Documento guilty beyond reasonable doubt
petitioner constitutes a waiver of her right to preliminary investigation or of two (2) counts of Rape.
reinvestigation. Such waiver is tantamount to a finding of probable cause.
For this reason, there is no need for the Court to determine the existence
or non-existence of probable cause.
 Documento was charged before the RTC with two (2) counts of Rape, 1. Documento started sexually molesting his daughter, AAA, in
as defined and punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, in 1989 when she was ten (10) years old. Eventually, AAA became pregnant
separate Informations, which read: and gave birth in 1993.
2. Documento raped AAA on a number of occasions in the houses
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6899 of Barsilisa Morada, Documento’s relative, and Aida Documento, both
located in Butuan City. During each incident, Documento hit and hurt AAA
That sometime on April 22, 1996 at Ochoa physically. He likewise threatened to kill her if she told anyone of the rape.
Avenue, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named 3. AAA’s mother, BBB, who was working in Manila from 1994
accused with the use of force and intimidation, did then to 1996, went to Barsilisa and asked for help in locating Oscar and AAA.
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal BBB testified that she had not seen nor heard from the two since April 7,
knowledge with his daughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of 1994, when Documento brought their daughters AAA and CCC to Tubod,
age, against her will and consent. Lanao del Norte, for a vacation. Thereafter, Documento left CCC in Tubod
and brought AAA with him to Santiago, Agusandel Norte.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to R.A. 7659). 4. When BBB found out from their relatives that AAA got pregnant
and gave birth, she suspected that Documento was the culprit. Upon
learning that Documento and AAA were in Butuan City, she went to the
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6900 Butuan Police Station and requested assistance in securing custody of AAA.
As soon as Documento was arrested, AAA informed the police that
That sometime on October 15, 1995 at Barangay Documento raped her.
Antongalon, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named 5. Dr. Hugo testified on the genital examination he conducted on
accused with the use of force and intimidation, did then AAA, and affirmed the medical certificate he issued with the following
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal findings:
knowledge with his daughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of
age, against her will and consent. Physical exam: HEENT – with in normal
limits.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 335 of the Revised Penal C/L – with in normal limits.
Code in relation to R.A. 7659).[4] CVB – with in normal limits.
ABD – Soft; NABS
GU – (-) KPS
Upon arraignment, Documento pled not guilty. Subsequently,
however, he changed his earlier plea to one of guilt. As such, the RTC Genitalia - Parrous
ordered a re-arraignment and entered appellant’s plea of guilt to the - Healed vaginal
charges. laceration
- Vaginal introitus; admits
Thereafter, the prosecution presented evidence consisting of the 2 finger[s]
testimonies of private complainant herself, AAA, her mother, BBB, and Dr. with ease
Johann A. Hugo. Their testimonies established the following: - Hymen
with pemnants “caruncula
multiforma”
 Labs; Vaginal Smear; Negative for Ruling on the appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s conviction, but
Spermatozoa.[5] changed the penalty imposed on Documento from death penalty
Documento testified as the sole witness for the defense. He toreclusion perpetua, and increased the award of moral damages
asseverated that he pled guilty to the crime of Rape only because from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each count of Rape. The fallo of the
Prosecutor Hector B. Salise convinced him to do so. Documento contended Decision reads:
that he did not rape AAA, and that, to the contrary, they had a consensual,
sexual relationship. He further alleged that the incident did not happen WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision finding
in Butuan City, but in Clarin, Misamis Occidental. Finally, on cross- appellant Oscar Documento guilty beyond reasonable
examination, Documento disowned the handwritten letters he had doubt of two counts of the crime of rape and ordering
supposedly written to his wife and to AAA, asking for their forgiveness. him to indemnify the victim for each count of rape the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00
The RTC rendered judgment convicting Documento of both counts of as exemplary damages, is AFFIRMED with the
Rape, to wit: MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
increased to P75,000.00 for each count of rape and that
WHEREFORE, as a consequence of the foregoing, in lieu of the death penalty, appellant
this Court finds accused Oscar M. Documento GUILTY Oscar Documento is hereby sentenced to suffer the
beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) counts of rape penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape
and correspondingly sentences him: without possibility of parole.

1. To suffer the penalty of DEATH in each of SO ORDERED.[8]

the two (2) rape cases filed against him - Criminal Case
No. 6899 and Criminal Case No. 6900;
Hence, this appeal, assigning the following errors:
2. To indemnify the victim, AAA, in the I
amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECIDING THE
respectively, for each count of rape in accordance with CASE WITHOUT FIRST RESOLVING ITS TERRITORIAL
recent jurisprudence. JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME CHARGED AS THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TWO (2)
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer COUNTS OF RAPE WERE PERPETRATED INBUTUAN CITY.
of accused Oscar M. Documento from Butuan City Jail to
the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa,Metro Manila. II.

Let the records of these cases be forwarded THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY INTO THE
review. VOLUNTARINESS AND FULL COMPREHENSION BY
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS
SO ORDERED.[6] PLEA.[9]

Consistent with our ruling in People v. Mateo,[7] Documento’s appeal We find no cogent reason to disturb Documento’s conviction. We
was remanded to the CA. affirm the CA, but with modification.
 On the issue of the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction over the Avenue, Butuan City on October 15, 1995 and April 22,
crime, we completely agree with the appellate court’s ruling thereon. 1996, respectively.
Contrary to the insistence of Documento that the prosecution failed to
establish that the two (2) counts of Rape were perpetrated in ButuanCity, Fourth. The inclusion of the two Barangays in the
the CA pointed to specific parts of the records which show that, although City of Butuan is a matter of mandatory judicial notice by
AAA did not specifically mention “Butuan City” in her testimony, the the trial court. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules
incidents in the present cases transpired in Barangay Antongalon and on on Evidence provides –
Ochoa Avenue, both in Butuan City.
SECTION 1. Judicial notice,
First. AAA in her Sworn Statement dated April 24, when mandatory. – A court shall take
1996 answered the prosecutor’s question in this wise: judicial notice, without the introduction
of evidence, of the existence and
15. Q : Right after you arrived territorial extent of states, their
[in] Butuan City, did your father political history, forms of government
molest you or rape you? and symbols of nationality, the law of
A : Yes, sir. nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the
Q : When was that? political constitution and history of the
A : From the month of October 15, Philippines, the official acts of the
1995 when we stayed legislative, executive and judicial
[in] Barangay Antongalon, Butuan departments of the Philippines, the
City, and the last happened in the laws of nature, the measure of time,
evening of April 22, 1996 and the geographical divisions.[10]
[on] Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City.

Second. The Resolution dated May 3, 1996 of Documento avers that his conviction for Rape must be reversed
Hector B. Salise, Second Assistant City Prosecutor, states because the trial court did not properly conduct a searching inquiry on the
that: voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea of guilt.

There were many places they We disagree.

stayed and several sexual intercourse
that took place which this office has no It is true that the appellate court noted the trial court’s failure to
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary conduct the prescribed “searching inquiry” into the matter of whether or
investigation but only on the incidents not Documento’s plea of guilt was improvidently made. Nonetheless, it still
of rape that took place found the conviction of appellant proper. Its disquisition
[in] Antongalon, Butuan City on onDocumento’s plea of guilt is in point.
October 15, 1995 and [on]Ochoa
Avenue, Butuan City on April 22, 1996. Nothing in the records of the case at bench
shows that the trial court complied with the guidelines
Third. The two (2) Informations dated May 8, [set forth by the Supreme Court in a number of cases]
1996, clearly state that the crimes charged against after appellant’s re-arraignment and guilty plea. The
appellant were perpetrated questions propounded to appellant during the direct and
in Barangay Antongalonand Ochoa
cross-examination likewise fall short of these his commission of the offense
requirements. x x x. charged.[11]

xxxx
On the whole, we find that the appellate court committed no
The questions propounded were clearly not reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling convicting Documento.
compliant with the guidelines set forth by the High Court.
The appellant was not fully apprised of the consequences Lastly, on the matter of the appellate court’s award of exemplary
of his guilty plea. In fact, as argued by appellant, “the damages, we increase the award from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line
trial court should have informed him that his plea of guilt with prevailing jurisprudence.
would not affect or reduce the imposable penalty, which
is death as he might have erroneously believed that WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision
under Article 63, the death penalty, being a single dated August 13, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR–HC No. 00285 isAFFIRMED with
indivisible penalty, shall be applied by the court the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is hereby
regardless of any mitigating circumstances that might increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. The Decision is affirmed in all
have attended the commission of the deed.” Moreover, other respects.
the trial court judge failed to inform appellant of his right
to adduce evidence despite the guilty plea. SO ORDERED.

With the trial court’s failure to comply with the G.R. No. 114331. May 27, 1997]
guidelines, appellant’s guilty plea is deemed
improvidently made and thus rendered inefficacious. CESAR E. A. VIRATA,Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
This does not mean, however, that the case should
be remanded to the trial court. This course of action is
DECISION
appropriate only when the appellant’s guilty plea was the
sole basis for his conviction. As held in People v. Mira, -
TORRES, JR., J.:
Notwithstanding the
incautiousness that attended In times past, when due process was more of a myth - empty accusations
appellant’s guilty plea, we are not have had its day. In a more enlightened age, a sage was heard to say -
inclined to remand the case to the trial Strike me if you must, but hear me first! We have come a long way, indeed,
court as suggested by appellant. for in our time one who is required to answer for an alleged wrong must at
Convictions based on an improvident least know what is it all about.
plea of guilt are set aside only if such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If This is the case before Us.
the trial court relied on sufficient and
credible evidence in finding the In this case, petitioner Cesar E. A. Virata (Virata, for brevity) is one of the
accused guilty, the judgment must be defendants in Civil Case No. 0035, entitled Republic of the Philippines
sustained, because then it is predicated versus Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et. al.. The case, which was filed by
not merely on the guilty plea of the the Presidential Commission on Good Government in behalf of the
accused but also on evidence proving Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for brevity) against fifty three
persons (53)1 including Virata, involves the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
amassed by the defendants during the twenty year reign of former of Manila, which required government capital investment amounting to
President Ferdinand Marcos. millions of pesos;

The complaint against the defendants was amended three times. The last xxx
amended complaint filed with the Sandiganbayan, hereafter known as the
expanded Second Amended Complaint, states, inter alia, the following (m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of
relevant allegations against petitioner Virata: Philguarantee officials led by Chairman Cesar E. A. Virata and the senior
managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings Incorporated led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr.,
V. SPECIFIC AVERMENTS OF DEFENDANTS ILLEGAL ACTS Jose M. Mantecon and Kurt S. Bachman, Jr., among others, the formation
of Erectors Holdings, Inc. without infusing additional capital solely for the
xxx. purpose of making it assume the obligation of Erectors Incorporated with
Philguarantee in the amount of P527,387,440.71 with insufficient
14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez securities/collaterals just to enable Erectors Inc. to appear viable and to
Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with borrow more capitals, so much so that its obligation with Philguarantee
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking has reached a total of more than P2 Billion as of June 30, 1987.
undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with
the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devises, schemes and xxx
strategems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff
and the Filipino people, among others: 17. The following Defendants acted as dummies, nominees and/or
agents by allowing themselves (i) to be used as instruments in
xxx accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions,
orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or (ii) to be
(b) gave MERALCO undue advantage (i) by effecting the increase of power incorporators, directors or members of corporations beneficially held
rates with automatic authority to tack into the consumers electric bills the and/or controlled by Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
so-called purchase and currency adjustment, and (ii) with the active Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy) T. Romualdez and Julliette Gomez
collaboration of Defendant Cesar E. A. Virata, by reducing the electric Romualdez in order (to) conceal and prevent recovery of assets
franchise tax from 5% to 2% of gross receipts and the tariff duty on fuel oil illegally obtained: xxx Cesar E. A. Virata xxx.
imports by public utilities from 20% to 10%, resulting in substantial savings
for MERALCO but without any significant benefit to the consumers of xxx
electric power and loss of millions of pesos in much needed revenues to
the government; 18. The acts of Defendants, singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful
concert with one another, constitute gross abuse of official position
xxx and authority, flagrant breach of public trust and fiduciary
obligations, acquisition of unexplained wealth, brazen abuse of right
(g) secured, in a veiled attempt to justify MERALCOs anomalous acquisition and power, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws
of the electric cooperatives, with the active collaborations of Defendants of the Republic of the Philippines, to the grave and irreparable
Cesar E. A. Virata, Juanito R. Remulla, Isidro Rodriguez, Jose C. Hernandez, damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino
Pedro Dumol, Ricardo C. Galing, Francisco C. Gatmaitan, Mario D. Camacho people."2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
and the rest of the Defendants, the approval by Defendant Ferdinand E.
Marcos and his cabinet of the so-called Three-Year Program for the Asserting that the foregoing allegations are vague and are not averred with
Extension of MERALCOs Services to Areas Within the 60-Kilometer Radius sufficient definiteness as to enable him to effectively prepare his
responsive pleading, petitioner Virata filed a motion for a bill of particulars beneficial owner and, thereby, expanding the said groups
on January 31, 1992. accumulation of ill-gotten wealth.
2. On July 11, 1978 defendant Virata representing the Republic
In a Resolution promulgated on 4 August 1992, the Sandiganbayan partially
of the Philippines as Finance Minister, executed an Agreement
granted the said motion by requiring the Republic to submit a bill of
with the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) whereby the
particulars concerning the charges against petitioner Virata stated only in
government agreed to buy the parcels of land, improvements
paragraph 17 (acting as dummy, nominee and/or agent) and paragraph 18
and facilities known as Gardner Station Unit No. 1, Gardner
(gross abuse of authority and violation of laws and the Constitution) of the
Station Unit No. 2, Snyder Station Unit No. 1, Snyder Station
expanded Second Amended Complaint. However, as to the other charges,
Unit No. 2 and Malaya Station Unit No. 1 for One Billion One
namely: 1) Viratas alleged active collaboration in the reduction of electric
Hundred Million Pesos (P1,100,000,000.00), a transaction
franchise tax and the tariff duty on fuel oil imports, as stated in paragraph
which was so disadvantageous to the government and most
14 b (ii), 2) his active collaboration in securing the approval by Ferdinand
favorable to MERALCO which gained a total of P206.2 million.
Marcos of the Three Year Program for the Extension of MERALCOs Services
As a result of this transaction, MERALCO is relieved of its heavy
to Areas within the 60 Kilometer Radius of Manila, mentioned in paragraph
burden in servicing its foreign loans which were assumed by the
14 g, and 3) his support, assistance and collaboration in the formation of
government. Furthermore, the agreement clearly showed the
Erectors Holdings Incorporated as reflected in paragraph 14 m of the
sweetheart deal and favors being given by the government to
expanded Second Amended Complaint, the Sandiganbayan declared that
MERALCO which was then owned/and or controlled by
these accusations are clear and specific enough to allow Virata to submit
Benjamin Romualdez representing the Marcos-Romualdez
an intelligent responsive pleading, hence, the motion for a bill of
group, when it provided that the sale is subject to the
particulars respecting the foregoing three charges was denied.
reservation of rights, leases and easements in favor of
Philippine Petroleum Corp., First Philippine Industrial Corp.
In view of the Sandiganbayans order of August 4, 1992 requiring the (formerly MERALCO Securities Industrial Corp.) and Pilipinas
Republic to amplify the charges in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the expanded Shell Petroleum Corp. insofar as the same are presently in force
Second Amended Complaint, the Republic through the Office of the and applicable. This enabled the Marcos-Romualdez Group to
Solicitor General submitted the bill of particulars dated October 22, 1992, further accumulate and expand the ill-gotten wealth and
hereafter called as the Limited Bill of Particulars, which was signed by a plunder the nation.
certain Ramon A. Felipe IV, who was designated in the bill of particulars as
private counsel, the relevant portion of which provides that: 3. At the meeting of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. held on September
xxx 16, 1983 defendant Virata acting as Chairman, together with
the other members of the board, approved the request of
Erectors, Inc., a Benjamin Romualdez owned and/or controlled
1. Defendant Virata, while being one of the members of the
Central Banks Monetary Board, approved Resolution No. 2320 corporation, for a guarantee to cover 100 % of its proposed
dated December 14, 1973, allowing the Benpres Corporation, behest loan of US $33.5 Million under the Central Bank
Consolidated Foreign Borrowing Program with the Philippine
Meralco Securities Corporation (MSC) and Manila Electric
National Bank, Development Bank of the Philippines, Interbank,
Company (MERALCO) to refinance/restructure their
outstanding loan obligations, a sweetheart or behest Philippine Commercial International Bank and Associated Bank
accommodation which enabled Meralco Foundation, Inc. to as conduit banks, to refinance Erectors, Inc.s short term loans
guaranteed by Philguarantee, which at present forms part of
acquire ownership and control of Manila Electric Company.
the governments huge foreign debt. Such act of defendant
Meralco Foundation, Inc. was then controlled by the Marcos-
Romualdez Group with Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez being the Virata was a flagrant breach of public trust as well as a violation
of his duty to protect the financial condition and economy of
 the country against, among others, abuses and Immediately after defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Benjamin Kokoy
corruption.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Romualdez took complete control of Meralco and its subsidiaries,
defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 551 on
On 3 December 1992, a motion to strike out the Limited Bill of Particulars September 11, 1974 which effected the reduction of electric franchise tax
and to defer the filing of the answer was filed by Virata on the grounds being paid by Meralco from 5% to 2% as well as lowered tariff duty of fuel
that the Limited Bill of Particulars avers for the first time new actionable oil imports from 20% to 10% and allowed Meralco to retain 3% reduction
wrongs allegedly committed by him in various official capacities and that in franchise tax rates thereby allowing it to save as much as P258 million as
the allegations therein do not indicate that Virata acted as dummy, of December 31, 1992.
nominee or agent but rather as a government officer, acting as such in his
own name. This motion was not acted upon by the Sandiganbayan. Defendant Cesar Virata then Minister of Finance, supported PD 551 and in
fact issued the guidelines on its implementation which were heavily relied
Way back on September 1, 1992, Virata, who was dissatisfied with the upon by the Board of Energy in its questioned ruling dated 25 November
Sandiganbayan Resolution of August 4, 1992, filed a petition 1982 by allowing Meralco to continue charging higher electric
for certiorari (G.R. No. 106527) with this Court questioning the consumption rates despite their savings from the aforesaid reduction of
Sandiganbayan s denial of his motion for a bill of particulars as regards the franchise tax without any significant benefit to the consumers of electric
first three charges stated in paragraph 14 b(ii), paragraph 14g and power and resulting in the loss of millions of pesos in much needed
paragraph 14m of the expanded Second Amended Complaint. The petition revenues to the government.
was granted by this Court in our decision promulgated on April 6, 1993.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan Resolution of August 4, 1992 to the extent 2. On the Specific Averments of Defendants Illegal Acts a (ii) [par. 14g of
that it denied the motion for a bill of particulars with respect to the first the expanded Second Amended Complaint]
three (3) charges was set aside and the Republic was required by this Court
to submit to Virata a bill of particulars containing the facts prayed for by Defendant Cesar E.A. Virata, then Prime Minester [sic], caused the issuance
the latter insofar as to these first three (3) actionable wrongs are of a confidential memorandum dated October 12, 1982 to then President
concerned.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Ferdinand E. Marcos informing the latter of the recommendation of the
cabinet of the so called Three Year Program for the Extension of Meralco
On August 20, 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Services of Areas within the 60 Kilometer Radius of Manila in order to
manifestation and motion dated August 18, 1993 alleging, inter alia, that justify Meralcos anomalous acquisition of electric cooperatives and which
the OSG and PCGG agreed that the required bill of particulars would be later required the Monetary Board and Philguarantee then headed by
filed by the PCGG since the latter is the investigating body which has the defendant Virata to recommend the restructuring of Meralcos foreign and
complete records of the case, hence, in a better position to supply the local obligation which led to the extending of loan accommodations by the
required pleading. The Sandiganbayan took note of this manifestation in a Development Bank of the Philippines and Philippine National Bank in favor
Resolution dated August 26, 1993. On the basis of this arrangement, the of Meralco.
PCGG submitted the bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993, which was
apparently signed by a certain Reynaldo G. Ros, who was named in the bill 3. On the Specific Averments of Defendants Illegal Acts a (iii) [par. 14m of
of particulars as deputized prosecutor of the PCGG. This bill of particulars, the expanded Second Amended Complaint]
which incorporates by reference the Limited Bill of Particulars of October
22, 1992, states, inter alia: Defendant Cesar Virata, as Chairman of Philguarantee and the Senior
Managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, J. Jose N.
xxx Mantecon and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., supported and assisted the formation
of Erectors Holdings, Inc. for the purpose of making it assume the
1. On the Specific Averments of Defendants Illegal Acts a (i) [paragraph 14 obligation of Erectors Inc. with Philguarantee in the amount of
b (ii) of the expanded Second Amended Complaint] P527,387,440.71 without sufficient securities/collateral and despite this
outstanding obligation, defendant Virata, as Chairman of Philguarantee, In the resolution of this incident, We find that the bill of particulars, filed
approved the Erectors Inc. Applications for loan guarantees that reached by the plaintiff on November 3, 1993 in compliance with the Supreme
more than P2 Billion as of June 30, 1987. Courts directive, appears to have substantially set out additional
averments and particulars which were not previously alleged in the
4. On the Specific Averments of Defendants Illegal Acts a (iv) [par. 17 of the Expanded Amended Complaint. We likewise consider these additional
expanded Second Amended Complaint] averments and particulars to be sufficient enough to enable defendant
Virata to frame his responsive pleading or answer and that what he feels
Plaintiff, hereby incorporates by reference plaintiffs Limited Bill of are still necessary in preparing for trial should be obtained by various
Particulars previously submitted to this Honorable Court with the modes of discovery, such as interrogatories, depositions, etc. A bill of
qualification that defendant Cesar Virata merely acted as particulars is sufficient if matters constituting the causes of action have
agent.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary already been specified with sufficient particularity and which matters are
within the moving partys knowledge. It cannot be utilized to challenge the
sufficiency of the claim asserted.
Consequently, Virata filed on November 23, 1993 his comment on the bill
of particulars with motion to dismiss the expanded Second Amended
Complaint. He alleges that both the bills of particulars dated October 22, Simplicity of pleading is the idea of modern procedure, hence, evidentiary
1992 and November 3, 1993 are pro forma and should be stricken off the facts and details should not be allowed to clutter a complaint as much as
records. According to him, the bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993 is possible, consistent with the right of the moving party to compel disclosure
merely a rehash of the assertions made in the expanded Second Amended in instances where it is beyond cavil that He cannot adequately frame a
Complaint, hence, it is not the bill of particulars that is required by this responsive pleading. In the instant case, the bill of particulars submitted by
Court in the previous case of Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, et. al. (G.R. No. the plaintiff, in Our considered opinion, is sufficient and adequate enough
106527). Furthermore, a reading of the Limited Bill of Particulars dated to fulfill its mission.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
October 22, 1992 shows that it alleges new imputations which are
immaterial to the charge of being a dummy, nominee or agent, and that Dissatisfied, Virata filed this instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
Virata acted, not as a dummy, nominee or agent of his co-defendants as the Rules of Court to challenge the foregoing Resolution of the
what is charged in the complaint, but as a government officer of the Sandiganbayan.
Republic. Virata also questions the authority of PCGG and its deputized
prosecutor to file the bill of particulars in behalf of the Republic. He asserts The issues to be resolved in the instant case are as follows:
that the legal representation of the Republic by the OSG is mandated by
law and that the Sandiganbayan, through its Resolution dated August 26, 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
1993, should not have allowed the OSG to abdicate its duty as the counsel OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
of record for the Republic. ADMITTING THE BILL OF PARTICULARS SUBMITTED BY THE REPUBLIC.

The Republic filed its Opposition to Viratas Comment to Bill of Particulars 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE
on December 17, 1993. Subsequently, Virata filed his Reply to Opposition PCGG ARE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO DEPUTIZE A COUNSEL TO FILE THE BILL
on January 18, 1994. OF PARTICULARS IN BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC.

After considering the relevant pleadings and motions submitted by the Petitioner maintains the view that the allegations in the bill of particulars
parties, the Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution of February 16, 1994, admitted of November 3, 1993 remain vague, general and ambiguous, and the
the bill of particulars submitted by the Republic and ordered Virata to file purported illegal acts imputed to Virata have not been averred with
his responsive pleading to the expanded Second Amended Complaint. The sufficient definiteness so as to inform Virata of the factual and legal basis
relevant portion of the Resolution states as follows: thereof.
Respecting the Limited Bill of Particulars dated October 22, 1992, which named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
amplifies paragraphs 17 and 18 of the expanded Second Amended omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff
Complaint, Virata reiterates his basic arguments that the Limited Bill of or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff
Particulars fails to provide the relevant and material averments sought to for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.7As
be clarified by him and that it asserts for the first time new matters long as the complaint contains these three elements, a cause of action
allegedly committed by him in different official capacities, to wit: a) as a exists even though the allegations therein are vague, and dismissal of the
member of the Central Bank Monetary Board, he, with the other Monetary action is not the proper remedy when the pleading is ambiguous because
Board members, approved Resolution No. 2320 dated December 14, 1973 the defendant may ask for more particulars. As such, Section 1, Rule 12 of
regarding the restructuring of the loans of Benpres Corporation, Meralco the Rules of Court, provides, inter alia, that a party may move for more
Securities Corporation, and the Manila Electric Company, b) as Finance definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not
Minister, he executed an agreement with Manila Electric Company in averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly
connection with the sale of lands and facilities of the Gardner Station Unit to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. Such motion shall
No. 1, Gardner Station Unit No. 2, Snyder Station Unit No. 1, Snyder Station point out the defects complained of and the details desired. Under this
Unit No. 2, and Malaya Station Unit No. 1, and, c) as Chairman of the Board Rule, the remedy available to a party who seeks clarification of any issue or
of Directors of the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee matter vaguely or obscurely pleaded by the other party, is to file a motion,
Corporation, approved the request of Erector, Incorporated, for a either for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars. 8 An order
guarantee to cover 100% of its proposed behest loan of US $ 33.5 Million directing the submission of such statement or bill, further, is proper where
under the Central Bank Consolidated Foreign Borrowing Program. He it enables the party movant intelligently to prepare a responsive pleading,
argues that the thrust of paragraphs 17 and 18 of the expanded Second or adequately to prepare for trial.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Amended Complaint is the charge that Virata acted as dummy, nominee
and/or agent, however, the foregoing allegations in the Limited Bill of A bill of particulars is a complementary procedural document consisting of
Particulars do not indicate that he acted as dummy, nominee or agent, but an amplification or more particularized outline of a pleading, and being in
rather, as a government officer. the nature of a more specific allegation of the facts recited in the
pleading.10 It is the office of the bill of particulars to inform the opposite
Invoking Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, Virata argued that both party and the court of the precise nature and character of the cause of
the bills of particulars submitted by the Republic did not follow the Rules action or defense which the pleader has attempted to set forth and
of Court and the orders of the Sandiganbayan and this Honorable Court, as thereby to guide his adversary in his preparations for trial, and reasonably
such, the failure to comply with these legal orders is a ground for dismissal to protect him against surprise at the trial.11 It gives information of the
of the action. Additionally, it is asserted that under Rule 12, Section 1(c) of specific proposition for which the pleader contends, in respect to any
the Rules of Court, if an order of the court for a bill of particulars is not material and issuable fact in the case, and it becomes a part of the
obeyed, it may order the striking out of the pleading to which the motion pleading which it supplements.12 It has been held that a bill of particulars
was directed. Accordingly, Virata prayed for the striking out of the bills of must inform the opposite party of the nature of the pleaders cause of
particulars dated October 22, 1992 and November 3, 1993 and the action or defense, and it must furnish the required items of the claim with
dismissal of the expanded Second Amended Complaint in so far as he is reasonable fullness and precision.13 Generally, it will be held sufficient if it
concerned. fairly and substantially gives the opposite party the information to which
he is entitled, as required by the terms of the application and of the order
We find the instant petition meritorious. therefor. It should be definite and specific and not contain general
allegations and conclusions. It should be reasonably certain and as specific
The rule is that a complaint must contain the ultimate facts constituting as the circumstances will allow.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
plaintiffs cause of action. A cause of action has the following elements, to
wit: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under Guided by the foregoing rules and principles, we are convinced that both
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the the bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993 and the Limited Bill of
Particulars of October 22, 1992 are couched in such general and uncertain upheld its validity in the case of Philippine Consumer Foundation, Inc. vs.
terms as would make it difficult for petitioner to submit an intelligent Board of Energy and Meralco.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
responsive pleading to the complaint and to adequately prepare for trial.
2. In the second paragraph of the said bill of particulars, it is alleged that
Let us examine the bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993: (D)efendant Cesar E.A. Virata, then Prime Minester [sic], caused the
issuance of a confidential memorandum dated October 12, 1982 to then
1. The first paragraph of the foregoing bill of particulars provides that President Ferdinand E. Marcos informing the latter of the recommendation
(I)mmediately after defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Benjamin Kokoy of the cabinet of the so called Three Year Program for the Extension of
Romualdez took control of Meralco and its subsidiaries, defendant Meralco Services of Areas within the 60 Kilometer Radius of Manila in
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 551 on September 11, order to justify Meralcos anomalous acquisition of electric cooperatives
1974 which effected the reduction of electric franchise tax being paid by and which later required the Monetary Board and Philguarantee then
Meralco from 5% to 2% as well as lowered tariff duty of fuel oil imports headed by defendant Virata to recommend the restructuring of Meralcos
from 20% to 10% and allowed Meralco to retain the 3% reduction in foreign and local obligation which led to the extending of loan
franchise tax rates thereby allowing it to save as much as P258 million as of accommodation by the Development Bank of the Philippines and
December 31, 1992. Further, it is stated that (D)efendant Cesar Virata then Philippine National Bank in favor of Meralco.
Minister of Finance, supported PD 551 and in fact issued the guidelines on
its implementation which were heavily relied upon by the Board of Energy The foregoing allegation purportedly amplifies the charge stated in
in its questioned ruling dated 25 November 1982 by allowing Meralco to paragraph 14 (g) of the expanded Second Amended Complaint, that is-
continue charging higher electric consumption rates despite their savings Viratas active collaboration in securing the approval by Ferdinand Marcos
from the aforesaid reduction of franchise tax without any significant and his cabinet of the Three Year Program for the Extension of Meralcos
benefit to the consumers of electric power and resulting in the loss of Services within the Manila Area. However, just like the first paragraph of
millions of pesos in much needed revenues to the government. the said bill of particulars, this Court finds that the second paragraph failed
to set forth particularly or specifically the charge against Virata. It is an
The abovequoted paragraph of the said bill of particulars is supposed to be incomplete or floating disclosure of material facts replete with
the amplification of the charge against Virata stated in paragraph 14(b) of generalizations and indefinite statements which seemingly ends to
the expanded Second Amended Complaint-which is his alleged active nowhere. There are certain matters alleged that need to be clarified and
collaboration in the reduction of electric franchise tax and tariff duty of filled up with details so that Virata can intelligently and fairly contest them
fuel oil imports. Yet, a careful perusal of the said paragraph shows that and raise them as cogent issues, to wit: a) In causing the issuance of the
nothing is said about his alleged active collaboration in reducing the taxes. said memorandum, what law, duty or right, if there is any, is violated by
Aside from the bare assertion that he supported PD 551 and issued the Virata?; b) What was the recommendation of the cabinet regarding the
guidelines on its implementation, the bill of particulars is disturbingly silent Three Year Program? The Republic should have at least furnish the
as to what are the particular acts of Virata that establish his active substantial or important features of the recommendation; c) What were
collaboration in the reduction of taxes. The allegation that he supported these electric cooperatives? Were these cooperatives the same as those
PD 551 and issued its implementing guidelines is an insufficient enumerated in paragraph 14(e) of the expanded Second Amended
amplification of the charge because the same is but a general statement Complaint?16 Why was the acquisition of these cooperatives anomalous?;
bereft of any particulars. It may be queried-how did Virata support PD and d) What were Viratas specific acts as the head of Philguarantee which
551? What were the specific acts indicating his support? What were these led to the restructuring of Meralcos obligation? What was his participation
implementing guidelines issued by him and when were they issued? In in recommending the restructuring of Meralcos obligation? What were
supporting PD 551 and in issuing its implementing guidelines, what law or these foreign and local obligations? How much of the obligation was
right, if there is any, is violated by Virata? It is worthy to note that, until recommended for restructuring? What were the loan accommodations
now, PD 551 has not been declared unconstitutional. In fact, this Court given in favor of Meralco? When were they given and how much were
involved in the transaction?
3. Regarding the third paragraph of the said bill of particulars, We find the which enabled Meralco Foundation, Inc. to acquire ownership and control
same as a mere recast or restatement of the charge set forth in paragraph of Manila Electric Company. It is stated further that Meralco Foundation,
14 (m) of the expanded Second Amended Complaint, which is Viratas Inc. was then controlled by the Marcos-Romualdez Group with Benjamin
alleged support, assistance and collaboration in the formation of Erectors (Kokoy) Romualdez being the beneficial owner and, thereby, expanding the
Holding, Incorporated. The said paragraph of the bill of particulars states said groups accumulation of ill gotten wealth.
that (D)efendant Cesar Virata, as Chairman of Philguarantee and the Senior
Managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, J. Jose N. It is apparent from the foregoing allegations that the Republic did not
Mantecon and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr. supported and assisted the formation furnish Virata the following material matters which are indispensable for
of Erectors Holdings, Inc. for the purpose of making it assume the him to be placed in such a situation wherein he can properly be informed
obligation of Erectors Inc. with Philguarantee in the amount of of the charges against him: a) Did Virata, who was only one of the
P527,387,440.71 without sufficient securities/collateral and despite this members of the Board, act alone in approving the Resolution? Who really
outstanding obligation, defendant Virata, as Chairman of Philguarantee, approved the Resolution, Virata or the Monetary Board?; b) What were
approved the Erectors Inc. Applications for loan guarantees that reached these outstanding loan obligations of the three corporations concerned?
more than P2 Billion as of June 30, 1987. Who were the creditors and debtors of these loan obligations? How much
were involved in the restructuring of the loan obligations? What made the
Clearly from the foregoing allegation, the Republic failed miserably to transaction a sweetheart or behest accommodation?; and c) How was the
amplify the charge against Virata because, instead of supplying the acquisition of MERALCO by Meralco Foundation, Inc. related to the
pertinent facts and specific matters that form the basis of the charge, it Resolution restructuring the loan obligations of the three corporations?
only made repetitive allegations in the bill of particulars that Virata
supported and assisted the formation of the corporation concerned, which 2. The second paragraph provides that (O)n July 11, 1978 defendant Virata
is the very same charge or allegation in paragraph 14 (m) of the expanded representing the Republic of the Philippines as Finance Minister, executed
Second Amended Complaint which requires specifications and unfailing an Agreement with the Manila Electric Co. (MERALCO) whereby the
certainty. As such, the important question as to what particular acts of government agreed to buy the parcels of land, improvements and facilities
Virata that constitute support and assistance in the formation of Erectors known as Gardner Station Unit No. 1, Gardner Station Unit No. 2, Snyder
Holding, Incorporated is still left unanswered, a product of uncertainty. Station Unit No. 1, Snyder Station Unit No. 2 and Malaya Station Unit No. 1
for One Billion One Hundred Million Pesos (P1,100,000,000.00), a
We now take a closer look at the Limited Bill of Particulars dated October transaction which was so disadvantageous to the government and most
22, 1992. favorable to MERALCO which gained a total of P206.2 million; that (A)s a
result of this transaction, MERALCO was relieved of its heavy burden in
The said bill of particulars was filed by the Republic to amplify the charge servicing its foreign loans which were assumed by the government; that
of Viratas being a dummy, nominee or agent stated in paragraphs 17 and xxx, the agreement clearly showed the sweetheart deal and favors being
18 of the expanded Second Amended Complaint. In the subsequent bill of given by the government to MERALCO which was then owned and/or
particulars dated November 3, 1993, the said charge was qualified by the controlled by Benjamin Romualdez representing the Marcos-Romualdez
Republic in the sense that Virata allegedly acted only as an agent. Let us group, when it provided that the sale is subject to the reservation of rights,
consider each paragraph of the said bill of particulars: leases and easements in favor of Philippine Petroleum Corp., First
Philippine Industrial Corp. (formerly MERALCO Securities Industrial Corp.)
1. The first paragraph of the Limited Bill of Particulars states that and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. insofar as the same are presently in
(D)efendant Virata, while being one of the members of the Central Banks force and applicable.
Monetary Board, approved Resolution No. 2320 dated December 14, 1973,
allowing the Benpres Corporation, Meralco Securities Corp. (MSC) and There are certain matters in the foregoing allegations which lack in
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) to refinance/restructure their substantial particularity. They are broad and definitely vague which require
outstanding loan obligations, a sweetheart or behest accommodation specifications in order that Virata can properly define the issues and
formulate his defenses. The following are the specific matters which the paragraphs of the Limited Bill of Particulars, Virata, in so doing the acts,
Republic failed to provide, to wit: a) What made the transaction can not be considered as an agent of any of his co-defendants, on the
disadvantageous to the government? The allegation that it was contrary, the factual circumstances stated in the said bill of particulars
disadvantageous is a conclusion of law that lacks factual basis. How did indicate that Virata acted on behalf of the government, in his official
MERALCO gain the P206.2 million? The Republic should have provided for capacity as a government officer. This observation is established by the
more specifics how was the transaction favorable to MERALCO?; b) What allegations that Virata acted as a member of the Central Bank Monetary
were these foreign obligations of MERALCO which were assumed by the Board, as chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Export and
government? Who were the creditors in these obligations? When were Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation, and, when he executed the
these obligations contracted? How much were involved in the assumption Agreement with Meralco on July 7, 1978 concerning the sale of certain
of foreign obligations by the government?; and c) By the presence of the properties, he acted as the Finance Minister of the government and as a
provision of the contract quoted by the Republic, what made the representative of the Republic in the contract. In performing the said acts,
agreement a sweetheart deal? The allegation that the agreement is a he, therefore, acted as an agent of the government, not as an agent of his
sweetheart deal is a general statement that needs further amplification. co-defendants, which is the charge against him in the expanded Second
Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the allegations in the Limited Bill of
3. The third paragraph states that (A)t the meeting of the Board of Particulars are irrelevant and immaterial to the charge that Virata acted as
Directors of the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. held an agent of his co-defendants.
on September 16, 1983 defendant Virata acting as Chairman, together with
the other members of the board, approved the request of Erectors Inc., a As clearly established by the foregoing discussion, the two bills of
Benjamin Romualdez owned and/or controlled corporation, for a particulars filed by the Republic failed to properly amplify the charges
guarantee to cover 100% of its proposed behest loan of US$ 33.5 Million leveled against Virata because, not only are they mere reiteration or
under the Central Bank Consolidated Foreign Borrowing Program with the repetition of the allegations set forth in the expanded Second Amended
Philippine National Bank, Development Bank of the Philippines, Interbank, Complaint, but, to the large extent, they contain vague, immaterial and
Philippine Commercial International Bank and Associated Bank as conduit generalized assertions which are inadmissible under our procedural rules.
banks, to refinance Erectors, Inc.s short term loans guaranteed by
Philguarantee, which at present forms part of the governments huge It must be remembered that in our decision promulgated on April 6, 1993
foreign debt; that (S)uch act of defendant Virata was a flagrant breach of (G.R. No. 106527), We required the Republic to submit a bill of particulars
public trust as well as a violation of his duty to protect the financial concerning the first three charges against Virata averred in paragraphs 14
condition and economy of the country against, among others, abuses and b(ii), 14 g, and 14 m of the expanded Second Amended Complaint, on the
corruption. other hand, as regards the charges stated in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the
said complaint, the Republic was ordered to file the required bill of
In like manner, the foregoing paragraph contains incomplete and indefinite particulars by the Sandiganbayan through its Resolution dated August 4,
statement of facts because it fails to provide the following relevant 1992. The Republic purportedly complied with these orders by filing the
matters: a) What was this $33.5 million proposed behest loan? What were questioned bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993 and the Limited Bill
its terms? Who was supposed to be the grantor of this loan?; b) What were of Particulars of October 22, 1992. However, as shown by the above
these short term loans? Who were the parties to these transactions? discussion, the two bills of particulars were not the bills of particulars
When were these transacted? How was this $ 33.5 million behest loan which fully complied with the Rules of Court and with the orders of the
related to the short term loans? Sandiganbayan and this Court.

Furthermore, as correctly asserted by petitioner Virata, the Limited Bill of As such, in view of the Republics failure to obey this Courts directive of
Particulars contains new matters which are not covered by the charge that April 6, 1993 (G.R. No. 106527) and the Sandiganbayans order of August 4,
Virata acted as agent of his co-defendants in the expanded Second 1992 to file the proper bill of particulars which would completely amplify
Amended Complaint. Apparently, as may be examined from the three the charges against Virata, this Court deems it just and proper to order the
dismissal of the expanded Second Amended Complaint, in so far as the investigating the case, was in a better position than the OSG. Armed with
charges against Virata are concerned. This action is justified by Section 3, this authority given by the OSG, the PCGG, through one of its deputized
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, which provides that: prosecutors, Reynaldo Ros, filed the bill of particulars dated November 3,
1993 to amplify the first three charges against Virata stated in paragraphs
Section 3. Failure to prosecute. - If plaintiff fails to appear at the time 14 b(ii), 14g, and 14 m of the expanded Second Amended Complaint.
of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the The action of the OSG in seeking the assistance of the PCGG is not without
action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the legal basis. The Administrative Code of 1987, which virtually reproduces
courts own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an the powers and functions of the OSG enumerated in P.D. No. 478 (The Law
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court. Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General),
(italics ours) provides, inter alia, that:

Regarding the second issue of the instant case, Virata contends that the Section 35. Powers and Functions. xxx.
Presidential Commission on Good Government is not authorized by law to
deputize a counsel to prepare and file pleadings in behalf of the Republic. It (the OSG) shall have the following specific powers and
Neither can the Office of the Solicitor General validly deputize an outside functions:
counsel to completely take over the case for the Republic. According to xxx
petitioner, only the Office of the Solicitor General is mandated by law to (8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus,
act counsel for the Republic. Thus, the bill of particulars filed for the agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear
Republic by private counsel or deputized prosecutor of the PCGG is or represent the Government in cases involving their respective
unauthorized. offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision and
control over such legal officers with respect to such cases.
This contention is devoid of merit. (9) Call on any department, bureau, office, agency, or
instrumentality of the Government for such service assistance
We are of the opinion that the Limited Bill of Particulars dated October 22, and cooperation as may be necessary in fulfilling its functions
1992 signed by Ramon Felipe IV and the Bill of Particulars dated November and responsibilities and for this purpose enlist the services of
3, 1993 signed by Reynaldo Ros are valid pleadings which are binding upon any government official or employee in the pursuit of his task.
the Republic because the two lawyer-signatories are legally deputized and xxx.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
authorized by the Office of the Solicitor General and the Presidential
Commission on Good Government to sign and file the bills of particulars Contrary to Viratas contention, the Solicitor General did not abdicate his
concerned. function and turn over the handling of the instant case to the PCGG.
Nowhere in the manifestation and motion filed by the OSG on August 20,
Realizing that it can not adequately respond to this Courts order of April 6 1993 is there an iota or indication that the OSG is withdrawing from the
1993 (G.R. No. 106527) requiring the Republic to submit the bill of case and that the PCGG is taking over its prosecution. What the OSG did
particulars concerning the first three charges against Virata, the Office of was merely to call the PCGG for assistance and authorize it to respond to
the Solicitor deemed it better to seek the help of the Presidential the motion for a bill of particulars filed by Virata. The OSG was impelled to
Commission on Good Government by availing the services of the latters act this way because of the existence of the special circumstance that the
lawyer who would directly file the required bill of particulars in behalf of PCGG, which has the complete records of the case and being in charge of
the Republic. This circumstance prompted the Office of the Solicitor its investigation, was more knowledgeable and better informed of the facts
General to manifest before the Sandiganbayan on August 20, 1993 that it of the case than the OSG.
would be the PCGG which would file the required bill of particulars and
move that it be excused from doing so as the PCGG, being in-charge of
The authority, therefore, of Attorney Reynaldo Ros to sign and submit in petitioner must know what the complaint is all about. The law requires no
behalf of the Republic the bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993 is less.
beyond dispute because 1) he was duly deputized by the PCGG in
pursuance to its power to prosecute cases of ill-gotten wealth under Although this Court is aware of the Governments laudable efforts to
Executive Order No. 14 of May 14, 1986, 2) the OSG empowered the PCGG recover ill-gotten wealth allegedly taken by the defendants, this Court,
to file the bill of particulars as evidenced by the OSGs manifestation and however, cannot shrink from its duty of upholding the supremacy of the
motion filed on August 20, 1993, and 3) there was no abdication of OSGs law under the aegis of justice and fairness. This Court in dismissing the
duty by giving the PCGG the authority to file the bill of particulars. action against the petitioner has rightfully adhered in the unyielding tenet -
principia, non homines - the rule of law, not of men.
On the other hand, the deputation of Ramon Felipe IV by the Solicitor
General to sign and file the Limited Bill of Particulars is based on Section 3 ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the expanded
of Presidential Decree No. 478, which provides that: Second Amended Complaint, in so far as petitioner Virata is concerned, is
hereby ordered DISMISSED.
Section 3. The Solicitor General may, when necessary and after
consultation with the Government entity concerned, employ, retain, SO ORDERED.
and compensate on a contractual basis, in the name of the
Government, such attorneysand experts or technical personnel as he Puno and Mendoza, JJ, concur.
may deem necessary to assist him in the discharge of his duties. The
compensation and expenses may be charged to the agency or office
Regalado, (Chairman), J., in the result.
in whose behalf the services have to be rendered. (italics ours)
G.R. No. 173588 April 22, 2009
The Solicitor General is mandated by law to act as the counsel of the
Government and its agencies in any litigation and matter requiring the
ARIEL M. LOS BAÑOS, on behalf of P/Supt. Victor Arevalo, SPO2 Marcial
services of a lawyer. In providing the legal representation for the
Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene and PO1 Raul Adlawan, and in his
Government, he is provided with vast array of powers, which includes the
personal capacity, Petitioner,
power to retain and compensate lawyers on contractual basis, necessary
vs.
to fulfill his sworn duty with the end view of upholding the interest of the
JOEL R. PEDRO, Respondent.
Government. Thus, the Solicitor General acted within the legal bounds of
its authority when it deputized Attorney Felipe IV to file in behalf of the
Republic the bill of particulars concerning the charges stated in paragraph DECISION
17 and 18 of the expanded Second Amended Complaint.
BRION, J.:
At any rate, whether or not the lawyer-signatories are duly deputized
would not be decisive in the resolution of this case considering that the We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the September 19, 2005
two bills of particulars filed by the Republic are mere scraps of paper which decision2 and the July 6, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
miserably failed to amplify the charges against Virata. For the Republics CA-G.R. SP No. 80223. The petition seeks to revive the case against
failure to comply with the courts order to file the required bill of respondent Joel R. Pedro (Pedro) for election gun ban violation after the
particulars that would completely and fully inform Virata of the charges CA declared the case permanently dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule
against him, the dismissal of the action against him is proper based on 117 of the Rules of Court.
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court and the relevant
jurisprudence thereon.18 Simple justice demands that as stated earlier, THE ANTECEDENTS
Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without the Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC
required written authorization from the Commission on Elections granted.7 The preliminary investigation, however, did not materialize.
(Comelec) a day before the May 14, 2001 national and local elections. The Instead, Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash, arguing that the
Information reads: Information "contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification8 and/or that the facts charged do not constitute an
That on or about the 13th day of May 2001 at about 4:00 o’clock in the offense."9 Pedro attached to his motion a Comelec Certification dated
afternoon, in [S]itio Bantauyan, [B]arangay Bantad, Municipality of Boac, September 24, 2001 that he was "exempted" from the gun ban. The
Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this provincial prosecutor opposed the motion.
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carry a Revolver Cal. 357, Magnum Ruger 100 The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the
loaded with six (6) ammunitions, with Serial No. 173-56836 outside his prosecutors to return the seized articles to Pedro.10
residence during the election period, without authorization in writing from
the Commission on Election[s]. The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los Baños (Los Baños),
representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedro’s
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 Comelec Certification was a "falsification," and the prosecution was
"deprived of due process" when the judge quashed the information
The accusation was based on Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus without a hearing. Attached to Los Baños’ motion were two Comelec
Election Code (Code) after the Marinduque Philippine National Police certifications stating that: (1) Pedro was not exempted from the firearm
(PNP) caught Pedro illegally carrying his firearm at a checkpoint at Boac, ban; and (2) the signatures in the Comelec Certification of September 24,
Marinduque. The Boac checkpoint team was composed of Police Senior 2001 were forged.
Inspector Victor V. Arevalo, SPO2 Marshal Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene,
and PO1 Raul Adlawan. The team stopped a silver-gray Toyota Hi-Ace with The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as Pedro did not
plate number WHT-371 on the national highway, coming from the Boac object to Los Baños’ motion.11 Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the
town proper. When Pedro (who was seated at the rear portion) opened RTC’s order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117,12 arguing that the
the window, Arevalo saw a gun carry case beside him. Pedro could not dismissal had become permanent. He likewise cited the public prosecutor’s
show any COMELEC authority to carry a firearm when the checkpoint team lack of express approval of the motion to reopen the case.
asked for one, but he opened the case when asked to do so. The
checkpoint team saw the following when the case was opened: 1) one The public prosecutor, however, manifested his express conformity with
Revolver 357 Magnum Ruger GP100, serial number 173-56836, loaded the motion to reopen the case. The trial court, for its part, rejected the
with six ammunitions; 2) one ammunition box containing 100 bullets; 3) position that Section 8, Rule 117 applies, and explained that this provision
two pieces speed loader with six ammunitions each; and 4) one set ear refers to situations where both the prosecution and the accused mutually
protector. Pedro was with three other men. The checkpoint team brought consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the
all of them to the Boac police station for investigation. offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a
situation where the information was quashed upon motion of the accused
The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro’s
violating the election gun ban, i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of his arraignment date.
residence or place of business without any authority from the Comelec.
After an inquest, the Marinduque provincial prosecutor filed the above Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify
Information against Pedro with the Marinduque Regional Trial Court (RTC) the RTC’s mandated reopening.13 He argued that the RTC committed grave
for violation of the Code’s Article XXII, Section 261 (q),5 in relation to abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that
Section 264.6 the dismissal contemplated under Section 8, Rule 117 refers to situations
where either the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to, or
where the prosecution alone moved for, the provisional dismissal of the 3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing
case; in rejecting his argument that the prescriptive periods under Article the case provisionally;
90 of the Revised Penal Code14 or Act No. 332615 find no application to his
case as the filing of the Information against him stopped the running of the 4. the public prosecutor is served, with a copy of the order of
prescriptive periods so that the prescription mandated by these laws provisional dismissal of the case.
became irrelevant; and, in setting the case for arraignment and pre-trial
conference, despite being barred under Section 8 of Rule 117. Although the second paragraph of Section 8 states that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof,
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION without the case having been revived, such provision should be construed
to mean that the dismissal shall become permanent one year after service
The CA initially denied Pedro’s petition. For accuracy, we quote the of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor, as the public prosecutor
material portions of its ruling: cannot be expected to comply with the timeliness requirement unless he is
served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
The petition lacks merit.
In the instant, case, the records are bereft of proof as to when the public
The trial court erred in ruling that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to prosecutor was served the order of dismissal dated 22 November 2001.
provisional dismissals on motion of the accused. The Rule merely provides Absent such proof, we cannot declare that the State is barred from
that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed, except with the express reviving the case.
consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. Nothing in
the said rule proscribes its application to dismissal on motion of the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
accused.
In his motion for reconsideration, Pedro manifested the exact date and
Nevertheless, we find no basis for issuing the extraordinary writs of time of the Marinduque provincial prosecutor’s receipt of the quashal
certiorari and prohibition, as there is no showing that the error was tainted order to be "2:35 p.m., December 10, 2001," and argued that based on this
with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious date, the provisional dismissal of the case became "permanent" on
and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The December 10, 2002. Based on this information, the CA reversed itself,
grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an ruling as follows:
evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
On 9 September 2005, we ruled that Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to a
Before the petitioner may invoke the time-bar in Section 8, he must dismissal on motion of the accused. However, we did not issue the writs of
establish the following: certiorari and prohibition, because it was shown that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reopening of the case.
1. the prosecution, with the express conformity of the accused or Moreover, we stated that we cannot rule on the issue of whether or not
the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the the State is barred from reopening the case because it was not shown
case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a when the public prosecutor was served the order of dismissal.
provisional dismissal of the case;
xxx
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case; The arguments raised in the respondents’ motion for modification were
duly passed upon in arriving at the decision dated 9 September 2005, and
no new matters were raised which would warrant a reconsideration year from the prosecutor’s receipt of the order; the order to quash the
thereof. Information was based on Section 3 of Rule 117, not on Section 8 of this
Rule; (2) it granted Pedro’s motion for reconsideration and denied Los
On the other hand, the petitioner was able to prove that the motion to Baños’ motion for modification of judgment, when Section 6 of Rule 117
reopen the case was filed after the lapse of more than one year from the clearly provides that an order granting a motion to quash is not a bar to
time the public prosecutor was served the notice of dismissal. Therefore, another prosecution for the same offense.
the state is barred from reopening the case.
He notes that the grounds Pedro relied upon in his motion to quash are
WHEREFORE, petitioner Joel Pedro’s motion for partial reconsideration is not subsections (g) or (i) of Rule 117, but its subsections (a) – that the facts
hereby GRANTED, and respondent Ariel Los Banos’ motion for modification charged do not constitute an offense, and (h) – that it contains averments
of judgment is, accordingly, DENIED. which if true would constitute a legal justification. Pedro’s cited grounds
are not the exceptions that would bar another prosecution for the same
To summarize this ruling, the appellate court, while initially saying that offense.18 The dismissal of a criminal case upon the express application of
there was an error of law but no grave abuse of discretion that would call the accused (under subsections [a] and [h]) is not a bar to another
for the issuance of a writ, reversed itself on motion for reconsideration; it prosecution for the same offense, because his application is a waiver of his
then ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion because it constitutional prerogative against double jeopardy.
failed to apply Section 8, Rule 17 and the time-bar under this provision.
In response to all these, respondent Pedro insists and fully relies on the
THE PETITION application of Section 8 of Rule 117 to support his position that the RTC
should not have granted Los Banos’ motion to reopen the case.
Los Baños prays in his petition that the case be remanded to the RTC for
arraignment and trial, or that a new charge sheet be filed against Pedro, or THE ISSUES
that the old information be re-filed with the RTC. He contends that under
Section 6 of Rule 117, an order sustaining a motion to quash does not bar The issue is ultimately reduced to whether Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable
another prosecution for the same offense, unless the motion was based on to the case, as the CA found. If it applies, then the CA ruling effectively lays
the grounds specified in Section 3(g)16 and (i)17 of Rule 117. Los Baños the matter to rest. If it does not, then the revised RTC decision reopening
argues that the dismissal under Section 8 of Rule 117 covers only situations the case should prevail.
where both the prosecution and the accused either mutually consented or
agreed to, or where the prosecution alone moved for the provisional OUR RULING
dismissal of the case; it can also apply to instances of failure on the part of
the prosecution or the offended party to object, after having been We find the petition meritorious and hold that the case should be
forewarned or cautioned that its case will be dismissed. It does not apply remanded to the trial court for arraignment and trial.
where the information was quashed. He adds that although the trial court
granted the motion to quash, it did not categorically dismiss the case, Quashal v. Provisional Dismissal
either provisionally or permanently, as the judge simply ordered the return
of the confiscated arms and ammunition to Pedro. The order was "open-
a. Motion to Quash
ended," and did not have the effect of provisionally dismissing the case
under Section 8 of Rule 117.
A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before
entering his plea, the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal
Los Baños also contends that the CA gravely erred when: (1) it ruled in
information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or
effect that the Order dated November 22, 2001 granting the motion to
for defect apparent on the face of the Information. 19 The motion, as a rule,
quash is considered a provisional dismissal, which became permanent one
hypothetically admits the truth of the facts spelled out in the complaint or permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having
information. The rules governing a motion to quash are found under Rule been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of
117 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 3 of this Rule enumerates the more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become
grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information, as follows: permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived.
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur:
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; 1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or
the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its
person of the accused; provisional dismissal;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to 2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
do so; dismissal of the case;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; 3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing
the case provisionally; and
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; 4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case.20
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
In People v. Lacson,21 we ruled that there are sine quanon requirements in
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a the application of the time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of
legal excuse or justification; and Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the time-bar under the foregoing
provision is a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State
to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of
inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to
the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.
otherwise terminated without his express consent.

c. Their Comparison
b. Provisional Dismissal

An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a dismissal based on a

On the other hand, Section 8, Rule 117 that is at the center of the dispute
motion to quash and a provisional dismissal are far different from one
states that:
another as concepts, in their features, and legal consequences. While the
provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion
SEC.8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed
to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional
except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
offended party.
A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it does not exactly
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not
state what a provisional dismissal is. The modifier "provisional" directly
exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become
suggests that the dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those suggests that a dismissal under Section 8 – i.e., one with the express
that are temporary in character (i.e., to dismissals that are without consent of the accused – is not intended to lead to double jeopardy as
prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are provided under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further
permanent (i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the case). Based on the law, prosecution under the special terms of Section 8.
rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those barred by the
principle of double jeopardy,22 by the previous extinction of criminal This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects of
liability,23 by the rule on speedy trial,24 and the dismissals after plea sustaining a motion to quash – the dismissal is not a bar to another
without the express consent of the accused. 25 Section 8, by its own terms, prosecution for the same offense – unless the basis for the dismissal is the
cannot cover these dismissals because they are not provisional. extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms,
read in relation with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with the
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable implications that cannot but
provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to quash lead to distinctions between a quashal and a provisional dismissal under
whose grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation of the Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has
grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a been provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion
class in itself, with specific and closely-defined characteristics under the to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The failure of the Rules
Rules of Court. A necessary consequence is that where the grounds cited to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to
are those listed under Section 3, then the appropriate remedy is to file a further prosecution shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal
motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely, where a ground does based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused
not appear under Section 3, then a motion to quash is not a proper with one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from
remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal may then apply if the motion to quash, and merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to
conditions required by Section 8 obtain. dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a
dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and
A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses on the consequences its time-bar does not apply.
of a meritorious motion to quash. This feature also answers the question
of whether the quashal of an information can be treated as a provisional Other than the above, we note also the following differences stressing that
dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 117 unmistakably provide for the a motion to quash and its resulting dismissal is a unique class that should
consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. Section 4 speaks of an not be confused with other dismissals:
amendment of the complaint or information, if the motion to quash
relates to a defect curable by amendment. Section 5 dwells on the effect of First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to
sustaining the motion to quash - the complaint or information may be re- question the efficacy of the complaint or information filed against
filed, except for the instances mentioned under Section 6. The latter him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case may be
section, on the other hand, specifies the limit of the re-filing that Section 5 provisionally dismissed at the instance of either the prosecution
allows – it cannot be done where the dismissal is based on extinction of or the accused, or both, subject to the conditions enumerated
criminal liability or double jeopardy. Section 7 defines double jeopardy and under Section 8, Rule 117.26
complements the ground provided under Section 3(i) and the exception
stated in Section 6.1awwphi1 Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated
under Section 2 of Rule 117; these requirements do not apply to a
Rather than going into specifics, Section 8 simply states when a provisional provisional dismissal.
dismissal can be made, i.e., when the accused expressly consents and the
offended party is given notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal
relates directly to what Section 3(i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., the complaint or the criminal information for defects or defenses
conditions for dismissals that lead to double jeopardy. This immediately apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may
 be grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not
information. constitute an offense [Section 3(a), Rule 117]. We find from our
examination of the records that the Information duly charged a specific
Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment offense and provides the details on how the offense was
(Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional dismissal of the committed.28 Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no merit. On the
case even when the trial proper of the case is already underway other hand, we do not see on the face or from the averments of the
provided that the required consents are present.27 Information any legal excuse or justification. The cited basis, in fact, for
Pedro’s motion to quash was a Comelec Certification (dated September 24,
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent 2001, issued by Director Jose P. Balbuena, Sr. of the Law Department,
until the time-bar applies, at which time it becomes a permanent Committee on Firearms and Security Personnel of the Comelec, granting
dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed stays him an exemption from the ban and a permit to carry firearms during the
quashed until revived; the grant of a motion to quash does not election period)29 that Pedro attached to his motion to quash. This
per se carry any connotation of impermanence, and becomes so COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate
only as provided by law or by the Rules. In re-filing the case, what motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash grounded on
is important is the question of whether the action can still be legal excuse or justification found on the face of the Information.
brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action or of the offense Significantly, no hearing was ever called to allow the prosecution to
has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-filing after contest the genuineness of the COMELEC certification. 30
the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate consideration.
Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts Information was in order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated
whose respective rules refer to different situations that should not be the true nature, function, and utility of a motion to quash. As a
confused with one another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro
extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face, should now be arraigned and stand trial.
the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All
other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, One final observation: the Information was not rendered defective by the
before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall fact that Pedro was charged of violating Section 261(q) of the Code,
under provisional dismissal. instead of Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which amended Section 261(q);
these two sections aim to penalize among others, the carrying of firearms
Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to the (or other deadly weapons) in public places during the election period
reopening of the case that the RTC ordered and which the CA reversed; the without the authority of the Comelec. The established rule is that the
reversal of the CA’s order is legally proper. character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated; the crime committed is determined by the recital of
Pedro’s Motion to Quash
the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information31 Further, in Abenes v. Court of Appeals, 32 we specifically
The merits of the grant of the motion to quash that the RTC initially
recognized that the amendment under Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 does
ordered is not a matter that has been ruled upon in the subsequent not affect the prosecution of the accused who was charged under Section
proceedings in the courts below, including the CA. We feel obliged to refer
261(q) of the Code.
back to this ruling, however, to determine the exact terms of the remand
of the case to the RTC that we shall order.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and accordingly declare the
assailed September 19, 2005 decision and the July 6, 2006 resolution of the
The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80223 respectively MODIFIED and
contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
REVERSED. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Boac, A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was approved for the excavation of
Marinduque for the arraignment and trial of respondent Joel R. Pedro, unsuitable materials and road filling works. As a consequence, Arceo Cruz
after reflecting in the Information the amendment introduced on Section of A.C. Cruz Construction submitted the fourth billing and Report of
261(q) of the Code by Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166. Physical Accomplishments on 6 May 1991. Fajutag, Jr., however,
discovered certain deficiencies. As a result, he issued Work Instruction No.
SO ORDERED. 1 requiring some supporting documents, such as: (1) copy of approved
concrete pouring; (2) survey results of original ground and finished leaks;
ARTURO D. BRION (3) volume calculation of earth fill actually rendered on site; (4) test results
Associate Justice as to the quality of materials and compaction; and (5) copy of work
instructions attesting to the demolished concrete structures.61avvphi1.zw+
G.R. No. 180122 March 13, 2009
The contractor failed to comply with the work instruction. Upon Fajutag,
Jr.’s further verification, it was established that there was no actual
FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., Petitioner,
excavation and road filling works undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction.
vs.
Fajutag, Jr.’s findings are summarized as follows:
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
1. No topographic map was appended, even if the same is
necessary in land development works; a discarded drawing sheet:
DECISION
"Spot Elevations and Existing Gradelines" of the project site was
found, but this contrasted significantly with the alleged joint-
TINGA, J.:
survey results in support of the Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1;

This is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
2. No laboratory tests were conducted to ascertain unsuitability of
Procedure assailing the Resolution2dated 2 March 2007 of the First Division
materials, even if the same should have been required as essential
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26583 entitled, "People of the
basis thereof;
Philippines v. Robert P. Balao, et al.," which denied petitioner Felicisimo F.
Lazarte, Jr.’s Motion to Quash. The Resolution3 dated 18 October 2007 of
3. There were no records of the excavation and disposal of
said court denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is likewise
unsuitable materials and of road filling works having been made
challenged in this petition.
by the previous engineers, Rodolfo de los Santos and Noel Lobrido
at the time said activities were allegedly executed;
The antecedents follow.
4. The excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works
In June 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded the original
were overestimated to the prejudice of the government:
contract for the infrastructure works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services
Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City to A.C. Cruz Construction. The project, with
a. in a 10.00 meter right-of-way (ROW) road, the entire
a contract cost of P7,666,507.55, was funded by the World Bank under the
width of 10.00 meters was used in calculating the volume
Project Loan Agreement forged on 10 June 1983 between the Philippine
of cut of unsuitable materials when the undisturbed
Government and the IBRD-World Bank.4
natural grounds on both sides of the road was only 6.00
meters;
A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the infrastructure works on 1 August
1990.5 In April 1991, the complainant Candido M. Fajutag, Jr.(Fajutag, Jr.)
b. the mathematical calculation in determining the
was designated Project Engineer of the project.
volume of cut of unsuitable materials are contrary to the
 contract’s technical specifications which provides for cut In March 1992, the NHA Board of Directors, per Resolution No. 2453,
measurements, i.e.[,] by end-area method; approved the mutual termination of the A.C. Cruz Construction contract
and awarded the remaining work to Triad Construction and Development
c. in a 10.00 ROW road, an effective width of 8.70 meters Corporation (Triad). The contract amount for the remaining work
was used in calculating the volume of road fill when the was P9,554,837.32.11 Thereafter, representatives from A.C. Cruz
undisturbed natural grounds on both sides of the road Construction, Triad and NHA-Bacolod conducted a joint measurement at
was only 6.00 meters apart; the site to determine the total accomplishment of A.C. Cruz Construction
inclusive of accomplishments after NHA inventory.
d. the mathematical calculations in determining the
volume of roadfill are contrary to the contract’s technical The Project Office was subsequently informed by the Central Office that
specifications, specifically Section 3.11 thereof, i.e., by the accomplishments made by A.C. Cruz Construction after the NHA
end-area method. inventory would be paid directly to said contractor by Triad. As of 27
March 1992, Triad had issued checks in favor of A.C. Cruz Construction
5. No laboratory test was made to ascertain the quality of amounting to One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) which were received by
imported road fill materials.7 Arceo M. Cruz per Official Receipt No. 3003.12

In a Memorandum dated 27 June 1991, the Project Office recommended In its Memorandum dated 22 June 1992, the Regional Projects Department
the termination of the infrastructure contract with A.C. Construction. 8 recommended to the General Manager that the fund settlement to A.C.
Cruz Construction be effected.13
In its Report dated 12 August 1991, the Inventory and Acceptance
Committee determined the total accomplishment of the contractor at Thereafter, Triad discovered that certain work items that had been in
40.89%, representing P3,433,713.10 out of the total revised contract under the inventory report as accomplished and acceptable were in fact
amount of P8,397,225.09 inclusive of Variation Order No. 1 in the amount non-existent. Fajutag, Jr. brought these irregularities to the attention of
of P710,717.54. Thereafter, said Committee recommended that the the Commission on Audit (COA).
temporary project suspension imposed by the contractor, which incurred
delays in the project completion, be referred to the Legal Department for After its special audit investigation, the COA uncovered some anomalies,
appropriate action.9 among which, are ghost activities, specifically the excavation of unsuitable
materials and road filling works and substandard, defective workmanship.
On 19 August 1991, the Manager of the Legal Department issued a Laboratory tests confirmed the irregularities. 14
Memorandum addressed to the General Manager of NHA endorsing
approval of the Regional Projects Department’s (RPD’s) recommendation. Further, according to the COA, while it is true that the fourth billing of A.C.
The NHA General Manager through a letter dated 29 August 1991 Cruz Construction had not been paid its accomplishments after the August
informed the contractor of the rescission of his contract for the 1991 inventory found acceptable by NHA amounting to P896,177.08 were
development of the said project upon his receipt thereof without prejudice paid directly by Triad. Effectively, A.C. Cruz Construction had been
to NHA’s enforcing its right under the contract in view of the contractor’s overpaid by as much as P232,628.35, which amount is more than the net
unilateral and unauthorized suspension of the contract works amounting payment due per the computation of the unpaid fourth billing. 15
to abandonment of the project. Despite the rescission notice issued by the
NHA per letter dated 29 August 1991, the contractor continued working Consequently, petitioner, as manager of the Regional Projects Department
intermittently with very minimal workforce until such time as the award of and Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee, and other NHA
remaining infrastructure works is effected by NHA to another contractor. 10 officials were charged in an Information16 dated 5 March 2001, worded as
follows:
 INFORMATION them have been violated by the inadequacy of the information; and (4) the
prosecution failed to determine the individual participation of all the
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor II of the Office of the accused in the information in disobedience with the Resolution dated 27
Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses ROBERT P. BALAO, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, March 2005.18
JR., VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, JOSEPHINE O. ANGSICO, JOSEPHINE T.
ESPINOSA, NOEL H. LOBRIDO AND ARCEO C. CRUZ for VIOLATION OF On 2 March 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution
SECTION 3 (e) of REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT denying petitioner’s motion to quash. We quote the said resolution in part:
AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows:
Among the accused-movants, the public officer whose participation in the
That in or about the month of March, 1992 at Bacolod City, Province of alleged offense is specifically mentioned in the May 30, 2006
Negros Occidental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Memorandum is accused Felicisimo Lazarte, Jr., the Chairman of the
Court, above-named accused, ROBERT P. BALAO, JOSEPHINE C. ANGSICO, Inventory and Acceptance Committee (IAC), which undertook the
VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, inventory and final quantification of the accomplishment of A.C. Cruz
and NOEL H. LOBRIDO, Public Officers, being the Construction. The allegations of Lazarte that the IAC, due to certain
constraints, allegedly had to rely on the reports of the field engineers
General Manager, Team Head, Visayas Mgt. Office, Division Manager and/or the Project Office as to which materials were actually installed; and
(Visayas), Manager, RPD, Project Mgt. Officer A and Supervising Engineer, that he supposedly affixed his signature to the IAC Physical Inventory
Diliman, Quezon City, in such capacity and committing the offense in Report and Memoranda dated August 12, 1991 despite his not being able
relation to office and while in the performance of their official functions, to attend the actual inspection because he allegedly saw that all the
conniving, confederating and mutually helping with each other and with members of the Committee had already signed are matters of defense
accused ARCEO C. CRUZ, a private individual and General Manager of A.C. which he can address in the course of the trial. Hence, the quashal of the
Cruz Construction with address at 7486 Bagtikan Street, Makati City with information with respect to accused Lazarte is denied for lack of merit.
deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause to be paid to A.C. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby resolves as
Construction public funds in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY TWO follows:
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS and THIRTY FIVE
CENTAVOS (P232,628.35) PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, supposedly for the (1) Accused Robert Balao, Josephine Angsico and Virgilio Dacalos’
excavation and roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Motion to Admit Motion to Quash dated October 4, 2006 is
Project in Bacolod City despite the fact no such works were undertaken by GRANTED; the Motion to Quash dated October 4, 2006 attached
A.C. Construction as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by the thereto, is GRANTED. Accordingly, the case is hereby DISMISSED
Commission on Audit, thus accused public officials in the performance of insofar as the said accused-movants are concerned.
their official functions had given unwarranted benefits, advantage and
preference to accused Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Construction and themselves (2) The Motion to Quash dated October 2, 2006 of accused
to the damage and prejudice of the government.
Engr. Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Let the
CONTRARY TO LAW.17 arraignment of the accused proceed as scheduled on March 13, 2007.

On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information SO ORDERED.19

raising the following grounds: (1) the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense; (2) the information does not conform
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed resolution
substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the constitutional rights of the
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Pertinently, it held:
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against
The Motion for Reconsideration of accused Lazarte, Jr. merely reiterated lack or excess of jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan in: (1) upholding the
the grounds and arguments which had been duly considered and passed validity and sufficiency of the Information despite its failure to make out an
upon in the assailed Resolution. Nonetheless, after a careful review of the offense and conform to the prescribed form; (2) denying his motion to
same, the Court still finds no cogent reason to disturb the finding of quash considering that the remaining averments in the Information have
probable cause of the Office of the Ombudsman to indict accused Lazarte, been rendered unintelligible by the dismissal of the charges against some
Jr., Espinosa, Lobrido and Cruz of the offense charged. In its Memorandum of his co-accused; and (3) using as bases the Prosecution’s Memoranda
dated July 27, 2004 and May 30, 2006, the prosecution was able to show dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May 2006 to supplement the inadequacies of
with sufficient particularity the respective participation of the the Information. In addition, petitioner avers that his constitutional right to
aforementioned accused in the commission of the offense charged. The be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him had
rest of the factual issues by accused Lazarte, Jr. would require the been violated for failure of the Information to specify his participation in
presentation of evidence in the course of the trial of this case. the commission of the offense. Petitioner also argues that the facts
charged in the Information do not constitute an offense as no damage or
The Court also maintains the validity and sufficiency of the information injury had been made or caused to any party or to the government. Finally,
against accused Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, Lobrido and Cruz. The information petitioner maintains that the Sandiganbayan lost its jurisdiction over him
has particularly alleged the ultimate facts constituting the essential upon the dismissal of the charges against his co-accused as the remaining
elements of the offense charged which are as follows: accused are public officers whose salary grade is below 27.

1. that accused Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, and Lobrido are public In its Comment21 dated 21 December 2007, the Office of the Ombudsman,
officers being the Department Manager, Project Management through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, counters that separate
Officer A, and Supervising Engineer of the NHA during the time allegations of individual acts perpetrated by the conspirators are not
material in the criminal information; and required in an Information and neither should they be covered by evidence
submitted to establish the existence of probable cause. Allegations
2. that the said accused, in their respective official capacities and regarding the nature and extent of petitioner’s participation and
in conspiracy with accused Cruz, a private individual and the justification for his acts which constitute the offense charged are
General manager of A.C. Cruz Construction, have acted with evidentiary matters which are more properly addressed during trial. The
manifest partiality or evident bad faith and have given Ombudsman reiterates our ruling in Ingco v. Sandiganbayan22 that the
unwarranted benefits, preference, and advantage to Arceo C. Cruz fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash is the
and A.C. Cruz Construction or have caused damage and prejudice sufficiency of the averments in the information that is, whether the facts
to the government, by "[causing] to be paid A.C. Cruz asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
Construction public funds in the amount of Two Hundred Thirty elements of the crime defined by law. And relying on the case of Domingo
Two Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Eight Pesos and Thirty Five v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Ombudsman states that informations need only
Centavos (P232,628.35) supposedly for the excavation and state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor are to be proved during the
roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in trial.24 The Ombudsman moreover maintains that the Sandiganbayan has
Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken jurisdiction over petitioner. The Ombudsman argues that it is of no
by A.C. Cruz Construction as revealed by the Special Audit moment that petitioner’s position is classified as
conducted by the Commission on Audit."
salary grade 26 as he is a manager within the legal contemplation of
The other factual details which accused Lazarte, Jr. cited are matters of paragraph 1(g), Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 8249.25
evidence best threshed out in the course of the trial. 20
In his Reply26 dated 9 October 2008, petitioner strongly asseverates that,
Hence, the instant petition which is a reiteration of petitioner’s according to the Constitution, in a conspiracy indictment the participation
submissions. Petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion amounting to of each accused in the so-called conspiracy theory should be detailed in
order to apprise the accused of the nature of the accusation against them SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.—A complaint or
in relation to the participation of the other accused. A general statement information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the
that all the accused conspired with each other without stating the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omissions complained
participation of each runs afoul of the Constitution.27 Petitioner adds that of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
the ultimate facts intended by law refer to determinate facts and approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein
circumstances which should become the basis of the cause of action; the offense was committed.
statement of facts which would be in complete accord with the
constitutional requirement of giving the accused sufficient information When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall
about the nature and the cause of the accusation against him.28 Petitioner be included in the complaint or information.
also avers that the Ombudsman’s reliance on and citation of the cases of
Ingco v. Sandiganbayan29 and Domingo v. Sandiganbayan30 is misplaced The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
and misleading. sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the proper
Petitioner’s main argument is that the Information filed before the judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements
Sandiganbayan insufficiently averred the essential elements of the crime of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
charged as it failed to specify the individual participation of all the accused. included therein must be determined by reference to the definition and
elements of the specific crimes.35
The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such
particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the
At the outset, it should be stressed that the denial of a motion to quash is offense charged. The raison d’etre of the rule is to enable the accused to
not correctible by certiorari. Well-established is the rule that when a suitably prepare his defense.36 Another purpose is to enable accused, if
motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the
for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to same offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient.37
measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are
frowned upon and often dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is to Pertinently, Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court.31 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, reads:

This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or
denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in excess omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
prohibition lies.32 And in the case at bar, the Court does not find the declared to be unlawful:
Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of discretion.
xxx
The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
the essential elements of the crime defined in law. 33 Matters aliunde will preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
not be considered.34 functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
Corollarily, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states that:
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant Information, the Court underscores the fact that under Philippine law,
of licenses or permits or other concessions. 38 conspiracy should be understood on two levels. Conspiracy can be a mode
of committing a crime or it may be constitutive of the crime itself.
The essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 are as Generally, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a
follows: crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in
conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition.40
1. The accused is a public officer or private person charged in
conspiracy with him; When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the
elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information.
2. Said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the But when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the
performance of his official duties or in relation to his public mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar, there is less necessity
position; of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not
the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only
because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy
3. He causes undue injury to any party, whether the government
and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of
or private party;
their participation in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective
and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for
4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
the act of one is the act of all.41
advantage or preference to such parties; and
Notably, in People v. Quitlong,42 as pointed out by respondent, the Court
5. The public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident
ruled on how conspiracy as a mode of committing the offense should be
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.39
alleged in the Information, viz:

The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the essential
x x x Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual
elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information
acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the
specifically alleges that petitioner, Espinosa and Lobrido are public officers
act of one being imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused must know
being then the Department Manager, Project Management Officer A and
from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only
Supervising Engineer of the NHA respectively; in such capacity and
for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
committing the offense in relation to the office and while in the
performance of their official functions, connived, confederated and
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of
mutually helped each other and with accused Arceo C. Cruz, with
conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the
deliberate intent through manifest partiality and evident bad faith gave
parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design
unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and to
or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the
themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government. The
conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same
felonious act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction
degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is
public funds in the amount of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and
enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be
road filling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod
constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much
City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken by said
certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable
construction company as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by COA.
a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with
such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a
On the contention that the Information did not detail the individual
subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that
participation of the accused in the allegation of conspiracy in the
an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute
and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is of his co-accused, the Court finds that the Information sufficiently makes
charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the out a case against petitioner and the remaining accused.
statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object
of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated With regard to the alleged irregular use by the Sandiganbayan of the
crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. Prosecution’s Memoranda dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May 2006 to
842-844). supplement the inadequacies of the Information, the Court finds adequate
its explanation in the first assailed resolution, to wit:
x x x Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy It may be recalled that a reinvestigation of the case was ordered by this
comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, Court because the prosecution failed to satisfactorily comply with an
to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the earlier directive of the former Chairperson and Members of the First
information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the Division, after noting the inadequacy of the information, to clarify the
crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or participation of each of the accused. In ordering the reinvestigation, the
an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an Court noted that the prosecution’s July 27, 2004 Memorandum did not
allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or address the apprehensions of the former Chairperson and Members of the
"confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in First Division as to the inadequacy of the allegations in the information.
the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In
fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the This time, despite a reinvestigation, the prosecution’s Memorandum dated
community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either May 30, 2006 still failed to specify the participation of accused-movants
by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by Balao, Angsico and Dacalos. The most recent findings of the prosecution
allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be still do not address the deficiency found by the Court in the information.
alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can The prosecution avers that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of
aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to Court, in determining the viability of a motion to quash based on the
the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing ground of "facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense,"
conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not the test must be whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically
necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime as defined
and conduct of the accused.43 by law. The prosecution contends that matter aliunde should not be
considered. However, in the instant case, the Court has found the
In addition, the allegation of conspiracy in the Information should not be information itself to be inadequate, as it does not satisfy the requirements
confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. of particularly alleging the acts or omissions of the said accused-movants,
A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative which served as the basis of the allegation of conspiracy between the
of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or aforementioned accused-movants and the other accused, in the
concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. A commission of the offense charged in the information.45
statement of the evidence on the conspiracy is not necessary in the
Information.44 Finally, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to hear the
case. As correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment
The other details cited by petitioner, such as the absence of any damage or that petitioner does not occupy a position with Salary Grade 27 as he was a
injury caused to any party or the government, likewise are matters of department manager of the NHA, a government-owned or controlled
evidence best raised during trial. corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense, which position
falls within the ambit of its jurisdiction. Apropos, the Court held in the case
As to the contention that the residual averments in the Information have of Geduspan v. People46 which involved a regional Manager/Director of
been rendered unintelligible by the dismissal of the charges against some
Region VI of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The
salary grade 26, to wit: Resolutions dated 2 March 2007 and 18 October 2007 of the First Division
of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.
It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as
salary grade 26. While the first part of the above–quoted provision covers SO ORDERED.
only officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher,
the second part thereof "specifically includes" other executive officials .R. No. 149453 May 28, 2002
whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
vs.
Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner PANFILO M. LACSON
together with Farahmand, a private individual charged together with her.
RESOLUTION
The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled
corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set
respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated August 24, 2001 in CA-
grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. G.R. SP No. 65034.2 The said Decision of the appellate court granted
respondent Lacson's Second Amended Petition for Prohibition with
This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al. ruled: application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, (1) assailing
the Order issued by Judge Herminia Pasamba of the Regional Trial Court
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, that allowed the continuation of the re-
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following investigation of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or the
requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. Kuratong Baleleng cases; and (2) praying for the dismissal of Criminal Cases
3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 Nos. Q-01-101102 to Q-01-101112 entitled "People of the Philippines v.
(the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, book II of Panfilo Lacson, et al." pending before Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City.
the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or The following appear in the records of this case:
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or (1) On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II
employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of announced, in a press conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of
section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office. the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout with police elements near
the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M.
To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a department manager that day.3
of Philhealth, a government-owned and controlled corporation. The
position of manager is one of those mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of (2) On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo
RA 8249 and the offense for which she was charged was committed in delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members
relation to her office as department manager of Philhealth. Accordingly, was a "rub-out" or summary execution and not a shootout. 4
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her person as well as the subject
matter of the case.47
(3) In an affidavit he executed the following day, delos Reyes stated,
among others, that he was part of a composite police team called the Anti-
Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Force Group (ABRITFG) composed of
elements of the National Capital Region Command (NCRC) and headed by prosecution of multiple murder charges against twenty-six (26) officers and
Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson; Traffic Management Command, personnel of ABRITFG.9
headed by Senior Superintendent Francisco Subia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-
Crime Commission (PACC), headed by Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. (9) On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed before
Lacson; Central Police District Command, headed by Chief Superintendent the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) Informations for MURDER, docketed as
Ricardo de Leon; and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC), headed by Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson
Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop. Delos Reyes claimed that the police and twenty-five (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of them were
team arrested the eleven (11) gang members in early morning of May 18, charged as principals.10 The following appear to be the victims: Meleubren
1995 at the gang's safe house in Superville Subdivision, Parañaque; that Sorronda in Crim. Case No. 23047; Welbor Elcamel in Crim. Case No.
after their arrest, the gang members were made to board two vans, their 23048; Carlito Alap-ap in Crim. Case No. 23049; Jevy Redillas in Crim. Case
hands tied behind their backs, and brought initially to Camp Crame where No. 23050; Ray Abalora in Crim. Case No. 23051; Joel Amora in Crim. Case
a decision to summarily execute them was made, and later to No. 23052; Alex Neri in Crim. Case No. 23053; Rolando Siplon in Crim. Case
Commonwealth Avenue where they were shot to death by elements of No. 23054; Manuel Montero in Crim. Case No. 23055; Sherwin Abalora in
ABRITFG.5 Crim. Case No. 23056; and Pacifico Montero in Crim. Case No. 23057.

