Gagui vs. Dejero

Gagui vs.
Dejero
GR No. 196036 October 23, 2013
FACTS:
In 1993, Dejero and Teodoro filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal and money claim against PRO
Agency Manila, Inc. and Abdul Rahman.
After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision in 1997 ordering PRO Agency and Abdul
Rahman to pay the amount due jointly and severally to the complainants. A Writ of Execution and Alias
Writ of Execution were issued but both remained unsatisfied.
In 2002, a Motion to Implead PRO’s corporate officers and directors as judgement debtors to which the
petitioner belongs. The 2nd and 3rd Alias Writ of Execution resulted in the garnishment of petitioner’s bank
deposit and levying of two parcels of lot owned by petitioner in San Fernando, Pampanga.
The Executive Labor Arbiter denied petitioner’s motions because under Section 10, RA 8042, corporate
officers may be held jointly and severally liable with the placement agency for the judgement award.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which rendered a Decision denying the appeal.
According to the NLRC:
In so far as overseas migrant workers are concerned, it is R.A.8042 itself that describes the nature of the
liability of the corporation and its officers and directors. x x x [I]t is not essential that the individual
officers and directors be impleaded as party respondents to the case instituted by the worker. A finding of
liability on the part of the corporation will necessarily mean the liability of the corporate officers or
directors.”
The CA found petitioner solidarily liable with PRO Agency Manila, Inc. and Abdul Rahman. The
CA stated:
There was no need for petitioner to be impleaded x x x because by express provision of the law, she is
made solidarily liable with PRO Agency Manila, Inc., for any and all money claims filed by private
respondents. The CA further said that this is not a case in which the liability of the corporate officer must
be established because an allegation of malice must be proven. The general rule is that corporate officers,
directors and stockholders are not liable, except when they are made liable for their corporate act by a
specific provision of law, such as R.A. 8042.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with PRO Agency Manila, Inc. in
accordance with Section 10 of RA 8042, despite not having been impleaded in the Complaint and named
in the Decision.
HELD:
No. The pertinent portion of Section 10, R.A. 8042 reads as follows:
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all
claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the
contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval.
The Court declared that “R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment and
deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous
OFWs seeking to work abroad.”
In Sto. Tomas v. Salac, we had the opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality of this provision. We
have thus maintained: the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of
corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their
company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as
sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.
Hence, for petitioner to be found jointly and solidarily liable, there must be a separate finding that she
was remiss in directing the affairs of the agency, resulting in the illegal dismissal of respondents.
According to the records of the case, there was no finding of neglect on the part of the petitioner in
directing the affairs of the agency. In fact, respondents made no mention of any instance when petitioner
allegedly failed to manage the agency in accordance with law, thereby contributing to their illegal
dismissal.
Moreover, petitioner is correct in saying that impleading her for the purpose of execution is tantamount to
modifying a decision that had long become final and executory.
While labor laws should be construed liberally in favor of labor, we must be able to balance this with the
equally important right of petitioner to due process. Because the 1997 Decision of Labor Arbiter Ramos
was not appealed, it became final and executory and was therefore removed from his jurisdiction.
Modifying the tenor of the judgment via a motion impleading petitioner and filed only in 2002 runs
contrary to settled jurisprudence, rendering such action a nullity.

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