People v.

Bayotas (digest)

FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof. Pending appeal of
his conviction, Bayotas died. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to the civil liability of
Bayotas arising from his commission of the offense charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.

HELD:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by death of the convict personal liabilities are
extinguished, as to pecuniary penalties liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.

Thus the court made a ruling as follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon;
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Aricle 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission: Law, Contracts, Quasi-contracts, Delicts…,Quasi-delicts;
3. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by way of
separate civil action and may be enforced either against the executor/administrator of the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation aside from delicts;
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute
of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension
on a possible privation of right by prescription.

In the case at bar, the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely on the act
of rape. Hence, his civil liability also extinguished together with his criminal liability upon his death.

People v. Bayotas
FACTS
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof. Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died in the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest.
Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal.
However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising
from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view
that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the
offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that
the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which
the civil liability is based. Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the
Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked
the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in
a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
ISSUE & ARGUMENTS
Whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Yes. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part: Art. 89. How
criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished: (1.) By the death
of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; The legal precept
contained in this Article is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870. Accordingly,
SC rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to
recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of
obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be
enforced. If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of
law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be
filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court: Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall
be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property,
or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for
an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him. This is in consonance
with our ruling in Belamala where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an
independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor
or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule
86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied.
Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which
have their source in delict or tort. Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises
from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec.
5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

Summary of Rules:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of
the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore." 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission: (a) Law (b) Contracts (c) Quasi-contracts (d) . . . (e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where
the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above. 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear
a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. 22 Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, SC held that the death of
appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
Philippine Rabbit vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004

Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment and to pay damages. The court further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused,
petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had
become final and executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal
case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the
criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.

Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee,
may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu
proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is based on the
rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond.

2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal
prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a
criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment
of conviction meted out to the employee.

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict
per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a
civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the
offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in
order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they
are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in
effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability.
While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present
case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the
event of the latter’s insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not
expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the
accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is
subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil
liability.

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify
or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the
final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly
amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is
binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with
regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the
accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his
flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is
correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the
primary civil liability.

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs People of the Philippines G.R. No. 147703, April 24, 2004
FACTS
“On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage
to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11)
days to six (6) years, and to pay damages several people.
• “The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the
civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
• “Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section
8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel
for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied
by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
• “Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial
court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioner’s] notice of appeal. On
December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor
General received [a] copy of [petitioner’s] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused
from filing [respondents’] brief on the ground that the OSG’s authority to represent People is confined to
criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999.
On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to dismiss.”6 (Citations
omitted)
• The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising
from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the
employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
• The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability fixed
in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final
judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA,
then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the
civil liability of the accused was the employer’s subsidiary liability. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the
judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

The Petition has no merit.
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and
executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own
behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of
the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision
that has become final and executory. Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil
liabilities of innkeepers, as follows: “In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers,
and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees. “Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable
for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the
innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given
them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper’s employees.”

Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which
reads: “The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.”

Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by petitioner. At
the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are
deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides: “When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action. “x x x xxx x x x” Only the civil liability of the accused
arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the
criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out
to the employee.

It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and
allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain “separate, distinct and independent” of any
criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and
omission: 1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the
criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein. 2. The institution or the waiver of
the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring
such action. 3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same
act or omission.

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or
delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or
quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
prosecution remains, and the offended party may – subject to the control of the prosecutor – still
intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.

This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that “[e]very person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.”

Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is conclusively
bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to
its logical conclusion – including the appeal.

The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was
filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they
are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in
effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability.
While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present
case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, the
accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below
final. Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived his right
to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc ruled: “There
are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of
appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or
not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the
case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal
from the judgment rendered against him. X x x.”

By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed himself
in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of
justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option. Such conduct is intolerable and does not
invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.

Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to
the proper authorities becomes final and executory.

Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the accused-
employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal
case against him is now final.

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings
of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., Alvarez v. CA and Yusay v. Adil do not apply to
the present case, because it has followed the Court’s directive to the employers in these cases to take
part in the criminal cases against their employees. By participating in the defense of its employee,
herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.

Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of
the most basic tenet they have laid down – that an employer’s liability in a finding of guilt against its
accused-employee is subsidiary.

Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated
civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. The provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on subsidiary liability – Articles 102 and 103 – are deemed written into the judgments in the
cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not
expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.

In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of
conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a
criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability. To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed
in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their
employees without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or
defeating the judgment.

The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not
only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.