(4) On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC investigator, (10) Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to
executed an affidavit corroborating the material allegations of delos Reyes. the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. On March 1, 1996, Amended
Dela Cruz claimed that she was with delos Reyes from the time the eleven Informations were filed against the same twenty-six (26) suspects but the
(11) KBG members were arrested up to the time they were killed in participation of respondent Lacson was downgraded from principal to
Commonwealth Avenue.6 accessory. Arraignment then followed and respondent entered a plea of
not guilty.11
(5) On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of Remate, executed an
affidavit stating that he was present when the KBG members were (11) With the downgrading of charges against him, respondent Lacson
arrested in Superville Subdivision.7 questioned the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan to hear the criminal cases
as none of the "principal" accused in the Amended Informations was a
(6) On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for government official with a Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, citing Section 2
Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman of R. A. No. 7975 then prevailing. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered
against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of- the cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court.12
kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same
officers and personnel.8 (12) The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration
of the transfer. Pending resolution of the motion, R. A. No. 8249 took
(7) Ombudsman Aniano Desierto then created a panel of investigators to effect on February 23, 1997, amending R. A. No. 7975. In particular, the
conduct a preliminary investigation of the murder charges. The panel was amendatory law deleted the word "principal" in Section 2 of R. A. No.
headed by Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs Bienvenido Blancaflor. 7975, thereby expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to include
On October 20, 1995, the panel issued a resolution recommending the all cases where at least one of the accused, whether principal, accomplice
dismissal of the charges for lack of probable cause. or accessory, is a government official of Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher. The
amendment is made applicable to all cases pending in any court in which
(8) Ombudsman Desierto referred the resolution for review by a panel trial has not yet begun as of the date of its approval.13
composed of Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa as head, and
Special Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo (13) In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,14 respondent Lacson challenged the
Aportadera as members. On November 20, 1995, the review panel constitutionality of the amendment and contended that
reversed the Blancaflor resolution and found probable cause for the the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the criminal cases. This Court,
while dismissing the constitutional challenge, nonetheless ordered the (19) On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution25 dismissing
transfer of the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court on the ground that Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, as follows:
the Amended Informations for murder failed to indicate that the offenses
charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the "As already seen, the documents attached to the Informations in
official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249. support thereof have been rendered meaningless, if not absurd,
with the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and
(14) Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 were raffled off to Branch 81 of the desistance of the private complainants. There is no more
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, then presided by Judge, now evidence to show that a crime has been committed and that the
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., and re- accused are probably guilty thereof. Following the doctrine
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. above-cited, there is no more reason to hold the accused for trial
and further expose them to an open and public accusation. It is
(15) Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses time to write finis to these cases and lay to rest the ghost of the
Eduardo de los Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez incident of May 18, 1995 so that all those involved--- the accused,
recanted their affidavits which implicated respondent Lacson in the the prosecution witnesses and the private complainants alike---
murder of the KBG members. may get on with their lives.

On the other hand, private complainants Myrna Abalora, 15 Leonora The Court is not unmindful of the admonition in the recent case of
Amora,16 Nenita Alap-ap,17 Imelda Montero,18 Margarita People vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999)
Redillas,19 Carmelita Elcamel20 and Rolando Siplon21 also executed their where the Supreme Court said that the general rule is that 'if the
respective affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no longer Information is valid on its face and there is no showing of
interested to prosecute these cases.22 manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part
of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want of
(16) Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, including evidence, because evidentiary matters should be presented and
respondent Lacson, filed five separate but identical motions to (1) make a heard during the trial', and that the ruling in Allado vs. Diokno 'is
judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance an exception to the general rule and may be invoked only if
of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist.'
and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause.
This Court holds that the circumstances in the case at bench
(17) The records of the case before us are not clear whether the private clearly make an exception to the general rule.
offended parties were notified of the hearing on March 22, 1999 23 held by
Judge Agnir to resolve the motions filed by respondent Lacson and the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds no
other accused. probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against
the accused or to hold them for trial. Accordingly, the
(18) During the said hearing, the private offended parties who desisted do Informations in the above-numbered cases are hereby ordered
not appear to have been presented on the witness stand. In their stead, dismissed."
Atty. Godwin Valdez testified that he assisted them in preparing their
affidavits of desistance and that he signed said affidavits as witness. On the SO ORDERED."26
other hand, Atty. Aurora Bautista of the Philippine Lawyer's League
presented the affidavits of recantation of prosecution witnesses Eduardo (20) On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the
de los Reyes, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez. Only prosecution witness Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S
Corazon de la Cruz testified to affirm her affidavit.24 Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for
preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of
Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter. On (23) On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the
April 17, 2001, the respondent was subpoenaed to attend the investigation killing of the same members of theKuratong Baleleng gang were filed
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.27 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. The new Informations
(21) On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson
their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for and his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of 81679 to Q-99-81689. The criminal cases were assigned to Judge Ma.
preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to Theresa L. Yadao.
enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary
investigation. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-100933 and (24) On the same day, respondent Lacson filed before the Court of Appeals
raffled to Branch 40, presided by Judge Herminia V. Pasamba.28 a petition for certiorari31 against Judge Pasamba, the Secretary of Justice,
the PNP Chief, State Prosecutors Ong and Zacarias, 2nd Assistant City
(22) The plea for temporary restraining order was denied by Judge Prosecutor Jamolin, and the People of the Philippines. The said petition
Pasamba in an Order29 dated June 5, 2001,viz: was amended to implead as additional party-respondents State Prosecutor
Claro Arellano and the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 81 in which the
"After a study, this Court submits that the dismissal of Criminal Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed.32
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 is not one on the merits
and without any recorded arraignment and entered plea on the (25) The Second Amended Petition33 dated June 14, 2001 and admitted by
part of the herein petitioners. The dismissal was a direct the Court of Appeals on June 26, 2001, alleged:
consequence of the finding of the Quezon City RTC that no
probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants of arrest "The reliefs of certiorari, prohibition and injunction against the
against petitioners herein and to hold them for trial. The questioned Order (Annex A) and the new Informations in Criminal
arraignment had with the Sandiganbayan does not put the case in Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 pending before respondent
a different perspective since theSandiganbayan was adjudged to Yadao (Annex B) are founded upon the grave abuse of discretion
be without any jurisdiction to try the cases. It is the People of the by respondent Judge Pasamba of her discretion in its issuance, the
Philippines who is the complainant in the Kuratong Baleleng case illegality of the proceedings of the respondent State Prosecutors
and remains to be the complainant in the present investigation as they cannot revive complaints which had been dismissed over
initiated thru a letter of PNP Chief Mendoza dated March 27, two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued, and
2001 (Exhibit "B") together with the sworn statements of the invalidity of the new Informations for Murder filed against
witnesses Ramos and Yu (Exhibits "2" and "3" - supportive of the petitioners and others, all in defiance of law and jurisprudence as
refiling of the case (Exhibit "9"). shown by the following:

xxx xxx xxx (a) Respondent judge had ruled on the merits of the main
prohibition action a quo rendering the same moot and academic
Above considered, this Court finds petitioners have not by concluding that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
preliminarily established that they have a right to be preserved 81679-Q-99-81689 by the QC RTC was not final and executory,
pending hearing on the injunctive relief. hence [i] the complaints therein can be reinvestigated, and [ii]
petitioner's arraignment while the case had not yet been
WHEREFORE, the prayer for temporary restraining order is hereby remanded to the QC RTC and while the Sandiganbayan had valid
DENIED. jurisdiction thereover [Criminal Cases No. 23047-2048] was void,
notwithstanding that the only issue in the TRO application was the
SO ORDERED."30
 existence or lack of a valid complaint as defined in S1 and S3, Rule Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against the
110. respondent, viz:

(b) Respondent Judge ruled that respondent State Prosecutors "In sum, this Court is of the considered view that the subject
could proceed to re-investigate and thereafter file new dismissal of [the] criminal cases was provisional in nature and that
Informations on June 6, 2001 covering those offenses subject of the cases presently sought to be prosecuted by the respondents
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-99-81689 on the basis of are mere revival or re-opening of the dismissed cases. The present
affidavits filed after said cases were dismissed on March 29, 1999, controversy, being one involving "provisional dismissal" and
despite the fact that under Section 8, Rule 117, cases similar to revival of criminal cases, falls within the purview of the
those filed against the petitioner and others (where the penalty prescriptive period provided under Section 8, Rule 117 of the
imposable is imprisonment of six (6) years or more) cannot be 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The second paragraph
revived after two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was of the said provision is couched in clear, simple and categorical
issued. words. It mandates that for offenses punishable by imprisonment
of more than six (6) years, as the subject criminal cases, their
(c) Respondent Judge held that the petitioner had not shown a provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
right to be preserved despite evidence showing the short cuts the issuance of the order without the case having been revived. It
taken by respondent State prosecutors in re-investigating a should be noted that the revival of the subject criminal cases,
dismissed case, in not complying with Rules in respect of its re- even if reckoned from the DOJ's issuance of subpoenas to
opening, and in insisting that a valid complaint was filed in clear petitioner, was commenced only on April 19, 2001, that is, more
violation of the Rules and case law thereon, and despite the fact than two (2) years after the issuance, on March 29, 1999, of RTC-
that the petitioner had shown that an inextendible deadline of Quezon City's Resolution, provisionally dismissing the criminal
June 5, 2001 was given him to file his counter-affidavit without cases now sought to be revived. Applying the clear and categorical
which his indictment for a non-bailable offense is assured because mandate of Section 8, Rule 117, supra, such efforts to revive the
of DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez's political schemes."34 criminal cases are now definitely barred by the two-year
prescriptive period provided therein.
(26) In the meantime, on June 8, 2001, respondent Lacson also filed with
the RTC-QC Branch 81 (presided by Judge Ma. Theresa Yadao), a Motion xxx xxx xxx
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and in the absence thereof,
to dismiss the cases outright. Respondent Lacson, however, filed a WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. As prayed for, the
Manifestation and Motion dated June 13, 2001 seeking the suspension of Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued against the conduct of
the proceedings before the trial court.35 further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112, including the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
(27) The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner, PANFILO M. LACSON, is hereby made PERMANENT.
Judge Yadao from issuing a warrant of arrest or conducting any proceeding Accordingly, with respect to said accused, the proceedings
or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112.36 conducted by respondent State Prosecutors in respect of the said
criminal cases are declared NULL AND VOID and the
(28) On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division), corresponding Informations, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
rendered the now assailed Decision. It characterized the termination of 101102 to 01-101112, entitled 'People of the Philippines vs.
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 as "provisional dismissal," Panfilo M. Lacson, et al." and filed before respondent Judge Maria
and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 as mere Theresa L. Yadao of Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of
revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Quezon City, are hereby ordered DISMISSED.
 SO ORDERED."37 that only seven (7) persons submitted their affidavits of desistance,
namely:
The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11)
informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some a. Myrna Abalora, mother of the victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. This rule which took effect on Abalora
December 1, 2000 provides:
b. Carmelita Elcamel, wife of Wilbur Elcamel;
"SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal.- A case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and c. Leonora Amora, mother of victim Joel Amora;
with notice to the offended party.
d. Nenita Alap-ap, wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap;
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall e. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero;
become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
f. Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas; and
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
g. Rolando Siplon.
issuance of the order without the case having been revived."

From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether
Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given
there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three
retroactive effect. However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due
to the lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the (3)38 other victims, namely: Meleubren Soronda, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and
Alex Neri. The same records do not show whether they were notified of
following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had
the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect
the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the
the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8,
court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to
Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time.
revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the
filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period.
The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the
petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order or
There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional
writ of preliminary injunction filed by respondent Lacson in the RTC of
dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express
Manila, presided by Judge Pasamba, to enjoin the prosecutors from
consent. It was respondent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss the
reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question raised in said
subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it
petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent
is beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express consent.
Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the
reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the
The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and
litigants.
conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were given before
the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge
Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof
Agnir. It appears from the resolution of then Judge Agnir that the relatives
after the eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson
of the victims who desisted did not appear during the hearing to affirm
and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge
their affidavits. Their affidavits of desistance were only presented by Atty.
Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case for
Godwin Valdez who testified that he assisted the private complainants in
respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the
preparing their affidavits and he signed them as a witness. It also appears
appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the case at bar is remanded to the RTC -
entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against him. Quezon City, Branch 81 so that the State prosecutors and the respondent
Lacson can adduce evidence and be heard on whether the requirements of
This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with on the basis of the evidence
never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where of which the trial court should make a ruling on whether the Informations
respondent Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 should be dismissed or not.
Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him. But Pending the ruling, the trial court is restrained from issuing any warrant of
even then, the appellate court did not require the parties to elucidate the arrest against the respondent Lacson. Melo and Carpio, JJ., take no part.
crucial issue of whether notices were given to the offended parties before
Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson SO ORDERED.
and company. To be sure, there is a statement in the Decision of the
appellate court to the effect that "records show that the prosecution and R. No. 126029 March 27, 2003
the private offended parties were notified of the hearing x x x."39 It is
doubtful whether this finding is supported by the records of the case. It PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
appears to be contrary to Judge Agnir's finding that only seven (7) of the vs.
complainants submitted affidavits of desistance. REY SUNGA, RAMIL LANSANG, INOCENCIO PASCUA, LITO OCTAC and
LOCIL CUI @ GINALYN CUYOS,accused,
Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of REY SUNGA, RAMIL LANSANG and INOCENCIO PASCUA, appellants.
whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being
revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
bar has to be first determined - - - whether it is from the date of the Order
of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were
The sole, uncorroborated testimony of an accused who turned state
received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity
witness may suffice to convict his co-accused if it is given unhesitatingly
of the new rule.
and in a straightforward manner and is full of details which by their nature
could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought;1 otherwise, it
If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given needs corroboration the presence or lack of which may ultimately decide
the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new the cause of the prosecution and the fate of the accused.
rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in
prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present
On July 12, 1994, the mutilated body of Jocelyn Tan (Jocelyn), a minor and
compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar.
a high school student of Palawan Integrated National School, (PINS), was
found at a coffee plantation in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao in Puerto
In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various Princesa City, Palawan.
requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this
Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the re-filing of the cases
The hunt for the possible killers of Jocelyn was swift, several arrests having
for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined.
been made in a span of days, followed by the conduct of the requisite
Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the
preliminary investigation by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in
respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to
Puerto Princesa City which culminated in the filing before the Regional
adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon
Trial Court (RTC) of Puerto Princesa City of the information for rape with
which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts
homicide against the suspects. The case was raffled to Branch 48 of the
and arguable questions of law. The reception of evidence on these various
court.
issues cannot be done in this Court but before the trial court.
Accused in the Information were Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio for her discharge had been complied with, and submitting her sworn
Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as statement6 which detailed how her co-accused carried out the crime. The
accomplice the accusatory portion of the information dated September 6, respective counsels for the other accused opposed the motion, insisting
1994 reads as follows: that it could only be filed during trial on the merits and that Locil’s
testimony was not absolutely necessary.7 By Order of October 20,
xxx 1994,8 the trial court deferred the resolution of the bail petition until after
the prosecution had rested its case, but it granted the motion to discharge
That on or about June 29, 1994 in the afternoon, at Barangay Locil.
Irawan, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring The accused assailed the discharge of Locil via a petition for certiorari and
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did prohibition9 before the Court of Appeals which issued a temporary
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of restraining order (TRO) enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the
force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by pinning down one trial of the case.10 The TRO lapsed, however, without a preliminary
JOCELYN TAN, a minor, fifteen (15) years of age, succeeded in injunction being issued, hence, the trial of the case resumed.
having carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent; that on the occasion of said rape and to enable them to Through state witness Locil, then 14 years old and an elementary school
conceal the commission of the crime, the herein accused in dropout who had been living away from her parents and using the alias
furtherance of the conspiracy together with LOCIL CUI, a minor, "Ginalyn Cuyos"11 to evade, by her own account,12 her mother and aunt
acting with discernment and who cooperated in the execution of who were looking for her after she got pregnant (the pregnancy was later
the offense as ACCOMPLICE, did then and there wilfully, aborted), the prosecution established the following version:
unlawfully and feloniously, taking advantage of their superior
number and strength, with intent to kill, treacherously attack, At about 2:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Locil boarded a tricycle bearing the
assault, and use personal violence upon JOCELYN TAN by marking "Ryan-Ryan" from the Social Security System (SSS) Office in Puerto
repeatedly stabbing and smashing a stone on her head, thereby Princesa City. Already on board the tricycle was a lesbian who had a
inflicting upon her mortal wounds and multiple fractures on her birthmark on the right side of the face and who invited Locil for a joy
skull which were the direct cause of her death shortly thereafter. ride.13 Upon instruction of the lesbian, the tricycle driver, whom she did
not know but whom she later identified and who answered to the name
CONTRARY TO LAW.2 Rey Sunga (Sunga), repaired to the Mendoza Park.

x x x. At the Mendoza Park, the lesbian alighted and spoke to Jocelyn Tan, the
victim, who was dressed in a PINS uniform. The lesbian, together with
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 11984. Jocelyn, then joined Locil aboard the tricycle which was already driven by
Inocencio Pascua (Pascua) vice Sunga who had in the meantime left. Still
Upon arraignment all the accused pleaded not guilty. aboard the tricycle, the four of them proceeded to and reached Barangay
Irawan, Puerto Princesa City and on reaching a forested area, Jocelyn was
met by Sunga who held her and by Ramil Lansang (Lansang) who wrapped
On September 26, 1994, the accused through counsel filed a petition for
his arm around her waist as they dragged her to a nearby "buho" clumps.
bail,3 underscoring the weakness of the People’s evidence, there being no
There, Jocelyn was made to lie down. Her skirt was raised and her panty
direct evidence against them, a fact admitted by the City Prosecutor in his
was taken off by Lansang. As she lay face up with both her hands held by
resolution4 for their indictment. Hearings on the bail petition were
Sunga and Pascua, Lansang stripped naked, placed himself on top of
conducted in the course of which the prosecution, after presenting several
Jocelyn, inserted his penis into her vagina and "seemed to be pumping."14
witnesses, filed on October 18, 1994 a motion to discharge 5 accused Locil
Cui (Locil) to be a state witness, averring therein that the legal requisites
After Lansang, Sunga took turn to have sexual intercourse with Jocelyn as the tricycle who seemed to be hiding their faces; that one of those two
Lansang and one who was not known to Locil and whom the latter men inside the tricycle inquired from her whether the discovered corpse,
described as one who has "chinky" or "narrow eyes," later identified to be that of Jocelyn, was from Barangay Caroray; that the following day, she
Pascua, kept Jocelyn pinned down by her hands.15 reported to the police about the three suspicious looking men who went to
her store; and that two days later, she was made to, as she did, identify
Pascua too subsequently had carnal knowledge of Jocelyn who all along Lansang at the police station as one of the men who went to her store in
struggled against her malefactors.16 the afternoon of July 12, 1994 and inquired as to Jocelyn’s corpse.20

After Pascua satisfied his lust, Sunga, with a sharp bladed weapon, stabbed Galahad Tan (Tan), Jocelyn’s father, recounted as follows: During the wake
the abdomen of the motionless Jocelyn, drawing her to rise to a sitting of his daughter at the Sampaton Funeral Parlor, at 1:30 a. m. of July 14,
position and clutch her abdomen. Sunga then passed on the bladed 1994 (15th day following the incident), Lansang arrived and told him as
weapon to Lansang who smashed Jocelyn’s head with an irregularly follows: "Total tayo ay magkaisang barangay lang ay ayosin natin itong
shaped stone, causing her to fall to the ground lifeless. Locil, who kaso at magtulungan na lang, mayroon na akong alam na makakapagturo
witnessed everything, was then pulled by the lesbian and led back into the kung sino and may kagagawan sa krimen. Huwag na lang nating sabihin sa
tricycle where they awaited Lansang, Sunga and Pascua to ride with them. mga polis." When he asked Lansang who he was referring to, Lansang
All five thereafter headed back to Puerto Princesa City proper, leaving replied that he would return. Lansang did not return, however, prompting
Jocelyn’s body behind.17 Tan to relay to law enforcers the statements of Lansang, his neighbor who
was courting Jocelyn at the time and with whose family his own family was
When the five reached the Mendoza Park where Locil alighted, she heard in good terms.21
the voice of someone from inside the tricycle warning her to keep mum
about the incident, otherwise something would also happen to her. Locil Testifying on the autopsy she conducted on Jocelyn, Dr. Ma. Carla Gallego -
then repaired to her boarding house. Until she was arrested following the Vigonte (Dr. Vigonte) affirmed the following findings in her report 22 dated
discovery on July 12, 1994 of Jocelyn’s corpse, she did not report the July 12, 1994:
incident to anyone.18
POST-MORTEM FINDINGS
The other prosecution witnesses provided testimonies pertaining to
circumstances after the fact. 1. The cadaver was seen in advanced stage of decomposition.

Oscar Devilleres, a garbage truck driver, recalled that he was on his way 2. Depressed fracture noted at the frontal bone of the skull about
home in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao at 12:30 a. m. of June 30, 1994, 2 cm anterior to the bregma, measuring 2.5 cm in width and 3.5
a day after the incident, when from a distance of about 30 meters, he saw cm in length, with a rounded hole at its right side with irregular
Lansang walking back and forth and appearing restless near the coffee edges measuring 4 cm x 5 cm in diameter; with a linear fracture
plantation in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao where Jocelyn’s body was about 2 cm in length extending from the depressed fracture up to
later found on July 12, 1994. Although it was then nighttime, Devilleres had the bregma; linear fracture about 3 cm in length along the coronal
a good look at Lansang due to the illumination provided by the electric suture, right side, extending from the hole to the bregma.
light post under which Lansang was situated.19
3. Multiple linear fracture with lengths ranging from 2 cm to 5 cm,
Igleceria Gabinete, a resident of Jacana, declared that she was among noted at the lambdoid suture, about 2 cm right side of the
those who saw the mutilated body of Jocelyn in the morning of July 12, lambda, extending to the right side of the occipital and parietal
1994 at a coffee plantation near her place; that in the afternoon of that bones of the skull.
date and while tending her sari-sari store, a tricycle arrived with three men
on board, one of whom, Lito Octac (Octac) alighted, leaving the two inside
 PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEATH: Intracranial Hemorrhage secondary bringing it to Jacana in Barangay Bancao-Bancao in accordance with
to multiple fractures of the skull. Lansang’s wish. On their way to Bancao-Bancao, Locil inserted a cigarette
into the corpse’s mouth – "…. pinasigarilyo ni [Locil] ang bangkay upang
Dr. Vigonte opined that a blunt object or instrument like a hard wood or a ikubli sa maaaring makakita ang tunay na kaanyuan ni Jocelyn Tan."26 At
rock caused the injury noted in post-mortem finding no. 2 which was fatal, Barangay Bancao-Bancao, he (Sunga), Lansang and Locil carried the
it being a deep wound in the skull affecting its inner organ and lacerating victim’s body and left the same at a coffee plantation fifty meters away
the tissues of the brain, thus causing hemorrhage; that for said fatal from Jacana Road while Octac served as a lookout by the roadside. On
wound, the assailant was probably at Jocelyn’s left side; that for the injury their return to the city, the four parted ways at the corner of Rizal Avenue
in post-mortem finding no. 3, the attacker was at the back of Jocelyn; and and Lacao Street. He (Sunga) then drove the tricycle with the marking
that in light of the multiple injuries, there were more than one "Ryan-Ryan" with Locil aboard while Lansang and Octac remained together
perpetrator.23 Dr. Vigonte was, however, unable to determine whether at the jeep.27
Jocelyn was also raped.24
The above sworn statement bears Sunga’s signature and that of his
The prosecution adduced documentary evidence consisting mainly of two assisting counsel, Atty. Agustin Rocamora (Atty. Rocamora), Puerto
supposed extrajudicial confessions made by Sunga. Princesa City Legal Officer.

In a sworn statement (Exhibit "A")25 dated July 18, 1994 which was Testifying as to the investigation he conducted upon Sunga, SPO2 Janoras
executed before SPO2 Jose P. Janoras (SPO2 Janoras), Sunga made the recalled that he was on duty at the Puerto Princesa City police precinct in
following disclosures: the morning of July 18, 1994 when SPO4 Boy Pantollano and patrolman
Bolos arrived together with Sunga. The two brought Sunga inside a room
At about 10:00 a. m. of the day of the incident, June 29, 1994, as he was and asked him questions pertaining to Jocelyn’s death and after about
then at work as a tricycle dispatcher, Lansang arrived in a tricycle bearing thirty minutes, Sunga was presented before him (SPO2 Janoras) for
the marking "Ryan-Ryan" and invited him to accompany him in fetching investigation. He initially asked Sunga whether he knew anything about
Jocelyn at the PINS. He obliged and just before reaching their destination, Jocelyn’s death and Sunga replied affirmatively, prompting him to inform
Locil boarded the tricycle. At the gate of the school, Lansang talked to him of his rights under custodial interrogation. After Sunga signified his
Jocelyn who was then wearing the school uniform after which the two desire to avail of the services of a lawyer, Sunga chose Atty. Rocamora to
boarded the tricycle which he (Sunga) drove to a spot at the corner of Rizal be his counsel from among the names of lawyers mentioned by him (SPO2
Avenue and Lacao St. in the Puerto Princesa City proper where the four of Janoras). He thereupon fetched Atty. Rocamora from his residence. Atty.
them (Sunga, Lansang, Locil and Jocelyn) transferred to an "owner’s jeep" Rocamora briefly conferred with Sunga, asking him if he wanted to give a
brought by Octac alias "Toto." The group then proceeded to and reached confession and informing him of the consequences thereof. Thereafter, the
Barangay Irawan at around 10:30 a. m. and at a forested area in Sitio investigation proceeded with Sunga voluntarily giving his answers to
Tagaud, everyone alighted except for Octac. Lansang then forcibly questions he (SPO2 Janoras) propounded at the end of which investigation
undressed Jocelyn and raped her while he (Sunga) and Locil watched. After Sunga and Atty. Rocamora affixed their respective signatures on the
consummating his carnal desire, Lansang hit Jocelyn with a 2" x 2" piece of recorded statement.28
wood on her head and successively on different parts of her body. When
Jocelyn was already dead, Locil also whacked Jocelyn’s body many times. The execution of Exhibit "A" was, during the preliminary investigation
The group then headed back to the city proper, leaving Jocelyn’s remains before the Municipal Trial Court,29 affirmed by Sunga. Apart from
at the scene of the crime. acknowledging its contents, Sunga answered the investigating judge’s
other queries as he implicated Lansang, Locil and Octac in the killing of
In accordance with their previous agreement, he (Sunga), Lansang and Jocelyn. This time, however, he alleged that not only Lansang but also
Locil returned to Barangay Irawan aboard a jeep driven by Octac four Octac raped Jocelyn, adding that he merely held Jocelyn’s hand.30
days after June 29, 1994 and took Jocelyn’s body for the purpose of
Subsequently or on August 3, 1994, Sunga executed another sworn same night of July 15, 1994 during which he signed the second and third
statement (Exhibit "I")31 before Special Investigator Reynaldo O. Abordo of pages of a three paged affidavit embodying his questioned extrajudicial
the Puerto Princesa office of the National Bureau of Investigation confession without the assistance of counsel and under threats and
(NBI). Exhibit "I" varied in a number of respects from Exhibit "A." In Exhibit intimidation from SPO2 Pantollano. He was later brought on July 18, 1994
"I," Sunga declared that in the morning of June 28, 1994 he already had an to the Capitol building where he signed the first page of his confession
agreement with Lansang to fetch Jocelyn from her school on the following after which Atty. Agustin Rocamora also signed the same. 35
day; that at 8:00 a. m. of the following day, June 29, 1994, he, together
with Lansang, Lito Octa (should be Octac) and a certain Jun left Mendoza As to his other sworn statement-Exhibit "I" executed before the NBI, Sunga
Park and proceeded to Irawan after asking Locil, one Bing Manila, and a initially affirmed having given the answers to questions propounded
certain Josie to fetch Jocelyn at her school; that Jun drove the tricycle back therein by the NBI Investigator and having executed the "confession" for
to the city proper and he transported their female companions including the purpose of applying to become a state witness in the case. 36 He
Jocelyn to Irawan; that at Irawan, Lansang raped the struggling Jocelyn subsequently retracted his acknowledgement of Exhibit "I" as his own
whose hands were then held by Josie; that after Lansang and Jun raped confession.37 While he admitted having participated in the preliminary
Jocelyn, Lansang smashed her head twice in accordance with his plan to kill investigation at the MTCC of Puerto Princesa City, he could not remember
her which plan was known to him (Sunga), Locil, Octac and Jun; that at having given most of the statements he made therein.38
1:30 a. m. of June 30, 1994, Lansang, Sunga, Octa and Jun returned to
Irawan, took Jocelyn’s corpse and dumped it at a coffee plantation in The defense presented other witnesses.
Jacana Road; and that he did not take part in the rape or killing of Jocelyn
but merely joined the group due to Lansang’s promise to give him
Joel Esquela Mayo (Mayo), an employee of Puerto Princesa City’s crime
P500.00. Exhibit "I" embodied a waiver by Sunga of his right to counsel.32
watchdog "Bantay Puerto," declared that in the morning of July 14, 1994
he and a co-employee Miguel Abrina (Abrina) were at Jacana in Barangay
The prosecution evidence with respect to Jocelyn’s family’s incurring of the Bancao-Bancao upon orders from their superior to be on the lookout for
amount of P11,000.00 for Jocelyn’s funeral expenses was admitted by the the possible return thereto of the perpetrators behind Jocelyn’s killing;
defense.33 seeing Locil uneasy as she alighted from a tricycle, they approached and
asked her how she was related to Jocelyn to which she replied that she
Upon the other hand, all the accused proffered alibi. was a friend; then Locil brought the two to the very spot where Jocelyn’s
remains were found and while there she acted as if she was looking for
Accused-appellant Sunga, who had previously been convicted for robbery something; Locil later commented that it was there that Jocelyn and she
with homicide, denied having anything to do with the rape and killing of had a fight; and Locil was subsequently apprehended by the police. 39
Jocelyn. He branded as false the testimony of Locil whom he claimed is a
prostitute and a pimp and was always seen loitering at Mendoza Park. Abrina substantially corroborated Mayo’s story.40
While he acknowledged knowing Octac and Pascua, he denied being in
their company on June 29, 1994 or in Lansang’s.34 Another witness, Orlando Lacsamana (Lacsamana), a detainee at the
Puerto Princesa City jail, testified that while he was conversing with Locil,
Confronted with his sworn statement-Exhibit "A," Sunga explained the also a detainee, on August 15, 1994, they saw Lansang being brought
circumstances behind his execution thereof as follows: After having been inside. Lacsamana asked Locil if she knew Lansang but she denied having
arrested without a warrant by the police in the evening of July 15, 1994 at known Lansang or having been her companion.41
the corner of Rizal and Valencia streets while "picking up passengers," he
was brought to the police station where he was subjected to violence and Detention prisoners John Pulga (Pulga) and Jerry Galgarin (Galgarin) as well
intimidation by SPO2 Pantollano and a certain Ka Ronnie to coerce him to as Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) personnel Joel
"pinpoint to anybody", and he involuntarily did. After being mauled and Rabanal (Rabanal) and SPO2 Conrado Guzman Rafael (SPO2
kicked, he was made to appear before police investigator Janoras on that
Rafael) testified as to Locil’s failure to correctly identify Lansang on exclusion from the criminal information, but he refused for he knew
separate occasions. nothing about the crime; that inside a small room at the police station in
the city, he again refused to obey SPO4 Pantollano’s order for him to say
Thus detention prisoner Pulga narrated that on July 21, 1994, he was made certain things about the crime, thereby infuriating Pantollano who
to form part of a police line-up together with three other detainees; and threatened to implicate him; that while still under detention on July 24,
that when Locil was asked by the police to identify who among them was 1994, he was brought before Locil for identification purposes but Locil
Lansang, she pointed to him (Pulga) whom she called Ramil Lansang.42 denied knowing him; and that he did not go into hiding after June 29, 1994
for he took up a farming course at the Palawan National Agricultural
Corroborating Pulga’s testimony was BJMP personnel Rabanal who College (PNAC).47
brought out Pulga and the three others for the police line-up, he too
alleging that Locil indeed pointed to Pulga as Lansang.43 Victor De Felipe corroborated his accused nephew’s testimony as to his
whereabouts on June 29, 1994 and his returning the tricycle two days
Detention prisoner Galgarin, who was detained at the 263rd Mobile Post of before the incident.48 Felix Mayor, De Felipe’s carpenter, confirmed
the Philippine National Police on July 23, 1994, declared that he saw Locil Pascua’s being with him and De Felipe the whole day of June 29, 1994 at
arrive in a police car after which Lansang and three other detainees were Barangay San Pedro to retrieve building materials from De Felipe’s
made to stand in a police line-up; and that when Locil was asked to identify demolished house in the said place.49
Lansang, she said he was not there.44
The testimony of witness Espiridion Labotoy was dispensed with when the
SPO2 Rafael testified that while he was on duty in the aforesaid PNP prosecution admitted its corroboration of Pascua’s allegation that the
Mobile Post on August 23, 1994, Locil hesitated to identify Lansang even latter returned the tricycle to its owner on June 27, 1994. 50
after the police assured her not to be afraid.45
Filomena Pascua-Tesorio also corroborated her nephew Pascua’s claim
Accused-appellant Pascua disclaimed knowledge of anyone of his co- that Locil did not identify him as one of those who wronged Jocelyn. And
accused prior to the June 29, 1994 incident. He denied having anything to she added that during her visit to Pascua at the police station on July 24,
do with the killing or rape of Jocelyn and branded Locil’s account as a lie. 1994, she asked Locil if she was acquainted with Pascua and she replied in
He claimed that he was staying with his uncle Victor de Felipe at 27 E. the negative, saying it was her first time to see Pascua.51
Burgos St., Puerto Princesa City from April to July 14, 1994; that while he
was driving the tricycle with the marking "Ryan-Ryan" for a living, he Cesar Batin (Batin), an instructor at PNAC, attested that Pascua was
returned it to its owner on June 27, 1994 due to engine trouble and never enrolled at PNAC Abo-Abo Center in Brooke’s point on July 18, 1994 but
drove it again; that at about 8:00 a. m. of June 29, 1994, he, together with that he attended classes for only about a week and resumed his studies on
his uncle Victor De Felipe and a carpenter, went to San Pedro also in August 16, 1994 until October 11, 1994. Batin affirmed the certification he
Puerto Princesa City where he helped in recovering materials from De issued as to Pascua’s school attendance.52
Felipe’s demolished house thereat for use in the latter’s other residence at
Burgos St.; and that he was at San Pedro until 4:00 p. m. of the same day. 46 Pascua’s mother Teodora Española testified that she accompanied her
arrested son when he was brought by the police to Puerto Princesa City on
Continuing, Pascua declared that on July 14, 1994, he left for his July 23, 1994 and confirmed that the policemen offered Pascua a reward in
stepfather’s home at Barangay Burirao of the town of Narra where he was, exchange for his admitting responsibility for the crime but that she
on July 23, 1994, arrested without a warrant by the police on suspicion rebuffed them.53
that he might have been involved in the subject crime, he having driven for
sometime the tricycle bearing the marking "Ryan-Ryan;" that the Lito Octac, also clinging to alibi, alleged that on the day of the incident he
apprehending policemen sought his cooperation so he could be utilized as was working at Pambato Forwarder loading cargoes and pieces of baggage,
a witness against Lansang, even offering him a P100,000.00 reward and his in support of which he presented an entry (Exhibit "9")54 in his employer’s
logbook showing that he reported for work from 1:00 to 5:00 p. m. of June with one Joel Egaña, went to the Sampaton Funeral Parlor in the evening
29, 1994.55 of July 13, 1994 to condole with the Tans, he denied having told Tan that
he (Lansang) knew somebody who could pinpoint those responsible for the
Lansang, who operated a pump boat that ferried passengers from crime. He likewise denied asking Tan to refrain from seeking the assistance
Barangay Caruray, San Vicente, Palawan where his parents reside, to of law enforcers, he having merely informed Tan that Sunga, with whom
Barangay Bahile, Puerto Princesa City and vice-versa, declared as follows: (he) Lansang got to be acquainted earlier that same evening, knew Jocelyn.
At about 8:30 a. m. of June 29, 1994, he met his sister Gloria Negosa in her Finally, Lansang disclaimed having been Jocelyn’s suitor for he had a live-in
office at the Philippine Ports Authority for the purpose of borrowing from partner named Mary Ann Dineros whom he intended to marry but could
her P3,000.00 which he would use to buy pieces of plywood and paint for not do so due to his indictment in the case at bar.59
his boat. His sister, however, directed him to get the money from his
mother who happened to be at her office at the time and who received Witnesses Jerry Rufano, Arnel Tulonghari and Ariel Bactad corroborated
two PCIB checks both dated June 29, 1994 payable to cash, one in the pertinent parts of Lansang’s testimony as to his whereabouts and activities
amount of two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos, and another in the amount of on June 29, 1994.60
Nine Thousand Six Hundred Sixteen (P9,616.00) pesos from Gloria. Shortly
after, he and his mother went to the PCI Bank where he, instead of his Joel Egaña also affirmed having accompanied Lansang to Sampaton
mother who did not have any identification card and Community Tax Funeral parlor on the night of July 13, 1994.61
Certificate, did the encashing (at 9:53 a. m.) of the checks- (Exhibits "12"
and "12-A"). The two left the bank and proceeded to the Palawan Poultry Melisa P. Mateo, on the other hand, testified that as a bank teller of PCI
store from which they purchased fertilizer. Thereafter, they bought Bank, she received and processed for encashment the two checks (Exhibit
plywood and paint at the Unico Merchandising.56 (An official receipt dated "12")62 from Lansang at almost 10:00 a. m. of June 29, 1994, which checks
June 6, 1994 of P2,206 representing the purchase price of the goods was as well as Lansang’s signatures and hers and other inscriptions thereon she
marked as Exhibit "11".)57 identified.63

Continuing, Lansang declared that while his mother left to make her other Edgardo Caisip declared that he was the driver of the jeepney which
purchases, he remained at the Unico Merchandising until 12:00 noon when Lansang rode on together with his cargo for a trip from the city proper to
he went to the house of his brothers-in-law to pick up her mother’s goods. Barangay Bahile from 1:00 to 3:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994. Caisip added that
At the said house, he briefly met a resident thereof named Ariel Bactad he already knew Lansang before that time, the Lansangs having been his
and then took his mother’s goods. He loaded all their purchases in a jeep usual passengers.64
bound for Barangay Bahile from which point they were to be transported
via a pump boat to his parent’s home in Barangay Caruray. As his mother
Finally, Freddie Gallego, a barangay councilor of Barangay Caruray, claimed
no longer showed up, he was constrained to accompany his cargo aboard
that Lansang was with him in the afternoon of July 12, 1994 on the
the jeep which departed at 1:00 p. m. and reached Barangay Bahile at 3:00
occasion of a birthday party in the said barangay.65
p. m. of the same day, June 29, 1994. At Barangay Bahile, he loaded the
goods into his boat with the help of the boat driver, Arnel Tulonghari. He
By decision of March 7, 1996, the trial court convicted Sunga and Lansang
then took lunch at the carinderia of a certain Jerry (or Jerico) Rufano where
as principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to
he waited in vain for two hours for his mother to come to Barangay Bahile.
At 5:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Rufano drove him to Barangay Salvacion suffer the penalty of DEATH, and Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads, quoted verbatim:
where he got a jeepney ride on his way home to the city proper, arriving
there at about 8:30 p. m. still of the same day.58
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused REY
SUNGA and RAMIL LANSANG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
Lansang further declared that he had never been to Barangay Irawan or to
principals of the crime charged and are sentenced to each suffer
Jacana in Barangay Bancao-Bancao. While he admitted that he, together
the penalty of DEATH. Accused INOCENCIO PASCUA, JR., is also
 found GUILTY as principal of the crime of Rape and is hereby (2) Whether the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. reasonable doubt.
Accused RAMIL LANSANG, REY SUNGA and INOCENCIO PASCUA,
JR. are jointly and severally liable to indemnify the heirs of Jocelyn After examining the record of the proceedings prior to the trial court’s
Tan the sum of P150,000.00 as moral, actual and compensatory questioned issuance of the order discharging Locil to become, as she did, a
damages with all the accessory penalties provided for the law and state witness, this Court is satisfied that there was nothing irregular
to pay the costs. therewith. Her discharge was ordered in the course of what originally were
hearings on the petition of the accused for bail and after the prosecution
For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused LITO had presented several of its witnesses and submitted Locil’s sworn
OCTAC beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the statement. Contrary to accused’s counsels’ argument that a motion for
crime charged. discharge could only be filed during trial on the merits, it could be done at
any stage of the proceedings, and discharge can be effected from the filing
It appearing that Lito Octac is detained and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn of the information to the time the defense starts to offer any evidence. 67
Cuyos is still under the custody of the PNP, Puerto Princesa City
their release are hereby ordered unless held for other lawful From the records, it appears that the following conditions for Locil’s
cause or causes. discharge under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court were
satisfied:
The City Jail Warden of Puerto Princesa City and Chief of Jimmy
Carbonell of Puerto Princesa City, are hereby ordered to transfer 1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought
immediately the bodies of accused REY SUNGA and RAMIL to be a state witness;
LANSANG to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila
pending review by the Supreme Court of this decision. 2. his testimony is absolutely necessary;

SO ORDERED.66 3. no other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution

of the offense committed except his testimony;
Hence, the automatic review of the case by this Court pursuant to Article
47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. 4. his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
Sunga, Lansang and Pascua filed their respective appeal briefs.
5. he does not appear to be the most guilty; and
In the Appellee’s Brief, the Solicitor General prays for the affirmance of
Sunga and Lansang’s conviction and the modification of Pascua’s 6. he has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
conviction such that he be also convicted for rape with homicide and moral turpitude.
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
It is undisputed that at the start of the trial, the prosecution did not have
The issues in the case boil down to: direct evidence, testimonial or otherwise, to establish the culpability of the
accused.
(1) Whether the discharge by the lower court of Locil Cui as a
state witness is in accordance with law; and Based on Locil’s sworn statement, she was the only person who saw what
happened to Jocelyn. Her testimony was thus indispensable. That she did
not appear to be the most guilty among the accused and that she had not
been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude were shown, as strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its
was the susceptibility of material corroboration of her testimony at the trustworthiness becomes manifest.72
time of her discharge in view of the other evidence in the hands of the
prosecution. Was Locil’s testimony corroborated in its material points by the
prosecution’s other evidence? If in the affirmative, was the corroborative
That the trial court ordered Locil’s discharge a day before the scheduled evidence unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances to such an
hearing on the motion for her discharge is of no moment. The requirement extent that Locil’strustworthiness becomes manifest?
of "a hearing in support of the discharge" had been substantially complied
with when the trial court, during the hearings on the bail petition, already Appellant Sunga’s two extrajudicial confessions, which strictly speaking
received evidence from the prosecutionincluding Locil’s sworn statement were admissions for they referred to statements of fact which did not
and also heard in open court the defense’s arguments in opposition directly involve an acknowledgement of guilt or of the criminal intent to
thereto. A hearing did take place but interspersed with the hearings on the commit the offense with which he was charged,73 could have lent
bail petition. So long as the trial court was able to receive evidence for and corroborative support to Locil’s testimony, having likewise given details of
against the discharge, its subsequent order granting or denying the motion how the crime took place. Contrary, however, to the trial court’s
for discharge is in order notwithstanding the lack of actual hearing on said ruling, this Court finds Sunga’s admissions to be inadmissible in evidence
motion.68 not only against him but also against his co-accused appellants.

In fine, even if Locil’s discharge failed to comply with all the requirements A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is
embodied in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, her testimony guaranteed the following rights by the Constitution: (1) the right to remain
would not, for that sole reason, be discarded or disregarded for, in the silent; (2) the right to have competent and independent counsel of his own
discharge of a co-defendant, the trial court may reasonably be expected to choice, and to be provided with one if he cannot afford the services of
commit error which is not reversible, the underlying principle being that it counsel; and (3) the right to be informed of these rights. 74
does not affect the competency and quality of testimony of the discharged
defendant.69 The right to counsel was denied Sunga during his execution of Exhibit "A" -
admission before the police on the ground that the counsel who assisted
From the prosecution evidence, the testimony of the erstwhile accused- him, Atty. Agustin Rocamora, was the City Legal Officer of Puerto Princesa.
turned state witness Locil is the most pivotal, for it is
an eyewitness’ account of what transpired before and at the time of In People v. Bandula,75 this Court made it sufficiently clear that the
Jocelyn’s death. Her testimony is the only direct evidence identifying independent counsel for the accused in custodial investigations cannot be
appellants and relating in detail their specific overt acts. a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a
municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. A
Yet like any other testimony, this Court may not readily accept Locil’s legal officer of the city, like Atty. Rocamora, provides legal aid and support
statements hook, line and sinker because in the assessment of the to the mayor and the city in carrying out the delivery of basic services to
testimony of a co-accused-turned state witness, the same must be received the people, which includes maintenance of peace and order and, as such,
with great caution and must be carefully scrutinized.70 his office is akin to that of a prosecutor who unquestionably cannot
represent the accused during custodial investigation due to conflict of
The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed interest.76 That Sunga chose him to be his counsel, even if true, did not
accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co- render his admission admissible. Being of a very low educational
accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof attainment,77 Sunga could not have possibly known the ramifications of his
to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the choice of a city legal officer to be his counsel. The duty of law enforcers to
commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially inform him of his Constitutional rights during custodial interrogations to
corroborated in its material points71 by unimpeachable testimony and
their full, proper and precise extent does not appear to have been alleged investigation started, as you said 6:00 o’clock in the
discharged. morning?

Notatu dignum is the fact that nothing in the records shows that Atty. A: Yes, sir. It did not take long because they were already
Rocamora exerted efforts to safeguard Sunga’s rights and interests, ready (Emphasis supplied.)79
especially that of his right not to be a witness against himself. In fact,
glaringly, Atty. Rocamora was not even made to testify so he could have xxx
related the extent of legal assistance he extended to Sunga at the police
station. This Court is thus constrained to rely on the COURT -
following verbatim testimony of SPO2 Janoras which described how Atty.
Rocamora assisted Sunga during the investigation:
Q: Who propounded the questions to accused Rey Sunga?

ATTY. ENRIQUEZ (Defense Counsel) -

A: I was the one, Your Honor.

Q: Did not Atty. Rocamora warn you, as the investigator, that

Q: And who gave the answers?
simply he is invoking his client’s right to remain silent? Did not
Atty. Rocamora first confer with the accused Rey Sunga prior to
A: Rey Sunga was the one answering me, Your Honor.
the investigation?

Continue.
A: They conversed.

PROSECUTOR GONZALES -
Q: You said a while ago that immediately upon your arrival
you already started the investigation. And now you are claiming
that they had a conversation first. Which is correct? Q: And what, if any, did Atty. Agustin Rocamora do, if any, at
the time these questions were being asked Rey Sunga?
A: They conversed for a very short while because everybody
was already there. I was on my typewriter and they were seated A: He instructed Rey Sunga to just answer the questions,
just very near me (Emphasis supplied.)78 sir (Emphasis supplied.)80

xxx xxx

ATTY. CRUZAT (Defense Counsel) - From the foregoing testimony of SPO2 Janoras, it can be gathered that
Atty. Rocamora did not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and
options prior to giving his (Sunga’s) admission. Evidently, Atty. Rocamora,
Q: And you informed Atty. Rocamora that allegedly Mr. Rey
without more, merely acted to facilitate the taking of the admission from
Sunga wanted to confess his alleged participation in the
Sunga.
commission of the offense, Mr. Witness?

Moreover, that Sunga was first questioned by SPO4 Pantollano and

A: Yes, sir.
Patrolman Bolos before he was investigated by SPO2 Janoras does not
escape the attention of this Court. Although Sunga failed to present
Q: And so upon arrival at the police station it did not take
evidence as to the maltreatment he claimed to have suffered in the hands
Atty. Rocamora a long time to confer with Rey Sunga before the
of SPO4 Pantollano and Patrolman Bolos, he did not have any lawyer by his
side at the time these two policemen started asking him questions about Sunga having had no counsel when he made his admission before the NBI
Jocelyn’s death. At that point, Sunga was already under custodial and his waiver of the right to have one being invalid, his statement- Exhibit
investigation without the assistance of counsel. "I" is inadmissible.

Custodial investigation is the stage "where the police investigation is no The testimony of Sunga during the preliminary investigation before the
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a Municipal Trial Court whereby he expressly acknowledged having executed
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process Exhibit "A" and affirmed the contents thereof did not render his
of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements (Italics in extrajudicial admission into a judicial one which could be used against him
the original; Emphasis supplied.).81 Under such circumstances, this Court and his co-appellants. Neither could his other statements in such
cannot but entertain serious misgivings as to the admission Sunga proceeding admitting his participation in the crime be utilized to establish
subsequently gave to SPO2 Janoras. his and the other appellants’ guilt. For in that preliminary investigation,
Sunga again was effectively denied of his essential right to counsel. Atty.
Like Exhibit "A," Sunga’s second extrajudicial admission-Exhibit "I" is Rocamora was appointed Sunga’s counsel de officio but just like the
inadmissible, due to the absence of counsel to assist him when he assistance he extended during the execution of Exhibit "A," Atty. Rocamora
executed it on August 3, 1994 before the NBI of Puerto Princesa City. utterly did nothing in defense of Sunga’s cause. While Sunga was being
Although Sunga declared in open court that he made such admission in asked by the judge a barrage of questions calling for answers which could
connection with his desire to apply as state witness which admission he and did incriminate him, Atty. Rocamora did not offer the slightest
later repudiated, this does not make Exhibit "I" admissible. Sunga was at objection to shield his client from the damning nature thereof.
the time still under detention at the NBI office and had been languishing in
jail since his arrest in mid-July 1994. His desire to regain his freedom is not The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be
difficult to understand, he having lost it once due to his conviction for deemed "critical stages" in the criminal process.85 The preliminary
another crime. His admission which was done without the benefit of investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the
counsel consisted of answers to questions propounded by the investigating police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be
agent of the NBI and not of a unilateral declaration of his participation in subjected to no less than the State’s processes, oftentimes intimidating
the crime. To this Court, these conditions are constitutive of an and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal
atmosphere pervading that of a custodial investigation and necessitating prosecution. In the case at bar, Sunga was thrust into the preliminary
the assistance of a competent and independent counsel of Sunga’s investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the latter’s lack of
choice as a matter of right but which he had none. vigilance and commitment to Sunga’s rights, he was virtually denied his
right to counsel.
Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which
may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
assistance of an independent counsel must be struck down as courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections;
inadmissible.82 Even if the confession contains a grain of truth or even if it rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple
had been voluntarily given, if it was made without the assistance of perfunctory representation.86 As in People v. Abano87 where the confession
counsel, it is inadmissible.83 by the therein accused in the preliminary investigation was excluded as
inadmissible due to the absence of her counsel, this Court will not admit
The waiver by Sunga of his right to counsel as contained in his sworn Sunga’s. This makes it unnecessary to discuss and emphasize the conflict
statement-Exhibit "I" was not a valid waiver for, on its face, it was on material points of Sunga’s and Locil’s accounts of the incident.
executed not in the presence of counsel, contrary to the express
requirement of the Constitution.84 As for the rest of the prosecution evidence, it fails to corroborate Locil’s
testimony. The declarations of witnesses Tan, Devilleres and Gabinete can
in no way enhance the veracity of the essential, material aspects of Locil’s of details which, by their nature, could not have been the result of
account for they relate not to the crime itself but to events thereafter. deliberate afterthought.89 An exhaustive review of the transcript of
stenographic notes of Locil’s testimony reveals, however, that the manner
Tan’s testimony that Lansang informed him that he knew someone who by which she related it was punctuated with marks of tentativeness,
could reveal the identity of Jocelyn’s assailants and that Lansang suggested uncertainty and indecisiveness which the trial court unfortunately failed to
to him to no longer report to the police does not at all constitute take note of in its decision on review.
incriminating evidence, for there was no admission, express or implied, by
Lansang of any wrongdoing or criminal participation on his part. Besides, Consider the following portions of her testimony, quoted verbatim:
why would Lansang suggest to Tan not to report to the police when the
police early on had its hands full in trying to solve the crime. COURT:

Dr. Vigonte’s affirmation of her finding of a fatal injury on Jocelyn’s head is Q Do you know the name of the woman who died?
supportive only of the fact that the victim was hit with something on her
head which caused her death, but this by no means is evidence that A Jocelyn Tan
appellants inflicted said fatal injury.
ATTY. GACOTT [Private Prosecutor]:
As for the circumstances testified to by the other witnesses, they do not,
by and in themselves, rise to the level of circumstantial evidence which
Maybe we can use the sound system.
warrant appellants’ conviction.
ATTY. GACOTT:
In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there must be at least two
proven circumstances which in complete sequence lead to no other logical
Q: Miss Witness, you said that you are fourteen years old.
conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. 88 The circumstances that
How come that you are 14 years old?
Lansang was seen on June 30, 1994, a day after the incident, walking back
and forth and appearing restless near the place where Jocelyn’s body was
eventually found; that Lansang was in the company of Octac and inquired, A: (Witness handing a document to counsel.)
the day after Jocelyn’s body was discovered on July 12, 1994, if Jocelyn was
from Barangay Caruray; that Lansang told Jocelyn’s father that he knew (To the Court:)
someone who could pinpoint those responsible for the crime; and that
Jocelyn was fatally hit on the head by a blunt object are too fragile to lead Your Honor, the witness handed to me a birth certificate.
to the inference that Lansang and his co-appellants are liable for Jocelyn’s
rape and slaying. These circumstances in the scheme of things are not ATTY. CRUZAT (Defense Counsel): We are requesting for the
indubitable pieces of evidence of a person’s commission of a crime for they witness to speak loud and not merely hand over certain
are susceptible of explanations which do not necessarily speak of guilt or documents.
culpability.
COURT: Instruct the witness to speak louder. (Emphasis
Standing alone and uncorroborated, can Locil’s testimony serve as a basis supplied.)90
for appellants’ conviction? As an exception to the general rule on the
requirement of corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice or co- xxx
conspirator-turned state witness, her testimony may, even if
uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself
ATTY. GACOTT -
because it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full
Q: Miss Witness, how many times did you attain your Grade I Q: Could you please relate to this Honorable Court what
schooling? happened during that date?

A: Three times. A: Yes, sir.

Q: What about your Grade II schooling? ATTY. CRUZAT: I may be compelled to ask this Honorable Court for
a coercive authority to declare her in contempt for repeatedly
A: Two years. disobeying the instruction of the Court for her to speak louder.

Q: How about your Grade III schooling? COURT: You speak louder, otherwise you will be cited in
contempt of court.
A: One year.
WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.92
ATTY. CRUZAT: I am already tired of requesting this Honorable
Court to instruct the witness to speak quite louder. She is just xxx
whispering to the interpreter.
ATTY. GACOTT -
COURT: You speak louder (Emphasis supplied.)91
Q: You mean to say, Miss Witness, that this Tomboy that you
xxx are referring to went upstairs of Mendoza Park, and once there
she talked to the woman sitting there?
ATTY. GACOTT -
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, Miss Witness, where were you last June 29, 1994 at
around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon? Q: Do you know the name of that woman?

A: In Mendoza. A: No, sir.

COURT - Q: After getting near to that woman, what did they do after
that?
Q: What is that Mendoza?
A: They talked, sir.
A: Mendoza Park.
Q: Then what happened next?
ATTY. GACOTT -
ATTY. CRUZAT: This woman does not speak quite loud, Your
Q: During that date, do you remember any unusual thing that Honor.
happened to you?
COURT: You talk louder (Emphasis supplied.)93
A: Yes, sir.
 xxx as having, among other things, singkit (chinky) eyes. But as Pascua did not
have singkit eyes, even the trial court was prompted to ask her if she was
A scrutiny of her testimony likewise reveals a strain of improbability sure that the third person who raped Jocelyn had singkit eyes.95 Thus, with
ingrained therein. To recapitulate, Locil claimed that on June 29, 1994 she the court’s approval, the defense made it of record that Pascua did not
boarded a tricycle bearing a lesbian who invited her for a joyride, have chinky eyes, contrary to Locil’s description of him. 96
proceeded to the Mendoza Park and picked up Jocelyn, whom she was not
acquainted with, then brought by the same tricycle to Irawan where the The aforementioned observations pertaining to both the weak,
latter was raped and brutally murdered. In other words, she wanted to incomprehensible voice with which Locil gave her testimony, the
convey that she was deliberately brought by appellants with them on June improbability with which she was precisely made by appellants to be a
29, 1994 to the place where they were to carry out, which they did, their witness to their crime, and the failure of her description of Pascua’s eyes
abominable acts against Jocelyn. This strikes this Court as improbable if not to match the latter’s actual physical feature cannot but engender serious
bizarre. For it is contrary to human nature and experience for those who doubts as to the reliability of her testimony against all appellants. This
undertake the commission of a crime to bring a spectator thereof. A Court thus finds her uncorroborated account to have failed the
criminal would certainly take steps to evade detection or discovery of his jurisprudentially established touchstone for its credibility and sufficiency,
criminal act, to keep it from being witnessed or known by others who that of straightforwardness and deliberateness, as evidence to warrant
might later turn against him. Yet, from Locil’s testimony, appellants took appellants’ conviction.
the trouble of bringing her to the locus criminis so she could bear witness
to a horrible crime which appellants carried out with evident secrecy in a In light of the weak evidence for the prosecution, the defense of alibi as
remote, uninhabited place in Puerto Princesa City. well as of denial by appellants is accorded credence, for it is precisely when
the prosecution’s case is weak that the defense of alibi assumes
That appellants required Locil’s presence at the time and place of the importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal liability.97 It bears
crime only to threaten her later against divulging what she had witnessed noting that the alibi proffered by appellants, especially that by Lansang,
thus defies comprehension. had been corroborated.

Evidence to be believed should not only proceed from the mouth of a In fine, regardless of the probative weight of appellants’ alibi, the
credible witness but should also be credible in itself such as the common prosecution still has the onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the of the accused and cannot rely on the weakness of the defense evidence.
circumstances.94 The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden, appellants’
presumed innocence remains and must thus be acquitted.
This Court is not in fact prepared to accord Locil credibly as a witness. Who
can trust one who, in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
in a boarding house albeit she has no visible means of income to pay doubt the guilt of appellants Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang and Inocencio
therefor, and carries an alias name to evade being traced by her mother Pascua in Criminal Case No. 11984 the decision therein is hereby SET ASIDE
and aunt? and REVERSED and said appellants are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
Locil’s testimony on how appellants put her in a position to have direct
knowledge of their malevolent acts despite taking measures to conceal The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to cause the
their deeds fails to inspire belief and must, therefore, be discredited. IMMEDIATE RELEASE of the appellants from custody, unless they are being
held for some other lawful cause, and to INFORM this Court within five (5)
A serious question too abounds on Locil’s identification of appellant Pascua days from receipt of this Decision of the date appellants were actually
as one of those who raped Jocelyn. She described Pascua, the man who released from confinement.
according to her raped the victim after appellants Lansang and Sunga did,
Costs de oficio. The instant case stemmed from a complaint filed by Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., a senatorial candidate in the May 1995 elections, against
SO ORDERED. private respondents Salayon and Llorente, Chairman and Vice-Chairman,
respectively, of the City Board of Canvassers of Pasig City, and a certain
OPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372 Reynaldo San Juan, Campaign Manager of senatorial candidate Juan Ponce
Petitioner, Enrile, for allegedly decreasing Pimentel's votes in the Statement of Votes
per precinct and in the City Certificate of Canvass for Pasig City. Pimentel
filed a petition with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 133509, which sought
Present: the reversal of the resolutions of the COMELEC dismissing his complaint for
lack of probable cause. On February 9, 2000, we promulgated our Decision
PUNO, J., Chairperson, in said case, granting Pimentel's petition and ordering the COMELEC "to
- versus - SANDOVAL- file forthwith with the proper [RTC] the necessary criminal information for
GUTIERREZ, *CORONA, violation of Section 27(b) of [Republic Act] No. 6646,[3] otherwise known as
AZCUNA, and the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, against private respondents Ligaya
GARCIA, JJ. Salayon and Antonio Llorente."[4]

Pursuant thereto, the COMELEC filed a total of 321 informations for

HON. JUDGE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 against private respondents
in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Promulgated: Llorente and Salayon on the following dates: a) nine (9) informations were
Br. 158, RTC-Pasig City, ATTY. filed on August 28, 2000, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 118823-
LIGAYA P. SALAYON and ATTY. 118831; b) forty-four (44) informations on August 29, 2000, docketed as
ANTONIO M. LLORENTE, Criminal Case Nos. 118848-118891; c) one hundred sixty-two (162)
Respondents. August 28, 2006 informations on August 31, 2000, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 118902-
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 119063; and d) 106 informations on September 7, 2000, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 119099-119204. The four sets of informations were
raffled to Branches 164, 158, 153 and 69, respectively, of the RTC of Pasig
DECISION City.

PUNO, J.: Private respondent Llorente filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Consolidation[5] of Criminal Case Nos. 118823-118831 (pending
before Branch 164) with Criminal Case Nos. 118848-118891 (pending
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the before Branch 158). This motion was granted by Branch 164,[6]thereby
Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Joint Decision [1] of the Court of consolidating the nine (9) informations pending before it with the 44 other
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 68922 and 69703 which affirmed the informations pending with Branch 158.
Order[2] issued by respondent Judge Jose R. Hernandez, presiding judge of
Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, dismissing Subsequently, private respondent Llorente filed three (3) Omnibus
Criminal Case Nos. 118823-31, 118848-91, 118902-9063 and 119099-204 Motions before Branches 158, 153 and 69 of the RTC of Pasig City, asking
for violation of private respondents Llorente and Salayon's right to speedy them: 1) to consolidate all the cases filed against him for violation of
trial. Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646; 2) to declare the multiple informations filed
against him as constituting only one offense; 3) to treat the 321
First, the facts. informations filed against him as only one information for violation of
Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646; and 4) to allow him to post bail to only one
information.
 September 6, 2000 and Omnibus Motion dated
After finding private respondent Llorente's prayer to consolidate to September 8, 2000 are granted allowing the
be "meritorious and there being no objection" from the prosecution, Judge consolidation of cases against accused Llorente pending
Ericcio C. Ygaña of Branch 153 granted the same and remanded Criminal before Branches 69, 153 and 164 of this Court with
Case Nos. 118902-119063 to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of those pending before this branch. The multiple acts
Pasig City for proper disposition.[7] Similarly, Judge Lorifel Lacap Pahimna alleged in the 321 Informations filed against him are
of Branch 69 granted private respondent Llorente's motion to consolidate, declared to constitute only one violation of Section
finding that "it is for the convenience of the parties that these cases 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646. There should then be
(Criminal Case Nos. 119099-119204) be consolidated with those cases only one information against accused Llorente. This
pending before Branch 158 considering that all cases involved common benefit applies also to accused Salayon. Public
questions of fact and law and the parties may have to introduce common Prosecutor's (sic) Bagabuyo's Omnibus Motion
evidence in support of their respective positions in these cases." Judge dated September 25, 2000 is denied.
Pahimna forwarded the cases pending before Branch 69 to Branch 158
"unless the presiding judge of said branch interposes objection to such The arraignment and pre-trial of both accused is
consolidation." Moreover, the other issues raised by private respondent (sic) set on March 20, 2001 at 8:30 in the morning.
Llorente were referred to Branch 158 for appropriate action.[8]
SO ORDERED.[13]
On September 27, 2000, Senior State Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo
filed his Notice of Appearance with Branch 158 of the RTC of Pasig The trial court noted that during the hearing on private respondent
City.[9] He likewise filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion To: 1) hold in Llorente's motion on September 12, 2000, the prosecution, then through
abeyance the implementation of the orders of the court prior to his Director Jose P. Balbuena of the COMELEC, was heard on the matter of
appearance as counsel; 2) remand all the cases pending before it to the consolidation of the cases and in fact gave its consent thereto. Even the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City; 3) hold in abeyance the representative from the office of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., an Atty.
resolution of all motions filed by private respondent Llorente with the Luis Gana, did not register any objection thereto. In ruling that only one
court; 4) order the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City to information for violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 should have
hold in abeyance the re-raffling of all the "dagdag-bawas" cases against been filed, the trial court held:
private respondents; and 5) allow him ample time to secure from the
Supreme Court a transfer of venue of the cases from Pasig City to Manila [I]n this case[,] the unity of criminal intent is
or Pasay City.[10] manifested by the fact that the several acts of
tampering[,] while allegedly done separately over a
Private respondent Llorente filed an Opposition (to the Prosecution's three-day period, were perpetuated on one single
Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 25 September 2000)[11] with Branch 158 of occasion which is the canvassing of the votes cast in the
the RTC of Pasig City. On December 13, 2000, petitioner, through Senior May 8, 1995 elections in Pasig City, and, significantly,
State Prosecutor Bagabuyo, filed with Branch 158 of the RTC of Pasig City perpetuated only on one single document, the SoV, a
its Comment/Opposition to [the] Omnibus Motions filed by Accused document of fifty-eight (58) pages. While there maybe
Llorente,[12] reiterating its prayers in its Omnibus Motion dated September several acts of tampering, this Court could attribute
25, 2000. only one crime against accused Llorente. This is what
the Comelec did in People vs. Maria Arsenia Garcia, et
On March 2, 2001, respondent Judge issued an Order, the dispositive al. docketed as Criminal Case No. 3485-A before the
portion which reads: Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan. The
multiple acts of tampering by the accused were treated
WHEREFORE, accused Llorente's Omnibus Motion by the COMELEC as one offense or a single count of (sic)
dated September 5, 2000, Omnibus Motion dated the violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646. There is no
 reason then why accused Llorente should be treated hearing on July 26, 2001 was again cancelled and reset toAugust 2,
differently.[14] 2001 for Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo's failure to appear, thus:

Since Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo is again not

On March 25, 2001, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of available for today's hearing because he is indisposed as
the March 2, 2001 Order of the trial court.[15] Private respondent Llorente relayed to this Court by his representative, Atty. Jay I.
filed his Comment and Opposition,[16] to which petitioner filed its Dejaresco, and through a telephone call from his
rejoinder.[17] secretary Orlando Nicolas, as prayed for, and over the
vehement objection of counsels for both accused, the
In his Order[18] dated May 11, 2001, respondent Judge denied pre-trial/trial scheduled today is cancelled and reset on
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the March 2, 2001 Order and August 2, 2001 at 8:30 in the morning.
set the arraignment and pre-trial of private respondents "on June 15, 2001
at 8:30 in the morning." xxx

On June 15, 2001, private respondents Llorente and Salayon were In the event that there will again be no
arraigned and pleaded "not guilty." Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo was appearance from Prosecutor Bagabuyo at the next
absent during the arraignment but the same nevertheless proceeded in scheduled hearing, the Legal Department of the
the presence of Public Prosecutor Jose Danilo C. Jabson, the assigned COMELEC shall then make its appearance and take over
prosecutor in the trial court. The trial court held: the prosecution of this case.

Both accused, assisted by their respective SO ORDERED.[22]

counsels, after having been informed of the charge filed
against them and its attending consequences, entered a
plea of NOT GUILTY. After considering the respective positions of the prosecution and the
private respondents, the trial court issued its Order dated August 2,
Pursuant to the Order of March 2, 2001, the 2001[23] denying the prosecution's Omnibus Motion to Postpone and
three hundred [twenty-one] (321) informations filed Motion for Reconsideration. It found that contrary to the prosecution's
against both accused were treated to be only a single claim that it was not notified of the arraignment on June 15, 2001, the
offense for which they should be made answerable. It is records revealed that the Order of the trial court datedMay 11,
for this reason that both accused were arraigned and 2001 which set the date of the arraignment and pre-trial on June 15,
entered their plea to a single or one information only. 2001 was received by the Department of Justice on May 17, 2001. As a
consequence, the arraignment of private respondents Llorente and
Having entered their plea, set the pre-trial of this Salayon proceeded as scheduled. The Motion for Reconsideration of the
case on June 29, 2001 at 8:30 in the morning.[19] trial court's March 2, 2001 Order was likewise denied for being in the
On June 27, 2001, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Postpone nature of a second motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited
and Motion for Reconsideration[20] of the Order dated June 15, 2001 of the pleading under the Rules of Court. Despite the denial of the prosecution's
trial court, asking the trial court to nullify the arraignment of respondents motions, the pre-trial and trial were cancelled and reset to September 4,
for lack of notice to the prosecution. The June 29, 2001hearing was reset 2001 in view of the prosecution's manifestation that it was appealing the
to July 6, 2001 in view of the prosecution's filing of the Omnibus Motion to trial court's order to a higher court. The court warned that "[i]n the event
Postpone and Motion for Reconsideration. TheJuly 6, 2001 hearing was that the prosecution shall not be able to get any restraining order to stop
cancelled as Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo did not appear, a the proceedings in this case, the hearing on said date shall proceed as
representative having telephoned the trial court that he was scheduled."[24]
indisposed. The hearing was reset to July 26, 2001.[21] However, the
 Accordingly, petitioner, through Senior State Prosecutor Private respondent Llorente filed his Motion to Dismiss
Bagabuyo, filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus, dated October 4, 2001.[32] Before petitioner could file an opposition, it
Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with the CA, filed its Motion to Inhibit[33] dated October 5, 2001, asking Judge
docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP No. 65966. On August 16, 2001, said petition Hernandez to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the instant cases and
was dismissed outright for having been filed without the participation of remand the same to the Clerk of Court of Pasig City for re-raffling. Later,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in violation of Section 35(1), the prosecution likewise filed its Opposition (to [Private Respondent's
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Motion to] Dismiss with Prayer to Hold in Abeyance its Resolution until
Code.[25] Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to no after Resolution of our Motion to Inhibit). Private respondent Llorente
avail.[26] Unhindered, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File filed his Reply (to Prosecution's Opposition dated October 7, 2001) and
Petition for Review on Certiorari[27] with this Court on October 30, 2001, Comment-Opposition (to Prosecution's Prayer for Inhibition). The
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We granted prosecution filed its Rejoinder (to Reply to Opposition to the Motion to
petitioner's motion in our Resolution dated December 12, 2001. Petitioner Dismiss with Prayer to Hold in Abeyance its Resolution until after
filed its Petition for Review on January 10, 2002, docketed as G.R. No. Resolution of our Motion to Inhibit) and Counter-Comment (to the
150317. We resolved to deny the petition on January 30, 2002 for having Opposition to Motion to Inhibit). Private respondent Salayon filed a
been filed out of time and for Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo's failure Manifestation dated October 6, 2001, adopting all the allegations
to sign the petition.[28] Petitioner again filed a Motion for Reconsideration mentioned in the Motion to Dismiss of his co-respondent
with this Court, to no avail.[29] Llorente. On October 15, 2001, the parties opted not to have a hearing
after having agreed to put all their arguments in their respective
Meantime, in the trial court, the hearing set on September 4, pleadings.[34]
2001 did not proceed due to Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo's
absence. Another representative from the office of Senator Pimentel, an On November 23, 2001, the trial court rendered its assailed
Atty. Galimpin, appeared in court and requested for a order, the dispositive portion of which states:
postponement. Again, the court received a call from the secretary of
Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo that the latter had his tooth extracted, WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss
hence, could not appear in court. The trial court found this excuse quite dated October 4, 2001 filed by accused Antonio M.
odd since Atty. Galimpin informed the court that he saw Senior State Llorente, adopted by co-accused Ligaya P. Salayon, is
Prosecutor Bagabuyo at the Office of the Clerk of Court in the first floor granted and this case is dismissed. The cash bail posted
of the same building where the court sits. Private respondents moved for by each accused is ordered released to them.
the dismissal of the instant cases due to the denial of their right to speedy
trial. The trial court denied their motion and gave the prosecution the last SO ORDERED.[35]
opportunity to prosecute the instant cases, setting the next hearings on
October 3 and 15, 2001, with the admonition that failure to proceed will
be dealt with accordingly.[30] Petitioner, through Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo, then
filed with
On October 3, 2001, the prosecution refused to proceed with
pre-trial and trial, giving as reason its pending petition before the
CA. Private respondent Llorente reiterated his motion to dismiss the case
on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. The trial court
granted private respondents a period of three (3) days therefrom within
which to formalize their motions to dismiss and the prosecution was also
given three (3) days from receipt of private respondents' motions within
which to file its comment or objection.[31]
this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus[36] dated February 1, 2002 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Subsequently, CA-G.R. SP Nos. 69703 and 68922 were
docketed as G.R. Nos. 151461-151781. Petitioner prayed that: consolidated.[42]

1. Upon the filing hereof, this case be consolidated with On July 4, 2002, the CA rendered its assailed Joint Decision in CA-G.R.
[the] Petition for Review, filed last January 10, SP Nos. 69703 and 68922, the dispositive portion of which states:
2002 [with the Supreme Court], and docketed as G.R.
No. 150317; WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions
in CA-G.R. SP No. 68922 and CA-G.R. SP No. 69703 are
2. The Order dismissing the instant cases be recalled, hereby both DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly
set aside and the 321 criminal cases filed against both DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The assailed Order dated
accused Salayon and Llorente be reinstated; after which November 23, 2001 issued by Branch 158 of the Regional
they be arraigned for the 321 counts for the violation of Trial Court of Pasig City in Criminal Case Nos. 118823-31;
Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646; 118848-91; 118902-9063; and 119099-204, all entitled
“People of the Philippines v. Ligaya P. Salayon and
3. The Order, dated June 15, 2001, be declared as null Antonio M. Llorente,” is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
and void and set aside;
No pronouncement as to costs.
4. All the cases that used to be pending before the
respondent, Honorable RTC-158 be ordered remanded SO ORDERED.[43]
to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle to the
other branches, except those where these cases were
originally assigned to; or in the alternative, The CA noted that as to CA-G.R. SP No. 69703, Senior State
Prosecutor Bagabuyo filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Petition
5. An Order be issued changing venue from the City datedApril 21, 2002 with the Supreme Court despite our referral of the
of Pasig to either Manila, Pasay or Makati; and, case to the CA. The CA held that the petition instituted by Senior State
Prosecutor Bagabuyo should be "effectively withdrawn" as the same was
6. Plaintiff-petitioner prays for such other relief filed without the participation of the OSG, in violation of Section 35(1),
consistent with law and equity on the matter.[37] Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. At any rate,
the CA likewise found no merit in the petition instituted by the OSG. It
held that petitioner was essentially assailing an error of judgment and not
Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, we referred of jurisdiction, hence, its resort to a special civil action for certiorari under
said petition to the CA for appropriate action.[38] In the CA, the case was Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69703. erroneous. Even assuming that petitioner's recourse was proper, the CA
held that respondent Judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion
Meantime, on February 2, 2001, petitioner, this time through the amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered his assailed
OSG, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a petition for certiorari Order dated November 23, 2001. The ruling of the trial court was found to
under Rule 65 directly with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68922. The be supported by Sections 6 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
motion having been granted,[39] petitioner, through the OSG, filed its Procedure, Sections 9 and 13 of R.A. No. 8493 and Sections 14(2) and 16,
petition[40] contending that respondent Judge "committed grave abuse of Article III of the 1987 Constitution. It restated the principle that "[t]he
discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the right to speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and
order of dismissal dated November 23, 2001 allegedly on account of the oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent
speedy trial rule."[41] person may be freed from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or,
if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible finding that the right of private respondents to speedy trial has been
time compatible with the presentation and considerations of whatever violated.
legitimate defense he may interpose."[44] The CA found that the
cancellation of the hearings in the trial court by the prosecution without We shall first resolve the procedural issue.
any valid grounds was "certainly vexatious, capricious and
oppressive." Citing People v. Abaño,[45] it held that "the dismissal of the Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with
cases following a number of postponements at the instance of the the CA was the proper remedy since respondent Judge committed grave
prosecution is not an abuse of discretion." The CA likewise held that "delay abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders," as an consolidated the 321 criminal cases into one information and dismissed
exclusion to the computation of the 80-day period within which to the "criminal case" on the ground of the denial of private respondents'
commence trial under Section 3(3), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, should right to speedy trial, without giving the prosecution the chance to present
be read in harmony with Section 7 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Hence, evidence. Citing People v. Velasco,[47] petitioner contends that the
in the case at bar, the mere expedient of petitioner's filing before the CA of dismissal of the "criminal case" against private respondents is tantamount
a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 to their acquittal which, as a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal
questioning the trial court's interlocutory order did not interrupt the from in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right. In any case,
running of the 80-day period. Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Section the alleged existence of the remedy of appeal does not always foreclose
3(7) of Rule 119 is also misplaced as the trial court did not state in its the remedy of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
orders granting continuance that the ends of justice in granting the
continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the right of the Petitioner's remedy with the CA was correct.
accused to a speedy trial. Finally, the CA pointed out that the prosecution
failed to commence with the trial even after the lapse of 122 days from the Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
arraignment of private respondents. provides that “[a]ny party may appeal from a judgment or final
Hence, the instant petition on certiorari under Rule 45 in which order,unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.”
petitioner raises the following issues:
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
I. [WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in
QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE WRIT OF the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right.[48] Thus, errors of
CERTIORARI IS NOT WARRANTED INASMUCH AS WHAT judgment are not appealable by the prosecution. Appeal by the
IS BEING IMPUGNED IS "AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT." prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal case by the trial
court may be allowed only on errors of jurisdiction when there was denial
II. [WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction.[49] This is so as while
QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF it is true that double jeopardy will attach in case the prosecution appeals a
THE 321 CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PRIVATE decision acquitting the accused, an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of
RESPONDENTS.[46] discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really
"acquit" and therefore does not terminate the case as there can be no
double jeopardy based on a void indictment.[50]
The issues to be resolved are: a) whether a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy from the dismissal of the In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the cases against private
cases before the trial court on the ground of the denial of private respondents for the denial of their right to speedy trial. In a long line of
respondents' right to speedy trial; and b) whether the CA erred in finding cases, we have held that a dismissal on the ground of the denial of the
that respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in accused's right to a speedy trial will have the effect of acquittal that
dismissing the instant criminal cases against private respondents upon a would
bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. [51] Thus, we of all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, [RTC], Metropolitan Trial
have held that where after such dismissal the prosecution moved for the Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court." On August
reconsideration of the order of dismissal and the court re-set the case for 11, 1998, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 38-98, the Rules
trial, the accused can successfully claim double jeopardy as the said order Implementing R.A. No. 8493. The provisions of said circular were adopted
was actually an acquittal, was final and cannot be reconsidered. [52] Hence, in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As to the time limit
petitioner was correct in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, within which trial must commence after arraignment, the 2000 Revised
alleging that "respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of
dismissal dated November 23, 2001 allegedly on account of the speedy Sec. 6, Rule 119. Extended time limit.-- Notwithstanding
trial rule" as an appeal was not available to it. Where the dismissal of the the provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116 and the
case was allegedly capricious, certiorari lies from such order of dismissal preceding section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month
and does not involve double jeopardy, as the petition challenges not the period following its effectivity on September 15,
correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal and such grave abuse 1998, the time limit with respect to the period from
of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction which prevents double arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall
jeopardy from attaching.[53] be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second
twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one
Having settled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-
was the proper remedy from the dismissal of the instant cases by the trial month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.
court, the crucial issue is: was the CA correct in ruling that a writ of
certiorari was not warranted inasmuch as the respondent Judge did not act
in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in R.A. No. 8493 and its implementing rules and the Revised Rules of
dismissing the instant cases against private respondents for the denial of Criminal Procedure enumerate certain reasonable delays as exclusions in
their right to speedy trial? the computation of the prescribed time limits. They also provide that "no
provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall
A writ of certiorari is warranted when 1) any tribunal, board or officer be interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of speedy trial as provided
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse by Article III, Section 14(2), of the 1987 Constitution."[57] Thus, in spite
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and 2) there is no of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course that the concept of "speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be
of law.[54] An act of a court or tribunal may be considered as in grave abuse a flexible concept.[58] In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,[59] we held:
of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of The right of the accused to a speedy trial and
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an
of passion or hostility.[55] indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by mandating the courts to
We affirm the CA's ruling that no such grave abuse of discretion was proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
shown to exist in respondent Judge's dismissal of the instant cases. cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy
disposition of a case is violated only when the
The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. [56] In 1998, oppressive delays. x x x
Congress enacted R.A. No. 8493, otherwise known as the "Speedy Trial Act
of 1998." The law provided for time limits in order "to ensure a speedy trial
 While justice is administered with dispatch, the
essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere
speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long
in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but
deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends
upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused,
but it does not preclude the rights of public justice.
Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to
the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court
are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give
meaning to that intent.

A balancing test of applying societal interests

and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the
court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad
hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been
deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered:
(a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the
 delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) restraining order was issued to stop the proceedings in
prejudice to the defendant. (citations omitted) this case, the pre-trial and trial shall proceed
on September 4, 2001. But the hearing of September 4,
2001 did not proceed on account of the absence of
In the cases at bar, in finding that private respondents were Prosecutor Bagabuyo. Another representative from the
denied of their right to speedy trial, respondent Judge recounted the
office of Senator Pimentel, a certain Atty. Rolando
following incidents in the trial court:
Galimpin, appeared and requested for another
postponement. Like before, the Court received a call
The Court considers the accused['s] arraignment
from the secretary of Prosecutor Bagabuyo that the
of June 15, 2001 and notes that the pre-trial was initially
latter had his tooth extracted and would not be in a
set on June 29, 2001. This initial setting did not proceed,
position to appear at the hearing. This Court found the
as earlier, the Prosecution, through State Prosecutor
motion for postponement odd because Atty. Galimpin
Bagabuyo, filed an Omnibus Motion to Postpone and
informed the Court he saw Prosecutor Bagabuyo at the
Motion for Reconsideration. The Court, nevertheless, set
Office of the Clerk of Court, which is located at the first
the hearing to July 5, 2001 and gave proper notice to the
floor of the building where this Court sits. Even then, the
Prosecution. This July 6 setting also did not proceed as a
Court denied the accused['s] oral motion to dismiss and
staff of Prosecutor Bagabuyo made a telephone call with
gave the Prosecution the last opportunity to prosecute
this Court seeking for a postponement as Prosecutor
this case. The Prosecution was given two dates, October
Bagabuyo was not feeling well. The Court issued its
3 and 15, 2001, the dates Prosecutor Bagabuyo would be
Order of July 6, 2001 setting the pre-trial again to July 26,
available as represented by Atty. Galimpin. Despite
2001 at 8:30 a.m. The July 26 pre-trial hearing likewise
these dates of October 3 and 15, 2001, the Prosecution
did not proceed, as Prosecutor Bagabuyo was
still failed to proceed to pre-trial and trial. Given the
indisposed. This matter was relayed to this Court in a
period of time to prosecute this case as above narrated,
telephone call of Orlando Nicolas, secretary of
the last opportunity on October 3 and 15, 2001, this
Prosecutor Bagabuyo. During the hearing, Atty. Jay I.
Court resolves that this case must now be dismissed. The
Dejaresco, a lawyer from the office of Senator Aquilino
accused’[s] right to speedy trial under Section 9, Rule 116
Pimentel, appeared and confirmed the inability of
(sic) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure has been
Prosecutor Bagabuyo to appear during the pre-trial
violated.[60]
hearing. The Court also requested Atty. Dejaresco to
inform Senator Pimentel on the delay caused by the non-
appearance of the Prosecutor. The hearing was reset
Clearly, the one hundred eleven (111) days that have elapsed
toAugust 2, 2001, the date suggested by Atty. Dejaresco.
from the time private respondents were arraigned on June 15, 2001 up to
the filing of the Motion to Dismiss by private respondents on the ground
The August 2, 2001 hearing was held, but the
of the denial of their right to speedy trial on October 4, 2001 is beyond the
Prosecution, through Prosecutor Bagabuyo, manifested
80-day limit provided under the law and the rules. The incidents that
that it would question the Order of this Court dated June
transpired before the trial court likewise show that the postponements at
15, 2001 and the Court’s Order on said date denying the
the instance of the prosecution were not justified. As found by the CA:
Prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration to the Order of
June 15, 2001. As requested, the Court granted the The Court a quo has sufficiently justified its order
Prosecution 30 days to file the proper petition before the
of dismissal for failure to prosecute in violation of the
higher court, and the pre-trial and trial was reset anew
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial as
to September 4, 2001. The Court [h]as impressed with
mandated by Section 14(2) and Section 16 of Article III
the commitment of the Prosecution that in the event no of the 1987 Constitution. The right to speedy trial
 means one free from vexatious, capricious and court motu proprio, or on motion of either
oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure the accused or his counsel, or the
that an innocent person may be freed from the anxiety prosecution, if the court granted the
and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of continuance on the basis of its findings
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible set forth in the order that the ends of
time compatible with the presentation and justice served by taking such action
consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may outweigh the best interest of the public
interpose.[61] and the accused in a speedy trial.

xxx
Petitioner contends that there was no inordinate delay on the
The cancellation of the hearings by the part of the prosecution to justify a dismissal of the cases based on a
prosecution without any valid ground is certainly violation of the private respondents' right to speedy trial. The date of
vexatious, capricious and oppressive and it has been arraignment was June 15, 2001. Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo filed a
held that the dismissal of the case following a number certiorari petition questioning the arraignment before the CA on August 6,
of postponements at the instance of the prosecution is 2001. Thus, a total of 51 days elapsed before the filing of the CA
not an abuse of discretion,[62] and especially taking into petition. On August 24, 2001, Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo received
account the periods in Rule 119 which are explicitly a copy of the CA Resolution dismissing his petition. OnSeptember 6, 2001,
provided.[63] he filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA Resolution. At this point,
only 64 days have passed since the arraignment. On October 17, 2001,
Petitioner invokes the exclusions provided in Section 3(a)(3) and Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo received a copy of the CA Resolution
(f), Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which state: denying his motion for reconsideration. On October 30, 2001, he filed a
motion for extension of time to file a petition under Rule 45 with this
Sec. 3. Exclusions.-- The following periods of Court. Prior to his filing of this motion for extension, 76 days have lapsed
delay shall be excluded in computing the time within from the date of arraignment. This Court granted him 30 days within
which trial must commence: which to file the petition or until December 1, 2001. Hence, when Judge
Hernandez issued an Order of dismissal dated November 23, 2001, the 80-
a) Any period of delay resulting day period mandated under Section 6 of Rule 119 has not yet
from other proceedings concerning the lapsed. Deducting the time it took Judge Hernandez to resolve petitioner's
accused, including but not limited to Omnibus Motion to Postpone and Motion for Reconsideration dated June
the following: 27, 2001, only 41 days had lapsed after private respondents' arraignment
onJune 15, 2001. Section 3 of Rule 119 provides that "delay resulting from
xxx extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders" is excluded in
3) Delay computing the time within which trial must commence. This provision is
resulting from not in conflict with Section 3(f) of Rule 119 as they speak of two different
extraordinary kinds of delay. If Section 3(f) is not applicable, Section 3(a) definitely is.
remedies against
interlocutory orders; We are not persuaded. As correctly held by the CA, "delay resulting
from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders" must be read in
xxx harmony with Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that
the "[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not interrupt the course of the
f) Any period of delay resulting principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
from a continuance granted by any preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent
from further proceeding in the case." This was clearly spelled out by propriety of [the] June 15, 2001 Order of this Court and
respondent Judge when, in addition to granting a 30-day continuance in the Honorable Court of Appeals dated August 16, 2001
view of the manifestation of the prosecution that it would file an appeal dismissed the petition outright. It also notes the
from the interlocutory order of the trial court with a higher court, the trial resolution of the said Court dated October 9,
court, in its August 2, 2001 Order, gave a warning that "[i]n the event that 2001 denying the Prosecution’s Motion for
the prosecution shall not be able to get any restraining order to stop the Reconsideration. Given these resolution, the
proceedings in this case, the hearing on [September 4, 2001] shall proceed Prosecution had no option under the circumstances but
as scheduled." Despite this warning, however, Senior State Prosecutor to proceed to pre-trial and trial during the October 15,
Bagabuyo did not appear for the prosecution on the September 4, 2001 2001 hearing. All and still, the Prosecution stood on its
hearing set by the trial court and the court only received a call from the ground not to prosecute this case and would only have
secretary of said Senior State Prosecutor that the latter had his tooth itself to blame for the dismissal of this case.[64]
extracted and would not be in a position to appear at the hearing. What
made the manner of postponement worse was that Atty. Galimpin, the
private prosecutor, informed the trial court that he saw Senior State
Prosecutor Bagabuyo at the Office of the Clerk of Court, which is located
at the first floor of the same building where the trial court sits.

Petitioner's reliance on Section 3(f) of Rule 119 is also misplaced

as nowhere in the Orders granting continuance did respondent Judgeset
forth that his order was based on findings that “the ends of justice served
by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the
accused in a speedy trial,” as required under the law and the Rules of
Court. To the contrary, the successive continuances granted by the trial
court were compelled by the repeated absence of the public prosecutor or
his refusal to proceed with the pre-trial and trial. The orders of the court
contained repeated warnings that "[i]n the event that there will again be
no appearance from Prosecutor Bagabuyo at the next scheduled hearing,
the Legal Department of the COMELEC shall then make its appearance and
take over the prosecution of this case." In its September 4, 2001 Order
denying private respondents' oral motions to dismiss and giving the
prosecution another chance to prosecute the cases by resetting the
hearings to October 3 and 15, 2001, the trial court gave an admonition
that the prosecution's failure to appear will be dealt with
accordingly. Even when Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo appeared
on October 3, 2001, the prosecution refused to proceed with the pre-trial
and trial of the cases on the ground of the pendency of its petition with
the CA. This, despite the fact that as early as August 16, 2001, the CA has
dismissed CA-G.R. No. SP. No. 65966 which raised the issue of the validity
of the private respondents' arraignment. As the trial court held:
The Court notes the petition for certiorari that
Prosecutor Bagabuyo filed before the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-GR SP No. 65966 questioning the
 Petitioner also contends in the instant petition that respondent such declaration continues to be the law of that case
Judge's decision declaring the 321 Informations against private even on a subsequent appeal. The rule made by an
respondents for violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 as only one appellate court, while it may be reversed in other cases,
Information, the arraignment of the accused to only one information and cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in
his Decision dismissing the "case" against private respondents give rise to the same case. The “Law of the Case,” as applied to a
the following questions: 1) Which one of the 321 Informations did private former decision of an appellate court, merely expresses
respondents plead "not guilty" to? and 2) What case did Judge Hernandez the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has
dismiss when he stated that "this case is dismissed"? been decided. Such a rule is "necessary to enable an
appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and
efficiently, which would be impossible if a question,
The contention is unavailing. Contrary to petitioner's claim, a once considered and decided by it, were to be litigated
reading of the June 15, 2001 Order of the trial court during arraignment anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent
leaves no room for vagueness. It states: appeal." Again, the rule is necessary as a matter of
policy in order to end litigation. "There would be no end
Pursuant to the Order of March 2, 2001, the
to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated
three hundred [twenty-one] (321) informations filed
appeals, compel a court to listen to criticisms on their
against both accused were treated to be only a single
opinions, or speculate of chances from changes in its
offense for which they should be made answerable. It is
members."
for this reason that both accused were arraigned and
entered their plea to a single or one information
only.[65]
Petitioner's contention that the prosecution was clearly deprived of
its day in court when it was not afforded the right to be present during the
private respondents' arraignment and to proceed to trial cannot stand
What this argument reflects is petitioner's stubborn insistence
scrutiny. Again, the issue of the validity of the arraignment of the private
not to recognize the trial court's interlocutory Orders dated March 2,
respondents without the presence of Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo
2001and June 15, 2001, granting private respondent Llorente's motion to
has already been established with finality in the prosecution's previous
consider all the 321 informations filed against each of them as constituting
appeal with the CA in CA-G.R. SP. No. 65966 and with this Court in G.R. No.
only one offense and declaring the arraignment of private respondents to
150317 and, thus, constitutes the law of the case between the
only one information, respectively. Notably, petitioner's Motion for
parties. Petitioner cannot re-raise said issue in this petition. Moreover,
Reconsideration of this Order on March 25, 2001 has been denied by the
petitioner's failure to proceed to trial, as clearly shown by the events that
trial court and was denied again when re-raised by petitioner with the trial
transpired in the trial court, was due to its own fault.
court in its Omnibus Motion to Postpone and Motion for Reconsideration
on June 27, 2001. On appeal to the CA raising said issue, the CA dismissed
In order that a judgment or order of acquittal may be successfully
the appeal for the non-participation of the OSG and the CA likewise denied
challenged in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioner must
the motion for reconsideration it filed. Petitioner filed a petition with this
prove that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely
Court raising the same issue and was likewise denied on January 30,
errors of judgment, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
2002 for having been filed out of time. We likewise denied its Motion for
excess of jurisdiction.[67] No such grave abuse of discretion can be
Reconsideration on April 24, 2002. Hence petitioner can no longer raise
attributed to respondent Judge in dismissing the instant cases for the
the same issue in this petition. InZarate v. Director of Lands,[66] we held
denial of private respondents' right to speedy trial.
that:
A last note. The first and the foremost state principle announced
A well-known legal principle is that when an
in our Constitution is that “the Philippines is a democratic and republican
appellate court has once declared the law in a case,
State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless
emanates from them.”[68] Our people express their mighty sovereignty Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and
mainly thru the election ballot where they decide, free from any fetter, Damage to Property. The pertinent portion of the information reads:
who will represent them in government. In a representative government,
the choice by the people of who will be their voice is nothing less than That at about 11:55 o’clock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy.
sacred, hence, its desecration is unpardonable. Regrettably, the prosecutor Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
failed in vindicating this constitutional principle whose wisdom has not this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
been diminished by the erosions of time. The lack of zealousness on the willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent
part of the prosecution to prove that the senatorial elections held in May manner a 10-wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue,
1995 was marred by the condemnable practice of “dagdag-bawas” which fully loaded with sacks of coconut shell, registered in the name of Ruben
led to the dismissal of the criminal charges against the private respondents Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an
cannot but be lamented. The inexplicable failure has left this Court no automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene
alternative except to affirm the dismissal of said charges for the R. Sendiong who was with two female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran
constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial cannot be held hostage and Elvie Sy, thus causing the instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R.
by the disinterest and mistakes of the prosecution in discharging its duty. Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and
Elvie Sy and extensive damage to the above-mentioned Colt Galant which
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Joint Decision is registered in the name of Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St.,
dated July 4, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 68922 and Dumaguete City, to the damage of the heirs of the same Lou Gene R.
69703 is affirmed. Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-mentioned.

No cost. An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan,

G.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009 Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the
charge.5
JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner,
vs. On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa
PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of court to file an
DURAN, Respondents. amended information.6 They sought to add the allegation of abandonment
of the victims by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck
DECISION abandoned the victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was
still alive inside the car; he was only extracted from the car by the by-
Tinga, J.: standers."7

Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari of the Decision2 dated 17 On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus
August 2006 and Resolution3 dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of Appeals Motion praying that the motion to amend the information be considered
in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. withdrawn.8 On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted the withdrawal and the
Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan and motion to amend was considered withdrawn.9
Jeffrey Reso Dayap.
Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the
The case had its origins in the filing of an Information 4 on 29 December prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought
2004 by the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his
Demurrer to Evidence10 dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecution’s be held responsible for it. This Court could only say that the prosecution
failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for has practically bungled this case from its inception.
reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment11 dated 25
April 2005. xxxx

In the Order12 dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecution’s
acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found [evidence] conclusively show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt
that the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the proximate cause of
allegations in the Information. Pertinent portions of the order state: the accident. The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of the
defense. It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated
An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the in the police blotter and can only conclude that the logical explanation of
same with the evidence presented by the prosecution would reveal that the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of vehicle 2, thus
the evidence presented has not established said allegations. The facts and hitting the latter’s inner fender and tires. Exhibit "7" which is a picture of
circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been proven. vehicle 2 shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle
It is elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his own 1’s ramming into the rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the differential
affirmative allegations. guide of vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled out together with
their axle. The cutting of the differential guide cause[d] the entire housing
xxxx connecting the tires to the truck body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to
tilt to its left side and swerve towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was this
Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was accident that caused the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of the
the accused who committed the crime as charged. Its witnesses have accused.
never identified the accused as the one who has committed the crime. The
prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused who xxxx
committed the crime or asked questions which would have proved the
elements of the crime. The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things—
was the accused who was driving the truck at the time of the incident. The the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for
Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime has which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the
been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it. perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably failed
There was no evidence on the allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. to prove these two things. When the prosecution fails to discharge its
Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in evidence. burden of establishing the guilt of the accused, an accused need not even
The alleged less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and offer evidence in his behalf.
Elvie Sy were not also proven as no medical certificate was presented to
state the same nor was a doctor presented to establish such injuries. The xxxx
alleged damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any
manner as no witness ever testified on this aspect and no documentary WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the
evidence was also presented to state the damage. The prosecution accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of
therefore failed to establish if indeed it was the accused who was evidence. The bail bond posted for his temporary liberty is also hereby
responsible for the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized
Duran and Elvie Sy, including the damage to the Colt Galant. The mother of representative.
the victim testified only on the expenses she incurred and the shock she
and her family have suffered as a result of the incident. But sad to say, she
SO ORDERED.13
could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who committed the crime and
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct
65,14 alleging that the MTC’s dismissal of the case was done without title of the case is Cuyos v. Garcia)18which ruled that in complex crimes
considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Respondents added involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries and
that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the
proceed as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as case is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property
failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused in spite of the evidence resulting from the reckless imprudence, not by the corresponding penalty
presented. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros for the physical injuries charged. It also found support in Sec. 36 of the
Oriental, Br. 32. Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary
Procedure, which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in
In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence where
petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00. As there was no proof of
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTC’s the total value of the property damaged and respondents were claiming
recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation the amount ofP1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls within the
that it failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The RTC’s jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 17 August
records also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in 2006 reads:
the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that
the defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us
course to the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region,
allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC however agreed that the MTC Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper disposition of the merits of the case.
failed to rule on the accused’s civil liability, especially since the judgment
of acquittal did not include a declaration that the facts from which the civil SO ORDERED.19
liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of
civil liability was not passed upon and resolved to remand the issue to the Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
MTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states: decision,20 arguing that jurisdiction over the case is determined by the
allegations in the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be
on accused’s acquittal is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the court of the basis of the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court of
origin or its successor for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the
case. No costs. Resolution dated 25 April 2007.21 It reiterated that it is the RTC that has
proper jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a willful,
SO ORDERED.16 unlawful, felonious killing as well as abandonment of the victims.

Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had
these were denied for lack of merit in the order 17 dated 12 September jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for reckless imprudence, owing to the
2005. enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,22 which confers jurisdiction to
first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property through
Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals criminal negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired
under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court jurisdiction on the basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn
subsequently rendered the assailed decision and resolution. The Court of amended information alleging abandonment. Respondents are also faulted
Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties for challenging the MTC’s order acquitting petitioner through a special civil
damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule
proceedings before the MTC are 42.
The petition has merit. It should be granted. Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to
hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the
The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive
jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained to the RTC. application thereof.26 When this case was filed on 29 December 2004,
Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by
Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level
Information dated 29 December 2004 charging petitioner only with the courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties
declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the including those for civil liability. It explicitly states "that in offenses
same offense but aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
victims. It appears from the records however that respondents’ attempt to exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for
amend the information by charging the aggravated offense was reckless
unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutor’s motion
to withdraw their motion to amend the information. The information filed imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and
before the trial court had remained unamended.23Thus, petitioner is maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the
deemed to have been charged only with the offense alleged in the original RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to
Information without any aggravating circumstance. the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal
case.27 Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and
reckless imprudence, commits any act which, had it been intentional, legal.
would constitute a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period toprision correccional in its medium period. When such As the records show, the MTC granted petitioner’s demurrer to evidence
reckless imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of
person attended the same article imposes upon the defendant the penalty evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same
is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable
resulting in homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
property, a complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act acquittal of the accused."28 Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of
results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place
committed.24 Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the the accused in double jeopardy.29 But while the dismissal order
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive
maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside
crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing
as "acts or omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of
deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).25 Thus, the penalty imposable upon discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
petitioner, were he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its medium process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.30
period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period (4
years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).
Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter,
alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case. 35
and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the
same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated A scrutiny of the MTC’s decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal
by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse was based on the findings that the act or omission from which the civil
its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTC’s conclusions liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the acts
were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioner’s civil liability has been
the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The extinguished by his acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically
records also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth stated that it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime had
in the Rules of Court. been committed and that accused was the person responsible for it. It
added that the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner who
The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the committed the crime as charged since its witnesses never identified
remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for the reception of petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the
evidence. incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of the
accident is the damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by the
We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and
to the RTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly establishing that
RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC. petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is no
more need to remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on the
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment civil aspect of the case, since petitioner’s acquittal has extinguished his civil
against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal liability.
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a)
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP.
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is No. 01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16 May 2005 of
not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. 31 However, the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No.
the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a 3016-04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner
finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the offense charged therein is REINSTATED and
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist32 or where the accused AFFIRMED.
did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. 33
SO ORDERED.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case NAMER SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y.
unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, respondents.
liability may arise did not exist.34 This is because when the accused files a
demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the DECISION
criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the
evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an CALLEJO, SR., J.:
order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and
acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the Rules of Criminal Procedure of the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court, 5th
Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 5,[2] dated November 19, 2001, and its
Order[3] dated January 14, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration of Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the
the decision of the said court on the civil aspect thereof and to allow her to private complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential Bank,
present evidence thereon. Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one Nena Jaucian Timario
in the amount of P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the
On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner’s assurance that it was a good check. The cavans of rice were
petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario with
picked up the next day by the petitioner. Upon presentment, the check
the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Criminal Case No.
was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account (“Account
7474 which reads as follows:
Closed”). The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the
Prudential Bank check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid
That sometime in the month of October, 1996, in the City of Legazpi, Bank, Legazpi Branch, which, however, was returned with the word
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above “DAUD” (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit).
named-accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent
to defraud by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and there to Evidence with Leave of Court[5] alleging that she could not be guilty of
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, on the part of accused NENA JAUCIAN the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she was merely an
TIMARIO, drew and issue[d] PRUDENTIAL BANK, LEGASPI CITY BRANCH indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315, paragraph
CHECK NO. 067481, dated October 15, 1996, in the amount of P214,000.00 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser
in favor of J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, represented by its thereof; (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner
Branch Manager, JERSON O. YAO, and accused ANAMER D. SALAZAR conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in order to
endorsed and negotiated said check as payment of 300 cavans of rice defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first check was dishonored,
obtained from J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, knowing fully the petitioner replaced it with a second one. The first transaction had
well that at that time said check was issued and endorsed, Nena Jaucian therefore been effectively novated by the issuance of the second
Timario did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to check. Unfortunately, her personal check was dishonored not for
cover the amount called for therein and without informing the payee of insufficiency of funds, but for “DAUD,” which in banking parlance means
such circumstance; that when said check was presented to the drawee “drawn against uncollected deposit.” According to the petitioner, this
bank for payment, the same was consequently dishonored and refused means that the account had sufficient funds but was still restricted
payment for the reason of “ACCOUNT CLOSED”; that despite demands, because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet been cleared.
accused failed and refused and still fail and refuse to pay and/or make
The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioner’s
arrangement for the payment of the said check, to the damage and
demurrer to evidence.
prejudice of said J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION.
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4] the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the private
complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase. The
Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did not establish the
of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued. existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner
and the issuer of the check, her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the
purpose of defrauding the private complainant. In fact, the private
complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never met Nena Jaucian
The Evidence of the Prosecution Timario who remained at large. As a mere indorser of the check, the
petitioner’s breach of the warranty that the check was a good one is not
On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess credit
300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation, through Mr. under Article 315(2)(d). The decretal portion of the trial court’s judgment
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged but is hereby held liable for the damages.
value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D. Salazar is therefore
ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the
of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused.[6] complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required
that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of for actual damages.
Court. On January 14, 2002, the court issued an order denying the motion.
In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
court claiming that after her demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have
court, she was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private
respondent. The petitioner invokes the applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
of Civil Procedure in this case, contending that before being adjudged deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
liable to the private offended party, she should have been first accorded such civil action separately shall be allowed.
the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
The Petition Is Meritorious involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where
the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts
Procedure – are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by
the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a criminal first lien on the judgment.
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
action. granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section
2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be
made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under The last paragraph of Section 2 of the said rule provides that the extinction
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
make such reservation. action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without exist.[7]
specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing
 The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of
the offender and indemnity to the offended party. The dominant and the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.
primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the
offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of
conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case,
state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand, liability might arise did not exist.[10]
the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended
solely to indemnify the former.[8] The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c)
criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based
People of thePhilippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil
action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final
criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from the judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit
defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid the acts or omission imputed to him.
multiplicity of suits. If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders
The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is proof judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot
beyond reasonable doubt, while in the civil aspect of the action, the appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in
quantum of evidence is preponderance of evidence. [9] Under Section 3, double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the
Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the said rules shall govern accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the
the procedure to be observed in action, civil or criminal. case within the period therefor.

The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option
the accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil liability of either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court
the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution has rested its under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or
case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the same. The aforecited rule
also on the civil aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court reads:
should render judgment not only on the criminal aspect of the case but
also on the civil aspect thereof: Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the
court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1)
SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. – If the judgment is of conviction, it shall on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be
state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances without leave of court.
which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the
the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right to
present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the “(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
evidence for the prosecution. innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
(5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt. behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence failure to appear is unjustifiable.”
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The
prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in
from its receipt. particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b)
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that
certiorari before the judgment. judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by now
a motion to dismiss the case for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are
beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused files a demurrer to mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance
evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his right to present and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due
evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence of process cannot possibly be met without a “law which hears before it
the prosecution. On the other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
a demurrer to evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not only on trial.”[12]
the criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is
denied by the court. This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the
accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial
unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused;
liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce
judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to
acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce
offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a their sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the
nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
process is thereby violated. As we held in Alonte v. Savellano, Jr.:[11]
Sec. 11. Order of trial. – The trial shall proceed in the following order:
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution
provides the fundamentals.
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in
the proper case, the civil liability.
“(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE G.R. No. 152643
damages, if any, arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the HON. RAMON C. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of
case. theRegional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, Present:
Petitioners,
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
and sur-rebuttal evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, - versus - Chairperson,
permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. NACHURA, and
deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs them to argue GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE, REYES, JJ.
orally or to submit written memoranda. Respondents.
Promulgated:
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the
August 28, 2008
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial
may be modified.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the
case on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution and the accused.
DECISION
In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action arising from the NACHURA, J.:
delict was impliedly instituted since there was no waiver by the private
offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the civil
action. Neither did he file a civil action before the institution of the
criminal action.
The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
evidence. The court issued an order granting the demurrer on its finding Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] datedAugust
that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil. However, 15, 2001 and its Resolution[2] dated March 12, 2002. The CA decision set
the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered aside the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Orders datedAugust 25,
the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private complainant even 2000[3] granting Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerra’s (Concepcion’s)
before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, motion to take deposition, and dated November 3, 2000[4] denying the
the petitioner was denied her right to due process. motion for reconsideration of respondents Raul G. Risos, Susana Yongco,
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Leah Abarquez, and Atty. Gamaliel D.B. Bonje.
Orders dated November 19, 2001 and January 14, 2002 are SET ASIDE AND
NULLIFIED. The Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 5, is hereby The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow:
DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No. 7474 for the continuation of trial for the
reception of the evidence-in-chief of the petitioner on the civil aspect of On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged with Estafa
the case and for the rebuttal evidence of the private complainant and the Through Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Cebu City,
sur-rebuttal evidence of the parties if they opt to adduce any. Branch 19, through a criminal information dated October 27, 1999, which
was subsequently amended on November 18, 1999. The case, docketed as
SO ORDERED. Criminal Case No. CBU-52248,[5] arose from the falsification of a deed of
real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they
made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property
known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the
document. Hence, the criminal case.[6]

Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion, who was a resident

of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at
the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and
was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment.[7]

On November 24, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for

Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal Case No. CBU-52248 on the
ground of prejudicial question. They argued that Civil Case No. CEB-20359,
which was an action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first
be resolved.[8] On May 11, 2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid
motion. Concepcion’s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 5,
2000.[9]

This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action

for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the May 11 and
June 5 RTC orders. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60266 and
remains pending before the appellate court to date.[10]

On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to

take the latter’s deposition.[11] He explained the need to
perpetuateConcepcion’s testimony due to her weak physical condition and
old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.

On August 25, 2000, the RTC granted the motion and directed
that Concepcion’s deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati
City.[12] The respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the
trial court on November 3, 2000. The court ratiocinated that procedural
technicalities should be brushed aside because of the urgency of the
situation, since Concepcion was already of advanced age.[13] After several
motions for change of venue of the deposition-taking, Concepcion’s
deposition was finally taken on March 9, 2001 at her residence.[14]

Aggrieved, respondents assailed the August 25 and November 3

RTC orders in a special civil action for certiorari before the CA in CA-G.R. SP
No. 62551.[15]
 On August 15, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision[16] favorable to WHETHER OR NOT FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE “PEOPLE
the respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads: OF THE PHILIPPINES” IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
ARISING FROM A CRIMINAL CASE A QUO CONSTITUTES A
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and WAIVABLE DEFECT IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.[20]
the August 25, 2000 and November 3, 2000 orders of the
court a quo are hereby SET ASIDE, and any deposition
that may have been taken on the authority of such void It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA,
orders is similarly declared void. respondents failed to implead the People of the Philippines as a party
thereto. Because of this, the petition was obviously defective. As provided
SO ORDERED.[17] in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all
criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved the petitioners (respondents
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the herein) to implead the People of the Philippines as respondent in the CA
respondents’ petition by not impleading the People of the Philippines, an case to enable the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. [21]
indispensable party. This notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved
the matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of prosecution However, this Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to
witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to
Court. The latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion
cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such
119, Concepcion’s deposition should have been taken before the judge or times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an
the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss
before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed the complaint/petition for the petitioner’s/plaintiff’s failure to
order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion. [18] comply.[22]

In its Resolution dated March 12, 2002 denying petitioner’s motion In this case, the CA disregarded the procedural flaw by allowing the
for reconsideration, the CA added that the rationale of the Rules in petition to proceed, in the interest of substantial justice. Also noteworthy
requiring the taking of deposition before the same court is the is that, notwithstanding the non-joinder of the People of the Philippines as
constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The party-respondent, it managed, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
appellate court likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be applied to file its Comment on the petition for certiorari. Thus, the People was
suppletorily because the situation was adequately addressed by a specific given the opportunity to refute the respondents’ arguments.
provision of the rules of criminal procedure.[19]
Instructive is the Court’s pronouncement in Commissioner Domingo
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: v. Scheer[23] in this wise:

I. There is nothing sacred about processes or

pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose is
WHETHER OR NOT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
PROCEDURE APPLIES TO THE DEPOSITION OF contending parties. They were created, not to hinder
PETITIONER. and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the
administration of justice. They do not constitute the
II. thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted
 to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a means to where the case is pending. Such examination, in the
an end. When they lose the character of the one and presence of the accused, or in his absence after
become the other, the administration of justice is at fault reasonable notice to attend the examination has been
and courts are correspondingly remiss in the served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as
performance of their obvious duty.[24] an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the
accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be
Accordingly, the CA cannot be faulted for deciding the case on the merits admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
despite the procedural defect.

On the more important issue of whether Rule 23 of the Rules of Petitioners contend that Concepcion’s advanced age and health
Court applies to the instant case, we rule in the negative. condition exempt her from the application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of Rule 23
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
the case in the presence of the judge.[25] This is especially true in criminal
cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross- The contention does not persuade.
examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the
witnesses face to face.[26] It also gives the parties and their counsel the The very reason offered by the petitioners to
chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary exempt Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground
to support their position or to test the credibility of said which places her squarely within the coverage of the same provision. Rule
witnesses.[27] Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses’ 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if
demeanor.[28] the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning. Thus,
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of whenConcepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been
the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may too sick at that time, her motion would have been denied. Instead of
be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have been
perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial
criminal proceedings, Sections 12,[29] 13[30] and 15,[31] Rule 119 of the proper.
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1,
2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case
prosecution witnesses. at bar. It is thus required that the conditional examination be madebefore
the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to
witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too sick to travel and waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination,
appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into play, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an
and it provides: examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.

Section 15. Examination of witness for the At this point, a query may thus be posed: in granting Concepcion’s
prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a motion and in actually taking her deposition, were the above rules
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear complied with? The CA answered in the negative. The appellate court
at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave considered the taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court of Makati
the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may City erroneous and contrary to the clear mandate of the Rules that the
forthwith be conditionally examined before the court
same be made before the court where the case is pending. Accordingly, To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for
said the CA, the RTC order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. the purpose of taking his deposition should be made before the court, or
at least before the judge, where the case is pending. Such is the clear
We agree with the CA and quote with approval its ratiocination in mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no necessity to
this wise: depart from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the
deposition is made elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, when he is under detention. More importantly, this requirement ensures
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the previous Rules, that the judge would be able to observe the witness’ deportment to
and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is especially true when
Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken before any the witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case.
“judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in
good standing so designated by the judge in the order, While we recognize the prosecution’s right to preserve its witness’
or, if the order be made by a court of superior testimony to prove its case, we cannot disregard rules which are designed
jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated mainly for the protection of the accused’s constitutional rights. The giving
therein,” the examination of a witness for the of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination
prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a
Criminal Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be done strict construction of the rules.
only “before the court where the case is pending.”[32]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution dated August 25, 2000 and March 12, 2002,
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 62551, are AFFIRMED.
prosecution witness shall be made before the court where the case is
pending. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, there is nothing in the rule SO ORDERED.
which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies
only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and R. No. 143093 May 21, 2007
not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the
court may not introduce exceptions or conditions. Neither may it engraft RIMBERTO T. SALVANERA, Petitioner,
into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not contemplated. [33] When the vs.
words are clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation. There PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUCITA PARANE, Respondents.
is only room for application.[34]
DECISION
Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case,
because the rules on civil procedure apply suppletorily to criminal cases.
PUNO, C.J.:
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the
rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special On appeal are the Decision dated April 30, 1999 and the two Resolutions of
proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have the Court of Appeals, dated September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, in CA-
suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that G.R. SP No. 46945. The Court of Appeals discharged accused Feliciano
the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the Information in Criminal Case No.
Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely TM-1730 for Murder, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Trece
covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Martires City, to become state witnesses. The appellate court likewise
Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise. cancelled the bail bond of petitioner Rimberto Salvanera.
First, the facts: The prosecution likewise claimed that it was premature and baseless for
the trial court to grant petitioner’s application for bail because the
In an Information1 dated November 30, 1996, petitioner Rimberto prosecution had not yet rested its case in the hearing for the discharge of
Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo the two accused.
Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane, committed as
follows: The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution. It discharged accused
Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the Information to become
That on or about October 23, 1995, in the Municipality of Gen. Trias, state witnesses, and cancelled the bail bond of petitioner Salvanera. In its
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Resolution dated September 22, 1999, it denied petitioner's Motion for
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually Reconsideration. Petitioner then filed his Motion for Clarification with
helping each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, then armed Leave of Court. The same was also denied in a Resolution dated May 11,
with a firearm, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously 2000.
assault, attack and shoot one RUBEN PARANE Y MAGSAMBOL, inflicting
gunshot wound on his body, resulting to his instantaneous death, to the Hence, this appeal.
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
Petitioner enumerates the grounds for his appeal, as follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner was the alleged mastermind; IN RENDERING THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ASSAILED ORDERS
Lungcay, the hired hitman; Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle which DEFYING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE THEREON WHEN IT RULED
carried Lungcay to the place of the commission of the crime; while THAT THE "SUBSTANTIAL CORROBORATION" REQUIREMENT
Tampelix delivered the blood money to the latter. All the accused have UNDER SECTION 9, RULE 119 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT
been arrested and detained, except Edgardo Lungcay who remained at- WAS SATISFIED BY THE PROSECUTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT -
large.
A. THE "SUBSTANTIAL CORROBORATION" REQUIREMENT
Respondent Lucita Parane is the spouse of victim Ruben Parane. MUST BE SATISFIED THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF THE
OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHO ARE NOT
On January 22, 1997, petitioner applied for bail. The prosecution, on AN (sic) ACCUSED SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS STATE
March 4, 1997, moved for the discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin and WITNESS, NOT BY ANOTHER ACCUSED LIKEWISE SOUGHT
Domingo Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses. TO BE DISCHARGED.

