A.

Power to Construe is defined under the Rules Implementing said law as the
6. National Food Authority v. Masada Security lowest wage rate fixed by law that an employer can pay his
Agency, G.R. no. 163448, march 8, 2005 worker. The basis thereof under Section 7 of the same Rules
FACTS: is the normal working hours, which shall not exceed eight
hours a day. Hence, the prescribed increase or the additional
MSA Inc. is a security agency engaged in providing
security services to individuals, corporations or government liability to be borne by the principal (NFA in this case) under
Section 6 of RA 6727 is only the increment or amount added
agencies. On September 17, 1996, MSA entered into a one
year contract to provide security services to the various to the remuneration of an employee for an eight hour work.
offices, warehouses and installations of NFA within the scope Where a statute by its terms, is expressly limited in
of the NFA Region 1. In their agreement, the parties certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction,
acknowledged the application to their contract of the wage be extended to others. Since the increase in wage referred to
orders issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and in section 6 pertains to the statutory minimum wage, as
Productivity Boards (RTWPB) which has wage fixing authority defined therein, principals in service contracts (like the NFA)
within the region including wage orders setting the daily cannot be made to pay the corresponding wage increase in
minimum wage rates pursuant to R.A. 6727. the overtime pay, night shift differential, holiday and rest day
Under Section 4 of R.A. 6727, the statutory minimum pay, premium pay and other benefits granted to workers.
While basis of said remuneration and benefits is the statutory
wage rates for all workers and employees in the private
sector, whether agricultural or non-agricultural shall be minimum wage, the law cannot be unduly expanded as to
include those not included in the subject provision (National
increased by P25 per day. Pursuant to this law, RTWPB issued
several wage orders mandating increases in the daily wage Food Authority vs. Masada Security Agency Inc. G.R. 163448
March 8, 2005. 453 SCRA 70).
rate. Accordingly, MSA requested NFA for a corresponding
upward adjustment in the monthly contract rate consisting of CASE 6 - National Food Authority (NFA) v. Masada
the increases in the daily minimum wage of the security Security Agency, Inc.
guards as well as the corresponding raise in their overtime 453 SCRA 70 (March 8, 2005)
pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, and rest day pay. MSA also
claimed increases in Social Security (SSS) and Pag-Ibig Facts:
premiums as well as administrative costs and margin. NFA Masada entered into a 1 year contract to provide security
however granted the request only with respect to the services to NFA-REGION 1. Upon the expiration of the said
increase in the daily wage by multiplying the amount of the contract, the parties extended the effectivity thereof on a
mandated increase by 30 days and denied the same with monthly basis under same terms and condition.
respect to adjustments in the other wage related benefits
The Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board
and remunerations computed on the basis of the daily wage.
(RTWPB) issued wage orders mandating increases in the daily
ISSUE: Was the NFA correct? wage rate. Masada requested NFA to increase the of the

HELD: Yes. The term wage as used in Section 6 of RA 6727

pertains to no other than the statutory minimum wage which
1
monthly contract rate1. NFA only granted the request only indirect employers in construction projects and
with respect to the increase in daily wage establishments providing security, janitorial and similar
services.
Respondent filed a case for recovery of sum of money The court found merit in NFA’s contention that its
against NFA with the RTC. additional liability under the aforcited provision is
only limited to the payment of the increment in the
NFA CONTENTION: Respondent cannot demand an statutory minimum wage rate i.e. the rate for a regular
adjustment on the said salary benefits because it is bound by eight (8) hour work day.
their contract expressly limiting NFA’s obligation to pay only
the increment in the daily wage. Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its
terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
Pre-trial Issue: WON respondent is entitled to recover from interpretation or construction, be extended to others. Since
NFA wage related benefits of the security guards. the increase in wage referred to in Section 6 pertains to the
“statutory minimum wage” as defined herein, principals in
RTC Ruling: NFA is liable to pay the security guards’ wage service contracts cannot be made to pay the corresponding
related benefits pursuant to RA 6727, because the basis of wage increase in the overtime pay, night shift differential,
the computation of said benefits, like overtime pay, holiday holiday and rest day pay, premium pay and other benefits
pay, SSS and Pag-ibig premium, is the increased minimum granted to workers. While basis of said remuneration and
wage. It also found NFA liable for the consequential benefits is the statutory minimum wage, the law cannot be
adjustments in administrative costs and margin. unduly expanded as to include those not stated in the subject
provision.
NFA appealed to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed
Moreover, the law secures the welfare of the workers by
ISSUE(Supreme Court): WON the liability of principals in imposing a solidary liability on principals and the service
service contracts under Section 6 of RA 6727 and the wage contractors. Under the second sentence of Section 6 of RA
orders issued by the RTWPB is limited only to the increment 6727, in the event that the principal or client fails to pay the
in the minimum wage. prescribed wage rates, the service contractor shall be held
solidarily liable with the former.
HELD/ RULING:
The parties therefore acknowledged the application to their
Payment of the increases in the wage rate of workers is contract of the wage orders issued by the RTWPB pursuant to
ordinarily shouldered by the employer. Section 6 of RA 6727, RA 6727. There being no assumption by NFA of a greater
however, expressly lodged said obligation to the principals or liability than that mandated by Section 6 of the Act, its
obligation is limited to the payment of the increased
1 Consisting of: (1)daily minimum wage of the security statutory minimum wage rates which, as admitted by
guards; (2) overtime pay; (3) holiday pay (4)13 th month pay; respondent, had already been satisfied by NFA. Under
Article 1231 of the Civil Code, one of the modes of
(5) holiday and rest day pay; (6) Social Security System
extinguishing an obligation is by payment. Having
[SSS]; (7) Pag-ibig premiums as well as administrative costs
discharged its obligation to respondent, NFA no longer
and margin.
have a duty that will give rise to a correlative legal
2
right of respondent. The latter’s complaint for HELD:
collection of remuneration and benefits other than the
increased minimum wage rate, should therefore be It does not apply since the law that the crime Rivera was
dismissed for lack of cause of action. accused of committing is not explicitly stated in the R.P.C
(although it is worthy to mention that the crime of indictment
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 12, of the innocent is present in the Old Penal Code)
2004 decision and the April 30, 2004 resolution of the Court
of Appeals which dismissed petitioner National Food The old penal code described it as the charge of the offense
Authority’s appeal and motion for reconsideration, is the imputation itself if made in front of the administrative/
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76677, are REVERSED and judicial officer while the R.P.C defines the offense as the act
SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by respondent MASADA that leads (tends directly) to imputation of the offense.
Security Agency, Inc., docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-43988,
The art 363 of the R.P.C was defined or described as
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon, City, Branch 83, is
“planting of evidence.”
ordered DISMISSED.
COURT HELD THAT THE ACCUSED FAUSTINO RIVERA IS NOT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME FO INCRIMINATION OF THE INNOCENT.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:
It is well settled law that where the text of a statute is clear,
it is improper to resort to a caption or title to make it
obscure.
CHAPTER III. AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION It is a well settled rule that statutes should receive a sensible
construction, such as will give effect to the legislative
1. Intrinsic Aids
intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
A. Title
conclusion. (Lau Ow Bew vs. United States, 144 U. S., 47, 59;
CASE 1 - PEOPLE VS. RIVERA
36 Law. ed., 340, 344.)
FACTS:
CASE 1 – PEOPLE v. RIVERA
The accused Faustino Rivera was being charged by the
Facts: Rivera signed and swore to a complaint accusing Vito
crime of Indictment of the Innocent planned and punished
and Moreno the crime of theft. According to the information,
under the Art 363 of the Revised Penal Code. The Provincial
the items stolen were a white American suit with one
Prosecutor filed a case against Rivera for filing a complaint in
eyeglasses amounting to P30, one buntal hat which costs P3,
writing and executing an oath accusing falsely and without
and to two buttons which cost P3 each, with the total amount
probable cause Vito Sunday and Felisa Moreno of the crime of
of P39. The justice of the peace dismissed the case. After
theft.
which, Vito and Moreno filed complaints against Rivera,
ISSUES OF THE CASE: WON Art 363 of the R.P.C should charging him with incriminating innocent people, which falls
apply in this case. under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. Rivera objected
3
and claimed that the facts alleged did not fall under Article a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall
363 of the Revised Penal Code, and that, Article 363 of the
not exceed an annual profit of 12%;
Codigo Penal does not appear in the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, there is no offense embracing acusacion o denuncia
falsa. b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their
customers;
Issue: Whether or not Rivera can be charged guilty of
incriminating innocent people under Article 363 of the
Revised Penal Code c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all
existing contracts with franchise holders for the
Held: No. Not guilty and inapplicable.
supply of energy.
Ratio: The crime Rivera was accused of is not explicitly
stated in the Revised Penal Code, although the crime of Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development
indictment of the innocent is included in the Old Penal Code. Company (PPDC) assailed the said provision.They averred
Article 363 of the Old Penal Code talks about punishment for
that Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included in
false prosecutions. In the Revised Penal Code, Article 363
pertains to punishment for any act which may tend directly the title of the amending law nor was it included in the
to cause a false prosecution. This provision is limited to acts amended law. Second, the main purpose of RA 3043 was to
of planting evidence which do not constitute false increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al
prosecution but tend directly to cause false prosecutions. believed that Section 3 was not germane to RA 3043.
StatCon maxim: The title may indicate the legislative intent
to extend or restrict the scope of the law and a statute ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.
couched in a language of doubtful import will be construed to
conform to the legislative intent as disclosed in its title. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the
CASE 2 – ALALAYAN V. NAPOCOR Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title
of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror,
24 SCRA 172 – Political Law – Title Must Express One Subject fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the
Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
and Forty One) was passed. This law amended the charter of proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to
NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation). Section 3 of RA inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
3043 provides that:

4
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise HELD: This argument has the ring of futility. Precisely, this
or fraud upon the legislators. Court in an opinion by the present Chief Justice upheld such a
figure as against the contention that it was rather too
generous to the public utility. To speak of it as confiscatory
then is to employ the language by hyperbole. Moreover, in
CASE 2 – ALALAYAN v. NAPOCOR the absence any evidence to demonstrate the alleged
confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there would
FACTS: This declaratory relief proceeding was started in the
be no basis for its nullification, in view of the well-known
lower court by petitioners, Alalayan and Philippine Power and
presumption of validity that every statute has in its favor. In
Development Company, both franchise holders of electric
the light of the above, there is thus clearly no occasion for
plants in Laguna, to test the validity of a section of an
yielding assent to the claim of petitioner that the legislation
amendatory act, empowering respondent National Power
assailed contravenes the due process clause. Statutes
Corporation "in any contract for the supply of electric power
enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper
to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of its electric
exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not
power and energy from it to require as a condition that such
only to those public utilities coming into existence after its
franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit of more than
passage, but likewise to those already, existence established
twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month
and in operation.
operating expenses." Respondent, under such provision,
could likewise "renew all existing contracts with franchise CASE 3 – CITY OF BAGUIO v. MARCOS
holders for the supply of electric power and energy," so that
Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of
the provisions of the Act could be given effect. This statutory Baguio INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral proceedings.
provision was assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is In November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land
violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill, involved was the Baguio Townsite which was declared public
which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the
civil case on the following grounds: 1) he and his
one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, as well as predecessors have been in continuous possession and
the due process guarantee, the liberty to contract of cultivation of the land since Spanish times; 2) his
petitioners being infringed upon. The lower court sustained predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to
its validity. file their claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr.,
and Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes’ reopening on the
ISSUE: W/N Section 3 of the subject act, which further following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-
amends Commonwealth Act No. 121 has a due process year period provided in RA 931; 2) the petition to reopen the
infringement on the right to non-impairment of contracts.
5
case was not published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one
have standing on the issue. basic question of law.
Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed Before those courts, Informations were filed charging
outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931, which was the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
ENACTED on June 20, 1953 weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a
motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges
Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral
mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before
proceedings
them — the details of which will be recounted below — an
Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common
in Proper Court under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which
Title to Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public Land, constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
by Virtue of Judicial Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
Next Preceding the Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
reads as “..in case such parcels of land, on account of their
failure to file such claims, have been, or about to be declared Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in
land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal
INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding the approval possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential
of this act.” If the title is to be followed, November 13, 1922 Decree (PD for short) No. 9?
is the date which should be followed, hence, would allow the
There are two elements to the the offense: first, the
reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date
carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or
of the institution of reopening of the case which was April 12,
pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or
1912, the petition would be invalid.
implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of
carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet,
or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a
lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
statute, and what may inadequately be omitted in the text
may be supplied or remedied by its title. The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying
of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard
PREAMBLE
to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory
CASE 1 – PEOPLE v. PURISMA construction.

FACTS: HELD:

There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER
the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT
the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the JUDGES.
Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:
6
 The problem of determining what acts fall within the of, connected with, or related to to subversion, insurrection,
purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among
The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read
others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which
in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to maintain law and
enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation
order in the country as well as the prevention and
of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
suppression of all forms of lawless violence. The non-
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be
there exists a valid presumption that undesirable distinguished from other legislation related to the illegal
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in particular,
and that a construction of which the statute is fairly reasoned that the information must allege that the purpose
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, of possession of the weapon was intended for the purposes
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized
consequence lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners said that the
purpose of subversion is not necessary in this regard because
CASE 1 – PEOPLE v. PURISIMA
the prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum or is an
Facts: action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The
City Fiscal also added in cases of statutory offenses, the
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the intent is immaterial and that the commission of the act is
People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the voluntary is enough.
Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are Issue: Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in
consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic form and substance to constitute the offense of “Illegal
question of law. possession of deadly weapon” penalized under Presidential
Decree No. 9?
The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII
and XVIII and CFI of Samar
Several informations were filed before the Held:
abovementioned courts charging the accused of Illegal
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands
Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of Presidential
charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the
Decree #9. The counsel of the defense filed motions to quash
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
the said informations after which the respondent-courts
passed their own orders quashing the said informations on 2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a
common ground that the informations did not allege facts complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the
constituting ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or
state an essential element of the crime, which is, that the omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is
carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed, essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him
pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.
7
3. The Supreme Court says that the preamble of PD#9 states more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas
that the intention of such decree is to penalize the acts which made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of
are related to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness, involves pasture lands in rural areas.
rebellion, subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble is
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or
not a part of the statute, it implies the intent and spirit of the
species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this
decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate
case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is
the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the
intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to
decree and the stiff sanctions provided.
illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a
The petition is DISMISSED. tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the
legislative intent is uncertain.
CASE 2 – PEOPLE v. ECHAVEZ
Punctuation Marks/ Capitalization
FACTS: CASE 1 – U.S. v. HART, MILLER, NATIVIDAD
Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate
informations against sixteen persons charging them with
squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before CASE 2 – AGCAOILI v. SUGUITAN
the accused could be arraigned, respondent Judge Echaves
G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926
motu proprio issued an omnibus order dismissing the five
informations (out of 16 raffled) on the grounds (1) that it was FACTS:
alleged that the accused entered the land through “stealth
and strategy”, whereas under the decree the entry should be Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of
effected “with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or the municipality of Laoag, of the Province of Ilocos Norte on
taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the the 25th day of March, 1916, with authority "to have and to
landowner”, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis hold the said office with all the powers, privileges, and
the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. emoluments thereunto of right appertaining unto him,
From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court subject to the conditions prescribed by law. The conditions
under Republic Act No. 5440. prescribed by law" to which the appointee was "subject" at
the time of his appointment, are found in section 1 of Act No.
ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes 2041 which provides that "All justices of the peace and
squatting and similar acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands. auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior . . . ."
HELD: NO. Appeal was devoid of merit. Trial court’s dismissal On the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine
was affirmed. Legislature adopted Act No. 3107. Said Act in section 203
provides for “ That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace
RATIO:
shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age
[T]he lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not of sixty-five years."
apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it
was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or
8
 On the 9th day of April, 1923, the Undersecretary of by a comma, and what follows that semicolon must have
Justice sent a to Agcaoili which provides that the former has relation to the same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is
the honor to advise the latter that he has ceased to be a not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A
justice of the peace by operation of said amendment of the semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the
Administrative Code. expression of a thought, a degree greater than that
expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose
of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are
ISSUES: both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences
and parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the
(1) Whether or not Act. 3107 applies to justices and semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than
auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior to the comma. The punctuation used in a law may always be
the passage of said act. referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning
(2) Whether or not Sec. 216 applies to public officers. of a doubtful statute. It follows therefore that, inasmuch as all
of the provisions of said section 216 which precede the
HELD: semicolon refer to corporations only, that which follows the
semicolon has reference to the same subject matter, or to
(1) No. Attention is called to one of the provisions of section
officers of a corporation.
3 of the Jones Law "That no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject The present case is anomalous under American
shall be expressed in the title of the bill." Considering that sovereignty. An officer was appointed in accordance with the
there is nothing in the title of Act No. 3107 which indicates in law to the judiciary to serve "during good behavior." After he
the slightest degree that said Act contains a provision "that had faithfully and honestly served the Government for a
justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed number of years the legislature adopted a new law which
to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years”, arbitrarily, without giving any reason therefore, provided that
the court is forced to the conclusions that, that provision is said officer cease to be such when he should reach the age of
illegal, void and contrary to the mandatory provision of the 65 years. Said law contained no express provision or method
Jones Law, and that said law cannot be applied to justices for its enforcement. The Executive Department, through its
and auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior Undersecretary of Justice, without any authority given in said
to the 17th day of March, 1923; and that when Julio Agcaoili law, notified the said officer that he was no longer an officer
was forcibly, by means of threats and intimidation, ordered to in the judicial department of the Government and must
leave his office as justice of the peace, he was forced to do vacate his office and turn the same over to another, who was
so illegally, without just cause, and should therefore be designated by said Undersecretary. When the officer
restored to his position as justice of the peace of the protested against such arbitrary action, giving reasons
municipality of Laoag, without delay. therefor, and without answering said protest, he was
threatened with a criminal prosecution if he did not
(2) No. A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation,
immediately vacate his office.
in the English language, to indicate a separation in the
relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed CASE 2 – AGCAOILI v. SUGUITAN
9
Facts: Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of preceding phrase. In the end, the court ruled that the
the municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte by Francis Harrison on petitioner remain in office.
March 25, 1916, with authority to have and hold the said
StatCon maxim: A semicolon is a mark of grammatical
office with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments
punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a separation
thereinto of right appertaining into him, subject to the
in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that
conditions prescribed by law. Agcaoili received a letter from
expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon
Luis Torres, Undersecretary of Justice, saying that he should
must have relation to the same matter which precedes it. A
cease to be a justice because he is now over 65 years old.
semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new
Justice Agcaoili filled a protest through a letter addressed to
idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the
the undersecretary to which he asserted that he will not
expression of a thought, a degree greater than that
cease from the office because he was appointed as justice of
expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose
peace before the enactment of Act 3107, and he has the
of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are
right to hold office during good behavior. Agcaoili filed
both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences
protest at Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte. He waited for a
and parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the
reply but nothing came. So, he filed for a petition for writ of
semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than
quo warranto in the CFI of the Province of Ilocos Norte.
the comma.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 216 of Act 190 is applicable to

the petitioner with regard to his petition for quo warranto
Held: No.
Context of Whole Text
Ratio: Article 190 provides remedies for the usurpation of
office and franchise. Section 216 provides “Nothing herein CASE 1 - Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX
contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 83736
forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within
five years after the act complained of was done or
committed; nor shall an action be brought against an officer Facts: TMX Sales Inc. filed its quarterly income tax for the
to be ousted from his office unless within one year after the 1st quarter of 1981. It declared P571,174.31 and paying an
cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose.” income tax of P247,019 on May 13, 1981. However, during
The Supreme Court held that this provision is applicable only the subsequent quarters, TMX suffered losses. On April 15,
to private officials. Hence, it has no applicability to the 1982, when TMX filed its Annual Income Tax Return for the
petitioner, who is a justice of the peace. The second point the year ended in December 31, 1981, it declared a net loss of
court made is with regard to the rules of Statutory P6,156,525. On July 9, 1982, TMX filed with the Appellate
Construction, given that the said provision is applicable to Division of BIR for refund in the amount of P247,010
public officials, the sentence after the word “committed;” representing overpaid income tax. His claim was not acted
should not be treated as a separate thought from the upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On May 14,
10
1984, TMX Sales filed a petition for review before the Court of FACTS: Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. filed its quarterly
Tax Appeals against CIR, praying that the CIR be ordered to income tax return for the first quarter of 1981, declaring an
refund to TMX the amount of P247,010. The CIR averred that income of P571,174.31, and consequently paying an income
TMX is already barred for claiming the refund since more tax thereon of P247,010.00 on May 15, 1981. During the
than 2 years has elapsed between the payment (May 15, subsequent quarters, however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered
1981) and the filing of the claim in court (March 14, 1984). losses so that when it filed on April 15, 1982 its Annual
The Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision granting the Income Tax Return for the year ended December 31, 1981, it
petition of TMX Sales and ordered CIR to refund the amount declared a gross income of P904,122.00 and total deductions
mentioned. Hence, this appeal of CIR. of P7,060,647.00, or a net loss of P6,156,525.00. On July 9,
1982, TMX Sales filed with the Appellate Division of the
Issue: Whether or not TMX Sales Inc. is entitled to a refund
Bureau of Internal Revenue a claim for refund in the amount
considering that two years gas already elapsed since the
of P247,010.00 representing overpaid income tax. This claim
payment of the tax
was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Held: Yes. Petition denied. on the ground that "granting, without admitting, the amount
in question is refundable, the petitioner is already barred
Ratio: Sec. 292, par. 2 of the National Internal Revenue Code from claiming the same considering that more than two years
stated that “in any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be had already elapsed between the payment and the filing of
begun after the expiration of two years from the date of the the claim in Court.
payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening
cause that may arise after payment.” This should be ISSUE: Does the two-year period to claim a refund of
interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code. erroneously collected tax provided for in Section 292 or the
The most reasonable and logical application of the law would National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the
be to compute the 2-year prescriptive period at the time of date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date the
the filing of the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income filing of the Final Adjustment Return?
Tax Return, where it can finally be ascertained if the tax
HELD: Section 292 of the Tax Code should be computed from
payer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is entitled
the time of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax
to a refund of overpaid income tax. Since TMX filed the suit
Return and final payment of income tax. The Court states
on March 14, 1984, it is within the 2-year prescriptive period
that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as
starting from April 15, 1982 when they filed their Annual
will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid
Income Tax Return.
an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Where there is ambiguity,
StatCon maxim: The intention of the legislature must be such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity
ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of is to be adopted. The intention of the legislator must be
the act is taken into view. ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of
the act is to be taken into view. Section 292 should be
CASE 1 - Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code
Sales in order to give effect to legislative intent and to avoid an
G.R. No. 83736. January 15, 1992
11
application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had
absurdity. called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband,
Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her
In the case at bar, the amount of P247,010.00 claimed
husband’s desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court
by private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. based on its
found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of
Adjustment Return required in Section 87, is equivalent to the
P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
tax paid during the first quarter. A literal application of
and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the
Section 292 would thus pose no problem as the two-year
trial court’s decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-
prescriptive period reckoned from the time the quarterly
GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22
income tax was paid can be easily determined. However, if
October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of the
the quarter in which the overpayment is made, cannot be
Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals,
ascertained, then a literal application of Section 292 would
submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having
lead to absurdity and inconvenience.
violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
The most reasonable and logical application of the law
Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent
would be to compute the two-year prescriptive period at the
within the scope or intent of the Insurance Act
time of filing the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual
Income Tax Return, when it can be finally ascertained if the Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
taxpayer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words,
entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax. clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the
CASE 2 – AISPORNA v. CA
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the
Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a
through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the
12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance
The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from
Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the the Insurance Commissioner; while the second paragraph
aforementioned policy. defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the
section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to
For reason unexplained, an information was filed be imposed for its violation. The appellate court’s ruling that
against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfo’s wife, with the City Court the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph
of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible
Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2
soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is
authority from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. “any person who for compensation shall be an insurance
Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, agent within the intent of this section.” Without proof of
she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the
12
insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be 4. Fiscal filed against Mapalad Aisporna, wife of Rodolfo
held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for having,
“Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously acted, "as agent in
misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect the solicitation for insurance by soliciting the
compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of application of Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of
authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing Perla Compaña de Seguros, ... without said accused
to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation
having first secured a certificate of authority to act as
either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. In the case of
such agent from the office of the Insurance
Bolen vs. Stake,19 the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's
Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize Commission, Republic of the Philippines
5. Defense: she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk,
persons only who acted as insurance solicitors without
license, and while acting in such capacity negotiated and and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued
concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It must be because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and
noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so
that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused she left a note on top of her husband's desk to renew
with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation 6. RTC and CA: guilty as charged
is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the
accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in our ISSUE: W/N the agent mentioned in the 1st paragraph of
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of Sec. 189 of the Insurance Act is governed by the definition of
the crime must be alleged and proved. After going over the an insurance agent found on its 2nd paragraph
records of this case, we are fully convinced, as the Solicitor HELD: NO. Reversed
General maintains, that accused did not violate Section 189
of the Insurance Act.” Section 189 of the Insurance Act

CASE 2 – AISPORNA v. CA “No insurance company doing business within the

Philippine Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay any
FACTS: commission or other compensation to any person for services
1. Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by Insurance in obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have
first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate
Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros,
of authority to act as an agent of such company as
with license to expire on 30 June, 1970
hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent, sub-
2. Eugenio S. Isidro was issued a Personal Accident Policy
agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of
by Perla thru its author representative, Rodolfo for a
applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining
period of 12 months with beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro new insurance, any commission or other compensation from
for P5,000 any insurance company doing business in the Philippine
3. Personal Accident Policy insured died by violence Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate
during lifetime of policy of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner,
which must be renewed annually on the first day of January,
13
or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be necessity that a person solicits an insurance for
issued by the Insurance Commissioner only upon the written compensation in order to be called an insurance agent)
application of persons desiring such authority, such
2. Second paragraph - defines who is an insurance agent
application being approved and countersigned by the
within the intent of this section (a person is an insurance
company such person desires to represent, and shall be upon
agent if he solicits and obtains an insurance for
a form approved by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such
compensation)
information as he may require. The Insurance Commissioner
shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke 3. Third paragraph - prescribes the penalty to be imposed for
any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall its violation
be valid, however, in any event after the first day of July of
the year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal - The appellate court has established ultimately that she did
certificates may be issued upon the application of the not receive any compensation for the issuance of the
company. insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro.

Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains It must be noted that the information, in the case at
insurance on behalf of any insurance company, or transmits bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance
for a person other than himself an application for a policy of contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for
insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been
act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained.
insurance agent within the intent of this section, and shall It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant
thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements, conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and
liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company proved.
is subject.
Any person or company violating the provisions of this
section shall be fined in the sum of five hundred pesos. On
the conviction of any person acting as agent, sub-agent, or
broker, of the commission of any offense connected with the
business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner shall
immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued to him
and no such certificate shall thereafter be issued to such
convicted person.” CASE 3 - Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals

Careful perusal of the provision shows: MANILA LODGE NO. 761 BENEVELONT & PROTECTIVE
ORDER OF THE ELKS V CA
1. First paragraph - prohibits a person from acting as agent,
sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of FACTS
applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate 1. On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted
of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner (no Act No. 1360 which authorized the City of Manila to
14
 reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area Extension, Situada en el Distrito de la
was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act Ermita."[Translation: Parcel of land which is part of the
provided that the reclaimed area "shall be the property Luneta Extension, situated in the District of Ermita]
of the City of Manila" and that the City of Manila is 6. At the back of this title was an annotated document
authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land which in part reads as follows: [Attempted Translation:
formed by the Luneta extension at the north end for a That the said city of Manila has the legal option to
hotel site, and to lease the same, with the approval of repurchase the said property solely for public
the Governor General, to a responsible person or purposes, at any time after fifty years from the 13th of
corporation for a term not to exceed 99 years. July 1911, at the price previously paid to the buying
2. Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on entity or the future market price of the property,
May 18, 1907 Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, so whichever value is higher.]
as to authorize the City of Manila either to lease or to 7. In January 1963 the BPOE petitioned the CFI of Manila,
sell the portion set aside as a hotel site. Branch IV, for the cancellation of the right of the City
3. The total area reclaimed was a little over 25 hectares. Manila to repurchase the property. This petition was
The City of Manila applied for the registration of the granted on February 15, 1963.
reclaimed area, and on January 20, 1911, original 8. On November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold for the sum of
certificate of title was issued in the name of the City of P4,700,000 the land together with all the
Manila. The title described the registered land improvements thereon to the Tarlac Development
[Translation: A land known under the name of Luneta Corporation (TDC, for short) which paid P1,700,000 as
Extension, situated in the district of Ermita.] down payment and mortgaged to the vendor the same
4. The registration was subject, however, to the realty to secure the payment of the balance to be paid
encumbrances mentioned in Article 39 of the Land in quarterly installments. At the time of the sale, there
Registration Act as may be subsisting and [Translation: was no annotation of any subsisting lien on the title to
Subject to the dispositions and conditions provided by the property.
Act No. 1360; and subject also to contracts of sale 9. On December 12, 1963 TCT No. 73444 was issued to
celebrated and entered into by the City of Manila in TDC over the subject land still described as "Una
favor of the Army and Navy Club and Manila Lodge No. parcela de terreno, que es parte de la Luneta
761 Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks (BPOE for Extension, situada en el Distrito de Ermita."
short), dated 29th of December 1908 and 16th of 10.In June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the CFI of
January 1909.] Manila a petition for the reannotation of its right to
5. On July 13, 1911, the City of Manila conveyed 5,543.07 repurchase. The court, after hearing, issued an order,
square meters of the reclaimed area to the Manila dated November 19, 1964, directing the Regrister of
Lodge No. 761, BPOE on the basis of which a transfer Deeds of the City of Manila to reannotate in toto the
certificate of title was issued to the latter over the entry regarding the right of the City of Manila to
"parcela de terreno que es parte de la Luneta repurchase the property after fifty years. From this

15
 order TDC and BPOE appealed to this Court which on a. Firstly, if the reclaimed area was granted to the
July 31, 1968 affirmed the trial court's order of City of Manila as its patrimonial property, the
reannotation, but reserved to TDC the right to bring City could, by virtue of its ownership, dispose of
another action for the clarification of its rights. the whole reclaimed area without need of
11.After trial the court a quo rendered on July 14, 1972 its authorization to do so from the lawmaking body.
decision finding the subject land to be part of the Thus Article 348 of the Civil Code of Spain
"public park or plaza" and, therefore, part of the public provides that "ownership is the right to enjoy
domain. The court consequently declared that the sale and dispose of a thing without further limitations
of the subject land by the City of Manila to Manila than those established by law." The right to
Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was null and void; that plaintiff dispose (jus disponendi) of one's property is an
TDC was a purchaser thereof in good faith and for attribute of ownership. Act No. 1360, as
value from BPOE and can enforce its rights against the amended, however, provides by necessary
latter; and that BPOE is entitled to recover from the implication, that the City of Manila could not
City of Manila whatever consideration it had paid the dispose of the reclaimed area without being
latter. authorized by the lawmaking, body. Thus the
12.In its decision promulgated on June 30, 1975, the CA statute provides that "the City of Manila is
concurred in the findings and conclusions of the lower hereby authorized to set aside a tract at the
court. north end, for a hotel site, and to lease the
same x x x should the municipal board x x x
ISSUES
deem it advisable, it is hereby authorized x x x
1. WON the property subject of the action was to sell said tract of land x x x." If the reclaimed
patrimonial property of the City of Manila and not a area were patrimonial property of the City, the
park or plaza latter could dispose of it without need of the
2. WON the City of Manila is estopped from questioning authorization provided by the statute, and the
the validity of the sale it executed on July 13, 1911 authorization to set aside, lease, or sell given by
conveying the subject property to the Manila Lodge the statute would indeed be superfluous. To so
No. 761, BPOE construe the statute as to render the term
3. WON the CA has departed from the accepted and "authorize," which is repeatedly used by the
usual course of judicial proceedings in that it did not statute, superfluous would violate the
make its own findings but simply recited those of the elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that
lower court effect must be given to every word, clause, and
HELD: sentence of the statute and that a statute
should be so interpreted that no part thereof
1. NO. We hold that it is of public dominion, intended for becomes inoperative or superflous. To
public use. authorizemeans to empower, to give a right to
16
 act. Act No. 1360 furthermore qualifies the verb c. Thirdly, the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the
"authorize" with the adverb "hereby," which Manila Bay. A bay is nothing more than an inlet of the sea.
means "by means of this statue or section." Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays,
Hence without the authorization expressly given roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are parts of the
by Act No. 1360, the City of Manila could not national domain open to public use. These are also property
lease or sell even the northern portion; much of public ownership devoted to public use, according to
Article 339 of the Civil Code of Spain. When the shore or part
less could it dispose of the whole reclaimed
of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its character of being
area. Consequently, the reclaimed area was
property for public use.
granted to the City of Manila, not as its
patrimonial property. At most, only the northern d. Fourthly, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or
portion reserved as a hotel site could be said to sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel
be patrimonial property, for, by express site. The subject property is not that northern portion
statutory provision it could be disposed of, and authorized to be leased or sold; the subject property is the
southern portion. Hence, applying the rule of expresio unius
the title thereto would revert to the City should
est exlusio alterius, the City of Manila was not authorized to
the grantee fail to comply with the terms
sell the subject property. The application of this principle of
provided by the statute.
statutory construction becomes the more imperative in the
b. Secondly, the reclaimed area is an "extension to
case at bar inasmuch as not only must the public grant of the
the Luneta in the City of Manila." If the
reclaimed area to the City of Manila be, as above stated,
reclaimed area is an extension of the Luneta, strictly construed against the City of Manila, but also because
then it is of the same nature or character as the a grant of power to a municipal corporation, as happens in
old Luneta. Anent this matter, it has been said this case where the city is authorized to lease or sell the
that a power to extend or continue an act or northern portion of the Luneta extension, is strictly limited to
business cannot authorize a transaction that is such as are expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily
totally distinct. It is not disputed that the old incidental to the objectives of the corporation.
Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so
e. Fifthly, Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that
considered by Section 859 of the Revised property of public use, in provinces and in towns, comprises
Ordinances of the City of Manila. the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets,
fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public
Hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be also a
works of general service paid for by such towns or
public park or plaza and for public use. TDC, however,
provinces." A park or plaza, such as the extension to the
contends that the subject property cannot be considered an
Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised in said article.
extension of the old Luneta because it is outside of the limits
of the old Luneta when extended to the sea. This is a strained We have demonstrated that the Luneta extension was
interpretation of the term "extension," for an "extension" it intended to be property of the City of Manila for public use.
has been held, "signifies enlargement in any direction-in But, could not said property later on be converted, as the
length, breadth, or circumstances.
17
petitioners contend, to patrimonial property? It could be. But there was in contemplation of law, no contract at all. The
this Court has already said, in Ignacio v. The Director of inexistence of said sale can be set up against anyone who
Lands that it is only the executive and possibly the legislative asserts a right arising from it, not only against the first
department that has the authority and the power to make vendee, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, but also against all
the declaration that said Property is no longer required for its Successors, including the
public use, and until such declaration is made the property
TDC, which are not protected by law. The doctrine of bone
must continue to form part of the public domain.
fide purchaser without notice, being claimed by the TDC,
In the case at bar, there has been no such explicit or does not apply where there is a total absence of title in the
unequivocal declaration. It should be noted that courts are vendor, and the good faith of the purchaser TDC cannot
undoubtedly not primarily called upon, and are not in a create title where none exists. The restoration or restitution
position, to determine whether any public land is still needed of what has been given is in order.
for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters.
3. NO. We have shown in our discussion of the first issue that
2. NO the decision of the trial court is fully in accordance with law.
It follows that when such decision was affirmed by the CA,
Ratio The Government is never estopped by mistakes or
the affirmance was likewise in accordance with law. Hence,
errors on the part of its agents and estoppel does not apply
no useful purpose will be served in further discussing this
to a municipal corporation to validate a contract that is
issue.
prohibited by law or its against public policy.
Disposition The petitions are denied for lack of merit and
Reasoning The sale of July 13, 1911 executed by the City of
the decision of the CA is affirmed, at petitioners' cost.
Manila to Manila
Extrinsic Aids
Lodge was certainly a contract prohibited by law. Estoppel A. Dictionaries
cannot be urged even if the City of Manila accepted the CASE 1 – ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
benefits of such contract of sale and the Manila
FACTS:
Lodge No. 761 had performed its part of the agreement, for
to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the City of Manila in
1. Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
this case would be tantamount to enabling it to do indirectly
Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations charging
what it could not do directly. The sale of the subject property
Estrada for violation of Plunder Law, among others.
executed by the City of Manila to the Manila Lodge No. 761, 2. Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the
BPOE, was void and inexistent for lack of subject matter. [a case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
park is outside the commerce of man] It suffered from an and for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses
incurable defect that could not be ratified either by lapse of to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-
time or by express ratification. The Manila Lodge No. 761 affidavits and other documents necessary to prove
therefore acquired no right by virtue of the said sale. Hence lack of probable cause. (Vagueness of law never raised
to consider now the contract inexistent as it always has been,
cannot be an impairment of the obligations of contracts, for
18
 in the Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of
and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law) merit. SO ORDERED.
3. Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding that “a
probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to Ratio:
justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the In view of vagueness and ambiguity
accused” Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its
4. Motion for reconsideration was filed by Estrada but will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a
was denied by Sandiganbayan statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or
5. Estrada moved to quash the Information on the ground ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or
that the facts alleged did not constitute an indictable at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-
offense since the law on which it was based was
settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for VAGUENESS.
will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
a. Failure for the law to provide definition of the
acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
phrase “a combination or series of overt or those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers — who are,
criminal acts” ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers — to use
b. They render the Plunder Law unconstitutional statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
for being impermissibly vague and overbroad Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the
and violative of his fundamental right to due following commonly accepted definition of the words
process "combination" and "series:"
6. Sandiganbayan denied Motion to Quash. Issues for
resolution raised before the Supreme Court. Combination — the result or product of combining; the act
or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such
Issues: WON R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
following grounds: Series — a number of things or events of the same class
I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or
ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec.
LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1
PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1)
to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law,
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a
otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer
7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And
19
thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the
'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
'general plan of action or method' which the principal presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of
accused and public officer and others conniving with him, Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the
overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable
a common goal. doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no
the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute Information to have been committed by the accused in
is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.
when measured by common understanding and practice. It
must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the B. Legislative History
statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. a) Greenfield v. Meer, 77 Phil 394
FACTS:
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does
not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks Since the year 1933, the plaintiff has been
to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on continuously engaged in the embroidery business. In 1935,
the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. the plaintiff began engaging in buying and selling mining
The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is stocks and securities for his own exclusive account and not
most commonly stated to the effect that a statute for the account of others. The plaintiff has not been a dealer
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with in securities as defined in section 84 (t) of Commonwealth
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence Act No. 466; he has no established place of business for the
can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. purchase and sale of mining stocks and securities; and he
was never a member of any stock exchange. The plaintiff
filed an income tax return where he claims a deduction of
In view of due process P67,307.80 representing the net loss sustained by him in
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly mining stocks securities during the year 1939. The defendant
stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents disallowed said item of deduction on the ground that said
the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond losses were sustained by the plaintiff from the sale of mining
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of stocks and securities which are capital assets, and that the
plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or loss arising from the sale of the same should be allowed only
criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The to the extent of the gains from such sales, which gains were
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already taken into consideration in the computation of the 2. W/N there was a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the
alleged net loss of P67,307.80. Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the personal and additional exemptions HELD:

granted by section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 466 should 1. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two
be considered as a credit against or be deducted from the laws that the later legislative enactment prevails.
net income, or whether it is the tax on such exemptions that Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Paras v. COMELEC had
should be deducted from the tax on the total net income. the opportunity to mention when the next barangay election
should be when it stated that “the next regular election
Held/Ratio: Personal and additional exemptions claimed by involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away, the
appellant should be credited against or deducted from the same having been scheduled in May 1997”.
net income. "Exception is an immunity or privilege; it is
freedom from a charge or burden to which others are 2. No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that, ‘The
subjected." (If the amounts of personal and additional term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
exemptions fixed in section 23 are exempt from taxation, officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
they should not be included as part of the net income, which years…” It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term
is taxable. There is nothing in said section 23 to justify the of office for barangay officials.
contention that the tax on personal exemptions (which are
exempt from taxation) should first be fixed, and then B. Explanatory Note
deducted from the tax on the net income. *SEE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY a) People v. Lidres, 108 Phil 995

FACTS: Dionisio Lidres and Josita Diotay filed their

applications as substitute teacher for Magdalena Echavez.
b) David v. COMELEC, GR No. 127116 The Supervising teacher requested Diotay to sign an
agreement, wherein both Diotay and defendant agreed to
FACTS: take over Echavez’ position on a “50-50” basis, e.i that is the
Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of period from January to March 1954, would be equally divided
when the barangay elections should be held and questions between them. Diotay then took over and began teaching.
the COMELEC’s schedule of holding such elections on the 2nd However, on February 12, 1954, Lidres went to the
Monday of May 1997. The COMELEC’s basis is R.A. 7160 or school with a letter of resignation and asked Diotay to sign it,
the Local Government Code which mandates barangay the latter refused. Lidres told Diotay that whether she like it
elections every 3 years. Petitioner David contends that an or not, he would take over her class on February 22, 1954.
earlier law, R.A. 6679, should be the one followed. R.A. 6679 True to his word Lidres went to the said class and insisted to
provides that barangay elections should be held every 5 take over. He held class with the half of the class and erased
years. He also contends that there is a violation of Art. 10, Diotay’s name from the attendance chart and place his own.
Sec. 8 of the Constitution. Diotay informed the principal and the following day they
were summoned by the supervising teacher, ordered Diotay
ISSUE: to continue her teaching and advised Lidres not to go back to
1. What the term of office of barangay officials is. the school. Without heeding the said instruction Lidres
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without any authority whatsoever, again took over Diotay’s alleged in the information nor proved during the trial that
class against the latter’s will. defendant is a member of a seditious organization engaged
Lidres was charged and prosecuted with the crime of in subversive activities, he could not be liable or found guilty
Usurpation of official functions as defined and penalized in under said provision of R.A. No. 10. Granting, arguendo, that
R.A. No. 10. R.A. No. 10 is an amendment to Art. 177, and not merely an
implementation thereof, the subsequent enactment of R.A.
ISSUE: WON R.A. No. 10 is only applicable to members of 379, effective June 14,1949, would constitute an amendment
subversive organizations engaged in subversive activities. thereof restoring the element of pretense of official position
in the offense of usurpation of official functions. Under R.A.
HOLDING: Court ruled that in examination of the discussion 379, the law in force at the time of the commission of the
of House Bill No. 126, which became R.A No. 10, discloses alleged offense, pretense of official position is an essential
indisputably that said Act was really intended as an element of the crime of usurpation of official functions. But
emergency measure, to cope with the abnormal situation the information specifically charges that defendant
created by the subversive activities of seditious organizations committed the offense “without pretense of official position.”
at the time of its passage in September 1946. Hence, the Under the circumstances, the facts alleged in the information
elimination of the element of pretense of official position fail to constitute an offense.
required under Article 177 of the RPC. And since it is neither

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