Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation Study

DRAFT FINAL REPORT
Ultra High-Speed Ground

Transportation Study
Prepared for
Washington State Department of

Transportation
December 2017
Prepared by
CH2M HILL, Inc.

2020 SW Fourth Avenue, 3rd Floor
Portland, OR 97201
PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Foreword
I am confident and optimistic about Washington State and the Cascadia Innovation Corridor. Our
region is characterized by a rapidly growing population with shared values, booming twenty‐first
century industries and an appetite for innovation. To fully realize our growth potential, we
continue to look for ways to improve economic, social and environmental well‐being, especially
across our borders. I believe people are passionate and hungry for options that would maintain
our quality of life in the Pacific Northwest.
Our prosperity depends in part on our ability to respond to rising congestion, shifts in population
and workforce, and alternative transportation needs. Ultra high‐speed ground transportation is
one way to address these issues. With an ultra high‐speed ground transportation system, people
could travel from Seattle to Vancouver BC in less than an hour. Such a system would greatly
improve connectivity, encourage smart development and enhance business opportunities. As
airports and roadways become increasingly congested, a new ultra high‐speed ground
transportation system would provide travelers with an alternative transportation mode, which
would not only bypass traffic but also reduce carbon emissions.
There is much work to do. This study is an important first step in examining the feasibility of an
ultra high‐speed ground transportation system across Cascadia. Indeed, there will be costs to
developing such a system. However, there are perhaps even greater costs to rising congestion and
a do‐nothing approach. Moving forward, public and private sectors in Washington, Oregon, and
British Columbia will need to continue to work together to explore innovative transportation
options that derive cross‐border benefits.
This study is the product of the Cascadia Innovation Corridor conference, in which Washington
State and British Columbia came together to explore joint partnerships, including opportunities for
faster, more reliable transportation for the Cascadia megaregion. I am confident that with this
tangible example of collaboration, we can better realize and seize the opportunities available to us
and work to further enhance our connectivity and quality of life in the Pacific Northwest.

—Jay Inslee, Governor

Acknowledgements
The Washington Department of Transportation would like to acknowledge and thank the many partners,
stakeholders, and staff that supported this study with special thanks to the Washington State
Legislature, the Office of Governor Inslee, Federal Railroad Administration, Microsoft, Washington
Building Trades, the Advisory Group members and the Vancouver Economic Commission for hosting the
October 25th Advisory Group meeting and Prosper Portland for hosting the December 7th Advisory
Group meeting.
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Contents
Foreword ............................................................................................................................................i
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................... iii
Contents ............................................................................................................................................ v
Acronyms and Abbreviations............................................................................................................. ix
Introduction...................................................................................................................................1-1
1.1 Study Background ............................................................................................................ 1-1
1.2 Study Purpose and Approach .......................................................................................... 1-1
Vision for Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation in the Cascadia Megaregion.............................. 2-1
2.1 Impetus for Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation .................................................... 2-1
2.2 Cascadia Megaregion Context ......................................................................................... 2-3
2.2.1 Population and Employment Profile................................................................... 2-3
2.2.2 Transportation Network ..................................................................................... 2-4
Technology Evaluation ...................................................................................................................3-1
3.1 High-Speed Rail (Steel Wheel) ......................................................................................... 3-1
3.1.1 Future Development of High-Speed Rail ............................................................ 3-2
3.2 Magnetic Levitation (Maglev) .......................................................................................... 3-2
3.2.1 Electromagnetic Suspension ............................................................................... 3-2
3.2.2 Electrodynamic Suspension ................................................................................ 3-3
3.2.3 Future Development ........................................................................................... 3-4
3.3 Hyperloop ........................................................................................................................ 3-5
3.3.1 Hyperloop Case Uses .......................................................................................... 3-5
3.3.2 Current Development and Studies ..................................................................... 3-6
3.3.3 Hyperloop Outlook and Recommendations ....................................................... 3-7
Study Corridor Concepts .................................................................................................................4-1
4.1 Corridor Concept Development ....................................................................................... 4-1
4.2 Concept Corridors ............................................................................................................ 4-3
4.3 Connecting Corridor Considerations................................................................................ 4-9
4.3.1 East-West Corridor Description .......................................................................... 4-9
4.3.2 North-South California Corridor Description .................................................... 4-10
Corridor Analysis ............................................................................................................................5-1
5.1 Evaluation Methodology.................................................................................................. 5-1
5.1.1 CONNECT Sketch Planning Tool .......................................................................... 5-1
5.1.2 Screening Process ............................................................................................... 5-3
5.2 Feasibility for Future Federal Funding Availability .......................................................... 5-4
5.2.1 Operating Recovery Ratio and Total Recovery Ratio .......................................... 5-5
5.2.2 Benefit/Cost Analysis .......................................................................................... 5-7
5.2.3 Other Indicators of Feasibility............................................................................. 5-8
5.3 Demand and Ridership..................................................................................................... 5-8
5.3.1 Primary Corridor – Portland to Vancouver ......................................................... 5-9
5.3.2 Connecting Corridor – Seattle to Spokane ....................................................... 5-10
5.4 Cost Estimates................................................................................................................ 5-10
5.4.1 Operating Cost Recovery .................................................................................. 5-11
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CONTENTS
5.4.2 Total Cost Recovery .......................................................................................... 5‐11
5.4.3 Total Capital Investment ................................................................................... 5‐12
5.4.4 CONNECT Results Summary .............................................................................. 5‐13
Implementing Ultra High‐Speed Ground Transportation .................................................................. 6‐1
6.1 Funding and Financing ..................................................................................................... 6‐1
6.2 Overview of Funding and Financing Models .................................................................... 6‐1
6.2.1 Overview of Public‐Private Partnerships ............................................................. 6‐2
6.2.2 United States Funding and Financing Programs .................................................. 6‐3
6.2.3 Canadian Funding and Financing Programs ........................................................ 6‐6
6.2.4 International Funding and Financing Models ...................................................... 6‐8
6.2.5 Summary of Learned Lessons ............................................................................ 6‐11
6.3 Cross‐Border Issues ........................................................................................................ 6‐12
6.4 U.S.– Canadian Cross‐Border Arrangements ................................................................. 6‐13
6.4.1 Amtrak Cascades Rail Service ........................................................................... 6‐14
6.4.2 St. Lawrence Seaway (Joint Commission) ......................................................... 6‐14
6.4.3 Ferry Services Between Washington State and British Columbia .................... 6‐15
6.4.4 Coach Services Between Washington State and British Columbia ................... 6‐15
6.5 Selected International Examples of Governance Models for High‐Speed Rail .............. 6‐15
6.5.1 London–Paris High‐Speed Rail .......................................................................... 6‐15
6.5.2 Kuala Lumpur–Singapore High‐Speed Rail........................................................ 6‐16
6.5.3 France‐Spain New High‐Speed Line under a P3 Model: Perpignan to Figueres ......
.......................................................................................................................... 6‐18
6.6 Categories of Governance Models: Initial Issues ........................................................... 6‐18
6.6.1 P3/Private Finance ............................................................................................ 6‐18
6.6.2 Single Country Delivery and Management for Operations .............................. 6‐19
6.6.3 Joint Commission or Joint Project Company .................................................... 6‐19
6.6.4 Vertical Separation Models .............................................................................. 6‐19
6.7 Study Findings ................................................................................................................ 6‐20
Next Steps ‐ Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 7‐1
7.1 Cascadia Transportation System ...................................................................................... 7‐1
7.2 Ridership .......................................................................................................................... 7‐1
7.3 Governance and Economic Framework ........................................................................... 7‐1
7.4 Funding and Financing ..................................................................................................... 7‐2
7.5 Stakeholder Involvement ................................................................................................. 7‐2
7.6 Short‐Term Rail Planning Consistent with the Longer‐Term UHSGT program ................ 7‐2

Tables
Table 2‐1. Existing Travel Choices Seattle to Vancouver ........................................................................... 2‐6
Table 2‐2. Existing Travel Choices Portland to Seattle ............................................................................... 2‐6
Table 3‐1. Types of Ultra High‐Speed Ground Transportation Systems .................................................... 3‐1
Table 3‐2. Length of the World’s High‐Speed Rail Network by 2035 ........................................................ 3‐2
Table 3‐3. Length of the Maglev Lines ....................................................................................................... 3‐5
Table 4‐1. UHSGT Corridor Screening Criteria ........................................................................................... 4‐2
Table 4‐2. Key Assumptions for Conceptual Corridors (For study purposes only) .................................... 4‐4
Table 5‐1. Operating Recovery Ratio for 2035 ........................................................................................... 5‐6
Table 5‐2. Operating Recovery Ratio for 2055 ........................................................................................... 5‐6
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CONTENTS
Table 5‐3. Total Recovery Ratio for 2035 ................................................................................................... 5‐7
Table 5‐4. Total Recovery Ratio for 2055 ................................................................................................... 5‐7
Table 5‐5. 2035 CONNECT Ridership Results ............................................................................................. 5‐8
Table 5‐6. 2055 CONNECT Ridership Results ............................................................................................. 5‐9
Table 5‐7. Network Ridership Breakdown ............................................................................................... 5‐10
Table 5‐8. 2035 CONNECT Cost Estimates ............................................................................................... 5‐10
Table 5‐9. 2055 CONNECT Cost Estimates ............................................................................................... 5‐11
Table 6‐1. United State Funding and Financing Programs and Eligibility .................................................. 6‐7
Table 6‐2. CIB Investment in Ultra High‐Speed Ground Transportation ................................................... 6‐8
Table 6‐3. International High‐Speed Rail Case Studies .............................................................................. 6‐9
Table 6‐4. Description of Alternative Multi‐State Governance Models .................................................. 6‐12

Figures
Figure 2‐1. Professional Network Connections of Seattle and Vancouver Residents ............................... 2‐1
Figure 2‐2. Cascadia Megaregion ............................................................................................................... 2‐3
Figure 2‐3. Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver MSAs Base and Forecast Population ................................. 2‐4
Figure 2‐4. Amtrak Cascades Route in the Cascadia Megaregion ..................................................................
Figure 2‐5. Amtrak Cascades Passenger Miles ........................................................................................... 2‐5
Figure 3‐1. Electromagnetic Suspension .........................................................................................................
Figure 3‐2. Schematic Diagram of EDS Maglev System ............................................................................. 3‐3
Figure 3‐3. Shanghai Maglev Train ............................................................................................................. 3‐4
Figure 3‐4. Chuo Shinkansen Map ............................................................................................................. 3‐4
Figure 4‐1. Corridor Concept 1A ................................................................................................................ 4‐6
Figure 4‐2. Corridor Concept 2 ................................................................................................................... 4‐7
Figure 4‐3. Corridor Concept 4 ................................................................................................................... 4‐8
Figure 4‐4. East‐West Corridor .................................................................................................................. 4‐9
Figure 5‐1. Round 1 Ridership Comparison ............................................................................................... 5‐3
Figure 5‐2. Round 2 Total Recovery Ratio Frequency Sensitivity .............................................................. 5‐4
Figure 5‐3. Capital Investment Ranges by Corridor ................................................................................. 5‐12
Figure 6‐1. Financing and Delivery models ‐ Distribution of Risk for Various Project Delivery Options ... 6‐2
Figure 6‐2. Governance and Regulatory Framework for London‐Paris HSR Passenger Services ............ 6‐16
Figure 6‐3. Regulatory Framework for Kuala Lumpur–Singapore HSR line ............................................. 6‐17

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Acronyms and Abbreviations
AssetsCo assets company
BC British Columbia
BCA Benefit/Cost Analysis
CapEx capital expenditure
CBD central business district
CBSA Core Based Statistical Area
CIB Canada Infrastructure Bank
CIQ Customs, Immigration and Quarantine
CONNECT Conceptual Network Connections Tool
EDS electrodynamic suspension
EMS electromagnetic suspension
FAST Fixing America’s Surface Transportation
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
HSGT high-speed ground transportation
HSR high-speed rail
IEP Intercity Express Program
IGC Inter-Governmental Commission
INFRA Infrastructure for Rebuilding America
InfraCo infrastructure company
KL Kuala Lumpur
km/h kilometers per hour
LRT light rail train
maglev magnetic levitation
mph miles per hour
MSA metropolitan statistical area
NEC Northeast Corridor
O&M operation and maintenance
OpCo operating company
OpEx operating expenditure
ORR Office of Rail and Road
P3 public-private partnership
PABs Private Activity Bonds
PNWRC Pacific Northwest Rail Corridor
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
RRIF Railroad Rehabilitation Improvement and Financing

SC maglev superconducting maglev
TIFIA Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act
TIGER Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery
UHSGT ultra high-speed ground transportation
UK United Kingdom
UPRR Union Pacific Railroad
WSDOT Washington State Department of Transportation
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SECTION 1
Introduction
1.1 Study Background
In September 2016, the Emerging Cascadia Innovation Corridor Conference invited leaders from British
Columbia and Washington to foster creation of a new global hub for innovation and economic
development. Business and government leaders explored the potential for joint partnerships in
education, transportation, university research, and human capital, among others. Leaders from both
sides of the U.S.-Canadian border acknowledged the importance of developing an interconnected,
competitive economic region and identified actions to further that vision.
At the conference, Washington Governor Jay Inslee and British Columbia Premier Christy Clark signed a
formal agreement 1 committing the two governments to work together to foster collaboration and
innovation. The agreement outlines formal steps the two governments will take to partner in several
areas, including transportation.
The agreement between the two governments has already resulted in meaningful collaboration, with
Governor Inslee and the Washington Legislature taking steps to foster greater economic
interconnectivity in the region by initiating an evaluation of the potential for ultra high-speed ground
transportation between Vancouver, British Columbia, and Portland, Oregon. The Washington State
Legislature appropriated $300,000 to update the Washington State Department of Transportation’s
(WSDOT) 1992 High Speed Ground Transportation Study and analyze the potential for an ultra high-
speed ground transportation (UHSGT) alignment and potential stop locations between Vancouver and
Portland. Furthermore, in response to the Washington State Legislature’s budget proviso to assess the
viability of an ultra high-speed rail corridor, Premier Clark submitted a letter of support for the project.
This report summarizes the findings of the evaluation and includes the following sections:
1. Introduction
2. Vision for Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation in the Cascadia Megaregion
3. Technology Evaluation
4. Study Corridor Concepts
5. Corridor Analysis
6. Implementing Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation
7. Next Steps
1.2 Study Purpose and Approach

A rapidly growing economy and population characterize the Cascadia megaregion, 2 encompassing
Vancouver, BC; Seattle, Washington; and Portland, Oregon. Cascadia shares similar values, skilled
workforces, and an appetite for innovation, including advancing economic and social interconnectivity.
Enhanced interconnectivity would allow Cascadia to better manage the megaregion’s growth potential
and maximize public transportation benefits. The purpose of the study is to examine (at an initial high
1 Business Council of British Columbia, 2016, “Providence of British Columbia and Washinton Memorandum of Understanding”,
http://www.bcbc.com/news-releases/2016/cascadiarelease.
2 Megaregions are networks of metropolitan regions with shared economies, infrastructure and natural ecosystems. There are 11 emerging
megaregions in the U.S. They include the Northeast, Florida, Piedmont Atlantic, Great Lakes, Gulf Coast, Texas Triangle, Arizona Sun Corridor,
Front Range, Southern California, Northern California, and Cascadia.
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SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION
level) potential technology, organizational, and financing and funding alternatives as well as possible
economic benefits to the megaregion from providing access to major employment hubs and growing
industries through UHSGT. This study identifies opportunities to increase economic and social
interconnections within the megaregion. It examines, at a high level, the potential for development of
UHSGT between Portland, Seattle and Vancouver, with a possible passenger rail connection to Spokane,
Washington, and extension of high-speed rail south of Portland to Sacramento, California to connect to
the proposed California high-speed rail network. In this study, ultra high-speed is defined as a maximum
operating speed of >250 miles per hour (mph) (402 km/h).
WSDOT identified five conceptual north-south corridors (Portland, Seattle, Vancouver, and potential
station locations in-between), one east-west connecting corridor (from Seattle to Spokane following the
Stampede Pass Line), and a conceptual connecting ultra high-speed rail corridor from Portland to
Sacramento to evaluate. The technologies evaluated include high-speed (steel wheel) rail and maglev,
with additional consideration of hyperloop. The project team used the Federal Railroad Administration’s
(FRA) Conceptual Network Connections Tool 3 (CONNECT) to estimate the identified rail corridors and
network performance for public benefits. CONNECT provides corridor analysis outputs for three high-
performance intercity passenger rail service tiers that they generally define as:
• Core Express – frequent trains at 125-250+ mph (201-402+ km/h) in the nation’s densest and most
populous regions
• Regional – 90-125 mph (145-201 km/h) between mid-sized and large cities
• Emerging – up to 90 mph (145 km/h) connecting communities to passenger rail network and
providing foundation for future corridor development
For the purposes of this study, the conceptual primary, north-south corridors are considered “Core
Express”, the east/west connecting corridor is considered “Emerging” and the connecting corridor from
Portland to Sacramento is considered “Core Express”.
In addition to the technical analysis of the conceptual corridors, WSDOT convened an Advisory Group
comprised of both public and private sector subject matter experts in a range of topics, to provide input
and comment on planning level inputs and draft conclusions and recommendations. The Advisory Group
met four times over a period of six months, including convening one meeting in Vancouver, Seattle, and
Portland, which are the three largest cities in the conceptual corridor. The following stakeholders that
participated in the Advisory Group are listed below.
• Association of Washington Business • Oregon Department of Transportation
• British Columbia Ministry of Transportation • Oregon Metro
• Business Council of British Columbia • Portland Business Alliance
• City of Portland • Prosper Portland
• City of Seattle • Puget Sound Regional Council
• City of Surrey • Seattle Chamber of Commerce
• City of Vancouver • Snohomish County Executive
• Fast Track Washington • Sound Transit
• Forth • Tourism Vancouver
• Futurewise • TransLink
• Microsoft • Transport Canada
• Office of King County Executive • Transportation Choices
3 CONceptual NETwork Connections Tool or CONNECT is a high level intercity passenger rail sketch planning tool that estimates overall
performance of user-define corridors and networks. It is intended for early-stage planning processes to compare corridors and enables a user to
describe potential high-performance rail network at a coarse level, estimate the financial and operational performance of the network, develop
high level service plans, and generate operational data. CONNECT is discussed in greater detail in Section 5 of this report.
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SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION
 U.S. Consulate Vancouver  Washington Department of Commerce
 University of Washington  Washington Governor’s Office
 Utilities and Transportation Commission  Washington Legislative Staff
 Vancouver Economic Commission  Washington Department of Transportation
 Washington Building Trades  YVR
 Washington CleanTech Alliance

This study addresses the following elements as identified by the Washington State Legislature4:
 An update to the 1992 WSDOT feasibility study based on UHSGT
 An analysis of corridor alignment and station stops, including connecting to Eastern Washington and
the high‐speed rail system in California
 Demand forecasts, economic feasibility, technological options, institutional arrangements, and
financing mechanisms
 Land use, right‐of‐way, and environmental implications
 Compatibility with other regional transportation plans and impacts to other modes, including air
travel
 Required speed, safety, access, and frequency specifications

4 2017 Engrossed Senate Bill 5096, Section 222.
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SECTION 2
Vision for Ultra High-Speed Ground

Transportation in the Cascadia Megaregion
2.1 Impetus for Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation
Geographic and economic trends indicate that the next 50 years will be defined by the emergence of
megaregions both nationally and internationally. America 2050, an infrastructure research and policy
initiative, identified 11 megaregions in the U.S. that share similar characteristics, including corridors that
range from 200 to 600 miles (322 to 966 km) in length, where roughly three-fourths of the nation’s
population lives, and an even greater percentage of its gross domestic product is produced. 5
Vancouver, Seattle, and Portland share many commonalities, including an educated and skilled
workforce, similar public policies, academic institutions, and a culture of innovation. However, despite
their relative proximity, these three cities are economically disconnected. 6 In Vancouver and Seattle
there are only a few companies that operate in both cities and most have a significant presence in one
and a smaller satellite outpost in the other.
Individuals from Vancouver and Seattle are not very connected and the workforce does not participate
between the two cities. According to LinkedIn, there are few interconnections between members from
Vancouver and Seattle with connections between members only representing less than 1% of their total
connections. Figure 2-1 illustrates the professional network of Vancouver and Seattle residents using
LinkedIn data. Members from Vancouver have greater connectivity with members from San Francisco
while Seattle member is more interconnected with Atlanta than to Vancouver.
Figure 2-1. Professional Network Connections of Seattle and Vancouver Residents

Source: LinkedIn Economic Graph data.
5 Hagler, Y., and P. Todorovich, 2009, Where High-Speed Rail Works Best, http://www.america2050.org/pdf/Where-HSR-Works-Best.pdf.
6 Westrup, J., Andersen, P., and St. Clair, W., 2016, Better Together: Th Cascadia Innovation Corridor Opportunity. BCG Perspectives.

