LAW TRADITION VS CIVIL LAW TRADITION A.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

The common law tradition emerged in England during the Middle 1. NATURAL OBLIGATIONS
Ages and was applied within British colonies across continents.
The civil law tradition developed in continental Europe at the same G.R. No. L-47362 December 19, 1940
time and was applied in the colonies of European imperial powers
such as Spain and Portugal. Civil law was also adopted in the JUAN F. VILLARROEL, recurrente-apelante,
nineteenth and twentieth centuries by countries formerly vs.
possessing distinctive legal traditions, such as Russia and Japan BERNARDINO ESTRADA, recurrido-apelado.
that sought to reform their legal systems in order to gain economic
and political power comparable to that of Western European On May 9, 1912, Alejandro F. Callao, the mother of the defendant
nation-states. Juan F. Villarroel, obtained from the Mariano Estrada and
Severina spouses a loan of P1, 000 payable after seven years
To an American familiar with the terminology and process of our (Exhibit A). Alejandra passed away, leaving the defendant as the
legal system, which is based on English common law, civil law sole heir. The spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina also died,
systems can be unfamiliar and confusing. Even though England leaving the plaintiff Bernardino Estrada as the sole heir. On
had many profound cultural ties to the rest of Europe in the Middle August 9, 1930, the defendant signed a document (Exhibit B)
Ages, its legal tradition developed differently from that of the declaring the applicant P1, 000 in duty, with an interest of 12
continent for a number of historical reasons, and one of the most percent per year. This action is about the collection of this amount.
fundamental ways in which they diverged was in the
establishment of judicial decisions as the basis of common law The Court of First Instance of Laguna, in which this action was
and legislative decisions as the basis of civil law. Before looking filed, ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount claimed
at the history, let’s examine briefly what this means. of P1, 000 with his legal interests of 12 percent a year from August
9, 1930 to its full payment. Appeal of this sentence.
Common law is generally uncodified. This means that there is
no comprehensive compilation of legal rules and statutes. While It will be noted that the parties in the present case are,
common law does rely on some scattered statutes, which are respectively, the sole heirs of the original creditors and the debtor.
legislative decisions, it is largely based on precedent, meaning This action is exercised by virtue of the obligation that the
the judicial decisions that have already been made in similar defendant, as the only son of the original debtor, contracted in
cases. These precedents are maintained over time through the favor of the plaintiff, the only heir of the original creditors. It is
records of the courts as well as historically documented in admitted that the amount of P1, 000 to which this obligation is
collections of case law known as yearbooks and reports. The contracted is the same debt of the defendant's mother to the
precedents to be applied in the decision of each new case are parents of the plaintiff.
determined by the presiding judge. As a result, judges have an
enormous role in shaping American and British law. Common law Although the action to recover the original debt has already
functions as an adversarial system, a contest between two prescribed when the claim was filed in this case, the question that
opposing parties before a judge who moderates. A jury of ordinary arises in this appeal is mainly the question of whether,
people without legal training decides on the facts of the case. The notwithstanding such a prescription, the action is
judge then determines the appropriate sentence based on the appropriate. However, the present action is not based on the
jury’s verdict. original obligation contracted by the defendant's mother, which
has already been prescribed, but on the one contracted by the
Civil Law, in contrast, is codified. Countries with civil law defendant on August 9, 1930 (Exhibit B) upon assuming
systems have comprehensive, continuously updated legal codes compliance with that obligation, already prescribed. Being the
that specify all matters capable of being brought before a court, defendant the only heir of the original debtor, with the right to
the applicable procedure, and the appropriate punishment for succeed her in her inheritance, that debt legally brought by her
each offense. Such codes distinguish between different mother, although it lost its effectiveness by prescription, is now,
categories of law: substantive law establishes which acts are however, for the moral obligation, which is considered enough to
subject to criminal or civil prosecution, procedural law establishes create and make effective and enforceable its obligation
how to determine whether a particular action constitutes a voluntarily contracted on August 9, 1930 in Exhibit B.
criminal act, and penal law establishes the appropriate penalty. In
a civil law system, the judge’s role is to establish the facts of the The rule that a new promise to pay a prescreened debt must be
case and to apply the provisions of the applicable code. Though made by the same obligated person or by another legally
the judge often brings the formal charges, investigates the matter, authorized by it, is not applicable to the present case in which it is
and decides on the case, he or she works within a framework not required compliance with the obligation of the obligor
established by a comprehensive, codified set of laws. The judge’s originally, but which you des voluntarily wanted to assume this
decision is consequently less crucial in shaping civil law than the obligation.
decisions of legislators and legal scholars who draft and interpret
the codes. The sentence appealed is confirmed, with the costs to the
appellant. This is how it is ordered.

Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Horrilleno, MM., Are satisfied.

G.R. No. 46274 November 2, 1939 In the fifth paragraph of the letter Exhibit B, dated March 16, 1936,
addressed by the defendant-appellant to the plaintiff-appellee, the
A.O. FISHER, plaintiff-appellee, former said: "I feel a moral responsibility for these second
vs. payments, which were made in order to carry out my plan (not the
JOHN C. ROBB, defendant-appellant. first payments, as you have it in your letter), and Mr. Hilscher and
I will see to it that stockholders who made second payments
Marcial P. Lichauco and Manuel M. Mejia for appellant. receive these amounts back as soon as possible, out of our own
Wolfson, Barrion and Baradi and Ignacio Ycaza for appellee. personal funds. "As it is, I have had to take my loss along with
everyone else here, and so far as I can see that is what all of us
VILLA-REAL, J.: must do. The corporation is finally flat, so it is out of the question
to receive back any of your investment from that source; the only
The defendant John C. Robb appeals to this Court from the salvage will be the second payment that you made, and that will
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive come from Hilscher and me personally, as I say, not because of
part of which reads: any obligation, but simply because we have taken it on ourselves
to do that. (And I wish I could find someone who would undertake
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against to repay a part of my own losses in the enterprise!)" And in the
the defendant, who is ordered to pay to the former the sum of seventh paragraph of the letter Exhibit C, dated February 21,
P2,000, with interest at the legal rate from March 11, 1938, until 1936, addressed by the same defendant-appellant to the same
paid, plus costs. plaintiff-appellee the former said the following:

The facts established at the trial without discussion are the However, Mr. Fischer and I feel a personal responsibility to those
following: few stockholders who made their second payments, including
yourself, and it is our intention to personally repay the amounts of
In September, 1935, the board of directors of the Philippine the second payments made by those few.
Greyhound Club, Inc., told the herein defendant-appellant John
C. Robb, to make a business trip to Shanghai to study the . . . And, finally, paragraph 8 of the same letter Exhibit C states:
operation of a dog racing course. In Shanghai, the defendant- "We are to receive a certain share of the new Philippine Racing
appellant stayed at the American Club where be became Club for our services as promoters of that organization, and as
acquainted with the plaintiff-appellee, A. O. Fisher, through their soon as this is received by us, we will be in a position to
mutual friends. In the course of a conversation, the defendant- compensate you and the few others who made the second
appellant came to know that the plaintiff-appellee was the payments. That, as T have said, will come from us personally, in
manager of a dog racing course. Upon knowing the purpose of an effort to make things easier for those who were sportsmen
the defendant-appellant's trip, the plaintiff-appellee showed great enough to try to save the Greyhound organization by making
interest and invited him to his establishment and for several days second payments.
gave him information about the business. It seems that the plaintiff
became interested in the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., and Article 1254 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
asked the defendant if he could have a part therein as a
stockholder. As the defendant-appellant answered in the A contract exists from the moment one or more persons consent
affirmative, the plaintiff-appellee thereupon filled a subscription to be bound with respect to another or others to deliver something
blank and, through his bank in Shanghai, sent to the Philippine or to render some services.
Greyhound Club, Inc., in Manila telegraphic transfer for P3,000 in
payment of the first installment of his subscription. Later on the And article 1261 of the same Civil Code provides the following:
defendant-appellant returned to Manila from Shanghai.
ART. 1261. There is no contract unless the following requisites
Some months thereafter, when the board of directors of the exists:
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., issued a call for the payment of
the second installment of the subscriptions, the defendant- 1. The consent of the contracting parties;
appellant sent a radiogram to the plaintiff-appellee did so and sent
P2,000 directly to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in payment 2. A definite object which is the subject-matter of the contract;
of the said installment. Due to the manipulations of those who
controlled the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., during the 3. A consideration for the obligation established.
absence of the defendant-appellant undertook the organization of
a company called The Philippine Racing Club, which now In the present case, while the defendant-appellant told the
manages the race track of the Santa Ana park. The defendant plaintiff-appellee that he felt morally responsible for the second
immediately endeavored to save the investment of those who had payments which had been made to carry out his plan, and that
subscribed to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., by having the Mr. Hilscher and he would do everything possible so that the
Philippine Racing Club acquire the remaining assets of the stockholders who had made second payments may receive the
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc. The defendant-appellant wrote a amount paid by them from their personal funds because they
letter to the plaintiff-appellee in Shanghai explaining in detail the voluntarily assumed the responsibility to make such payment as
critical condition of the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., and soon as they receive from the Philippine racing Club certain
outlining his plans to save the properties and assets of the shares for their services as promoters of said organization, it does
plaintiff-appellee that he felt morally responsible to the not appear that the plaintiff-appellee had consented to said form
stockholders who had paid their second installment (Exh. C). In of reimbursement of the P2,000 which he had directly paid to the
answer to said letter, the plaintiff-appellee wrote the defendant- Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in satisfaction of the second
appellant requiring him to return the entire amount paid by him to installment.
the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., (exhibit E). Upon receiving
this letter, the defendant-appellant answered the plaintiff-appellee The first essential requisite, therefore, required by the cited article
for any loss which he might have suffered in connection with the 1261 of the Civil Code for the existence of a contract, does not
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in the same way that he could exists.
not expect anyone to reimburse him for his own losses which were
much more than those of the plaintiff-appellee (Exh. B). As to the third essential requisite, namely, "A consideration for the
obligation established," article 1274 of the same Code provides:
The principal question to be decided in this appeal is whether or
not the trial court erred in holding that there was sufficient In onerous contracts the consideration as to each of the parties is
consideration to justify the promise made by the defendant- the delivery or performance or the promise of delivery or
appellant in his letters Exhibits B and C. performance of a thing or service by the other party; in
remuneratory contracts the consideration is the service or benefit
for which the remuneration is given, and in contracts of pure perfect or imperfect, and without the receipt of actual pecuniary or
beneficence the consideration is the liberality of the benefactors. material benefit by the promisor prior to the subsequent promise;
(2) cases in which the moral obligation arose from a legal liability
And article 1275 of the same Code provides: already performed or still enforceable; (3) cases in which the
moral obligation arose out of, or was connected with, a previous
ART. 1275. Contracts without consideration or with an illicit request or promise creating originally an enforceable legal
consideration produce no effect whatsoever. A consideration is liability, which, however, at the time of the subsequent express
illicit when it is contrary to law or morality. promise had become discharged or barred by operation of a
positive rule of law, so that at that time there was no enforceable
Manresa, in volume 8, 4rth edition, pages 618-619 of his legal liability; (4) cases in which the moral obligation arose from,
Commentaries on the Civil Code, has this to say: or was connected with, a previous request or promise which,
however, never created any enforceable legal liability, because of
Considering the concept of the consideration as the explanation a rule of law which rendered the original agreement void, or at
and motive of the contract, it is related to the latter's object and least unenforceable; and (5) cases in which the moral obligation
even more to its motives with which it is often confused. It is arose out of, or was connected with, the receipt of actual material
differentiated from them, however, in that the former is the or pecuniary benefit by the promisor, without, however, any
essential reason for the contract, while the latter are the particular previous request or promise on his part, express or implied, and
reasons of a contracting party which do not affect the other party therefore, of course, without any original legal liability, perfect or
and which do not preclude the existence of a different imperfect.
consideration. To clarify by an example: A thing purchased
constitutes the consideration for the purchaser and not the SEC. 97. Moral obligation unconnected with legal liability or legal
motives which have influenced his mind, like its usefulness, its benefit. — Although, as subsequently shown was formerly some
perfection, its relation to another, the use thereof which he may doubt as to the point, it is now well established that a mere moral
have in mind, etc., a very important distinction, which precludes obligation or conscience duty arising wholly from ethical motives
the annulment of the contract by the sole influence of the motives, or a mere conscientious duty unconnected with any legal
unless the efficacy of the former had been subordinated to obligation, perfect or imperfect, or with the receipt of benefit by
compliance with the latter as conditions. the promisor of a material or pecuniary nature will not furnish a
consideration for an executory promise. . . . .
The jurisprudence shows some cases wherein this important
distinction is established. The consideration of contracts, states In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and
the decision of February 24, 1904, is distinct from the motive so hold, that the promise made by an organizer of a dog racing
which may prompt the parties in executing them. The course to a stockholder to return to him certain amounts paid by
inaccuracies committed in expressing its accidental or secondary the latter in satisfaction of his subscription upon the belief of said
details do not imply lack of consideration or false consideration, organizer that he was morally responsible because of the failure
wherefore, they do not affect the essence and validity of the of the enterprise, is not the consideration rquired by article 1261
contract. In a loan the consideration in its essence is, for the of the Civil Code as an essential element for the legal existence
borrower the acquisition of the amount, and for the lender the of an onerous contract which would bind the promisor to comply
power to demand its return, whether the money be for the former with his promise.
or for another person and whether it be invested as stated or
otherwise. Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the costs to
the plaintiff.
The same distinction between the consideration and the motive is
found in the decisions of November 23, 1920 and March 5, 1924. Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, Concepcion, and Moran,
JJ., concur.
The contract sought to be judicially enforced by the plaintiff-
appellee against the defendant-appellant is onerous in character,
because it supposes the deprivation of the latter of an amount of
money which impairs his property, which is a burden, and for it to
be legally valid it is necessary that it should have a consideration
consisting in the lending or or promise of a thing or service by
such party. The defendant-appellant is required to give a thing,
namely, the payment of the sum of P2,000, but the plaintiff-
appellee has not given or promised anything or service to the
former which may compel him to make such payment. The
promise which said defendant-appellant has made to the plaintiff-
appellee to return to him P2,000 which he had paid to the
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., as second installment of the
payment of the amount of the shares for which he has subscribed,
was prompted by a feeling of pity which said defendant-appellant
had for the plaintiff-appellee as a result of the loss which the latter
had suffered because of the failure of the enterprise. The
obligation which the said defendant-appellant had contracted with
the plaintiff-appellee is, therefore, purely moral and, as such, is
not demandable in law but only in conscience, over which human
judges have no jurisdiction.1awphi1.net

As to whether a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration, read

in volume 12 of the American Jurisprudence, pages 589-590,
paragraphs 96, 67, the following:

SEC. 96. Moral obligation. — Although there is authority in

support of the board proposition that a moral obligation is
sufficient consideration, such proposition is usually denied. . . . .

The case presenting the question whether a moral obligation will

sustain an express executory promise may be divided into five
classes: (1) Cases in which the moral obligation arose wholly from
ethical considerations, unconnected with any legal obligations,
QUASI DELICTS THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS
NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
III
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity
as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs- THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO
appellants, 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE
vs. INSTANT CASE; and
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees. IV

Cruz & Avecilla for appellants. THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees. RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT
THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
BARREDO, J.:
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted
City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance
Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill,
damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has
time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably
with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis
Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their
which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." motion to dismiss above-referred to.

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two
decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of
section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules 1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the
of Court; acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for
civil liability, was not reversed?
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now
final and or in res-adjudicata; 2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil
Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father,
defendant through emancipation by marriage. was already legally married?

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.]) The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a
reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73
above grounds that the following order was issued: Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a
scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or
on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of
arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence
meritorious and well-founded. of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not
only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus,
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is the opinion holds:
hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above
entitled case. The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil
Record on Appeal.) action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted
that it was the employer and not the employee who was being
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following
assignment of errors: It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have
been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code.
UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT - Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence
being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its
I consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE; regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after
II such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability
arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
 the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of
although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil
made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
(p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3 intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo
ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation
we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth
the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations. lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the
of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer
life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear
any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether
crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said
cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts)
to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article
We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and 2177 of the new code provides:
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
Spanish Civil Code. liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of omission of the defendant.
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or
negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.) negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has
been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo
culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker
pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the should be observed in applying the same. And considering that
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to
own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of
make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law,
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"-
issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic.
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that
likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only
Phil.) acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the Separate Opinions
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the AQUINO, J, concurring:
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act,
hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes which is blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards.
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4 "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include
any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal developed in any society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion
case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38,
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a
civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot
be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon

emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176

is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason

behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the
clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation
does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any
act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol.
II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites
judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child
does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child,
while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of
money and alienation or encumbering of real property which
cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
(Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty.

Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age,
as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial

court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing
opinion. Costs against appellees.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979 Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any
liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the
vs. former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not
Court of First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-
RODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents. owner-driver Salazar.

