209215-2017-Padilla v. Congress of The Philippines

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 231671. July 25, 2017.]
ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, CHRISTIAN S.

MONSOD, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, RENE B. GOROSPE, and
SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA , petitioners, vs. CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, consisting of the SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, as
represented by Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III, and
the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, as represented by House
Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez , respondents.
[G.R. No. 231694. July 25, 2017.]
FORMER SEN. WIGBERTO E. TAADA, BISHOP EMERITUS

DEOGRACIAS S. IIGUEZ, BISHOP BRODERICK PABILLO, BISHOP
ANTONIO R. TOBIAS, MO. ADELAIDA YGRUBAY, SHAMAH BULANGIS
and CASSANDRA D. DELURIA , petitioners, vs. CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CONSISTING OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AQUILINO "KOKO" PIMENTEL III, President,
Senate of the Philippines, and PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, Speaker,
House of the Representatives , respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO , J : p
These consolidated petitions under consideration essentially assail the failure

and/or refusal of respondent Congress of the Philippines (the Congress), composed of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, to convene in joint session and therein
deliberate on Proclamation No. 216 issued on May 23, 2017 by President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte (President Duterte). Through Proclamation No. 216, President Duterte declared
a state of martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days effective from the date of
the proclamation's issuance. CAIHTE
In the Petition for Mandamus of Alexander A. Padilla (Padilla), Rene A.V. Saguisag
(Saguisag), Christian S. Monsod (Monsod), Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Rosales), Rene B.
Gorospe (Gorospe), and Senator Leila M. De Lima (Senator De Lima), led on June 6,
2017 and docketed as G.R. No. 231671 (the Padilla Petition), petitioners seek a ruling
from the Court directing the Congress to convene in joint session to deliberate on
Presidential Proclamation No. 216, and to vote thereon. 1
In the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus of former Senator Wigberto E.
Taada (Taada), Bishop Emeritus Deogracias Iiguez (Bishop Iiguez), Bishop
Broderick Pabillo (Bishop Pabillo), Bishop Antonio Tobias (Bishop Tobias), Mo.
Adelaida Ygrubay (Mo. Ygrubay), Shamah Bulangis (Bulangis), and Cassandra D. Deluria
(Deluria), led on June 7, 2017 and docketed as G.R. No. 231694 (the Taada Petition),
petitioners entreat the Court to: (a) declare the refusal of the Congress to convene in
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joint session for the purpose of considering Proclamation No. 216 to be in grave abuse
of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) issue a writ of
mandamus directing the Congress to convene in joint session for the aforementioned
purpose. 2
Respondent Congress, represented by the O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG),
led its Consolidated Comment on June 27, 2017. Respondents Senate of the
Philippines and Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III (Senate President
Pimentel), through the O ce of the Senate Legal Counsel, separately led their
Consolidated Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela) on June 29, 2017.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a
state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
Mindanao group of islands on the grounds of rebellion and necessity of public safety
pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.
Within forty-eight (48) hours after the proclamation, or on May 25, 2017, and
while the Congress was in session, President Duterte transmitted his "Report relative to
Proclamation No. 216 dated 23 May 2017" (Report) to the Senate, through Senate
President Pimentel, and the House of Representatives, through House Speaker
Pantaleon D. Alvarez (House Speaker Alvarez).
According to President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and his Report to the
Congress, the declaration of a state of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao ensued from the series of armed
attacks, violent acts, and atrocities directed against civilians and government
authorities, institutions, and establishments perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute
terrorist groups, in complicity with other local and foreign armed a liates, who have
pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to sow lawless violence,
terror, and political disorder over the said region for the ultimate purpose of
establishing a DAESH wilayah or Islamic Province in Mindanao.
Representatives from the Executive Department, the military, and other security
o cials of the government were thereafter invited, on separate occasions, by the
Senate and the House of Representatives for a conference brie ng regarding the
circumstances, details, and updates surrounding the President's proclamation and
report.
On May 29, 2017, the brie ng before the Senate was conducted, which lasted for
about four (4) hours, by Secretary of National Defense Del n N. Lorenza (Secretary
Lorenzana), National Security Adviser and Director General of the National Security
Council Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr. (Secretary Esperon), and Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) General Eduardo M. Ao (General Ao). The
following day, May 30, 2017, the Senate deliberated on these proposed resolutions: (a)
Proposed Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 388, 3 which expressed support for President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216; and (b) P.S. Resolution No. 390, 4 which called for the
convening in joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives to deliberate
on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.
P.S. Resolution No. 388 was approved, after receiving seventeen (17) a rmative
votes as against ve (5) negative votes, and was adopted as Senate Resolution No. 49
5 entitled "Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate Not to Revoke, at this Time,
Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and
Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao.'" 6 DETACa
P.S. Resolution No. 390, on the other hand, garnered only nine (9) votes from the
senators who were in favor of it as opposed to twelve (12) votes from the senators
who were against its approval and adoption. 7
On May 31, 2017, the House of Representatives, having previously constituted
itself as a Committee of the Whole House, 8 was briefed by Executive Secretary
Salvador C. Medialdea (Executive Secretary Medialdea), Secretary Lorenzana, and other
security o cials for about six (6) hours. After the closed-door brie ng, the House of
Representatives resumed its regular meeting and deliberated on House Resolution No.
1050 entitled "Resolution Expressing the Full Support of the House of Representatives
to President Rodrigo Duterte as it Finds No Reason to Revoke Proclamation No. 216,
Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao.'" 9 The House of Representatives proceeded
to divide its members on the matter of approving said resolution through viva voce
voting. The result shows that the members who were in favor of passing the subject
resolution secured the majority vote. 1 0
The House of Representatives also purportedly discussed the proposal calling
for a joint session of the Congress to deliberate and vote on President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216. After the debates, however, the proposal was rejected. 1 1
These series of events led to the filing of the present consolidated petitions.
THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
The Padilla Petition
Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 raise the question of "[w]hether Congress is

required to convene in joint session, deliberate, and vote jointly under Article VII,
[Section] 18 of the Constitution" and submit the following arguments in support of their
petition:
[I] THE PETITION SATISFIES THE REQUISITES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE
HONORABLE COURT'S POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.
[i] THERE IS AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY.
[ii] PETITIONERS, AS PART OF THE PUBLIC AND AS TAXPAYERS,
POSSESS LEGAL STANDING TO FILE THIS PETITION.
[iii] PETITIONER [DE LIMA], AS MEMBER OF CONGRESS, HAS LEGAL
STANDING TO FILE THIS PETITION.
[iv] THE CASE AND THE ISSUE INVOLVED ARE RIPE FOR JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION.
[II] THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION, SUPPORTED BY THE
EXPRESS INTENT OF THE FRAMERS, AND CONFIRMED BY THE SUPREME
COURT, REQUIRES THAT CONGRESS CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION TO
DELIBERATE AND VOTE AS A SINGLE DELIBERATIVE BODY.
[i] THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT
CONGRESS CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION.
[ii] THE EXPRESS INTENT OF THE FRAMERS IS FOR CONGRESS TO
CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION TO DELIBERATE AND VOTE AS A
SINGLE DELIBERATIVE BODY.
[iii] THE SUPREME COURT CONFIRMED IN FORTUN v. GMA THAT
CONGRESS HAS THE "AUTOMATIC DUTY" TO CONVENE IN JOINT
SESSION.
[iv] LEGISLATIVE PRECEDENT ALSO RECOGNIZES CONGRESS' DUTY
TO CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION.
[III] THE REQUIREMENT TO ACT AS A SINGLE DELIBERATIVE BODY UNDER
ARTICLE VII, [SECTION] 18 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS A MANDATORY,
MINISTERIAL CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY OF CONGRESS, WHICH CAN BE
COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS . 1 2
Petitioners claim that there is an actual case or controversy in this instance and
that their case is ripe for adjudication. According to petitioners, the resolutions
separately passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives, which express
support as well as the intent not to revoke President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216,
injure their rights "to a proper [and] mandatory legislative review of the declaration of
martial law" and that the continuing failure of the Congress to convene in joint session
similarly causes a continuing injury to their rights. 1 3
Petitioners also allege that, as citizens and taxpayers, they all have locus standi in
their "assertion of a public right" which they have been deprived of when the Congress
refused and/or failed to convene in joint session to deliberate on President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216. Senator De Lima adds that she, together with the other senators
who voted in favor of the resolution to convene the Congress jointly, were even
effectively denied the opportunity to perform their constitutionally-mandated duty,
under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, to deliberate on the said proclamation
of the President in a joint session of the Congress. 1 4
On the propriety of resorting to the remedy of mandamus, petitioners posit that
"the duty of Congress to convene in joint session upon the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not require the
exercise of discretion." Such mandate upon the Congress is allegedly a purely
ministerial act which can be compelled through a writ of mandamus. 1 5 aDSIHc
As for the substantive issue, it is the primary contention of petitioners that a plain
reading of Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution shows that the Congress is
required to convene in joint session to review Proclamation No. 216 and vote as a
single deliberative body. The performance of the constitutional obligation is allegedly
mandatory, not discretionary. 1 6
According to petitioners, the discretionary nature of the phrase "may revoke such
proclamation or suspension" under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution allegedly
pertain to the power of the Congress to revoke but not to its obligation to jointly
convene and vote which, they stress, is mandatory. To require the Congress to
convene only when it exercises the power to revoke is purportedly absurd since the
Congress, without convening in joint session, cannot know beforehand whether a
majority vote in fact exists to effect a revocation. 1 7
Petitioners claim that in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo , 1 8 this Court described the
"duty" of the Congress to convene in joint session as "automatic." The convening of the
Congress in joint session when former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President
Macapagal-Arroyo) declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Maguindanao was also a legislative precedent where the Congress
clearly recognized its duty to convene in joint session. 1 9
The mandate upon the Congress to convene jointly is allegedly intended by the
1986 Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to serve as a protection against potential
abuses in the exercise of the President's power to declare martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is "a mechanism purposely designed by the
Constitution to compel Congress to review the propriety of the President's action x x x
[and] meant to contain martial law powers within a democratic framework for the
preservation of democracy, prevention of abuses, and protection of the people." 2 0
The Taada Petition
The petitioners in G.R. No. 231694 chiefly opine that:

I. A PLAIN READING OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION LEADS TO THE
INDUBITABLE CONCLUSION THAT A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS TO
REVIEW A DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW BY THE PRESIDENT IS
MANDATORY.
II. FAILURE TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION DEPRIVES LAWMAKERS OF A
DELIBERATIVE AND INTERROGATORY PROCESS TO REVIEW MARTIAL
LAW.
III. FAILURE TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION DEPRIVES THE PUBLIC OF
TRANSPARENT PROCEEDINGS WITHIN WHICH TO BE INFORMED OF THE
FACTUAL BASES OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE INTENDED PARAMETERS
OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION.
IV. THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED THAT A JOINT
SESSION OF CONGRESS BE CONVENED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE
DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW. 2 1
Similar to the contentions in the Padilla Petition, petitioners maintain that they
have su ciently shown all the essential requisites in order for this Court to exercise its
power of judicial review, in that: (1) an actual case or controversy exists; (2) they
possess the standing to le this case; (3) the constitutionality of a governmental act
has been raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the constitutionality of the
said act is the very lis mota of the petition.
According to petitioners, there is an actual case or controversy because the
failure and/or refusal of the Congress to convene jointly deprived legislators of a venue
within which to raise a motion for revocation (or even extension) of President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216 and the public of an opportunity to be properly informed as to
the bases and particulars thereof. 2 2
Petitioners likewise claim to have legal standing to sue as citizens and taxpayers.
Nonetheless, they submit that the present case calls for the Court's liberality in the
appreciation of their locus standi given the fact that their petition presents "a question
of rst impression one of paramount importance to the future of our democracy
as well as the extraordinary nature of Martial Law itself." 2 3
Petitioners contend that the convening of the Congress in joint session,
whenever the President declares martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, is a public right and duty mandated by the Constitution. The writ of
mandamus is, thus, the "proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right
and to compel the performance of a public duty, especially when the public right
involved is mandated by the Constitution." 2 4 ETHIDa
For this group of petitioners, the Members of the Congress gravely abused their
discretion for their refusal to convene in joint session, underscoring that "[w]hile a writ
of mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate
branch, or to compel the performance of a discretionary act, this admits of certain
exceptions, such as in instances of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or
palpable excess of authority, when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy." 2 5
As to the merits, petitioners assert that the convening of the Congress in joint
session after the declaration of martial law is mandatory under Article VII, Section 18 of
the Constitution, whether or not the Congress is in session or there is intent to revoke.
It is their theory that a joint session should be a deliberative process in which, after
debate and discussion, legislators can come to an informed decision as to the factual
and legal bases for the declaration of martial law. Moreover, "legislators who wish to
revoke the martial law proclamation should have the right to put that vote on historical
record in joint session and, in like manner, the public should have the right to know
the position of their legislators with respect to this matter of the highest national
interest." 2 6
Petitioners add that a public, transparent, and deliberative process is purportedly
necessary to allay the people's fears against "executive overreach." This concern
allegedly cannot be addressed by brie ngs in executive sessions given by
representatives of the Executive Branch to both Houses of the Congress. 2 7
Petitioners further postulate that, based on the deliberations of the Members of
the ConCom, the phrase "voting jointly" under Article VII, Section 18 was intended to
mean that a joint session is a procedural requirement, necessary for the Congress to
decide whether to revoke, affirm, or even extend the declaration of martial law. 2 8
Consolidation of Respondents' Comments
Respondents assert rmly that there is no mandatory duty on their part to "vote
jointly," except in cases of revocation or extension of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 2 9 In the absence of such
duty, the non-convening of the Congress in joint session does not pose any actual case
or controversy that may be the subject of judicial review. 3 0 Additionally, respondents
argue that the petitions raise a political question over which the Court has no
jurisdiction.
Petitioners' avowal that they are citizens and taxpayers is allegedly inadequate to
clothe them with locus standi. Generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the
assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Petitioners must show that
they have a direct and personal interest in the Congress' failure to convene in joint
session, which they failed to present herein. A taxpayer's suit is likewise proper only
when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of the Congress. However, in
these cases, the funds used in the implementation of martial law in Mindanao are taken
from those funds already appropriated by the Congress. Senator De Lima's averment of
h e r locus standi as an incumbent member of the legislature similarly lacks merit.
Insofar as the powers of the Congress are not impaired, there is no prejudice to each
Member thereof; and even assuming arguendo that the authority of the Congress is
indeed compromised, Senator De Lima still does not have standing to le the present
petition for mandamus because it is not shown that she has been allowed to
participate in the Senate sessions during her incarceration. She cannot, therefore, claim
that she has suffered any direct injury from the non-convening of the Congress in joint
session. 3 1
Respondents further contend that the constitutional right to information, as
enshrined under Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution, is not absolute. Matters
affecting national security are considered as a valid exception to the right to
information of the public. For this reason, the petitioners' and the public's right to
participate in the deliberations of the Congress regarding the factual basis of a martial
law declaration may be restricted in the interest of national security and public safety.
32
Respondents allege that petitioners failed to present an appropriate case for

