Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo

Estipona, Jr. v.
Lobrigo
G.R. No. 226679 (August 15, 2017)
Topic: Rule 118: Pre-Trial (plea bargaining in drug cases)
Issue: Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases, unconstitutional
Held: Yes
Ratio: The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now their
exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the
sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that
effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal
or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To
reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the
safeguards of our institutional independence.
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out
a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common
in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to
avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the
system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away
a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against
him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. In any case,
whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch
as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard
by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself.
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than
accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and
the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in
the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions;
his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand
can sustain.
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference
are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to assessing the strength and
importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government
enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice
system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these decisions "are
not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant
to examine the decision whether to prosecute. "
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to plead guilty to
a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion
upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that
a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining
or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already
rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not
amount to a grave abuse thereof. "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a
court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its
case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of
the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the
former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the
prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously
study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to
the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. The ruling on the motion must disclose the
strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the
judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.

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Topic: Rule 118: Pre-Trial (plea bargaining in drug cases)

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