Coalition Proposed Third Amended Complaint

Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 160-1 Filed 04/04/18 Page 1 of 74
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
)
)
DONNA CURLING, ET AL. )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) Civil Action
v. ) No. 1:17-cv-02989-AT
)
BRIAN KEMP, ET AL. )
)
Defendants. )
)
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFFS COALITION FOR

GOOD GOVERNANCE, LAURA DIGGES, WILLIAM DIGGES III,
RICARDO DAVIS, AND MEGAN MISSETT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................1
II. PARTIES .........................................................................................................10
A. PLAINTIFFS ...............................................................................................10
1. Plaintiff Coalition for Good Governance .................................................10
2. Plaintiff Individuals Who Are Members of Coalition (the “Member

Plaintiffs”) ........................................................................................................12
3. Former Plaintiff Individuals. ....................................................................13
4. Plaintiff Individuals Who Are Not Now Members of Coalition (the

“Non-Member Plaintiffs”) ...............................................................................13
B. DEFENDANTS ...........................................................................................14
1. Defendant Secretary. ................................................................................14
2. Defendant State Board Members. ............................................................15
3. Defendants Fulton Board Members. ........................................................17
4. All Other Previously Named Defendants Are Now Dismissed Without

Prejudice...........................................................................................................18
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE .....................................................................18
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................19
ii
A. The United States Constitution ...................................................................19
B. The Georgia Constitution ............................................................................20
C. The Georgia Election Code .........................................................................20
D. Georgia’s Regulation of Elections ..............................................................24
V. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS ..........................................................................25
A. How Georgia’s Voting System Works. .......................................................25
B. AccuVote DREs Are Insecure and Vulnerable to Malicious Hacking. ......29
C. AccuVote DREs Fail to Provide Absolute Secrecy of the Ballot. ..............33
D. Security Breaches at KSU and CES Have Further Compromised Georgia’s

Voting System. .....................................................................................................34
VI. SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS ..........................................................................38
A. Conduct of All Defendants—Past and Threatened .....................................38
B. Conduct of Defendant Secretary—Past and Threatened.............................41
C. Conduct of Defendant State Board Members—Threatened .......................44
D. Conduct of Defendant Fulton Board Members—Past and Threatened. .....44
E. Standing of Plaintiff Coalition ....................................................................50
1. Coalition Has Organizational Standing Derived from Past and
Threatened Direct Injuries to Coalition. ..........................................................50
iii
2. Coalition Has Associational Standing Derived from Past and Threatened

Injuries to Coalition’s Members. .....................................................................53
VII. CLAIMS ......................................................................................................62
COUNT I: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO VOTE .............................................62
COUNT II: EQUAL PROTECTION .................................................................65
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ..........................................................................................67
iv
Plaintiffs Coalition for Good Governance (“Coalition”), Laura Digges,
William Digges, Ricardo Davis, and Megan Missett (the “Coalition Plaintiffs”),
for their Third Amended Complaint, allege as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This Third Amended Complaint is being filed at a time when virtually
every American voter has come to understand that the nation’s election
infrastructure is susceptible to malicious manipulation from local and foreign
threats. Yet, Georgia’s election officials continue to defend the State’s electronic
voting system that is demonstrably unreliable and insecure, and have repeatedly
refused to take administrative, regulatory or legislative action to address the
election security failures.
2. This is a civil rights action for declaratory and injunctive relief
brought against Georgia elections officials who have adopted—and who require
Georgia voters to use, as a condition of being able to cast a ballot in their polling
places—the State’s direct recording electronic voting machines (“DREs”) as the
means of casting their ballot. Because Georgia’s DRE touchscreen voting
machines are insecure, lack a voter-verified paper audit capacity, fail to meet
minimum statutory requirements, and expose voters to being deprived of the ability
to cast a “secret ballot,” Ga. Const. Art. II, § 1, ¶ 1, requiring voters to use those
1
machines violates the voters’ constitutional rights to have their votes recorded in a
fair, precise, verifiable, and anonymous manner, and to have their votes counted
and reported in an accurate, auditable, legal, and transparent process.
3. “The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the
essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart
of representative government.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). The
secret ballot—“the hard-won right to vote one’s conscience without fear of
retaliation”—is a cornerstone of this right to freely vote for one’s electoral choices.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 (1995).
4. The Coalition Plaintiffs challenge Georgia’s use of DREs in the May
2018 and November 2018 General Elections; in any Runoff or Special Elections
and in any of the numerous other elections, including special elections and runoffs
for vacancies, that will be conducted in Georgia during 2018 (collectively, the
“Relevant Upcoming Elections”).1 Without this Court’s intervention, the flawed
and legally deficient DRE voting units will be used to conduct these elections,
causing the true results of these elections to be uncertain. The continued use of
unreliable un-auditable voting machines has a deleterious impact on the
1
See Georgia Secretary of State, 2018 Elections and Voter Registration Calendar,
http://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/2018_elections_and_voter_registration_calendar (last
visited Apr. 2, 2018).
2
governance of the State and its jurisdictions, when voters have increasing reasons
to lose confidence in the stated election results. Since the action was initially filed
in Fulton County Superior Court on July 3, 2017, the State and its counties and
municipalities have continued to conduct scores of regularly scheduled and special
elections. For example, on November 7, 2017, WAGA reported on the results of
over 400 races in North Georgia alone.2 There have been at least 12 special state
legislative races and 5 runoffs since this case was filed. In addition to the May
primary election, a July special election and primary run-off election are scheduled
prior to the November general election.
5. The Coalition Plaintiffs seek to have the Relevant Upcoming
Elections conducted using verifiable paper ballots. The paper ballots may be
counted using Georgia’s currently owned and certified optical scanning system or,
alternatively, counted by hand. Both voting methods are feasible and authorized by
Georgia’s election statutes.
6. The relief requested is especially critical since Plaintiff Coalition and
its members have found the doors to Georgia’s ballot counting rooms locked,
leaving them unable to watch how Georgia’s elections are conducted, despite the
2
See Fox 5 News, Results from more than 400 races across north Georgia,
http://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/georgia-heads-to-the-polls-tuesday-for-municipal-elections
(last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
3
obligation of Georgia’s election officials under O.C.G.A. § 21–2–406 to “perform
their duties in public.”
7. By this Third Amended Complaint, the Coalition Plaintiffs seek to
remedy Georgia’s unreliable, insecure and unverifiable election methods. This
Third Amended Complaint is filed in an environment of alarming national news
concerning the vulnerability of our country’s election infrastructure. Georgia is
frequently reported in the media as being the most populous of only five (5) states
in the country that continue to utilize unverifiable electronic voting statewide.
Admonitions from authorities regarding the serious risks of paperless electronic
voting machines are escalating as the 2018 mid-term elections approach.
Meanwhile, those in Georgia with the political power to remedy the situation have
done nothing.
8. Locally, Atlanta residents recently have been reminded of the very
real disruption that cyber-attacks on government computer systems can create as
they are experiencing loss of some City of Atlanta services following a
ransomware attack on March 22, 2018. Atlanta city government is still reeling
from the attack at the time of this filing. There is no rational reason to believe that
the current voting system, run on outdated computers using outdated operating
systems, could defend against such an attack in the 2018 elections.
4
9. On March 20, 2018, the United States Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence issued initial recommendations on election security, including a
“minimum” standard of a voter-verified paper trail.3 The recommendation to use
paper ballots with post-election audits echoed the nearly universal warnings of
voting system experts over the last fifteen years. National and local media reports
have repeatedly described officials’ concerns of immediate cybersecurity risk of
undetected system compromises. It is universally acknowledged that voting
machines, tabulation computers, voter registration records, and ballot provisioning
systems are exposed to cybersecurity threats in most jurisdictions at unacceptable
levels. Making the situation worse still, the use of an electronic voting system
without independent paper records of voter intent makes it all but impossible for
election officials to detect attacks when they have occurred. These factors render
our elections, particularly elections involving Georgia’s un-auditable voting
system, increasingly attractive targets for foreign adversaries. Meanwhile, Georgia
3
The Select Committee determined that, “States should rapidly replace outdated and vulnerable
voting systems. At a minimum, any machine purchased going forward should have a voter-
verified paper trail and no WiFi capability.” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Russian Targeting Of Election Infrastructure During The 2016 Election,
https://www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/One-
Pager%20Recs%20FINAL%20VERSION%203-20.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
5
has demonstrated a conscious disregard for these threats and a lack of interest in
solving the problem, impacting every voter in the State of Georgia.
10. Despite the constant drum-beat of warnings coming from the federal
government, technology experts, security experts, the media, and voters, Georgia’s
General Assembly closed its 2017–18 session on March 29, 2018, having
specifically debated the issue in the proposed Senate Bill 403 (“SB403”) but
without ultimately enacting that bill or any other palliative measure. Georgia’s
legislature thus has done nothing to improve an election infrastructure that is
widely recognized as one of the least secure in the country.
11. In August 2016, the State of Georgia experienced massive security
breaches exposing critical vulnerabilities in its centralized election computer
operations--weaknesses so pervasive as to expose every voting machine and
tabulating program in the State to the risk of undetectable malware. Yet Georgia’s
General Assembly declined to act on voting system and election security issues
during both the 2017 and the 2018 legislative sessions.
12. While SB403 acknowledged some of the problems afflicting
Georgia’s voting system, the proposed legislation failed to address what is required
to remedy the problem. Crucially, though its proponents called the bill a “paper
ballot” bill, SB403 did not require hand-marked auditable paper ballots. Instead,
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SB403 sought to authorize a new type of unverifiable electronic voting system
technology that, while favored by Defendant Secretary of State Brian Kemp and
the bill’s sponsors, was roundly criticized by experts as an insecure, dangerously
hackable, high-risk technology.
13. Strangely, while SB403’s provisions authorized limited post-election
audits, state legislative races would have been exempted from required audits
altogether. The General Assembly demonstrated its clear preference for continuing
use of unverifiable voting systems in its deliberations and ultimately failed to
address the imminent threats to the electoral process looming with the 2018 mid-
term elections.
14. On March 23, 2018, during the legislative session, the U.S. Election
Assistance Commission announced that, “Georgia would receive $10.3 million in
federal grants from the recently signed fiscal 2018 government spending bill,
combined with $515,000 in matching funds from the State” for the purpose
of “upgrad[ing] its voting machines and mak[ing] other security improvements
ahead of the upcoming elections.”4 Even with immediate funding available,
4
Tamar Hallerman & Mark Niesse, Feds to give Georgia $10 million to upgrade outdated
voting machines, Atlanta Journal Constitution, 2018, https://www.myajc.com/news/state--
regional-govt--politics/feds-give-georgia-million-upgrade-outdated-voting-
machines/B8IbGwxNJxtPFloEXn4aIL/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
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lawmakers chose to do nothing to improve the State’s election security. A simple
joint resolution requesting that the State Election Board use its authority to
dedicate a very small portion of such funding to further deploy the currently
authorized and state-owned paper ballot systems would have signaled lawmakers’
desire to implement a verifiable voting system, but the legislature decline to take
even that modest step.
15. Defendant State Election Board has known of the massive August
2016 security breaches and vulnerabilities of the election system for over a year,
and since this action was filed in July 2017, has known of the specific allegations
in this litigation concerning the failures of the election system. Despite having the
authority to require Georgia’s elections to be conducted using paper ballots
counted by optical scanners—widely considered the best practice by voting system
experts—and despite having the equipment and software licenses necessary to do
so, the State Board has taken no action to mandate the use of paper ballots to
protect Georgia’s elections. Instead, the State Board has maintained its Election
Rule 183–1–12–.01 mandating touchscreen voting machines for in-person voting.
16. As explained in this Complaint, and as will be demonstrated by the
Coalition Plaintiffs, the State possesses not only the authority, but the equipment,
software licenses and know-how to immediately transition to paper ballots. The
8
required optical scan equipment is already used for current mail-in paper-ballot
processing. The security and reliability that would result from deploying the
currently available paper-ballot system far outweighs the administrative
inconvenience of converting to hand-marked paper ballots to be counted by
existing equipment.
17. The State of Georgia and its officials have the legal, moral, and ethical
obligation to secure the State’s electoral system. Sadly—and inexplicably—they
appear to lack the will to do so. When the political branches have failed to secure
fundamental rights in our country, it has traditionally been the Courts that stepped
in to do so. In a free society, no right is more precious or important than the right
to vote. When the exercise of that right is corrupted, the integrity of the
democratic process is corrupted, and the legitimacy of our government suffers as
the inevitable consequence. If the right to vote in this society is essential to the
integrity of democratic self-governance, then our election processes warrant the
most urgent judicial protection. Plaintiffs seek the intervention of this Court
because neither the State Board of Elections, the Secretary of State, nor the
Georgia General Assembly appear willing to act to protect voters’ rights to a
secure and accurately counted election process.
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II. PARTIES
A. PLAINTIFFS
1. Plaintiff Coalition for Good Governance