In an Omnibus Order2 dated September 5, 1997, the trial court granted B. THE SWORN STATEMENT OF AN ACCUSED SOUGHT TO
petitioner’s application for bail and denied the prosecution’s motion for BE DISCHARGED CANNOT BE USED AS EVIDENCE FOR
the discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix. The prosecution moved for PURPOSES OTHER THAN HIS OWN DISCHARGE PRIOR TO
reconsideration but the motion was denied. THE ISSUANCE BY A COMPETENT COURT OF THE ORDER
OF HIS DISCHARGE.
The prosecution then appealed to the Court of Appeals. It contended that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the C. THE TESTIMONIES OF ABUTIN AND TAMPELIX CANNOT
motion to discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state witnesses. It BE SUBSTANTIALLY CORROBORATED IN ITS MATERIAL
alleged that the testimonies of the two accused are absolutely necessary POINTS BY THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
to establish that petitioner masterminded the murder of Ruben Parane.
 D. THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY AN ACCUSED SOUGHT TO d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
BE DISCHARGED AS STATE WITNESS CANNOT BE USED TO and,
CORROBORATE THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY ANOTHER
ACCUSED LIKEWISE SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of
STATE WITNESS. any offense involving moral turpitude.4

II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR According to petitioner, the testimony of an accused sought to be
IN RENDERING THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ASSAILED ORDERS, discharged to become a state witness must be substantially corroborated,
DEFYING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER, WHEN IT not by a co-accused likewise sought to be discharged, but by other
CANCELLED PETITIONER'S BAIL BOND DESPITE THE FACT THAT prosecution witnesses who are not the accused in the same criminal case.
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE ALREADY RULED THAT THE EVIDENCE OF Petitioner justifies this theory on the general principles of justice and
HIS GUILT IS NOT STRONG.3 sound logic. He contends that it is a notorious fact in human nature that a
culprit, confessing a crime, is likely to put the blame on others, if by doing
We uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals. so, he will be freed from any criminal responsibility. Thus, in the instant
case, petitioner supposes that both Abutin and Tampelix will naturally
In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the seize the opportunity to be absolved of any liability by putting the blame
following conditions must be present, namely: on one of their co-accused. Petitioner argues that prosecution witnesses
Parane and Salazar, who are not accused, do not have personal knowledge
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of the circumstances surrounding the alleged conspiracy. Thus, they could
of an offense; not testify to corroborate the statement of Abutin and Tampelix that
petitioner is the mastermind or the principal by induction.
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it
rests its case; We agree with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as
specious. To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate
the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points is to
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn
render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other direct
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support
evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
of the discharge;
except the testimony of the state witness."5 The corroborative evidence
required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same evidence
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We have ruled that
"a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than
(5) The trial court is satisfied that: by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator
are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some
accused whose discharge is requested; particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in
other respects."6 It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the corroborated by some other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are
proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin and
testimony of said accused; Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each other’s
testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent that their
corroborated in its material points; trustworthiness becomes manifest."7
As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal Lastly, we affirm the ruling of the appellate court in cancelling the bail
plan of the conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the bond of petitioner. The grant of petitioner’s application for bail is
discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only they have premature. It has to await the testimony of state witnesses Abutin and
knowledge of the crime.8 The other prosecution witnesses are not Tampelix. Their testimonies must be given their proper weight in
eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the determining whether the petitioner is entitled to bail.
conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the
accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and
link petitioner to the commission of the crime. Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945, dated April
30, 1999, September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, respectively, are
In Chua v. Court of Appeals,9 we ruled that the trial court has to rely on AFFIRMED in toto.
the information offered by the public prosecutor as to who would best
qualify as a state witness. The prosecutor knows the evidence in his SO ORDERED.
possession and the witnesses he needs to establish his case. In Mapa v.
Sandiganbayan,10 we held: EN BANC

The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171655
of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego Appellee,
prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It is Present:
a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who
appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the PUNO, C.J.,
particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty QUISUMBING,
criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be - versus - CARPIO,
extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed CORONA,
solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute CARPIO MORALES,
includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary CHICO-NAZARIO,
right to decide whom not to prosecute. VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
We further ruled: PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Appellants. BRION,
In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the PERALTA, and
jurisdiction of the respondent court is limited. For the business of a court BERSAMIN, JJ.
of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the
success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the Promulgated:
prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are July 22, 2009
not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the x------------------------------- ------------------ x
blunders of the defense. For fairness demands that courts keep the scales
of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process DECISION
demands that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field
perfectly even and perpetually level. CARPIO MORALES, J.:
 Appellant Maritess Ang (Maritess) was charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City with kidnapping for ransom,
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 10th of October 1995, in

Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
conspiring together, confederating with two (2) other
persons whose true names, identities and
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and
mutually helping one another did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and
 feloniously kidnap one CHARLIE CHUA, a
businessman, from the Casa Leonisa Bar located at The evidence for the prosecution presents the following version of
Examiner Street, Quezon City and brought him to an events:[5]
unknown place and detained him up to the present
for the purpose of extorting ransom money in the At around 10:00 in the evening of October 10, 1995, Maritess,
amount of P15,000,000.00, Philippine Currency, together with Estacio and Sumipo, arrived at Casa Leonisa, a bar-restaurant
thereby depriving him of his liberty from October 10, at Examiner Street, Quezon City where the three of them would meet with
1995 up to the present, to the damage and prejudice Charlie Mancilla Chua (the victim). Maritess had earlier told Sumipo that
of said offended party.[1] she would settle her debt to the victim and then “deretsong dukot na
rin x x x kay Charlie [the victim].”[6] Sumipo assumed, however, that
Maritess was just joking.
The Information was subsequently amended to implead the other
appellant, Pablo Estacio, Jr. (Estacio), and to change the charge from After the victim arrived past midnight and talked to Maritess for a
kidnapping for ransom to kidnapping with murder. The accusatory portion short while, the group boarded his car, Maritess taking the seat beside the
of the Amended Information reads: victim who was driving, as Estacio and Sumipo took the backseat.

That on or about the 11th day of October, Not long after, Estacio pulled out a gun and ordered the victim to
1995, in Quezon City, Philippipnes, the above-named pull the car over. As the victim complied, Estacio, with a gun pointed at
accused, conspiring, confederating with another him, pulled him to the backseat as Maritess transferred to the backseat, sat
person whose true name and identity has not as yet beside the victim, tied the victim’s hands behind his back, and placed tape
been ascertained and mutually helping one another, on his mouth. Estacio then directed Sumipo to take over the wheels as he
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and did.[7]
feloniously kidnap one CHARLIE MANCILLAN CHUA, a
businessman, with the use of motor vehicle from While Sumipo tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their
Casa Leonisa Bar located at Examiner Street, Quezon plan, they replied that they would kill the victim so that he would not take
City and brought him to BRGY. STO. CRISTO, San Jose, revenge.[8] Thereupon, the victim told Maritess, “bakit mo nagawa sa akin
del Monte, Bulacan and thereafter with intent to kill,
qualified by evident premeditation, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously repeatedly
stab said CHARLIE MANCILLAN CHUA on the different
parts of his body with the use of [a] fan knife, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds, which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Charlie
Mancillan Chua.[2] (Underscoring in the original.)

Still later, the Information was further amended to additionally

implead one Hildo Sumipo (Sumipo)[3] who was, however, subsequently
discharged as state witness.[4]
ito sa kabila ng lahat?,” to which she replied, “Bayad na ako sa utang ko sa Sumipo soon learned that Maritess and Estacio sold Chua’s gun,
iyo ngayon.” watch, and necklace from the proceeds of which he was given P7,000.

On Estacio’s instruction, Sumipo drove towards San Jose del On May 16, 1996, Sumipo surrendered to the National Bureau of
Monte, Bulacan and on reaching a secluded place, Estacio ordered Sumipo Investigation. On May 23, 1996, Estacio surrendered to the police. The
to stop the car as he did. Maritess and Estacio then brought the victim to a police then informed the victim’s mother that Estacio had admitted having
grassy place. Estacio with bloodied hands later resurfaced. killed her son, and that he offered to accompany them to the crime scene.

The three then headed towards Malinta, Valenzuela, Bulacan. On The police, accompanied by the victim’s mother and Estacio, went
the way, Estacio and Maritess talked about how they killed the victim, to the crime scene and recovered the remains of the victim who was
Estacio telling Maritess, “Honey, wala na tayong problema dahil siguradong identified by his mother by the clothes attached to his bones. The victim’s
patay na si Charlie sa dami ng saksak na nakuha niya.” dentist found his teeth to match his dental record.

On Estacio’s and Maritess’ directive, Sumipo stopped by a drug Sumipo explained in an affidavit,[9] which he identified in open
[10]
store where Maritess bought alcohol to clean their hands. Along the way, court, that Maritess got angry with the victim after he lent money to her
Maritess and Estacio threw out the victim’s attaché case. Maritess later husband, one Robert Ong,[11] enabling him to leave the country without her
told Estacio “Honey, sana hindi muna natin pinatay si Charlie para knowledge, while Estacio was jealous of the victim with whom Maritess had
makahingi pa tayo ng pera sa mga magulang [niya].” a relationship.[12]

The three later abandoned the car in Malinta. In his affidavit[13] which he identified in open court, Estacio
claimed that a quarrel broke out in the car between the victim and Maritess
The following morning, Estacio went to the residence of Sumipo about a debt to the victim; that he tried to pacify the two, but the victim
where he called up by telephone the victim’s mother and demanded got angry at him, prompting him to point a fan knife at his neck; and that he
aP15,000,000 ransom. The mother replied, however, that she could not then asked Sumipo to drive the car up to Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del
afford that amount. Monte, Bulacan where he dragged the victim away from the car and
accidentally stabbed him.
In the afternoon of the same day, Maritess and Estacio went to
Sumipo’s residence again where Estacio again called up the victim’s mother, When asked on cross-examination why the stabbing was
this time lowering the ransom demand to P10,000,000 which she still found accidental, Estacio replied that he and Maritess originally planned to leave
to be too steep. Sumipo expressed his misgivings about future calls, as they the victim in Bulacan, but since there was talk of the victim getting back at
might get caught, but Estacio and Maritess assured him that that call would them, he “got confused and so it happened.”[14]
be the last.
Maritess for her part denied[15] having conspired with Estacio. She
The group then went to Greenhills where Estacio still again called claimed that while on board the car, the victim took issue with her
up the victim’s mother, still lowering the ransom demand “friendship” with Estacio, whom he insulted. Incensed, Estacio grabbed the
toP5,000,000, P1,000,000 of which should be advanced. The victim’s victim by the collar, prompting the victim to pull out a gun from under the
mother having agreed to the demand, Maritess and Estacio directed her to driver’s seat which he aimed at Estacio.
place the money in a garbage can near Pizza Hut in Greenhills at 11:30 in
the evening. Estacio and Sumipo later proceeded to Pizza Hut, and as they Continuing, Maritess claimed that she tried to pacify the quarreling
were seated there, a patrol car passed by, drawing them to leave and part men; that the car stopped at San Jose del Monte and the three men
ways. alighted; that Sumipo returned to the car and was later followed by Estacio
who said “Masama raw ang nangyari,”[16] he adding that he did not intend
to stab the victim.
 A. x x x Discharging Sumipo as State Witness and
Branch 219 of the Quezon City RTC found both Estacio and in Relying on His Testimony for the Conviction
Maritess guilty of “kidnapping on the occasion of which the victim was of Appellant Ang.[21]
killed,” disposing as follows: xxx
B. x x x Finding That There was Kidnapping with
WHEREFORE, finding accused Pablo Estacio, Murder and That Appellant Ang is Guilty
Jr. and Maritess Ang guilty beyond reasonable doubt Thereof.
of the crime of kidnapping on the occasion of which C. x x x Not Concluding that the Crime Committed
the victim was killed, the court hereby sentences was Plain Homicide, and That Accused Estacio
each of them to suffer the maximum penalty is Solely Responsible Therefor.[22](Emphasis and
of Death; to jointly and severally pay the heirs of underscoring in the original)
Charlie Chua the amount of P200,000.00, as actual
damages, and P1,000,000.00, as moral damages; and
to pay the costs.
By Decision[23] of May 12, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed,
[17]
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis and with modification, the trial court’s decision, disposing as follows:
underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in
The case was forwarded to this Court for automatic Criminal Case No. Q-95-63818 finding accused-
review.[18] However, the Court referred it to the Court of Appeals for appellants Maritess Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr. guilty
intermediate review following People v. Mateo.[19] beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping
with murder and sentencing them to each suffer the
Estacio faulted the trial court for: penalty of DEATH, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants are ordered to
I pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased
the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
x x x FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF HEREIN ACCUSED- indemnity; P25,000.00 as exemplary
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED WAS PROVEN damages and P500,000.00 as moral damages.
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
In view of the death penalty imposed, let the
II entire records of this case be forwarded to the
Honorable Supreme Court for further review.
x x x CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis and
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE INDISPENSABLE underscoring supplied)
ELEMENTS OF DETENTION AND “LOCK
UP”.[20] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Appellants manifested before this Court that supplemental
pleadings would not be necessary, all relevant matters having already been
As for Maritess, she faulted the trial court for: taken up.[25]
 Findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims
of witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of
its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect, if not kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered
conclusive effect, by this Court because of the trial court’s unique as a component felony to produce the complex crime
advantage in observing and monitoring at close range the demeanor, of kidnapping with murder. In fact, as we held in the
deportment, and conduct of the witnesses as they testify. [26] This Court aforecited case of Masilang, et. al., although the
need not thus pass upon the findings of fact of the trial court, especially if accused had planned to kidnap the victim for ransom
they have been affirmed on appeal by the appellate court, as in the present but they first killed him and it was only later that
case.[27] Nevertheless, the Court combed through the records of the case they demanded and obtained the money, such
and found no ground to merit a reversal of appellants’ conviction. demand for ransom did not convert the crime into
kidnapping since no detention or deprivation of
The Court finds, however, that the offense of which appellants liberty was involved, hence the crime committed was
were convicted was erroneously designated. only murder.

Appellants were eventually charged with and convicted of the That from the beginning of their criminal
special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, defined in the last venture appellant and his brothers intended to kill
paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. In a special complex the victim can be readily deduced from the manner
crime, the prosecution must prove each of the component offenses with by which they swiftly and cold-bloodedly snuffed out
the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject his life once they reached the isolated sugarcane
of separate complaints.[28] plantation in Calamba, Laguna. Furthermore, there
wasno evidence whatsoever to show or from which it
In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. can be inferred that from the outset the killers of the
Although appellants bound and gagged Chua and transported him to victim intended to exchange his freedom for ransom
Bulacan against his will, they did these acts to facilitate his killing, not money. On the contrary, the demand for ransom
because they intended to detain or confine him. As soon as they arrived at appears to have arisen and was consequently made
thelocus criminis, appellants wasted no time in killing him. That appellants’ as an afterthought, as it was relayed to the victim’s
intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by the family very much later that afternoon after a
conversation which Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a sufficient interval for consultation and deliberation
knife would be used to kill him so that it would not create among the felons who had killed the victim around
noise.[29] The subsequent demand for ransom was an afterthought which five hours earlier.
did not qualify appellants’ prior acts as kidnapping.
x x x The fact alone that ransom money is
People v. Padica[30] instructs: demanded would not per se qualify the act of
preventing the liberty of movement of the victim into
We have consistently held that where the the crime of kidnapping, unless the victim is actually
taking of the victim was incidental to the basic restrained or deprived of his liberty for some
purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, and this is appreciable period of time or that such restraint was
true even if, before the killing but for purposes the basic intent of the accused. Absent such
thereof, the victim was taken from one place to determinant intent and duration of restraint, the
another. Thus, where the evident purpose of taking mere curtailment of freedom of movement would at
the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the most constitute coercion.[31] (Underscoring supplied)
accused it cannot be inferred that the latter’s
purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims
 The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was crime. He in fact at first thought that Maritess was joking when she said,
qualified by treachery. The victim was gagged, bound, and taken “Diretsong dukot na rin kay Charlie.” He tried to dissuade appellants from
fromQuezon City to an isolated place in Bulacan against his will to prevent pursuing their plan. He did not participate in the actual stabbing. And he
him from defending himself and to facilitate the killing. tried to extricate himself from the attempts to extract ransom from the
victim’s family.
This Court’s finding that the offense committed is Murder Sumipo’s testimony was corroborated on material points. The
notwithstanding, the resulting penalty is the same. Under Article 248 of the victim’s mother testified regarding the demands for ransom.[33] Cesar
Revised Penal Code, murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to Moscoso, an employee of Casa Leonisa, testified to seeing the victim,
death. The use of a motor vehicle, having been alleged in the Information Estacio, and Maritess at the bar-restaurant on the day and at the time in
and proven, can be appreciated as a generic aggravating question.[34] Henry Hong, the victim’s cousin who arrived at Pizza Hut,
circumstance. There being one generic aggravating circumstance, the Greenhills ahead of the victim’s brother during the scheduled delivery of
resulting penalty is death. In view, however, of the enactment of Republic the ransom, testified to seeing Estacio there with companions. [35] And the
Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, victim’s skeletal remains were found at the scene of the crimeupon
the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole. Estacio’s information and direction.

Respecting the assigned error in discharging Sumipo as a state And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at any time, been convicted
witness, the same does not lie. of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state witness Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of Sumipo as a state
are as follows: witness was erroneous, such error would not affect the competency and
quality of his testimony.[36]
(a) There is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is Finally, the Court brushes aside Maritess’ disclaimer
requested; of participation in killing the victim. It was she who bound the hands and
(b) There is no other direct evidence available gagged the victim. When Estacio, in Maritess’ company, brought the victim
for the proper prosecution of the offense to the scene of the crime and thereafter returned to the car, her and
committed, except the testimony of said Estacio’s hands were bloodied.
accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material
points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the
most guilty; and Parenthetically, prosecution witness Arlene Francisco, Maritess’
(e) Said accused has not at any time been friend who visited her in prison, testified that Maritess admitted having
convicted of any offense involving moral killed Chua.[37] And the prosecution presented letters from Maritess to
turpitude.[32] Estacio, written from prison, where she admitted the deed.[38]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of May 12,

These conditions were established by the prosecution. Sumipo 2005 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The Court finds appellants
was the only person other than appellants who had personal knowledge of Maritess Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the acts for which they were being prosecuted. Only he could positively Murder, with the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor
identify appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. He does not appear to vehicle. And in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on June
be the most guilty. He did not participate in planning the commission of the
24, 2006, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility for Supervising Examiner, did then and there willfully,
parole. unlawfully and feloniously and with intent of personal
gain, directly demand and extort from a certain Mrs.
SO ORDERED. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in
JUANITO T. MERENCILLO, G.R. Nos. 142369-70 connection, in consideration and in exchange for the
Petitioner, release of the certification of her payment of the capital
Present: gains tax for the land purchased by the Ramasola
[Superstudio] Inc. from one Catherine Corpuz Enerio, a
PUNO, C.J., C transaction wherein the aforesaid accused has to
hairperson, intervene in his official capacity, and to which the said
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar reluctantly agreed
- versus - CORONA, but upon prior consultation with the military authorities
AZCUNA and particularly the elements of the 702nd Criminal
GARCIA, JJ. Investigation Command [CIC] who set up the accused for
a possible entrapment resulting to (sic) his being caught
in the act of receiving an envelope supposedly
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,* containing the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
Respondent. Promulgated: (P20,000.00) but consisting only of four (4) marked one
hundred peso bills and the rest all bogus (paper)
April 13, 2007 monies, to the damage and prejudice of the said Mrs.
Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar in particular and the
x------------------------------------------x public and the government in general in the amount to
be proved during the trial of the case.
DECISION
CORONA, J.: Acts committed contrary to the provisions of
Section 3(b) of [RA] 3019.[7]
This petition for review[1] assails the June 18, 1999 decision[2] of the
Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case Nos. 004-005 affirming[3] the omnibus
decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Branch 47, in On the other hand, the information for direct bribery penalized
Criminal Case Nos. 9482-83 finding petitioner Juanito T. Merencillo guilty under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 9483
of violating Section 3(b) of RA 3019[5]and Article 210[6] of the Revised Penal charged:
Code.
That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995
The information charging petitioner for violation of Section 3(b) of in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the
RA 3019 in Criminal Case No. 9482 read: jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being then a public official connected with the
performance of official duty as its Group Supervising
That, on or about the 28th day of September, Examiner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
1995, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within feloniously and with intent of personal gain, demand,
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- extort and agree to perform an act constituting a crime,
named accused being then a public official connected an act which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue as its Group Practices Act, that is – that the certification for payment of
 the capital gains tax relative to the land purchased by the Fuentes prepared the revenue audit reports and submitted them together
Ramasola Superstudio Incorporated from Catherine with the application for the CAR to petitioner for preliminary approval.
Corpus Enerio be released by him only upon payment of [The application was to be forwarded thereafter to the Revenue District
an additional under the table transaction in the amount of Officer (RDO) for final approval.] Fuentes advised Estillore that the CAR
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine would be released after seven days.
Currency, which Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar
reluctantly agreed, but upon prior consultation with the At around 10:00 a.m. of the same day, private complainant Maria
military authorities particularly the elements of the Angeles Ramasola Cesar[10] (Cesar) received a call from Estillore. She was
702nd Criminal [Investigation] Command (CIC) who set up told that petitioner wanted to see her “for some negotiation.” She
the accused for a possible entrapment resulting to (sic) his proceeded to petitioner’s office where the latter demanded P20,000 in
being caught in the act of receiving an envelope exchange for the approval of the CAR. Cesar replied that she needed to
supposedly containing the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND confer with her two brothers who were her business associates.
PESOS (P20,000.00) but, consisting only of four (4) marked
one hundred pesos bills and the rest all bogus (paper) The following day, on September 14, 1995, Cesar received a call
monies, an act performed by the accused in his official from petitioner who was following up his demand. Later that day, Cesar
capacity as Group Supervising Examiner of the BIR, to the received another call from petitioner who told her that she could get the
damage and prejudice of Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola CAR after four or five days.
Cesar in particular and the public and the government in
general in the amount to be proved during the trial of the Cesar was able to return to the BIR only on September 20, 1995.
case. When petitioner saw her, he repeated his demand for P20,000 although
the CAR had in fact been signed by RDO Galahad Balagon the day before,
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article on September 19, 1995, and was therefore ready for release. On Cesar’s
210 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.[8] inquiry, the releasing clerk, Susan Cabangon, informed Cesar that she
(Cabangon) was still waiting for petitioner’s go signal to release the
document.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges when arraigned. On September 22, 1995, Cesar visited RDO Balagon and
Thereafter trial ensued and the cases were tried jointly. complained about petitioner’s refusal to release the CAR unless his
demand was met. RDO Balagon assured Cesar that he would look into her
complaint. Subsequently, Cesar received a call from petitioner informing
her that she could get the CAR but reminded her of his demand. He told
THE FACTS ESTABLISHED her that he was willing to accept a lesser amount. It was at this point that
BY THE PROSECUTION Cesar decided to report the matter to the authorities. She sought the help
of the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Bohol,
In the morning of September 13, 1995, Lucit Estillore went to the Senior Superintendent Dionaid Baraguer.
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) office in Tagbilaran City to ask for the
computation of taxes due on the sale of real property to Ramasola The following day, Sr. Supt. Baraguer referred Cesar’s complaint
Superstudio, Inc. and to apply for a certificate authorizing registration to the chief of police of Tagbilaran City who coordinated with Cesar for the
(CAR).[9] At the BIR office, she was entertained by revenue examiner entrapment of petitioner. Cesar was instructed to prepare two bundles of
Lourdes Fuentes who computed the documentary stamp tax (P37,500) and bogus money by putting a one-hundred peso bill on each side of each of
capital gains tax (P125,000) due on the transaction. The computation was the two bundles to make it appear that the two bundles amounted
approved by petitioner in his capacity as group supervisor. Estillore paid to P10,000 each or a total of P20,000. After the serial numbers of the four
the taxes in the bank and returned to apply for a CAR. She submitted the one-hundred peso bills were recorded, the entrapment was set for
application together with relevant documents to Fuentes for processing. September 28, 1995.
 of [RA] 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
On the appointed day, Cesar called petitioner and pleaded for the Corrupt Practices Act, and sentences him to suffer the
release of the CAR as well as for the reduction of petitioner’s demand. indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for eight (8)
Petitioner cautiously told Cesar not to talk about the matter on the phone years and one (1) month as minimum to fifteen (15)
and asked her to see him instead. Cesar went to petitioner’s office with the years as maximum, there being aggravating
two bundles of bogus money inside a white envelope. circumstances considered under Section 3(e) and
Section (f) of [RA] 3019 in relation to Article 14(1) and
Petitioner was entertaining a lady visitor when Cesar arrived. The (11) of the [RPC] in the sense that the offender have
members of the PNP entrapment team were already in petitioner’s office taken advantage of his public position, and that the
posing as civilians. On seeing Cesar, petitioner handed the CAR to her and, crime was committed in consideration of a price or
as she was signing the acknowledgment for the release of the CAR, he promise, without any mitigating or extenuating
informed her that he was going down to the second floor. Cesar took this circumstances to neutralize or offset any of the
as a cue for her to follow. aggravating circumstances, with perpetual
disqualification from public office, and the Court
As petitioner left his office, he held the door open for Cesar to further finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
follow. On reaching the third floor lobby, petitioner uttered “Here only.” doubt as principal by direct participation, for the
Cesar handed the envelope containing the two bundles of marked money crime of Direct Bribery defined and penalized by
to petitioner who, upon receiving it, asked “Why is this thick?” Before Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences
Cesar could answer, a member of the PNP entrapment team photographed him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
petitioner holding the envelope. Petitioner panicked, hid the envelope years and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years
behind his back and turned towards the window at the back of the BIR of prision mayor as maximum and a fine of Sixty
building. On seeing that the window was closed, he turned around towards Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos, all as mandated by law.
the open window facing the street. He threw the envelope towards the The accused Juanito T. Merencillo likewise is ordered
window but it hit the ceiling instead, bounced and fell to the first floor of to indemnify private complainant [Cesar] to pay
the BIR building.[11] The PNP entrapment team then introduced themselves moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and
to petitioner and invited him to go with them to their headquarters. attorney’s fees in the amount of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos. Costs shall also be taxed against
Charges were filed against petitioner. During the trial, the accused.
petitioner’s evidence consisted of nothing more than a general denial of
the charges against him. He claimed that he never asked for money and CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
that the allegations of demand for money existed only in Cesar’s mind
after she was told that there was a misclassification of the asset and Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Sandiganbayan. The
additional taxes had to be paid. He was surprised when policemen Sandiganbayan, however, denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision
suddenly arrested him as soon as Cesar handed him a white envelope the with modification reducing the penalty of imprisonment for violation of
contents of which he suspected to be money. Section 3(b) of RA 3019 to an indeterminate sentence of six years and one
month of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten years of prision mayor, as
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The dispositive maximum.[13] Thus, this petition.
portion of the decision read:
Petitioner basically raises two points: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court refusal to believe his evidence over that of the prosecution’s and (2) the
finds the accused Juanito T. Merencillo, Sandiganbayan’s failure to recognize that he was placed in double
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct jeopardy.
participation, defined and penalized by Section 3(b)
 Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for affirming the RTC decision evidence should be respected on review.[19] The presiding judge of the trial
and disregarding his evidence. He claims that, had the RTC and the court had the opportunity to actually observe the conduct and demeanor
Sandiganbayan not ignored the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the of the witnesses on the witness stand on direct examination by the
prosecution’s witnesses,[14] he would have been acquitted. He also asserts prosecution, cross-examination by the defense as well as during
that he was placed twice in jeopardy when he was prosecuted for violation clarificatory questioning by the trial judge himself.[20] Between the trial
of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 and for direct bribery. judge and this Court, the former was concededly in a better position to
determine whether or not a witness was telling the truth.[21] Based on the
Petitioner is wrong. records, we find no reason to disagree with the trial court’s assessment
and to discredit the prosecution’s witnesses.

TRIAL COURT’S Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the RTC and the

EVALUATION OF Sandiganbayan considered the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of
EVIDENCE WILL the prosecution witnesses. Both courts, however, ruled that the
NOT BE DISTU inconsistencies referred only to minor details that did not detract from the
RBED truth of the prosecution’s testimonial evidence. We agree.

Witnesses testifying on the same event do not have to be consistent in

Both the RTC and the Sandiganbayan found the testimonies of the each and every detail. Differences in the recollection of the event are
prosecution’s witnesses (that petitioner demanded and received money inevitable and inconsequential variances are commonly regarded as signs
from private complainant Cesar for the release of the CAR) sufficient and of truth instead of falsehood. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of
credible enough to sustain conviction. prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters
do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the
This notwithstanding, petitioner now asks this Court to review the weight of their testimony.[22] In fact, such minor flaws may even enhance
entire evidence anew, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses and make the worth of a testimony for they guard against memorized falsities.[23]
another factual determination of the case – a course of action clearly
improper given the nature of the instant petition. [15] Questions of fact Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential
cannot generally be raised for the consideration of this Court. integrity of the prosecution’s evidence as a whole or reflect on the
witnesses’ honesty.[24] The test is whether the testimonies agree on
The calibration of evidence and the relative weight thereof belongs to essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and
the appellate court.[16] Its findings and conclusions cannot be set aside by substantially coincide with each other so as to make a consistent and
this Court unless there is no evidence on record to support them. [17] In this coherent whole.[25] Thus, inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which
case, however, the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan, affirming the are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be successfully invoked
factual findings of the RTC, were amply supported by evidence and the as grounds for acquittal.[26]
conclusions therein were not against the law and jurisprudence. There is
no reason to disturb the congruent findings of the trial and appellate The RTC and the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the
courts. inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner were neither material nor
relevant to the elements of the offenses for which he was charged. For
Moreover, findings and conclusions of the trial court on the instance, whether or not it was petitioner himself who handed the CAR to
credibility of witnesses enjoy the respect of appellate courts because trial private respondent was immaterial. The fact was that petitioner demanded
courts have the distinct advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and received money in consideration for the issuance of the CAR.
as they testify.[18] In the absence of any arbitrariness in the trial court’s
findings and evaluation of evidence tending to show that it overlooked PETITION
certain material facts and circumstances, its findings and evaluation of ER WAS
NOT
PLACED Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public
IN DOUBLE JEOPAR officers already penalized by existing law, the following
DY shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared unlawful:

Section 3 of RA 3019 begins with the following statement: xxx xxx xxx

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving

Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of any gift, present, share percentage or
public officers already penalized by existing law, the benefit, for himself or for any other
following [acts] shall constitute corrupt practices of any person, in connection with any contract or
public officer and are hereby declared unlawful: transaction between the Government and
any other party, wherein the public officer
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis in his official capacity has to intervene
supplied) under the law.

xxx xxx xxx

One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a
felony under the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is,
either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony under The elements of the crime penalized under Section 3(b) of RA 3019
the Revised Penal Code.[27] There is no double jeopardy if a person is are:
charged simultaneously or successively for violation of Section 3 of RA (1) the offender is a public officer;
3019 and the Revised Penal Code.
(2) he requested or received a gift, present,
The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person share, percentage or benefit;
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.[28] The test is whether one
offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a (3) he made the request or receipt on behalf of the
frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is offender or any other person;
necessarily included in the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court.[29] An offense charged necessarily includes that which is (4) the request or receipt was made in connection
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, with a contract or transaction with the
as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter; and an government and
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those (5) he has the right to intervene, in an official capacity
constituting the latter.[30] under the law, in connection with a contract or
transaction has the right to intervene.[31]
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery
defined and punished under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and
those of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither On the other hand, direct bribery has the following essential
identity nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses. elements:

Section 3(b) of RA 3019 provides: (1) the offender is a public officer;

 (2) the offender accepts an offer or promise or Costs against petitioner.
receives a gift or present by himself or through
another; SO ORDERED.

(3) such offer or promise be accepted or gift or G.R. No. 179462 February 12, 2009
present be received by the public officer with a
view to committing some crime, or in PEDRO C. CONSULTA, Appellant,
consideration of the execution of an act which vs.
does not constitute a crime but the act must be PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it
is his official duty to do and
DECISION
(4) the act which the offender agrees to perform or
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.[32]
The Court of Appeals having, by Decision of April 23, 2007,1 affirmed the
December 9, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 139 convicting Pedro C. Consulta (appellant) of Robbery with
Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither Intimidation of Persons, appellant filed the present petition.
identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. While they have
common elements, not all the essential elements of one offense are The accusatory portion of the Information against appellant reads:
included among or form part of those enumerated in the other. Whereas
the mere request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or That on or about the 7th day of June, 1999, in the City of Makati,
benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is required named accused, with intent of gain, and by means of force, violence and
in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary steal and carry away complainant’s NELIA R. SILVESTRE gold necklace
consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under worth P3,500.00, belonging to said complainant, to the damage and
the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount of
scope: (a) performance of an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an P3,500.00.
unjust act which does not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or
refraining from doing an act which is his official duty to do. CONTRARY TO LAW.2 (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied)

Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed from the From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered:
same transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct
offenses. No double jeopardy attached since there was a variance between
At about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of June 7, 1999, private complainant
the elements of the offenses charged.[33] The constitutional protection
Nelia R. Silvestre (Nelia), together with Maria Viovicente (Maria) and
against double jeopardy proceeds from a second prosecution for the same
Veronica Amar (Veronica), boarded a tricycle on their way to Pembo,
offense, not for a different one.[34]
Makati City. Upon reaching Ambel Street, appellant and his brother Edwin
Consulta (Edwin) blocked the tricycle and under their threats, the driver
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The June 18, 1999
alighted and left. Appellant and Edwin at once shouted invectives at Nelia,
decision of the Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case Nos. 004-005 is AFFIRMED.
saying "Putang ina mong matanda ka, walanghiya ka, kapal ng mukha mo, Sembrano, and asked him (Pacaña) if he knew a bald man who is big/stout
papatayin ka namin." Appellant added "Putang ina kang matanda ka, wala with a big tummy and with a sister named Maria. As he replied in the
kang kadala dala, sinabihan na kita na kahit saan kita matiempuhan, affirmative, Nelia at once asked him to accompany them to appellant’s
papatayin kita." house, to which he acceded. As soon as the group reached appellant’s
house, appellant, on his (Pacaña’s) call, emerged and on seeing the group,
Appellant thereafter grabbed Nelia’s 18K gold necklace with a crucifix told them to go away so as not to cause trouble. Retorting, Nelia uttered
pendant which, according to an "alajera" in the province, was of 18k gold, "Mga hayop kayo, hindi ko kayo titigilan."
and which was worth P3,500, kicked the tricycle and left saying "Putang
ina kang matanda ka! Kayo mga nurses lang, anong ipinagmamalaki niyo, Another defense witness, Thelma Vuesa, corroborated Pacaña’s account.
mga nurses lang kayo. Kami, marami kaming mga abogado. Hindi niyo
kami maipapakulong kahit kailan!" The trial court, holding that intent to gain on appellant’s part "is presumed
from the unlawful taking" of the necklace, and brushing aside appellant’s
Nelia and her companions immediately went to the Pembo barangay hall denial and claim of harassment, convicted appellant of Robbery, disposing
where they were advised to undergo medical examination. They, however, as follows:
repaired to the Police Station, Precinct 8 in Comembo, Makati City and
reported the incident. They then proceeded to Camp Crame where they WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused PEDRO C.
were advised to return in a few days when any injuries they suffered were CONSULTA guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the felony of
expected to manifest. Robbery with Intimidation of Persons defined and penalized under Article
294, paragraph No. 5, in relation to Article 293 of the Revised Penal
Nine days after the incident or on June 16, 1999, Nelia submitted a Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
medico-legal report and gave her statement before a police investigator. from one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
Denying the charge, appellant branded it as fabricated to spite him and his mayor, as maximum, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there
family in light of the following antecedent facts: being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances which attended the
commission of the said crime.
He and his family used to rent the ground floor of Nelia’s house in Pateros.
Nelia is his godmother. The adjacent house was occupied by Nelia’s The said accused is further ordered to pay unto the complainant Nelia
parents with whom she often quarreled as to whom the rental payments Silvestre the amount of P3,500.00 representing the value of her necklace
should be remitted. Because of the perception of the parents of Nelia that taken by him and to pay the costs of this suit.
his family was partial towards her, her parents disliked his family. Nelia’s
father even filed a case for maltreatment against him which was dismissed SO ORDERED. (Italics in the original, underscoring supplied)
and, on learning of the maltreatment charge, Nelia ordered him and his
family to move out of their house and filed a case against him for grave The appellate court affirmed appellant’s conviction with modification on
threats and another for light threats which were dismissed or in which he the penalty.
was acquitted.
In his present appeal, appellant raises the following issues:
Appellant went on to claim that despite frequent transfers of residence to
avoid Nelia, she would track his whereabouts and cause scandal. (1) Whether or not appellant was validly arraigned;

