240. TIU VS CA, G.R. No. 127410.

January 20, 1999

(Equal Protection of the Law)

FACTS:
Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled
"An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into Other Productive
Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose,
Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." Section 12 thereof created the
Subic Special Economic Zone and granted there to special privileges.
President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97, clarifying the application of the
tax and duty incentives. The President issued Executive Order No. 97-A, specifying the
area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative. The petitioners
challenged before this Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative
of their right to equal protection of the laws. This Court referred the matter to the Court
of Appeals. Proclamation No. 532 was issued by President Ramos. It delineated the
exact metes and bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant
to Section 12 of RA 7227.
Respondent Court held that "there is no substantial difference between the
provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227. In both, the 'Secured Area' is precise
and well-defined as '. . . the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous
extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement
between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended . . .'"
ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution
HELD :
No. The Court found real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances
obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and
reasonable classification. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized
by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from another.
The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all
those belonging to the same class. Classification, to be valid, must
(1) rest on substantial distinctions,
(2) be germane to the purpose of the law,
(3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Supreme Court believed it was reasonable for the President to have
delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military
base. It is this specific area which the government intends to transform and develop
from its status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial
and commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local investors to use as
operational bases for their businesses and industries.
 Aurora Land Project Corp
vs.
NLRC and Dagui
GR No 114733, 02.01.1997
By Richard Troy A. Colmenares
USA College of Law
6/17/14 10:24:23 AM
Nature of the Case
A petition for certiorari seeking reversal of NLRC decision which modified petitioner’s liability for separation pay and attorneys fees as ruled
by the labor arbiter.

Facts
Private respondent worked as maintenance and repairs man for almost 40 years in the apartments and buildings owned by petitioner. The
daughter of the owner, the petitioner, alleged that his work was unsatisfactory and so dismissed private respondent. Private respondent filed
a complaint of illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter, who in turn ruled in favor of private respondent for separation pay and attorneys fees.
Petitioner appealed before the NLRC which affirmed the decision of labor arbiter, but lowered the separation pay and deleted the attorney’s
fees. Petitioners thus filed petition for certiorari implicating NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for four reasons.

Issue(s)
(1). Whether private respondent is an employee petitioner?
(2). Whether private respondent has been illegally dismissed?

Held
(1). Yes. In fact, private respondent is a regular employee.

The Court, consistent with the labor arbiter and NLRC’s ruling, is not convinced that private respondent is only a contractual
employee. To qualify as a contractual one employee, one must have substantial capital investment (Sec.8, Rule VIII, Book III of the
IRR of the Labor Code). Petitioners showed no proof that private respondent was a contractual employee. The same ruling based
on fact is within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and NLRC.

All the elements of the four-fold test in identifying employer-employee relationship (E2e; power to hire, payment of wages, power to
fire, and power of control over conduct of employee) are present in the instant case. The fact the private respondent was paid on a
daily basis admits that he is an employee compensated by way of wages and not by profit. The petitioner had indeed the power of
dismissal over private respondent.

The mere existence of the power of control is enough to show its compliance with the four-fold test. This is the case with petitioner
and the same is not negated by the fact the petitioner does not directly supervise the performance of the private respondent. He
works between 7AM to 4PM within the premises of the petitioner, and thus, naturally has to receive supervision over his work from
the petitioner. There are two ways to determine a regular employee, and whichever is applied does not negate the fact that private
respondent is a regular employee by definition - “an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer” and
that “any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee” (Art. 280, Labor Code).

The petitioners contest that private respondent is not a regular employee by reason that he performs a specific job function and
1
only while the same exists, falling as an exception to Art. 280. The same argument is disproved by petitioners act of not submitting
a mandatory “report of termination” for their alleged project employee, private respondent.

(2). Yes.

Due process requires the right to be heard and to defend himself with the option of counsel, noted as procedural and substantive
due process. The mandatory notice of hearing and notice of dismissal was absent in the instant case, making private respondent
an illegally dismissed employee.

