Posadas V Ombudsman
Posadas V Ombudsman
Posadas V Ombudsman
FACTS:
Dennis Venturina (Venturina), a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines (UP), was killed in a
rumble between his fraternity and another fraternity. Petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of UP Diliman,
asked the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for assistance in determining the persons
responsible for the crime. In response to the request, respondent Orlando V. Dizon (Dizon), Chief of the Special
Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went to UP and, on the basis of the supposed positive identification of
two alleged eyewitnesses, attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan (Taparan) and Raymundo Narag (Narag),
officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina.
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino (Lambino), and Rosario Torres-Yu (Torrres-Yu), also of UP, and a certain
Atty. Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with
them. Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result of their
intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents.
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners with violation of PD
1829, which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
On motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the dismissal of the case. But the
recommendation was disapproved. The Office of the Ombudsman directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with
the prosecution of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside
the resolution of the Ombudsman's office ordering the prosecution of petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of PD No. 1829
HELD:
No. There is no probable cause to charge petitioners of violating PD 1829. Probable cause is defined as "sufficient
ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has been committed and that the
respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial" (Section 1, Rule 112, Rules of Court). The
absence of an arrest warrant, the absence of knowledge or reasonable ground on the part of the accused to
believe that the students had committed a crime, the absence of any law punishing refusal to attend an
investigation at the NBI, all show that there is no sufficient ground to charge the accused with Obstruction of
Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the accused, in safeguarding the rights of students, were
acting within the bounds of law.
The rule is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. But as has been held, "[i]nfinitely more important than
conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only
from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution." In this case,
petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a violation of PD 1829. Petitioners had a
right to prevent the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal.