Benguet Corp V Leviste PDF
Benguet Corp V Leviste PDF
Benguet Corp V Leviste PDF
SYLLABUS
DECISION
FERNAN, C. J : p
On March 1, 1975, or almost three (3) months after the Deed of Ratification was executed,
private respondent revoked the Special Power of Attorney of January 15, 1967, stating
that "while there is no question that I still have complete and full trust and confidence in the
judgment and wisdom of my father, it is not my wish to add any more to his already many
and mounting problems." 5 Notice of the revocation was served on Dizon Mines on March
20, 1975 and on Benguet on August 26, 1975.
However, in spite of said notice, on September 6, 1975, Dizon Mines and Benguet entered
into an Operations Agreement 6 whereby the former transferred to the latter the
possession of the 57 mining claims for the purpose of exploring, developing and operating
them for production and marketing of marketable products under the terms and
conditions specified therein.
Claiming that the Operations Agreement lacked legal basis by reason of the revocation of
Celestino Dizon's special power of attorney; the obligation imposed by the Agreement of
January 21, 1967 on Dizon Mines to itself operate the mines after raising the capital
needed therefor, without authority to engage another corporation for this purpose; and the
inefficacy of the Deed of Ratification arising from the physiological incapacity of Celestino
Dizon to give his consent thereto, private respondent prayed that the Operations
Agreement be declared null and void and inoperative insofar as it covers her eleven (11)
lode mining claims. In the alternative, private respondent prayed that should the validity of
the Operations Agreement be upheld, defendants therein be ordered to observe and
comply with the sharing of profits stipulated in the Agreement of January 21, 1967. She
further prayed for the award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation as may be proved
during the trial.
On August 12, 1980, Benguet filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: 1) the
court is without jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the action; 2) the action
is barred by prior judgment and laches; 3) the action to declare invalid the Deed of
Ratification has prescribed; and 4) the venue of the action was improperly laid. Dizon
Mines filed its own motion to dismiss.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
After private respondent has filed her consolidated opposition to the motions to dismiss
and Benguet, its reply to said consolidated opposition, the trial court issued an Order
dated March 26, 1982, denying the motions to dismiss for lack of merit. 7
Its motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied in an Order dated June 20,
1983, 8 petitioner Benguet is now before this Court, reiterating the four (4) grounds stated
in its motion to dismiss.
Invoking Section 7 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1281 and the ruling in Twin Peaks Mining
Association vs. Navarro and Philex Mining Corp., 9 petitioner contends that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 30171 as jurisdiction over actions to cancel mining
contracts is vested exclusively in the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences. It likewise
adverts to the decision of the Secretary of Natural Resources dated March 17, 1976 on the
private respondent's opposition to the registration of the subject Operations Agreement. It
claims that decision, which had become final upon private respondent's failure to appeal to
the Office of the President, constitutes res judicata to the question of the validity of the
Operations Agreement. Besides, by failing to take seasonable action, private respondent is
guilty of laches in that she has led petitioner Benguet to believe that she was amenable to
the decision of the Secretary of Natural Resources and to incur huge expenses in
connection with the development of the mining claims.
Moreover, petitioner maintains that the action to annul the Deed of Ratification upon which
private respondent thinks the validity of the Operations Agreement necessarily depends,
should have been brought within four (4) years from its execution on December 12, 1974.
Thus, the complaint filed on June 20, 1980 came too late. Cdpr
Lastly, petitioner theorizes that since the action to annul the mining contract necessarily
involves the recovery of possession of the mining claims which are located in Zambales,
venue of the action should have been laid in Zambales.
Private respondent in her Comment, later adopted as her Memorandum, 1 0 confined her
discussion to the issues of jurisdiction and venue, because in her opinion, the other
grounds involve questions of facts entailing the presentation of evidence, which is
premature and improper in a petition for certiorari. 1 1
While admitting that the contract sought to be annulled is a mining contract, private
respondent nonetheless opines that the action for its annulment does not fall under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines. The reason given is that Section 7 (c) of P.D. 1281
contemplates a mining contract, valid and binding in 11 respects, but either the
claimowner or operator refuses to comply with its terms and conditions. In the case at bar,
the contract is null and void because of the mental incapacity of the late Celestino Dizon to
execute the Deed of Ratification on the validity of which the validity of the Operations
Agreement is in turn dependent. Thus, the principal issue in this case is not whether or not
the claimowner or operator refuses to comply with the contract's terms and conditions,
but rather the mental capacity of the attorney-in-fact to execute a prior agreement upon
which the Operations Agreement is based. It is claimed that the Bureau of Mines and Geo-
Sciences is not equipped to determine the question of mental capacity.
Anent the issue of venue, private respondent contends that the case does not affect title to
or possession of real property, and therefore, is not a real action but an action in
personam, for which venue is laid in the residence of the plaintiff.
"(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the
claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof."
Analyzing the objectives of P.D. 1281, particularly said Section 7 thereof, the Court in Twin
Peaks Mining Association, 1 3 the case relied upon by petitioner, noted that the trend is to
make the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter. This observation
was reiterated in the more recent case of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corp.
vs. Court of Appeals. 1 4
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the subject agreement is a mining contract and
private respondent, in seeking a judicial declaration of its nullity, does not wish to abide by
its terms and conditions. These elements alone bring the action within the ambit of
Section 7 of P.D. 1281. Whatever the basis for the refusal to abide by the contract's terms
and conditions, the basic issue remains one of its cancellation, which is precisely what P.D.
No. 1281 places within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Bureau. llcd
The reason underlying such refusal is indeed an irrelevant matter insofar as jurisdictional
competence is concerned, for to make jurisdiction dependent thereon would not only be
"ratifying two judicial bodies exercising jurisdiction over an essentially the same subject
matter — a situation analogous to split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice" 1 5 but also clearly ignoring the object of P.D. 1281 to make the
adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter.
And if, perchance the law did intend to split jurisdiction, it could have done so by providing
exceptions to par. (c), Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281. Not having done so, there can be no
justification for restricting or limiting the Bureau's jurisdiction over "actions for
cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the
claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof."
In the light of our ruling that the jurisdiction over private respondent's action to annul the
Operations Agreement pertaining to the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences rather than the
regional trial court, the question of venue becomes immaterial.
Considering further that the other issues raised by petitioner, namely res judicata, laches
and prescription are factual matters which are not only improper in a petition for certiorari
but which, more importantly, petitioner failed to substantiate, no ruling on these issues
need be made.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of March 26, 1982 and
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
June 20, 1983 are set aside and Civil Case No. Q-30171 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch XCVII, is ordered DISMISSED. This decision is immediately executory.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
2. Rollo, p. 43.
3. Ibid., pp. 46-60.
14. G.R. No. 54305, February 14, 1990, 182 SCRA 166.
15. Atlas Consolidated Mining & Dev't. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, Ibid., citing Gonzales vs.
Province of Iloilo, 38 SCRA 209 (1971).