GAPS Guidelines: Utility System Problems Capacity and Distribution

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GAPS Guidelines GAP.5.7.1.

A Publication of Global Asset Protection Services LLC

UTILITY SYSTEM PROBLEMS


CAPACITY AND DISTRIBUTION

INTRODUCTION
Electric utility companies usually supply continuous, reliable, sinusoidal, ac voltages at needed levels.
But utilities have limited generating, transmission and distribution capacity. Unusual loads and events
can result in service interruptions, voltage reductions, voltage surges and other waveform distortions.
A heat wave may cause an unusual load to be placed on the utility system and may necessitate the
implementation of controls in order to maintain service with a minimum of disruption to customers.
Winds may sway or break tree limbs, causing line contact or arcing, resulting in service interruptions
for all customers downstream of protective switchgear. Other unusual events include ice storms,
lightning, the switching of equipment under load and vehicle accidents that result in utility system
damage.
Many utility problems cause only inconvenience to consumers. The effects may not be noticed at all.
Momentary interruptions and small voltage surges are common examples. But these same
disruptions can have disastrous effects on other customers.
Utilities minimize disruptions by the arrangement, maintenance and protection of utility equipment and
lines. Some disruptions are avoided by increasing the capacity of the system. Regional “pools” are
formed to combine the capacities of member utilities. Each member supplies power to a grid, thus
providing a large reserve capacity which is accessible by all systems for any local area need.
In the U.S., fast growing demands and years of only minor increases in total utility capacity have
caused an overall reduction in reserves. Complicating the problem, distribution systems have become
more restricted as land for right-of-ways becomes harder to obtain.
To limit system disruptions following a fault, a break in a power line or damage to equipment as from
fire or vehicular accident, utilities can provide manual or automatic disconnects of power feeding the
damaged section. Generally, these power outages affect relatively small isolated areas, and last for
as long as it takes to make repairs.
To avoid or minimize disruptions when a catastrophic event occurs or when demands reach or
exceed normal generating capacity, a utility may put older, idle, less-efficient units back on line, or
may purchase additional power from other utility companies. When it is necessary to reduce loads
due to insufficient system capacity, special control methods are used to minimize the effect of the
disruption. These include:
• Conservation - Emergency appeals are made to all customers for a voluntary shutdown of
nonessential electrical equipment.
• Load Interruption - Selected large industrial and commercial electric power users are requested
to shut down during peak load periods, generally for several hours.
• Brownout - The utility system voltage is reduced.
• Blackout - Sections of distribution or transmission circuits are manually disconnected as a control
to prevent serious overload on generating or transmission equipment, or both.

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Global Asset Protection Services LLC and its affiliated organizations provide loss prevention surveys and other risk management, business continuity and facility asset
management services. Unless otherwise stated in writing, our personnel, publications, services, and surveys do not address life safety or third party liability issues. The
provision of any service is not meant to imply that every possible hazard has been identified at a facility or that no other hazards exist. Global Asset Protection Services LLC
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specifically disclaim any warranty or representation that compliance with any advice or recommendation in any document or other communication will make a facility or
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GAP.5.7.1.2

Some customers experience more electric power disruptions than others. Some even request
multiple remote service connections to try to improve power reliability. However even then, the
reliability of purchased electric power may not be satisfactory.
Means to further improve the reliability of on-site power include supplemental, private electric power
supplies. Alternate considerations include nonelectric power systems such as diesel engine drivers in
lieu of electric motors.
These management decisions are best handled as part of a loss control management program, such
as that described in Global Asset Protection Services’ (GAPS) OVERVIEW. Generally, the individuals
responsible for Hazard Identification and Evaluation and Pre-Emergency Planning have the
responsibility to review and evaluate utility disruptions, their hazards and loss potentials.
This guideline discusses the reliability of public electric power supplies and related loss control
considerations. A detailed discussion of power quality (clean verses dirty power) and reliability is
beyond the scope of this document. Additional information can be found in GAP.5.7.1.3.