18. Plaintiff COALITION FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE is a non-profit
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Colorado.
19. Coalition is a membership organization, with a membership that
consists of individuals residing in Georgia and across the United States.
Individuals become members of Coalition by providing their contact information
and indicating a desire to associate with the organization. Members donate money,
contribute time, and share information and intelligence with the organization to the
extent they are able and wish to do so. Members receive informational
communications from Coalition and can benefit from Coalition’s facilitation of
members’ individual participation in civic activities that are germane to the
organization’s purpose, such as poll watching, auditing election results, and
publishing opinion pieces. Members utilize Coalition as a resource to answer a
wide range of questions about voting rights, voting processes, open meetings law,
public records law, recalls, petition processes, election legislation, and how to
challenge election issues they encounter.
10
20. Coalition’s purpose is to preserve and advance the constitutional
liberties and individual rights of citizens, with an emphasis on preserving and
protecting those private rights of its members that are exercised through public
elections.
21. Coalition serves its purpose in multiple ways, including by providing
information and education to its members; by serving as a non-partisan educational
and informational resource for the public, press, campaigns, candidates, and
political parties; by monitoring nationwide developments in election law and
technology; by providing speakers for events at educational institutions; by
providing commentary from its leadership on election issues; by collaborating in
voting rights and election integrity initiatives with other nonpartisan nonprofits and
academics; by developing and sharing research and investigation of reported
election problems with the press, public and other members of the election-
integrity community; and by facilitating the engagement of members and
prospective members as non-partisan participants in the electoral process through
poll watching, attendance at public meetings, and other civic activities.
22. Coalition, acting on its own behalf, has organizational standing to
bring each of the claims for prospective relief stated herein.
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23. Coalition, acting on behalf of its members who are threatened with
imminent injury-in-fact, including the Member Plaintiffs identified below, also has
associational standing to bring the claims for prospective relief stated herein.
2. Plaintiff Individuals Who Are Members of Coalition

(the “Member Plaintiffs”)
24. Plaintiff LAURA DIGGES (“Ms. Digges”) was a Plaintiff when this
action was initially filed in Fulton County Superior Court on July 3, 2017. (ECF
No. 1-2.) Ms. Digges has been a member of Coalition since June 2017. Ms.
Digges is an elector of the State of Georgia and a resident of Cobb County. Ms.
Digges intends to vote in each of the Relevant Upcoming Elections in Cobb
County.
25. Plaintiff WILLIAM DIGGES III (“Mr. Digges”) was a Plaintiff when
this action was initially filed in Fulton County Superior Court on July 3, 2017.
(ECF No. 1-2.) Mr. Digges has been a member of Coalition since June 2017. Mr.
Digges is an elector of the State of Georgia and a resident of Cobb County. Mr.
Digges intends to vote in each of the Relevant Upcoming Elections in Cobb
County.
26. Plaintiff RICARDO DAVIS (“Davis”) was a Plaintiff when this
action was initially filed in Fulton County Superior Court on July 3, 2017. (ECF
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No. 1-2.) Davis has been a member of Coalition since May 2017. Davis is an
elector of the State of Georgia and a resident of Cherokee County. Davis intends
to vote in each of the Relevant Upcoming Elections in Cherokee County.
27. Plaintiff MEGAN MISSET (“Missett”) has been a member of
Coalition since March 2018. Missett is an elector of the State of Georgia and a
resident of Fulton County. Missett intends to vote in each of the Relevant
Upcoming Elections in Fulton County.
3. Former Plaintiff Individuals.
28. Former Plaintiff EDWARD CURTIS TERRY (“Terry”) was a
Plaintiff when the Second Amended Complaint in this action was filed on
September 15, 2017, (ECF No. 70, at 11–12, ¶ 31), Terry’s individual claims were
dismissed on March, 20, 2018, pursuant to Local Rule 41.3A(2) because Terry did
not comply with an Order directing him to apprise this Court of his mailing
address. (ECF No. 147.)
4. Plaintiff Individuals Who Are Not Now Members of

Coalition (the “Non-Member Plaintiffs”)
29. Plaintiff DONNA CURLING (“Curling”) was a Plaintiff and member
of Coalition when this action was initially filed in Fulton County Superior Court on
July 3, 2017. (ECF No. 1-2, at 6–7, ¶¶ 12, 13, 15.) Curling was a member of
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Coalition between May 2017 and December 2017. Curling’s claims are not
amended by this Third Amended Complaint.
30. Plaintiff DONNA PRICE (“Price”) was a Plaintiff and member of
Coalition when this action was initially filed in Fulton County Superior Court on
July 3, 2017. (ECF No. 1-2, at 7–8, ¶ 12, 15–16.) Price was a member of Coalition
between May 2017 and December 2017. Price’s claims are not amended by this
Third Amended Complaint.
31. Plaintiff JEFFREY SCHOENBERG (“Schoenberg”) was a Plaintiff
when this action was initially filed in Fulton County Superior Court on July 3,
2017. (ECF No. 1-2, at 7–9, ¶ 12, 15, 17.) Schoenberg’s claims are not amended by
this Third Amended Complaint.
B. DEFENDANTS
1. Defendant Secretary.
32. Defendant BRIAN P. KEMP is sued for prospective declaratory and
injunctive relief in his official capacities as the Secretary of State of Georgia and as
Chairperson of the State Election Board when this action was initially filed in
Fulton County Superior Court on July 3, 2017. Together with any successors in
office automatically substituted for him as a Defendant by operation of Fed. R.
14
Civ. P. 25(d), Defendant KEMP is hereinafter referred to as “Kemp” or the
“Secretary.”
33. In his official and individual capacity, the Secretary is responsible for
the orderly and accurate administration of Georgia’s electoral processes. The
Secretary’s legal duties, among others, include the following: (i) to approve or
discontinue the use of Georgia’s voting systems and to conduct any reexamination
of Georgia’s voting systems, upon request or at his own discretion, O.C.G.A.
§§ 21–2–379.2(a), –379.2(b), –368(a), –368(b); (ii) to develop, program, build, and
review ballots for use by counties and municipalities on direct recording electronic
(DRE) voting systems in use in the State, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-50(a)(15); and (iii) to
serve as Chair of the State Election Board. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-30(d).
34. The Secretary is also required by law to determine the voting
equipment that is to be used to cast and count the votes in all county, state, and
federal elections in Georgia and to provide the same type of equipment to all
counties in the State on behalf of the State of Georgia. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-300.
2. Defendant State Board Members.
35. Together with the Secretary, Defendants DAVID J. WORLEY,
REBECCA N. SULLIVAN, RALPH F. “RUSTY” SIMPSON, and SETH HARP,
are sued for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief in their official capacities
15
as members of Georgia’s State Election Board (the “State Board”) when this
action was initially filed in Fulton County Superior Court on July 3, 2017.
Together with any successors in office automatically substituted for any of them as
Defendants by operation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), these Defendants are hereinafter
collectively referred to as the “State Board Members.”
36. Acting through the State Board, the State Board Members collectively
are to discharge the following duties of the State Board, among others: (1) to
promulgate rules and regulations to obtain uniformity in election practices, as well
as the legality and purity of all primaries and elections, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(1); (2)
to formulate, adopt, and promulgate such rules and regulations, consistent with
law, as will be conducive to the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of primaries and
elections, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(2); (3) to investigate the administration of primary
and election laws and frauds and irregularities in elections and to report election
law violations to the Attorney General or appropriate district attorney, O.C.G.A.
§ 21-2-31(5); and (4) to promulgate rules and regulations to define uniform and
nondiscriminatory standards concerning what constitutes a vote and what will be
counted as a vote for each category of voting system used in Georgia, O.C.G.A.
§ 21-2-31(7).
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37. Acting through the State Board, the State Board Members collectively
exercise the power vested in the State Board to enforce compliance with the
Georgia Election Code and with the State Board’s regulations. See O.C.G.A. §§
21-2-33.1, -32.
3. Defendants Fulton Board Members.
38. Defendants MARY CAROLE COONEY, VERNETTA NURIDDIN,
DAVID J. BURGE, STAN MATARAZZO, and AARON JOHNSON, are sued for
prospective declaratory and injunctive relief in their official capacities as members
of the Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections (the “Fulton Board”)
when this action was initially filed in Fulton County Superior Court on July 3,
2017. Together with any successors in office automatically substituted for any of
them as Defendants by operation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), these Defendants are
hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Fulton Board Members.”
39. The Fulton Board was created by a local Act of the General
Assembly. Georgia Law, 1989, Act 250. The Fulton Board has the authority to
exercise the powers and duties of a county election superintendent with respect to
conducting elections in Fulton County, see O.C.G.A. § 21–2–70 to –77. Duties of a
county election superintendent include, among others, the following: (i) “To select
and equip polling places for use in primaries and elections in accordance with [the
17
Georgia Election Code],” O.C.G.A. § 21–2–70(4); (ii) “To make and issue such
rules, regulations, and instructions, consistent with law, including the rules and
regulations promulgated by the State Election Board, as he or she may deem
necessary for the guidance of poll officers, custodians, and electors in primaries
and elections,” O.C.G.A. § 21–2–70(7); (iii) “To conduct all elections in such
manner as to guarantee the secrecy of the ballot and to perform such other duties as
may be prescribed by law,” O.C.G.A. § 21–2–70(13); and (iv) to determine
whether to use paper ballots when the use of voting machines is not practicable,
O.C.G.A. § 21–2–334.
4. All Other Previously Named Defendants Are Now

