National Federation of Labor vs. National Labor Relations Commission G.R. No. 127718 (March 2, 2000)
National Federation of Labor vs. National Labor Relations Commission G.R. No. 127718 (March 2, 2000)
National Federation of Labor vs. National Labor Relations Commission G.R. No. 127718 (March 2, 2000)
Facts:
Petitioners are employees of the Patalon Coconut Estate in Zamboanga. With the advent of the
RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the government sought the
compulsory acquisition of the land for agrarian reform. Because of this, the private respondents
who are owners of the estate decided to shut down its operation. Petitioners did not receive
any separation pay. Now, the petitioners pray, with the representation of their labor group,
claiming that they were illegally dismissed. They cite Article 283 of the Labor code where an
employer “may” terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor
operation.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court should apply the legal maxim verbal legis in construing Article 283 of
Held:
Yes, the legal maxim is applicable in this case. The use of the word “may,” in its plain meaning,
denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only. Also, Article 283 of the
Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the closure of the business establishment
is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the benefit of the employees. The Patalon
Coconut Estate was closed down because a large portion of the said estate was acquired by the
DAR pursuant to the CARP. The severance of employer-employee relationship between the
parties came about involuntarily, as a result of an act of the State. Consequently, complainants
Reasoning:
Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
Policy:
Article 283 of the Labor Code applies in cases of closures of establishment and reduction of
personnel. The peculiar circumstances in the case at bar, however, involves neither the closure
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the Court may depart from the words of the law which clearly provides that a
creditor may levy execution on a firm’s properties when such execution precedes SEC’s
organization of a Management Committee to act as its receiver.
Held:
PD 209-A states that suspension of claims against a corporation under rehabilitation is counted
or figured up only upon the appointment of a management committee or a rehabilitation
receiver. The holding that suspension of actions for claims against a corporation under
rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application or a petition for rehabilitation is filed with
the SEC — may, to some, be more logical and wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent with
the clear language of the law. Suspension of actions for claims commences only from the time a
management committee or receiver is appointed by the SEC. Petitioner RCBC rightfully moved
for the extrajudicial foreclosure of its mortgage on October 26, 1984 because a management
committee was not appointed by the SEC until March 18, 1985.
Reasoning:
No matter how practical and noble a reason would be, in order to depart from the words of the
law stated in clear and unambiguous manner, would be to encroach upon legislative
prerogative to define the wisdom of the law. Such is plainly judicial legislation.
Policy: