Coalition for Good Governance

7035 Marching Duck Dr. E504

Charlotte, NC 28210
704 552 1618
[email protected]

Dear Commissioners:

Thank you for your service to Georgia voters by participating in this public process
to review the options and considerations for a future verifiable, auditable voting
system for Georgia. There is no doubt that much work lies ahead for the
Commission, and your willingness to volunteer your time to this essential public
policy effort is greatly appreciated.

We note that the first meeting agenda is primarily focused the history and
description of the current Diebold Accu-Vote system, some components of which
have been in use since 2002. While Coalition for Good Governance and our
members are critical of the paperless DRE elements of the system, we wish to note
that there are acceptable and usable components of Georgia’s voting system that
can secure the state’s elections beginning this year.

As you know, there are three primary components of the Diebold system in current
use:
--the electronic touchscreens (DREs) used in the polling places (Accu-vote TS, and
TSx);
--the optical scanners used for paper mail-in ballots (Accu-Vote OS);
--the GEMS server (a desktop computer) used for consolidating tabulations,
programming machines, and generating reports of results.)

One component, the paperless DREs, creates the unacceptable security problem in
Georgia’s system. The optical scanners and GEMS servers are nearing the end of
their useful lives, but can be used reliably during a multi-year transition period to
adopt a new voting system to support secure paper ballot elections counted on
optical scanners. In fact, that combination (Accu-Vote optical scanners coupled
with GEMS servers), is likely the most used voting system in the country today.
Thousands of jurisdictions across the country use these two components (Accu-
Vote OS and GEMS) as their primary system for hand-marked paper ballots
counted in the polling place or in a central count operation in the county election
office on Accu-Vote scanners.
Current Diebold system can be used for secure paper ballot elections

Coalition for Good Governance and its Georgia-based members urge you to
discuss the merits of requesting that State Board and Secretary Kemp immediately
sideline the DRE machines and adopt the use of hand-marked paper ballots to be
scanned by currently owned optical scanners for the conduct of the November
2018 mid-terms and near term future elections. We are not recommending the use
of Diebold Accu-vote optical scan system as a new long term voting solution, but
merely as a low risk, low cost transition plan that permits maximum flexibility and
the security of paper ballots as deliberate thoughtful analysis is brought to bear by
this Commission in recommending which new systems and election system
infrastructure are right for Georgia longer term.

In short, we propose that each county be given the option to adopt one of the
following methods of paper ballot elections for November. All are authorized by
Georgia’s election code. We have previously communicated this suggestion to
Secretary Kemp and the State Election Board.

1. Precinct optical scanning of paper ballots

(a) Method: voters hand-mark paper ballots and insert the ballots into
the Accu-Vote optical scanners of the type currently in use for
paper ballots. Votes are tabulated by the optical scanners at the
polling location after polls close, and the tabulated results are
posted on the door of the polling place. (Because votes are
tabulated on one polling place scanner, results are determined far
more quickly and efficiently than the current tabulation from
numerous DREs.) The tabulated results are securely transported
from the polling location to the county election office by hand
delivery of the memory cards and results tapes along with all
balloting materials. Unofficial preliminary results can be
immediately emailed to the county election office using digital
photos of the results tapes, while awaiting the election night hand
delivery of the secured original records.

(b) Statutory authority: O.C.G.A. §21-2-483(a). This is the best

overall solution, and is the method that Georgia used prior to the
2002 implementation of the DREs. Specific procedures are
provided in Title 21, Chapter 2, Article 11 Part 5, and security
 requirements can be updated and strengthened by promulgation of
Election Board Rules.

2. Central count optical scanning of paper ballots

(a) Method: voters hand-mark paper ballots and cast them into
traditional secured ballot boxes at the polling locations. After polls
close, the locked boxes are securely transported to the county
elections office for ballot counting and reporting using the
currently-owned and state-approved Accu-Vote OS scanners.
(Mid-day deliveries could also be made, so that election day
tabulation can begin during the afternoon.) Vote totals for each
precinct and the county would be consolidated by the county
Elections Department and reported to the public and the Secretary
of State using the current GEMS election management system.
Although “precinct scan” (described in 1 above) is preferable from
a security perspective, the central count method may be
temporarily attractive to counties concerned about training enough
precinct workers to use a scanner in each polling place.