mandamus to lie. Mandamus will only issue when the act to be compelled is a clear
legal duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent to
perform the act required that the law speci cally enjoins as a duty resulting from o ce,
trust, or station. 3 3
According to respondents, it is erroneous to assert that it is their ministerial duty
to convene in joint session whenever martial law is proclaimed or the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended in the absence of a clear and speci c
constitutional or legal provision. In fact, Article VII, Section 18 does not use the words
"joint session" at all, much less impose the convening of such joint session upon the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. What the Constitution requires is joint voting when the action of the Congress
is to revoke or extend the proclamation or suspension. 3 4
Indeed, prior concurrence of the Congress is not constitutionally required for the
effectivity of the proclamation or suspension. Quoting from the deliberations of the
framers of the Constitution pertaining to Article VII, Section 18, the Congress points out
that it was the intention of the said framers to grant the President the power to declare
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for a period not
exceeding sixty (60) days without the concurrence of the Congress. There is absolutely
nothing under the Constitution that mandates the Congress to convene in joint session
when their intention is merely to discuss, debate, and/or review the factual and legal
basis for the proclamation. That is why the phrase "voting jointly" is limited only in case
the Congress intends to revoke the proclamation. 3 5 In a situation where the Congress
is not in session, the Constitution simply provides that the Congress must convene in
accordance with its rules but does not state that it must convene in joint session.
Respondents further refer to the proper procedure for the holding of joint sessions. cSEDTC
Respondents brush aside as mere obiter dictum the Court's pronouncement in

the Fortun case that it is the duty of the Congress to convene upon the declaration of
martial law. That whether or not the Congress should convene in joint session in
instances where it is not revoking the proclamation was not an issue in that case.
Moreover, the factual circumstances in the Fortun case are entirely different from the
present cases. The Congress then issued a concurrent resolution calling for the
convening of a joint session as the intention at least as far as the Senate was
concerned was to revoke the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. The Fortun case then cannot be
considered a legislative precedent of an "automatic convening of a joint session by the
Congress upon the President's proclamation of martial law." 3 6
Respondents argue that the remedy of certiorari is likewise unavailing. To justify
judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 3 7 The Congress has the duty to
convene and vote jointly only in two (2) instances, as respondents have already
explained. The Congress had even issued their respective resolutions expressing their
support to, as well as their intent not to revoke, President Duterte's Proclamation No.
216. There then can be no evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty on the part of the Congress if there is no duty to begin with. 3 8
Respondents respectfully remind the Court to uphold the "constitutional
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government." 3 9 The Court may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the Legislature and it is not within the province of the
courts to direct the Congress how to do its work. Respondents stress that this Court
cannot direct the Congress to convene in joint session without violating the basic
principle of the separation of powers. 4 0
Subsequent Events
On July 14, 2017, petitioners in G.R. No. 231671, the Padilla Petition, led a
Manifestation, calling the attention of the Court to the imminent expiration of the sixty
(60)-day period of validity of Proclamation No. 216 on July 22, 2017. Despite the lapse
of said sixty (60)-day period, petitioners exhort the Court to still resolve the instant
cases for the guidance of the Congress, State actors, and all Filipinos.
On July 22, 2017, the Congress convened in joint session and, with two hundred
sixty-one (261) votes in favor versus eighteen (18) votes against, overwhelmingly
approved the extension of the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao until December 31, 2017.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
After a meticulous consideration of the parties' submissions, we synthesize them
into the following fundamental issues:
I. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these
consolidated petitions;
II. Whether or not the petitions satisfy the requisites for the Court's exercise of
its power of judicial review;
III. Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly
upon the President's proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution; and
IV. Whether or not a writ of mandamus or certiorari may be issued in the
present cases.
THE COURT'S RULING
The Court's jurisdiction over these
consolidated petitions
The principle of separation of powers
The separation of powers doctrine is the backbone of our tripartite system of

government. It is implicit in the manner that our Constitution lays out in separate and
distinct Articles the powers and prerogatives of each co-equal branch of government.
In Belgica v. Ochoa, 4 1 this Court had the opportunity to restate:
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated
words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission , it means that the
"Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government." To the legislative branch of government, through Congress,
belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government,
through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial
branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to
interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional
design, ordained in this respect, "[e]ach department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere." Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the
law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the
judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." The principle of separation
of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the
notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of
these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single
branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To
achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally capable of independent
action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence
would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary
or self-interest assertions of another or others. (Emphases supplied, citations
omitted.)
Contrary to respondents' protestations, the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over
these petitions cannot be deemed as an unwarranted intrusion into the exclusive
domain of the Legislature. Bearing in mind that the principal substantive issue
presented in the cases at bar is the proper interpretation of Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution, particularly regarding the duty of the Congress to vote jointly when
the President declares martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, there can be no doubt that the Court may take jurisdiction over the petitions. It
is the prerogative of the Judiciary to declare "what the law is." 4 2 It is worth repeating
here that: SDAaTC
[W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it

does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not
in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine con icting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. 4 3 (Emphases supplied.)
Political question doctrine
Corollary to respondents' invocation of the principle of separation of powers,

they argue that these petitions involve a political question in which the Court may not
interfere. It is true that the Court continues to recognize questions of policy as a bar to
its exercise of the power of judicial review. 4 4 However, in a long line of cases, 4 5 we
have given a limited application to the political question doctrine.
In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections , 4 6 we emphasized that
the Court's judicial power as conferred by the Constitution has been expanded to
include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Further, in past cases, the
Court has exercised its power of judicial review noting that the requirement of
interpreting the constitutional provision involved the legality and not the wisdom
of a manner by which a constitutional duty or power was exercised. 4 7
I n Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC
Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., 4 8 we explained the rationale behind the
Court's expanded certiorari jurisdiction. Citing former Chief Justice and Constitutional
Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion in his sponsorship speech for Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution, we reiterated that the courts cannot hereafter evade the
duty to settle matters, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
Existence of the requisites for judicial
review
Petitioners' legal standing
Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 allege that they are suing in the following
capacities: (1) Padilla as a member of the legal profession representing victims of
human rights violations, and a taxpayer; (2) Saguisag as a human rights lawyer, former
member of the Philippine Senate, and a taxpayer; (3) Monsod as a framer of the
Philippine Constitution and member of the 1986 ConCom, and a taxpayer; (4) Rosales
as a victim of human rights violations committed under martial law declared by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and a taxpayer; (5) Gorospe as a lawyer and a taxpayer;
and (6) Senator De Lima as an incumbent Member of the Philippine Senate, a human
rights advocate, a former Secretary of Justice, Chairperson of the Commission on
Human Rights, and a taxpayer.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 231694, while petitioner Taada sues in his
capacity as a Filipino citizen and former legislator, his co-petitioners (Bishop Iiguez,
Bishop Pabillo, Bishop Tobias, Mo. Ygrubay, Bulangis, and Deluria) all sue in their
capacity as Filipino citizens.
Respondents insist that none of the petitioners have legal standing, whether as a
citizen, taxpayer, or legislator, to file the present cases.
The Court has consistently held that locus standi is a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the challenged governmental act. The question is whether the challenging
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy so as to assure the
existence of concrete adverseness that would sharpen the presentation of issues and
illuminate the court in ruling on the constitutional question posed. 4 9
Petitioners satisfy these standards.
The Court has recognized that every citizen has the right, if not the duty, to
interfere and see that a public offense be properly pursued and punished, and that a
public grievance be remedied. 5 0 When a citizen exercises this "public right" and
challenges a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action, he
represents the public at large, thus, clothing him with the requisite locus standi. He may
not sustain an injury as direct and adverse as compared to others but it is enough that
he su ciently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief
from the Court in the vindication of a public right. 5 1
Verily, legal standing is grounded on the petitioner's personal interest in the
controversy. A citizen who les a petition before the court asserting a public right
satis es the requirement of personal interest simply because the petitioner is a
member of the general public upon which the right is vested. 5 2 A citizen's personal
interest in a case challenging an allegedly unconstitutional act lies in his interest and
duty to uphold and ensure the proper execution of the law. 5 3
The present petitions have been led by individuals asserting that the Senate and
the House of Representatives have breached an allegedly constitutional duty to
convene in joint session to deliberate on Presidential Proclamation No. 216. The
citizen-petitioners' challenge of a purportedly unconstitutional act in violation of a
public right, done in behalf of the general public, gives them legal standing.
On the other hand, Senator De Lima questions the Congress' failure to convene in
joint session to deliberate on Proclamation No. 216, which, according to the petitioners,
is the legislature's constitutional duty.
We have ruled that legislators have legal standing to ensure that the
constitutional prerogatives, powers, and privileges of the Members of the Congress
remain inviolate. 5 4 Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any o cial action
or in these cases, inaction which, to their mind , infringes on their prerogatives as
legislators. 5 5
Actual case or controversy
It is long established that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
or controversies. There is an actual case or controversy where there is a con ict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, where the contradiction of the rights
can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 5 6
There are two con icting claims presented before the Court: on the one hand, the
petitioners' assertion that the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene in joint
session to deliberate on Proclamation No. 216; and, on the other, the respondents' view
that so convening in joint session is discretionary on the part of the Congress. acEHCD
Petitioners seek relief through a writ of mandamus and/or certiorari. Mandamus

is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, o cer, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law speci cally enjoins as a
duty resulting from an o ce, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use or enjoyment of a right or o ce to which such other is entitled. 5 7 Certiorari, as a
special civil action, is available only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or
o cer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or o cer
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 5 8 With respect to the Court, however,
certiorari is broader in scope and reach, and it may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board, or o cer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo, and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions . 5 9
As the present petitions allege an omission on the part of the Congress that
constitutes neglect of their constitutional duties, the petitions make a prima facie case
for mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an
act or omission of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but, in fact, the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute. 6 0
Respondents aver that the Congress cannot be compelled to do something that
is discretionary on their part nor could they be guilty of grave abuse of discretion in the
absence of any mandatory obligation to jointly convene on their part to a rm the
President's proclamation of martial law. Thus, petitioners are not entitled to the reliefs
prayed for in their petitions for mandamus and/or certiorari; consequently, no actual
case or controversy exists.
There is no merit to respondents' position.
For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and give due course to the
petitions, it is su cient that the petitioners set forth their material allegations to make
out a prima facie case for mandamus or certiorari. 6 1 Whether the petitioners are
actually and ultimately entitled to the reliefs prayed for is exactly what is to be
determined by the Court after careful consideration of the parties' pleadings and
submissions.
Liberality in cases of transcendental
importance
In any case, it is an accepted doctrine that the Court may brush aside procedural
technicalities and, nonetheless, exercise its power of judicial review in cases of
transcendental importance.
There are marked differences between the Chief Executive's military powers,
including the power to declare martial law, as provided under the present Constitution,
in comparison to that granted in the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, 6 2
such powers were seemingly limitless, unrestrained, and purely subject to the
President's wisdom and discretion.
At present, the Commander-in-Chief still possesses the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. However, these
executive powers are now subject to the review of both the legislative and judicial
branches. This check-and-balance mechanism was installed in the 1987 Constitution
precisely to prevent potential abuses of these executive prerogatives.
Inasmuch as the present petitions raise issues concerning the Congress' role in
our government's system of checks and balances, these are matters of paramount
public interest or issues of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty, and weight as precedents. 6 3
Mootness
The Court acknowledges that the main relief prayed for in the present petitions
(i.e., that the Congress be directed to convene in joint session and therein deliberate
whether to a rm or revoke Proclamation No. 216) may arguably have been rendered
moot by: (a) the lapse of the original sixty (60) days that the President's martial law
declaration and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus were effective
under Proclamation No. 216; (b) the subsequent extension by the Congress of the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus over the whole of Mindanao after convening in joint session on July 22, 2017;
and (c) the Court's own decision in Lagman v. Medialdea , 6 4 wherein we ruled on the
su ciency of the factual bases for Proclamation No. 216 under the original period
stated therein.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo , the jurisprudential rules regarding mootness were
succinctly summarized, thus:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such
case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. SDHTEC
xxx xxx xxx

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review. 6 5 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
It cannot be gainsaid that there are compelling and weighty reasons for the Court
to proceed with the resolution of these consolidated petitions on the merits. As
explained in the preceding discussion, these cases involve a constitutional issue of
transcendental signi cance and novelty. A de nitive ruling from this Court is imperative
not only to guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public but, more importantly, to clarify the
parameters of congressional conduct required by the 1987 Constitution, in the event of
a repetition of the factual precedents that gave rise to these cases.
The duty of the Congress to vote jointly
under Article VII, Section 18
We now come to the crux of the present petitions the issue of whether or not
under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, it is mandatory for the Congress
to automatically convene in joint session in the event that the President proclaims a
state of martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
Philippines or any part thereof.
The Court answers in the negative. The Congress is not constitutionally
mandated to convene in joint session except to vote jointly to revoke the President's
declaration or suspension.
By the language of Article VII, Section 18
of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress is
only required to vote jointly to revoke the
President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution fully reads:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus , the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation
or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in
the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding led by any
citizen, the su ciency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he
shall be released. (Emphasis supplied.)
Outside explicit constitutional limitations, the Commander-in-Chief clause in
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution vests on the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed
forces, 6 6 in recognition that the President, as Chief Executive, has the general
responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, the more speci c
duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. 6 7 However, to safeguard
against possible abuse by the President of the exercise of his power to proclaim
martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the 1987
Constitution, through the same provision, institutionalized checks and balances on the
President's power through the two other co-equal and independent branches of
government, i.e., the Congress and the Judiciary. In particular, Article VII, Section 18 of
the 1987 Constitution requires the President to submit a report to the Congress after
his proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and grants the Congress the power to revoke, as well as extend, the
proclamation and/or suspension; and vests upon the Judiciary the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis for such proclamation and/or suspension.
There are four provisions in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
speci cally pertaining to the role of the Congress when the President proclaims martial
law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, viz.:
a. Within forty-eight (48) hours from the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress;
b. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President;
c. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined
by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist; and
d. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours (24)
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its
rules without need of call.
There is no question herein that the rst provision was complied with, as within
forty-eight (48) hours from the issuance on May 23, 2017 by President Duterte of
Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao, copies of President Duterte's Report relative to
Proclamation No. 216 was transmitted to and received by the Senate and the House of
Representatives on May 25, 2017. AScHCD
The Court will not touch upon the third and fourth provisions as these concern
factual circumstances which are not availing in the instant petitions. The petitions at
bar involve the initial proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and not their extension; and the 17th Congress was still in
session 6 8 when President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 2017.
It is the second provision that is under judicial scrutiny herein: "The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There
is only room for application. According to the plain-meaning rule or verba legis, when
the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. It is expressed in the maxims index animi
sermo or "speech is the index of intention[,]" and verba legis non est recedendum or
"from the words of a statute there should be no departure." 6 9
I n Funa v. Chairman Villar , 70 the Court also applied the verba legis rule in
constitutional construction, thus:
The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This is known as the plain meaning rule enunciated by
the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
The primary source whence to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose
is the language of the provision itself. If possible, the words in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning, save where technical terms are employed.
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration illustrates the verbal legis
rule in this wise:
We look to the language of the document itself in our
search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is
where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained . They are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in
which case the signi cance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present
in the people's consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision
to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus there are cases where the need
for construction is reduced to a minimum. (Emphases supplied.)
The provision in question is clear, plain, and unambiguous. In its literal and
ordinary meaning, the provision grants the Congress the power to revoke the
President's proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress may exercise such power, i.e., by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special
session. The use of the word "may" in the provision such that "[t]he Congress x x x
may revoke such proclamation or suspension x x x" is to be construed as permissive
and operating to confer discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke, 7 1 but
in order to revoke, the same provision sets the requirement that at least a majority of
the Members of the Congress, voting jointly, favor revocation.
It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer to a "joint session."
While it may be conceded, subject to the discussions below, that the phrase "voting
jointly" shall already be understood to mean that the joint voting will be done "in joint
session," notwithstanding the absence of clear language in the Constitution, 7 2 still, the
requirement that "[t]he Congress, voting jointly , by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, x x x" explicitly applies only to the situation
when the Congress revokes the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Simply put, the provision only
requires Congress to vote jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation
and/or suspension.
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional provision does not
support the petitioners' argument that it is obligatory for the Congress to convene in
joint session following the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, under all circumstances.
The deliberations of the 1986 ConCom
reveal the framers' specific intentions to (a)
remove the requirement of prior concurrence
of the Congress for the effectivity of the
President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and (b) grant to the
Congress the discretionary power to revoke
the President's proclamation and/or
suspension by a vote of at least a majority of
its Members, voting jointly.
The Court recognized in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary 7 3 that: AcICHD
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention

underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the
Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
However, in the same Decision, the Court issued the following caveat:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views
of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's
understanding thereof. 7 4 (Emphasis supplied.)
As the Court established in its preceding discussion, the clear meaning of the
relevant provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution is that the
Congress is only required to vote jointly on the revocation of the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Based on the Civil Liberties Union case, there is already no need to look beyond
the plain language of the provision and decipher the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution. Nonetheless, the deliberations on Article VII, Section 18 of the 1986
ConCom does not reveal a manifest intent of the framers to make it mandatory for the
Congress to convene in joint session following the President's proclamation and/or
suspension, so it could deliberate as a single body, regardless of whether its Members
will concur in or revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension.
What is evident in the deliberations of the 1986 ConCom were the framers'
intentions to (a) remove the requirement of prior concurrence by the Congress for the
effectivity of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) grant to the Congress the discretionary
power to revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension by a vote of at least a
majority of its Members, voting jointly.
As the Commander-in-Chief clause was initially drafted, the President's
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus required the prior concurrence
of at least a majority of all the members of the Congress to be effective. The rst line
read, "The President shall be the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the
Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion[;]" and the next line, "In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the
members of the Congress, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus." 7 5

The Commissioners, however, extensively debated on whether or not there
should be prior concurrence by the Congress, and the exchanges below present the
considerations for both sides:
MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's
thesis that in the rst imposition of martial law there is no need for
concurrence of the majority of the Members of Congress because the
provision says "in case of actual invasion and rebellion." If there is actual
invasion and rebellion, as Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is need
for immediate response because there is an attack. Second, the fact of securing
a concurrence may be impractical because the roads might be blocked or
barricaded. They say that in case of rebellion, one cannot even take his car and
go to the Congress, which is possible because the roads are blocked or
barricaded. And maybe if the revolutionaries are smart, they would have an
individual team for each and every Member of the Congress so he would not be
able to respond to a call for a session. So the requirement of an initial
concurrence of the majority of all the Members of the Congress in case of an
invasion or rebellion might be impractical as I can see it.
Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke the declaration
or lift the suspension.
And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable
question and no longer a political one in that it is subject to judicial review at
any point in time. So on that basis, I agree that there is no need for concurrence
as a prerequisite to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SUAREZ. x x x
The Commissioner is suggesting that in connection with Section 15, we
delete the phrase "and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of
all the Members of the Congress . . ."
MR. PADILLA. That is correct especially for the initial suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or also the declaration of
martial law.
MR. SUAREZ. So in both instances, the Commissioner is suggesting that
this would be an exclusive prerogative of the President ?
MR. PADILLA. At least initially, for a period of 60 days. But even
that period of 60 days may be shortened by the Congress or the Senate because
the next sentence says that the Congress or the Senate may even revoke the
proclamation.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD. x x x
We are back to Section 15, page 7, lines 1 and 2. I just want to reiterate
my previous proposal to amend by deletion the phrase "and, with the
concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of Congress."
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SUAREZ. x x x TAIaHE
The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because

this means that he is vesting exclusively unto the President the right to
determine the factors which may lead to the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and
compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular phrase. May we be
informed of his good and substantial reasons?
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And
in previous interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on
the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual
invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act quickly.
Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a maximum of 60
days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the
judiciary to inquire into the su ciency of the factual basis of the proclamation
always exists, even during those first 60 days.
MR. SUAREZ. Given our traumatic experience during the past
administration, if we give exclusive right to the President to determine these
factors, especially the existence of an invasion or rebellion and the second
factor of determining whether the public safety requires it or not, may I call the
attention of the Gentleman to what happened to us during the past
administration. Proclamation No. 1081 was issued by Ferdinand E. Marcos in
his capacity as President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon
him purportedly under Article VII, Section 10(2) of the Constitution, wherein he
made this predicate under the "Whereas" provision.
Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by
these lawless elements of the Communists and other armed
aggrupations organized to overthrow the Republic of the
Philippines by armed violence and force have assumed the
magnitude of an actual state of war against our people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
And may I also call the attention of the Gentleman to General Order No. 3,
also promulgated by Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972 wherein he said, among other things:
Whereas, martial law having been declared because of
wanton destruction of lives and properties, widespread
lawlessness and anarchy and chaos and disorder now prevailing
throughout the country, which condition has been brought about
by groups of men who are actively engaged in a criminal
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the Philippines in
order to take over the government by force and violence, the extent
of which has now assumed the proportion of an actual war
against our people and the legitimate government . . .
And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and declare martial law in our country without justi able reason.
Would the Gentleman still insist on the deletion of the phrase "and, with the
concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of the Congress"?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos he is
undoubtedly an aberration in our history and national consciousness. But given
the possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitution now has
su cient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman
has mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the
factual bases because the paragraph beginning on line 9 precisely
tells us that the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding led by any citizen, the su ciency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or
the extension thereof and must promulgate its decision on the same within 30
days from its filing.
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed
to balance the interests of the country. And here we are trying to balance the
public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of citizens.
And I am saying that there are enough safeguards, unlike in 1972 when Mr.
Marcos was able to do all those things mentioned.
MR. SUAREZ. Will that prevent a future President from doing what Mr.
Marcos had done?
MR. MONSOD. There is nothing absolute in this world, and there may be
another Marcos. What we are looking for are safeguards that are reasonable
and, I believe, adequate at this point. On the other hand, in case of invasion
or rebellion, even during the rst 60 days when the intention here is to
protect the country in that situation, it would be unreasonable to ask
that there should be a concurrence on the part of the Congress, which
situation is automatically terminated at the end of such 60 days.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SUAREZ. Would the Gentleman not feel more comfortable if we
provide for a legislative check on this awesome power of the Chief Executive
acting as Commander-in-Chief?
MR. MONSOD. I would be less comfortable if we have a presidency that
cannot act under those conditions.
MR. SUAREZ. But he can act with the concurrence of the proper or
appropriate authority.
MR. MONSOD. Yes. But when those situations arise, it is very unlikely
that the concurrence of Congress would be available; and, secondly, the
President will be able to act quickly in order to deal with the circumstances.
MR. SUAREZ. So, we would be subordinating actual circumstances to
expediency.
MR. MONSOD. I do not believe it is expediency when one is trying to
protect the country in the event of an invasion or a rebellion.
MR. SUAREZ. No. But in both instances, we would be seeking to protect
not only the country but the rights of simple citizens. We have to balance these
interests without sacrificing the security of the State.
MR. MONSOD. I agree with the Gentleman that is why in the Article on the
Bill of Rights, which was approved on Third Reading, the safeguards and the
protection of the citizens have been strengthened. And on line 21 of this
paragraph, I endorsed the proposed amendment of Commissioner Padilla. We
are saying that those who are arrested should be judicially charged within ve
days; otherwise, they shall be released. So, there are enough safeguards. cDHAES
MR. SUAREZ. These are safeguards after the declaration of

martial law and after the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus .
MR. MONSOD. That is true. 7 6 (Emphases supplied.)
Ultimately, twenty-eight (28) Commissioners voted to remove the requirement
for prior concurrence by the Congress for the effectivity of the President's
corpus, against only twelve (12) Commissioners who voted to retain it.
As the result of the foregoing, the 1987 Constitution does not provide at all for
the manner of determination and expression of concurrence (whether prior or
subsequent) by the Congress in the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the instant cases, both
Houses of the Congress separately passed resolutions, in accordance with their
respective rules of procedure, expressing their support for President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216.
In contrast, being one of the constitutional safeguards against possible abuse by
the President of his power to proclaim martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for how the Congress
may exercise its discretionary power to revoke the President's proclamation and/or
suspension, that is, "voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session."
The ConCom deliberations on this particular provision substantially revolved
around whether the two Houses will have to vote jointly or separately to revoke the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; but as the Court reiterates, it is undisputedly for the express purpose of
revoking the President's proclamation and/or suspension.
Based on the ConCom deliberations, pertinent portions of which are reproduced
hereunder, the underlying reason for the requirement that the two Houses of the
Congress will vote jointly is to avoid the possibility of a deadlock and to facilitate the
process of revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I want to ask the Committee a
clarifying question on line 4 of page 7 as to whether the meaning here is that
the majority of all the Members of each House vote separately. Is that the intent
of this phrase?
xxx xxx xxx
FR. BERNAS. We would like a little discussion on that because yesterday
we already removed the necessity for concurrence of Congress for the
initial imposition of martial law. If we require the Senate and the House of
Representatives to vote separately for purposes of revoking the imposition of
martial law, that will make it very di cult for Congress to revoke the imposition
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
That is just thinking aloud. To balance the fact that the President acts
unilaterally, then the Congress voting as one body and not separately
can revoke the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, voting jointly.
FR. BERNAS. Jointly, yes.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. May I comment on the statement made by Commissioner
Bernas? I was a Member of the Senate for 12 years. Whenever a bicameral
Congress votes, it is always separately.
For example, bills coming from the Lower House are voted upon by the
Members of the House. Then they go up to the Senate and voted upon
separately. Even on constitutional amendments, where Congress meets in joint
session, the two Houses vote separately.
Otherwise, the Senate will be useless; it will be sort of absorbed by the
House considering that the Members of the Senate are completely outnumbered
by the Members of the House. So, I believe that whenever Congress acts, it must
be the two Houses voting separately.
If the two Houses vote "jointly," it would mean mixing the 24 Senators
with 250 Congressmen. This would result in the Senate being absorbed and
controlled by the House. This violates the purpose of having a Senate.
FR. BERNAS. I quite realize that that is the practice and, precisely, in
proposing this, I am consciously proposing this as an exception to this practice
because of the tremendous effect on the nation when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended and then martial law is imposed. Since we have
allowed the President to impose martial law and suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus unilaterally, we should make it a little more easy for
Congress to reverse such actions for the sake of protecting the rights of the
people.
MR. RODRIGO. Maybe the way it can be done is to vest this function in
just one of the Chambers to the House alone or to the Senate alone. But to
say, "by Congress," both House and Senate "voting" jointly is practically a vote
by the House.
FR. BERNAS. I would be willing to say just the vote of the House.
MR. RODRIGO. That is less insulting to the Senate. However, there are
other safeguards. For example, if, after 60 days the Congress does not act, the
effectiveness of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ ceases. Furthermore, there is recourse to the Supreme Court.
FR. BERNAS. I quite realize that there is this recourse to the Supreme
Court and there is a time limit, but at the same time because of the extraordinary
character of this event when martial law is imposed, I would like to make it
easier for the representatives of the people to review this very signi cant action
taken by the President.
MR. RODRIGO. Between the Senate being absorbed and controlled by the
House numerically and the House voting alone, the lesser of two evils is the
latter.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. x x x
In connection with the inquiry of Commissioner Monsod, and considering
the statements made by Commissioner Rodrigo, I would like to say, in reply to
Commissioner Bernas, that perhaps because of necessity, we might really have
to break tradition. Perhaps it would be better to give this function of revoking
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ or extending the
same to the House of Representatives, instead of to the Congress. I feel that
even the Senators would welcome this because they would feel frustrated by the
imbalance in the number between the Senators and the Members of the House
of Representatives. ASEcHI
Anyway, Madam President, we have precedents or similar cases. For