To correct is the plain error committed by the labor arbiter and NLRC by not awarding backwages. The Court relaxes strict
construction of procedural requirements (private respondent’s failure to appeal for backwages) in pursuit of justice. Thus, the
decision of the labor arbiter and NLRC are modified to include backwages reckoning from the time private was re-employed until
the day he was illegally dismissed, as well as other benefits entitled to him by law.!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
Art. 280, Labor Code xxx except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.
 the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
deleting the word “principal” from the phrase
Facts: “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Eleven persons believed to be members of the Petitioner questions the constitutionality of

Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7
syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain which provides that the said law shall apply to
by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery all cases pending in any court over which trial
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among has not begun as of the approval hereof.
those included in the ABRITG were petitioners
Issues:
and petitioner-intervenors.
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo
8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process
delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal
and the equal protection clause of the
Investigation Command, that what actually
Constitution as the provisions seemed to have
transpired was a summary execution and not a
been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang
continue to acquire jurisdiction over the
members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman
Kuratong Baleleng case.
Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators
to investigate the said incident. Said panel (2) Whether or not said statute may be
found the incident as a legitimate police considered as an ex-post facto statute.
operation. However, a review board modified
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the
the panel’s finding and recommended the
alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
indictment for multiple murder against
committed in relation to the office of the
twenty-six respondents including herein
accused PNP officers which is essential to the
petitioner, charged as principal, and herein
determination whether the case falls within the
petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories.
Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s
After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
jurisdiction.
amended informations before the
Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged RULING:
only as an accessory
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that
The accused filed separate motions questioning Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting to equal protection of the law is too shallow to
that under the amended informations, the cases deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial convincing argument were presented to warrant
Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They such a declaration. Every classification made
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction by the law is presumed reasonable and the
of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or party who challenges the law must present
ore of the “principal accused” are government proof of arbitrariness. The classification is
officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP reasonable and not arbitrary when the following
officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or concur: (1) it must rest on substantial
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said distinction; (2) it must be germane to the
requisites. However, pending resolution of their purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending existing conditions only, and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class; all of related to the discharge of their official duties as
which are present in this case. police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall
accused arrested and investigated the victim
apply “to all cases involving” certain public
and then killed the latter while in their custody.
officials and under the transitory provision in
The stringent requirement that the charge set
Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.”
forth with such particularity as will reasonably
Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’
indicate the exact offense which the accused is
argument, the law is not particularly directed
alleged to have committed in relation to his
only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
office was not established.
transitory provision does not only cover cases
which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in Consequently, for failure to show in the
“any court.” amended informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex
discharge of official functions of the accused
post facto law, generally, provides retroactive
PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject
effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal
criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore,
law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
is not penal in character. Penal laws are those
Regional Trial Court and not the
acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
Sandiganbayan.
acts and establish penalties for their violations
or those that define crimes and provide for their ============================
punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the On May 18, 1995, alleged members of the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death.
appeal and other procedural matters, has been The incident was later sensationalized as a rub
declared by the Court as not a penal law, but out. This implicated case Panfilo Lacson, who,
clearly a procedural statute, one which at the time of the “rub out” was then the PNP
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts Chief, among others, as the ones responsible.
applying laws of all kinds can properly They were accused of multiple murder. The
administer justice. Not being a penal law, the case reached the Sandiganbayan. In 1996,
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be Lacson et al filed separate motions questioning
challenged as unconstitutional. the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They
aver that the cases fall within the jurisdiction of
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an
the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2
offense is said to have been committed in
(par a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975 also
relation to the office if it is intimately connected
known as “An Act To Strengthen The
with the office of the offender and perpetrated
Functional And Structural Organization Of The
while he was in the performance of his official
Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose
functions. Such intimate relation must be
Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended”.
alleged in the information which is essential in
determining the jurisdiction of the They contend that the said law limited the
Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
the amended information, there was no specific where one or more of the “principal accused”
allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim are government officials with Salary Grade (SG)
by the said principal accused was intimately 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of
Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or arbitrary when there is concurrence of four
higher. The highest ranking principal accused in elements, namely:
the amended informations has the rank of only
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent
of at least SG 27. (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the
law;
In 1997, Republic Act No. 8249 was passed
which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the (3) must not be limited to existing conditions
Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by only, and
Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed (4) must apply equally to all members of the
the law as it was introduced by the authors same class
thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely
The classification between those pending cases
suit the situation in which Lacson’s cases were
involving the concerned public officials whose
in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring
trial has not yet commenced and whose cases
jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his
could have been affected by the amendments
right to procedural due process and the equal
of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A.
protection clause of the Constitution. Further,
8249, as against those cases where trial had
from the way the Sandiganbayan has
already started as of the approval of the law,
foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution
rests on substantial distinction that makes real
of a pending incident involving the transfer of
differences. In the first instance, evidence
the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the
against them were not yet presented, whereas
passage of the law may have been timed to
in the latter the parties had already submitted
overtake such resolution to render the issue
their respective proofs, examined witness and
therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of
presented documents. Since it is within the
petitioner’s vested rights under the old
power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).
courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the right to equal can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration
protection by Lacson et al has been violated of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect
with the passage of RA 8249. pending cases, which is why it has to provide
HELD: ​No. The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not for a remedy in the form of a transitory
violate the right of Lacson et al to equal provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot claim that
protection. No concrete evidence and Secs 4 and 7 placed them under a different
convincing argument were presented to warrant category from those similarly situated as them.
a declaration of an act of the entire Congress Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall
and signed into law by the highest officer of the apply to “all cases involving” certain public
co-equal executive department as officials and, under the transitory provision in
unconstitutional. Every classification made by Sec 7, to “all cases pending in any court.”
law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’
who challenges the law must present proof of arguments, the law is not particularly directed
arbitrariness. It is an established precept in only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal transitory provision does not only cover cases
protection of the laws is not violated by a which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in
legislation based on reasonable classification. “any court.” It just happened that the Kuratong
The classification is reasonable and not
Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the
law. Moreover, those cases where trial had
already begun are not affected by the transitory
provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A.
8249).
Facts: ​DOLE enacted Department Order No 1,
outlining guidelines of temporary suspension
deployment of female domestic workers.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
engaged in the recruitment of overseas workers
assailed the validity of the said order. They
contend that this is discriminatory against
female domestic workers and does not apply to
all Filipino workers but to domestic helpers only.