SECTION 2. VISION FOR ULTRA HIGH-SPEED GROUND TRANSPORTATION IN THE CASCADIA MEGAREGION
Megaregions are quickly representing a greater share of the international economy. For example, 300
metro areas represent 10 percent of the global population and generate approximately 50 percent of
global GDP 7. Although, Vancouver and Seattle are economically disconnected there is an opportunity for
the two cities to collaborate toward greater integration that could generate increased economic and
social gains for both metro areas.
UHSGT systems are an efficient transportation mode to promote greater economic interconnectivity and
innovation within megaregions by substantially enhancing connection between people and goods and
services, which promotes trade and tourism, and expands travel, housing, and employment options.
Centralized and interconnected transportation hubs provide opportunities to generate economic
development and jobs for businesses within a corridor. UHSGT in the Cascadia megaregion can provide a
fast and reliable transportation mode that is essential to supporting the economic and social
interconnectivity identified in the agreement between Governor Inslee and Premier Clark.
In addition to economic development, several needs or drivers form the basis and rationale for
Washington State and its partner stakeholders to study the potential for UHSGT in Cascadia. These
include (but are not limited to) the following:
• Robust population and economic growth in the Cascadia megaregion that encompasses the
Vancouver, BC, to Portland, Oregon, travel market will substantially increase travel demand and
generate additional congestion that further reduces automobile, transit, and air travel reliability
using existing and committed transportation infrastructure.
• Automobile collisions and the resultant injuries, loss of life, and property damage decrease the
safety of driving as a transportation mode and contribute to non-recurring congestion that reduces
travel time reliability and increases delays for travelers.
• Current intercity passenger rail service operating capacity and speed constraints limit regional
mobility, and economic development and global competitiveness.
• Declining air quality and greater climate instability associated with greenhouse gas emissions from
increased travel demand and congestion require more environmentally sustainable modes of travel.
• Natural hazards, such as flooding and landslides, are common in the Cascadia megaregion and can
result in prolonged closure or disruption to major transportation infrastructure including Interstate
5 and the BNSF/Amtrak rail line, with no other viable route options available.
• Cumulatively, these driving factors negatively impact quality of life for residents, businesses, and
visitors of the Cascadia megaregion.
America 2050 developed six criteria to identify corridors in the U.S. where high-speed rail would be most
successful. The criteria include metropolitan size, distance, transit connections, economic productivity,
congestion, and megaregion. 8 Cities located in one of the 11 megaregions identified by America 2050
are more likely to be part of a network of interconnected cities with the appropriate density to support
high-speed rail systems. The Cascadia megaregion emerged as one of the 11 megaregions with the
appropriate characteristics to support high-speed rail.
7 Westrup, J., Andersen, P., and St. Clair, W., 2016, Better Together: Th Cascadia Innovation Corridor Opportunity. BCG Perspectives.
8 Hagler, Y., and P. Todorovich, 2009, Where High-Speed Rail Works Best, http://www.america2050.org/pdf/Where-HSR-Works-Best.pdf.

2.2 Cascadia Megaregion Context

2.2.1 Population and Employment Profile
The Cascadia megaregion spans approximately 466 miles (750 km) from Vancouver, BC to Eugene,
Oregon. It includes two medium-sized metropolitan areas (Portland and Seattle) and one larger
metropolitan area (Vancouver). Portland and Seattle are relatively compact with consistent medium
density from their urban core through their metropolitan fringe. Vancouver is Canada’s third largest
metro region with more than two million people. 9 Figure 2-1 illustrates the Cascadia megaregion.
Figure 2-2. Cascadia Megaregion

Source: http://www.america2050.org/megaregions.html
Seattle and Portland have relatively large central business districts, especially when compared with
other U.S. metros with much larger populations, such as Los Angeles, Houston, and Dallas. For example,
in 2010, Seattle’s central business district (CBD) ranked ninth in the nation and supported 700,000 jobs
within 10 miles of the city center. Portland’s CBD ranked 14th in the nation and supported 650,000 jobs
within 10 miles (16 km) of downtown. 10 Vancouver, BC, supports a similar number of jobs with 600,000
jobs being located within 10 miles (16 km) of its CBD.
The populations of the three largest metropolitan areas in the Cascadia megaregion are growing and at
a faster rate than anticipated by demographic forecasters. In 1990, the populations of Portland, Seattle,
and Vancouver, BC, metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) were forecast to reach 2.0, 3.4, and 2.3 million
people, respectively by 2020. As of 2015, each MSA had exceeded the 2020 forecasts for population
growth made in 1990. In 2015, the three metro regions had a combined total population of
approximately 8.4 million people. Rapid population growth is expected to continue; each metro area is
expected to add around 1 million people each, with Seattle experiencing the greatest levels of growth
9 Todorovich, P. and Y. Hagler, 2011, High Speed Rail in America.

and reaching 5.2 million people by 2040. Figure 2-3 illustrates the base and forecast population for the
Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver MSAs.
Figure 2-3. Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver MSAs Base and Forecast Population
Source: CH2M calculations (Washington Department of Transportation 1992 High-Speed Ground Transportation Study, Washington Office of
Financial Management population projections, Oregon Department of Administrative Services and Metro Portland population projections, Metro
Vancouver population projections, and U.S. Census Bureau).
2.2.2 Transportation Network

2.2.2.1 Rail and Transit Service
The Pacific Northwest Rail Corridor (PNWRC) is one of 11 federally-
designated high-speed rail corridors in the U.S. As illustrated in Figure
2-4, the 461-mile (742-kilometer) PNWRC serves the most densely
populated areas of the Cascadia megaregion, linking Vancouver, BC, to
Seattle, Portland, and Eugene. BNSF Railway owns most of the existing
PNWRC railroad infrastructure in British Columbia, in Washington, 11 and
in Oregon north of Union Station in Portland. Union Pacific Railroad
(UPRR) owns the existing PNWRC railroad infrastructure in Oregon
south of Union Station. Freight and passenger trains operated by BNSF
Railway, UPRR, Oregon Pacific, Portland Terminal Railroad, Willamette
Valley Rail, Portland & Western Railroad, and Amtrak currently use BNSF
Railway and UPRR trackage that also serves as the PNWRC. With funding
from the states of Washington and Oregon, Amtrak operates the
Cascades passenger rail service, which consists of 11 trains operating in
the Pacific Northwest daily with stops in 18 cities. The service includes
six daily round trips between Seattle and Portland; two daily round trips
between Seattle and Vancouver, BC; and two daily round trips between
Portland and Eugene. Operating the Amtrak Cascades trains requires
partnerships between Washington, Oregon, British Columbia,
Amtrak, three railroads, international customs and border Figure 2-4. Amtrak Cascades Route in the
control agencies, and train and locomotive manufacturers. Cascadia Megaregion
Source: WSDOT
11 Except the Point Defiance Bypass, which is owned by Sound Transit.

Amtrak Cascades is funded by ticket sales and by subsidies provided by WSDOT and the Oregon
Department of Transportation.
In 2010, under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, also known as the ARRA program, the U.S.
Department of Transportation awarded the State of Washington over $800 million in infrastructure and
equipment grants to improve the reliability of the PNWRC, add two additional frequencies between
Portland and Seattle and to reduce travel time between those two cities by 10 minutes. As of the
publication of this report, those new services and improvements were about to be placed in service.
Ridership has more than quadrupled on the corridor, from 200,000 in 1994 to approximately 817,000 in
2016. As illustrated in Figure 2-5, the Seattle to Portland and Seattle to Vancouver segments
represented the largest share of riders with 441,000 and 188,000 riders in 2016, respectively. The
Portland to Eugene segment had the smallest share of total riders in 2016 with 69,000 riders. 12
Figure 2-5. Amtrak Cascades Passenger Miles

Source: WSDOT
Regional transit systems in Vancouver, Seattle, and Portland have extensive network connectivity and
service. Vancouver’s transit network, planned and managed by TransLink, is one of the most extensive
for a large metropolitan region in North America. TransLink operates SkyTrain, the oldest and one of the
longest automated driverless light rapid transit systems in the world. It consists of three primary lines:
Expo, Millennium, and Canada. In December 2016, TransLink officially opened the Evergreen Extension,
an extension of the Millennium Line, for operation.
In Seattle, Sound Transit plans, builds, and operates express bus, light rail and commuter train services
in the urban areas of King, Pierce, and Snohomish counties. The Sounder train is a regional commuter
rail service operated by BNSF on behalf of Sound Transit. Trains travel from Seattle north to Everett and
south to Lakewood.
TriMet provides bus, light rail, and commuter rail transit services in the Portland metropolitan area. The
Portland region’s light rail system is the largest stand-alone light rail system in the nation by ridership.
According to the America 2050 report, High Speed Rail in America, “nearly one-quarter of the population
12 WSDOT, 2016, Amtrak Cascades: 2016 Performance Data Report.

and 42 percent of the employment within 25 miles (40 km) of downtown Portland is located accessible
to a transit station.” 13 In contrast, at the time this report was written in 2011, 7 percent of Seattle’s
population and 10 percent of the employment is accessible by transit.
The existing travel choices in Cascadia include air, rail, automobile, and bus service. Tables 2-1 and 2-2
illustrate the distance, travel time, and price for each mode for the Seattle to Vancouver and Portland to
Seattle segments. Travel distances are greater in the Portland to Seattle segment than the Seattle to
Vancouver segment for all travel modes. However, for both segments Amtrak Cascades travels the
farthest and has the highest travel time. Air travel for both segments is most competitive in terms of
travel time across all modes, but is also the most expensive travel option.
Table 2-1. Existing Travel Choices Seattle to Vancouver
Mode Distance (miles) Travel Time Price
Air 119 0:55 $164
(192 km)
Amtrak Cascades 157 4:30 $63 - $98 14
(253 km)
Automobile 141 2:41 $75
(227 km)
Bus 141 4:08 $45
(227 km)
Source: AECOM calculations (Expedia flight data, Amtrak schedules and pricing, Google maps and IRS mileage; and Greyhound
bus schedules and ticket pricing)
Table 2-2. Existing Travel Choices Portland to Seattle

Mode Distance (miles) Travel Time Price
Air 130 0:50 $175
(209 km)
Amtrak Cascades 177 3:40 $35 - $64 15
(285 km)
Automobile 173 3:14 $92
(278 km)
Bus 173 3:35 $20
(278 km)
Source: AECOM calculations
The distance between Portland and Seattle is less than 200 miles (322 km), which is at the low end of
the range for distances between destinations that support a robust air market. 16 In addition, the
corridor has significant highway congestion. In 2016, the three largest metropolitan cities, Vancouver,
Seattle, and Portland, experienced an average of 142 hours of delay annually per driver. 17 This total is
significantly greater than the 107 average annual hours of delay experienced by the largest metropolitan
areas in the travel corridors when compared with Texas Central Partners High-Speed (Dallas and
Houston) and the Brightline Intercity (Miami and Orlando) rail projects. 18
14 Price of business class ticket.
15 Price of business class ticket.
17 Annual hours of delay are the extra travel time during peak hours compared to an hour of driving during free flow conditions, multiplied by
230 working days per year.
18 Source: Analyst derived using data from https://www.tomtom.com/en_gb/trafficindex

SECTION 3
Technology Evaluation
Three technologies could potentially meet the operating speed requirement of >250 mph (402 km/h) for
UHSGT:
• High-speed rail
• Maglev
• Hyperloop
The level of development and the maturity of the UHSGT technologies are substantially different (Table
3-1). Furthermore, there is no operational experience for the envisioned design speeds of high-speed
rail (HSR), at greater than 250 mph (402 km/h), although the French Train à Grande Vitesse (TGV) train
was tested at speeds in excess of 350 mph (574.8 km/h) on April 3, 2007, on the new Ligne à Grand
Vitesse (LGV) Est in France.
Table 3-1. Types of Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation Systems
Technology Current Maximum Design Maximum Minimum Maximum
Option Maximum Speed Speed Seating Capacity Horizontal Curve Gradient
High-speed Rail 220 mph 250 mph 1,500 4.7 miles 4%

(354 km/h) (402 km/h) (7.6 km)
Maglev 270 mph 375 mph 824 5.7 miles 10%

(435 km/h) (604 km/h) (9.1 km)
Hyperloop 200 mph* 760 mph 28 per capsule 3.0 miles Not applicable
(322 km/h) (1,223 km/h) (4.8 km)
*Test track speed, which was limited by length of test track. Source: CH2M, 2017, Ultra-High Speed Ground Transportation
Study: Technology Options Technical Memorandum.
3.1 High-Speed Rail (Steel Wheel)

Railways started regular operation almost 200 years ago. Through a steady improvement in technology,
railways could operate regularly at maximum speeds of 100 mph (161 km/h) by the early 20th century,
with a current maximum HSR steel wheel operational speed of 218 mph (350 km/h).
HSR is a major technological advancement, which is based on the same vehicle guiding principle as the
early railways, namely steel wheel contact with guidance flanges on steel rail. High-speed rail
technologies improve the competitiveness of rail against other modes of transport, help eliminate
capacity bottlenecks, require less energy than cars and planes, produce a lower amount of emissions,
and are safer. 19
By 2030-2035, the route mileage of the world HSR network could reach more than 55,000 miles (88,514
km). See Table 3-2 for more information on the world’s high-speed rail network. 20
19 CH2M, 2017, Ultra-High Speed Ground Transportation Study: Technology Options Technical Memorandum.
20 CH2M, 2017, Ultra-High Speed Ground Transportation Study: Technology Option Technical Memorandum.

SECTION 3. TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION
Table 3-2. Length of the World’s High-Speed Rail Network by 2035

Lines in Operation 14 countries 25,310 miles
(40,732 km)
Lines Under Construction 16 countries 8,859 miles

(14,257 km)
Lines Planned 36 countries 22,126 miles

(35,608 km)
Total 43 countries 56,294 miles

(90,597 km)
Source: CH2M, 2017, Ultra-High Speed Ground Transportation Study: Technology Options Technical Memorandum.
3.1.1 Future Development of High-Speed Rail

Current railway research and development programs are aiming at higher operational speeds combined
with lower aerodynamic resistance of the trains and new energy transmission systems. Researchers are
using a holistic and interdisciplinary approach to tackle the key questions of how the trains of the future
can be faster, safer, more comfortable, and more environmentally friendly.
The main objective is to raise the maximum running speed by 25 percent without breaching existing
safety standards while simultaneously halving energy consumption. In addition, noise emissions will be
reduced and travelers’ comfort enhanced with regard to cabin pressure variations, climate control,
vibration, and acoustics. A close look at today’s HSR transport, however, reveals that these attributes
often compete and conflict with each other. 21
3.2 Magnetic Levitation (Maglev)

The main feature of the maglev technology is the levitation,
i.e., guidance and propulsion of vehicles by magnetic fields.
There is no contact between vehicle and guideway. For high-
speed transport, there are two notable types of maglev
technology: electromagnetic suspension (EMS) and
electrodynamic suspension (EDS).
3.2.1 Electromagnetic Suspension

In EMS systems like the German Transrapid, the train
levitates above a steel rail while electromagnets attached to
the train are oriented toward the rail from below (Figure 3-
1). The system is typically arranged on a series of C-shaped
arms, with the upper portion of the arm attached to the
vehicle and the lower inside edge containing the magnets.
The rail is situated inside the C, between the upper and lower
edges.
Figure 3-1. Electromagnetic Suspension
Magnetic attraction varies inversely with the cube of distance,
so minor changes in distance between the magnets and the rail produce greatly varying forces. These
changes in force are dynamically unstable; a slight divergence from the optimum position tends to grow,
requiring sophisticated feedback systems to maintain a constant distance from the track.

The major advantage to EMS maglev systems is that they work at all speeds, unlike EDS systems, which
only work at a minimum speed of about 19 mph (30 km/h). This eliminates the need for a separate low-
speed suspension system, and can simplify track layout. On the downside, the dynamic instability of
EMS demands fine track tolerances, which can offset this advantage.22
3.2.2 Electrodynamic Suspension

Japan’s superconducting maglev (SC maglev) EDS system, currently under construction, is powered by
the magnetic fields induced on either side of the vehicle through the passage of the vehicle's
superconducting magnets (Figure 3-2).
Figure 3-2. Schematic Diagram of EDS Maglev System

Source: CH2M, 2017, Ultra-High Speed Ground Transportation Study: Technology Options Technical Memorandum .
In EDS, both the guideway and the train exert a magnetic field, and the train is levitated by the repulsive
and attractive force between these magnetic fields. The magnetic field is produced by superconducting
magnets. The repulsive and attractive force in the track is created by an induced magnetic field in wires
or other conducting strips in the track. A major advantage of EDS maglev systems is that they are
dynamically stable; changes in distance between the track and the magnets create strong forces to
return the system to its original position. However, at slow speeds, the current induced in these coils
and the resultant magnetic flux is not large enough to levitate the train. For this reason, the train must
have wheels or some other form of landing gear to support the train until it reaches take-off speed.
Since a train may stop at any location, due to equipment problems for instance, the entire track must be
able to support both low- and high-speed operation.
To date, only one maglev system is in operation. The Shanghai Maglev Train (Transrapid) in China is the
fastest commercial train currently in operation and has a top speed of 270 mph (430 km/h) See Figure 3-
3 below for an illustration of the Shanghia Maglev Train. The line was designed to connect Shanghai
Pudong International Airport and the outskirts of central Pudong, Shanghai. It covers a distance of 19.0

miles (30.5 km) in 8 minutes. The Shanghai Maglev Train demonstration line, or initial operating
segment, has been in commercial operation since April 2004 and now operates 115 daily trips. 23
Figure 3-3. Shanghai Maglev Train

3.2.3 Future Development

The Chuo Shinkansen is a Japanese superconducting maglev line under construction between Tokyo and
Nagoya and planned to be extended to Osaka (Figure 3-4). The line is expected to connect Tokyo and
Nagoya in 40 minutes by 2027, and eventually Tokyo and Osaka in 67 minutes, running at a maximum
speed of 314 mph (505 km/h) About 90 percent of the 177.5-mile (285.6-kilometer) line to Nagoya will
be built underground or through tunnels.
Figure 3-4. Chuo Shinkansen Map


In 2016, the FRA awarded $27.8 million to Maryland Department of Transportation to prepare
preliminary engineering and an environmental impact analysis in compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act for a proposed high-speed ground transportation line between Baltimore,
Maryland, and Washington, DC, with an intermediate stop at Baltimore-Washington International
Thurgood Marshall Airport. Baltimore-Washington Rapid Rail, the private company proposing the
system, is aiming for an optimum speed of over 300 mph (482 km/h) that would enable an
approximately 15-minute travel time between Washington and Baltimore. The system would require a
guideway (track) and three stations, a rolling stock storage depot, maintenance facility, power
substations, ventilation plants, and an operations facility. Table 3-3 summarizes existing and planned
EMS and EDS maglev lines.
Table 3-2. Length of the Maglev Lines
Lines in operation 1 country 19.0 miles (30.5 km)
Lines under construction 1 country 177.5 miles (285.6 km)

Yamanashi Test Track 26.6 miles (42.8 km)
Lines planned 1 country + various studies 95 miles (152 km)
3.3 Hyperloop
Hyperloop is a proposed mode of passenger and/or freight transportation using magnetic propulsion to
carry vehicles through highly evacuated tubes with very high speed. The main goal of the concept is to
reduce the air resistance and therefore to enable very high speeds combined with moderate energy
consumption.
The Hyperloop high-speed technology has three main components: passive magnetic levitation to
reduce friction of the vehicles on the system, an electric linear induction motor to propel the vehicle,
and a vacuum chamber system to reduce environmental pressure and drag on the vehicles.
Theoretically, the combination of these components enables this transportation system to operate at
high-speeds, estimated to be over 760 mph (1,100 km/h). The system is also anticipated to function fully
autonomously, both within the hyperloop system and outside the hyperloop system for first/last mile
connectivity.
Beyond the core system, the operational model of the Hyperloop system is still under development. The
system vehicles for passenger travel have been described as smaller group transit, with capacity
estimated at 12 to 30 passengers per vehicle, traveling more point to point with limited, if any, stops
between city pairs. The headway between vehicles has been described as very short, under 10 seconds
in most cases. The loading/unloading and system operations for this type of operation have not been
publicly detailed, but operation with such minimal headways and operations that include launching a
vehicle in a depressurized system are likely to be key considerations moving forward to
commercialization.
Elon Musk's version of the concept, first publicly mentioned in 2012, 24 incorporates reduced-pressure
tubes in which pressurized capsules ride on air bearings driven by linear induction motors and air
compressors.
3.3.1 Hyperloop Case Uses

The case use of hyperloop technologies has been identified to be similar to rail technology case uses.
Both cargo and passenger transportation have been the primary case use for the technology, with the

cargo being containerized or palletized goods. For passengers, vehicle sizes ranging from 4 to 36
passengers have been described as potential case use.
The Hyperloop Alpha 25 concept was first published in August 2013, proposing and examining a route
running from the Los Angeles region to the San Francisco Bay Area roughly following the Interstate 5
corridor. The paper conceived of a Hyperloop system that would propel passengers along the 350-mile
(560-km) route at an average speed of around 600 mph (970 km/h), with a top speed of 760 mph (1,200
km/h), allowing for a travel time of 35 minutes, which is considerably faster than current rail or air travel
times. 26
3.3.2 Current Development and Studies

Several studies have been conducted worldwide to determine the case use and feasibility of using
hyperloop technologies. Studies have included passenger-only systems, cargo-only systems, and
passenger and cargo mixed systems. Of these studies, none have been publicly released that include
design documents that definitively detail geometric constraints, operational model, costs, or technology
requirements. The studies have been more academic to understand impacts and benefits of a high-
speed, easily accessible, and autonomous transportation system.
Only two test tracks have been built to test the technology, a 1-km test track for SpaceX (operated by
Elon Musk) and a 500-meter test track for Hyperloop One. While these test tracks are viable ways to test
components of the technology, it is anticipated that a track of much greater length and scale would be
required to gain certification and validation of the operations and feasibility of the technology. No
operational demonstrations have been built to show how the system would be loaded and operated
autonomously, which may be examined at a later time. The autonomous technology is still being
developed for vehicles. The two short experimental sections are:
• SpaceX’s test facility, Hawthorne, California. Length 0.8 mile (1.25 km), tube diameter 6 feet (1.83
meters), max speed reached 220 mph (354 km/h). 27
• Hyperloop One's "DevLoop," Nevada. Length 0.31 mile (500 meters ), full-scale test structure, tube
diameter 11 feet (3.4 meters), max speed reached 192 mph (309 km/h). 28
In 2015, Elon Musk announced a Hyperloop Competition and a group, connected through reddit, formed
a team called rLoop. Today rLoop consists of over 1,200 people from more than 50 countries who have
collaborated to develop to Hyperloop technology. rLoop has made great strides in development of a
Hyperloop prototype to date, including the first pod to achieve static levitation in vacuum and to
demonstrate pressure vessel sustaining human life in vacuum. 29
A team from China Aerospace Science & Technology Industry Corp., who attended the 3rd China
(International) Commercial Aerospace Forum in Central China's Wuhan, Hubei Province in August 2017,
announced plans to launch a research and development project with plans to develop hyperflight
transport with maximum speeds reaching 2,485 mph (4,000 km/h). 30 Hyperloop technology, at the time
of this report, is still developing. The technology should be monitored to determine feasibility for an
UHSGT system in the future.
29 rLoop, 2017. www.rloop.org. Accessed on December 11, 2017.

3.3.3 Hyperloop Outlook and Recommendations

While hyperloop technology promises to be a highly innovative transportation mode that could enable
true high-speed ground transportation, the development of the technology is still in early stages. The
technology is moving quickly, but will require coordination and acceptance from regulatory agencies on
design, operations, security, and safety. It is not anticipated that hyperloop technologies will be ready
for commercial viability for at least the next decade, and viability is highly dependent on regulatory
acceptance of the technology. Agencies and owners will need to study the technology and assist in
developing standards and regulations that can drive the development of the technology based on what
is actually needed for an advanced transportation system. Because there are currently no commercially
viable operations, which are required in order to develop order-of-magnitude operation and
maintenance (O&M) and capital costs for the CONNECT model, Hyperloop is described in this technology
section, but was not utilized in the model runs described in Section 5.

SECTION 4
Study Corridor Concepts

The corridor concepts described in this report were developed through a review of several high-speed
rail studies and websites containing information on development of high-speed rail in the Pacific
Northwest. 31 In addition, screening criteria were developed to inform the development of corridor
concepts and to assess them. This study considered five corridor concepts with various numbers and
locations of stations (stops) between Portland, Oregon, and Vancouver, British Columbia. Additional
connections east to Spokane and south to Sacramento were considered as potential connecting
corridors for travel market assessment.
4.1 Corridor Concept Development

The high-level screening criteria presented in this report defined the key UHSGT physical, operational,
and service characteristics for ridership forecasting and economic (benefits and costs) effects analyses,
including inputs to and outputs from the FRA’s CONNECT model. The study team applied corridor
screening criteria, along with the analysis outputs, to help narrow potential conceptual corridors to a
representative set of UHSGT conceptual corridors as the basis for this high-level study.
A review of previous high-speed rail feasibility studies completed in Washington, Colorado, and Texas
and Oklahoma 32 informed the development of the screening criteria. The project team modified criteria
to fit the anticipated needs and parameters of this high-level study. The primary assumptions that
guided development of the screening criteria and corridor concepts are that the UHSGT system serving
the Vancouver to Portland corridor would have an average operating speed of 250 mph (402 km/h) and
(based on this operating speed) that the service would operate on a guideway within separate and
dedicated right-of-way that would only stop at designated stations.
To address these key needs, the project team identified seven draft actionable public benefits objectives
based on previous studies 33. These guiding objectives were integrated into the screening and corridor
concept development process primarily in a qualitative manner, and they include:
• Enhance intercity mobility by providing ultra high-speed transportation service as a mobility option
that is competitive with automobile, bus, and air travel.
• Reduce congestion on freeways and surface streets by creating high-speed options for travelers, and
enhance local commuter transit.
31 The following sources were reviewed:

Cascadia High Speed Rail, June 20, 2017, http://www.cascadiahighspeedrail.com/
Colorado Department of Transportation, 2014, Interregional Connectivity Study: Final Report.
Fast Track Washington, June 27, 2017, https://fasttrackwa.org/resources/.
Seattle Transit Blog, June 24, 2017, https://www.seattletransitblog.com/2017/02/17/the-technical-challenges-of-seattle-vancouver-high-speed-
rail-part-1/.
Texas Department of Transportation, 2014, Final Route Alternatives Analysis Technical Memorandum: Texas-Oklahoma Passenger Rail Study.
WSDOT, 1992, High Speed Ground Transportation Study.
32 CH2M, 2017, Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation: Corridor Concepts.
33 CH2M, 2017, Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation: Corridor Screening Criteria.

SECTION 4. STUDY CORRIDOR CONCEPTS
• Provide infrastructure for a high-quality intercity transportation service that will reduce travel time,
increase schedule reliability, and increase traveler comfort.
• Provide a world class transportation option for intercity travel that is much safer than driving, which
could result in a mode shift from single-occupancy vehicles and contribute to congestion relief.
• Encourage more energy-efficient and environmentally sustainable modes of intercity travel than
available through current and planned highway, air, and rail modes.
• Provide an economically equitable and affordable intercity travel alternative to automobile, bus, and
air service, especially for travelers that have limited access to other travel modes such as aging
populations and people with disabilities.
• Enhance access and intermodal connectivity between other intercity rail services, regional transit
services, and major regional airports that are situated within or linked to the Vancouver to Portland
corridor.
• Enhance interregional access to employment, entertainment, recreation, health, and shopping
opportunities for existing and future residents.
• Provide a cost-efficient investment where the projected UHSGT service revenue meets or exceeds
operations and maintenance costs, based on service level.
The criteria in Table 4-1 consist of both qualitative and quantitative criteria and are intended to be used
to assess the public benefits, engineering feasibility, environmental considerations and constraints, and
the short-term and long-term operational and infrastructure costs associated with the initial corridor
concepts. Each corridor concept will be assessed and compared according to a “balance sheet” method.
This method includes three ratings (low, moderate, high) to describe the relative order of magnitude of
the impacts for each of the criteria along a concept corridor. This method will highlight key issues of
concern and differentiate the concept corridors.
Table 4-1. UHSGT Corridor Screening Criteria
Criterion Measure Data Source
Public Benefits
Ability to Meet Public Benefits Objectives Qualitative assessment Narrative description
Access to Stations Total population of cities served by U.S. Census/CONNECT model

stations
Ridership Annual trips CONNECT model
Length of Route Miles Corridor route GIS files
Engineering Feasibility
Minimize Right-of-Way/Real Estate Acres of urban/rural right-of-way within

Study route right-of-way
Impacts the study area
Miles and % of (horizontal and vertical)

Runs Supportive of 250 Mph Operating
alignment that meet UHSGT engineering Study route/GIS
Speeds in Corridor
design geometry parameters
Probable Tunnel Construction
Probable Bridge Construction Narrative description Study route
Probable Aerial Construction

Criterion Measure Data Source
Geographic Features (e.g., waterways,

mountains)
Number of Existing Structures Affected

(e.g., rail, highway, transit)
Environmental Considerations and Constraints 34
Areas of Concern (e.g., wetlands, parks,

wildlife refuges, river and stream Narrative description Study route
crossings, farmland, and public schools)
Operational and Infrastructure Considerations
Revenue/Operating Cost Revenue/operating cost (%)
Capital Cost per Passenger Mile Capital cost per passenger mile (US$)
CONNECT model
Reduce Travel Times Time reduction vs. automobile
Enhance Mode Share on Rail Rail mode share (%)

Source: CH2M, 2017, Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation: Corridor Screening Criteria.
4.2 Concept Corridors

In addition to the screening criteria, the following considerations and constraints informed the
development of the five primary corridor concept alignments:
• Average operating speed of at least 250 mph (402 km/h)
• Separate trackway or guideway with dedicated right-of-way
• Turn radii of at least 45,000 feet (13,716 meters)
• Population of cities near proposed station
• Opportunity for multimodal connects at stations
Each corridor concept will require an alignment that can support an average operating speed of 250
mph (402 km/h) or greater. To maintain this speed, a separate trackway with a dedicated right-of-way
will be necessary for steel-wheel-to-steel-rail or SC maglev systems. In addition, each corridor concept
alignment has turning radii that are at least 45,000 feet (13,716 meters) to maintain the 250-mph (402-
km/h) operating speed. Other important factors considered include the populations of cities near a
proposed station and opportunities for multimodal connections. These factors would affect potential
ridership of a high-speed train and the access and mobility for the regional transportation system.
The length of this primary corridor from Portland to Vancouver is approximately 310 miles (499 km) and
is within the America 2050 desirable range of 150 to 500 miles (241 to 805 km). The screening criteria
listed above in Table 4-1 can be used to comparatively assess ridership potential including corridor
population, corridor employment, and current travel, and identify counties with major cities. The
physical criteria of existing facilities and constructability considerations were subjectively reviewed at a
high level to distinguish between corridors that would each need to traverse the mountainous areas
west of the Columbia River in southwestern Washington and the requirement to cross the Columbia
River at Portland. The environmental feasibility criterion was also subjectively reviewed for the western
34 Due to the high-level nature of this study, evaluation of environmental considerations and constraints is limited to existing GIS data.
Conceptual alignments would need to undergo a more detailed analysis to advance into project development.

half of the corridor that has a relatively high number of ecologically sensitive areas and/or recreational
activity areas.
Five corridor concepts were developed that decrease in the number of stops included in the alignment
and that have different termini (urban vs. suburban), which impacts operating and capital cost estimates
inputs tested in the CONNECT model. Fewer stations would result in shorter travel times between the
largest cities. Table 4-2 outlines the nearest potential station locations for each of the five corridor
concepts. The potential station locations listed are for study purposes only for comparative use in this
study.
The WSDOT study team’s intent with using CONNECT to test the five primary conceptual corridors was
to learn how each of the corridors performs based upon differences primarily in terms of number and
locations of stations. For each of the five primary corridors, the team also wanted to be able to
determine whether the higher speed of maglev would generate any significant difference in ridership
over steel wheel technology at a lower average operating speed. For corridors 1 and 1A, the team was
interested in determining the effects of providing stops at “minor” stations in the Bellingham and
Olympia-Tumwater CBSAs in addition to “major” stations in Vancouver, Seattle-Tacoma, and Portland.
For concept corridors 1A and 2, the team wanted to learn what ridership variations result from an
airport stop versus a downtown core station in Vancouver (1A) and Portland (2) with consideration of
capital costs differences associated with an outlying airport station. Concept corridors 3 and 4 would be
similar in terms of limiting service to the three largest population centers along the corridor, and for
concept corridor 4, the team wanted to learn how much reducing costs associated with using minor
stations on the periphery of the denser urban core could affect cost recovery results.
Table 4-2. Key Assumptions for Conceptual Corridors (For study purposes only)
Corridor Nearest Station Locations Defining Characteristics
1 Pacific Central Station – Vancouver, BC • Stations in urban core

Fairhaven Station – Bellingham, WA
• Does not include an airport station location
Everett Station (new station near Delta Yard) – Everett, WA
• 295 miles (475 km)
Stadium Station – Seattle, WA
Tacoma Dome Station – Tacoma, WA
Centennial Station – Lacey, WA
Rose Quarter Station (TriMet Max station) – Portland, OR
1A Vancouver International Airport – Vancouver, BC • Combinations of urban core and periphery
Fairhaven Station – Bellingham, WA stations
Everett Station – Everett, WA • Airport station in Vancouver, BC
• All seven cities identified in legislation
• 283 miles (455 km)
Centennial Station – Lacey, WA
Rose Quarter Station – Portland, OR
2 Pacific Central Station – Vancouver, BC • Fewer potential stations
• Major stations in 4 largest cities
• Airport station in Portland, OR
Portland International Airport, Portland, OR
• 282 miles (454 km)
3 Pacific Central Station – Vancouver, BC • Fewest potential stations with 3 potential

Stadium Station – Seattle, WA station locations
Rose Quarter Station – Portland, OR • Station locations in urban core
• Does not include airport station location
• 288 miles (463 km)

Corridor Nearest Station Locations Defining Characteristics
4 King George Station – Surrey, BC • Fewest potential stations with 3

Tukwila Station – Tukwila, WA potential station locations
Expo Center Station – Portland, OR • Station locations in urban periphery
outside of 3 largest cities
• Does not include airport station location
• 270 miles (435 km)
Source: CH2M, 2017, Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation: Corridor Concepts.
Figures 4-1 through 4-3 are map representations of concept corridors 1A, 2, and 4 the three concepts
that the project team selected for additional rounds of testing in CONNECT. Each corridor concept and
are for study purposes only. Each figure shows nearby major transportation facilities and illustrates the
alignment by grade type, including at grade, below grade, elevated, and tunnel, defined as follows:
• At grade: within +/- 5 to 10 feet (1.5 to 3 meters) of ground surface
• Below grade: 10 to 20 feet (3 to 6 meters) below ground surface (includes a retaining wall, trench,
and/or embankment)
• Tunnel: 20 feet (6 meters) or more below ground surface (bored or cut-and-cover construction)
• Elevated: 20 feet (6 meters) or more above ground surface (on a viaduct or bridge)
Corridor concepts 1 and 1A are nearly identical except for the station locations in Vancouver, BC.
Corridor concept 1 terminates at the Pacific Central Station area whereas the northern terminus of
concept 1A is located at Vancouver International Airport. Station locations were selected based on the
WSDOT 1992 study, more recent concepts developed by other parties, and with consideration of
potential ridership and opportunity for multimodal connections, including with freight and aviation
modes. The nearest station locations in corridor Concept 1 would serve downtowns or city centers and
potentially connect to local transit services. Corridor Concept 1A would diverge from the city center in
Vancouver and instead provide a connection to the airport.
Corridor concepts 1A and 2 both include station locations at airports. Airport station locations could
support increases in capacity for longer-haul trips for airlines by providing an alternative modal option
for short-haul trips. Long-haul trips tend to be more efficient and cost-effective for airlines.

Figure 4-1. Corridor Concept 1A

Corridor concepts 2 and 3 include similar station locations and numbers of stops. Concept corridor 2
includes four stops: Pacific Central Station, Stadium Station, Tacoma Dome Station, and Portland
International Airport.

Figure 4-2. Corridor Concept 2

Corridor concept 4 is a “low-cost” option and includes three stops at outlying stations to reduce costs
for right-of-way acquisition and complex engineering approaches required for dense, urbanized areas.
Stations include King George Station, Tukwila Station, and the Expo Center Station. In addition, the

southern terminus in Portland is near several special event venues, including the Oregon Convention
Center, the Moda Center, and the Veterans Memorial Coliseum.
Figure 4-3. Corridor Concept 4


4.3 Connecting Corridor Considerations

In addition to evaluating the five primary corridor concepts, the project team evaluated two connecting
corridors: one east-west corridor and one north-south corridor. The East-West Corridor connects to the
primary corridor at Tukwila, travels east, and terminates in Spokane. The North-South Corridor connects
to the primary corridor at Portland and travels south to Sacramento, California.
4.3.1 East-West Corridor Description

The East-West corridor connects to the BNSF mainline south of Seattle to the Ellensburg, Yakima, Tri-
Cities, and Spokane urban areas in Washington. This study corridor, illustrated in Figure 4-4 and as
defined for study purposes, would connect to the Vancouver-Seattle-Portland corridor by following a
portion of the “mainline that BNSF owns and operates as freight rail. This line connects to the north-
south mainline in Auburn, Washington. Heading east towards the Cascade Mountains, the line rises to
2,840 feet (866 meters) and crosses the mountains via the 1.8-mile (2.9 km) long Stampede Tunnel, then
continues through the communities of Ellensburg and Yakima, and then continuing southeast through
the Yakima Valley to the Tri-Cities (Kennewick, Richland, and Pasco) area where the Stampede Pass line
connects with the Pasco East main line in Pasco, which continues north to Spokane on a portion of the
same line used by the Amtrak Empire Builder route to Chicago.
Figure 4-4. East-West Corridor

Source: CH2M
There are four general station locations along this East-West Corridor. These stations represent possible
station sites along the corridor to determine the relative network effects upon potential ridership and
cost recovery of connecting a potential emerging intercity passenger rail line with a UHSGT system in

Washington. The preliminary location of these station sites is based on providing service to major
metropolitan areas and maintaining minimum station spacing to facilitate optimum operating
conditions. The final number and location of stations were not determined as part of this study.
The general station areas assumed for study purposes are listed below:
• South Seattle/Tukwila
• Ellensburg
• Tri-Cities area (Kennewick, Richland, Pasco)
• Spokane
4.3.2 North-South California Corridor Description

The project team identified seven general station locations along this conceptual North-South corridor
to connect to the California HSR system in Sacramento, California. These stations represent possible
station sites along the corridor to determine the relative potential for a high-speed ground
transportation system connecting Oregon to central California and California’s proposed HSR statewide
network. The preliminary locations of these station sites are based on providing service to major
metropolitan areas and maintaining minimum station spacing to facilitate optimum operating
conditions. The final number and location of stations were not determined as part of this study. The
general station locations assumed for study purposes are:
• Portland, Oregon
• Salem, Oregon
• Eugene, Oregon
• Medford, Oregon
• Redding, California
• Chico, California
• Sacramento, California
The North-South Portland to Sacramento corridor would likely require very high capital costs for a
dedicated high-speed rail corridor and relatively low ridership and revenue network potential due to a
sparsely populated area and mountainous terrain. The recently released 2018 California State Rail Plan
does not include any high-speed rail connection north of Sacramento and limits intercity rail service to
the existing Amtrak Coast Starlight and connecting thruway bus services to Redding, California.
Additional CONNECT analysis of this connecting corridor is still being performed and will be the subject
of a future addendum to this study.

SECTION 5
Corridor Analysis
5.1 Evaluation Methodology
The evaluation methodology was developed to ensure an appropriate balance between market
potential, train operations, and engineering costs for a high-level study study. The methodology
provides a structured way of examining the trade-offs of the financial and economic values of selected
alternatives. The method reflects closely the procedures and evaluation criteria adopted by the FRA for
high-speed rail and maglev planning as defined by two reference publications:
• High Speed Ground Transportation for America, FRA, 1997
• Maglev Deployment Program, FRA, 1999
The screening of alternatives employed an iterative process starting with a wide array of alternatives
and then narrowed the alternatives to a smaller, more manageable level based on preliminary findings.
The analysis utilized the CONceptual NEtwork Connections Tool (CONNECT) sketch planning model
developed by the FRA for high-level passenger rail network evaluation. This section will describe the
CONNECT tool and its limitations and then describe the iterative screening process.
5.1.1 CONNECT Sketch Planning Tool

CONNECT is a sketch planning model that estimates ridership, revenue, and costs of high-speed and
intercity passenger rail corridors and networks. Originally developed as part of the FRA National
Planning Study, CONNECT is a CBSA-to-CBSA 35 based planning model. It is intended for use at the outset
of the study process, before detailed alignment and operational plans are developed. CONNECT outputs
are not a substitute for more detailed ridership and revenue studies required for FRA service
development plans or for investment-grade analysis of feasibility.
The user can build a desired HSR network and develop associated service plans, generate operational
data, and bracket the financial and operational performance for the network with CONNECT. The
analytical process is driven by user inputs. These include network configuration and capital and O&M
costs, as well as operational and infrastructure assumptions. Outputs include ridership, revenue, capital
cost estimates, O&M estimates, and public benefit estimates for the user-defined network. CONNECT
can also provide a series of charts developed from summary level data to support a conceptual analysis
of network performance.
5.1.1.1 Intended Use

The FRA developed CONNECT to provide an up-front analytical basis for the decisions shaping HSR
network planning. CONNECT produces order-of-magnitude ridership, revenue, costs, and public benefits
that enable the user to understand relative differences in service alternatives and should only be used
for comparative purposes. The outputs also enable the user to assess the relative importance of
network connectivity. The ultimate goal of a CONNECT analysis is help the user identify the more viable
and attractive alternatives before proceeding to more detailed and corridor-specific network
assessments.
35 A Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) is a U.S. geographic area defined by the Office of Management and Budget. A CBSA consists of one or
more counties (or equivalents) anchored by an urban center of at least 10,000 people plus adjacent counties. The counties are tied
socioeconomically to the urban center by commuting.

SECTION 5. CORRIDOR ANALYSIS
CONNECT can also supplement ongoing corridor analyses. The model can be used in regions that have
corridors already undergoing detailed planning, but where potential markets outside of the study area
have not been evaluated. In such a case, CONNECT can help the user sense the importance of
connecting markets and the potential impact of these markets on the future network.
5.1.1.2 CONNECT Limitations

As noted previously, CONNECT is not a substitute for detailed corridor and network planning and will not
produce investment-grade results. The estimates of ridership, revenue, capital and O&M costs, and
public benefits must be considered as order-of-magnitude estimates. Nevertheless, these estimates
empower the user to conceptualize and compare the potential performance of the user’s defined
network.
CONNECT uses generalized calculations that generate typical rather than corridor-specific outputs.
CONNECT cannot be expected to reflect with accuracy the ridership, revenue, or costs of existing
corridors. But the results are indicative and can be used to compare alternatives and determine general
feasibility.
Furthermore, analyzing corridor and network performance only on a CBSA-to-CBSA basis limits
CONNECT’s outputs. For example, multiple station stops in one CBSA will not alter the ridership results,
but it will increase travel time, which impacts ridership results. In addition, CONNECT cannot account for
trips less than 50 miles (80.5 km) or greater than 850 miles (1,368 km). This generally eliminated
intercity trips within the CBSA. It also became a limitation when assessing the connecting corridor all the
way to Sacramento which connected to the California High Speed Rail System; certain longer distance
markets were precluded by the model’s distance limitations so some network effect revenue and
ridership was excluded.
Importantly, the capital cost calculations are derived by a simplified costing model driven by inputs
provided by the user and not by actual infrastructure assessments. The cost of capital (debt service), for
example, is not included in these calculations. The costing model uses unit costs derived from domestic
and international averages. They can be modified by the user as has been done in this study for both the
HSR and maglev inputs. The model has embedded steel wheel HSR capital costs, but has no inputs for
maglev; the project team derived those capital cost inputs from similar planning work team members
had performed around the world on maglev projects. Even with these user-provided inputs, these
averages are meant to reflect typical rather than local conditions. To calculate O&M costs, CONNECT
applies a simplified service plan consisting of daily frequencies and average speeds to drive the cost
estimates and similar to the capital cost calculations, uses domestic and international averages as well
as a large number of similar estimates for maglev operation.
In terms of revenue, CONNECT only looks at projected fare revenue. Ancillary revenues such as real
estate development, commercial leases, value capture, tax increment financing, etc., are all location
specific and are not included in this model. For that reason, this model may underestimate, given
specific locations, the ultimate project’s revenue potential.
CONNECT presents the ridership, revenue, cost, and public benefit outputs in ranges having low,
medium, and high values. The ranges are intended to capture typical conditions for the set of inputs
provided by the user.
Lastly, for the best results the user must input reasonable assumptions for the user’s corridors and
network. The user should consider all outputs as conceptual and preliminary to a more detailed analysis
of corridor-specific conditions. Only a more finely tuned analysis can develop the ridership and cost
estimates needed for specific corridor planning or investment decision-making.

5.1.2 Screening Process

Although each of the corridors under investigation can technically accommodate UHSGT, each corridor
has alignment issues and potential impacts associated with such an investment. Moreover, the purpose
of the corridor analysis process is to investigate the appropriateness and cost-effectiveness of various
UHSGT technology options being studied. Consequently, an array of alignment options can be developed
to solve specific transportation problems in the corridors linking Vancouver, Seattle, and Portland and
beyond. These specific alignment alternatives were not analyzed in detail as doing so is beyond the
scope of this study.
For this study, a high-level defined multi-step screening and evaluation process was used. The final
ridership results are the product of an iterative process running the CONNECT tool with incremental
changes over multiple rounds. The initial round of ridership results tested only the primary corridor from
Portland to Vancouver, and included 10 scenarios, which were all run with a forecast year of 2035 and a
daily frequency of 28 roundtrips, which is equivalent to half-hourly service, tapering at the start and end
of the day. The 10 model runs were comprised of each of the five conceptual corridors (examining a
variety of stopping patterns) for both HSR and maglev technology (Figure 5-1).
1,750,000
1,700,000
1,650,000
2035 Annual Ridership
1,600,000
1,550,000
1,500,000
1,450,000
1,400,000
1,350,000
1,300,000
HSR Maglev HSR Maglev HSR Maglev HSR Maglev HSR Maglev
Scenario 1 Scenario 1A Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Figure 5-1. Round 1 Ridership Comparison

Source: AECOM derived from CONNECT results
To account for the differences in technology and not exclude any specific technology, the team adjusted
the default values of the operating and cost assumptions in the CONNECT tool, as described above,
which includes operating characteristics such as speed and operating and construction costs. After
reviewing the results of the initial round, which included a sensitivity analysis varying the daily
frequency, the team made the following adjustments for the second round of CONNECT tool runs:
• Adjusted some of the input cost assumptions for the HSR and maglev technologies.
• Reduced the daily frequency to eight daily round trips. The first CONNECT runs showed that that the
inflection point is approximately at eight trains per day on the sensitivity curve of the total recovery
ratio 36 versus the daily frequency.
36 In the CONNECT tool this is defined as the annual ticket revenue divided by the total costs, annualized.

• Added in the forecast year of 2055 to examine longer range future ridership potential.
The concept corridors were reduced to three (1A, 2, and 4), as the differences between the corridors
were minor and including all five primary corridors was redundant for analysis purposes. These three
represent the range of ridership, cost, and geographic coverage. For concept corridor 1A, the project
team wanted to find out the effects of providing stops at “minor” stations in the Bellingham and
Olympia-Tumwater CBSAs in addition to “major” stations in Vancouver, Seattle-Tacoma, and Portland.
For concept corridors 1A and 2, the project team wanted to learn what ridership variations result from
an airport stop as compared to a downtown core station in Vancouver (1A) and Portland (2) with
consideration of capital costs differences associated with an outlying airport station. Concept corridor 4
limits service to the three largest population centers along the corridor and the project team wanted to
learn how much reducing costs associated with using minor stations on the periphery of the denser
urban core could affect ridership and revenue results. Figure 5-1, compares the ridership results across
the corridors.
For the last round of CONNECT, two additional changes were made:
• Increased daily frequencies up to 12, as the frequency sensitivity curve was adjusted due to the
changes in the cost inputs, as can be seen in Figure 5-2.
• Added in the East-West corridor connecting Seattle to Spokane.
• While the connecting corridor to Sacramento was run using CONNECT, the results are still be
analyzed as of the publication of this study. Model limitations and the network impact of connecting
to the extensive proposed California High-Speed Rail system require more detailed evaluation and
will be the subject of a future addendum to this report.
0.16
0.14
0.12
Total Recovery Ratio
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04 HSR 1A
Maglev 1A
0.02 HSR 2
Maglev 2
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Daily Roundtrips
Figure 55-2. Round 2 Total Recovery Ratio Frequency Sensitivity

5.2 Feasibility for Future Federal Funding Availability

Determining project feasibility is the initial design stage of any project. This phase of study brings
together the elements of knowledge that indicate if a project is possible or not. While not a detailed

feasibility study required to meet federal funding standards, the UHSGT Study did focus on determining
whether options exist that ultimately may be able to satisfy criteria for technical and commercial the
potential for ultra HSR. Technical viability is addressed by evaluating engineering and constructability
issues and whether the vehicle technology is commercially available and revenue service ready. This
study found no “fatal flaws” for the two technologies for which sufficient commercial cost data is
available. For the third technology, Hyperloop, proven cost data is not yet available but there is nothing
in the corridor concepts in Section 4 utilized as inputs that would preclude future comparative analysis
of this technology. The critical elements of determining cost recovery include demand and ridership
estimates and estimates of probable costs associated with alternatives that are technically feasible. This
section discusses cost recovery feasibility as previously defined by the FRA. 37
The FRA criteria for determining cost recovery include the possibility of public/private partnership for
capital investments by determining the proportion of each corridor’s initial investment that might be
funded or financed based on future operating surpluses. At a coarse level, CONNECT allows the user to
compare alternatives and generally determine whether these Federal criteria have a possibility of being
met. This is measured as:
• Low operating cost recovery ratio (operating costs/revenue)
• Positive fare recovery ratio (operating revenue/operating costs)
• Positive benefit/cost ratio (direct + indirect benefits/total costs)
Other criteria used by FRA to determine feasibility include:
• Whether the proposed corridors include rail lines where passenger rail speeds of 90 mph (145 km/h)
or more are occurring or can reasonably be expected to occur in the future. In this study, the study
team are examining average speeds of 250 mph (402 km/h) or higher.
• Projected ridership associated with the proposed corridors sufficient to generate revenue that
exceeds operating costs.
• Percentage of the corridors over which trains will be able to operate at maximum speed, considering
such factors as topography and other traffic on the line, if tracks are shared with other train
operating companies or services.
• Projected indirect benefits to non-riders, such as congestion relief on other modes of transportation
providing service in the corridors.
• Amount of federal, state, and local financial support that can reasonably be anticipated for the
improvement of the line and related facilities.
• Cooperation of the owners of the rights-of-way that can be reasonably expected.
This study did not examine detailed financial feasibility, which analyzes cash flows in greater detail. This
more detailed financial analysis and feasibility determination is deferred to project-level study once a
preferred option has been identified and environmentally cleared.
5.2.1 Operating Recovery Ratio and Total Recovery Ratio

5.2.1.1 Operating Recovery Ratio
The operating recovery ratio shows the degree to which passenger fare revenue covers operating costs.
CONNECT does not account for any ancillary revenue (e.g., generated from real estate development or
commercial activity). In the CONNECT tool the operating recovery ratio is the annual ticket revenue
divided by the O&M costs for the primary corridor and full network. Values greater than 1.0 represent
37 High Speed Ground Transportation for America, FRA, 1997, and Maglev Deployment Program, FRA, 1999.

an operating profit. After several iterations of analysis, the third and final round of CONNECT tool runs
indicated the operating recovery ratios shown in Tables 5-1 and 5-2 for study years 2035 and 2055. The
results are shown for both the standalone primary corridor (Portland to Vancouver) and the total
network results (Portland to Vancouver plus Seattle to Spokane).
Table 5-1. Operating Recovery Ratio for 2035
Concept Corridor 1A Concept Corridor 2 Concept Corridor 4
Seven Stations Four Stations Three Stations
HSR Maglev HSR Maglev HSR Maglev
Standalone Primary Corridor (Portland to Vancouver)
O&M Cost Recovery Ratio 0.62 - 0.72 0.70 - 0.97 0.63 - 0.74 0.71 - 0.99 0.69 - 0.83 0.79 - 1.20
Annual OpEx per Passenger Mile $0.78 - 0.76 $0.58 - 0.67 $0.75 - 0.73 $0.56 - 0.65 $0.66 - 0.65 $0.45 - 0.57
Revenue per Passenger Mile $0.51 - 0.51 $0.51 - 0.51 $0.50 - 0.50 $0.50 - 0.50 $0.50 - 0.50 $0.50 - 0.50
Full Network (Primary + Connecting East-West Corridor)
Table 55-2. Operating Recovery Ratio for 2055

Total Network (Primary + Connecting East-West Corridor)
5.2.1.2 Total Recovery Ratio

In the CONNECT tool, total recovery ratio is the annual ticket revenue divided by the total annualized
capital and operating costs. Values greater than 1.0 represent an operating profit. After several
iterations of analysis, the third and final round of CONNECT tool runs indicated the total recovery ratios
shown in Tables 5-3 and 5-4 for study years 2035 and 2055.

