Defensor- Santiago vs.

COMELEC
Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC
G.R No. 127325
March 19, 1997

FACTS:

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed
with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case
for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between
petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda
and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising
the following arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by
Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in
the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE:

WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative.

WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act
as worded adequately covers such initiative.

WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?

WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition would
constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.

WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.

WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC.

HELD:

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not
accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The
use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes
that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and
Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the
law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide
for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national
and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the
Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

2) RODRIGUEZ - EUGENIO V. DRILON [D2017]

Sep 30, 2015

Documents
liz-angela-a-intia

Eugenio VS Drilon
Digest by: Alyssa Rodriguez GR Number + Date: G.R. 109404, January 22,
1996
Petition: Instant Petition seeking to set aside the Decision of the respondent
Executive Secretary. Petitioner: Florencio Eugenio - doing business under the
name E. & S. Delta Village Respondent: Franklin M. Drilon †“ Executive
Secretary of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB); Prospero
Palmiano †“ private respondent Ponencia: Justice Panganiban
DOCTRINE: Retroactivity of laws. As well as the importance of the intent of
laws, consistent with its preamble.
FACTS: 1. May 10, 1972 - private respondent (Palmiano), on installment basis,
purchased two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City from petitioner
(Eugenio) and his co-owner/ developer Fermin Salazar. 2. The Delta Village
Homeowners†™Association, Inc. filed a complaint of non-development
(docketed as cases 2619 and 2620) to the National Housing Authority (NHA).
Acting on this, the NHA ordered petitioner to cease and desist from making
further sales of lots in said village or in any project owned by him. 3. And while
these NHA Cases (Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620) were still pending, private
respondent (Palmiano) filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal
Affairs (OAALA) of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a
complaint against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo (he
alleges that in spite of the NHA ruling petitioner resold one of the two lots to the
said spouses Relevo, in whose favor title to the said property was registered).
4. Furthermore, private respondent suspended his payments because of
petitioner†™s said failure to develop the village. Respondent also prays for the
annulment of the sale to the Relevo spouses and for reconveyance of the lot to
him. 5. October 11, 1983 †“ the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the
right of petitioner to cancel the contract with private respondent and dismissed
private respondent†™s complaint. 6. On appeal, the Commission Proper of
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) reversed the OAALA
and (applying P.D. 957) ordered petitioner to complete the subdivision
development and to reinstate private respondent†™s purchase contract over
one lot, and as to the other (as it was bought by the couple already), to
immediately refund to Palmiano all payments made thereon, plus interests
computed at legal rates from date of receipt hereof until fully paid.†• 7. The
respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, also affirmed the decision of the
HSRC. 8. AND THUS, petitioner has now filed this Petition for review before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not P.D. 957, †œThe Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers†™Protective Decree†• has retroactive effect. Whether or not, in
pursuance of P.D. 957, respondents are right in assailing that due to
petitioner†™s failure to develop the land, private respondent is justified in his
non-payment of amortizations on installment under a land purchase entered
into by the parties way before the enactment of P.D. 957. PROVISIONS: P.D.
957, †œThe Subdivision and Condominium Buyers†™Protective
Decree†• †“ protects the rights of subdivision and condominium buyers by
providing that the developers of these properties should fulfill all the guarantees
of facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development
which they have offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or
condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any
form of advertisement †œSec. 23 (0f P.D. 957). Non-Forfeiture of Payments. -
No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium
project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the
owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer,
desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to
develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved
plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at
his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests
but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate.†•
RULING + RATIO: 1. Yes, it is retroactive. Although, P.D. 957 did not
expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, such can be plainly inferred
from the unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the law, as culled from its
preamble and from the situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to
 remedy (From the Preamble: †œWHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that
many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have
reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain
properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting
systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and
safety of home and lot buyers), must be enforced. 2. Yes. Pursuant to Section
23 of P.D. 957, respondent rightly invoked his desistance from making further
payment to petitioner due to petitioner†™s failure to develop the subdivision
project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying
with the same. DISPOSITION 1. P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as
to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. 2. There
is no merit in petitioner†™s contention that respondent Secretary exceeded
his jurisdiction in ordering the refund of private respondent†™s payments on
Lot 12 although (according to petitioner) only Lot 13 was the subject of the
complaint. 3. The petition is DENIED due course and is hereby DISMISSED.
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COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS ESSO

Case digest
Download Commissioner of Customs vs Esso

Transcript
IT IS A WELL ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE THAT WERE A STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS,
COURTS MAY EXAMINE BOTH THE PRINTED PAGES OF THE PUBLISHED ACT AS
WELL AS THOSE EXTRINSIC MATTERS THAT MAY AID IN CONSTRUING THE
MEANING OF THE STATUTE, SUCH AS THE HISTORY OF ITS ENACTMENT, THE
REASONS FOR THE PASSAGE OF THE BILL AND PURPOSES TO BE
ACCOMPLISHED BY THE MEASURE. COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., (Formerly:
Standard-Vacuum Refining Corp. (Phil.), respondent. G.R. No. L-28329 August
17, 1975 FACTS: Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2,
issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on December 9,
1957, and operates a petroleum refining plant in Limay Bataan. Under Article
103 of Republic Act No. 387 which provides: "During the five years following
the granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import free of customs
duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and
accessories," respondent imported and was assessed the special import tax
(which it paid under protest). Court procedures: The Collector of Customs on
February 16, 1962, held that respondent ESSO was subject to the payment of
the special import tax provided in Republic Act No. 1394, as amended by R.A.
No. 2352, and dismissed the protest. On March 1, 1962, respondent appealed
the ruling of the Collector of Customs to the Commissioner of Customs who, on
March 19, 1965, affirmed the decision of said Collector of Customs. 3 On July
2, 1965, respondent ESSO filed a petition with the Court of Tax Appeals for
review of the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. The Court of Tax
Appeals, on September 30, 1967, reversed the decision of herein petitioner
Commissioner of Customs and ordered refund of the amount of P775.62 to
respondent ESSO which the latter had paid under protest. Statutes subject of
construction: a. R.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) – title, Art. 103, Art.
102, Art. 104; b. R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW), as amended by R.A. No.
2352 – title
ISSUE: WON the exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent ESSO from
custom duties granted by R.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) should
embrace or include the special import tax imposed by R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL
TAX LAW).
HELD: Yes. Petition denied. · The title of R.A. No. 1394 (Special Tax Law)
indicates unmistakably that it is repealing six prior statutes (all these laws dealt
with the imposition of a special excise tax on foreign exchange or other form of
levy on importation of goods into the country). · On the other hand, it is
apparent that R.A. No. 387 (The Petroleum Act), has not been repealed
(although this law had granted more concessions and tax exemption privileges
than any of the statutes that were amended, repealed or revoked by R.A. No.
1394. · The CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES saw fit to preserve the privileges
granted under the Petroleum Law of 1949 in order to keep the door open to
exploitation and development of the petroleum resources of the country. ·
The SC is convinced that R.A. No. 387 or the Petroleum Act of 1949 was
intended to encourage the exploitation, exploration and development of the
petroleum resources of the country by giving it the necessary incentive in the
form of tax exemptions. This is the raison d’ etre for the generous grant of
tax exemptions to those who would invest their financial resources towards the
achievement of this national economic goal.

KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO

G.R. NO. 118910. July 30, 1993
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C.
CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE
TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN.
FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the
PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:

1. GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the contract between Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract violated the provision
in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries through a
collaboration, association, or joint venture.
2. Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and
accessories on January 25, 1995. The agreement are as follow:
4. Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case be less than an annual
rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in commercial operation.
5. Rent is computed bi-weekly.
6. Term is 8 years.
7. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities.
8. Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at P25M.
3. Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because:
4. It is the same as the old contract of lease.
5. It is still violative of PCSO’s charter.
6. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not been approved by the President and
it is not most advantageous to the government.
4. PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments
0. ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior contract.
 1. ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the exception provided in EO No. 301.
2. Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the Board of Directors of PCSO.
3. Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery equipment.
4. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
5. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.

Issues:

1. Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal standing to sue.

2. Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in operating an online lottery is valid.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.

1. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues
were actually involved.
2. LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present
case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling
cannot be in any sense be regarded as “the law of this case”. The parties are the same but the
cases are not.
3. RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly
passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future
action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not
apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the
second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable
from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to
make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue.
4. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the
petitioner’s standing.
5. Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually
involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are ‘real parties of interest’.
6. Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are
bound either principally or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting
parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract.
7. Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of
public contracts maybe made before COA or before the Ombudsman.
2. Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is valid.
1. It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO now bears all losses because the operation
of the system is completely in its hands.
2. Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Court is not
inclined to review.
3. Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by law as a maximum. (4.3% of gross receipt is
discussed in the dissenting opinion of Feliciano, J.)
4. In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement. Petitioners state that this
would allow PGMC to control and operate the on-line lottery system. The Court held that the
claim is speculative. In any case, in the construction of statutes, the resumption is that in making
contracts, the government has acted in good faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is
not a reason for denying power.
5. It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO does not have the power to enter into any
contract which would involve it in any form of “collaboration, association, or joint venture” for
the holding of sweepstakes activities. This only mentions that PCSO is prohibited from investing
in any activities that would compete in their own activities.
6. It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement which does not compete with their own
activities. The Court held that is also based on speculation. Evidence is needed to show that the
transfer of technology would involve the PCSO and its personnel in prohibited association with
the PGMC.
7. O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies,
materials and equipment and not on the contracts of lease. Public bidding for leases are only for
privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government owned buildings or
spaces for private use.

Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. The motion for reconsideration of petitioners
is DENIED with finality.