Dismissed Without Prejudice.
40. With effect as of the date of this Court’s Order granting Coalition’s
motion for leave to file this Third Amended Complaint as its operative complaint,
Plaintiff Coalition voluntarily dismissed without prejudice its claims against any
other Defendants previously named in this action.
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
41. This action was initially filed in Fulton County Superior Court on
July 3, 2017. (ECF No. 1-2, at 7–9, ¶ 12, 15, 17.)
42. The Secretary was served with the state-court Complaint on August 3,
2017. (ECF No. 1, at 4, ¶ 5.)
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43. On August 8, 2017, the Secretary and other Defendants removed this
action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and § 1446. (ECF No. 1.)
44. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over each of the claims
raised in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction),
§ 1343 (jurisdiction over civil rights actions), § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction),
§ 2201 (jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief) and § 2202 (jurisdiction to grant
relief ancillary to declaratory judgment).
45. Venue lies in the Northern District of Georgia pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because multiple defendants reside in this judicial district and
all defendants are residents of Georgia and a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this judicial district.
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. The United States Constitution

46. The United States Constitution provides: “The times, places and
manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed
in each state by the legislature thereof….” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
19
B. The Georgia Constitution
47. The Georgia Constitution provides: “Elections by the people shall be
by secret ballot and shall be conducted in accordance with procedures provided by
law.” Ga. Const. Art. II, § 1, ¶ 1.
C. The Georgia Election Code
48. The Georgia Election Code (the “Code”) provides, in pertinent part:
“All primaries and elections in this state shall be conducted by ballot, except when
voting machines are used as provided by law. A ballot may be electronic or printed
on paper.” O.C.G.A. § 21–2–280.
49. The Code requires that uniform voting equipment “shall be provided
to each county by the state, as determined by the Secretary of State.” See
O.C.G.A. § 21–2–300.
50. Specifically, the Code requires the Secretary to furnish “a uniform
system of direct recording electronic (DRE) equipment” to each county. O.C.G.A.
§ 21–2–379.3, and authorizes the use of DRE equipment under required conditions
in numerous provisions of Title 21, Chapter 2, Article 9, Part 5.
20
51. The Code establishes the following requirements for DREs in addition
to other minimum operating standards:
No direct recording electronic voting system shall be

adopted or used unless it shall, at the time, satisfy the
following requirements:
….
(6) It shall permit voting in absolute secrecy so that no

person can see or know for whom any other elector has
voted or is voting, save an elector whom he or she has
assisted or is assisting in voting, as prescribed by law;
….
(8) It shall, when properly operated, record correctly and

accurately every vote cast;
O.C.G.A. § 21–2–379.1.
52. The Code requires that, “All direct recording electronic (DRE) units
and related equipment, when not in use, shall be properly stored and secured under
conditions as shall be specified by the Secretary of State.” O.C.G.A. § 21–2–
379.9(a).
53. The Code requires county election superintendents who conduct
elections using DREs to do the following:
• “examine each unit before it is sent to a polling place, verify
that each registering mechanism is set at zero, and properly secure each unit so that
21
the counting machinery cannot be operated until later authorized,” O.C.G.A. § 21-
2-379.6(a);
• three days before every election, “have each DRE unit tested to
ascertain that it will correctly count the votes cast for all offices and on all
questions,” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(c);
• “require that each DRE unit be thoroughly tested … prior to the
delivery of each DRE unit to the polling place,” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.7(b);
• “[p]rior to opening the polls each day[,] … certify that each unit
is operating properly and is set to zero….” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.7(b);
• “[e]nsure that each DRE unit’s tabulating mechanism is secure
throughout the day during the primary or election,” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.7(d)(3);
• use only DREs that “permit voting in absolute secrecy so that
no person can see or know how any other elector has voted or is voting,” O.C.G.A.
§ 21–2–379.1(6), and “conduct all elections in such manner as to guarantee the
secrecy of the ballot,” O.C.G.A. § 21–2–70(13); and
• “make and issue such rules, regulations, and instructions,
consistent with law, including the rules and regulations promulgated by the State
Election Board, as he or she may deem necessary for the guidance of poll officers,
custodians, and electors in primaries and elections[,]” O.C.G.A. § 21–2–70(7);
22
• “perform their duties in public,” O.C.G.A. § 21–2–406; and
• comply with the legal requirement that “all proceedings at the
tabulating center and precincts shall be open to the view of the public,” O.C.G.A.
§ 21–2–379.11.
54. The Code authorizes the use of paper ballots for use in “any primary
or election in which the use of voting equipment is impossible or impracticable, for
the reasons set out in [§] 21–2–334….”, O.C.G.A. § 21–2–281—i.e., when the use
of voting machines is required but “is not possible or practicable” or “if, for any
other reason, at any primary or election the use of voting machines wholly or in
part is not practicable,” O.C.G.A. § 21–2–334.
55. The Code defines electors who do not vote in person at the polls on
Election Day to vote as “absentee electors.” O.C.G.A. § 21–2–380(a).
56. The Code permits absentee electors who do not vote in person to use a
paper absentee ballot that is mailed in or hand delivered, see O.C.G.A. § 21–2–
385, and generally counted by optical scan equipment, but the Code requires
absentee electors who vote in the advance voting period who vote in person to vote
by DRE if DRE machines are used in the polling places on election day, see
O.C.G.A. § 21–2–383(b).
23
57. The Code authorizes the use of paper ballots counted by optical
scanning equipment and sets forth requirements for their approval and operation.
See O.C.G.A Title 21, Chapter 2, Article 9, Part 4.
D. Georgia’s Regulation of Elections

58. The State Board’s rules implementing the Code require that all voters
who cast ballots in person at the polls on Election Day must vote by DRE:
Rule 183-1-12-.01 Conduct of Elections: Beginning with

the November 2002 General Election, all federal, state,
and county general primaries and elections, special
primaries and elections, and referendums in the State of
Georgia shall be conducted at the polls through the use
of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units
supplied by the Secretary of State or purchased by the
counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State.
In addition, absentee balloting shall be conducted through
the use of optical scan ballots which shall be tabulated on
optical scan vote tabulation systems furnished by the
Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the
authorization of the Secretary of State; provided, however,
that the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting
units is authorized by the Secretary of State for persons
desiring to vote by absentee ballot in person.
Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 183–1–12–.01 (emphasis added).
24
V. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
A. How Georgia’s Voting System Works.
59. The voting system configuration most recently provided to Georgia’s
counties by the Secretary consists of the following configuration of hardware
components and related firmware and software:
• Diebold Election Systems (“Diebold”)5 AccuVote DRE touchscreen

voting units (“AccuVote DREs”):
o R6 TS model, with BallotStation version 4.5.2! firmware.
o TSx model, with BallotStation version 4.5.2! firmware.
• Diebold optical scanners for tabulating paper ballots.
• Electronic Poll Books with barcode scanner to scan identification.
• Diebold General Election Management Software (“GEMS”) for