Before the employers’ subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence
establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former are
engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the
discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to
insolvency.
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination
must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and freely present.
Such determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s liability,
criminal and civil, has been pronounced;51 and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due
notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.

Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not
mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation
erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employee’s conviction has attained
finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.

According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction could
be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not
affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-
employee.

The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the
accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for
this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is
dependent upon the conviction of the former. The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and
dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter
has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has
also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary
liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
Air France v Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155
Nature: Petition for Review by Certiorari of a decision of CA
FACTS:
Rafael Carrascoso was one of the 28 Filipino pilgrims who left Manila for Lourdes. He had a first class round trip
ticket from Manila to ROME. However, when the plane was in Bangkok, the Manager forced him to vacate his first
class seat because a white man had a better right to the seat. Carrascoso filed complaint for damages.

ISSUE:
won damages may be recovered on the basis of expulsion.

HELD: Yes
Ratio:
The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with public duty. Passengers should be protected and
insured a pleasant trip. Wrongful expulsion is a violation of public duty by the air carrier – a quasi delict. Damages are
proper. Doubt WON ticket was confirmed as first class is immaterial as claim is based on the wrongful expulsion
itself.

Air France v. Carascoso and CA

G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
FACTS
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked
to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager
that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr.
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr.
Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave
his "first class" seat in the plane.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims and therefore entitles to damages?

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Yes. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first
class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first
class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a
first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon
the availability of first class seats. If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to
a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then
an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security, then, can a passenger
have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the
passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a
uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the
relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the
case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the
ticket. Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat or, if
another had a better right to the seat? To authorize an award for moral damages there must be an
averment of fraud or bad faith. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the
complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set
forth therein. The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the
action is put on wrongful expulsion. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if
any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is
that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an
action for damages against the carrier.

Air France vs Rafael Carrascoso

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome from
Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in
Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man
allegedly has a “better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise
of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the plane’s tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for
the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when
he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by a
plane purser who told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded damages in
favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a first class
ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in truth
and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding the note made by the
purser because the said note was never presented in court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.

HELD: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.

Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish
Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France failed to
furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s
employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was already,
seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.

The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a
passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.

Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there
is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air France’s
contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper.
AIR FRANCE V CARRASCOSO September 28, 1966 AIR FRANCE, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL
CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on
March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked
to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager
that his seat would be taken over his dead body. After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI – Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral
damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first
class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts with interest at
the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and
the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and
voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on
any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class
ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the
availability of first class seats.

ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?

RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he
imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having
to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not
been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning
different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."

For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of
the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.

Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is
placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case
of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
Andamo v. IAC
Doctrine:
It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Facts:
Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to
that of private respondent corporation, Missionaries of Our lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the land of the
latter, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly
inundated and eroded petitioner’s land, caused a young man to drown, damagaed petitioner’s crops and
plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the livesofthepetitioners and their laborers and some
other destructions. This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means of
inundation under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages.
Issue:
Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused by respondent’s
waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Held:
Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Clearly, from petitioner’s complaint, the
waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of
petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence
which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is
not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of
others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must
be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to
adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause
injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the
injury or damage suffered.
Castro vs. People
Facts: This case is a petition on certiorari emanated from the complaint for grave oral defamation filed by
Atty. Albert P. Tan against the petitioner Jerome Castro. The petitioner is the assistant of headmaster in
the Reedly International School, while the private respondent Atty. Albert Tan is a parent of Justin Albert,
who is studying in the said School. The RIS issued a letter to the parents of Justine Albert that their son
accumulated 34 code violations including public display of affection and conduct unbecoming of a
gentleman. As a sanction, RIS exclude their son from participating in the graduation ceremony. But Atty.
Tan filed a complaint in the Department of Education alleging that the dismissal of his son was
undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation ------------Dep-Ed rendered its decision in
favor of Tan, ordering the RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any condition. Thus he was able to
participate in the graduation ceremony. On the day of the graduation ceremony, Atty. Tan met Bernice C.
Ching, a fellow parent at RIS. During their conversation, Tan intimated that he was contemplating a suit
against the officers of RIS in their personal capacities, including the petitioner who was the assistant
headmaster. Then Chin made a call to the petitioner and told him the plan of Tan to sue the officers of
RIS in their personal capacity, at the end of their conversation the petitioner told ching “okay, you too,
take care and be careful talking to tan, that’s dangerous”. Ching then made another phone call to atty.
Tan and informed him that the petitioner said “talking to him is dangerous” Insulted, Tan filed a complaint
for grave oral defamation in the office of the City prosecutor of Mandaluyong city against the petitioner on
August 21, 2003. On Nov. 3, 2003, petitioner was charge with oral defamation in the Metropolitan trial
court (MeTC)

