PRIVATE ACTS AND CONTRACTS STATUTE (EJUSDEM GENERIS)

EMETERIA LIWAG, Petitioner vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS

ASSOCIATION, INC.,Respondent
G. R. No. 189755 July 04, 2012
Sereno, J.

FACTS
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from
Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle
its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of
land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the lots already sold.
As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National Housing
Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a
water facility is available in the subdivision. The said water facility has been the only
source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years.
In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099 was issued to the latter. In 2003,
Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the
respondent Association demanding the removal of the overhead water tank over
theparcel of land. The latter refused and filed a case before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board against T. P.Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving
heirs of Hermogenes.
The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent Association. One of the things it
affirmed was the existence of an easement for water system/facility or open space on
Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well and overhead tank are
situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board
found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space.
ISSUE
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an “open space”
as defined in P. D.1216.
RULING
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an “open space.” The Court used
the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine whether the
area falls under “other similar facilities and amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no
specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities.
Ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include – or to be restricted to – things akin to or resembling, or of the
same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court
found out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of
the community. Therefore, the phrase “other similar facilities and amenities” should be
interpreted in like manner.
It is without a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is
a basic necessity, without which, survival in the community would be impossible.
ELISEO F. SORIANO versus MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, ET AL.
(DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION)
G.R. No. 164785
April 29, 2009

Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program, Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made offensive utterances which prompted Jessie L.
Galapon and other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), to file
complaint-affidavits against petitioner before the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board(MTRCB).

After notice of hearing and preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the
MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively suspended the showing
of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of
Presidential Decree No. (PD)1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter
XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7,
Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. The same order also set the case for
preliminary investigation.

Thereafter, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order but

which was withdrawn after the filing of this petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify
the preventive suspension order by the MTRCB.

On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision finding
respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty
of three (3) months suspension from his program, “Ang Dating Daan”.

It was the contention of petitioner that preventive suspensions imposed upon him are in
valid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue
preventive suspension.

Thus this present petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:
Whether or not the MTRCB has the power to order preventive suspension.

Ruling:
Yes.
MTRCB is expressly empowered by PD 1986, Section 3 (d), to regulate and supervise
television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or
immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent
further violations as it investigates. This authority stems naturally from, and is necessary
for the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision.
Well-settled is the rule that administrative agencies have the power to discipline and
impose penalties and said power carries with it the power to investigate administrative
complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of
the complaint. Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the
MTRCB’s express regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory
and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other
construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.
MAGDALENA T. VILLASI vs. FILOMENO GARCIA, substituted by his heirs,
namely, ERMELINDA H. GARCIA, LIZA GARCIA-GONZALEZ, THERESA GARCIA-
TIANGSON, MARIVIC H. GARCIA, MARLENE GARCIA-MOMIN, GERARDO H.
GARCIA, GIDEON H. GARCIA and GENEROSO H. GARCIA, and ERMELINDA
H.GARCIA
G.R. No. 190106 January 15, 2014

Nature of the Case

A petition for review on Certiorari assailing judgment of the Court of Appeals

(CA) affirming decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) directing the Sheriff to
suspend execution of sale on levied building.

Facts

The issue revolves around a foreclosed property levied upon by the Sheriff for an
unpaid sum of money due to services contracted by petitioner in the construction of a
building somewhere in Quezon City. The foreclosure was due to the lower court’s order
against petitioner-debtor to pay the contractor-creditor [Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc.;
FGCI for brevity], which was however reversed on appeal in view that petitioner-debtor
made overpayments – changing the relationship between the parties to that of judgment
petitioner-creditor and judgment contractor-debtor. Contractor-debtor’s untimely petition
for certiorari did not elicit from the Supreme Court favorable judgment. Thus, petitioner-
creditor moved for Execution of the CA’s judgment with the RTC, which in turn ordered
the Sheriff to execute the CA’s judgment. The Sheriff levied on a building only
registered to contractor-debtor [FGCI] for tax purposes, erected at a property belonging
to respondent spouses [substituted by their heirs in this Petition]. After complying with
the procedural requirements [mandatory posting and publication of notice of sale on
execution of the real property], a public auction ensued. Respondents received
favorable judgment from the RTC which ordered the Sheriff to suspend execution of
sale on the building levied upon. Petitioner-creditor’s motion for reconsideration [before
the RTC], appeal [before the CA], and motion for reconsideration [before the CA] were
denied. Thus, this petition for review on Certiorari.

Issue(s)

(1). Did the Sheriff wrongly levy the property belonging to respondents?
(2). Did the CA err in holding that there is no reason to pierce the veil of contractor-
debtor’s corporate fiction?

Held

(1). No. True that respondents were able to prove the land belongs to them.
Respondents however failed to show proof that the building belongs to them, whereas
petitioner established, by way of a tax declaration and tax receipts, that the said building
is registered under the name of contractor-debtor which is sufficient to prove that the
holder [contractor-debtor FGCI] has claim of the said title. A tax declaration or realty tax
payments, although inconclusive proofs to ownership, are indicative of the possession
in the concept of owner “ xxx for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession xxx [Buduhan vs.
Pakurao, 518 Phil. 285 (2006)] – proof that the holder has claim over the title. This
voluntary declaration to pay the taxes manifests: (1) one’s honest and sincere desire to
obtain title to the property; (2) announce adverse claim to the title against the State and
all parties-in-interest; and (3) contribution to needed Government revenues. This, in
effect, strengthens one’s bon fide claim for acquisition of ownership.

Not only that, contractor-debtor is also in actual possession of the building which overall
support contractor-debtors ownership over said properties [land and building].

Furthermore, respondent’s claim that the City Assessor erred in declaring the property
under the contractor-debtor for tax purposes is also suspect and indicative of manifest
intent to put the property beyond the reach of judgment petitioner-creditor. The same
could have been rectified before the onset of this Petition.
On top of that, it is true, as respondents contend, that accessory follows the principal.
The same is however subject to an exception. In cases where there is no clear and
convincing evidence that the principal [building] and accessory [land] does not belong to
one and the same person [natural or juridical], there is no doubt there is
separate ownership, and should be treated as such. In the case at Bar, clearly
the ownership of the land and the building belong to different persons.

(2). No.

This premise is irrelevant. The respondents are trying to protect contractor-debtor from
liability by asserting they are the owners of the building. The contractor-debtor is the
proven owner of the building. Piercing FGCI’s corporate veil will not protect it from its
judgment debt. Piercing will result in the identification of the Spouses Garcia as FGCI
itself and will make them liable for FGCI’s judgment debt.

Henceforth, the Petition is granted. The assailed decision of the CA is reversed and set
aside. The Sheriff is directed to proceed with the conduct of the sale on execution of the
levied building.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP.
NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.

FACTS:

The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of
Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.

Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of
the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation
of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as
one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of
having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two
(2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as
representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally
envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the
National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with
the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on
July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made
aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral
one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of
Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC
would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of
Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing
balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely
provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential
appointees.

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the
right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

ISSUE:

Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2)
of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution.

HELD:

No.

The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the
functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and
unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the use of the singular
letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for
any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional
Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative
to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the
legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction
may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is
founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or
phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or
phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its
meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to
this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section
8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is
made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but
that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the
Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into
the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the
records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be
divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the
sitting members of the JBC for that matter.

With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the
Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the
records of Constitutional Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC
representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are still
differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the
Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is
required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department.

The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three
branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of
the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more
quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with
one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle of equality among
the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.”

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven
(7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote
or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in
recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the
constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws
must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must
defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of
time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and
much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who
run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC,

all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized. They are not nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the
Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute it so that only one (1) member of Congress
will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.