Appellant’s witness Darius Pacaña testified that on the date of the alleged
robbery, Nelia, together with her two companions, approached him while
he was at Ambel Street in the company of Michael Fontanilla and Jimmy
 (2) Whether or not appellant was denied due process having been On the third and fourth issues. Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code under
represented by a fake lawyer during arraignment, pre-trial and which appellant was charged provides:
presentation of principal witnesses for the prosecution;
Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. – Any person who, with intent to gain,
(3) Whether or not appellant has committed the crime of which shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of
he was charged; and violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything, shall be guilt of robbery. (Italics in the original, underscoring
(4) Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of supplied)
the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. (Underscoring supplied)
Article 294, paragraph 5, under which appellant was penalized provides:
The first two issues, which appellant raised before the appellate court only
when he filed his Motion for Reconsideration of said court’s decision, were Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons –
resolved in the negative in this wise: Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against
or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
On the matter of accused-appellant’s claim of having been denied due
process, an examination of the records shows that while accused-appellant xxxx
was represented by Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes, who "seems not a lawyer,"
during the early stages of trial, the latter withdrew her appearance with 5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
the conformity of the former as early as July 28, 2000 and subsequently, mayor in its medium period in other cases. x x x (Citations omitted; italics
approved by the RTC in its Order dated August 4, 2000. Thereafter, in the original; underscoring supplied)
accused-appellant was represented by Atty. Rainald C. Paggao from the
Public Defender’s (Attorney’s) Office of Makati City. Since the accused- The elements of robbery are thus: 1) there is a taking of personal property;
appellant was already represented by a member of the Philippine Bar who 2) the personal property belongs to another; 3) the taking is with animus
principally handled his defense, albeit unsuccessfully, then he cannot now lucrandi; and 4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of
be heard to complain about having been denied of due persons or with force upon things.
process.3 (Underscoring supplied)
Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be
That appellant’s first counsel may not have been a member of the bar does established through the overt acts of the offender. It may be presumed
not dent the proven fact that appellant prevented Nelia and company from from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless
proceeding to their destination. Further, appellant was afforded special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
competent representation by the Public Attorneys’ Office during the perpetrator.5
presentation by the prosecution of the medico-legal officer and during the
presentation of his evidence. People v. Elesterio4 enlightens:
The Court finds that under the above-mentioned circumstances
surrounding the incidental encounter of the parties, the taking of Nelia’s
"As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out later to be a necklace does not indicate presence of intent to gain on appellant’s part.
non-lawyer, it is observed that he was chosen by the accused himself and That intent to gain on appellant’s part is difficult to appreciate gains light
that his representation does not change the fact that Elesterio was given his undenied claim that his relationship with Nelia is rife with ill-
undeniablycarrying an unlicensed firearm when he was arrested. At any feelings, manifested by, among other things, the filing of
rate, he has since been represented by a member of the Philippine bar, complaints6 against him by Nelia and her family which were subsequently
who prepared the petition for habeas corpus and the appellant’s brief." dismissed or ended in his acquittal.7
(Underscoring supplied)
Absent intent to gain on the part of appellant, robbery does not lie against "The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to
him. He is not necessarily scot-free, however. robbery and the other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the
accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of
From the pre-existing sour relations between Nelia and her family on one another by use of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery. Was
hand, and appellant and family on the other, and under the circumstances the purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the owner
related above attendant to the incidental encounter of the parties, or the creditor, to compel another to do something against his will and to
appellant’s taking of Nelia’s necklace could not have been animated with seize property? Then, conviction for coercion under Article 497 of the
animus lucrandi. Appellant is, however, just the same, criminally liable. Penal Code. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion. And there
was no common robber in the present case, but a man who had fought
For "[w]hen there is variance between the offense charged in the bitterly for title to his ancestral estate, taking the law into his own hands
complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is and attempting to collect what he thought was due him.Animus
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be furandi was lacking."10 (Italics in the original; citations omitted;
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, underscoring supplied)
or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved." 8
The Court finds that by appellant’s employment of threats, intimidation
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense and violence consisting of, inter alia, uttering of invectives, driving away of
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the the tricycle driver, and kicking of the tricycle, Nelia was prevented from
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint proceeding to her destination.
or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the Appellant is thus guilty of grave coercion which carries the penalty
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.9 (Italics in of prision correccional and a fine not exceedingP6,000. There being no
the original, underscoring supplied) aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its
medium term. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
Grave coercion, like robbery, has violence for one of its elements. Thus that may be imposed is anywhere from one (1) month and one (1) day to
Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code provides: six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and from two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
"Art. 286. Grave coercions. – The penalty of prision correccional and a fine
not exceeding six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
without authority of law, WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the challenged Court of Appeals
shall, by means of violence, threats orintimidation, prevent another from d Decision and another is rendered finding appellant, Pedro C. Consulta,
oing something not prohibited by law or compel him to do something GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Grave Coercion and sentences him to
against his will, whether it be right or wrong. suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months of arresto mayor
as minimum, to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional
medium as maximum.
If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the right of
suffrage or for the purpose of compelling another to perform any religious
act or to prevent him from exercising such right or from doing such act, the Appellant is further ordered to return the necklace, failing which he is
penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed." (Italics in the original; ordered to pay its value, Three Thousand Five Hundred (P3,500) Pesos.
underscoring supplied)
Costs de oficio.
The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the
commission of the act. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion: SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141181 April 27, 2007 days from the date thereof, was dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason that it was drawn against insufficient funds and notwithstanding
SAMSON CHING, Petitioner, receipt of notice of such dishonor the said accused failed and refused and
vs. still fails and refuses to pay the value of the said check in the amount of
CLARITA NICDAO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. [P20,000,000.00] or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for the
payment in full of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving the
DECISION said notice, to the damage and prejudice of the said Samson T.Y. Ching in
the aforementioned amount of [P20,000,000.00], Philippine Currency.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Samson Ching
of the Decision1 dated November 22, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in Dinalupihan, Bataan, October 21, 1997.
CA-G.R. CR No. 23055. The assailed decision acquitted respondent Clarita
Nicdao of eleven (11) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa (Sgd.) SAMSON T.Y. CHING
Bilang (BP) 22, otherwise known as "The Bouncing Checks Law." The
instant petition pertains and is limited to the civil aspect of the case as it Complainant
submits that notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal, she should be
held liable to pay petitioner Ching the amounts of the dishonored checks in The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9433 up to 9443 involving
the aggregate sum of P20,950,000.00. the following details:

Factual and Procedural Antecedents

Reason for
Check Private
Amount Date the
On October 21, 1997, petitioner Ching, a Chinese national, instituted No. Complainant
Dishonor
criminal complaints for eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22 against
respondent Nicdao. Consequently, eleven (11) Informations were filed Oct.
with the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dinalupihan- Samson T.Y.
0025242 P 20,000,000 6, DAIF*
Hermosa, Province of Bataan, which, except as to the amounts and check Ching
1997
numbers, uniformly read as follows:
Oct.
The undersigned accuses Clarita S. Nicdao of a VIOLATION OF BATAS 0088563 150,000 6, " "
PAMBANSA BILANG 22, committed as follows: 1997

Oct.
That on or about October 06, 1997, at Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, 0121424 100,000 6, " "
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did 1997
then and there willfully and unlawfully make or draw and issue Hermosa
Savings & Loan Bank, Inc. Check No. [002524] dated October 06, 1997 in Oct.
the amount of [P20,000,000.00] in payment of her obligation with 0045315 50,000 6, " "
complainant Samson T.Y. Ching, the said accused knowing fully well that at 1997
the time she issued the said check she did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the said check upon Oct.
0022546 100,000 " "
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) 6,
 1997 allegedly issued to him by respondent Nicdao amounting
to P20,950,000.00. He identified the signatures appearing on the checks as
Oct. those of respondent Nicdao. He recognized her signatures because
0088757 100,000 6, " " respondent Nicdao allegedly signed the checks in his presence. When
1997 petitioner Ching presented these checks for payment, they were
dishonored by the bank, HSLB, for being "DAIF" or "drawn against
Oct. insufficient funds."
0089368 50,000 6, " "
1997 Petitioner Ching averred that the checks were issued to him by respondent
Nicdao as security for the loans that she obtained from him. Their
Oct.
transaction began sometime in October 1995 when respondent Nicdao,
0022739 50,000 6, " "
proprietor/manager of Vignette Superstore, together with her husband,
1997
approached him to borrow money in order for them to settle their
Oct. financial obligations. They agreed that respondent Nicdao would leave the
00894810 150,000 6, " " checks undated and that she would pay the loans within one year.
1997 However, when petitioner Ching went to see her after the lapse of one
year to ask for payment, respondent Nicdao allegedly said that she had no
Oct. cash.
00893511 100,000 6, " "
1997 Petitioner Ching claimed that he went back to respondent Nicdao several
times more but every time, she would tell him that she had no money.
Oct.
12 Then in September 1997, respondent Nicdao allegedly got mad at him for
010377 100,000 6, " "
being insistent and challenged him about seeing each other in court.
1997
Because of respondent Nicdao's alleged refusal to pay her obligations, on
October 6, 1997, petitioner Ching deposited the checks that she issued to
At about the same time, fourteen (14) other criminal complaints, also for him. As he earlier stated, the checks were dishonored by the bank for
violation of BP 22, were filed against respondent Nicdao by Emma Nuguid, being "DAIF." Shortly thereafter, petitioner Ching, together with Emma
said to be the common law spouse of petitioner Ching. Allegedly fourteen Nuguid, wrote a demand letter to respondent Nicdao which, however,
(14) checks, amounting to P1,150,000.00, were issued by respondent went unheeded. Accordingly, they separately filed the criminal complaints
Nicdao to Nuguid but were dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. The against the latter.
Informations were filed with the same MCTC and docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 9458 up to 9471. On cross-examination,14 petitioner Ching claimed that he had been a
salesman of the La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing for almost
At her arraignment, respondent Nicdao entered the plea of "not guilty" to ten (10) years already. As such, he delivered the goods and had a
all the charges. A joint trial was then conducted for Criminal Cases Nos. warehouse. He received salary and commissions. He could not, however,
9433-9443 and 9458-9471. state his exact gross income. According to him, it increased every year
because of his business. He asserted that aside from being a salesman, he
For the prosecution in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443, petitioner Ching and was also in the business of extending loans to other people at an interest,
Imelda Yandoc, an employee of the Hermosa Savings & Loan Bank, Inc., which varied depending on the person he was dealing with.
were presented to prove the charges against respondent Nicdao. On
direct-examination,13 petitioner Ching preliminarily identified each of the Petitioner Ching confirmed the truthfulness of the allegations contained in
eleven (11) Hermosa Savings & Loan Bank (HSLB) checks that were the eleven (11) Informations that he filed against respondent Nicdao. He
reiterated that, upon their agreement, the checks were all signed by she owed him. Respondent Nicdao refused for fear that it would cause
respondent Nicdao but she left them undated. Petitioner Ching admitted disharmony in the family. She assured petitioner Ching, however, that he
that he was the one who wrote the date, October 6, 1997, on those checks would be paid by her daughter.
when respondent Nicdao refused to pay him.
Petitioner Ching reiterated that after the lapse of one (1) year from the
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check (Check No. 002524), petitioner time respondent Nicdao issued the checks to him, he went to her several
Ching explained that he wrote the date and amount thereon when, upon times to collect payment. In all these instances, she said that she had no
his estimation, the money that he regularly lent to respondent Nicdao cash. Finally, in September 1997, respondent Nicdao allegedly went to his
beginning October 1995 reached the said sum. He likewise intimated that house and told him that Janette was only willing to pay him
prior to 1995, they had another transaction amounting to P1,200,000.00 between P3,000,000.00 and P5,000,000.00 because, as far as her daughter
and, as security therefor, respondent Nicdao similarly issued in his favor was concerned, that was the only amount borrowed from petitioner Ching.
checks in varying amounts of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00. When the said On hearing this, petitioner Ching angrily told respondent Nicdao that she
amount was fully paid, petitioner Ching returned the checks to respondent should not have allowed her debt to reach P20,000,000.00 knowing that
Nicdao. she would not be able to pay the full amount.

Petitioner Ching maintained that the eleven (11) checks subject of Criminal Petitioner Ching identified the demand letter that he and Nuguid sent to
Cases Nos. 9433-9443 pertained to respondent Nicdao’s loan transactions respondent Nicdao. He explained that he no longer informed her about
with him beginning October 1995. He also mentioned an instance when depositing her checks on his account because she already made that
respondent Nicdao’s husband and daughter approached him at a casino to statement about seeing him in court. Again, he admitted writing the date,
borrow money from him. He lent themP300,000.00. According to October 6, 1997, on all these checks.
petitioner Ching, since this amount was also unpaid, he included it in the
other amounts that respondent Nicdao owed to him which Another witness presented by the prosecution was Imelda Yandoc, an
totaled P20,000,000.00 and wrote the said amount on one of respondent employee of HSLB. On direct-examination,15 she testified that she worked
Nicdao’s blank checks that she delivered to him. as a checking account bookkeeper/teller of the bank. As such, she received
the checks that were drawn against the bank and verified if they were
Petitioner Ching explained that from October 1995 up to 1997, he regularly funded. On October 6, 1997, she received several checks issued by
delivered money to respondent Nicdao, in the amount of P1,000,000.00 respondent Nicdao. She knew respondent Nicdao because the latter
until the total amount reached P20,000,000.00. He did not ask respondent maintained a savings and checking account with them. Yandoc identified
Nicdao to acknowledge receiving these amounts. Petitioner Ching claimed the checks subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and affirmed that
that he was confident that he would be paid by respondent Nicdao stamped at the back of each was the annotation "DAIF". Further, per the
because he had in his possession her blank checks. On the other hand, the bank’s records, as of October 8, 1997, only a balance of P300.00 was left in
latter allegedly had no cause to fear that he would fill up the checks with respondent Nicdao’s checking account andP645.83 in her savings account.
just any amount because they had trust and confidence in each other. On even date, her account with the bank was considered inactive.
When asked to produce the piece of paper on which he allegedly wrote the
amounts that he lent to respondent Nicdao, petitioner Ching could not On cross-examination,16 Yandoc stated anew that respondent Nicdao’s
present it; he reasoned that it was not with him at that time. checks bounced on October 7, 1997 for being "DAIF" and her account was
closed the following day, on October 8, 1997. She informed the trial court
It was also averred by petitioner Ching that respondent Nicdao confided to that there were actually twenty-five (25) checks of respondent Nicdao that
him that she told her daughter Janette, who was married to a foreigner, were dishonored at about the same time. The eleven (11) checks were
that her debt to him was only between P3,000,000.00 and P5,000,000.00. purportedly issued in favor of petitioner Ching while the other fourteen
Petitioner Ching claimed that he offered to accompany respondent Nicdao (14) were purportedly issued in favor of Nuguid. Yandoc explained that
to her daughter in order that they could apprise her of the amount that
respondent Nicdao or her employee would usually call the bank to inquire Respondent Nicdao denied ever confiding to petitioner Ching that she was
if there was an incoming check to be funded. afraid that her daughter would get mad if she found out about the amount
that she owed him. What allegedly transpired was that when she already
For its part, the defense proffered the testimonies of respondent Nicdao, had the money to pay them (presumably referring to petitioner Ching and
Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. On direct- Nuguid), she went to them to retrieve her checks. However, petitioner
examination,17 respondent Nicdao stated that she only dealt with Nuguid. Ching and Nuguid refused to return the checks claiming that she
She vehemently denied the allegation that she had borrowed money from (respondent Nicdao) still owed them money. She demanded that they
both petitioner Ching and Nuguid in the total amount ofP22,950,000.00. show her the checks in order that she would know the exact amount of her
Respondent Nicdao admitted, however, that she had obtained a loan from debt, but they refused. It was at this point that she got angry and dared
Nuguid but only forP2,100,000.00 and the same was already fully paid. As them to go to court.
proof of such payment, she presented a Planters Bank demand draft dated
August 13, 1996 in the amount of P1,200,000.00. The annotation at the After the said incident, respondent Nicdao was surprised to be notified by
back of the said demand draft showed that it was endorsed and negotiated HSLB that her check in the amount ofP20,000,000.00 was just presented to
to the account of petitioner Ching. the bank for payment. She claimed that it was only then that she
remembered that sometime in 1995, she was informed by her employee
In addition, respondent Nicdao also presented and identified several that one of her checks was missing. At that time, she did not let it bother
cigarette wrappers18 at the back of which appeared computations. She her thinking that it would eventually surface when presented to the bank.
explained that Nuguid went to the grocery store everyday to collect
interest payments. The principal loan was P2,100,000.00 with 12% interest Respondent Nicdao could not explain how the said check came into
per day. Nuguid allegedly wrote the payments for the daily interests at the petitioner Ching’s possession. She explained that she kept her checks in an
back of the cigarette wrappers that she gave to respondent Nicdao. ordinary cash box together with a stapler and the cigarette wrappers that
contained Nuguid’s computations. Her saleslady had access to this box.
The principal loan amount of P2,100,000.00 was allegedly delivered by Respondent Nicdao averred that it was Nuguid who offered to give her a
Nuguid to respondent Nicdao in varying amounts of P100,000.00 loan as she would allegedly need money to manage Vignette Superstore.
and P150,000.00. Respondent Nicdao refuted the averment of petitioner Nuguid used to run the said store before respondent Nicdao’s daughter
Ching that prior to 1995, they had another transaction. bought it from Nuguid’s family, its previous owner. According to
respondent Nicdao, it was Nuguid who regularly delivered the cash to
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, respondent Nicdao admitted respondent Nicdao or, if she was not at the grocery store, to her saleslady.
that the signature thereon was hers but denied that she issued the same to Respondent Nicdao denied any knowledge that the money loaned to her
petitioner Ching. Anent the other ten (10) checks, she likewise admitted by Nuguid belonged to petitioner Ching.
that the signatures thereon were hers while the amounts and payee
thereon were written by either Jocelyn Nicdao or Melanie Tolentino, who At the continuation of her direct-examination,19 respondent Nicdao said
were employees of Vignette Superstore and authorized by her to do so. that she never dealt with petitioner Ching because it was Nuguid who went
to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments. When
Respondent Nicdao clarified that, except for the P20,000,000.00 check, the shown theP20,000,000.00 check, respondent Nicdao admitted that the
other ten (10) checks were handed to Nuguid on different occasions. signature thereon was hers but she denied issuing it as a blank check to
Nuguid came to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest petitioner Ching. On the other hand, with respect to the other ten (10)
payments. Respondent Nicdao said that she purposely left the checks checks, she also admitted that the signatures thereon were hers and that
undated because she would still have to notify Nuguid if she already had the amounts thereon were written by either Josie Nicdao or Melanie
the money to fund the checks. Tolentino, her employees whom she authorized to do so. With respect to
the payee, it was purposely left blank allegedly upon instruction of Nuguid
who said that she would use the checks to pay someone else.
On cross-examination,20 respondent Nicdao explained that Josie Nicdao that the check could have been issued to someone else, and that it would
and Melanie Tolentino were caretakers of the grocery store and that they just surface when presented to the bank.
manned it when she was not there. She likewise confirmed that she
authorized them to write the amounts on the checks after she had affixed Tolentino recounted that Nuguid came to the grocery store everyday to
her signature thereon. She stressed, however, that the P20,000,000.00 collect the interest payments of the loan. In some instances, upon
check was the one that was reported to her as lost or missing by her respondent Nicdao’s instruction, Tolentino handed to Nuguid checks that
saleslady sometime in 1995. She never reported the matter to the bank were already signed by respondent Nicdao. Sometimes, Tolentino would
because she was confident that it would just surface when it would be be the one to write the amount on the checks. Nuguid, in turn, wrote the
presented for payment. amounts on pieces of paper which were kept by respondent Nicdao.

Again, respondent Nicdao identified the cigarette wrappers which On cross-examination,22 Tolentino confirmed that she was authorized by
indicated the daily payments she had made to Nuguid. The latter allegedly respondent Nicdao to fill up the checks and hand them to Nuguid. The
went to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments. latter came to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments.
Further, the figures at the back of the cigarette wrappers were written by Tolentino claimed that in 1995, in the course of chronologically arranging
Nuguid. Respondent Nicdao asserted that she recognized her handwriting respondent Nicdao’s check booklets, she noticed that a check was missing.
because Nuguid sometimes wrote them in her presence. Respondent Respondent Nicdao told her that perhaps she issued it to someone and
Nicdao maintained that she had already paid Nuguid the amount that it would just turn up in the bank. Tolentino was certain that the
of P1,200,000.00 as evidenced by the Planters Bank demand draft which missing check was the same one that petitioner Ching presented to the
she gave to the latter and which was subsequently negotiated and bank for payment in the amount of P20,000,000.00.
deposited in petitioner Ching’s account. In connection thereto, respondent
Nicdao refuted the prosecution’s allegation that the demand draft was Tolentino stated that she left the employ of respondent Nicdao sometime
payment for a previous transaction that she had with petitioner Ching. She in 1996. After the checks were dishonored in October 1997, Tolentino got
clarified that the payments that Nuguid collected from her everyday were a call from respondent Nicdao. After she was shown a fax copy thereof,
only for the interests due. She did not ask Nuguid to make written Tolentino confirmed that the P20,000,000.00 check was the same one that
acknowledgements of her payments. she reported as missing in 1995.

Melanie Tolentino was presented to corroborate the testimony of Jocelyn Nicdao also took the witness stand to corroborate the testimony of
respondent Nicdao. On direct-examination,21Tolentino stated that she the other defense witnesses. On direct-examination,23 she averred that she
worked at the Vignette Superstore and she knew Nuguid because her was a saleslady at the Vignette Superstore from August 1994 up to April
employer, respondent Nicdao, used to borrow money from her. She knew 1998. She knew Nuguid as well as petitioner Ching.
petitioner Ching only by name and that he was the "husband" of Nuguid.
Jocelyn Nicdao further testified that respondent Nicdao was indebted to
As an employee of the grocery store, Tolentino stated that she acted as its Nuguid. Jocelyn Nicdao used to fill up the checks of respondent Nicdao
caretaker and was entrusted with the custody of respondent Nicdao’s that had already been signed by her and give them to Nuguid. The latter
personal checks. Tolentino identified her own handwriting on some of the came to the grocery store everyday to pick up the interest payments.
checks especially with respect to the amounts and figures written thereon. Jocelyn Nicdao identified the checks on which she wrote the amounts and,
She said that Nuguid instructed her to leave the space for the payee blank in some instances, the name of Nuguid as payee. However, most of the
as she would use the checks to pay someone else. Tolentino added that time, Nuguid allegedly instructed her to leave as blank the space for the
she could not recall respondent Nicdao issuing a check to petitioner Ching payee.
in the amount of P20,000,000.00. She confirmed that they lost a check
sometime in 1995. When informed about it, respondent Nicdao told her
Jocelyn Nicdao identified the cigarette wrappers as the documents on
which Nuguid acknowledged receipt of the interest payments. She
explained that she was the one who wrote the minus entries and they authorized her employees to provide the details on the checks after she
represented the daily interest payments received by Nuguid. had signed them.

On cross-examination,24 Jocelyn Nicdao stated that she was a distant The MCTC disbelieved respondent Nicdao’s claim that the P20,000,000.00
cousin of respondent Nicdao. She stopped working for her in 1998 because check was the same one that she lost in 1995. It observed that ordinary
she wanted to take a rest. Jocelyn Nicdao reiterated that she handed the prudence would dictate that a lost check would at least be immediately
checks to Nuguid at the grocery store. reported to the bank to prevent its unauthorized endorsement or
negotiation. Respondent Nicdao made no such report to the bank. Even if
After due trial, on December 8, 1998, the MCTC rendered judgment in the said check was indeed lost, the MCTC faulted respondent Nicdao for
Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven being negligent in keeping the checks that she had already signed in an
(11) counts of violation of BP 22. The MCTC gave credence to petitioner unsecured box.
Ching’s testimony that respondent Nicdao borrowed money from him in
the total amount of P20,950,000.00. Petitioner Ching The MCTC further ruled that there was no evidence to show that petitioner
delivered P1,000,000.00 every month to respondent Nicdao from 1995 up Ching was not a holder in due course as to cause it (the MCTC) to believe
to 1997 until the sum reachedP20,000,000.00. The MCTC also found that that the said check was not issued to him. Respondent Nicdao’s admission
subsequent thereto, respondent Nicdao still borrowed money from of indebtedness was sufficient to prove that there was consideration for
petitioner Ching. As security for these loans, respondent Nicdao issued the issuance of the checks.
checks to petitioner Ching. When the latter deposited the checks (eleven in
all) on October 6, 1997, they were dishonored by the bank for being The second element was also found by the MCTC to be present as it held
"DAIF." that respondent Nicdao, as maker, drawer or issuer, had knowledge that at
the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
The MCTC explained that the crime of violation of BP 22 has the following drawee bank for the payment in full of the checks upon their presentment.
elements: (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to
account or for value; (b) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that As to the third element, the MCTC established that the checks were
at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for being "DAIF" or drawn
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; against insufficient funds. Stamped at the back of each check was the
and (c) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for annotation "DAIF." The bank representative likewise testified to the fact of
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the dishonor.
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 25
Under the foregoing circumstances, the MCTC declared that the conviction
According to the MCTC, all the foregoing elements are present in the case of respondent Nicdao was warranted. It stressed that the mere act of
of respondent Nicdao’s issuance of the checks subject of Criminal Cases issuing a worthless check was malum prohibitum; hence, even if the checks
Nos. 9433-9443. On the first element, respondent Nicdao was found by the were issued in the form of deposit or guarantee, once dishonored, the
MCTC to have made, drawn and issued the checks. The fact that she did same gave rise to the prosecution for and conviction of BP 22.26 The
not personally write the payee and date on the checks was not material decretal portion of the MCTC decision reads:
considering that under Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
"where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused is found guilty of
possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in 11 counts, and is hereby ordered to
the blanks therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the pay the private complainant the amount of P20,950,000.00 plus 12%
person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into interest per annum from date of filing of the complaint until the total
a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as amount had been paid. The prayer for moral damages is denied for lack of
such for any amount x x x." Respondent Nicdao admitted that she evidence to prove the same. She is likewise ordered to suffer
imprisonment equivalent to 1 year for every check issued and which Trial Court, 3rd Judicial Region, Branch 5, Bataan, affirming the decision
penalty shall be served successively. dated December 8, 1998, of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan, convicting petitioner Clarita S. Nicdao in
SO ORDERED.27 Criminal Cases No. 9433 to 9443 of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and another judgment rendered ACQUITTING her in all
Incidentally, on January 11, 1999, the MCTC likewise rendered its judgment these cases, with costs de oficio.
in Criminal Cases Nos. 9458-9471 and convicted respondent Nicdao of the
fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by Nuguid. SO ORDERED.28

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, On even date, the CA issued an Entry of Judgment declaring that the above
in separate Decisions both dated May 10, 1999, affirmed in toto the decision has become final and executory and is recorded in the Book of
decisions of the MCTC convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) and Judgments.
fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443
and 9458-9471, respectively. In acquitting respondent Nicdao in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055, the CA made the
following factual findings:
Respondent Nicdao forthwith filed with the CA separate petitions for
review of the two decisions of the RTC. The petition involving the eleven Petitioner [respondent herein] Clarita S. Nicdao, a middle-aged mother and
(11) checks purportedly issued to petitioner Ching was docketed as CA-G.R. housekeeper who only finished high school, has a daughter, Janette Boyd,
CR No. 23055 (assigned to the 13th Division). On the other hand, the who is married to a wealthy expatriate.
petition involving the fourteen (14) checks purportedly issued to Nuguid
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 (originally assigned to the 7th Complainant [petitioner herein] Samson Ching is a Chinese national, who
Division but transferred to the 6th Division). The Office of the Solicitor claimed he is a salesman of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory.
General (OSG) filed its respective comments on the said petitions.
Subsequently, the OSG filed in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 a motion for its Emma Nuguid, complainant’s live-in partner, is a CPA and formerly
consolidation with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054. The OSG prayed that CA-G.R. CR connected with Sycip, Gorres and Velayo. Nuguid used to own a grocery
No. 23055 pending before the 13th Division be transferred and store now known as the Vignette Superstore. She sold this grocery store,
consolidated with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 in accordance with the Revised which was about to be foreclosed, to petitioner’s daughter, Janette Boyd.
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA). Since then, petitioner began managing said store. However, since
petitioner could not always be at the Vignette Superstore to keep shop,
Acting on the motion for consolidation, the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 she entrusted to her salesladies, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao,
issued a Resolution dated October 19, 1999 advising the OSG to file the pre-signed checks, which were left blank as to amount and the payee, to
motion in CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 as it bore the lowest number. Respondent cover for any delivery of merchandise sold at the store. The blank and
Nicdao opposed the consolidation of the two cases. She likewise filed her personal checks were placed in a cash box at Vignette Superstore and were
reply to the comment of the OSG in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055. filled up by said salesladies upon instruction of petitioner as to amount,
payee and date.
On November 22, 1999, the CA (13th Division) rendered the assailed
Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 acquitting respondent Nicdao of the Soon thereafter, Emma Nuguid befriended petitioner and offered to lend
eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by petitioner money to the latter which could be used in running her newly acquired
Ching. The decretal portion of the assailed CA Decision reads: store. Nuguid represented to petitioner that as former manager of the
Vignette Superstore, she knew that petitioner would be in need of credit
WHEREFORE, being meritorious, the petition for review is hereby to meet the daily expenses of running the business, particularly in the daily
GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision dated May 10, 1999, of the Regional purchases of merchandise to be sold at the store. After Emma Nuguid
succeeded in befriending petitioner, Nuguid was able to gain access to the The CA gave credence to the testimony of respondent Nicdao that when
Vignette Superstore where petitioner’s blank and pre-signed checks were she had fully paid her loans to Nuguid, she tried to retrieve her checks.
kept.29 Nuguid, however, refused to return the checks to respondent Nicdao.
Instead, Nuguid and petitioner Ching filled up the said checks to make it
In addition, the CA also made the finding that respondent Nicdao appear that: (a) petitioner Ching was the payee in five checks; (b) the six
borrowed money from Nuguid in the total amount of P2,100,000.00 checks were payable to cash; (c) Nuguid was the payee in fourteen (14)
secured by twenty-four (24) checks drawn against respondent Nicdao’s checks. Petitioner Ching and Nuguid then put the date October 6, 1997 on
account with HSLB. Upon Nuguid’s instruction, the checks given by all these checks and deposited them the following day. On October 8,
respondent Nicdao as security for the loans were left blank as to the payee 1997, through a joint demand letter, they informed respondent Nicdao
and the date. The loans consisted of (a) P950,000.00 covered by ten (10) that her checks were dishonored by HSLB and gave her three days to settle
checks subject of the criminal complaints filed by petitioner Ching (CA-G.R. her indebtedness or else face prosecution for violation of BP 22.
CR No. 23055); and (b) P1,150,000.00 covered by fourteen (14) checks
subject of the criminal complaints filed by Nuguid (CA-G.R. CR No. 23054). With the finding that respondent Nicdao had fully paid her loan obligations
The loans totaledP2,100,000.00 and they were transacted between to Nuguid, the CA declared that she could no longer be held liable for
respondent Nicdao and Nuguid only. Respondent Nicdao never dealt with violation of BP 22. It was explained that to be held liable under BP 22, it
petitioner Ching. must be established, inter alia, that the check was made or drawn and
issued to apply on account or for value. According to the CA, the word
Against the foregoing factual findings, the CA declared that, based on the "account" refers to a pre-existing obligation, while "for value" means an
evidence, respondent Nicdao had already fully paid the loans. In particular, obligation incurred simultaneously with the issuance of the check. In the
the CA referred to the Planters Bank demand draft in the amount case of respondent Nicdao’s checks, the pre-existing obligations secured by
ofP1,200,000.00 which, by his own admission, petitioner Ching had them were already extinguished after full payment had been made by
received. The appellate court debunked petitioner Ching’s allegation that respondent Nicdao to Nuguid. Obligations are extinguished by, among
the said demand draft was payment for a previous transaction. According others, payment.30 The CA believed that when petitioner Ching and Nuguid
to the CA, petitioner Ching failed to adduce evidence to prove the refused to return respondent Nicdao’s checks despite her total payment
existence of a previous transaction between him and respondent Nicdao. of P6,980,000.00 for the loans secured by the checks, petitioner Ching and
Nuguid were using BP 22 to coerce respondent Nicdao to pay a debt which
Apart from the demand draft, the CA also stated that respondent Nicdao she no longer owed them.
made interest payments on a daily basis to Nuguid as evidenced by the
computations written at the back of the cigarette wrappers. Based on With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, the CA was not convinced by
these computations, as of July 21, 1997, respondent Nicdao had made a petitioner Ching’s claim that he deliveredP1,000,000.00 every month to
total of P5,780,000.00 payments to Nuguid for the interests alone. Adding respondent Nicdao until the amount reached P20,000,000.00 and, when
up this amount and that of the Planters Bank demand draft, the CA placed she refused to pay the same, he filled up the check, which she earlier
the payments made by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid as already amounting delivered to him as security for the loans, by writing thereon the said
to P6,980,000.00 for the principal loan amount of only P2,100,000.00. amount. In disbelieving petitioner Ching, the CA pointed out that, contrary
to his assertion, he was never employed by the La Suerte Cigar and
The CA negated petitioner Ching’s contention that the payments as Cigarette Manufacturing per the letter of Susan Resurreccion, Vice-
reflected at the back of the cigarette wrappers could be applied only to the President and Legal Counsel of the said company. Moreover, as admitted
interests due. Since the transactions were not evidenced by any document by petitioner Ching, he did not own the house where he and Nuguid lived.
or writing, the CA ratiocinated that no interests could be collected
because, under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, "no interest shall be due Moreover, the CA characterized as incredible and contrary to human
unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing." experience that petitioner Ching would, as he claimed, deliver a total sum
of P20,000,000.00 to respondent Nicdao without any documentary proof
thereof, e.g., written acknowledgment that she received the same. On the and undelivered. Hence, petitioner Ching did not acquire any right or
other hand, it found plausible respondent Nicdao’s version of the story interest therein and could not assert any cause of action founded on the
that the P20,000,000.00 check was the same one that was missing way
back in 1995. The CA opined that this missing check surfaced in the hands stolen checks.32 Under these circumstances, the CA concluded that
of petitioner Ching who, in cahoots with Nuguid, wrote the respondent could not be held liable for violation of BP 22.
amount P20,000,000.00 thereon and deposited it in his account. To the
mind of the CA, the inference that the check was stolen was anchored on The Petitioner’s Case
competent circumstantial evidence. Specifically, Nuguid, as previous
manager/owner of the grocery store, had access thereto. Likewise
As mentioned earlier, the instant petition pertains and is limited solely to
applicable, according to the CA, was the presumption that the person in
the civil aspect of the case as petitioner Ching argues that notwithstanding
possession of the stolen article was presumed to be guilty of taking the
respondent Nicdao’s acquittal of the eleven (11) counts of violation of BP
stolen article.31
22, she should be held liable to pay petitioner Ching the amounts of the
dishonored checks in the aggregate sum ofP20,950,000.00.
The CA emphasized that the P20,000,000.00 check was never delivered by
respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As such, the said check without the
He urges the Court to review the findings of facts made by the CA as they
details as to the date, amount and payee, was an incomplete and
are allegedly based on a misapprehension of facts and manifestly
undelivered instrument when it was stolen and ended up in petitioner
erroneous and contradicted by the evidence. Further, the CA’s factual
Ching’s hands. On this point, the CA applied Sections 15 and 16 of the
findings are in conflict with those of the RTC and MCTC.
Negotiable Instruments Law:
Petitioner Ching vigorously argues that notwithstanding respondent
SEC. 15. Incomplete instrument not delivered. – Where an incomplete
Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA, the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and
instrument has not been delivered, it will not, if completed and negotiated
authority to resolve and rule on her civil liability. He invokes Section 1, Rule
without authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against
111 of the Revised Rules of Court which, prior to its amendment, provided,
any person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery.
in part:

SEC. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. – Every contract on a

SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is
negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course,
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the
action prior to the criminal action.
authority of the party making, drawing, accepting or indorsing, as the case
may be; and, in such case, the delivery may be shown to have been
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised
conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
transferring the property. But where the instrument is in the hands of a
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the
holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so
accused. x x x
as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. And where the
instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature
appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until Supreme Court Circular No. 57-9733 dated September 16, 1997 is also cited
the contrary is proved. as it provides in part:

The CA held that the P20,000,000.00 check was filled up by petitioner 1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
Ching without respondent Nicdao’s authority. Further, it was incomplete deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or were allegedly issued by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching as security
recognized. x x x for the loans that she obtained from him from 1995 to 1997. The existence
of another loan obligation prior to the said period was allegedly
Petitioner Ching theorizes that, under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised established by the testimony of respondent Nicdao’s own witness, Jocelyn
Rules of Court, the civil action for the recovery of damages under Articles Nicdao, who testified that when she started working in Vignette
32, 33, 34, and 2176 arising from the same act or omission of the accused Superstore in 1994, she noticed that respondent Nicdao was already
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Moreover, under the above- indebted to Nuguid.
quoted Circular, the criminal action for violation of BP 22 necessarily
includes the corresponding civil action, which is the recovery of the Petitioner Ching also takes exception to the CA’s ruling that the payments
amount of the dishonored check representing the civil obligation of the made by respondent Nicdao as reflected on the computations at the back
drawer to the payee. of the cigarette wrappers were for both the principal loan and interests. He
insists that they were for the interests alone. Even respondent Nicdao’s
In seeking to enforce the alleged civil liability of respondent Nicdao, testimony allegedly showed that they were daily interest payments.
petitioner Ching maintains that she had loan obligations to him Petitioner Ching further avers that the interest payments
totaling P20,950,000.00. The existence of the same is allegedly established totaling P5,780,000.00 can only mean that, contrary to respondent
by his testimony before the MCTC. Also, he asks the Court to take judicial Nicdao’s claim, her loan obligations amounted to much more
notice that for a monetary loan secured by a check, the check itself is the thanP2,100,000.00. Further, she is allegedly estopped from questioning
evidence of indebtedness. the interests because she willingly paid the same.

He insists that, contrary to her protestation, respondent Nicdao also Petitioner Ching also harps on respondent Nicdao’s silence when she
transacted with him, not only with Nuguid. Petitioner Ching pointed out received his and Nuguid’s demand letter to her. Through the said letter,
that during respondent Nicdao’s testimony, she referred to her creditors in they notified her that the twenty-five (25) checks valued at P22,100,000.00
plural form, e.g. "[I] told them, most checks that I issued I will inform them were dishonored by the HSLB, and that she had three days to settle her
if I have money." Even respondent Nicdao’s employees allegedly knew ndebtedness with them, otherwise, face prosecution. Respondent Nicdao’s
him; they testified that Nuguid instructed them at times to leave as blank silence, i.e., her failure to deny or protest the same by way of reply, vis-à-
the payee on the checks as they would be paid to someone else, who vis the demand letter, allegedly constitutes an admission of the statements
turned out to be petitioner Ching. contained therein.

It was allegedly erroneous for the CA to hold that he had no capacity to On the other hand, the MCTC’s decision, as affirmed by the RTC, is
lend P20,950,000.00 to respondent Nicdao. Petitioner Ching clarified that allegedly based on the evidence on record; it has been established that the
what he meant when he testified before the MCTC was that he was checks were respondent Nicdao’s personal checks, that the signatures
engaged in dealership with La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing, thereon were hers and that she had issued them to petitioner Ching. With
and not merely its sales agent. He stresses that he owns a warehouse and respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, petitioner Ching assails the CA’s
is also in the business of lending money. Further, the CA’s reasoning that ruling that it was stolen and was never delivered or issued by respondent
he could not possibly have lent P20,950,000.00 to respondent Nicdao since Nicdao to him. The issue of the said check being stolen was allegedly not
petitioner Ching and Nuguid did not own the house where they live, is raised during trial. Further, her failure to report the alleged theft to the
allegedly non sequitur. bank to stop payment of the said lost or missing check is allegedly contrary
to human experience. Petitioner Ching describes respondent Nicdao’s
Petitioner Ching maintains that, contrary to the CA’s finding, the Planters defense of stolen or lost check as incredible and, therefore, false.
Bank demand draft for P1,200,000.00 was in payment for respondent
Nicdao’s previous loan transaction with him. Apart from Aside from the foregoing substantive issues that he raised, petitioner Ching
the P20,000,000.00 check, the other ten (10) checks (totaling P950,000.00) also faults the CA for not acting and ordering the consolidation of CA-G.R.
CR No. 23055 with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054. He informs the Court that latter To respondent Nicdao’s mind, these pronouncements are equivalent to a
case is still pending with the CA. finding that the facts upon which her civil liability may arise do not exist.
The instant petition, which seeks to enforce her civil liability based on the
In fine, it is petitioner Ching’s view that the CA gravely erred in eleven (11) checks, is thus allegedly already barred by the final and
disregarding the findings of the MCTC, as affirmed by the RTC, and submits executory decision acquitting her.
that there is more than sufficient preponderant evidence to hold
respondent Nicdao civilly liable to him in the amount of P20,950,000.00. In any case, respondent Nicdao contends that the CA did not commit
He thus prays that the Court direct respondent Nicdao to pay him the said serious misapprehension of facts when it found that the P20,000,000.00
amount plus 12% interest per annum computed from the date of written check was a stolen check and that she never made any transaction with
demand until the total amount is fully paid. petitioner Ching. Moreover, the other ten (10) checks were not issued to
apply on account or for value. These findings are allegedly supported by
The Respondent’s Counter-Arguments the evidence on record which consisted of the respective testimonies of
the defense witnesses to the effect that: respondent Nicdao had the
Respondent Nicdao urges the Court to deny the petition. She posits practice of leaving pre-signed checks placed inside an unsecured cash box
preliminarily that it is barred under Section 2(b), Rule 111 of the Revised in the Vignette Superstore; the salesladies were given the authority to fill
Rules of Court which states: up the said checks as to the amount, payee and date; Nuguid beguiled
respondent Nicdao to obtain loans from her; as security for the loans,
respondent Nicdao issued checks to Nuguid; when the salesladies gave the
SEC. 2. Institution of separate of civil action. - Except in the cases provided
checks to Nuguid, she instructed them to leave blank the payee and date;
for in Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the
Nuguid had access to the grocery store; in 1995, one of the salesladies
civil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final
reported that a check was missing; in 1997, when she had fully paid her
judgment in the criminal action.
loans to Nuguid, respondent Nicdao tried to retrieve her checks but Nuguid
and petitioner Ching falsely told her that she still owed them money; they
xxxx
then maliciously filled up the checks making it appear that petitioner Ching
was the payee in the five checks and the six others were payable to "cash";
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the and knowing fully well that these checks were not funded because
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment respondent Nicdao already fully paid her loans, petitioner Ching and
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. Nuguid deposited the checks and caused them to be dishonored by HSLB.