example, under Section 24 of the committee report on the Legislative,
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, and bills authorizing increase of public debt
are supposed to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. Besides,
we have always been saying that it is the Members of the House of
Representatives who are mostly in touch with the people since they represent
the various districts of our country.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD. I would prefer to have the vote of both Houses because
this is a very serious question that must be fully discussed. By limiting it alone
to the House of Representatives, then we lose the bene t of the advice and
opinion of the Members of the Senate. I would prefer that they would be in joint
session , but I would agree with Father Bernas that they should not be voting
separately as part of the option. I think they should he voting jointly, so that, in
effect, the Senators will have only one vote. But at least we have the bene t of
their advice.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. I was the one who proposed that the two Houses vote
separately because if they vote jointly, the Senators are absolutely
outnumbered. It is insulting to the intelligence of the Senators to join a session
where they know they are absolutely outnumbered. Remember that the Senators
are elected at large by the whole country. The Senate is a separate Chamber.
The Senators have a longer term than the Members of the House; they have a
six-year term. They are a continuing Senate. Out of 24, twelve are elected every
year. So, if they will participate at all, the Senate must vote separately. That is
the practice everywhere where there are two chambers. But as I said, between
having a joint session of the Senate and the House voting jointly where it is
practically the House that will decide alone, the lesser of two evils is just to let
the House decide alone instead of insulting the Senators by making them
participate in a charade.
MR. REGALADO. May the Committee seek this clari cation from
Commissioner Rodrigo? This voting is supposed to revoke the
proclamation of martial law. If the two Houses vote separately and a
majority is obtained in the House of Representatives for the revocation of the
proclamation of martial law but that same majority cannot he obtained in the
Senate voting separately, what would be the situation?
MR. RODRIGO. Then the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
continues for almost two months. After two months, it stops. Besides, there is
recourse to the Supreme Court.
MR. REGALADO. Therefore, that arrangement would be very di cult for
the legislative since they are voting separately and, for lack of majority in one of
the Houses they are precluded from revoking that proclamation. They will just,
therefore, have to wait until the lapse of 60 days.
MR. RODRIGO. It might be di cult, yes. But remember, we speak of the
Members of Congress who are elected by the people. Let us not forget that the
President is also elected by the people. Are we forgetting that the President is
elected by the people? We seem to distrust all future Presidents just because
one President destroyed our faith by his declaration of martial law. I think we
are overreacting. Let us not judge all Presidents who would henceforth be
elected by the Filipino people on the basis of the abuses made by that one
President. Of course, we must be on guard; but let us not overreact.
Let me make my position clear. I am against the proposal to make the
House and the Senate vote jointly. That is an insult to the Senate.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. Will the Gentleman yield to a question?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. So, in effect, if there is a joint session composed of 250
Members of the House plus 24 Members of the Senate, the total would be 274.
The majority would be one-half plus one.
MR. MONSOD. So, 148 votes.
MR. RODRIGO. And the poor Senators would be absolutely absorbed and
outnumbered by the 250 Members of the House. Is that it?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, that is one of the implications of the suggestion and
the amendment is being made nonetheless because there is a higher objective
or value which is to prevent a deadlock that would enable the President to
continue the full 60 days in case one House revokes and the other House does
not.
The proposal also allows the Senators to participate fully in the
discussions and whether we like it or not, the Senators have very large
persuasive powers because of their prestige and their national vote.
MR. RODRIGO. So, the Senators will have the "quality votes" but Members
of the House will have the "quantity votes." Is that it?
MR. MONSOD. The Gentleman is making an assumption that they will
vote against each other. I believe that they will discuss, probably in joint session
and vote on it; then the consensus will be clear.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, the purpose of the amendment is
really to set forth a limitation because we have to avoid a stalemate. For
example, the Lower House decides that the declaration of martial law should be
revoked, and that later on, the Senate sitting separately decides that it should
not be revoked. It becomes inevitable that martial law shall continue even if
there should be no factual basis for it.
MR. OPLE. Madam President, if this amendment is adopted, we will be
held responsible for a glaring inconsistency in the Constitution to a degree that
it distorts the bicameral system that we have agreed to adopt. I reiterate: If there
are deadlocks, it is the responsibility of the presidential leadership, together with
the leaders of both Houses, to overcome them. 7 7 (Emphases supplied.)
When the matter was put to a vote, twenty-four (24) Commissioners voted for
the two Houses of the Congress "voting jointly" in the revocation of the President's
corpus, and thirteen (13) Commissioners opted for the two Houses "voting separately."
Yet, there was another attempt to amend the provision by requiring just the
House of Representatives, not the entire Congress, to vote on the revocation of the
habeas corpus: ITAaHc
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I propose an amendment?

xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. On Section 15, page 7, line 4, I propose to change the
word "Congress" to HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES so that the sentence will
read: "The HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension or extend the same if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it."
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, the proposed amendment is really a
motion for reconsideration. We have already decided that both Houses will vote
jointly. Therefore, the proposed amendment, in effect, asks for a reconsideration
of that vote in order to give it to the House of Representatives.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, the opposite of voting jointly is voting
separately. If my amendment were to vote separately, then, yes, it is a motion for
reconsideration. But this is another formula.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DE CASTRO. What is the rationale of the amendment?
MR. RODRIGO. It is intended to avoid that very extraordinary and
awkward provision which would make the 24 Senators meet jointly with 250
Members of the House and make them vote jointly. What I mean is, the 24
Senators, like a drop in the bucket, are absorbed numerically by the 250
Members of the House.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President, we need the wisdom of the
Senators. What is at stake is the future of our country human rights and civil
liberties. If we separate the Senators, then we deprive the Congressmen of the
knowledge and experience of these 24 men. I think we should forget the
classi cation of "Senators" or "Congressmen." We should all work together to
restore democracy in our country. So we need the wisdom of 24 Senators.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I just answer. This advice of the
24 Senators can be sought because they are in the same building. Anyway, the
provision, with the amendment of Commissioner Monsod, does not call
for a joint session . It only says: "the Congress, by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members in regular or special session" it does not say "joint session."
So, I believe that if the Members of the House need the counsel of the Senators,
they can always call on them, they can invite them. 7 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
The proposed amendment was not adopted, however, as only ve (5)
Commissioners voted in its favor and twenty- ve (25) Commissioners voted against it.
Thus, the power to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus still lies with both Houses of
the Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members.
Signi cantly, the Commissioners only settled the manner of voting by the
Congress, i.e., "voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members," in order
to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, but they did not directly take up and specify in
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution that the voting shall be done during a
joint session of both Houses of the Congress. In fact, Commissioner Francisco A.
Rodrigo expressly observed that the provision does not call for a joint session. That the
Congress will vote on the revocation of the President's proclamation and/or
suspension in a joint session can only be inferred from the arguments of the
Commissioners who pushed for the "voting jointly" amendment that the Members of
the House of Representatives will bene t from the advice, opinion, and/or wisdom of
the Senators, which will be presumably shared during a joint session of both Houses.
Such inference is far from a clear mandate for the Congress to automatically
convene in joint session, under all circumstances, when the President proclaims
martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, even when
Congress does not intend to revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension.
There was no obligation on the part of the
Congress herein to convene in joint session
as the provision on revocation under Article
VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution did
not even come into operation in light of the
resolutions, separately adopted by the two
Houses of the Congress in accordance with
their respective rules of procedure,
expressing support for President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216.
The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the
Congress to vote jointly in a joint session is specifically for the purpose of revocation of
the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. In the petitions at bar, the Senate and House of Representatives
already separately adopted resolutions expressing support for President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216. Given the express support of both Houses of the Congress for
Proclamation No. 216, and their already evident lack of intent to revoke the same, the
provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on revocation did not even
come into operation and, therefore, there is no obligation on the part of the Congress to
convene in joint session.
Practice and logic dictate that a collegial body will rst hold a meeting among its
own members to get a sense of the opinions of its individual members and, if possible
and necessary, reach an o cial stance, before convening with another collegial body.
This is exactly what the two Houses of the Congress did in these cases.
The two Houses of the Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
immediately took separate actions on President Duterte's proclamation of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao through
Proclamation No. 216, in accordance with their respective rules of procedure. The
Consolidated Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela), led by the Senate and Senate President
Pimentel, recounted in detail the steps undertaken by both Houses of the Congress as
regards Proclamation No. 216, to wit: CHTAIc
2. On the date of the President's declaration of martial law and the

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, Congress was in
session (from May 2, to June 2, 2017), in its First Regular Session of the 17th
Congress, as evidenced by its Legislative Calendar, otherwise known as
Calendar of Session as contained in Concurrent Resolution No. 3 of both the
Senate and the House of Representatives. x x x
3. During the plenary session of the Senate on the following day, 24
May 2017, privilege speeches and discussions had already been made about
the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. This prompted Senator Franklin M. Drilon to move to invite the
Secretary of National Defense, the National Security Adviser and the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to brief the senators in closed
session on what transpired in Mindanao. Submitted to a vote and there being no
objection, the Senate approved the motion. x x x
4. On 25 May 2017, the President furnished the Senate and the
House of Representatives, through Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III
and Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez, respectively, with copies of his report
(hereinafter, the "Report") detailing the factual and legal basis for his declaration
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in Mindanao.
5. On or about 25 May 2017, invitation letters were issued and sent
by the Senate Secretary, Atty. Lutgardo B. Barbo to the following o cials
requesting them to attend a brie ng for the Senators on 29 May 2017 at 3:00
p.m. at the Senators' Lounge at the Senate in a closed door session to describe
what transpired in Mindanao which was the basis of the declaration of martial
law in Mindanao: (a) Secretary Del n N. Lorenzana, Secretary of National
Defense (hereinafter, "Secretary Lorenzana"); (b) Secretary Hermogenes C.
Esperon, Jr., National Security Adviser and Director General of the National
Security Council (hereinafter, "Secretary Esperon"); and (c) General Eduardo M.
Ao, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (hereinafter, "Gen.
Ao"). The said letters stated that the Senators requested that the President's
Report be explained and that more details be given about the same. x x x
6. On 29 May 2017, about 3:30 p.m., a closed door brie ng was
conducted by Secretary Lorenzana, Secretary Esperon and other security
o cials for the Senators to brief them about the circumstances surrounding the
declaration of martial law and to inform them about details about the
President's Report. The brie ng lasted for about four (4) hours. After the
brie ng, the Senators had a caucus to determine what could be publicly
revealed.
7. On the same day, 29 May 2017, the House of Representatives
resolved to constitute itself as a Committee of the Whole on 31 May 2017 to
consider the President's Report.
8. On 30 May 2017, two (2) resolutions were introduced in the Senate
about the proclamation of martial law. The rst one was P.S. Resolution No.
388 (hereinafter, "P.S.R. No. 388") introduced by Senators Sotto, Pimentel, Recto,
Angara, Binay, Ejercito, Gatchalian, Gordon, Honasan, Lacson, Legarda,
Pacquiao, Villanueva, Villar and Zubiri which was entitled, "Expressing the Sense
of the Senate, Supporting the Proclamation No. 216 dated May 23, 2017,
entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao" and Finding no Cause to
revoke the Same." The second one was P.S. Resolution No. 390 (hereinafter,
"P.S.R. No. 390") introduced by Senators Pangilinan, Drilon, Hontiveros,
Trillanes, Aquino and De Lima which was entitled, "Resolution to Convene
Congress in Joint Session and Deliberate on Proclamation No. 216 dated 23
May 2017 entitled, "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao." x x x
9. Discussions were made on the two (2) proposed resolutions
during the plenary deliberations of the Senate on 30 May 2017. The rst
resolution to be discussed was P.S.R. No. 388. During the deliberations,
amendments were introduced to it and after the amendments and the debates,
P.S.R. No. 388 was voted upon and it was adopted by a vote of seventeen (17)
a rmative votes and ve (5) negative votes. The amended, substituted and
approved version of P.S.R. No. 388, which was then renamed Resolution No. 49,
states as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. 49
RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE NOT TO
REVOKE, AT THIS TIME, PROCLAMATION NO. 216, SERIES OF
2017, ENTITLED, "DECLARING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND
SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO."
WHEREAS , the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article VII,
Section 18, provides that:
". . . in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he (President) may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. . .";
WHEREAS , President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017, entitled "Declaring a State
of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao," on May 23, 2017 (the
"Proclamation");
WHEREAS , pursuant to his duty under the Constitution, on
May 25, 2017, and within forth-eight hours after the issuance of
the Proclamation, President Duterte submitted to the Senate his
report on the factual and legal basis of the Proclamation;
WHEREAS , on May 29, 2017, the Senators were briefed by
the Department of National Defense (DND), the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), and by the National Security Council (NSC)
on the factual circumstances surrounding the Proclamation as
well as the updates on the situation in Mindanao;
WHEREAS , on the basis of the information received by the
Senators, the Senate is convinced that President Duterte declared
martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao because actual rebellion exists
and that the public safety requires it;
WHEREAS , the Senate, at this time, agrees that there is no
compelling reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017;
WHEREAS , the Proclamation does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, which among others, guarantees
respect for human rights and guards against any abuse or
violation thereof: Now, therefore, be itEATCcI
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, To express the sense of

the Senate, that there is no compelling reason to revoke
Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017 at this time.
Adopted. x x x"
xxx xxx xxx
10. Immediately thereafter, P.S.R. No. 390 was also deliberated upon.
After a prolonged discussion, a vote was taken on it and nine (9) senators were
in favor and twelve (12) were against. As such, P.S.R. No. 390 calling for a joint
session of Congress was not adopted. x x x
11. In the meantime, on 31 May 2017, the House of Representatives
acting as a Committee of the Whole was briefed for about six (6) hours by
o cials of the government led by Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea
(hereinafter, "Executive Secretary Medialdea"), Secretary Lorenzana and other
security o cials on the factual circumstances surrounding the President's
declaration of martial law and on the statements contained in the President's
Report. During the evening of the same day, a majority of the House of
Representatives passed Resolution No. 1050 entitled, "Resolution Expressing the
Full Support of the House of Representatives to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
as It Finds No Reason to Revoke Proclamation No. 216 Entitled, 'Declaring A
State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
in the Whole of Mindanao.'" In the same deliberations, it was likewise proposed
that the House of Representatives call for a joint session of Congress to
deliberate and vote on the President's declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. However, after debates,
the proposal was not carried. x x x. 7 9
It cannot be disputed then that the Senate and House of Representatives placed
President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 under serious review and consideration,
pursuant to their power to revoke such a proclamation vested by the Constitution on
the Congress. Each House timely took action by accepting and assessing the
President's Report, inviting over and interpellating executive o cials, and deliberating
amongst their fellow Senators or Representatives, before nally voting in favor of
expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and against calling
for a joint session with the other House. The prompt actions separately taken by the
two Houses of the Congress on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 belied all the
purported di culties and delays such procedures would cause as raised in the
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice
Leonen). As earlier pointed out, there is no constitutional provision governing
concurrence by the Congress in the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and absent a speci c mandate
for the Congress to hold a joint session in the event of concurrence, then whether or not
to hold a joint session under such circumstances is completely within the discretion of
the Congress.
The Senate and Senate President Pimentel explained in their Consolidated
Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela), that, by practice, the two Houses of the Congress
must adopt a concurrent resolution to hold a joint session, and only thereafter can the
Houses adopt the rules to be observed for that particular joint session:
It must be stated that the Senate and the House of Representatives have
their own respective Rules, i.e., the Rules of the Senate and the Rules of the
House of Representatives. There is no general body of Rules applicable
to a joint session of Congress. Based on parliamentary practice and
procedure, the Senate and House of Representatives only adopt Rules
for a joint session on an ad hoc basis but only after both Houses have
already agreed to convene in a joint session through a Concurrent
Resolution. The Rules for a Joint Session for a particular purpose
become functus officio after the purpose of the joint session has been
achieved. Examples of these Rules for a Joint Session are (1) the Rules of the
Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential
and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 9, 2016 Election adopted on 24
May 2016; and (2) the Rules of the Joint Session of Congress on Proclamation
No. 1959 (Proclaiming a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Province of Maguindanao, Except for Certain
Areas) adopted on 09 December 2009. The only time that the Senate and the
House of Representatives do not adopt Rules for a joint session is when they
convene on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session to receive or listen
to the State of the Nation Address of the President and even then, they adopt a
Concurrent Resolution to do so.
The usual procedure for having a joint session is for both
Houses to rst adopt a Concurrent Resolution to hold a joint session.
This is achieved by either of two (2) ways: (1) both the Senate and the
House of Representatives simultaneously adopting the Concurrent
Resolution an example would be when the two (2) Houses inform
the President that they are ready to receive his State of the Nation
Address or (2) For one (1) House to pass its own resolution and to
send it to the other House for the latter's concurrence. Once the joint
session of both Houses is actually convened, it is only then that the Senate and
the House of Representatives jointly adopt the Rules for the joint session. x x x
8 0 (Emphases supplied.)
With neither Senate nor the House of Representatives adopting a concurrent

resolution, no joint session by the two Houses of the Congress can be had in the
present cases.
The Court is bound to respect the rules of the Congress, a co-equal and
independent branch of government. Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the 1987 Constitution
states that "[e]ach House shall determine the rules of its proceedings." The provision
has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses
of Congress in the formulation, adoption, and promulgation of its rules; and as such, the
exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference. 8 1
Moreover, unless there is a clear showing by strong and convincing reasons that they
con ict with the Constitution, "all legislative acts are clothed with an armor of
constitutionality particularly resilient where such acts follow a long-settled and well-
established practice by the Legislature." 8 2 Nothing in this Decision should be
presumed to give precedence to the rules of the Houses of the Congress over the
provisions of the Constitution. This Court simply holds that since the Constitution does
not regulate the manner by which the Congress may express its concurrence to a
Presidential proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
o f habeas corpus, the Houses of the Congress have the discretion to adopt rules of
procedure as they may deem appropriate for that purpose. DHITCc
The Court highlights the particular circumstance herein that both Houses of
Congress already separately expressed support for President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216, so revocation was not even a possibility and the
provision on revocation under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring
the Congress to vote jointly in a joint session never came into operation. It will be a
completely different scenario i f either of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, or if both Houses of the Congress, resolve/s to revoke the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus , in which case, Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution shall apply and the Congress must convene in joint session to vote jointly
on the revocation of the proclamation and/or suspension. Given the foregoing
parameters in applying Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Justice
Leonen's concern, expressed in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, that a deadlock
may result in the future, is completely groundless.
The legislative precedent referred to by petitioners actually supports the position
of the Court in the instant cases. On December 4, 2009, then President Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1959, entitled "Proclaiming a State of Martial Law and
Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Province of Maguindanao,
except for Certain Areas." The Senate, on December 14, 2009, adopted Resolution No.
217, entitled "Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate that the Proclamation of
Martial Law in the Province of Maguindanao is Contrary to the Provisions of the 1987
Constitution." Consequently, the Senate and the House of Representatives adopted
Concurrent Resolutions, i.e., Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 14 and House
Concurrent Resolution No. 33, calling both Houses of the Congress to convene in joint
session on December 9, 2009 at 4:00 p.m. at the Session Hall of the House of
Representatives to deliberate on Proclamation No. 1959. It appears then that the two
Houses of the Congress in 2009 also initially took separate actions on President
Macapagal-Arroyo's Proclamation No. 1959, with the Senate eventually adopting
Resolution No. 217, expressing outright its sense that the proclamation of martial law
was unconstitutional and necessarily implying that such proclamation should be
revoked. With one of the Houses favoring revocation, and in observation of the
established practice of the Congress, the two Houses adopted concurrent resolutions
to convene in joint session to vote on the revocation of Proclamation No. 1959.
For the same reason, the Fortun case cannot be deemed a judicial precedent for
the present cases. The factual background of the Fortun case is not on all fours with
these cases. Once more, the Court points out that in the Fortun case, the Senate
expressed through Resolution No. 217 its objection to President Macapagal-Arroyo's
Proclamation No. 1959 for being unconstitutional, and both the Senate and the House
of Representatives adopted concurrent resolutions to convene in joint session for the
purpose of revoking said proclamation; while in the cases at bar, the Senate and the
House of Representatives adopted Senate Resolution No. 49 and House Resolution No.
1050, respectively, which expressed support for President Duterte's Proclamation No.
216, and both Houses of the Congress voted against calling for a joint session. In
addition, the fundamental issue in the Fortun case was whether there was factual basis
for Proclamation No. 1959 and not whether it was mandatory for the Congress to
convene in joint session; and even before the Congress could vote on the revocation of
Proclamation No. 1959 and the Court could resolve the Fortun case, President
Macapagal-Arroyo already issued Proclamation No. 1963 on December 12, 2009,
entitled "Proclaiming the Termination of the State of Martial Law and the Restoration of
the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Province of Maguindanao."
Furthermore, the word "automatic" in the Fortun case referred to the duty or power of
the Congress to review the proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, rather than the joint session of Congress. 8 3
Petitioners invoke the following provision also in Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution: "The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension convene in accordance with its rules
without call." Petitioners reason that if the Congress is not in session, it is
constitutionally mandated to convene within twenty-four (24) hours from the
habeas corpus, then it is with all the more reason required to convene immediately if in
session.
The Court is not persuaded.
First, the provision specially addresses the situation when the President
proclaims martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus while
the Congress is in recess. To ensure that the Congress will be able to act swiftly on the
proclamation and/or suspension, the 1987 Constitution provides that it should convene
within twenty-four (24) hours without need for call. It is a whole different situation when
the Congress is still in session as it can readily take up the proclamation and/or
suspension in the course of its regular sessions, as what happened in these cases.
Second, the provision only requires that the Congress convene without call, but it does
not explicitly state that the Congress shall already convene in joint session. In fact, the
provision actually states that the Congress "convene in accordance with its rules,"
which can only mean the respective rules of each House as there are no standing rules
for joint sessions. And third, it cannot be said herein that the Congress failed to
convene immediately to act on Proclamation No. 216. Both Houses of the Congress
promptly took action on Proclamation No. 216, with the Senate already issuing
invitations to executive o cials even prior to receiving President Duterte's Report,
except that the two Houses of the Congress acted separately. By initially undertaking
separate actions on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and making their
respective determination of whether to support or revoke said Proclamation, the
Senate and the House of Representatives were only acting in accordance with their own
rules of procedure and were not in any way remiss in their constitutional duty to guard
against a baseless or unjusti ed proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by the President. cEaSHC
There is likewise no basis for petitioners' assertion that without a joint session,
the public cannot hold the Senators and Representatives accountable for their
respective positions on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Senate records
completely chronicled the deliberations and the voting by the Senators on Senate
Resolution No. 49 (formerly P.S. Resolution No. 388) and P.S. Resolution No. 390. While
it is true that the House of Representatives voted on House Resolution No. 1050 viva
voce, this is only in accordance with its rules. Per the Rules of the House of
Representatives:
RULE XV
Voting
Sec. 115. Manner of Voting. The Speaker shall rise and state the
motion or question that is being put to a vote in clear, precise and simple
language. The Speaker shall say "as many as are in favor, (as the question may
be) say 'aye.'" After the a rmative vote is counted, the Speaker shall say "as
many as are opposed, (as the question may be) say 'nay.'"
If the Speaker doubts the result of the voting or a motion to divide the
House is carried, the House shall divide. The Speaker shall ask those in favor to
rise, to be followed by those against. If still in doubt of the outcome or a count
by tellers is demanded, the Speaker shall name one (1) Member from each side
of the question to count the Members in the a rmative and those in the
negative. After the count is reported, the Speaker shall announce the result.
An abstention shall not be counted as a vote. Unless otherwise provided
by the Constitution or by these rules, a majority of those voting, there being a
quorum, shall decide the issue.
Sec. 116. Nominal Voting. Upon motion of a Member, duly
approved by one- fth (1/5) of the Members present, there being a quorum,
nominal voting on any question may be called. In case of nominal voting, the
Secretary General shall call, in alphabetical order, the names of the Members
who shall state their vote as their names are called.
Sec. 117. Second Call on Nominal Voting. A second call on
nominal voting shall be made to allow Members who did not vote during the
rst call to vote. Members who fail to vote during the second call shall no longer
be allowed to vote.
Since no one moved for nominal voting on House Resolution No. 1050, then the
votes of the individual Representatives cannot be determined. It does not render
though the proceedings unconstitutional or invalid.
The Congress did not violate the right of the
public to information when it did not
convene in joint session.
The Court is not swayed by petitioners' argument that by not convening in joint
session, the Congress violated the public's right to information because as records
show, the Congress still conducted deliberations on President Duterte's Proclamation
No. 216, albeit separately; and the public's right to information on matters of national
security is not absolute. When such matters are being taken up in the Congress,
whether in separate or joint sessions, the Congress has discretion in the manner the
proceedings will be conducted.
Petitioners contend that the Constitution requires a public deliberation process
on the proclamation of martial law: one that is conducted via a joint session and by a
single body. They insist that the Congress must be transparent, such that there is an
"open and robust debate," where the evaluation of the proclamation's factual bases and
subsequent implementation shall be openly discussed and where each member's
position on the issue is heard and made known to the public.
The petitioners' insistence on the conduct of a "joint session" contemplates a
mandatory joint Congressional session where public viewing is allowed.
However, based on their internal rules, each House has the discretion over the
manner by which Congressional proceedings are to be conducted. Verily, sessions are
generally open to the public, 8 4 but each House may decide to hold an executive
session due to the con dential nature of the subject matter to be discussed
and deliberated upon.
Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:
Section 82. Sessions Open to the Public. Sessions shall be open to
the public. However, when the security of the State or the dignity of the
House or any of its Members are affected by any motion or petition being
considered, the House may hold executive sessions.
Guests and visitors in the galleries are prohibited from using their
cameras and video recorders. Cellular phones and other similar electronic
devices shall be put in silent mode.
Section 83. Executive Sessions. When the House decides to hold
an executive session, the Speaker shall direct the galleries and hallways to be
cleared and the doors closed. Only the Secretary General, the Sergeant-at-Arms
and other persons speci cally authorized by the House shall be admitted to the
executive session. They shall preserve the con dentiality of everything read or
discussed in the session. (Emphasis supplied.)
Rule XLVII of the Rules of the Senate similarly sets forth the following:
SEC. 126. The executive sessions of the Senate shall be held always
behind closed doors. In such sessions, only the Secretary, the Sergeant-at-Arms,
and/or such other persons as may be authorized by the Senate may be
admitted to the session hall.
SEC. 127. Executive sessions shall be held whenever a Senator so
requests it and his petition has been duly seconded, or when the security of
the State or public interest so requires . Thereupon, the President shall
order that the public be excluded from the gallery and the doors of the session
hall be closed.
The Senator who presented the motion shall then explain the reasons
which he had for submitting the same.
The minutes of the executive sessions shall be recorded in a separate
book. (Emphasis supplied)
From afore-quoted rules, it is clear that matters affecting the security of the
state are considered confidential and must be discussed and deliberated upon in an
executive session , excluding the public therefrom. CTIEac
That these matters are considered con dential is in accordance with settled
jurisprudence that, in the exercise of their right to information, the government may
withhold certain types of information from the public such as state secrets regarding
military , diplomatic, and other national security matters . 8 5 The Court has also
ruled that the Congress' deliberative process, including information discussed and
deliberated upon in an executive session, 8 6 may be kept out of the public's reach.
The Congress not only recognizes the sensitivity of these matters but also
endeavors to preserve their con dentiality. In fact, Rule XLVII, Section 128 8 7 of the
Rules of the Senate expressly establishes a secrecy ban prohibiting all its members,
including Senate o cials and employees, from divulging any of the con dential matters
taken up by the Senate. A Senator found to have violated this ban faces the possibility
of expulsion from his o ce. 8 8 This is consistent with the Ethical Standards Act 8 9 that
prohibits public o cials and employees from using or divulging "con dential or
classi ed information o cially known to them by reason of their o ce and not made
available to the public." 9 0
Certainly, the factual basis of the declaration of martial law involves intelligence
information, military tactics, and other sensitive matters that have an undeniable effect
on national security. Thus, to demand Congress to hold a public session during which
the legislators shall openly discuss these matters, all the while under public scrutiny, is
to effectively compel them to make sensitive information available to
everyone, without exception, and to breach the recognized policy of
preserving these matters' con dentiality , at the risk of being sanctioned,
penalized, or expelled from Congress altogether.
That these are the separate Rules of the two Houses of the Congress does not
take away from their persuasiveness and applicability in the event of a joint session.
Since both Houses separately recognize the policy of preserving the con dentiality of
national security matters, then in all likelihood, they will consistently observe the same
in a joint session. The nature of these matters as con dential is not affected by the
composition of the body that will deliberate upon it whether it be the two Houses of
the Congress separately or in joint session.
Also, the petitioners' theory that a regular session must be preferred over a mere
brie ng for purposes of ensuring that the executive and military o cials are placed
under oath does not have merit. The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation 9 1 require that all witnesses at executive sessions or public
hearings who testify as to matters of fact shall give such testimony under oath or
a rmation. The proper implementation of this rule is within the Senate's competence,
which is beyond the Court's reach.
Propriety of the issuance of a writ of
mandamus or certiorari
For mandamus to lie, there must be compliance with Rule 65, Section 3, Rules of
Court, to wit:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal,
corporation, board, o cer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law speci cally enjoins as a duty resulting from an o ce, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
o ce to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may le a veri ed petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be speci ed by the court, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requirements for a petition for
mandamus to prosper:
[T]hus, a petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject
thereof is a ministerial act or duty , and not purely discretionary on the part of
the board, o cer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-de ned, clear
and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been
established. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an o cer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public o cer and gives
him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such
duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion or judgment. 9 2 (Emphases added.)
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a
clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required. Mandamus never issues in doubtful cases.
While it may not be necessary that the ministerial duty be absolutely expressed, it must
however, be clear. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a
command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already
imposed. 9 3
Although there are jurisprudential examples of the Court issuing a writ of
mandamus to compel the ful llment of legislative duty, 9 4 we must distinguish the
present controversy with those previous cases. In this particular instance, the Court has
no authority to compel the Senate and the House of Representatives to convene in joint
session absent a clear ministerial duty on its part to do so under the Constitution and in
complete disregard of the separate actions already undertaken by both Houses on
Proclamation No. 216, including their respective decisions to no longer hold a joint
session, considering their respective resolutions not to revoke said Proclamation.
In the same vein, there is no cause for the Court to grant a writ of certiorari.
As earlier discussed, under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, a petition for
certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the
government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. 9 5 Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so
patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 9 6 It bears to
mention that to pray in one petition for the issuance of both a writ of mandamus and a
writ of certiorari for the very same act which, in the Taada Petition, the non-
convening by the two Houses of the Congress in joint session is contradictory, as the
former involves a mandatory duty which the government branch or instrumentality must
perform without discretion, while the latter recognizes discretion on the part of the
government branch or instrumentality but which was exercised arbitrarily or
despotically. Nevertheless, if the Court is to adjudge the petition for certiorari alone, it
still nds the same to be without merit. To reiterate, the two Houses of the Congress
decided to no longer hold a joint session only after deliberations among their Members
and putting the same to vote, in accordance with their respective rules of procedure.
Premises considered, the Congress did not gravely abuse its discretion when it did not
jointly convene upon the President's issuance of Proclamation No. 216 prior to
expressing its concurrence thereto . SaCIDT
WHEREFORE , the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Perlas-
Bernabe, Jardeleza, Martires, Tijam and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Caguioa, J., I join J. Leonen.
Separate Opinions
LEONEN , J., concurring and dissenting :
I concur only in the result.

The Petitions are moot in that the 60-day period has already lapsed. It is likewise
academic considering that both the Senate and the House of Representatives convened
jointly to extend the e cacy of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
However, I dissent with the majority's attempts to establish doctrine in this case.
In my view, the power to revoke intrinsically and logically includes the duty to
deliberate on whether or not to revoke.
Immediately after the President, as Commander in Chief, suspends the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or declares martial law, Congress convenes as a whole to
jointly consider the reasons, scope, and proposed authorities to be exercised,
deliberates, and thus decides whether or not to revoke the proclamation. Only after all
legislators whether Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
participate in deliberations in one (1) forum will they take a vote.
This, to me, is the clear and logical requirement of Article VII, Section 18 of the
Constitution in the light of its context and its history. It harmonizes with the exigency of
the circumstances that require the suspension of the privilege of the writ and the
declaration of martial law.
The ponencia proposes that deliberation to consider whether or not to revoke
can be separated from the actual vote to revoke the suspension or the proclamation. It
proposes to defer to the political wisdom of the majority in the present Senate and the
House of Representatives.
I disagree.
To defer to the actions of the respondents today and grant the veneer of
constitutionality ensure the unworkability of the constitutional provision at bar in the
future.
Instead of one (1) forum for all legislators to deliberate, there will be two (2).
Senators will consider their own issues. Members of the House of Representatives will
also consider their own issues, which may or may not be different from that of the
Senate. The voices of the minority in the Senate will not be heard by any member of the
House of Representatives. Likewise, the minority in the House will not be heard by the
Senate.
The representatives of the President, including ranking o cers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines as well as the Philippine National Police, will appear, make
presentations, and respond to questions not in one (1) but in two (2) forums. One (1)
chamber may decide that the information provided by their resource persons will be
considered in camera or in executive session. The other chamber may see it differently.
Thus, we can have the same information treated con dentially by one (1) chamber and
publicly by the other.
Furthermore, the high-ranking o cials of both the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police will, thus, be called out of their stations,
where they can best address the urgency of an actual invasion or rebellion, to address
the legislators. They will do this not once, but twice. Perhaps even more. They will
appear before the House of Representatives. They will appear before the Senate. They
may also still appear when both chambers finally decide to convene jointly to vote.
The Senate will take a vote as to whether they are inclined to revoke the
proclamation. The House will also take a vote. The results can be different. If the results
are different, then the heads of both houses or their representatives will have to meet
perhaps in a bicameral committee.
Then, their representatives will present the results of the bicameral committee to
their respective chambers. Only when the Senate and the House separately decide that
they should revoke the suspension or the proclamation will they then convene.
Deadlock is possible when one (1) chamber decides to revoke and the other
does not. The crisis that gave rise to the suspension or proclamation will then be
burdened with another crisis: that of the inability of the government to decide.
All this must be done within the rst 60 days from the suspension or
proclamation. This is the constitutional limitation imposed on the duration of this type
of presidential action. The longer it takes for Congress to decide, the less potent their
review of the President's power to suspend the privilege of the writ or to declare
martial law. The longer it takes for Congress to decide, the higher the possibility that
the rationale for the constitutional provision would be frustrated.
These scenarios were already imagined by those who drafted this Constitution.
That is why it requires that Congress convene immediately, vote jointly and thus,
logically, also deliberate as one (1) body.
In this case, there was no deadlock between the House and the Senate. Both
agreed not to revoke Proclamation No. 216. What happened was one (1) of four (4)
possible permutations, namely:
Senate House of
Representatives
One Not to revoke Not to revoke
Two Not to revoke Revoke
Three Revoke Not to revoke
Four Revoke Revoke
But, this case is not being decided pro hac vice. We are not dismissing the case
on the ground that it is moot and academic upon the automatic expiration of the 60-day
period for Proclamation No. 216 on July 22, 2017. Rather, the ponencia proposes a
doctrine which will possibly result in a deadlock in the future. With the interpretation
proposed by the ponencia, two (2) of the four (4) possibilities will result in a
constitutional crisis. cHECAS
Thus, the act of actually revoking the suspension or the declaration becomes a
thin and truncated power divorced from its deliberation to be exercised by Congress
convened jointly. If it is true that the Senate and the House can deliberate separately on
the legality, necessity, and appropriateness of the suspension and the proclamation,
then the constitutional requirement that the vote for revocation should be done jointly
with both houses convened does not make sense. That is, of course, if such vote to
revoke is only mere ceremony.
If the requirement to convene is required when there is a deadlock after the two
legislative chambers have opposing views on whether to revoke, then we grossly lose
sight of the exigencies of the situation and the importance of the check on the
President. Every moment that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is imposed or martial law is declared is a potential situation where a
fundamental right may be violated.
Clearly, the power to revoke exercised by Congress jointly convened logically
includes their duty to jointly convene and deliberate.
I
The real issue in this case is not only one of procedure. It pertains to the role of
Congress when the President, as Commander-in-Chief, places any part of the
Philippines under martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The relevant constitutional provision states:
ARTICLE VII
Executive Department
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation
or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in
the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.
with its rules without any need of a call.
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
the invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he
shall be released. (Emphasis supplied)
The sentences which mention the role of Congress are as follows:
First:
"Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report
in person or in writing to the Congress."
Second:
"The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members
in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President."

Third:
"Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it."
Fourth:
"The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any
need of a call."
I agree with the ponencia that this case should be reviewed based on the
interpretative modality adopted in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary . 1 A
reading of the Constitution requires an examination of the text and an understanding of
the "intention underlying the provision under consideration." 2
Moreover, the text should be read as a whole, thus:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject
are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must
lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather
than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 3 AHDacC
The interpretation of the Constitution based on textual primacy entails a review