POSITION
Assign the Emergency Coordinator the responsibility to document all utility disruptions, and to make
this information available to the committees responsible for Pre-Emergency Planning and Hazard
Identification and Evaluation.
Write Pre-Emergency Plans to direct prompt reviews of all utility disruptions. Include specific
directives to guide actions during protracted emergencies, such as directing measures to:
• Set and update priorities.
• Prevent or mitigate unsafe conditions.
• Control damage and losses.
• Counteract impairments to protection and surveillance systems.
• Provide an effective, logical and safe plan for the restoration of power following lengthy outages.
• Expedite repairs.
Maintain an up-to-date off-premises power analysis if public utility electric power reliability is important
to loss control. This off-premises power analysis should be periodically updated and reviewed by the
Hazard Identification and Evaluation committee.

DISCUSSION
Utility power disruptions should be considered important to loss control if they:
• Supply critical components and systems.
• Create a hazardous situation by preventing an orderly shutdown of hazardous processes and
equipment.
• Result in an impairment to an electric pump used in a fire protection water supply.
• Result in an impairment to special extinguishing system, special exhaust system, fire detection
system or alarm signaling system.
• Result in significant property damage.
• Or, result in a serious interruption to business based on high time element values.
Where utility reliability is important to loss control efforts, an off-premises power analysis should be
made to determine if improvements are needed. GAP.5.7.1.1 describes such an analysis. The off-
premises power analysis should be periodically reviewed for updating, especially whenever a
newspaper item, broadcast announcement or utility communication identifies a changed condition.
Examples of such changes include a critical power situation, recent system problems, unusual
demands, equipment damage and equipment or system changes.

GAPS Guidelines
2 A Publication of Global Asset Protection Services LLC
GAP.5.7.1.2

Promptly review utility disruptions and take appropriate action to mitigate losses. Take the following
courses of action:
• Implement load interruption in a way that will avoid increased hazards and impairments of fire
protection equipment. The Emergency Coordinator normally handles such tasks.
• Analyze the effects of brownouts. For instance, a low voltage power supply may damage a
computer. Similarly, as described in NFPA 20, the voltages to a fire pump motor and controller
should not fall below specified minimums. Voltages below these levels will result in less reliable
starting or breakdown during pump operation due to overheating caused by high current flow. A
utility voltage reduction of less than 5% will not normally cause a problem, however each
installation requires analysis. Where there is a history of brownouts and their effects on a pump
are questionable, appropriate action may include testing the pump during a brownout. It may be
possible to avoid low voltage problems during brownouts by changing tap connections on a supply
transformer, if this does not cause excessive voltages when service returns to the normally
supplied voltage. The Hazard Identification and Evaluation function normally performs these types
of reviews.
• Evaluate the need for power system changes to improve power reliability. The provision of an
uninterruptible power supply for a computer system is one example of an improvement made to
prevent the loss of valuable data upon even a momentary power outage. The addition of a diesel
engine driven fire pump to replace or supplement an electric motor driven pump might similarly be
appropriate where the reliability of the utility electric power supply is questionable due to a history
of power outages or blackouts. The group responsible for the Hazard Identification and Evaluation
function normally performs these reviews.
Increased surveillance may be needed during blackouts and other power outages. Arranging for a fire
department pumper to remain at the site may be appropriate. But also, long-term actions to improve
the reliability of a power supply may be necessary. These actions may include the installation of an
additional remote utility service connection and the provision of a private means of power generation.
For a facility following a Loss Prevention and Control Program similar to GAPS’ OVERVIEW, these
features are readily identified and addressed. Those responsible for Hazard Identification and
Evaluation and for Pre-Emergency Planning should be satisfied that the consequences of public
electric power supply losses are recognized, that the susceptibility has been analyzed, and that
adequate controls are in place.

GAPS Guidelines
3 A Publication of Global Asset Protection Services LLC

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