tabulation and reporting of data generated by AccuVote DRE and
Diebold optical scanners.
(such configuration, “Georgia’s Voting System”).
60. On information and belief, Georgia uses approximately 27,000
Diebold AccuVote DRE touchscreen voting machines. These AccuVote DREs are
located at polling locations during elections, where they are used by electors who
vote absentee ballots in person during early voting as authorized by O.C.G.A.
§ 21–2–385(d) and by electors who vote in person on Election Day at the polls in
5
Diebold Election Systems changed its name to Premier Election Solutions in 2007. Diebold’s
election system business was subsequently acquired by Dominion Voting Systems.
25
their home precincts. In Fulton County, TSx units are used as an intermediate
device for electronic transmission of ballot data collected on TS units to the county
GEMS server.
61. The use of AccuVote DREs makes Georgia’s elections unverifiable,
unauditable, and vulnerable to undetectable manipulation. AccuVote DREs create
no verifiable record of voter intent, unlike optical scanner components that rely on
a voter-marked paper ballot as a verifiable official record.
62. Each AccuVote DRE internally contains much of the same hardware
that might typically be found in a very low-end general-purpose personal desktop
computer in use in the early 2000s.
63. Georgia’s AccuVote DREs run a Diebold-modified version of
Microsoft’s Windows CE version 4.1 operating system—which Microsoft stopped
supporting in early January 2013. As a consequence, Microsoft is no longer
issuing updates or security patches for that software.6
64. A proprietary Diebold software application called BallotStation runs
on top of the Windows operating system on AccuVote DREs and provides the user
interface that voters and poll workers see. BallotStation interacts with the voter,
6
See Wikipedia, Windows Embedded Compact,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Embedded_Compact (last visited Feb. 12, 2018).
26
accepts and records votes, counts the votes recorded on the DRE, and performs all
other election-related processing by the DRE.
65. AccuVote DREs are configured for each election by inserting a
memory card into a slot behind a locked door on the side of the machine.
66. Before the election, the file system on the memory card stores the
election definition, sound files, translations for other languages, interpreted code
that is used to print reports, and other configuration information.
67. AccuVote DREs use software installed on the unit to display graphical
information to the voter that indicates which part of the touchscreen display
corresponds to particular electoral choices.
68. Voters record their preferences by physically touching the part of the
screen that corresponds to voter’s preferred choice.
69. When operating properly, AccuVote DREs use software installed on
the unit to translate the voter’s physical act of touching a particular place on the
touchscreen into a vote for the corresponding candidate or issue.
the unit to change what is graphically displayed on the touchscreen to indicate to
the voter that a particular electoral choice has been electronically registered by the
unit.
27
the unit to record the voter’s choice on both the DRE’s removable memory card
and into the machine’s internal flash memory. Both such records of the voter’s
choices are unreadable to humans.
72. Georgia’s AccuVote DREs do not record a paper or other independent
verifiable record of the voter’s selections.
73. Upon the closing of the polls, poll workers cause AccuVote DREs to
interpret collected electronic information and convert it to human readable form to
print a paper tape of vote totals recorded on each machine.
74. After the tape of the DREs machine’s vote totals is printed, the
removable DRE memory cards are taken from each of the AccuVote DREs and
secured for transport either to a satellite vote transmission center, in the case of
Fulton County, or to the county election office in other counties.
75. On election night, AccuVote DRE memory cards from polling places
are collected and uploaded into the Diebold GEMS server (running on a desktop
computer) where the GEMS software combines DRE vote data with data from
mail-in absentee ballots, and consolidated preliminary results reports are created
and printed.
28
76. Mail-in absentee paper ballots and provisional paper ballots are
scanned and tabulated by Diebold AccuVote Optical Scan units, located in the
office of the superintendents of elections.
77. The Diebold AccuVote Optical Scan units are programmed with
software to scan, count, tabulate and report the paper ballot vote counts.
78. On election night, Diebold AccuVote Optical Scan unit memory cards
are uploaded to the Diebold GEMS server and combined with the data from the
AccuVote DREs to create unofficial consolidated results and generate reports in
human readable form.
B. AccuVote DREs Are Insecure and Vulnerable to Malicious

Hacking.
79. Scores of news reports in the last year have amplified the fifteen-plus
years of warnings from voting system computer scientists that paperless balloting
is unreliable, unquestionably insecure, and unverifiable because paperless balloting
cannot be audited.
80. In January 2018, the Congressional Task Force on Election Security
formed by House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi and others issued a Final
29
Report addressing the insecurity of the voting infrastructure in the United States.
The Final Report warned:
Given the breadth of security risks facing voting machines,

it is especially problematic that approximately 20% of
voters are casting their ballots on machines that do not
have any paper backup. These voters are using paperless
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines that have
been shown over and again to be highly vulnerable to
attack. Because these machines record votes on the
internal memory of the machine, and do not leave any
paper backup, it is near impossible to detect whether
results have been tampered with.7
81. Such alarming findings about the security of DREs are not new. In
2007, California’s then Secretary of State Debra Bowen (“Secretary Bowen”) and
Ohio’s Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner (“Secretary Brunner”) separately
commissioned and published independent research studies that included the entire
Diebold AccuVote voting system.
82. Secretary Bowen’s “Top-to-Bottom Review” (“TTBR”) 8 of
California’s voting system produced a detailed scientific review of a Diebold
AccuVote voting system that used newer, upgraded—and thus presumably more
7
Congressional Task Force of Election Security, Final Report, https://democrats-
homeland.house.gov/sites/democrats.homeland.house.gov/files/documents/TFESReport.pdf
(Feb. 14, 2018), at 24 (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
8
See Joseph A. Calandrino, et al., Source Code Review of the Diebold Voting System,
http://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/ttbr/diebold-source-public-jul29.pdf (Jul. 20, 2007)
(last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
30
secure—Diebold voting system components than the AccuVote DREs that are
currently used in Georgia.
83. Secretary Brunner’s Evaluation and Validation of Election-Related
Equipment, Standards and Testing (“EVEREST”) 9 initiative likewise examined a
newer version of the AccuVote DREs than Georgia uses.
84. The TTBR found that California’s AccuVote DREs were “inadequate
to ensure accuracy and integrity of the election results…”; that the system
contained “serious design flaws that have led directly to specific vulnerabilities,
which attackers could exploit to affect election outcomes…”; and that “attacks
could be carried out in a manner that is not subject to detection by audit, including
review of software logs.”10
85. The EVEREST report concluded that Ohio’s voting “system lacks the
technical protections necessary to guarantee a trustworthy election under
operational conditions. Flaws in the system’s design, development, and processes
lead to a broad spectrum of issues that undermine the voting system’s security and
9
Pennsylvania State Univ., et al., EVEREST: Evaluation and Validation of Election-Related
Equipment, Standards and Testing, https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/28/EVEREST.pdf (Dec. 7,
2007) (last visited Feb. 5, 2018).
10
See California Secretary of State, Withdrawal Of Approval,
http://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/vendors/premier/premier-11824-revision-1209.pdf (Dec. 31,
2009 rev.), at 2, 2, 3 (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
31
reliability. The resulting vulnerabilities are exploitable by an attacker, often easily
so, under election conditions.” 11
86. Citing the failures and vulnerabilities of the Diebold’s AccuVote
voting system identified in the TTBR, Bowen decertified California’s voting
system. 12
87. The TTBR and the EVEREST reports are consistent with other
published scientific reviews of AccuVote DREs that concluded the security and
design failures of AccuVote DREs render the units unfit for use in public
elections.13
88. The only record of a voter’s selection kept by Georgia’s AccuVote
DREs is the digital record created in the DRE’s computer memory by the
executable software that is installed on the individual DRE voting unit. This
digital record is only as trustworthy as the software that writes the information to
memory.
89. As indicated by the TTBR and EVEREST reports, the design of
AccuVote DREs permits unauthorized, surreptitious manipulation of software
11
See EVEREST, supra note 9, at 103.
12
See Withdrawal Of Approval, supra note 10, at 5.
13
See, e.g.,Candice Hoke, Judicial Protection of Popular Sovereignty: Redressing Voting
Technology, 62 Cas. W. Res. L. Rev. 997 (2012), available at,
http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol62/iss4/6 (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
32
installed on individual machines that causes the AccuVote DREs to record and
report false votes and that is, for all practical purposes, undetectable by election
officials.
90. As indicated by the TTBR and EVEREST reports, the results
produced by an AccuVote DRE are not reliable because the machine’s software,
which is responsible for correctly recording voter choices, is subject to
undetectable manipulation.
91. As indicated by the TTBR and EVEREST reports, the results
produced by an AccuVote DRE are not trustworthy because the unreliable software
is likewise responsible for reading the DRE unit’s memory and reporting the
recorded results.
C. AccuVote DREs Fail to Provide Absolute Secrecy of the Ballot.
92. Georgia’s AccuVote DREs record votes in the order in which they are
cast and otherwise associate each electronic ballot with a unique serial number and
timestamp that can be used to determine the ballot’s position in the chronology of
votes cast on the machine. These design flaws render the electronic ballots cast on
AccuVote DREs capable of being matched to voter records maintained by
pollworkers and pollwatchers, or to polling place security video, or to ExpressPoll
book timestamps, each of which makes it possible to connect many voters with
33
their DRE ballots in violation of Georgia’s state constitutional requirements of
absolute secrecy of the ballot.
D. Security Breaches at KSU and CES Have Further Compromised

Georgia’s Voting System.
93. From at least 2002 until at least December 31, 2017, Secretary Kemp
contracted with the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia and
through Kennesaw State University (“KSU”), a unit of the University System of
Georgia, for the creation of the Center for Election Services (“CES”) at KSU to
assist the Secretary in the fulfillment of his statutory duties to manage Georgia’s
election system.
94. Acting under contract as Kemp’s agents, KSU, CES and CES’s
Executive Director Merle King (“King”) maintained a computer server with the
URL “elections.kennesaw.edu,” on which they hosted an enormous assemblage of
electronic files consisting of software applications, password files, encryption
keys, voter information registration information, technical training videos, and
other sensitive information critical to the safe and secure operation of Georgia’s
Voting System.
95. The information hosted on the “elections.kennesaw.edu” server was
not authorized to be publicly accessible. But between at least August 2016 and
34
March 2017, and likely for a much longer period of time, this server was fully
accessible to any computer user with Internet access.
96. The “elections.kennesaw.edu” server was in fact accessed from the
public Internet by an unknown number of unauthorized individuals, including
cybersecurity researcher Logan Lamb (“Lamb”), his colleague Chris Grayson
(“Grayson”), and KSU’s own computer science instructor Andy Green (“Green”).
97. In late August 2016, Lamb freely accessed files hosted on the
“elections.kennesaw.edu” server, including the voter histories and personal
information of all Georgia voters, tabulation and memory card programming
databases for past and future elections, instructions and passwords for voting
equipment administration, and executable programs controlling essential election
resources. When he accessed these sensitive files, Lamb noted that the files had
been publicly exposed for so long that Google had cached (i.e., saved digital
backup copies of) and published the pages containing many of them.
98. Lamb immediately recognized that these files were a high-value target
for malicious users who might want to manipulate Georgia’s elections, not only in
the November 2016 general election, but future elections as well, because he knew
that the files created and maintained on this server were used to program virtually
all other voting and tabulation equipment used in Georgia’s elections.
35
99. As a computer scientist and security researcher, Lamb knew that
introducing malware into key files hosted on the “elections.kennesaw.edu” server
could permit a malicious user to infect Georgia’s Voting System with a computer
virus that could be designed to travel across jurisdictions and equipment and
potentially alter or control the results in multiple future elections with very little
risk of detection.
100. On or about August 28, 2016, Lamb promptly contacted King by
telephone and email to warn him that CES should assume that the sensitive
documents hosted on the “elections.kennesaw.edu” server had already been
downloaded by unauthorized persons. King responded by assuring Lamb that the
security issue would be addressed, but King simultaneously warned Lamb to keep
his discovery of the server’s vulnerabilities to himself or else, King warned, Lamb
would be “crushed” by the politicians “downtown.”
101. King immediately informed CES staff of the breach, and KSU IT
management was asked for advice and assistance on or about August 29, 2016.
Public records demonstrate that in early September 2016, in a series of internal
email communications, KSU’s information technology staff member William
Moore informed CES staffers Michael Barnes and Steven Dean and Information
Technology professionals of KSU Tyler Hayden, Jason Figueroa, Matthew Sims,
36
and Chris Gaddis that the State’s primary voting systems server had “exploitable,”
“severe,” and “critical” vulnerabilities, and Stephen Gay, KSU’s Chief Information
Security Officer, ordered security scans of the CES server.
102. In October 2016, in a series of internal email communications sent
between William Moore, King, Michael Barnes, Steve Dean, Stephen Gay, Chris
Gaddis, Jason Figueroa, KSU’s information technology staff described the
“elections.kennesaw.edu” server as having “40+ critical vulnerabilities.”
103. Despite these internal communications within KSU, and despite
King’s commitment to Lamb to ensure that the software, data, and the
“elections.kennesaw.edu” server would be secured, neither Secretary Kemp nor his
agents KSU, CES, and King secured the server, which remained easily accessible
from the public Internet.
104. Lamb and colleague Grayson accessed the server again several times
in late February 2017 and on March 1, 2017, and they were repeatedly able to
access and download the same types of files that Lamb had accessed months
earlier.
105. On March 1, 2017, Grayson contacted KSU Computer Science
Instructor Green and informed him of the exact times and IP addresses of his own
recent repeated access of the unsecured voting system server.
37
106. Green replicated Lamb and Grayson’s access to the server and its
sensitive files and then contacted Stephen Gay, who finally caused the elections
server to be isolated from the public Internet on or about March 1, 2017.
107. It is widely and generally known from public media reporting both
prior to and since the 2016 presidential election that foreign governments and other
unknown suspect parties have actively probed state election systems in attempts to
gain unauthorized access and manipulate the voter information and computer
systems used to conduct American elections.
108. Public reports have documented that these efforts targeting American
voting systems have included unauthorized intrusions into the very same kind of
computer systems and files that Lamb, Grayson, and Green found to be completely
unprotected from external access in Georgia for at least seven consecutive months
from August 2016 through February 2017.
VI. SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS

A. Conduct of All Defendants—Past and Threatened
109. All Defendants, at all times material to this Complaint, knew that
AccuVote DREs did not and cannot meet Georgia’s statutory and regulatory
requirements for certification, safety, security, and accuracy equipment as provided
in Title 2 Chapter 21Article 9 Part 5.
38
110. All Defendants, at all times material to this complaint, knew that
software applications, password files, encryption keys, voter information
registration information, and other sensitive information critical to the safe and
secure operation of Georgia’s Voting System had been unsecured, breached, and
compromised; could not be presumed to be uncorrupted and should instead have
been presumed to be compromised; and that Georgia’s Voting System is materially
noncompliant with applicable Election Code statutes and governing regulations as
a result.
111. From at least August 2016 until the present, the Secretary and his
agents—and from at least March 2017 all Defendants—knew or should have
known that the software, data, and voter information hosted on the
“elections.kennesaw.edu” server at KSU had been repeatedly compromised by
unauthorized access.
112. All Defendants have known at all times material to this Complaint
that no efforts have been made to remediate the compromised software programs
and machines or to identify and remove any malware that was likely introduced
during the lengthy security breaches referred to herein on the
“elections.kennesaw.edu” server that hosted the election-specific software
applications and data that are re-installed on every piece of voting and tabulation
39
equipment used to conduct Georgia’s elections in advance of each election
conducted using Georgia’s Voting System.
113. All Defendants, at all times material to this Complaint, knew or
should have known of numerous expert opinions and academic research
identifying security vulnerabilities in AccuVote DREs and advising against the use
of AccuVote DREs in public elections because of their demonstrable lack of
safety, reliability, and trustworthiness.
114. All Defendants, at all times material to this complaint, knew or should
have known that they were incapable of confirming the integrity of the software on
AccuVote DREs and incapable of certifying that election results produced by
AccuVote DREs were correct, given that malicious manipulations are generally
undetectable, in part because of the inferior engineering of the system.
115. By choosing to move forward in using the AccuVote DREs to conduct
the November 2016 general election, the April and June 2017 Congressional
District 6 (“CD6”) Special Election Runoff and Special Election, and other
elections from November 2016 to the present (the “Relevant Past Elections”), all
Defendants caused Georgia voters to cast votes on an illegal and unreliable system
that must be presumed to be compromised and that is incapable of producing
verifiable results.
40
116. By choosing to continue using the non-compliant system in the
Relevant Upcoming Elections without taking any meaningful steps to remedy
known security breaches affecting AccuVote DREs, all Defendants know that they
will cause, and intend to cause, Georgia voters to cast votes in the Relevant
Upcoming Elections on an illegal and unreliable voting system that must be
presumed to be compromised and that is incapable of producing verifiable results.
B. Conduct of Defendant Secretary—Past and Threatened

117. KSU, CES, and King were actual and apparent agents of the
Secretary, contracted and supervised by him for a purpose of providing, among
other things, “technical support and training of State election officials in the use of
the Statewide uniform electronic voting system[;]” “acceptance testing for the
fiscal year 2018 of the GEMS software and server, [Georgia’s AccuVote DREs],
and the electronic poll book/encoders[;]” and “ballot building election related
activities for counties and municipalities in the State of Georgia.” 14
118. At all times material to this Complaint, KSU, CES, and King were
acting further to their contractual arrangement with the Secretary, within the scope
of their actual and apparent agency, and for the purpose of serving the Secretary.
14
See Agreement Between the Secretary of State and The Board of Regents of the University
System of Georgia, at 2 (July 13, 2017).
41
119. In their capacity as agents for the Secretary, KSU, CES, and King
maintained software applications, password files, encryption keys, voter
information registration information, ballot building files, tabulation databases, and
other sensitive and essential information critical to the safe and secure operation of
Georgia’s Voting System on the “elections.kennesaw.edu” server.
120. After it became known that the “elections.kennesaw.edu” server was
compromised, none of the Secretary and his agents KSU, CES, and King
subsequently made adequate efforts to determine whether malicious hacking of
software, data, and voter information hosted on the “elections.kennesaw.edu”
server and used in Georgia’s Voting System occurred during the at least seven-
months-long exposure of the “elections.kennesaw.edu” server content on the public
Internet.
121. Neither the Secretary nor any of his agents, KSU, CES, and King, has
ever properly verified the integrity of, or repaired or replaced, any of the
potentially compromised software, passwords, and encryption keys that were
hosted on the “elections.kennesaw.edu” server. As a consequence, the software,
passwords, and encryption keys that were presumably compromised all continue to
be used on the equipment that will be employed to conduct Georgia’s public
elections.
42
122. On July 7, 2017, after this action was initially filed in Fulton County
Superior Court on July 3, 2017, KSU, CES, and King, acting as agents of the
Secretary, destroyed all data on the hard drives of the KSU
“elections.kennesaw.edu” server.
123. On August 9, 2017, less than 24 hours after this action was removed
from Fulton County Superior Court to this Court , KSU, CES, and King, acting as
agents of the Secretary, destroyed all data on the hard drives of a secondary server
hosted at “unicoi.kennesaw.edu”, which contained similar, but not identical data, to
that on the “elections.kennesaw.edu” server.
124. On information and belief, the logfiles that contained historical
records of external access from the public Internet to the “elections.kennesaw.edu”
and “unicoi.kennesaw.edu” servers were deleted when all data on the respective
servers’ hard drives was destroyed.
125. The Secretary intends to enforce and will enforce O.C.G.A. § 21–2–
383(b) in the Relevant Upcoming Elections in all Georgia counties, and thus will
require absentee electors who vote during the advance voting period in person to
vote by DRE.
126. The Secretary intends to enforce and will enforce State Election Board
Rule 183–1–12–.01 in the Relevant Upcoming Elections in all Georgia counties,
43
and thus to require that all voters who cast ballots in person at the polls on Election
Day must vote by DRE.
C. Conduct of Defendant State Board Members—Threatened
127. The State Board Members, acting in their official capacity through the
State Board, intend to enforce and will enforce O.C.G.A. § 21–2–383(b) in the
Relevant Upcoming Elections in all Georgia counties, and thus to require absentee
electors who vote during the advance voting period in person to vote by DRE.
128. The State Board Members, acting in their official capacity through the
State Board, intend to enforce and will enforce State Election Board Rule 183–1–
12–.01 in the Relevant Upcoming Elections in all Georgia counties, and thus to
require that all voters who cast ballots in person at the polls on Election Day must
vote by DRE.
D. Conduct of Defendant Fulton Board Members—Past and

Threatened.
129. At all times material to this Complaint, Richard Barron (“Barron”)
was employed as the staff Director of Registration & Elections for Fulton County,
in which capacity he was an actual and apparent agent of the Fulton Board and its
official members, the Fulton Board Members, and was contracted and supervised
by them.
44
130. At all times material to this Complaint, Barron acted within the scope
of his agency for a purpose of serving the Fulton Board Members and the Fulton
Board.
131. On April 18, 2017, Barron and the Fulton Board Members deprived
numerous Fulton County voters, including Coalition member Brian Blosser, of the
right to cast a ballot in the CD6 Special Election.
132. On April 22, 2017, at a Fulton Board meeting, Barron blamed the
disfranchisement of CD6 voters such as Blosser on a software “glitch” of unknown
origin that erroneously caused eligible voters to appear to be voters in other
congressional districts or unregistered.
133. On November 7, 2017, and December 5, 2017, Barron and the Fulton
Board Members aggressively blocked and prevented visual observation by
Coalition’s members and representatives of the Fulton Board’s performance of the
following election duties:
a. North Fulton Annex polling place. At the close of the polls
on November 7 and December 5, at the North Fulton Annex
polling place, Barron instructed polling place managers to
refuse to permit Coalition Executive Director Marilyn Marks
(“Marks”) and other members of the public to observe polling
45
place close-down procedures, vote tabulation and printing of
DRE machines’ election results. Fulton Board Members’
agents and employees refused to permit Coalition’s election
observers within approximately 50 feet of the DRE machines
and process on November 7 and refused to permit them and
other members of the public into the polling place at all on
December 5. The Fulton Board Members’ agents and
employees threatened Marks and others with arrest on both
occasions, and some members of the public were forcefully
escorted from the premises by law enforcement on Barron’s
instructions. Marks and others filed formal complaints with the
Fulton Board which remain unanswered.
b. North Fulton Annex satellite location. On November 7 and
December 5, at the North Fulton Annex satellite location,
Barron instructed officials not to permit Marks, Missett, and
others to observe the implementation of chain of custody
procedures or the handling of the memory cards and provisional
ballots received from Fulton County precincts before
tabulation. Marks, Missett, and other members were prevented
46
from observing the uploading and electronic transmission of
AccuVote DRE memory cards and from entering or seeing into
the room in which this important process was occurring behind
closed doors.
c. English Street Warehouse. On November 7 and December 5,
at the Board’s English Street Warehouse, Barron instructed
officials not to permit Marks, Missett, and others to observe the
public meeting of the Fulton Board Members at which central
tabulation of election results was conducted. On November 7,
security guards, operating at Barron’s instruction, aggressively
demanded that Marks and another Coalition representative
leave the premises of the building where the Board meeting was
taking place and the vote tabulation was being conducted. On
Barron’s instruction, the security guards threatened Marks and
another Coalition representative with physical removal from
premises, despite their presence being entirely non-disruptive
and despite the press and other members of the public being
allowed to attend. On December 5, Barron permitted Marks and
Missett to remain in the building during tabulation but did not
47
allow them to come within 50 feet of documents or discussions,
which effectively deprived Marks and Missett of the ability to
observe.
134. By preventing public observation of the performance of their duties,
the Fulton Board Members violated their statutory duty to “perform their duties in
public,” O.C.G.A. § 21–2–406, and also violated the statutory requirement that “all
proceedings at the tabulating center and precincts shall be open to the view of the
public,” O.C.G.A. § 21–2–379.11. The Fulton Board Members thereby injured
Coalition and its representatives by depriving them of their corresponding implied
state-created informational rights to observe election officials performing their
duties and to obtain public information. The conduct of local official such as
Barron and the State Board aggravate the injuries to the constitutional rights of
Coalition’s members attributable to Defendants Kemp and the State Board by
preventing any public assessment of the integrity of Georgia’s elections.
135. With the authorization of Defendants Kemp and the State Board, the
Fulton Board Members intend to continue to prevent the public from observing the
performance these duties in the Relevant Upcoming Elections in Fulton County.
Fulton Board Members intend to enforce Election Rule 183-1-12-.01 concerning
48
election day use of DREs and will thus enforce O.C.G.A. § 21–2–383(b) in the
Relevant Upcoming Elections in Fulton County, requiring absentee electors who
vote in person during the early voting period to vote by AccuVote DRE.
Fulton Board Members, acting in their official capacities on behalf of the Fulton
Board, intend to enforce and will enforce State Election Board Rule 183–1–12–.01
in the Relevant Upcoming Elections in all Fulton County, and thus to require all
voters who cast ballots in person at the polls on Election Day to vote by AccuVote
DRE.
Fulton Board Members have adopted voting procedures under which individual
electronic ballots bearing a unique identifier are transmitted from Fulton County’s
AccuVote DREs located in satellite voting centers to Fulton County’s central
GEMS tabulation server in clear text (i.e., unencrypted) over an ordinary,
unsecured telephone line on Election Night. This practice violates fundamental
security principles because it subjects the transmitted votes to manipulation (such
as man-in-the-middle interception and substitution of votes) and exposes the votes
with their unique identifier to third-party interception, violating voters’ rights of
secrecy in voting.
49
E. Standing of Plaintiff Coalition
139. Coalition has organizational standing on its own behalf and
associational standing on behalf of Coalition’s individual members to bring each of
the claims for prospective relief stated in this Third Amended Complaint.
1. Coalition Has Organizational Standing Derived from Past

and Threatened Direct Injuries to Coalition.
140. Coalition has organizational standing, on its own behalf, to bring each
of the claims for prospective relief stated in this Third Amended Complaint
because Coalition has been and will be directly harmed by having to divert its own
personnel and resources to counteract Defendants’ unconstitutional enforcement of
laws and regulations requiring Georgia voters to use DREs.
141. Coalition possess a legally cognizable interest in pursuing its
organizational goals without having to divert resources and personnel to counteract
Defendants’ illegal acts.
142. Defendants’ prior and intended imminent enforcement of O.C.G.A.
§ 21–2–383(b) and State Election Board Rule 183–1–12–.01 have caused and will
cause Coalition to divert resources and personnel to counteract Defendants’ illegal
acts. Specifically, Coalition has been and will be required by Defendants’ past and
intended conduct to do the following:
50
• Divert Coalition’s scarce organizational funds since April 2017
to pay the fees of lawyers for advice and representation, litigation expenses,
consulting expert expenses, travel expenses for Coalition’s personnel, and research
and copying costs required by Coalition’s efforts to document and resist
Defendants’ enforcement of laws and regulations requiring Coalition’s members to
vote on DREs;
• Divert approximately 90% of the time of Coalition’s Executive
Director Marilyn R. Marks since April 2017 to participation in and management of
Coalition’s litigation, educational, and investigative efforts undertaken to
counteract Defendants’ conduct in Georgia—time that the Executive Director
would otherwise have devoted to Coalition’s ongoing efforts including but not
limited to researching and promoting and new post-election Risk Limiting Audit
techniques in Colorado; advocacy of secret ballot and voter privacy principles in
North Carolina seeking a change in state policy; researching security failures in
North Carolina voter registration databases, and advocating for enhanced security;
assisting members in researching South Carolina voting system security failures
and impacts; educating Colorado voters on the negative impacts of new ballot-
selfie laws; assisting Colorado members with organizing plans for a petition for a
special election; publishing educational commentary related to election security
51
and transparency issues; educating public and officials on the dangers of internet
voting through publishing and public speaking; assisting in research and planning
for film documentary on election security; training members in Colorado for
canvass board member duties; assisting Georgia members in evaluating ballot
access laws; participating in press interviews regarding election security issues;
speaking to civic groups on election security; assisting Colorado members in
challenging public records violations for ballots in recent county assembly
elections; and assisting members experiencing with problems in accessing public
election records in numerous jurisdictions.
• Divert Coalition’s organizational personnel and financial
resources away from Coalition’s established ongoing efforts to conduct research on
new voting systems being used in Tennessee and considered in Georgia and other
States and summarizing and providing that information to Coalition’s members;
and
• Divert Coalition’s organizational personnel and financial
resources away from Coalition’s established ongoing efforts to market Coalition to
new members and thereby grow Coalition’s membership.
143. Defendants’ past and imminent future invasions of Coalition’s legally
protected interests in pursuing its own organizational goals and projects have thus
52
caused and will continue to cause concrete and particularized harms to Coalition in
the form of diverted organizational personnel and financial resources.
144. Coalition has been directly harmed by the conduct of the Fulton Board
Members and their agent Barron, done with the authorization of Defendants Kemp
and the State Board, which deprived Coalition of its informational rights to observe
election officials performing their duties and to obtain public information in
furtherance of Coalition’s mission of educating and informing its membership.
2. Coalition Has Associational Standing Derived from Past

and Threatened Injuries to Coalition’s Members.
145. Coalition also has associational standing, on behalf of Coalition’s
individual Georgia members threatened with imminent injury-in-fact, to bring each
of the claims for prospective relief stated in this Third Amended Complaint
because: (1) at least one of Coalition’s members would have standing to sue each
Defendant on each claim in his or her own right; (2) the interests Coalition seeks to
protect are germane to Coalition’s organizational purpose described above; and (3)
the prospective injunctive and declaratory relief requested does not require the
participation of Coalition’s individual members in this lawsuit.
146. At all times since this case was initially filed in Fulton County
Superior Court on July 3, 2017, Coalition’s membership has included at least one
53
eligible elector of the State of Georgia who is a resident in each of Fulton County,
Cherokee County, Cobb County, and DeKalb County.
147. In each of the Relevant Past Elections, the Secretary and State Board
Members (acting through the State Board) have authorized and required local
official such as Barron, and the Fulton Board Members to enforce and threaten to
enforce O.C.G.A. § 21–2–383(b) and State Election Board Rule 183–1–12–.01.
Standing of Coalition’s Individual Members
148. The following Coalition members, whose standing to sue is a
predicate to Coalition’s associational standing, have standing because each of them
suffered concrete and particularized harms and are now threatened with imminent
additional injury-in-fact as a result of Defendants’ prior and intended future
unconstitutional enforcement of O.C.G.A. § 21–2–383(b) and State Election Board
Rule 183–1–12–.01 and prior and intended deprivations of the right to observe
election officials in the conduct of their duties.
Past Injury
a) Virginia R. Forney (Fulton County)
149. Virginia R. Forney, (“Forney”) has been a member of Coalition since
2015.
54
150. Forney, an elector of Fulton County, voted in person either during
early voting or on Election Day at the polls in all Relevant Prior Elections,
requiring her to vote on an AccuVote DRE. Forney is a physician by profession,
and multiple patients and others associated with her practice were candidates on
the November 2017 City of Atlanta and Fulton County ballot. Forney’s work
schedule required that she vote early before Election Day in the November 7
election. Aware that a ballot cast by AccuVote DRE was capable of being traced to
her and that the risk was particularly enhanced in an early voting polling location
with low traffic, and also fearing that her practice would suffer if her vote
preferences became known, Forney skipped casting a vote in at least one race to
avoid the risk of personal pecuniary harm.
b) Brian Blosser (Fulton County)
151. Brian Blosser, (“Blosser”) has been a member of Coalition since
January 2018.
152. Blosser was prohibited from voting on April 18, 2017, in the CD6
Special Election when his name did not appear on the eligible voter rolls for CD6,
and was instead erroneously listed as a resident of CD11. Blosser was not
permitted to vote a provisional ballot, even after he made repeated attempts to have
Fulton County election officials correct this system error. At a public meeting on
55
April 22, 2017, Barron and the Fulton Board Members blamed this error on a
“software glitch.”
c) Megan Missett (Fulton County)
153. Member Plaintiff Megan Missett, an elector of Fulton County, voted
by DRE in each of the last several elections for which she was eligible, including
most recently, the Fulton County November 2017 election and December 2017
runoff. Missett was deprived of her right to vote in a verifiable, reliable election
conducted in a manner that ensured that her vote would be counted accurately.
Missett was deprived of her right to participate in the public observation of the
December 5, 2017, runoff election in the City of Atlanta and was thereby deprived
of access to public information concerning the election.
d) Mr. and Ms. Digges (Cobb County)

154. Member Plaintiffs Mr. and Ms. Digges, electors of Cobb County,
voted a mail-in paper absentee ballot in the June 2017 CD6 Special Election
Runoff despite their preferences to vote in their neighborhood precinct on Election
Day. Mr. and Ms. Digges chose to vote by mail-in paper absentee ballot because
they were aware that an electronic ballot cast using an AccuVote DRE was
insecure, not verifiable or re-countable, and incapable of being guaranteed to be a
secret ballot. In order to cast their absentee ballots by mail, Mr. and Ms. Digges
56
were required to undergo the inconvenience of requesting paper ballot and the cost
of postage required to mail their ballots. In addition, by choosing to vote by using
a mail-in absentee ballot, Mr. and Ms. Digges became subject to the corresponding
need to place their ballots in the mail well before Election Day to ensure timely
delivery and the ability to confirm timely receipt. Accordingly, Mr. and Ms.
Digges were deprived of the ability to await the latest campaign information before
making their voting decisions and voting as part of their community in their home
precinct along with their neighbors.
e) Mr. Davis (Cherokee County)
155. Member Plaintiff Ricardo Davis, an elector of Cherokee County,
voted a mail-in paper absentee ballot in all prior elections for over 10 years
(including the November 8, 2016, election), with the exception of Cherokee
County Special Election on November 7, 2017. As an Information Technology
professional, Davis has been keenly aware of the security and reliability
deficiencies of AccuVote DREs and that a vote cast on such voting units cannot be
audited or recounted, and that the secrecy of such a vote cannot be guaranteed. To
avoid these burdens on his right to vote, Davis avoided voting on a DRE, and
instead took steps to cast his votes by mail-in absentee paper ballot. In order to do
so, Mr. Davis was required to undergo the inconveniences of requesting paper
57
ballot and the costs of postage necessary to mail his ballot. In addition, because he
chose to vote by means of mail-in absentee paper ballots, Mr. Davis was forced to
place his voted ballots in the mail well before Election Day to ensure their timely
delivery and to give himself the ability to ensure receipt. Accordingly, Mr. Davis
was deprived of the ability to await the latest campaign information before making
his voting decisions and to vote on Election Day along with his community
members in his nearby neighborhood precinct.
156. In the November 7, 2017, Cherokee County Special Election, Davis
was unable to submit his mail-in ballot application in time, so he was required to
choose between not voting at all and voting by AccuVote DRE.
157. All of the foregoing Coalition members were injured by being
required to vote in an election conducted using AccuVote DREs, which deprived
them of their right to participate in a trustworthy and verifiable election process
that safely, accurately, and reliably records and counts all votes cast and that
produces a reliable election result capable of being verified as true in a recount or
election contest.
158. All of the foregoing Coalition members were additionally injured by
being required by Defendants to cast votes on AccuVote DREs—and thereby to
58
suffer violations of their constitutional rights—as a condition of being permitted by
Defendants to enjoy the benefits and conveniences of casting a ballot in person.
Imminent Future Injury
159. Each of Coalition’s foregoing members intends to vote in each of the
Relevant Upcoming Elections in his or her respective county.
160. Each of Coalition’s Georgia members will be required to cast their
votes in the Relevant Upcoming Elections using Georgia’s AccuVote DREs or to
suffer the burdens required to obtain and cast a mail-in absentee ballot as an
alternative.
161. Each of Coalition’s Georgia members will again be exposed to all the
same injuries they have suffered in the past if Defendants again enforce O.C.G.A.
§ 21–2–383(b) and State Election Board Rule 183–1–12–.01 in the Relevant
Upcoming Elections.
162. Each of Coalition’s Georgia members voting in the Relevant
Upcoming Elections, if required to vote using an unreliable, untrustworthy
AccuVote DRE, will be irreparably harmed in the following ways:
• By suffering burdens and infringements on the fundamental
right to vote caused by having to use a voting machine that
59
cannot be relied upon for a trustworthy and verifiable election
result;
• By suffering burdens and infringements on the fundamental
right to vote caused by having to use a voting machine that
cannot guarantee a secret ballot;
• By suffering burdens and infringements on the First
Amendment right to anonymous free speech and association
caused by having to use a voting machine that cannot guarantee
a secret ballot;
• By suffering unequal protection of the state right to a secret
ballot caused by having to use a voting machine that cannot
guarantee a secret ballot, while similarly situated absentee
electors who vote a mail-in ballot in the same election are
allowed to vote a secret ballot;
• By suffering the arbitrary and capricious deprivation without
due process of the state right to a secret ballot caused by having
to use a voting machine that cannot guarantee a secret ballot;
60
• By having to endure the foregoing constitutional deprivations
as the condition of being allowed to cast a ballot in person at
the polls, either during advance voting or on Election Day.
163. Each of Coalition’s Georgia members voting in the Relevant
Upcoming Elections will be irreparably harmed in the exercise of the fundamental
right to vote if his or her votes are tabulated together with the votes of other voters
who cast their ballots using unreliable, untrustworthy AccuVote DREs.
164. Each of Coalition’s Georgia members who to cast his or her
individual ballots using AccuVote DREs will be irreparably harmed in the exercise
of their constitutional, fundamental right to vote in the Relevant Upcoming
Elections if they are required to cast their individual ballots using—or in an
election in which anyone used—AccuVote DREs.
165. Each of the foregoing harms to each of Coalition’s Georgia members
is imminent for standing purposes because each of the Relevant Upcoming
Elections is set to occur on a fixed date not later than eighteen months after the
date when this action was filed in Fulton County Superior Court on July 3, 2017.
166. None of Coalition’s Georgia members can be adequately compensated
for these harms in an action at law for money damages brought after the fact
because the violation of constitutional rights is an irreparable injury.
61
VII. CLAIMS
COUNT I: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO VOTE
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Threatened Infringement of the Fundamental Right to Vote in Violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Guarantee of (Substantive) Due Process
(Right to a trustworthy and verifiable election; Unconstitutional condition)
(Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against all Defendants)
167. Plaintiff Coalition incorporates and realleges each of the foregoing
Paragraphs 1 through 166.
168. The right of all eligible citizens to vote in public elections is a
fundamental right of individuals that is protected by the United States Constitution
and incorporated against the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
169. Inherent in individuals’ fundamental right to vote is the right to
participate in a trustworthy and verifiable election process that safely, accurately,
and reliably records and counts all votes cast and that produces a reliable election
result capable of being verified as true in a recount or election contest.
170. By requiring the Member Plaintiffs and other members of Coalition to
vote using AccuVote DREs in the Relevant Upcoming Elections, Defendants
Kemp, the State Board Members, and the Fulton Board Members will knowingly
62
burden severely and infringe upon the fundamental right to vote of the Member
Plaintiffs and other members of Coalition and will injure Coalition by causing it to
divert resources and personnel from other ongoing projects.
171. These severe burdens and infringements that will be caused by
Defendants’ conduct will violate the fundamental right to vote of the Member
Plaintiffs and other members of Coalition.
Defendants’ conduct are not outweighed or justified by, and are not necessary to
promote, any substantial or compelling state interest that cannot be accomplished
by other, less restrictive means, like conducting the Relevant Upcoming Elections
using paper ballots.
173. Requiring voters to suffer these severe burdens and infringements
upon their constitutional right to vote as a condition of being able to enjoy the
benefits and conveniences of being permitted to cast their ballots in person at the
polls violates the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine.
174. The foregoing violations will occur as a consequence of Defendants
Kemp, the State Board Members, and the Fulton Board Members acting under
color of state law. Accordingly, Coalition and the Member Plaintiffs bring this
63
cause of action for prospective equitable relief against Defendants Kemp, the State
Board Members, and the Fulton Board Members pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
175. Unless Defendants Kemp, the State Board Members, and the Fulton
Board Members are enjoined by this Court, then the Coalition Plaintiffs will have
no adequate legal, administrative, or other remedy by which to prevent or
minimize the irreparable, imminent injury that is threatened by Defendants’
intended conduct. Accordingly, injunctive relief against these Defendants is
warranted.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court preliminarily
and permanently enjoin Defendants Kemp, the State Board Members, and the
Fulton Board Members from enforcing O.C.G.A. § 21–2–383(b) and State Election
Board Rule 183–1–12–.01; and from requiring voters to vote using DREs; and
grant such other relief as may be warranted.
64
COUNT II: EQUAL PROTECTION
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Threatened Infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Guarantee of

Equal Protection
(fundamental right to vote, the right to freedom of speech and association, and
the Georgia state constitutional right to a secret ballot; unconstitutional
condition)
(Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against all Defendants)
176. Plaintiff Coalition incorporates and realleges each of the foregoing
Paragraphs 1 through 166.
177. By requiring the Member Plaintiffs and other members of Coalition to
vote using AccuVote DREs in the Relevant Upcoming Elections, Defendants
Kemp, the State Board Members, and the Fulton Board Members will knowingly
treat the Member Plaintiffs and other members of Coalition who vote by DRE
differently than other, similarly situated electors in the same election who vote
using mail-in paper ballots.
178. Because of this differential treatment, Member Plaintiffs and other
members of Coalition who vote by DRE will suffer greater and more severe
burdens and infringements on their underlying substantive rights—namely, the
fundamental right to vote, the right to freedom of speech and association, and the
65
Georgia state constitutional right to a secret ballot—than will other, similarly
situated electors.
179. These severe burdens and infringements that Defendants will impose
unequally on Member Plaintiffs and other members of Coalition who vote by DRE
will violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendants’ conduct are not outweighed or justified by, and are not necessary to
promote, any substantial or compelling state interest that cannot be accomplished
by other, less restrictive means, like conducting the Relevant Upcoming Elections
using paper ballots.
181. Requiring voters to be deprived of their constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws as a condition of being able to enjoy the benefits and
conveniences of voting in person at the polls violates the unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine.
182. The foregoing violations will occur as a consequence of Defendants
Kemp, the State Board Members, and the Fulton Board Members acting under
color of state law. Accordingly, Coalition and the Member Plaintiffs bring this
cause of action for prospective equitable relief against Defendants Kemp, the State
Board Members, and the Fulton Board Members pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
66
183. Unless Defendants Kemp, the State Board Members, and the Fulton
Board Members are enjoined by this Court, then the Coalition Plaintiffs will have
no adequate legal, administrative, or other remedy by which to prevent or
minimize the irreparable, imminent injury that is threatened by Defendants’
intended conduct. Accordingly, injunctive relief against these Defendants is
warranted.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court preliminarily
and permanently enjoin Defendants Kemp, the State Board Members, and the
Fulton Board Members from enforcing O.C.G.A. § 21–2–383(b) and State Election
Board Rule 183–1–12–.01; and from requiring voters to vote using DREs; and
grant such other relief as may be warranted.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:
A. Enter a judgment finding and declaring it unconstitutional for any
public election to be conducted using any model of DRE voting unit;
B. Enter a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants
Kemp, the State Board Members, and the Fulton Board Members from enforcing
O.C.G.A. § 21–2–383(b) and State Election Board Rule 183–1–12–.01 and from
requiring voters to vote using DREs;
67
C. Enter a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants
Kemp, the State Board Members, and the Fulton Board Members from conducting
or authorizing the conduct of any public election using optical scanned paper
ballots without requiring the conduct in each case of post-election audits of paper
ballots to verify the results reported by the tabulation machines;
D. Enter a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants
Kemp, the State Board Members, and the Fulton Board Members from conducting
or authorizing the conduct of any public election without requiring subordinate
election officials to permit, meaningful public observation of all stages of election
processing;
E. Retain jurisdiction to ensure all Defendants’ ongoing compliance with
the foregoing Orders.
F. Grant Plaintiff an award of its reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and
expenses incurred in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
G. Grant Plaintiff such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Dated: April 4, 2018.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Robert A. McGuire, III

Robert A. McGuire, III
Admitted Pro Hac Vice (ECF No. 125)
68
ROBERT MCGUIRE LAW FIRM

2703 Jahn Ave NW, Suite C-7
Gig Harbor, WA 98335
T: (844) 318-6730
Attorney for Plaintiff Coalition for Good

Governance
/s/ Cary Ichter

Cary Ichter
Georgia Bar No. 382515
[email protected]
Ichter Davis, LLC

3340 Peachtree Road NE
Suite 1530
Atlanta, GA 30326
Tel.: 404.869.5243
Fax: 404.869.7610
Attorney for Plaintiffs Coalition for Good

Governance, William Digges III, Laura
Digges, Ricardo Davis, and Megan Missett
/s/ Bruce P. Brown

Bruce P. Brown
Georgia Bar No. 064460
[email protected]
Bruce P. Brown Law LLC

1123 Zonolite Rd. NE
Suite 6
Atlanta, Georgia 30306
(404) 881-0700
69
Attorney for Plaintiff Coalition for Good

Governance
/s/ William Brent Ney

William Brent Ney
GA Bar Number 542519
NEY HOFFECKER PEACOCK & HAYLE, LLC

One Midtown Plaza, Suite 1010
1360 Peachtree Street NE
Atlanta, GA 30309
T: (404) 842-7232
Attorney for Plaintiffs Coalition for Good

Governance, William Digges III, Laura
Digges, Ricardo Davis, and Megan Missett
70

Coalition Proposed Third Amended Complaint

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Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 160-1 Filed 04/04/18 Page 1 of 74

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFFS COALITION FOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii

II. PARTIES .........................................................................................................10

1. Plaintiff Coalition for Good Governance .................................................10

2. Plaintiff Individuals Who Are Members of Coalition (the “Member

3. Former Plaintiff Individuals. ....................................................................13

4. Plaintiff Individuals Who Are Not Now Members of Coalition (the

1. Defendant Secretary. ................................................................................14

2. Defendant State Board Members. ............................................................15

3. Defendants Fulton Board Members. ........................................................17

4. All Other Previously Named Defendants Are Now Dismissed Without

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE .....................................................................18

IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................19

A. The United States Constitution ...................................................................19

B. The Georgia Constitution ............................................................................20

C. The Georgia Election Code .........................................................................20

D. Georgia’s Regulation of Elections ..............................................................24

V. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS ..........................................................................25

A. How Georgia’s Voting System Works. .......................................................25

B. AccuVote DREs Are Insecure and Vulnerable to Malicious Hacking. ......29

C. AccuVote DREs Fail to Provide Absolute Secrecy of the Ballot. ..............33

D. Security Breaches at KSU and CES Have Further Compromised Georgia’s

VI. SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS ..........................................................................38

A. Conduct of All Defendants—Past and Threatened .....................................38

B. Conduct of Defendant Secretary—Past and Threatened.............................41

C. Conduct of Defendant State Board Members—Threatened .......................44

D. Conduct of Defendant Fulton Board Members—Past and Threatened. .....44

E. Standing of Plaintiff Coalition ....................................................................50

1. Coalition Has Organizational Standing Derived from Past and

Threatened Direct Injuries to Coalition. ..........................................................50

2. Coalition Has Associational Standing Derived from Past and Threatened

VII. CLAIMS ......................................................................................................62

COUNT I: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO VOTE .............................................62

COUNT II: EQUAL PROTECTION .................................................................65

PRAYER FOR RELIEF ..........................................................................................67

Plaintiffs Coalition for Good Governance (“Coalition”), Laura Digges,

for their Third Amended Complaint, allege as follows:

infrastructure is susceptible to malicious manipulation from local and foreign

refused to take administrative, regulatory or legislative action to address the

election security failures.

2. This is a civil rights action for declaratory and injunctive relief

places—the State’s direct recording electronic voting machines (“DREs”) as the

means of casting their ballot. Because Georgia’s DRE touchscreen voting

and reported in an accurate, auditable, legal, and transparent process.

secret ballot—“the hard-won right to vote one’s conscience without fear of

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 (1995).

4. The Coalition Plaintiffs challenge Georgia’s use of DREs in the May

“Relevant Upcoming Elections”).1 Without this Court’s intervention, the flawed

unreliable un-auditable voting machines has a deleterious impact on the

municipalities have continued to conduct scores of regularly scheduled and special

elections. For example, on November 7, 2017, WAGA reported on the results of

prior to the November general election.

5. The Coalition Plaintiffs seek to have the Relevant Upcoming

Georgia’s election statutes.

6. The relief requested is especially critical since Plaintiff Coalition and

obligation of Georgia’s election officials under O.C.G.A. § 21–2–406 to “perform