The halo effect, and other managerial delusions 77

By Invitation:

The halo effect, and other

managerial delusions
Companies cannot achieve superior and lasting business performance
simply by following a specific set of steps.

Phil Rosenzweig

The quest of every high-quality corporate executive is to find the keys to

superior performance. Achieving market leadership is hard enough, but
staying at the top—given intense competition, rapidly changing technology,
and shifting global forces—is even more difficult. At the same time,
executives are under enormous pressure to deliver profitable growth and
high returns for their shareholders. No wonder they constantly search
for ways to achieve competitive advantage.

But many executives, despite their good intentions, look in the wrong places
for the insights that will deliver an edge. Too often they reach for books
and articles that promise a reliable path to high performance. Over the past
decade, some of the most popular business books have claimed to reveal
the blueprint for lasting success, the way to go from good to great, or how
to craft a fail-safe strategy or to make the competition irrelevant.

At first glance, many of the pronouncements in such works look entirely

credible. They are based on extensive data and appear to be the result of
rigorous analysis. Millions of managers read them, eager to apply these
keys to success to their own companies. Unfortunately, many of the studies
are deeply flawed and based on questionable data that can lead to
erroneous conclusions. Worse, they give rise to the especially grievous
78 The McKinsey Quarterly 2007 Number 1

Article at a glance
notion that business success follows
In the quest to achieve superior performance,
predictably from implementing
executives often rely on advice in business books, a few key steps. In promoting this
articles, and business school case studies idea, authors obscure a more basic
that claim to reveal a blueprint for gaining lasting
truth—namely, that in the business
competitive advantage.
world success is the result of
The research underpinning this advice, however, is
decisions made under conditions of
often deeply flawed and, worse, obscures the
basic truth that success in the business world is uncertainty and shaped in part
based on decisions made under uncertainty and by factors outside our control. In
in the face of factors executives cannot control. the real world, given the flux of
This article, an adaptation of material from the competitive dynamics, even seem-
author’s book, The Halo Effect: . . . and the Eight ingly good choices do not always
Other Business Delusions That Deceive Managers,
lead to favorable outcomes.
explores some of the misconceptions and delusions
found in the business world, particularly those
concerning the ability of executives to achieve Rather than succumb to the
durable superior performance. These include the hyperbole and false promises found
idea that variables such as leadership and corporate
culture have a causal relationship to financial
in so much management writing,
performance. business strategists would do far
The article also explores ways for executives to
better to improve their powers of
improve their powers of critical thinking, an critical thinking. Wise executives
important but overlooked tool for crafting effective should be able to think clearly
corporate strategy.
about the quality of research claims
and to detect some of the egregious
Related articles errors that pervade the business
on mckinseyquarterly.com
world. Indeed, the capacity for
“Distortions and deceptions in strategic decisions,”
2006 Number 1 critical thinking is an important
asset for any business strategist—
“Just-in-time strategy for a turbulent world,”
2002 special edition: Risk and resilience one that allows the executive to cut
through the clutter and to discard
“Hidden flaws in strategy,”
2003 Number 2 the delusions, embracing instead
a more realistic understanding of
business success and failure.

As a first step, it’s important to identify some of the misperceptions and

delusions commonly found in the business world. Then, using these insights,
we might replace flawed thinking with a more acute method of approach-
ing strategic decisions.

Beware the halo effect

Many studies of company performance are undermined by a problem known
as the halo effect. First identified by US psychologist Edward Thorndike
in 1920, it describes the tendency to make specific inferences on the basis
of a general impression.
 The halo effect, and other managerial delusions 79

How does the halo effect manifest itself in the business world? Imagine
a company that is doing well, with rising sales, high profits, and a sharply
increasing stock price. The tendency is to infer that the company has
a sound strategy, a visionary leader, motivated employees, an excellent cus-
tomer orientation, a vibrant culture, and so on. But when that same
company suffers a decline—if sales fall and profits shrink—many people are
quick to conclude that the company’s strategy went wrong, its people
became complacent, it neglected its customers, its culture became stodgy,
and more. In fact, these things may not have changed much, if at all.
Rather, company performance, good or bad, creates an overall impression—
a halo—that shapes how we perceive its strategy, leaders, employees,
culture, and other elements.

