Time Inc v Reyes 2.

WON epublic Act 4363 is applicable to action against a foreign corporation

31 May 1971 | Reyes JBL, J. | CP | Torts and Crimes or non-resident defendant – NO
P: Time Inc Ruling: GRANTED.
R: Judge Andres Reyes, Antonio Villegas, JPE Ratio:
S: Antonio J. Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile seek to recover from Time Inc damages
upon an alleged libel arising from a publication of Time (Asia Edition) magazine. 1. Art 360, RA 4363 reads in part: The criminal and civil action for damages
D: [Caveat: The only tort doctrine in the case was mentioned in passing and was not in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
relevant to the disposition of the case but the case is placed under the heading torts simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province
and crimes so the author of the digest will put the doctrine pertinent to the topic or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any
aforementioned.] The common law rule/multiple publication rule as to causes of of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
action for tort arising out of a single publication was to the effect that each offense; Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a
communication of written or printed matter was a distinct and separate publication of public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the
a libel contained therein, giving rise to a separate cause of action. This rule ('multiple commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
publication' rule) is still followed in several American jurisdictions, and seems to be Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the
favored by the American Law Institute. Other jurisdictions have adopted the 'single libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public
publication' rule which originated in New York, under which any single integrated officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in
publication, such as one edition of a newspaper, book, or magazine, or one broadcast, the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the
is treated as a unit, giving rise to only one cause of action, regardless of the number time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed
of times it is exposed to different people. and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private
individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of
Facts: the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first
1. In Time’s Asian Edition Magazine, Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas was published; Provided,further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same
accused of having coffers containing “far more pesos than seemed court where the criminal action is filed and vice
reasonable in the light of his income.” Juan Ponce Enrile was dragged onto versa; Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or
the article because he allegedly lent Villegas 30,000 pesos as he was his civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the
compadre and at that time, Enrile was the Secretary of Finance. exclusion of other courts; And provided finally, That this amendment shall
2. Villegas and Enrile sought to recver damages from Time Magazine, an not apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions
American Corporation, so they filed a complaint in the CFI of Rizal. which have been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of the law…
3. Petitioner received the summons and a copy of the complaint at its offices 2. The complaint lodged in the court of Rizal by respondents does not allege
in New York on 13 December 1967 and, on 27 December 1967, it filed a that the libelous article was printed and first published in the province of
motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, Rizal and, since the respondents-plaintiffs are public officers with offices in
relying upon the provisions of Republic Act 4363. Manila at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, it is clear that
4. The judge deferred the proceedings for the reason that "the rule laid down the only place left for them wherein to file their action, is the Court of First
under Republic Act. No. 4363, amending Article 360 of the Revised Penal Instance of Manila.
Code, is not applicable to actions against non-resident defendants, and 3. The intent, of the law is clear: a libeled public official might sue in the court
because questions involving harassment and inconvenience, as well as of the locality where he holds office, in order that the prosecution of the
disruption of public service do not appear indubitable. action should interfere as little as possible with the discharge of his official
Issue/s duties and labors. The only alternative allowed him by law is to prosecute
1. WON under the provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 the respondent Court those responsible for the libel in the place where the offending article was
of First Instance of Rizal has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civil suit printed and first published. Here, the law tolerates the interference with the
for damages arising from an allegedly libelous publication, considering that libeled officer's duties only for the sake of avoiding unnecessary harassment
the action was instituted by public officers whose offices were in the City of of the accused. Since the offending publication was not printed in the
Manila at the time of the publication; if it has no jurisdiction, whether or not Philippines, the alternative venue was not open to respondent Mayor
its erroneous assumption of jurisdiction may be challenged by a foreign Villegas of Manila and Undersecretary of Finance Enrile, who were the
corporation by writ of certiorari or prohibition. – NO and YES offended parties.
4. That respondents-plaintiffs could not file a criminal case for libel against a predicated on the respondent court's lack of jurisdiction to entertain the
non-resident defendant does not make Republic Act No. 4363 incongruous action; and the rulings of this Court are that writs of certiorari or
of absurd, for such inability to file a criminal case against a non-resident prohibition, or both, may issue in case of a denial or deferment of action on
natural person equally exists in crimes other than libel. It is a fundamental such a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
rule of international jurisdiction that no state can by its laws, and no court
which is only a creature of the state, can by its judgments or decrees,
directly bind or affect property or persons beyond the limits of the
state. Not only this, but if the accused is a corporation, no criminal action
can lie against it, whether such corporation or resident or non-resident. At
any rate, the case filed by respondents-plaintiffs is case for damages.
5. 50 Am. Jur. 2d 659 differentiates the "multiple publication" and "single
publication" rules (invoked by private respondents) to be as follows: The
common law rule as to causes of action for tort arising out of a single
publication was to the effect that each communication of written or printed
matter was a distinct and separate publication of a libel contained therein,
giving rise to a separate cause of action. This rule ('multiple publication'
rule) is still followed in several American jurisdictions, and seems to be
favored by the American Law Institute. Other jurisdictions have adopted the
'single publication' rule which originated in New York, under which any
single integrated publication, such as one edition of a newspaper, book, or
magazine, or one broadcast, is treated as a unit, giving rise to only one cause
of action, regardless of the number of times it is exposed to different people.
6. These rules are not pertinent in the present scheme because the number of
causes of action that may be available to the respondents-plaintiffs is not
here in issue. The court is confronted by a specific venue statute, conferring
jurisdiction in cases of libel against Public officials to specified courts, and
no other. The rule is that where a statute creates a right and provides a
remedy for its enforcement, the remedy is exclusive; and where it confers
jurisdiction upon a particular court, that jurisdiction is likewise exclusive,
unless otherwise provided. Hence, the venue provisions of Republic Act
No. 4363 should be deemed mandatory for the party bringing the action,
unless the question of venue should be waived by the defendant, which was
not the case here. Only thus can the policy of the Act be upheld and
maintained. Nor is there any reason why the inapplicability of one
alternative venue should result in rendering the other alternative, also
inapplicable.
7. Petitioner's failure to aver its legal capacity to institute the present petition is
not fatal, for A foreign corporation may, by writ of prohibition, seek relief
against the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction. And a foreign corporation
seeking a writ of prohibition against further maintenance of a suit, on the
ground of want of jurisdiction in which jurisdiction is not bound by the
ruling of the court in which the suit was brought, on a motion to quash
service of summons, that it has jurisdiction.
8. It is also advanced that the present petition is premature, since respondent
court has not definitely ruled on the motion to dismiss, nor held that it has
jurisdiction, but only argument is untenable. The motion to dismiss was