The prosecution essentially tried to establish that the petitioner depicted Tan as dangerous man through
the testimony given by Ching. Then Atty. Tan added that petitioner probably took offense because of the
complaint he filed against RIS in the Dep-Ed

The petitioner denied harboring ill-feelings against Tan despite the latter’s complaint against RIS in the
Dep-Ed. Although he admitted conversing with Ching on the telephone. The MeTC rendered its decision
in favored of Atty. Tan finding the petitioner guilty beyond doubt of the crime of grave oral defamation. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed and modified the decision of MeTC declaring that the petitioner is guilty of slight
oral defamation. But because Tan filed his complaint in the office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City on August 21, 2003, the RTC ruled that prescription already set in, therefore acquitted petitioner on
that ground. The office of the Solicitor General fled a petition for certiorari in the court of appeals assailing
the decision of the RTC ( acted in grave abuse of discretion when it downgraded petitioners offense)-----
the CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, therefore CA reinstated the MeTC
decision. Petitioner appealed in the Supreme Court in the contention that CA erred in taking cognizance
of the petition for certiorari inasmuch as the OSG raised errors of judgment but failed to prove that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. Thus, double jeopardy attached when RTC acquitted him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner violated article 26 when he announced that the Private respondent
is a dangerous man.

Ruled: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could have been guilty of violation of article 26 of the
civil code if it was raised in the case. Since the petitioner is an educator, he is supposed to be a role
model for the youth. As such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith. The action of the petitioner could cause damage to the private respondent.
Damage are provided for violations of tan's personal dignity, personality and privacy that may result for
alienation of tan from his friends. Article 26 every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
1)xxxxxx 2)xxxxxx 3) intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
Fabre vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a Mazda minibus. They used the bus
principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in Manila. It was
driven by Porfirio Cabil.

On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged
with the petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La
Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.

The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen
was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La
Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that
night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway. The road was slippery because it was
raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road
shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one
Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of
impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front
portion. Because of the mishap, several passengers were injured particularly Amyline Antonio.

Criminal complaint was filed against the driver and the spouses were also made jointly liable. Spouses
Fabre on the other hand contended that they are not liable since they are not a common carrier. The RTC
of Makati ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the defendants were ordered to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether the spouses Fabre are common carriers?

Held: Petition was denied. Spouses Fabre are common carriers.

The Supreme Court held that this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres,
did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held: 10 Art. 1732, Common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.

The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as
"a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers
services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article
1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.

ENGRACIO FABRE, JR. and PORFIRIO CABIL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. no. 111127, July 26, 1996

FACTS:
Petitioner Fabre and his wife were the owners of 1982 model Mazda minibus. They were using the said
vehicle as a school bus service for children in Manila. They hired Cabil as their driver. On November 2,
1982, private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for
the transportation of members of young adult ministry from Manila to La Union and back. While travelling,
they met an accident. The bus hit a fence and a coconut tree that caused passengers to be injured
including respondent Antonio.
The WWCF and Antonio then filed a criminal complaint against the driver, the trial court decided in favor
of respondents. All evidence presented showed the negligence of the defendants ultimately resulted to
the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are liable for the injuries suffered by the respondents based on culpa
contractual and/or culpa aquiliana.

RULING:
The Court ruled that damages should be awarded based on the theory that petitioners are liable for
breach of contract of carriage or culpa contractual or on the theory of quasi delict or culpa aquiliana
holding thatthe relation of passenger and carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature,” nevertheless
“the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. In both sources of obligation, the existence of
negligence of petitioners must be determined. In this case, Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his
employer, the Fabres, who owned the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of their employee is fully supported by the evidence on record. Pursuant to
Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the presumption that his employers, the
Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of their employee. Thus, the finding of
the Court that petitioners are liable under Arts. 2176 and 2180 for quasi delictfully justify that they are
guilty of breach of contract of carriage under Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1759 of the Civil Code.

Calalas v CA. G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000 VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
FACTS:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a
college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney
owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the
door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she
was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing
so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion
of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier.
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu
truck.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. RTC – Dumaguete – rendered judgment against Salva holding that the driver of the Isuzu truck was
responsible
It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for
quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to
Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
2. CA – reversed the RTC, awarding damages instead to Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of
contract of carriage since the cause of action was based on such and not quasi delict.
Hence, current petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether (per ruling in Civil Case) negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates
his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its
passengers
In relation thereto, does the principle of res judicata apply?
RULING: No. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for
quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.

Quasi-delict / culpa aquiliana / culpa extra contractual

1. Has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor
2. negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action
3. doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
(device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party,
obligation is created by law itself)

Breach of contract / culpa contractual

1. premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation
2. action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor
(here, the common carrier) failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination
3. not available; it is the parties themselves who create the obligation and the function of the law is merely
to regulate the relation thus created

In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to
the common carrier the burden of proof.

Hence, Vicente Calalas (operator) is liable since he did not exercise utmost diligence.
1. Jeepney was not properly parked;
2. Overloading of passengers.

VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and

FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
Judgments; Res Judicata;The principle of res judicata does not apply where a party in a pending case
was never a party in a previous one.—The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case
No.3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was
never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in
CivilCase No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether
Salva andhis driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner’s jeepney. On
the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first,
quasi-delict,also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of
the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in
the performance of a contractual obligation. Common Carriers; Breach of Contract; Quasi­Delicts;Torts; In
quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action,
whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination.— Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be
prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the
common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to
passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined
in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.
Cinco v. Canonoy
FACTS:
Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana
Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident
At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending
the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered
City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case
CFI by certiorari: dismissed

ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the
criminal action

HELD: YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for

nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant
primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to
protect society
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 3, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal
action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of
as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also
damage to property
word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident
involving his car and a jeepney driven by respondent Romeo Hilot and operated by respondents
Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver. At the pre-
trial of the civil case counsel for the respondents moved for the suspension of the civil action pending
determination of the criminal case invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The City Court
granted the motion and ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner elevated the matter on
certiorari to the Court of First Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court of First Instance
dismissed the petition; hence, this petition to review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to property during the pendency of
the criminal action.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil
Code is quasi-delictual in character which can be prosecuted independently of the criminal action.Where
the plaintiff made essential averments in the complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the
operation of the jeepney which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that
plaintiff sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal connection exists between the
damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant-driver and where the defendant-operator
in their answer, contended, among others, that they observed due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such action is
principally predicated on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in nature
and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent court action as specifically provided for in Article 2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule" in
which, "once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can
be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered". The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11
of the Rules of Court which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi delict.

The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so broad that it includes
not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between "damage to
persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two
concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that it
includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property
injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law itself which includes damage to property in Article 2191(2)
of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which
may be harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the
decision of the city court suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the criminal action is
finally terminated.

CINCO vs CANONOY
FACTS: Cinco filed a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City for the recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident because of the fault or negligence of Hilot involving his automobile and
Hilot'sjeepney. After such, a criminal case was filed against the driver arising from the same accident. At
the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending
the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered;
Judge Canonoy of City Court of Mandaue City ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied and he elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of
First Instance of Cebu with the allegation that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence.
CFI dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
a.) that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action
inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper
b.) that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his
claim for damages in the criminal case
c.) that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper; d.) that the
Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus.
Cinco filed a Petition for Review in SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action.
HELD: The City Court erred in reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The civil action
referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 is that arising from the criminal offense and not the civil
action based on quasi-delict
Art. 31 is more appropriate in this case.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of
as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter.
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the
civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated.

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V. C.A. & LUISA. LUNA
G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995
FACTS:
Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a Fareast card issued by petitioner
FEBTC.

Clarita informed FEBTC that she lost her credit card. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted an
affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures and policy would be
torecord the lost card, along with the principal card, as a "HotCard" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.

Luis then tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend. When he presented his fareast card to pay for
the lunch, the card was not honored, forcing him to pay in cash the bill. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed
by this incident.

Private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian
V. Festejo, a vice-president of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies, admitting that they have failed
to inform Luis about its security policy.

Private respondents then filed a complaint for damages in the RTC, which rendered a decision ordering
FEBTC to pay private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are entitled of moral damages.

HELD: NO. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to
have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.

Concededly, the bank was negligent for failing to inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in the
findings of the trial court and the appellate court can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part
of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. The failure to inform Luis is not considered to be so
gross that it would amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional
design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliguity; it is different from the negative idea
of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or ill-will.

Article 21 of the Code contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. In relation to a breach of contract, its
application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so
deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most
importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must, in
any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral
damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.

The decision is modified by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents;
in its stead, petitioner is ordered to pay nominal damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code