As an example, when Cisco Systems was growing rapidly, in the late 1990s,
it was widely praised by journalists and researchers for its brilliant strategy,
masterful management of acquisitions, and superb customer focus. When
the tech bubble burst, many of the same observers were quick to make the
opposite attributions: Cisco, the journalists and researchers claimed,
now had a flawed strategy, haphazard acquisition management, and poor
customer relations. On closer examination, Cisco really had not changed
much—a decline in its performance led people to see the company differ-
ently. Indeed, Cisco staged a remarkable turnaround and today is still
one of the leading tech companies. The same thing happened at ABB , the
Swiss-Swedish engineering giant. In the 1990s, when its performance
was strong, ABB was lauded for its elegant matrix design, risk-taking culture,
and charismatic chief executive, Percy Barnevik. Later, when the com-
pany’s performance fell, ABB was roundly criticized for having a dysfunc-
tional organization, a chaotic culture, and an arrogant CEO. But again,
the company had not really changed much.

The fact is that many everyday concepts in business—including leadership,

corporate culture, core competencies, and customer orientation—are
ambiguous and difficult to define. We often infer perceptions of them from
something else, which appears to be more concrete and tangible: namely,
financial performance. As a result, many of the things that we commonly
believe are contributions to company performance are in fact attributions.
In other words, outcomes can be mistaken for inputs.

Wise managers know to be wary of the halo effect. They look for indepen-
dent evidence rather than merely accepting the idea that a successful
company has a visionary leader and a superb customer orientation or that a
struggling company must have a poor strategy and weak execution. They
ask themselves, “If I didn’t know how the company was performing, what
80 The McKinsey Quarterly 2007 Number 1

would I think about its culture, execution, or customer orientation?”

They know that as long as their judgments are merely attributions reflecting
a company’s performance, their logic will be circular.

The halo effect is especially damaging because it often compromises the

quality of data used in research. Indeed, many studies of business
performance—as well as some articles that have appeared in journals such
as Harvard Business Review and The McKinsey Quarterly and in academic
business journals—rely on data contaminated by the halo effect. These
studies praise themselves for the vast amount of data they have accrued but
overlook the fact that if the data aren’t valid, it really doesn’t matter
how much was gathered or how sophisticated the analysis appears to be.

This reliance on questionable data, in turn, gives rise to a number of further

errors in logic. Two delusions—of absolute performance and of lasting
success—have particularly serious repercussions for business strategists.

The delusion of absolute performance

One of the most seductive claims in business best sellers is that a company
can achieve success if it follows a specific set of steps. Some recent books
are explicit on this point, claiming that a company hewing to a certain
formula is virtually sure to become a great performer. On closer inspection
these studies rely on sources of data (including retrospective interviews,
articles from the business press, and business school case studies) that are
routinely undermined by the halo effect. Whereas a given set of factors
may appear to have led predictably to success, the reverse is more likely—
it would be more accurate to say that successful companies tended to be
described in the same way. The direction of causality is wrong.

Following a given formula can’t ensure high performance, and for a simple
reason: in a competitive market economy, performance is fundamentally
relative, not absolute. Success and failure depend not only on a company’s
actions but also on those of its rivals. A company can improve its opera-
tions in many ways—better quality, lower cost, faster throughput time,
superior asset management, and more—but if rivals improve at a faster
rate, its performance may suffer.

Consider General Motors. In 2005 GM’s debt was reduced to junk bond
status—hardly a vote of confidence from financial markets. Yet compared
with the automobiles GM produced in the 1980s, its cars today boast
better quality, additional features, superior comfort, and improved safety.
Owing to myriad factors, including the increased prominence of Japanese
and South Korean automakers, GM’s share of the US market keeps slipping,
 The halo effect, and other managerial delusions 81

from 35 percent in 1990 to 29 percent in 1999 and 25 percent in 2005. Its

declining performance must be understood in relative terms. Paradoxi-
cally, the rigors of competition from Asian automakers are precisely what
have stimulated GM to improve. Is GM a better automaker than it was a
generation ago? Yes, if we look at absolute measures. But that’s little comfort
to its employees or shareholders.