Issue: ​Whether or not DO No 1 violates equal

protection on the ground of sexual
discrimination?

Decision: ​Petition dismissed. The Court is well

aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen
our female labor force abroad, especially
domestic servants, amid exploitative working
conditions marked by, in not a few cases,
physical and personal abuse. The same cannot
be said of our male workers. It is the avowed
objective of DO No 1 to “enhance the protection
for Filipino female overseas workers” this Court
has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible
mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered
abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their
own good and welfare. The Court finds the
impugned guidelines to be applicable to all
female domestic overseas workers. That it does
not apply to “all Filipina workers” is not an
argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban
been given universal applicability, then it would
have been unreasonable and arbitrary. Not all
of them are similarly circumstanced. What the
Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a
select person or group of persons within an
existing class, to the prejudice of such a person
or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to
another person or group of persons.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE As a general rule, official acts enjoy a
EXPORTERS VS. DRILON presumed validity. In the absence of clear and
G.R. NO. L-81958 convincing evidence to the contrary, the
JUNE 30, 1988 presumption logically stands.

FACTS: ​The Philippine Association of Service The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason
Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) challenges the why the contested measure should be nullified.
Constitutional validity of Department Order No. There is no question that Department Order No.
1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but
and Employment, in the character of it does not thereby make an undue
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE discrimination between the sexes. It is
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF well-settled that "equality before the law" under
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND the Constitution does not import a perfect
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for Identity of rights among all men and women. It
certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
measure is assailed for "discrimination against classifications rest on substantial distinctions;
males or females;" that it "does not apply to all (2) they are germane to the purposes of the
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers law; (3) they are not confined to existing
and females with similar skills;" and that it is conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise members of the same class.
to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power, police power being legislative, and not The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight
executive, in character. that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes working conditions marked by physical and
Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, personal abuse. As precisely the caretaker of
providing for worker participation "in policy and Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to
decision-making processes affecting their rights protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that
and benefits as may be provided by law." duty, the Court sustains the Government's
Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was efforts.
passed in the absence of prior consultations. It
is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the The same, however, cannot be said of our male
Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to workers. In the first place, there is no evidence
the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our
members face should the Order be further men abroad have been afflicted with an
enforced. identical predicament. Suffice it to state, then,
that insofar as classifications are concerned,
ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Order this Court is content that distinctions are borne
No. 1 in nature of the police power is valid by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is
under the Constitution? justified.

HELD: ​In the light of the foregoing, the petition There is likewise no doubt that such a
must be dismissed. classification is germane to the purpose behind
the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed
objective of Department Order No. 1 to other freedoms, is not free from restrictions,
"enhance the protection for Filipino female more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire
overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel has never been fully accepted as a controlling
that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment economic way of life.
Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on
deployment will be for their own good and This Court understands the grave implications
welfare. the questioned Order has on the business of
recruitment. The concern of the Government,
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply business firms. In the ordinary sequence of
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. events, it is profits that suffer as a result of
This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending Government regulation. The interest of the
review of the administrative and legal State is to provide a decent living to its citizens.
measures, in the Philippines and in the host The Government has convinced the Court in
countries . . ."), meaning to say that should the this case that this is its intent. We do not find
authorities arrive at a means impressed with a the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave
greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary
lifted. relief prayed for.

It is incorrect to say that Department Order No.

1 prescribes a total ban on overseas
deployment. From scattered provisions of the
Order, it is evident that such a total ban has not
been contemplated.

The consequence the deployment ban has on

the right to travel does not impair the right. The
right to travel is subject, among other things, to
the requirements of "public safety," "as may be
provided by law. Neither is there merit in the
contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative
power. It is true that police power is the domain
of the legislature, but it does not mean that
such an authority may not be lawfully
delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor
Code itself vests the Department of Labor and
Employment with rule-making powers in the
enforcement whereof.

The non-impairment clause of the Constitution,

invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the
loftier purposes targeted by the Government.
Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all
The​ ​constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, clearly vests in the President the authority to
that provides that the grant and enjoyment of delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ.
the tax and duty incentives authorized under He adds that the issuance fully complies with
RA 7227 were limited to the business the requirements of a valid classification.
enterprises and residents within the fenced-in
area of the Subic Special Economic Zone Decision: Panganiban J., ​The Court held that
(SSEZ), was questioned. the classification was based on valid and
reasonable standards and does not violate the
Nature of the case: ​A petition for review to equal protection clause.
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
which upheld the constitutionality and validity of The fundamental right of equal protection of the
the E.O. 97-A. laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are
Facts of the case: ​The petitioners assail the characterized by substantial distinctions that
constitutionality of the said Order claiming that make real differences, one class may be
they are excluded from the benefits provided by treated and regulated differently from another.
RA 7227 without any reasonable standards and The classification must also be germane to the
thus violated the equal protection clause of the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
Constitution. The Court of Appeals upheld the belonging to the same class.
validity and constitutionality and denied the
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on
was filed. substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the
purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing
Issue: ​WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all
protection clause of the Constitution members of the same class.

Arguments: ​Petitioners contend that the SSEZ Ruling: ​Petition denied. The challenge
encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the decision and resolution were affirmed.
Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the
area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval
Base. However, EO 97-A, according to them,
narrowed down the area within which the
special privileges granted to the entire zone
would apply to the present “fenced-in former
Subic Naval Base” only. It has thereby
excluded the residents of the first two
components of the zone from enjoying the
benefits granted by the law. It has effectively
discriminated against them, without reasonable
or valid standards, in contravention of the equal
protection guarantee.

The solicitor general defends the validity of EO

97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227