David G. Nitafan for petitioner. On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases,
petitioner filed Civil Case No. 80803 with the Court of First
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol. Instance of Manila against respondents jeep-owner-driver
Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar. and sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for the
damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving
their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner Timbol
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J: were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum
allegedly for the reason that petitioner was uncertain as to
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the whether he was entitled to relief against both on only one of them.
Orders of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing
his Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to
respondents Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar. Dismiss Civil Case No. 80803 on the grounds that the Complaint
is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails
The facts which spawned the present controversy may be to state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by
summarized as follows: petitioner.

On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge
three- way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur dismissed the Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for reasons
Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned stated in the afore- mentioned Motion to Dismiss On September
and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by 30, 1970, petitioner sought before this Court the review of that
respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned dismissal, to which petition we gave due course.
by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As
a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar,
Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed respondent Judge also dismissed the case as against the former.
against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the Court of Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that an
First Instance of Bulacan. The race against truck-driver Montoya, independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil
docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for causing damage Code could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for
to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by the offense from which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which
hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation
and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's of the civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the
Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, same would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 ... 2
docketed as Criminal Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied in the
to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00 order dated February 23, 1971, with respondent Judge
suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep- decisive interpretation of the rule. 3
owner- driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya,
swerved to the left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition
his car which was bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified that before us, also to review the last two mentioned Orders, to which
before the impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he we required jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.
was not aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by
the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of the accident The Complaint against
was adopted by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar,
on the other hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck truck-owner Timbol
driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to
turn left towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September
intersection by a policeman who was directing traffic; that while 12, 1970, dismissing petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner
he was at a stop position, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the Timbol.
truck driven by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep,
which then swerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which was In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent
coming from the opposite direction. Judge sustained Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred
by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was
V, Sta. Maria, rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion: made by petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the
trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only;
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused and that the Complaint does not state a cause of action against
Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-
of damage to property thru reckless imprudence in Crime. Case owner-driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the
No. SM-227, and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 damage suffered by his car.
and to indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of P972.50
as actual damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar
insolvency, both as to fine and indemnity, with costs. to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it
must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs de oficio, and his parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must
bond is ordered canceled be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties,
Identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of action.
SO ORDERED. 1
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are
present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is no Identity
of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil
Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing
truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create
petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck- an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is
owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court had a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any independent negligence, having always had its own foundation
damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in
being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-
Case No. SM-228. 4 And more importantly, in the criminal cases, delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for
the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.
from criminal negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ...
Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter
under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code As and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and
held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. 5 are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated
in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in. procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized
individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil
Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the
civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the proviso ... .
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a Barredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and
crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different
or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under
more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable the Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made
to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant- in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it
petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the being substantive in character and is not within the power of the
Civil Code. Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive
but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the
based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint Rules of 1940."
to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur
Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is
suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that
car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file
by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.
employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii the
same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of The suit against
the collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damage
amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurred actual and jeep-owner-driver Salazar
moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees. Clearly,
therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist of, The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was
namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a acquitted in Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different
Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or picture altogether.
omission which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the
negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability
Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the
Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner's car, were offended party has the option between an action for enforcement
alleged in the Complaint. 6 of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi- based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The
delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when he action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal
dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless
regardless of the result of the latter. expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the
offended party. 8
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the
civil action may proceed independently of the criminal conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on
culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep- intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said
owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner's failure to make a Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the
reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an independent criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there
civil action bars the institution of such separate civil action, was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a
invoking section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which says: separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed
impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.
Section 2. — Independent civil action. — In the cases provided
for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and basis of the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal
distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured case, expounded by the trial Court in this wise:
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right
is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action In view of what has been proven and established during the trial,
shau proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall accused Freddie Montoya would be held able for having bumped
require only a preponderance of evidence. and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo
Salazar,
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida
7 said:
Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo
Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was
the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven
by Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo
Salazar cannot be held able for the damages sustained by
Edgardo Mendoza's car. 9

Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the

facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable
for the damages sustained by petitioner's car. In other words, "the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. " Accordingly,
inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-
driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been
extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court 10 which provides:

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases

not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be
observed:

xxx xxx xxx

c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it

extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
night arise did not exist. ...

And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-

driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the
same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that
Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt,
consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be
instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil
Code quoted here under:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted

on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence ...

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon

reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is

concerned, therefore, we sustain respondent Judge's Order dated
January 30, 1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on different
grounds.

WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970

dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against private respondent
Felino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his
successor, hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing on the
merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and February
23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803
against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.