(b) Statutory authority: O.C.G.A.§ 21-2-483(a). Specific procedures

are provided in Title 21, Chapter 2, Article 11 Part 5, and security
requirements can be updated and strengthened by promulgation of
Election Board Rules.

3. Traditional hand-counted paper ballots

(a) Method: Voters hand-mark paper ballots, casting them in a

traditional secured ballot box. The ballots are manually counted
by teams of poll workers in the neighborhood precincts,
typically within two hours of the closing of the polls. Unofficial
results could be immediately transmitted by an emailed digital
photo of the precinct tally sheets, to be immediately followed
by Election Night hand delivery of the secured original tally
sheets, ballots, and election records to the county Election
Board. This is an easily implementable alternative, particularly
in smaller population counties. Hand counted elections are
routinely conducted in Georgia in some municipalities.
 (b) Statutory authority: O.C.G.A.§21-2-280. Numerous Georgia
municipalities employ hand counted paper ballots routinely for
all municipal elections with detailed procedures are provided by
Title 21, Chapter 2, Article 11, Part 2.

2018 conversion is feasible, economical and mitigates risks

The state currently owns approximately 1,000 Diebold Accu-Vote scanners,---

more than enough to use in central scanning operations. Additionally, other
jurisdictions that have upgraded their scanners have hundreds of Diebold Accu-
vote scanners available for loan to Georgia, should they be needed.

Georgia already owns the software licenses, and every county has Accu-vote
scanner know-how because they use it in every election for paper mail and
provisional ballots.

A paper ballot election will naturally cost considerably less than current elections
using DREs because of the low labor cost of paper ballots and optical scanners
versus the high labor cost of programming, securing, transporting, set up, shut-
down, etc. of the nearly 30,000 touchscreen machines. Paper ballots for every
precinct are already printed in small quantities for provisional and absentee ballots.
Print order quantities merely need to be increased for paper ballot elections. Early
voting centers can be supplied with widely used economical Ballot On Demand
printers to print only the ballot styles as needed in early voting locations.

Other states which have made this conversion from DREs to paper ballots, such as
Maryland in 2016, and most recently Virginia, found very little training time was
required for pollworkers to issue more paper ballots at the polls. Pollworkers are
already trained for paper ballot issuance and security measures required with
provisional ballots.

In summary, converting to hand-marked paper ballots counted by existing Accu-

vote optical scanners can create a secure, verifiable election in November. The
costs are less than conducting DRE-based elections, and the conversion effort is
quite manageable.

Looking beyond 2018, making this conversion to paper ballots and optical
scanners now permits a more thoughtful lower-risk conversion to new voting
systems in the future, while maintaining verifiable paper ballot elections in all
counties during a new system conversion period. A phased-in plan can be adopted
to avoid a high risk 159 county simultaneous conversion.

While we appreciate the fact that the goal of this Commission is to make
recommendations for future voting systems for Georgia, we believe that this
proposed transition plan is relevant to a pathway to support your goals, and urge
your prompt consideration of this transition plan to recommend to the state’s
election officials for immediate implementation.

Complying with federal law

Additionally, we are pleased that the Commission will consider voting system
legal mandates, such as HAVA and EAC minimum requirements, during the initial
meeting. Georgia’s non-compliance with federal and state voting systems law is an
area too long overlooked. Please consider HAVA’s fundamental requirements for a
paper audit trail that became mandatory for all federal elections in 2006. (Exhibit
1) See Exhibits 2 and 3 for the EAC interpretation of the paper record and manual
audit capacity requirement, making it clear that a voting system must provide a
paper record that can be used for a manual recount. Georgia’s DREs clearly violate
this most basic requirement.

Georgia’s DRE machines do not comply with federal law, nor is the state
responsive to the urgent warnings from Congress and DHS that paperless election
systems are a national security risk. (https://goo.gl/cRNtXM)

By immediate conversion to the use of Georgia’s currently owned Accu-vote

Optical Scan components, the state can immediately comply with federal law, state
law, and provide a secure, verifiable November election that rebuilds the
confidence of Georgia electors.

Please contact us if we can provide you with additional information.

Sincerely,

Marilyn Marks
Executive Director
 Exhibit
APPENDIX1 A
EXCERPTS FROM HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 (HAVA) AND ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
(EAC) ADVISORY 2005-004

TITLE III--UNIFORM AND NONDISCRIMINATORY ELECTION TECHNOLOGY AND ADMINISTRATION

REQUIREMENTS

SEC. 301. <<NOTE: 42 USC 15481.>> VOTING SYSTEMS STANDARDS.

a. Requirements.--Each voting system used in an election for Federal office shall meet the following requirements:
1. In general.--
A. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the voting system (including any lever voting system,
optical scanning voting system, or direct recording electronic system) shall--
i. permit the voter to verify (in a private and independent manner) the votes selected by the
voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted;
ii. provide the voter with the opportunity (in a private and independent manner) to change
the ballot or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted (including the
opportunity to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter
was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error); and
iii. if the voter selects votes for more than one candidate for a single office--
I. notify the voter that the voter has selected more than one candidate for a single
office on the ballot;
II. notify the voter before the ballot is cast and counted of the effect of casting
multiple votes for the office; and
III. provide the voter with the opportunity to correct the ballot before the ballot is cast
and counted.
B. A State or jurisdiction that uses a paper ballot voting system, a punch card voting system, or a
central count voting system (including mail-in absentee ballots and mail-in ballots), may meet the
requirements of subparagraph (A)(iii) by--
i. establishing a voter education program specific to that voting system that notifies
each voter of the effect of casting multiple votes for an office; and
ii. providing the voter with instructions on how to correct the ballot before it is cast and
counted (including instructions on how to correct the error through the issuance of a
replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any
error).
C. The voting system shall ensure that any notification required under this paragraph preserves the
privacy of the voter and the confidentiality of the ballot.
2. Audit capacity.--
A. In general.--The voting system shall produce a record with an audit capacity for such system.
B. Manual audit capacity.--
See EAC advisory . The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity
on audit capacity at for such system.
Exhibits 2 and 3. i. The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity to change the ballot or
correct any error before the permanent paper record is produced.
ii. The paper record produced under subparagraph (A) shall be available as an official
record for any recount conducted with respect to any election in which the system is
used.
3. Accessibility for individuals with disabilities.--The voting system shall--
A. be accessible for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind and
visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation
(including privacy and independence) as for other voters;
B. satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) through the use of at least one direct recording
electronic voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each
polling place; and
C. if purchased with funds made available under title II on or after January 1, 2007, meet the voting
system standards for disability access (as outlined in this paragraph).
4. Alternative language accessibility.--The voting system shall provide alternative language accessibility
pursuant to the requirements of section 203 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973aa-1a).
 5. Error rates.--The error rate of the voting system in counting ballots (determined by taking into account
only those errors which are attributable to the voting system and not attributable to an act of the voter)
shall comply with the error rate standards established under section 3.2.1 of the voting systems standards
issued by the Federal Election Commission which are in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
6. Uniform definition of what constitutes a vote.--Each State shall adopt uniform and nondiscriminatory
standards that define what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote for each category of
voting system used in the State.
b. Voting System Defined.--In this section, the term ``voting system'' means--
1. the total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the software,
firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support the equipment) that is used--
A. to define ballots;
B. to cast and count votes;
C. to report or display election results; and
D. to maintain and produce any audit trail information; and
2. the practices and associated documentation used--
A. to identify system components and versions of such components;
B. to test the system during its development and maintenance;
C. to maintain records of system errors and defects;
D. to determine specific system changes to be made to a system after the initial qualification of the
system; and
E. to make available any materials to the voter (such as notices, instructions, forms, or paper
ballots).
c. Construction.--
1. In general.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a State or jurisdiction which used a
particular type of voting system in the elections for Federal office held in November 2000 from using the
same type of system after the effective date of this section, so long as the system meets or is modified to
meet the requirements of this section.
2. Protection of paper ballot voting systems.--For purposes of subsection (a)(1)(A)(i), the term ``verify'' may
not be defined in a manner that makes it impossible for a paper ballot voting system to meet the
requirements of such subsection or to be modified to meet such requirements.
d. Effective Date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this section on
and after January 1, 2006.
 Exhibit 2

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

1225 New York Ave. NW – Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005

Requirements for HAVA compliance

July 20, 2005

EAC Advisory 2005-004: How to determine if a voting system is compliant

with Section 301(a) – a gap analysis between 2002
Voting System Standards and the requirements of
Section 301(a)

The United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has received a

number of inquiries from several states as to whether one or more particular voting
systems comply with Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).
In addition, in one of its recent public meetings, EAC was asked to conduct an
analysis to identify the gaps between the 2002 Voting System Standards adopted by
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and the requirements for voting systems
under Section 301(a) of HAVA. EAC is not required by HAVA to preclear or
approve voting systems purchased by states and local election jurisdictions.
Furthermore, EAC does not believe that it was the intention of Congress or HAVA
for EAC to assume this role. However, it is evident that states and local election
jurisdictions as well as testing laboratories are in need of information that will help
in determining whether a voting system meets the threshold requirements of
Section 301(a). Thus, EAC offers the following analysis of Section 301(a) in light of
the 2002 Voting System Standards.

Title III of HAVA, entitled “Uniform and Nondiscriminatory Election

Technology and Administration Requirements,” imposes certain requirements upon
states and local jurisdictions conducting federal elections. Section 301(a) sets forth
the standards that voting systems must meet after January 1, 2006. Those
requirements include functions and features that, among other things: (1) allow the
voter to review his or her selections privately and independently prior to casting a
ballot; (2) allow the voter to change his or her selections privately and
independently prior to casting a ballot; (3) notify the voter when he or she has made Georgia's
more selections in a single race than are permitted (overvote); (4) provide for the DREs provide
no paper
production of a permanent paper record suitable to be used in a manual recount; (5) records of
provide voters with disabilities, including visual disabilities, the same opportunity votes to be
for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other recounted.

voters; (6) provide accessibility in minority languages for voters with limited
English proficiency as required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965; and (7) provide for

1
an error rate in operating the voting system that is no greater than the error rate
set forth in Section 3.2.1 of the 2002 Voting System Standards adopted by the
Federal Election Commission (FEC).

Although the 2002 Voting System Standards set forth measurable standards
that predict compliance with some of the Section 301(a) requirements, those
standards do not provide sufficient and adequate guidance as to what is required to
meet the accessibility requirements of Section 301(a)(3); do not prescribe testable
measures for language accessibility required by Section 301(a)(4) of HAVA; and do
not prescribe standards that adequately explain the requirements for overvote
notification required by Section 301(a)(1) of HAVA. As such, EAC issues the
following policy statement to identify the gaps between the 2002 Voting System
Standards and the requirements set forth under Section 301(a) of HAVA and to
explain what is needed to meet the requirements of Section 301(a) above and
beyond the testing requirements established in the 2002 Voting System Standards.

Section 301(a)(1):

The requirements of Section 301(a)(1) of HAVA are met if the voting system
(1) conforms and complies with Section 2.4.3.3 of the 2002 Voting System Standards
and (2) notifies the voter through a visual and/or audio message prior to casting the
ballot when the voter makes more selections than are legally allowed in a single
race or contest (overvote):

(a) that an overvote has occurred and

(b) the effect of overvoting.

Following that notification, the voting system must allow the voter to change his or
her selection(s), if so desired. Voting systems that preclude and prohibit overvoting
meet this requirement. Notwithstanding the above, certain paper ballot voting
systems may meet the overvote requirements of Section 301(a)(1)(A)(iii) of HAVA by
meeting the requirements set forth in Section 301(a)(1)(B).

Section 301(a)(2):

The requirements of Section 301(a)(2) of HAVA are met if the voting system
conforms and complies with Sections 2.2.5.2.1 and 2.5.3.1 of the 2002 Voting System
Standards.

Section 301(a)(3):

Section 301(a)(3) of HAVA requires that by January 1, 2006, at least one

voting system in each polling place be accessible to persons with disabilities such
that the voting system allows an individual with a disability the same access and

2
opportunity to vote privately and independently as is afforded a non-disabled voter.
Compliance with Section 301(a)(3) requires that the voting system is accessible to
persons with disabilities as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act,
including physical, visual, and cognitive disabilities, such that the disabled
individual can privately and independently receive instruction, make selections,
and cast a ballot. However, accessibility involves more than the technical features
of the voting system. The accessible voting system also must be used in a manner
that is consistent with providing access for disabled voters (e.g., the accessible
voting system must be set up for use in a space that is accessible to a disabled voter
who uses a wheelchair).