The delusion of absolute performance is very important because it suggests

that a company can achieve high performance by following a simple
formula, regardless of the actions of competitors. If left unchecked, executives
may avoid decisions that, although risky, could be essential for success.
Once we see that performance is relative, however, it becomes obvious that
a company can never achieve success simply by following certain steps,
no matter how serious its intentions. High performance comes from doing
things better than rivals can, which means that managers have to take
risks. This uncomfortable truth recognizes that some elements of business
performance are beyond our control, yet it is an essential concept that
clear-thinking executives must grasp.

The delusion of lasting success

The halo effect leads to a second misconception about the performance of
companies: that they can achieve enduring success in a predictable way.
These studies typically begin by selecting a group of companies that have
outperformed the market for many years and then gather data to try and
distill what led to that high performance. Regrettably, however, much of the
data come from sources that are commonly contaminated by the halo
effect. What the authors claim to be the causes of long-term performance
are more accurately understood as attributions made about companies
that had been selected precisely for their long-term performance.

In fact, lasting success is largely a delusion, a statistical anomaly. As

McKinsey’s Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan showed,1 corporate longevity
is neither very likely nor, when we find it, generally associated with high
performance. On the whole, if we look at the full population of companies
over time, there’s a strong tendency for extreme performance in one time
period to be followed by less extreme performance in the next. Suggesting
that companies can follow a blueprint to achieve lasting success may be
appealing, but it’s not supported by the evidence.

High performance is difficult for companies to maintain, for an obvious

reason: in a free-market economy, profits tend to decline as a result of

1
C reative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last Underperform the Market—and How to
Successfully Transform Them, New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001.
82 The McKinsey Quarterly 2007 Number 1

imitation and competition. Rivals copy the leader’s winning ways, new
companies enter the market, best practices are diffused, and employees
move from one company to another. Of course, it is always possible to
pick out a handful of enduring success stories after the fact. Then if
we study those companies by relying on data that are suffused with the
halo effect, we may think we have discovered the keys to success.
In fact, we have only managed to show how successful companies were
described—an entirely different matter.

The delusion of lasting success is a serious matter because it casts build-

ing an enduringly high-performing company as an achievable objective.
Yet companies that outperform the market for long periods of time are
not just rare but statistical anomalies whose apparent greatness is observ-
able only in retrospect. More accurately, companies that enjoy long-
term success have probably done so by stringing together many short-term
successes, not because they somehow unlocked the secrets of sustained
greatness. Unfortunately, pursuing a dream of enduring greatness may
divert attention from the need to win more immediate battles.

Clear thinking for business

strategists
These points, taken together, expose
the principal fiction at the heart of so
many popular business books and
articles: that following a few key steps
will inevitably lead to greatness and
that a company’s success is of its own
making and not often shaped by
external factors.

The simple fact is that no formula can guarantee a company’s success,

at least not in a competitive business environment. This truth may seem
disappointing. Many managers would like to find a formula that can
be easily applied—a tidy plug-and-play solution that ensures success. But
on reflection, the absence of a simple success formula should not be
disappointing at all. Indeed, it might even come as a relief. If success
could be reduced to a formula, companies would not need strategic
thinking but could rely on administrators to tick the right boxes and
ensure that formulas were followed with precision. What makes stra-
tegic decision making so difficult, and therefore so valuable to companies,
is precisely that there are no guaranteed keys to success. The ability
to make the sorts of difficult, complex judgments that are pivotal for a
company’s fortunes is, in the last analysis, a business executive’s
most important contribution. Here are some approaches that may help.
 The halo effect, and other managerial delusions 83

Recognize the role of uncertainty

Rather than search in vain for success formulas, business executives
would do better to adjust their thinking about the context of strategic
decisions. As a first step, they should recognize the fundamental
uncertainty of the business world. Doing so does not come naturally.
People want the world to make sense, to be predictable, and to follow
clear rules of cause and effect. Managers want to believe that their busi-
ness world is similarly predictable, that specific actions will lead to
certain outcomes. Yet strategic choice is inevitably an exercise in decision
making under uncertainty. Another source of uncertainty involves
customers: will they embrace or reject a new product or service? Even if
a company accurately anticipates what customers will do, it has to
contend with the unpredictable actions of new and old competitors.

A third source of uncertainty comes from technological change. Whereas

some industries are relatively stable, with products that don’t change
much and customer demand that remains fairly steady, others change
rapidly and in unpredictable ways. A final source of uncertainty concerns
internal capabilities. Managers can’t tell exactly how a company—with
its particular people, skills, and experiences—will respond to a new
course of action. Our best efforts to isolate and understand the inner
workings of organizations will be moderately successful at best. Combine
these factors and it becomes clear why strategy involves decisions made
under uncertainty.

See the world through probabilities

Faced with this basic uncertainty, wise managers approach problems as
interlocking probabilities. Their objective is not to find keys to guaranteed
success but to improve the odds through a thoughtful consideration of
factors. Some of these are outside the company—including industry forces,
customer trends, and the intentions of competitors. Others are internal—
capabilities, resources, and risk preferences. On the foundation of that
analysis, the role of the business strategist is to make decisions that improve
a company’s chances for success while never imagining that a company
can simply will its success.

Rather, the goal should be gathering accurate information and subjecting

it to careful scrutiny in order to improve the odds of success. As former
US Treasury Secretary and Goldman Sachs executive Robert E. Rubin
wrote in his memoirs,2 “Once you’ve internalized the concept that
you can’t prove anything in absolute terms, life becomes all the more

2
Robert E. Rubin and Jacob Weisberg, In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall Street to Washington,
reprint edition, New York: Random House, 2004.
84 The McKinsey Quarterly 2007 Number 1

about odds, chances, and trade-offs. In a world without provable truths,

the only way to refine the probabilities that remain is through greater
knowledge and understanding.” Wise managers know that business is about
finding ways to improve the odds of success—but never imagine that it
is a certainty.

Separate inputs from outcomes

Finally, clear-thinking executives know that in an uncertain world,
actions and outcomes are imperfectly linked. It’s easy to infer that good
outcomes result from good decisions and that bad outcomes must
mean someone blundered. Yet the fact that a given choice didn’t turn out
well doesn’t always mean it was a mistake. Therefore it’s important
to examine the decision process itself and not just the outcome. Had the
right information been gathered or had some important data been
overlooked? Were the assumptions reasonable or were they flawed? Were
calculations accurate or had there been errors? Had the full set of
eventualities been identified and their impact estimated? Had the
company’s strategic position and risk preference been considered properly?

This sort of rigorous analysis, with outcomes separated from inputs,

requires the extra mental step of judging actions on their merits rather
than simply making after-the-fact attributions, favorable or unfavor-
able. Good decisions don’t always lead to favorable outcomes,
and unfavorable outcomes are not always the result of mistakes. Wise
managers resist the natural tendency to make attributions based
solely on outcomes. They avoid the halo bestowed by performance and
insist on independent evidence.

Our business world is full of research and analysis that are comforting
to managers: that success can be yours by following a formula, that specific
actions will lead to predictable outcomes, and that greatness can be
achieved no matter what rivals do. The truth is very different: the busi-
ness world is not a place of clear causal relationships, where a given
set of actions leads to predictable results, but one that is more tenuous
and uncertain.

The task of strategic leadership is therefore not to follow a given formula

or set of steps. Instead it is to gather appropriate information, evaluate it
thoughtfully, and make choices that provide the best chance for the
company to succeed, all the while recognizing the fundamental nature of
 The halo effect, and other managerial delusions 85

business uncertainty. Paradoxically, a sober understanding of this risk—

along with an appreciation of the relative nature of performance and the
general tendency for performance to regress—may offer the best basis
for guiding effective decisions. These complex decisions, made without any
guarantee of success, are ultimately the main contribution of business
strategists. If a set of steps that could guarantee success did exist, and if
greatness were indeed simply a matter of will, then the value of clear
thinking in business would be lower, not greater.  Q
Phil Rosenzweig is a professor of strategy and international management
at the International Institute for Management Development (IMD),
in Lausanne, Switzerland. This article is adapted from The Halo Effect: . . . and the Eight Other
Business Delusions That Deceive Managers, New York: Free Press, 2007.
Copyright © 2007 McKinsey & Company.
All rights reserved.