of the evolution of its provisions. This may involve a comparison between the current
text and its counterpart in previous texts. 4 However, the interpretation of the
Constitution may also include recourse to extrinsic aids to validate the meaning of the
text when the latter is capable of multiple meanings. 5 The primary duty of this Court in
interpreting the Constitution is to reasonably construe its provisions under
contemporary conditions so that what has been rati ed by the sovereign people is
given full effect. 6
We review the history of the text and the corresponding jurisprudence then
examine the possible readings taking all the provisions into consideration.
II
Prior to the 1987 Constitution, Congress played a limited role with respect to the
President's exercise of his Commander-in-Chief powers. It was delegated as a
bystander and was never given much participation.
In Barcelon v. Baker, 7 the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus was characterized as a discretionary act of the political branch of the
government beyond the review of the judiciary. 8 This Court applied a deferential
approach and emphasized that a branch of the government can neither interfere with
nor inquire into purely discretionary acts of the other. 9
Barcelon was decided at a time when the Philippine Bill of 1902 was still in force
and effect. 1 0 Although martial law was never mentioned, the Philippine Bill of 1902
empowered the Governor General to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. 1 1 However, its exercise was conditioned upon the concurrence of the
legislature:
Section 5.
xxx xxx xxx
That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may
require it, in either of which events the same may be suspended by the
President, or by the Governor, with the approval of the Philippine Commission,
wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.
It was in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 or the Jones Law where the
concept of martial law was rst introduced into the organic law of the Philippines. The
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was however retained. The
relevant text then read:
Section 21.
xxx xxx xxx
[The Governor General of the Philippine Islands] shall be responsible for the
faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands and of the United States
operative within the Philippine Islands, and whenever it becomes necessary he
may call upon the commanders of the military and naval forces of the United
States in the Islands, or summon the posse comitatus, or call out the militia or
other locally created armed forces, to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion; and he may, in case of rebellion or invasion,
or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, suspend the
privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Islands, or any part thereof,
under martial law: Provided, That whenever the Governor General shall exercise
this authority, he shall at once notify the President of the United States thereof,
together with the attending facts and circumstances, and the President shall
have power to modify or vacate the action of the Governor-General. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the exercise of these powers, legislative concurrence was not necessary.
Nevertheless, the Governor General was required to notify the President of the United
States when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended or when any part
of the country was placed under martial law. No other branch of government was
authorized to review the action taken by the Governor General except the President of
the United States. 1 2
The passage of the Tydings-Mcdu e Act or the Philippine Independence Act
paved the way for the enactment of the 1935 Constitution. 1 3 Article VII, Section 10 of
the 1935 Constitution reiterated the extraordinary powers of the executive and vested
the President with the power to call out the armed forces, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, or declare martial law in any part of the country, thus:
ARTICLE VII
Executive Department
Section 10.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger
thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under Martial
Law.
In the exercise of his Commander-in-Chief powers, the discretion of the President
was paramount and was not subject to review by any of the other branches of the
government. The participation of Congress was practically nil. It could only step in
when it grants emergency powers to the President pursuant to Article VI, Section 26 of
the 1935 Constitution. 1 4 This provided:
Section 26. In times of war and other national emergency the Congress may
by law authorize the President, for a limited period, and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out
a declared national policy.
The text of Article VII, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the 1935 Constitution was
reproduced in Article VII, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution:
ARTICLE VII
The President and Vice-President
Section 10. The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law. IDSEAH
Similar to the 1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution appeared to not textually
allow any form of intrusion or participation from any of the other branches of the
government in the President's exercise of his powers except in cases where there was
a vacancy in the o ce of the President. Legislative concurrence was only deemed
necessary when the acting President declared martial law:
ARTICLE VII
The President and Vice-President
Section 9.
xxx xxx xxx
The Acting President may not declare martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without the prior consent of at least a
majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa, or issue any decree,
order or letter of instruction while the law-making power of the President is in
force. He shall be deemed automatically on leave and the Speaker Pro Tempore
shall act as Speaker. While acting as President, the Speaker may not be
removed. He shall not be eligible for election in the immediately succeeding
election for President and Vice-President. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 and 1973 Constitutions suggested deference to the President's
discretion and wisdom in declaring martial law or in suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. This changed with the 1987 Constitution, which was cognizant of the
aberrant type of martial law imposed by then President Ferdinand Marcos. That part of
our history served as the impetus to limit the President's powers as Commander-in-
Chief 1 5 by making that power less exclusive.
Instead of wresting power from the President, the 1987 Constitution bestowed
powers of review on both the legislature and the judiciary. The text of Article VII,
Section 18 of the Constitution outlines a dynamic interaction between the three (3)
branches of the government. It also delineates the important functions of each branch,
which serves as a check-and-balance mechanism on executive prerogative. Thus:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote
of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall
not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President,
the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
with its rules without any need of a call.
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its ling. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution and its historical underpinning
direct the legislature and the judiciary not to grant full deference to the President's
discretion when he chooses to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. The two (2) other branches of the government were intended to play
an active role to check any possible abuses that may be committed. As it now stands,
the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is no longer a power that exclusively pertains to the President. 1 6
An important safeguard placed by the 1987 Constitution is the authority of
Congress to revoke the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. Although the prerogative to make the declaration or
suspension is vested on the President, it is ultimately up to Congress whether to revoke
or extend it. 1 7 The signi cant role and power of Congress was highlighted in Fortun v.
Macapagal-Arroyo: 1 8
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial
law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power
with the Congress. Thus:
1. The President's proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for
only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report
his action in person or in writing to Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene
within 24 hours of the proclamation or suspension for the purpose
of reviewing its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or a rm the President's
proclamation or suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse,
or extend the same if Congress deems warranted.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the
Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not
only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated
the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same
based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have. 1 9
Unlike this Court, whose power of review is activated only upon the ling of an
"appropriate proceeding led by any citizen," 2 0 Congress is not constrained by any
condition precedent before it can act. Congress convenes automatically through a
constitutional mandate. Subject to the voting requirements under the Constitution,
Congress can revoke the proclamation or suspension at any time, which the President
cannot undo. 2 1 It can also extend the proclamation or suspension upon the initiative of
the President voting "in the same manner." 2 2
In my view, moreover, Congress' scope of review under Article VII Section 18 is
neither bound nor restricted by any legal standard except when it is arbitrary or
unreasonable. Congress is given "a wider latitude in how it chooses to respond to the
President's proclamation or suspension." 2 3 The Court's power of review meanwhile is
limited to a nding of the "su ciency of the factual basis" 2 4 or a violation of any of the
fundamental rights or processes embedded in a speci c provision of the Constitution.
aCIHcD
III
The obvious motivation for the requirement that Congress convene automatically
and deliberate and vote jointly was to render any action by a deliberative body practical
in the light of the exigencies. The framers of the 1987 Constitution already anticipated
the possibility of a deadlock between the two (2) houses. Hence, to make revocation of
the proclamation or suspension easier, they purposely proposed an exception to the
general rule where each house acts separately:
FR. BERNAS: We would like a little discussion on that because yesterday
we already removed the necessity for concurrence of Congress for the initial
imposition of martial law. If we require the Senate and the House of
Representatives to vote separately for purposes of revoking the
imposition of martial law, that will make it very di cult for Congress
to revoke the imposition of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. That is just thinking aloud. To
balance the fact that the President acts unilaterally[,] then the Congress voting
as one body and not separately can revoke the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
MR. MONSOD: In other words, voting jointly.
FR. BERNAS: Jointly, yes.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO: May I comment on the statement made by Commissioner
Bernas? I was a Member of the Senate for 12 years. Whenever a bicameral
Congress votes, it is always separately.
For example, bills coming from the Lower House are voted upon by the
Members of the House. Then they go up to the Senate and voted upon
separately. Even on constitutional amendments, where Congress meets in joint
session, the two Houses vote separately.
Otherwise, the Senate will be useless; it will be sort of absorbed by the
House considering that the Members of the Senate are completely outnumbered
by the Members of the House. So, I believe that whenever Congress acts, it must
be the two Houses voting separately.
If the two Houses vote "jointly," it would mean mixing the 24
Senators with 250 Congressmen. This would result in the Senate
being absorbed and controlled by the House. This violates the purpose
of having a Senate.
FR. BERNAS: I quite realize that that is the practice and, precisely,
in proposing this, I am consciously proposing this as an exception to
this practice because of the tremendous effect on the nation when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended and then martial
law is imposed. Since we have allowed the President to impose
martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
unilaterally, we should make it a little more easy for Congress to
reverse such actions for the sake of protecting the rights of the
people.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO: Will the Gentleman yield to a question?
MR. MONSOD: Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: So, in effect, if there is a joint session composed of 250
Members of the House plus 24 Members of the Senate, the total would be 274.
The majority would be one-half plus one.
MR. MONSOD: So, 148 [sic] votes.
MR. RODRIGO: And the poor Senators would be absolutely absorbed and
outnumbered by the 250 Members of the House. Is that it?
MR. MONSOD: Yes, that is one of the implications of the
suggestion and the amendment is being made nonetheless because
there is a higher objective or value which is to prevent a deadlock that
would enable the President to continue the full 60 days in case one
House revokes and the other House does not.
The proposal also allows the Senators to participate fully in the
discussions and whether we like it or not, the Senators have very large
persuasive powers because of their prestige and their national vote . 2 5
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, those who participated in the drafting of the Constitution were
contemplating not only the voting but likewise the deliberations that would lead to the
voting. Thus, Commissioner Monsod mentioned that "the proposal allows Senators to
participate fully in the discussions and whether we like it or not, the Senators have very
large persuasive powers because of their prestige and national vote." 2 6
When the deliberations are conducted in separate chambers, the nal results
may differ. Thus, the leaders may have to meet in a bicameral body or repeat the same
discussions done in both chambers but, this time, with Congress convened jointly.
Since any declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus will only
be for an initial period of 60 days, the length of the deliberations in each chamber
duplicated in bicameral and/or in Congress assembled as a whole weakens legislative
oversight.
The Constitution requires that Congress convene within 24 hours if it is
adjourned to consider the suspension or the declaration. This communicates a sense
of urgency that Congress has to act. The context of the provisions, thus, suggests that
the discussions in Congress cannot take place in layers that is, with each Chamber
first before it goes to Congress convened jointly.
There will be other unintended consequences which will point to the lack of
viability for the interpretation proposed by the ponencia.
Clearly, when each chamber deliberates separately, the representatives of the
executive will have to make their presentations twice. They will present the reasons,
evidence, and their intended program to the Senate and then to the House of
Representatives, all within the same 60-day period. In each of their presentations, they
will have to take questions, discuss their answers, and adjust their programs of action.
The points considered in one (1) chamber may be different in the other. Thus, the other
chamber will not bene t from the wisdom of the other. If the points discussed are the
same, then the Constitution is read as allowing redundancy during a situation where
there may be actual invasion or rebellion. cHaCAS
Such waste of energies does not harmonize with the exigent circumstances
sought to be addressed by the extraordinary use of the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ or the declaration of martial law. Certainly, it is not the process that will
ensure that Congress will always decide early within the initial 60 days. An ordinary
libuster in one (1) chamber by one (1) legislator will negate the power of the entire
Congress.
Within such limited time, the views of the minority of the Senate will not be heard
by the House of Representatives. Neither will the voice of the minority in the House of
Representatives be heard by or considered by the Senators. With separate
deliberations read as being allowed by the Constitution, a joint vote becomes a mere
ceremony.
The power to revoke should be made as effectively and e ciently as possible.
The constitutional design is not to make it di cult for Congress to revoke. This is not
what the Constitution requires. In the words of a member of the Constitutional
Commission:
FR. BERNAS: [W]e should make it a little more easy for Congress to
reverse such actions for the sake of protecting the rights of the people. 2 7
The present Constitution negates a vision of an authoritarian. Its goal is the
establishment of a "democratic and republican" State. 2 8 It cannot be read to allow the
emergence of a strongman. Even in situations that may appear to require the
derogation of certain rights through the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or the declaration of martial law, our fundamental law requires further
deliberation by Congress, which should effectively check on the contingent powers of
the President. The representatives of the people, thus, gather as a whole Congress
jointly considering the reasons, necessity, and appropriateness of the policies taken.
IV
With due respect, the ponente arrives at her conclusion by proposing that
sentences from Article VII, Section 18 be taken in isolation from each other. 2 9 Thus,
she starts with the position that this sentence shall not be considered:
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following
such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules even
without need of a call.
The ponencia thus isolates this sentence:
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
I disagree with this approach. The parts of the Constitution must be construed in
its entirety. Each provision should provide the context of meaning.
Thus, the requirement that Congress automatically convene quali es the
interpretation of the scope of the power to revoke.
First, it communicates the urgency and that Congressional action should be
taken soonest; and
Second, it communicates that Congress may exercise all its other legislative
powers in order that it may assist in ensuring that the crisis that led to the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the declaration of martial law is
adequately addressed.
The rst conclusion does not require further elaboration considering that the
duration of the Presidential Proclamation is initially limited to 60 days without
Congressional action.
The second is likewise obvious. The Constitution frames an entire government.
The social, economic, or political conditions which led to actual invasion or rebellion,
including the possible ine ciencies of intelligence or law enforcement, cannot be the
sole domain of the President alone. After all, long-term policymaking is the province of
the legislature. So is the allocation of resources through regular or special
appropriations. Congress, when it convenes and deliberates jointly, will thus be able to
identify more e ciently what needs to be done by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Within the time that it convenes, the chambers do not shed their
nature as legislative bodies that can consider the measures that will assist the
President to address the emergencies in the near term. After having discussed as a
whole body, the Senators and Members of the House of Representatives will, thus, have
a better idea of what may be needed in terms of legislation and appropriation. While
martial law is declared, they can then proceed either to legislate or appropriate through
the normal legislative process.
V
More telling in the interpretation of how Congress must exercise its full powers
during the exigent circumstances described in Article VII, Section 18 is the sentence
that comes next to the one (1) privileged in the ponencia, thus:
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner , extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined
by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it. (Emphasis provided)
The phrase "in the same manner" clearly textually refers to the prior sentence,
which reads:
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
If the ponencia holds, this means that Congress should deliberate in separate
chambers rst and will only convene jointly as a whole body when it is ready to vote to
extend the suspension or the proclamation. Thus, the fact that rebellion and invasion
persist and that public safety requires the suspension or proclamation should rst be
determined separately. Only when both chambers are convinced of the merits to extend
the suspension or proclamation will Congress convene jointly. Again, all this con uence
of events should happen within the same 60 days the same 60 days when the House
and the Senate separately determine whether they should revoke and then the same 60
days that they will also separately deliberate for the purpose of acting on a proposal of
the President to extend. DACcIH
Given the time constraints, the interpretation proposed by the ponencia will, thus,
not make sense when there is a difference of opinion between the Senate and the
House of Representatives.
VI
Respondents have not presented any rationale for meeting separately to
consider whether or not they should exercise their prerogative to revoke Proclamation
No. 216 except either as a policy of deference or their traditions.
I agree with the ponencia that respect should be given to the rules that each
house of Congress has adopted. 3 0 However, I disagree with the proposition that
Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the Constitution, which grants each house of Congress the
power and authority to "determine the rules of its proceedings," is paramount to the
mandate in Article VII, Section 18. 3 1
The tradition of Congress to rst deliberate amongst themselves and
subsequently adopt a concurrent resolution convening both houses in joint session
must, however, yield to Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution. The urgency of the
provision should be read into the rules of each chamber.
With due respect to my colleagues, the majority impales the meaning of the
Constitution at its most critical period. The decision degrades the historical lessons we
have learned and weakens the safeguards that those who ratified the 1987 Constitution
wanted. There is a more reasoned contemporary reading of the fundamental law:
during a crisis that may lead the President to effect the suspension of some
fundamental rights, Congress as a whole not as two (2) chambers should
automatically convene to publicly deliberate. In my view, this is the Congressional
power that the respondents should have discharged on behalf of their constituents.
When there is a perception that the existence of the democratic republic may be
threatened, we should read as inscribed in Article VII, Section 18 of our fundamental
law the fullest, most effective, most e cient, and most timely Congressional review of
the President's exercise of his awesome powers as Commander-in-Chief.
There can be no second order solutions. The exigencies and the protection of
fundamental rights require nothing less.
We are a democratic and republican state. This is true during normal times and
during times of perceived crisis.

Sovereignty resides in the people. This is true likewise during normal times and
during times of perceived crisis.
We should live these values and not consciously allow political barriers to
degrade what the Constitution means. In my view, it was the constitutional duty of the
House of Representatives and the Senate to convene jointly, deliberate jointly, and
decide jointly whether or not to revoke Proclamation No. 216. aICcHA
ACCORDINGLY , I vote to DISMISS the Petitions but only because they have
become moot and academic.
Footnotes
1. Rollo (G.R. No. 231671), p. 22.
2. Rollo (G.R. No. 231694), p. 27.
3. Entitled "Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate, Supporting Proclamation No. 216
dated May 23, 2017, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao' and Finding No Cause
to Revoke the Same." (Rollo [G.R. No. 231671], p. 177).
4. Entitled "Resolution to Convene Congress in Joint Session and Deliberate on Proclamation
No. 216 dated 23 May 2017 Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending
the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao.'" (Rollo [G.R. No.
231671], pp. 178-181).
5. Rollo (G.R. No. 231671), pp. 182-183.
6. The pertinent portions of the resolution reads:
WHEREAS, the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article VII, Section 18, provides that:
". . . in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (President) may,
for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law . . .";
WHEREAS, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017,
entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao," on May 23, 2017 (the "Proclamation");
WHEREAS, pursuant to his duty under the Constitution, on May 25, 2017, and within forty-
eight hours after the issuance of the Proclamation, President Duterte submitted to the
Senate his report on the factual and legal basis of the Proclamation;
WHEREAS, on May 29, 2017, the Senators were briefed by the Department of National
Defense (DND), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and by the National Security
Council (NSC) on the factual circumstances surrounding the Proclamation as well as the
updates on the situation in Mindanao;
WHEREAS, on the basis of information received by the Senators, the Senate is convinced
that President Duterte declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao because actual rebellion exists and that public
safety requires it;
WHEREAS, the Senate, at this time, agrees that there is no compelling reason to revoke
Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017;
WHEREAS, the Proclamation does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, which
among others, guarantees respect for human rights and guards against any abuse or
violation thereof: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, To express the sense of the Senate, that there is no
compelling reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017, at this time.
7. See excerpts from the deliberations of the Senate on P.S. Resolution No. 390 held on May 30,
2017, attached as Annex "7" of the Consolidated Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela) of the
Senate of the Philippines and Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III through the
Office of the Senate Legal Counsel (Rollo [G.R. No. 231671], pp. 184-230.)
8. The House of Representatives resolved to constitute itself as a Committee of the Whole
House on May 29, 2017.
9. Rollo (G.R. No. 231671), pp. 130-131. The full text of said resolution is reproduced here:
WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution states,
in pertinent part:
"The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
Report in person or in writing to the Congress. x x x";
WHEREAS, on May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
"Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao";
WHEREAS, on May 25, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte submitted a Report to the
House of Representatives relative to Proclamation No. 216 stating, among others:
"x x x, after finding that lawless armed groups have taken up arms and committed public
uprising against the duly constituted government and against the people of Mindanao,
for the purpose of removing Mindanao starting with the City of Marawi, Lanao del Sur
from its allegiance to the Government and its laws and depriving the Chief Executive
of its powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public
order and safety in Mindanao, to the great damage, prejudice, and detriment of the
people therein and the nation as a whole. x x x"
WHEREAS, on May 31, 2017, the House of Representatives constituted itself into a
Committee of the Whole House to consider the Report of the President relative to
Proclamation No. 216, and heard the briefing by the heads of departments of the
Executive Department;
WHEREAS, during the said briefing and after interpellation, the Members of the House of
Representatives determined the sufficiency of the factual basis for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216;
RESOLVED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, to express its full support to
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte as it finds no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216,
entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao."

10. See excerpts from the deliberations of the Committee of the Whole House on House
Resolution No. 1050 held on May 31, 2017, attached as Annex "8" of the Consolidated
Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela) of the Senate of the Philippines and Senate President
Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III through the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel. (Rollo [G.R.
No. 231671], pp. 231-241.)
11. Consolidated Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela) of the Senate of the Philippines and Senate
President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III through the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel. (Id.
at 140.)
12. Rollo (G.R. No. 231671), pp. 8-10, 12, 15, 19-20.
13. Id. at 8.
14. Id. at 8-9.
15. Id. at 21.
16. Id. at 12-13.

17. Id. at 14-15.
18. 684 Phil. 526 (2012).
19. Rollo (G.R. No. 231671), pp. 19-20.
20. Id. at 19.
21. Rollo (G.R. No. 231694), pp. 18-21.
22. Id. at 13.

23. Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 17.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 20.
27. Id. at 21.
28. Id. at 25.
29. Id. at 224-225, 279.

30. Id. at 211.
31. Id. at 212-214.
32. Id. at 236-240.
33. Id. at 217, citing Pacheco v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 200, 203 (2000).
34. Id. at 228.
35. Id. at 230-231.

36. Id. at 233-234.
37. Id. at 222, citing Unilever Philippines v. Tan, 725 Phil. 486, 493-494 (2014).

38. Id.
39. Id. at 223, citing The Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 589 Phil. 387 (2008).
40. Id. at 223, 266-267.
41. 721 Phil. 416, 534-535 (2013).
42. See Lozano v. Nograles, 607 Phil. 334, 340 (2009), citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,
2L. Ed. 60 [1803].
43. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
44. A recent example is Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016.
45. Marcos v. Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479, 506-507 (1989); Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, 280 Phil. 829, 840 (1991); Daza v. Singson, 259 Phil. 980, 983 (1983);
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 904 (2003).
46. 751 Phil. 301, 340 (2015), citing Chief Justice Reynato Puno's separate opinion in
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, id.
47. Id. at 338-339.
48. G.R. No. 207132, December 6, 2016.
49. Purisima v. Lazatin, G.R. No. 210588, November 29, 2016, citing Galicto v. Aquino III, G.R.
No. 193978, February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 150, 170.
50. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 756 (2006).
51. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629, 680 (2010).
52. Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521, 530 (1987).
53. Taada v. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 430 (1985).

54. Purisima v. Lazatin, supra note 49, citing Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of
2010, 651 Phil. 374, 439 (2010).
55. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, id., citing Senate of the Philippines v.
Ermita, 522 Phil. 1, 29 (2006).
56. The Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain, supra note 39 at 481, citing Didipio Earth Savers' Multi-
Purpose Association, Incorporated (DESAMA) v. Gozun, 520 Phil. 457, 471 (2006).
57. RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 3.
58. Cawad v. Abad, 764 Phil. 705, 722 (2015).
59. Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 531 (2014).
Panel on Ancestral Domain, supra note 39 at 486, citing Taada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546,
575 (1997).
61. This is implied in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council (supra note 51 at 737), wherein we
ruled: "On its face, this petition fails to present any justiciable controversy that can be the
subject of a ruling from this Court. As a petition for certiorari, it must first show as a
minimum requirement that the JBC is a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions and is acting outside its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A petition for mandamus, on the
other hand, at the very least must show that a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty."
62. Article VII, Section 10 (2) of the 1935 Constitution provides, "The President shall be
commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the
privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
Martial Law."
Panel on Ancestral Domain, supra note 39 at 488, citing Integrated Bar of the Phils. v.
Hon. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618 (2000).
64. G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 and 231774, July 4, 2017.
65. Supra note 50 at 753-754.
66. B/Gen. Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga, 530 Phil. 398, 421-422 (2006).
67. The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel on the Ancestral Domain, supra note 39 at 529.
68. The First Regular Session of the 17th Congress was from May 2 to June 2, 2017.
69. Bolos v. Bolos, 648 Phil. 630, 637 (2010).
70. 686 Phil. 571, 591-592 (2012).
71. See Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, 584 Phil. 119, 127 (2008).
72. Compared to Article VI, Section 23 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, which reads, "The Congress,
by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled , voting separately,
shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war." See also Article VII,
Section 4, fourth paragraph, which states:
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board
of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to
the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of
the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the
certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint
public session , and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
73. 272 Phil. 147, 157 (1991).
74. Id. at 169-170.
75. II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 393-394 (July 29, 1986).
76. Id. at 470-477.
77. II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 493-501 (July 31, 1986).

78. Id. at 501-502.
79. Rollo (G.R. No. 231671), pp. 136-140.
80. Id. at 156-157.
81. Dela Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 598 Phil. 981, 986 (2009).
82. McGillicuddy v. Commissioner, Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural Resources, 646
A.2d 354, July 22, 1994, citing State v. Hills, 574 A.2d 1357, 1358 (Me. 1990).
83. The Court wrote in the Fortun case, that "President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint
houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or
invalidate the same[;]" and "Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the
Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow
Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated."
(Supra note 18 at 556, 558.)
84. See Rule XI, Section 82, The Rules of the House of Representatives.
85. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, 586 Phil.
135, 162 (2008), citing Almonte v. Vasquez, 314 Phil. 150, 167 (1995); Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 534 (2002).
86. Chavez v. Philippine Commission on Good Government, 360 Phil. 133, 162 (1998).
87. SEC. 128. The President as well as the Senators and the officials and employees of the
Senate shall absolutely refrain from divulging any of the confidential matters taken up
by the Senate, and all proceedings which might have taken place in the Senate in
connection with the said matters shall be likewise considered as strictly confidential
until the Senate, by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its Members, decides to lift the ban of
secrecy.
88. SEC. 129. Any Senator who violates the provisions contained in the preceding section may,
by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all the Senators, be expelled from the Senate, and if the
violator is an official or employee of the Senate, he shall be dismissed.
89. Republic Act No. 6713, enacted on February 20, 1989, cited in Chavez v. Philippine
Commission on Good Government, supra note 86.
90. Section 7, Republic Act No. 6713.
91. Sec. 12. Testimony Under Oath. All witnesses at executive sessions or public hearings who
testify as to matters of fact shall give such testimony under oath or affirmation.
Witnesses may be called by the Committee on its own initiative or upon the request of
the petitioner or person giving the information or any person who feels that he may be
affected by the said inquiry.
92. Velasco v. Belmonte, Jr., G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016, 780 SCRA 81, 119 citing
Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, 442 Phil. 139, 189 (2002).
93. University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 300 Phil. 819, 830 (1994).
94. See Velasco v. Belmonte, Jr., supra note 92 at 123, citing Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, supra
note 92 at 188-189.
95. Jardeleza v. Sereno, 741 Phil. 460, 491 (2014).
96. Limkaichong v. Land Bank of the Phils., G.R. No. 158464, August 2, 2016.
LEONEN, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. 272 Phil. 147 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En Banc].

2. Id. at 157.
3. Id. at 162.
4. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/september2016/221538.pdf> 22 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
5. Id. at 23.
6. See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 501-
523 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
7. 5 Phil. 87 (1905) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc].
8. Id. at 98.
9. Id. at 115.
10. Id. at 91-92.
11. Phil. Bill of 1902, sec. 5, par. 7.

12. Phil. Autonomy Act (1916), sec. 21.
13. Phil. Independence Act (1934), sec. 1.
14. Similarly, the 1987 Constitution in art. VI, sec. 23 (2) provides:
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
15. Sanlakas v. Reyes, 466 Phil. 482, 521-522 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc] citing Marcos v.
Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479 (1989) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].
16. Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 684 Phil. 526, 557 (2012) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
17. CONST, art. VII, sec. 18.
18. 684 Phil. 526 (2012) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
19. Id. at 557-558.
20. CONST., art. VII, sec. 18, par. 3.

23. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, 231774,
July 4, 2017 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/231658.pdf> [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
25. II Records of the Constitutional Commission, dated July 31, 1986.
28. CONST., art. II, sec. 1.

29. Ponencia, pp. 27-30.
30. Ponencia, p. 48.
31. Id.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 231671. July 25, 2017.]

ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, CHRISTIAN S.

[G.R. No. 231694. July 25, 2017.]

FORMER SEN. WIGBERTO E. TAADA, BISHOP EMERITUS

These consolidated petitions under consideration essentially assail the failure

Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 raise the question of "[w]hether Congress is

The petitioners in G.R. No. 231694 chiefly opine that:

Respondents allege that petitioners failed to present an appropriate case for

Respondents brush aside as mere obiter dictum the Court's pronouncement in

The principle of separation of powers

The separation of powers doctrine is the backbone of our tripartite system of

[W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it

Political question doctrine

Corollary to respondents' invocation of the principle of separation of powers,

Petitioners' legal standing

Petitioners seek relief through a writ of mandamus and/or certiorari. Mandamus

xxx xxx xxx

Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution fully reads:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention

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The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because

MR. SUAREZ. These are safeguards after the declaration of

Anyway, Madam President, we have precedents or similar cases. For

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I propose an amendment?

2. On the date of the President's declaration of martial law and the

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, To express the sense of

With neither Senate nor the House of Representatives adopting a concurrent

WHEREFORE , the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

I concur only in the result.

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The interpretation of the Constitution based on textual primacy entails a review

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16. Id. at 12-13.

22. Id. at 13.

29. Id. at 224-225, 279.

35. Id. at 230-231.

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53. Taada v. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 430 (1985).

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1. 272 Phil. 147 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En Banc].

11. Phil. Bill of 1902, sec. 5, par. 7.

21. CONST., art. VII, sec. 18, par. 1.

28. CONST., art. II, sec. 1.

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