Conformance with Section 301(a)(3) is a complex matter, which must take

into account the disability of the voter, the advancement of technology and its
availability, and the efforts of the elections officials to make the voting process
accessible to disabled voters in a private and independent manner. The following
are some factors that must be considered in determining accessibility in
conformance with Section 301(a)(3) of HAVA:

(1) Section 2.2.7 of the 2002 Voting System Standards;

(2) Section 2.4.3.1 (a) of the 2002 Voting System Standards;
(3) Section 3.4.9 (a-e) of the 2002 Voting System Standards;
(4) The voting system must afford a disabled voter the ability to perform the
same functions (e.g., receiving and reading the ballot, making selections,
reviewing selections, changing selections, and casting the final ballot) as
are afforded to a non-disabled voter. These functions may be provided to
the disabled voter through features of the voting system that are different
than those used by non-disabled voters. The disabled voter need not and
in many cases cannot have an identical voting experience as a non-
disabled voter (e.g., a voter with a visual disability is afforded the same
access to reading the ballot as a sighted voter when the ballot is read to
the visually disabled voter using an audio component of the voting
system).
(5) Accessibility of the voting system to the voter includes accessibility to all
equipment needed to cast and count ballots. Many jurisdictions use a
paper ballot voting system that requires the voter to submit his or her
own ballot after casting for purposes of ballot counting. Where such
voting systems are in use, such jurisdictions must to the extent reasonably
and technologically possible afford a disabled voter the same ability to
submit his or her own ballot, in a private and independent manner, as is
afforded a non-disabled voter. In this example, visually disabled voters
must be allowed to submit the ballot independently, as the disability is
one that is capable of being accommodated, and technology and practice
provide a means that can be used to allow the visually disabled voter to

3
 submit a ballot with the same degree of privacy and independence
afforded to a sighted voter (e.g., a privacy sleeve).
(6) There may be certain disabled voters whose disabilities prevent them
from voting independently (i.e., without assistance from a person of their
choosing or a poll worker). While HAVA requires voting systems to allow
independence and privacy, it does not preclude a disabled voter from
requesting and obtaining the assistance of another person as provided in
Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
(7) Section 301(a)(3)(B) contemplates that an accessible voting system can
include a direct recording electronic (DRE) voting system or other voting
system equipped for individuals with disabilities. This advisory should
not be read to preclude the innovation and use of accessible voting
systems other than DREs for purposes of meeting this requirement.

Section 301(a)(4):

The minority language requirements of Section 301(a)(4) are met if the voting
system complies with the minority language requirements of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (contained in Section 203 as well as Section 4(f)(4)) and the implementing
regulations found at 28 C.F.R. Part 55 and 67 F.R. 48871 (July 26, 2002). The
voting system must provide all information, excluding the names of the candidates,
that would otherwise be provided by the voting system in English (whether written
or oral) in the language(s) that the voting jurisdiction is required to provide
materials pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its regulations as
referenced above.

Section 301(a)(5):

The requirements of Section 301(a)(5) are met if the voting system error rate
does not exceed that established in Section 3.2.1 of the 2002 Voting System
Standards.

Gracia Hillman, Chair Paul DeGregorio, Vice Chairman

Ray Martinez III , Commissioner

4
 Exhibit 3

U.S. Election Assistance Commission

1225 New York Ave. - Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005

While addressing lever machines, EAC

defines the paper record/audit capacity
September 8, 2005
need.

EAC Advisory 2005-005: Lever Voting Machines and HA VA Section 301(a)

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has recently received numerous inquiries
regarding whether lever voting machines meet the requirements of Section 301(a) of the Help
America Vote Act (HAVA) (42 U.S.C. §15481). After careful review of HA VA Section 30l(a),
the EAC concludes that lever voting systems have significant barriers which make compliance
with Section 301(a) difficult and unlikely. 1

HAVA does not specifically outlaw the use oflever machines, per se. However, the statute
does require that the voting system meet the standards found in HAVA Section 30l(a). 2 This
section, titled Voting Systems Standards, sets minimum statutory requirements all voting systems
must meet if they are to be used in an election for Federal office. In applying these requirements
to lever voting machines, the EAC has identified a number of areas which create compliance
problems for these voting systems. These areas of non-compliance would have to be addressed
and remedied before a lever system could be lawfully used in an election for Federal office on or
after January 1, 2006. EAC's concerns are fourfold.