According to respondent Nicdao, the assailed CA decision has already It is pointed out by respondent Nicdao that her testimony (that
made a finding to the effect that the fact upon which her civil liability the P20,000,000.00 check was the same one that she lost sometime in
might arise did not exist. She refers to the ruling of the CA that 1995) was corroborated by the respective testimonies of her employees.
the P20,000,000.00 check was stolen; hence, petitioner Ching did not Another indication that it was stolen was the fact that among all the
acquire any right or interest over the said check and could not assert any checks which ended up in the hands of petitioner Ching and Nuguid, only
cause of action founded on the said check. Consequently, the CA held that the P20,000,000.00 check was fully typewritten; the rest were invariably
respondent Nicdao had no obligation to make good the stolen check and handwritten as to the amounts, payee and date.
cannot be held liable for violation of BP 22. She also refers to the CA’s
pronouncement relative to the ten (10) other checks that they were not
Respondent Nicdao defends the CA’s conclusion that the P20,000,000.00
issued to apply on account or for value, considering that the loan
check was stolen on the ground that an appeal in a criminal case throws
obligations secured by these checks had already been extinguished by her
open the whole case to the appellate court’s scrutiny. In any event, she
full payment thereof.
maintains that she had been consistent in her theory of defense and
merely relied on the disputable presumption that the person in possession Based on the foregoing evidence, the CA allegedly correctly held that,
of a stolen article is presumed to be the author of the theft. computing the amount of the Planters Bank demand draft (P1,200,000.00)
and those reflected at the back of the cigarette wrappers (P5,780,000.00),
Considering that it was stolen, respondent Nicdao argues, respondent Nicdao had already paid petitioner Ching and Nuguid a total
the P20,000,000.00 check was an incomplete and undelivered instrument sum of P6,980,000.00 for her loan obligations totaling only P950,000.00, as
in the hands of petitioner Ching and he did not acquire any right or interest secured by the ten (10) HSLB checks excluding the stolenP20,000,000.00
therein. Further, he cannot assert any cause of action founded on the said check.
stolen check. Accordingly, petitioner Ching’s attempt to collect payment on
the said check through the instant petition must fail. Respondent Nicdao rebuts petitioner Ching’s argument (that the daily
payments were applied to the interests), and claims that this is illegal.
Respondent Nicdao describes as downright incredible petitioner Ching’s Petitioner Ching cannot insist that the daily payments she made applied
testimony that she owed him a total sum of P20,950,000.00 without any only to the interests on the loan obligations, considering that there is
documentary proof of the loan transactions. She submits that it is contrary admittedly no document evidencing these loans, hence, no written
to human experience for loan transactions involving such huge amounts of stipulation for the payment of interests thereon. On this point, she invokes
money to be devoid of any documentary proof. In relation thereto, Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which proscribes the collection of interest
respondent Nicdao underscores that petitioner Ching lied about being payments unless expressly stipulated in writing.
employed as a salesman of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing. It
is underscored that he has not adequately shown that he possessed the Respondent Nicdao emphasizes that the ten (10) other checks that she
financial capacity to lend such a huge amount to respondent Nicdao as he issued to Nuguid as security for her loans had already been discharged
so claimed. upon her full payment thereof. It is her belief that these checks can no
longer be used to coerce her to pay a debt that she does not owe.
Neither could she be held liable for the ten (10) other checks (in the total
amount of P950,000,000.00) because as respondent Nicdao asseverates, On the CA’s failure to consolidate CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 and CA-G.R. CR
she merely issued them to Nuguid as security for her loans obtained from No. 23054, respondent Nicdao proffers the explanation that under the
the latter beginning October 1995 up to 1997. As evidenced by the RIRCA, consolidation of the cases is not mandatory. In fine, respondent
Planters Bank demand draft in the amount ofP1,200,000.00, she already Nicdao urges the Court to deny the petition as it failed to discharge the
made payment in 1996. The said demand draft was negotiated to burden of proving her civil liability with the required preponderance of
petitioner Ching’s account and he admitted receipt thereof. Respondent evidence. Moreover, the CA’s acquittal of respondent Nicdao is premised
Nicdao belies his claim that the demand draft was payment for a prior on the finding that, apart from the stolen check, the ten (10) other checks
existing obligation. She asserts that petitioner Ching was unable to present were not made to apply to a valid, due and demandable obligation. This, in
evidence of such a previous transaction. effect, is a categorical ruling that the fact from which the civil liability of
respondent Nicdao may arise does not exist.
In addition to the Planters Bank demand draft, respondent Nicdao insists
that petitioner Ching received, through Nuguid, cash payments as The Court’s Rulings
evidenced by the computations written at the back of the cigarette
wrappers. Nuguid went to the Vignette Superstore everyday to collect The petition is denied for lack of merit.
these payments. The other defense witnesses corroborated this fact.
Petitioner Ching allegedly never disputed the accuracy of the accounts Notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal, petitioner Ching is entitled
appearing on these cigarette wrappers; nor did he dispute their to appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period
authenticity and accuracy.
It is axiomatic that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable."34 Under the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court, the
civil action is generally impliedly instituted with the criminal action. At the action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
time of petitioner Ching’s filing of the Informations against respondent action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
Nicdao, Section 1,35 Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, quoted earlier, defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
provided in part: damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil acquittal is due to that ground.
action prior to the criminal action.
The Court likewise expounded in Salazar v. People39 the consequences of
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised an acquittal on the civil aspect in this wise:
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on
accused. the civil aspect of the criminal case where: (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the
xxxx court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) the civil
liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime
As a corollary to the above rule, an acquittal does not necessarily carry of which the accused is acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the
with it the extinguishment of the civil liability of the accused. Section delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the
2(b)36 of the same Rule, also quoted earlier, provided in part: criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the act or
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the omission imputed to him.
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders
judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot
It is also relevant to mention that judgments of acquittal are required to appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in
state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or case within the period therefor.
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."37
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the
38
In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, the Court enunciated that the civil liability offended party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding
is not extinguished by acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is based on respondent Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly
reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability instituted with the criminal action since he did not reserve his right to
of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and (c) where the civil institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the
liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the criminal action.
accused is acquitted. Thus, under Article 29 of the Civil Code –
Following the long recognized rule that "the appeal period accorded to the
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the accused should also be available to the offended party who seeks redress
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil of the civil aspect of the decision," the period to appeal granted to
petitioner Ching is the same as that granted to the accused. 40 With
petitioner Ching’s timely filing of the instant petition for review of the civil check,"41 and that respondent Nicdao "has no obligation to make good the
aspect of the CA’s decision, the Court thus has the jurisdiction and stolen check and cannot, therefore, be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg.
authority to determine the civil liability of respondent Nicdao 22."42
notwithstanding her acquittal.
With respect to the ten (10) other checks, the CA established that the
In order for the petition to prosper, however, it must establish that the loans secured by these checks had already been extinguished after full
judgment of the CA acquitting respondent Nicdao falls under any of the payment had been made by respondent Nicdao. In this connection, the
three categories enumerated in Salazar and Sapiera, to wit: second element for the crime under BP 22, i.e., "that the check is made or
drawn and issued to apply on account or for value," is not present.
(a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; Second, in acquitting respondent Nicdao, the CA did not adjudge her to be
civilly liable to petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly stated that she
(b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is had already fully paid her obligations. The CA computed the payments
only civil; and made by respondent Nicdao vis-à-vis her loan obligations in this manner:

(c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is Clearly, adding the payments recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons
not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. by Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting totaling P5,780,000.00 and
the P1,200,000.00 demand draft received by Emma Nuguid, it would
Salazar also enunciated that the civil action based on the delict is appear that petitioner [respondent herein] had already made payments in
extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action the total amount of P6,980,000.00 for her loan obligation of
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist only P2,100,000.00 (P950,000.00 in the case at bar and P1,150,000.00 in
or where the accused did not commit the act or omission imputed to him. CA-G.R. CR No. 23054).43

For reasons that will be discussed shortly, the Court holds that respondent On the other hand, its finding relative to the P20,000,000.00 check that it
Nicdao cannot be held civilly liable to petitioner Ching. was a stolen check necessarily absolved respondent Nicdao of any civil
liability thereon as well.
The acquittal of respondent Nicdao likewise effectively extinguished her
civil liability Third, while petitioner Ching attempts to show that respondent Nicdao’s
liability did not arise from or was not based upon the criminal act of which
she was acquitted (ex delicto) but from her loan obligations to him (ex
A painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent
contractu), however, petitioner Ching miserably failed to prove by
Nicdao’s acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of the action to
preponderant evidence the existence of these unpaid loan obligations.
enforce her civil liability. There is simply no basis to hold respondent
Significantly, it can be inferred from the following findings of the CA in its
Nicdao civilly liable to petitioner Ching.
decision acquitting respondent Nicdao that the act or omission from which
her civil liability may arise did not exist. On theP20,000,000.00 check, the
First, the CA’s acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on
CA found as follows:
reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the finding that she did not
commit the act penalized under BP 22. In particular, the CA found that
True, indeed, the missing pre-signed and undated check no. 002524
the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check which was never issued nor
surfaced in the possession of complainant Ching who, in cahoots with his
delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As such, according to
paramour Emma Nuguid, filled up the blank check with his name as payee
the CA, petitioner Ching "did not acquire any right or interest over Check
and in the fantastic amount of P20,000,000.00, dated it October 6, 1997,
No. 002524 and cannot assert any cause of action founded on said
and presented it to the bank on October 7, 1997, along with the other
checks, for payment. Therefore, the inference that the check was stolen is Evidence sufficiently shows that the loans secured by the ten (10) checks
anchored on competent circumstantial evidence. The fact already involved in the cases subject of this petition had already been paid. It is not
established is that Emma Nuguid , previous owner of the store, had access controverted that petitioner gave Emma Nuguid a demand draft valued
to said store. Moreover, the possession of a thing that was stolen , absent atP1,200,000 to pay for the loans guaranteed by said checks and other
a credible reason, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that the checks issued to her. Samson Ching admitted having received the demand
person in possession of the stolen article is presumed to be guilty of taking draft which he deposited in his bank account. However, complainant
the stolen article (People v. Zafra, 237 SCRA 664). Samson Ching claimed that the said demand draft represents payment for
a previous obligation incurred by petitioner. However, complainant Ching
As previously shown, at the time check no. 002524 was stolen, the said failed to adduce any evidence to prove the existence of the alleged
check was blank in its material aspect (as to the name of payee, the obligation of the petitioner prior to those secured by the subject checks.
amount of the check, and the date of the check), but was already pre-
signed by petitioner. In fact, complainant Ching himself admitted that Apart from the payment to Emma Nuguid through said demand draft, it is
check no. 002524 in his possession was a blank check (TSN, Jan. 7, 1998, also not disputed that petitioner made cash payments to Emma Nuguid
pp. 24-27, Annex J, Petition). who collected the payments almost daily at the Vignette Superstore. As of
July 21, 1997, Emma Nuguid collected cash payments amounting to
Moreover, since it has been established that check no. 002524 had been approximately P5,780,000.00. All of these cash payments were recorded at
missing since 1995 (TSN, Sept. 9, 1998, pp. 14-15, Annex DD, Petition; TSN, the back of cigarette cartons by Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting, the
Sept. 10, 1998, pp. 43-46, Annex EE, Petition), it is abundantly clear that authenticity and accuracy of which were never denied by either
said check was never delivered to complainant Ching. Check no. 002524 complainant Ching or Emma Nuguid.
was an incomplete and undelivered instrument when it was stolen and
ended up in the hands of complainant Ching. Sections 15 and 16 of the Clearly, adding the payments recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons
Negotiable Instruments Law provide: by Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting totaling P5,780,000.00 and
the P1,200,000.00 demand draft received by Emma Nuguid, it would
xxxx appear that petitioner had already made payments in the total amount
of P6,980,000.00 for her loan in the total amount of P6,980,000.00 for her
In the case of check no. 002524, it is admitted by complainant Ching that loan obligation of only P2,100,000.00 (P950,000.00 in the case at bar and
said check in his possession was a blank check and was subsequently P1,150,000.00 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23054).45
completed by him alone without authority from petitioner. Inasmuch as
check no. 002524 was incomplete and undelivered in the hands of Generally checks may constitute evidence of indebtedness.46 However, in
complainant Ching, he did not acquire any right or interest therein and view of the CA’s findings relating to the eleven (11) checks - that
cannot, therefore, assert any cause of action founded on said stolen check the P20,000,000.00 was a stolen check and the obligations secured by the
(Development Bank of the Philippines v. Sima We, 219 SCRA 736, 740). other ten (10) checks had already been fully paid by respondent Nicdao –
they can no longer be given credence to establish respondent Nicdao’s civil
It goes without saying that since complainant Ching did not acquire any liability to petitioner Ching. Such civil liability, therefore, must be
right or interest over check no. 002524 and cannot assert any cause of established by preponderant evidence other than the discredited checks.
action founded on said check, petitioner has no obligation to make good
the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be held liable for violation of B.P. After a careful examination of the records of the case, 47 the Court holds
Blg. 22.44 that the existence of respondent Nicdao’s civil liability to petitioner Ching
in the amount of P20,950,000.00 representing her unpaid obligations to
Anent the other ten (10) checks, the CA made the following findings: the latter has not been sufficiently established by preponderant evidence.
Petitioner Ching mainly relies on his testimony before the MCTC to
establish the existence of these unpaid obligations. In gist, he testified that
from October 1995 up to 1997, respondent Nicdao obtained loans from respondent Nicdao still has unpaid obligations to him in the said amount.
him in the total amount of P20,950,000.00. As security for her obligations, Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof
she issued eleven (11) checks which were invariably blank as to the date, under our Rules.50
amounts and payee. When respondent Nicdao allegedly refused to pay her
obligations despite his due demand, petitioner filled up the checks in his In contrast, respondent Nicdao’s defense consisted in, among others, her
possession with the corresponding amounts and date and deposited them allegation that she had already paid her obligations to petitioner Ching
in his account. They were subsequently dishonored by the HSLB for being through Nuguid. In support thereof, she presented the Planters Bank
"DAIF" and petitioner Ching accordingly filed the criminal complaints demand draft for P1,200,000.00. The said demand draft was negotiated to
against respondent Nicdao for violation of BP 22. petitioner Ching’s account and he admitted receipt of the value thereof.
Petitioner Ching tried to controvert this by claiming that it was payment
It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who for a previous transaction between him and respondent Nicdao. However,
makes the allegations – Et incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum other than his self-serving claim, petitioner Ching did not proffer any
per rerum naturam factum negantis probatio nulla sit (The proof lies upon documentary evidence to prove the existence of the said previous
him who affirms, not upon him who denies; since, by the nature of things, transaction. Considering that the Planters Bank demand draft was dated
he who denies a fact cannot produce any proof).48 In civil cases, the party August 13, 1996, it is logical to conclude that, absent any evidence to the
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of contrary, it formed part of respondent Nicdao’s payment to petitioner
evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of Ching on account of the loan obligations that she obtained from him since
the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be October 1995.
synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight
of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in Additionally, respondent Nicdao submitted as evidence the cigarette
the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is wrappers at the back of which were written the computations of the daily
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered payments that she had made to Nuguid. The fact of the daily payments
in opposition thereto.49 Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court was corroborated by the other witnesses for the defense, namely, Jocelyn
offers the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence: Nicdao and Tolentino. As found by the CA, based on these computations,
respondent Nicdao had made a total payment of P5,780,000.00 to Nuguid
SEC. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the as of July 21, 1997.51 Again, the payments made, as reflected at the back of
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a these cigarette wrappers, were not disputed by petitioner Ching. Hence,
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or these payments as well as the amount of the Planters Bank demand draft
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may establish that respondent Nicdao already paid the total amount
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of P6,980,000.00 to Nuguid and petitioner Ching.
of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they The Court agrees with the CA that the daily payments made by respondent
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or Nicdao amounting to P5,780,000.00 cannot be considered as interest
want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may payments only. Even respondent Nicdao testified that the daily payments
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number that she made to Nuguid were for the interests due. However, as correctly
of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater ruled by the CA, no interests could be properly collected in the loan
number. transactions between petitioner Ching and respondent Nicdao because
there was no stipulation therefor in writing. To reiterate, under Article
Unfortunately, petitioner Ching’s testimony alone does not constitute 1956 of the Civil Code, "no interest shall be due unless it has been
preponderant evidence to establish respondent Nicdao’s civil liability to expressly stipulated in writing."
him amounting to P20,950,000.00. Apart from the discredited checks, he
failed to adduce any other documentary evidence to prove that
Neither could respondent Nicdao be considered to be estopped from WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
denying the validity of these interests. Estoppel cannot give validity to an
act that is prohibited by law or one that is against public policy.52 Clearly, SO ORDERED.
the collection of interests without any stipulation therefor in writing is
prohibited by law. Consequently, the daily payments made by respondent G.R. No. 158802 November 17, 2004
Nicdao amounting to P5,780,000.00 were properly considered by the CA as
applying to the principal amount of her loan obligations.
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained
at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City)
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, the defense of respondent JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator,
Nicdao that it was stolen and that she never issued or delivered the same vs.
to petitioner Ching was corroborated by the other defense witnesses, THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.
namely, Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao.

All told, as between petitioner Ching and respondent Nicdao, the requisite
quantum of evidence - preponderance of evidence - indubitably lies with
DECISION
respondent Nicdao. As earlier intimated, she cannot be held civilly liable to
petitioner Ching for her acquittal; under the circumstances which have just
been discussed lengthily, such acquittal carried with it the extinction of her
civil liability as well.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The CA committed no reversible error in not consolidating CA-G.R. CR No.
23055 and CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102
of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son,
petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First, that
During the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 and CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 in
respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of
the CA, the pertinent provision of the RIRCA on consolidation of cases
petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that petitioner be granted a new
provided:
trial.1 These reliefs are sought on the basis of purportedly exculpatory
evidence, gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing
SEC. 7. Consolidation of Cases. – Whenever two or more allied cases are
on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child born to the
assigned to different Justices, they may be consolidated for study and
victim of the rape.
report to a single Justice.
By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v.
(a) At the instance of any party or Justice to whom the case is assigned for
Reynaldo de Villa,2 we found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen
study and report, and with the conformity of all the Justices concerned,
Mendoza, his niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
the consolidation may be allowed when the cases to be consolidated
reclusión perpetua; and ordered him to pay the offended party civil
involve the same parties and/or related questions of fact and/or law. 53
indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and support for Leahlyn
Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the rape. Petitioner is
The use of the word "may" denotes the permissive, not mandatory, nature currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.
of the above provision, Thus, no grave error could be imputed to the CA
when it proceeded to render its decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055, without
As summarized in our Decision dated February 1, 2001, Aileen Mendoza
consolidating it with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054.
charged petitioner Reynaldo de Villa with rape in an information dated
January 9, 1995, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. When WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, finding
arraigned on January 26, 1995, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." 3 accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that he is sentenced
During the trial, the prosecution established that sometime in the third to suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua and ordered to pay the
week of April 1994, at about 10:00 in the morning, Aileen Mendoza woke offended party P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
up in her family's rented room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find damages; costs of the suit and to provide support for the child
petitioner on top of her. Aileen was then aged 12 years and ten months. Leahlyn Corales Mendoza.
She was unable to shout for help because petitioner covered her mouth
with a pillow and threatened to kill her. Aileen could not do anything but SO ORDERED.10
cry. Petitioner succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. After
making thrusting motions with his body, petitioner ejaculated. This Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more
encounter allegedly resulted in Aileen's pregnancy, which was noticed by faced with the question of Reynaldo de Villa's guilt or innocence.
her mother, Leonila Mendoza, sometime in November 1994. When
confronted by her mother, Aileen revealed that petitioner raped her. Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He
Aileen's parents then brought her to the Pasig Police Station, where they alleges that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a
lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner.4 scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the
father of the victim's child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed
Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner's case that DNA
months pregnant and found in her hymen healed lacerations at the 5:00 testing could resolve the issue of paternity.11 This information was
and 8:00 positions. On December 19, 1994, Aileen gave birth to a baby girl apparently furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death
whom she named Leahlyn Mendoza.5 Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for petitioner.

In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he Thus, petitioner's brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood
was already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had rendered him incapable type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child
of having an erection. He further averred that Aileen's family had been allegedly conceived as a result of the rape.12 This relief was implicitly
holding a grudge against him, which accounted for the criminal charges. denied in our Decision of February 21, 2001.
Finally, he interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that at the time of the
incident, he was in his hometown of San Luis, Batangas. 6 On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA
The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the tests be conducted.13 The Motion was denied with finality in a Resolution
crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the dated November 20, 2001.14 Hence, the Decision became final and
victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to executory on January 16, 2002.15
support the child, Leahlyn Mendoza.7
Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having been
On automatic review,8 we found that the date of birth of Aileen's child was informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted from
medically consistent with the time of the rape. Since it was never alleged saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de
that Aileen gave birth to a full-term nine-month old baby, we gave Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a
credence to the prosecution's contention that she prematurely gave birth new, sterile cup.16 Leahlyn readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the
to an eight-month old baby by normal delivery. 9 Thus, we affirmed sample home and gave it to the petitioner-relator, who immediately
petitioner's conviction for rape, in a Decision the dispositive portion of labeled the cup as "Container A."
which reads:
Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of the said child. Since this paternity is now conclusively disproved, he argues
Reynaldo de Villa. These samples were placed in separate containers with that the 2001 conviction must be overturned.
distinguishing labels and temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to
transport to the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to
Institute (NSRI).17 During transport, the containers containing the saliva collaterally attack the 2001 Decision. The ancillary remedy of a motion for
samples were kept on ice. new trial is resorted to solely to allow the presentation of what is alleged
to be newly-discovered evidence. This Court is thus tasked to determine,
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the first, the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an
sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of individual already convicted and serving sentence by virtue of a final and
Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The executory judgment; and second, the propriety of granting a new trial
identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by under the same factual scenario.
Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory. 18
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of relief for
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March those seeking liberty from any unwarranted denial of freedom of
21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of movement. Very broadly, the writ applies "to all cases of illegal
the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match confinement or detention by which a person has been deprived of his
between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and those of liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person has been withheld
any of the other samples, including Leahlyn's.19 from the person entitled thereto".22 Issuance of the writ necessitates that
a person be illegally deprived of his liberty. In the celebrated case of
Hence, in the instant petition for habeas corpus, petitioner argues as Villavicencio v. Lukban,23 we stated that "[a]ny restraint which will
follows: preclude freedom of action is sufficient."24

DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
PETITIONER DE VILLA IS NOT THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN MENDOZA; individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of
HIS CONVICTION FOR RAPE, BASED ON THE FACT THAT LEAHLYN movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's
WAS SIRED AS A RESULT OF THE ALLEGED RAPE, CANNOT STAND liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is
AND MUST BE SET ASIDE.20 unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot
be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or
xxx xxx xxx tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or
ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the
proceedings.
A NEW TRIAL TO CONSIDER NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE IS
PROPER AND MAY BE ORDERED BY THIS COURT IN VIEW OF THE
RESULTS OF THE DNA TESTS CONDUCTED.21 Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the
writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a post-conviction
remedy. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals, 25 we ruled that
Considering that the issues are inter-twined, they shall be discussed
review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance
together.
of the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific instances, such as when,
as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation
In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to
of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court
the trial in order to re-litigate the factual issue of the paternity of the child
had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has
Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this issue is crucial, considering
been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. 26
that his conviction in 2001 was based on the factual finding that he sired
In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a Thus, in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,34 the writ of habeas corpus
final judgment of conviction, without, however, providing a legal ground was held to be available where an accused was deprived of the
on which to anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges neither the constitutional right against self-incrimination. A defect so pronounced as
deprivation of a constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the the denial of an accused's constitutional rights results in the absence or
court imposing the sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been loss of jurisdiction, and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent
imposed upon him. conviction of the accused. That void judgment of conviction may be
challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek corpus.35 Later, in Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,36 this
the review of findings of fact long passed upon with finality. This relief is Court ruled that, once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to
far outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings. In the early case of exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of
Abriol v. Homeres,27 for example, this Court stated the general rule that jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the
the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should not be thus legality of the detention.37 Although in Feria v. Court of Appeals38 this
used. The writ of habeas corpus, whereas permitting a collateral challenge Court was inclined to allow the presentation of new evidence in a petition
of the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal issuing the process or judgment for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, this was an exceptional
by which an individual is deprived of his liberty, cannot be distorted by situation. In that case, we laid down the general rule, which states that the
extending the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting squarely within burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the
their jurisdiction.28 The reason for this is explained very simply in the case petitioner who attacks such restraint. Where the return is not subject to
of Velasco v. Court of Appeals:29 a habeas corpus petition reaches the exception, that is, where it sets forth a process which, on its face, shows
body, but not the record of the case. 30 A record must be allowed to good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on
remain extant, and cannot be revised, modified, altered or amended by petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the
the simple expedient of resort to habeas corpus proceedings. apparent effect of such process.39

Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of In the recent case of Calvan v. Court of Appeals,40 we summarized the
depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of scope of review allowable in a petition for the issuance of the writ of
the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ habeas corpus. We ruled that the writ of habeas corpus, although not
of habeas corpus; if at all, these errors must be corrected on certiorari or designed to interrupt the orderly administration of justice, can be invoked
on appeal, in the form and manner prescribed by law. 31 In the past, this by the attendance of a special circumstance that requires immediate
Court has disallowed the review of a court's appreciation of the evidence action. In such situations, the inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus would be
in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, as this is not the addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to
function of said writ.32 A survey of our decisions in habeas corpus cases the question of whether the proceeding or judgment under which a person
demonstrates that, in general, the writ of habeas corpus is a high has been restrained is a complete nullity. The probe may thus proceed to
prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary remedy; it may thus be check on the power and authority, itself an equivalent test of jurisdiction,
invoked only under extraordinary circumstances.33 We have been of the court or the judge to render the order that so serves as the basis of
categorical in our pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is not to imprisonment or detention.41 It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of
be used as a substitute for another, more proper remedy. Resort to the conviction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through the filing
writ of habeas corpus is available only in the limited instances when a of a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
judgment is rendered by a court or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction. If, for
instance, it can be demonstrated that there was a deprivation of a Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but of People v. de
constitutional right, the writ can be granted even after an individual has Villa, we find that the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
been meted a sentence by final judgment.
First, the denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by petitioner.
As such, this Court is hard-pressed to find legal basis on which to anchor
the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Much as this Court sympathizes with amount to a denial of a constitutional right. There is likewise no showing
petitioner's plea, a careful scrutiny of the records does not reveal any that the proceedings were tainted with any other jurisdictional defect.
constitutional right of which the petitioner was unduly deprived.
In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ
We are aware that other jurisdictions have seen fit to grant the writ of of habeas corpus to seek a re-examination of the records of People v. de
habeas corpus in order to test claims that a defendant was denied Villa, without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For all intents and
effective aid of counsel.42 In this instance, we note that the record is purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his
replete with errors committed by counsel, and it can be alleged that the conviction. We are being asked to reexamine the weight and sufficiency of
petitioner was, at trial, denied the effective aid of counsel. The United the evidence in this case, not on its own, but in light of the new DNA
States Supreme Court requires a defendant alleging incompetent counsel evidence that the petitioner seeks to present to this Court. This relief is
to show that the attorney's performance was deficient under a reasonable outside the scope of a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas
standard, and additionally to show that the outcome of the trial would corpus must, therefore, fail.
have been different with competent counsel. 43 The purpose of the right to
effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that the defendant receives a Coupled with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,
fair trial.44 petitioner seeks a new trial to re-litigate the issue of the paternity of the
child Leahlyn Mendoza.
The U.S. Supreme Court asserts that in judging any claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, one must examine whether counsel's conduct It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process to such an central to the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence. The rape of the
extent that the trial did not produce a fair and just result. 45 The proper victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question, separate and
measure of attorney performance is "reasonable" under the prevailing distinct from the question of the father of her child. Recently, in the case
professional norms, and the defendant must show that the representation of People v. Alberio,51 we ruled that the fact or not of the victim's
received fell below the objective standard of reasonableness.46 For the pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether
petition to succeed, the strong presumption that the counsel's conduct or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of
falls within the wide range or reasonable professional assistance must be rape. Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by the
overcome.47 purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment in
determining an individual's guilt.
In the case at bar, it appears that in the middle of the appeal, the
petitioner's counsel of record, a certain Atty. Alfonso G. Salvador, suddenly In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child support to
and inexplicably withdrew his appearance as counsel, giving the sole Leahlyn Mendoza indicates that our Decision was based, at least in small
explanation that he was "leaving for the United States for an indefinite measure, on the victim's claim that the petitioner fathered her child. This
period of time by virtue of a petition filed in his favor." 48In the face of this claim was given credence by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was
abandonment, petitioner made an impassioned plea that his lawyer be affirmed by this Court on automatic review.
prevented from this withdrawal in a handwritten "Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Opposition of Counsel's Withdrawal of Appearance The fact of the child's paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the
with Leave of Court" received by this Court on September 14, civil award of child support. It is only tangentially related to the issue of
1999.49 Petitioner alleged that his counsel's withdrawal is an "untimely and petitioner's guilt. However, if it can be conclusively determined that the
heartbreaking event", considering that he had placed "all [his] trust and petitioner did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of
confidence on [his counsel's] unquestionable integrity and dignity."50 reasonable doubt, and allow the acquittal of the petitioner on this basis.

While we are sympathetic to petitioner's plight, we do not, however, find Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner once more relies upon
that there was such negligence committed by his earlier counsel so as to erroneous legal grounds in resorting to the remedy of a motion for new
trial. A motion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered
Procedure, is available only for a limited period of time, and for very after the trial, we nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for
limited grounds. Under Section 1, Rule 121, of the Revised Rules of "newly-discovered evidence" that would merit a new trial. Such evidence
Criminal Procedure, a motion for new trial may be filed at any time before disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with
a judgment of conviction becomes final, that is, within fifteen (15) days the exercise of reasonable diligence.
from its promulgation or notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a
motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy. Section 2 of Rule 121 Petitioner-relator's claim that he was "unaware" of the existence of DNA
enumerates the grounds for a new trial: testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court. Lack
of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.—The court shall grant a new trial on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner's counsel. In either
on any of the following grounds: instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner. It is a settled
rule that a party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial was guilty of neglect.54 A client is bound by the acts of his counsel,
rights of the accused have been committed during the trial; including the latter's mistakes and negligence. 55 It is likewise settled that
relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his
the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure. 56
and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted
would probably change the judgment. Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence
presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that
In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out
"newly-discovered evidence", i.e., the DNA test subsequently conducted, by the Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de
allegedly excluding petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory,
result of the rape. still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and positive identification as
its bases.57The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the
pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a
rape.58 Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this
writ of habeas corpus has long attained finality, and entry of judgment was
Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged. Although petitioner
made as far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an examination of
claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of the
the evidence presented by the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA
child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was based on the clear
evidence falls within the statutory or jurisprudential definition of "newly-
and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given credence
discovered evidence".
by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for habeas
granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was
corpus and new trial is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or No costs.
impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if
admitted, it would probably change the judgment.52 It is essential that the SO ORDERED.
offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the
evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. 53 Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Panganiban, J., joins Carpio and Callejo, Sr., JJ., in their 73. Petitioner is also the private complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 92-
separate opinion. 8157 and 92-8158 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with respondent
Carpio, J., please see separate concurring opinion. Generoso Damaso as accused. Upon motion of respondents, said civil and
Callejo, Sr., J., please see separate opinion. criminal cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
Corona, J., on leave.
On February 21, 2003, the RTC promulgated its
Decision[3] dated January 16, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads
RODRIGO SUMIRAN, G.R. No. 162518 as follows:
Petitioner,

Present: WHEREFORE, premises considered,

accused GENEROSO DAMASO is hereby ACQUITTED in
Criminal Case Nos. 92-8157 and 92-8158 on grounds of
CARPIO MORALES, J.,*
insufficiency of evidence.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - Acting Chairperson,**
As for Civil Case No. 93-2588, in the interest justice
VELASCO, JR.,
and equity, judgment is hereby rendered against the
NACHURA, and
plaintiff Rodrigo Sumiran and in favor of the defendants
PERALTA, JJ.
Damaso. The plaintiff is further ordered to pay to the
defendants the following:
SPOUSES GENEROSO DAMASO and Promulgated:
EVA DAMASO, a. P50,000.00 as moral damages
Respondents. August 19, 2009 b. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x c. the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.[4]
DECISION

On March 6, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration

PERALTA, J.: dated Match 4, 2003, stating that he received a duplicate original copy of
the decision on February 21, 2003. Respondents opposed said
motion. On May 9, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner’s
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, on May 29, 2003, petitioner filed a
the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) Notice of Appeal dated May 28, 2003, stating instead that he received a
in CA-G.R. SP No. 80267, dated December 22, 2003, and the copy of the decision dated January 16, 2003 only on March 8, 2003 and of
Resolution[2] dated February 20, 2004, denying petitioner's motion for the Order dated May 9, 2003 denying his motion for reconsideration
reconsideration, be reversed and set aside. on May 19, 2003.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with
prayer for preliminary attachment (Civil Case No. 93-2588) against On June 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying due course to
respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time, emphasizing that the
decision was promulgated on February 21, 2003 in the presence of both
parties and their counsels. Considering counsel for petitioner to have motion for new trial or motion for
received a copy of the decision on said date of promulgation, the RTC ruled reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may
that since petitioner had filed a motion for reconsideration on the 13 th day be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the
(March 6, 2003), he had belatedly filed the notice of appeal when he filed decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of
it ten (10) days after allegedly receiving the Order of May 9, 2003 on May the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section
19, 2003. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner on June 20, 3.[6]
2003, but the same was denied by the RTC on October 1, 2003.
The foregoing ruling of the Court was reiterated in Makati Insurance
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Co., Inc. v. Reyes,[7] to wit:
CA. However, the CA found the petition unmeritorious and dismissed the
same in its Decision dated December 22, 2003. Ruling that petitioner was Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of
bound by his judicial admission that he received the Decision of the RTC Appeals, promulgated on 14 September 2005 while the
when it was promulgated on February 21, 2003, the CA held that present Petition was already pending before us. x x x
petitioner’s period within which to file an appeal had lapsed by the time
the Notice of Appeal was filed on May 29, 2003. Petitioner’s motion for xxxx
reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per Resolution
datedFebruary 20, 2004. With the advent of the "fresh period rule," parties
who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for
Hence, this petition where it is alleged that the CA erred in ruling reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal
that petitioner’s period to appeal had lapsed, as such ruling was premised within fifteen days from the denial of that motion.
on misapprehension of facts and contradicted by evidence on record. The
CA also allegedly failed to state in its decision and resolution the particular The “fresh period rule” is not inconsistent with
evidence upon which the same was based; and there were supposedly Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which
some facts that, if properly noticed and considered, would justify a states that the appeal shall be taken “within fifteen (15)
different conclusion. days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
from.” The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies
The petition deserves some consideration. disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense
which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the
As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be
Court of Appeals[5] that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within
amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is 15 days from notice of the “final order,” x x x.
allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in
the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion xxxx
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the The “fresh period rule” finally eradicates the
appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the Court counted – from receipt of notice of judgment or from
stated: receipt of notice of “final order” appealed from.

To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v.
notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of a notice of
Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days appeal which was purportedly filed five days late. With
from receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying his the fresh period rule, the 15-day period within which to
 file the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the promulgated. That question may be answered with the
denial of the therein petitioner’s motion for guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be
reconsideration. given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being
We followed suit in Elbiña v. Ceniza, wherein we no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments
applied the principle granting a fresh period of 15 days to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in
within which to file the notice of appeal, counted from character as they do not create new or remove vested
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
motion for reconsideration or any final order or confirmation of rights already existing.
resolution.
Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and
Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. categorically warrants that Neypes bears the quested
Bank of the Philippine Islands, we held that a party-litigant retroactive effect, to wit:
may now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days
from receipt of the original decision or within fifteen days Procedural law refers to the
from the receipt of the order denying the motion for adjective law which prescribes rules and
reconsideration. forms of procedure in order that courts
may be able to administer
In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, we applied justice. Procedural laws do not come
the same principle of “fresh period rule,” expostulating within the legal conception of a
that procedural law refers to the adjective law which retroactive law, or the general rule
prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that against the retroactive operation of
courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws statues ― they may be given retroactive
do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive effect on actions pending and
law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation undetermined at the time of their
of statutes. The "fresh period rule" is irrefragably passage and this will not violate any right
procedural, prescribing the manner in which the of a person who may feel that he is
appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or adversely affected, insomuch as there
determined and, therefore, can be made applicable to are no vested rights in rules of
actions pending upon its effectivity, such as the present procedure.
case, without danger of violating anyone else’s rights. The “fresh period rule” is a
(Emphasis supplied) procedural law as it prescribes a fresh
period of 15 days within which an
appeal may be made in the event that
The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for the motion for reconsideration is
appeal had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation denied by the lower court. Following
of Neypes onSeptember 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil- the rule on retroactivity of procedural
Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia,[8] stating thus: laws, the “fresh period rule” should be
applied to pending actions, such as the
The determinative issue is whether the “fresh present case.
period” rule announced in Neypes could retroactively Also, to deny herein petitioners
apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed the benefit of the “fresh period rule” will
prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was amount to injustice, if not absurdity,
 since the subject notice of judgment and
final order were issued two years later or
in the year 2000, as compared to the
notice of judgment and final order
in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It
will be incongruous and illogical that
parties receiving notices of judgment
and final orders issued in the year 1998
will enjoy the benefit of the “fresh
period rule” while those later rulings of
the lower courts such as in the instant
case, will not.[9]

Since this case was already pending in this Court at the time of
promulgation of Neypes, then, ineluctably, the Court must also apply the
foregoing rulings to the present case. Petitioner is entitled to a “fresh
period” of 15 days − counted from May 19, 2003, the date of petitioner’s
receipt of the Order denying his motion for reconsideration of the RTC
Decision − within which to file his notice of appeal. Therefore, when he filed
said notice on May 29, 2003, or only ten (10) days after receipt of the Order
denying his motion for reconsideration, his period to appeal had not yet
lapsed.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80267, dated December 22,
2003, and the Resolution dated February 20, 2004, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of
theRegional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated June 2, 2003 in
Civil Case No. 93-2588, and its Order dated October 1, 2003, reiterating the
June 2, 2003 Order, are hereby
declared NULL and VOID. The Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch
73, isDIRECTED to give due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal
dated May 28, 2003. No costs.

SO ORDERED.