Audit Capacity. Section 301(a) requires that all voting systems used in an election for Federal
office "produce a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity ... " (HAVA Section
301(a)(2)(B)(i)). This paper record must be available for use as an official record in recount
proceedings. (HAVA Section 301(a)(2)(B)(iii)). While most lever machines in use today do not
have the capability to produce a paper record, a few systems have the facility to create a limited
record. Such systems can record the total number of votes cast on a given machine by imprinting
the raised numbers on the counters at the close of an election.

Clearly, those lever voting systems that are not capable of producing a paper record are not As well, DRE
in compliance with HAVA Section 301 (a)(2)(B). Similarly, it is the position of the EAC that machines do
not provide
those machines which produce a limited paper record (documenting only vote totals) also do not
anything other
meet these requirements. HA VA makes it clear that the reason it requires a paper record trail is to than vote totals.

1
The EAC is the Federal agency charged with the administration of HA VA. HAVA requires the Commission to draft
guidance to assist states in their implementation of Section 301(a). Although EAC's administrative interpretations do
not have the force of law associated with legislative rules, the Supreme Court has long held that the interpretations of
agencies charged with the administration of a statute are to be given deferential treatment by Courts when faced with
issues of statutory construction. York v. Secretary of Treasury. 774 F. 2d 417, 419 - 420 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing
Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 - 154 (1963)); See also Christian v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000); Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 122 S. Ct. 1145 (2002).
2
A State's acceptance or repudiation of Federal Funds to replace lever machines under HA VA Section 102 in no way
affects its obligation to meet minimum voting system requirements under RAVA Section 301(a).
ensure all voting systems create a permanent, manually auditable record for use in a recount.
(HAVA Section 30l(a)(2)(B)(i) and (iii)). Given these facts, to meet HAVA's Audit Capacity
requirement, systems must create a paper record that can serve as an audit trail. In other words,
the document must be a "chain of evidence connecting . . summary results to original
transactions." 3 A document is not an appropriate audit tool when it is, itself, a summary that
cannot show the original actions that make up its whole.

Error Rate. Section 30l(a) requires that all voting systems have a test error rate that complies
with error rate requirements "established under Section 3 .2.1 of the voting systems standards
issued by the Federal Election Commission, which are in effect on the date of the enactment of
[HAVA]." (HAVA Section 30l(a)(5)). That standard (in testing) is a maximum of one error for
every 500,000 ballot positions. 4 Thus, in order to comply with HAVA Section 301 (a), a voting
system must have a tested error rate that falls below the one per 500,000 standard. The EAC is
unaware of any lever voting system that has a documented, tested error rate. A lever voting
system cannot meet the requirements of Section 30l(a)(5) without a documented, tested error rate
that meets the one per 500,000 standard.

Alternative Language Accessibility. Section 30l(a) requires voting systems provide alternative
language accessibility pursuant to the requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. §
1973aa-la). While lever voting systems are capable of providing ballots in more than one
language, the number of languages such systems may present is limited. Election officials must
ensure that the number of languages a particular lever voting system can accommodate meets the
number of alternative languages required in a given jurisdiction by the Voting Rights Act.

Accessibility for Individuals with Disabilities. Section 30l(a) requires that, at a minimum,
election officials provide at least one voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at
each polling place. Such systems must provide disabled individuals the same opportunity for
access (including privacy and independence) as other voters. {HAVA Section 301(a)(3)). The
EAC is unaware of any lever voting system that is presently capable of meeting the disability
standards in Section 30l(a)(3). No system may be used exclusively at a polling place unless it
complies with Section 30l(a)(3).

(\~~,,_It~
o l: a Hillman
Chair

f-rJt~
Ray Martinez III
i!l,J~
Jt,7,L
Donetta Davidson
Commissioner Commissioner

3
"Audit trail" as defined in Black's Law Dictionary 131 (6th ed. 1990).
4
Voluntary Voting System Standards, Volume I: Performance Standards, Federal Election Commission (April 2002),
Section 3 .2.1.