Table 55-3. Total Recovery Ratio for 2035

Total Cost Recovery Ratio 0.09 - 0.14 0.09 - 0.13 0.08 - 0.14 0.09 - 0.13 0.08 - 0.14 0.08 - 0.13
Annual CapEx per Passenger Mile $3.14 - 4.62 $3.59 - 4.53 $3.21 - 4.7 $3.69 - 4.77 $3.29 - 4.92 $3.85 - 4.95
Full Network (Primary + Secondary East-West Corridor)

Table 5-4. Total Recovery Ratio for 2055

Total Network (Primary + Secondary East-West Corridor)

The CONNECT results indicate that maglev has a higher probability of covering its operating costs in the
2035-time frame than HSR, but at a slightly higher capital cost, all other things being equal. Determining
the preferred technology option and alignment and service options will require more detailed study and
analysis. However, this analysis indicates that HSR and maglev could each cover their operating costs by
2055, but they would only recover a small portion of the capital costs, similar to other HSR projects
internationally.
5.2.2 Benefit/Cost Analysis

The Benefit/Cost Analysis (BCA) module outputs a time stream of project benefits and costs from the
start of construction to the horizon year based on user-defined inputs and on estimates of travel
demand and costs. The BCA module in the CONNECT tool automatically performs runs and calculations
for all relevant study years. The CONNECT tool simplifies benefits into consumer surplus, safety, and
environmental benefits, and costs into capital and O&M costs. Consumer surplus is defined as the
difference between the total amount that passengers are willing and able to pay for the service offering

indicated by the demand curve and the total amount that they actually do pay defined by the ticket
price. It measures the welfare benefit buyers get from participating in a market. The consumer surplus
benefits incorporate travel time and volume changes by mode and trip purpose between the baseline
and the project alternative for each CBSA pair. It also accounts for diversions from auto, air, and bus to
rail, as well as induced rail demand. The benefit/cost analysis module of CONNECT is still in development
by FRA. The BCA will be included in the separate report of Wider Economic Benefits, which will be
available in January 2018.
5.2.3 Other Indicators of Feasibility

The analysis clearly shows that UHSGT technologies exist that have a high likelihood of being
commercially available and are revenue service proven. The corridors examined present engineering
challenges that are not insurmountable. Alignments can be planned, designed, and constructed in a way
that does not preclude emerging UHSGT technologies with operating speeds that can exceed 250 mph
(402 km/h) on a high percentage of the planned alignment outside of urban areas. Determinations on
alignments within cities and the approaches to major city stations where the UHSGT systems connect
with conventional speed trains have not been determined.
5.3 Demand and Ridership

This section describes the demand and ridership results from the final round of the CONNECT runs,
which include both 2035 and 2055 estimates of ridership for conceptual corridors 1A, 2, and 4 for both
HSR and maglev technologies. The results presented in Table 5-5 for 2035 and Table 5-6 for 2055 are
shown for both the standalone primary corridor (Portland to Vancouver) as well as total network results
(Portland to Vancouver plus Seattle to Spokane). The max segment load indicates how full the train is at
the maximum point in the system. This section discusses elements of the ridership forecasts and
compares across dimensions (corridor, technology, and forecast year).
Table 5-5. 2035 CONNECT Ridership Results
Annual Ridership (millions) 1.8 – 2.0 1.9 - 2.1 1.8 - 1.9 1.8 – 2.0 1.6 - 1.7 1.6 - 1.8
O&M Subsidy per Passenger Mile $0.31 - 0.19 $0.22 - 0.02 $0.29 - 0.17 $0.20 – 0.00 $0.22 - 0.10 $0.13 – 0.00
Rail Mode Share 13% 14% 17% 17% 15% 15%
Max Segment Load 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.27 0.29
Total Network (Primary + Connecting E/W Corridor)
Ridership (annual) 2.2 - 2.5 2.3 - 2.6 2.1 - 2.4 2.2 - 2.5 1.9 - 2.2 2 - 2.3
O&M Subsidy per Passenger Mile $0.28 - 0.17 $0.19 - 0 $0.26 - 0.14 $0.17 - 0 $0.21 - 0.09 $0.11 - 0
Max Segment Load 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.35

Table 55-6. 2055 CONNECT Ridership Results

Annual Ridership (millions) 2.9 - 3.2 3 - 3.3 2.7 - 3 2.9 - 3.2 2.5 - 2.8 2.6 - 2.9
% Increase in Ridership over 2035 61% 58% 54% 61% 60% 62%
O&M Subsidy per Passenger Mile $0.01 - 0 $0 - 0 $0.01 - 0 $0 - 0 $0 - 0 $0 - 0
Rail Mode Share 13% 13% 16% 16% 15% 14%
Max Segment Load 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.40 0.42
Annual Ridership (millions) 3.5 - 4 3.7 - 4.2 3.4 - 3.8 3.5 - 4 3.1 - 3.5 3.3 - 3.7
O&M Subsidy per Passenger Mile $0 - 0 $0 - 0 $0 - 0 $0 - 0 $0 - 0 $0 - 0
Max Segment Load 0.6 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.58 0.58
5.3.1 Primary Corridor – Portland to Vancouver

5.3.1.1 Total Ridership and Rail Mode Share
Overall, the scenarios perform similarly across the corridors corresponding with the geographic
coverage. Concept corridor 1A has seven stations, and has the highest ridership with approximately 2
million annual riders. Concept corridor 2 has similar results with only four stations, but they cover
approximately 95 percent of the population covered in 1A. Concept corridor 4 has the lowest ridership
estimates, with approximately 1.7 million, but is the only corridor of the three which does not include an
airport connection. For the year 2055, there is approximately a 60 percent increase in ridership,
indicating that the market will mature into a strong potential for UHSGT service.
Similar to the ridership, the rail mode share of the total intercity travel demand within the region does
not change significantly across the corridors, but in all corridors, there is a strong rail mode share,
ranging from 13 to 17 percent, which indicates a strong travel market penetration.
5.3.1.2 Ridership by Market

Across all corridors, the Portland-Seattle market represents approximately half of the total ridership and
is the driver for the corridor. The Seattle-Vancouver market is approximately 25 percent of the total,
with the remaining station pairs making up the final 25 percent of ridership.
5.3.1.3 Rail Mode Share and Max Segment Load

While the rail mode share is strong, the max segment load (indicating how full the train is at the
maximum point in the system) across all corridors shows that the train is just over one-third full at the
maximum point in 2035, and roughly 60 percent full at the maximum point in 2055. Therefore, it is not
shown to be fully utilized based on the service provided. This warrants further detailed analysis since
efficient transport services require maximum load points to be above 75 percent.
5.3.1.4 Technology Type

Maglev operates at a faster speed (and therefore has shorter travel times) compared to HSR, and the
ridership results show an increase of approximately 5 percent for maglev versus HSR across the
corridors. Given the high-level nature of this study, that difference maybe within the “margin of error”.
Because of the lack of commercial costs for hyperloop, the significant travel time savings and its
potential impact on ridership and revenue was indeterminate.
5.3.1.5 O&M Subsidy

HSR requires an operating subsidy across all corridors, while maglev approaches breaking even on
operating costs at the high end of the forecast for 2035. By the year 2055, the operating subsidy is
negligible regardless of technology or corridor.
5.3.2 Connecting Corridor – Seattle to Spokane

Table 5-7 shows the results split by the primary corridor and the connecting corridor for 2035 and 2055.
Adding in the connecting corridor does not have a major impact on the primary corridor ridership, but
could add 300,000 to 400,000 in annual ridership across the corridors for 2035, which is an increase of
15 to 25 percent.
Table 5-7. Network Ridership Breakdown
2035
Primary Corridor (Portland - Vancouver) 1.8 - 2 1.9 - 2.1 1.8 - 2 1.9 - 2.1 1.6 - 1.8 1.7 - 1.9
Connecting Corridor (Seattle - Spokane) 0.4 - 0.5 0.4 - 0.5 0.3 - 0.4 0.3 - 0.4 0.3 - 0.4 0.3 - 0.4
Total Network 2.2 - 2.5 2.3 - 2.6 2.1 - 2.4 2.2 - 2.5 1.9 - 2.2 2 - 2.3
2055
Primary Corridor (Portland - Vancouver) 2.9 - 3.2 3.0 - 3.3 2.7 - 3.3 2.9 - 3.2 2.5 - 2.8 2.6 - 2.9
Connecting Corridor (Seattle - Spokane) 0.6 - 0.8 0.7 - 0.9 0.7 - 0.5 0.6 - 0.8 0.6 - 0.7 0.7 - 0.8
Total Network 3.5 - 4.0 3.7 - 4.2 3.4 - 3.8 3.5 - 4.0 3.1 - 3.5 3.3 - 3.7
5.4 Cost Estimates

This section describes the cost estimates from the final round of the CONNECT runs, which include both
2035 and 2055 forecasts for concept corridors 1A, 2, and 4 for both HSR and maglev technologies. The
data presented in Table 5-8 for 2035 and Table 5-9 for 2055 are shown for both the standalone primary
corridor (Portland to Vancouver) and the total network results (Portland to Vancouver plus Seattle to
Spokane). This section discusses elements of the cost estimates and compares across dimensions
(corridor, technology, and forecast year).
Table 5-8. 2035 CONNECT Cost Estimates



Table 55-9. 2055 CONNECT Cost Estimates
Annual CapEx per Passenger Mile $2 - 2.93 $2.27 - 2.86 $2.1 - 3.05 $2.39 - 3.08 $2.11 - 3.14 $2.44 - 3.14
5.4.1 Operating Cost Recovery

Similar to the ridership results, there is no significant difference in operating cost recovery across the
corridors, but operating cost is a distinguisher between HSR and maglev. Maglev is cheaper to operate,
but has slightly higher ridership due to faster travel times. Maglev will likely cover the operating costs,
while HSR may require operating subsidies for the first 20 years or so.
5.4.2 Total Cost Recovery

The total cost recovery ratio incorporates the annualized operating and capital costs, and HSR has an
advantage over maglev in this metric, as it is less expensive to construct HSR. Both maglev and HSR do
not cover the annualized total costs, but HSR is more cost-effective.

5.4.3 Total Capital Investment

Figure 5-3 shows the total capital investment ranges for each corridor and technology, and it can be
seen that on the high end there is very little difference among the options. As noted previously, given
the early development stage of Hyperloop, there were not commercial or revenue-tested operating or
capital cost data to input into the CONNECT model. To not preclude any technologies at this stage, a
high level of tunneling was assumed when developing generic corridor concepts. It is anticipated that as
the engineering parameters of the Hyperloop technology are developed over time, the assumed
required tunneling will be reduced and therefore the upper levels of the capital cost ranges in Figure 5-3
could be reduced substantially. The cost inputs specified for the two technologies, as well as the
percentage of tunneling, are driving the overall costs. While Hyperloop is not analyzed, care was taken
not to preclude this technology which also drives a portion of the higher end capital costs.
Concept corridor 2 is the highest, due to the construction cost distribution being skewed more towards
urban construction versus rural (55 percent urban versus 45 percent rural), while the other two are
slightly more rural (54 percent urban versus 46 percent rural). While the low end of HSR capital costs is
lower overall than maglev, the range for HSR is greater, making the high end almost indistinguishable
between the technologies.
The range of $24-42 billion encompasses the needs of all three technologies at this high-level stage of
analysis, including some that require very straight routes with minimum curvature and /or subgrade
development with tunneling. A high percentage of tunneling was included as a capital cost input to the
CONNECT model. When these capital parameters are narrowed down following a more detailed
subsequent analysis of corridor alignments and technology, cost ranges could be reduced by 25 percent
or more.
Figure 55-3. Capital Investment Ranges by Corridor

Table 5-10 summarizes the costs by category for each technology. Based on these costs, O&M is
cheaper for maglev. There is no clear winner for capital costs between HSR and maglev, and station
costs are only a small portion of the overall costs. One of the identifying features of concept corridor 4
was that it would not include any major stations, but that proved to not contribute enough to the
overall costs to show a large difference.

Table 55-10. Estimated Cost Inputs by Technology

Cost Category Maglev HSR
Right-of-way Acquisition $1.7-$27 million/mile $2-32 million/mile
($2.7-$43.2 million/km) ($3.2-$51.2 million/km)
At Grade Construction $45-$52 million/mile $15-$35 million/mile

($72-$83.2 million/km) ($24-$56 million/km)
Aerial Construction $93 million/mile $123-$200 million/mile

($148.8 million/km) ($196.8-$320 million/km)
Tunnel Construction $290 million/mile $230 million/mile

($464 million/km) ($368 million/km)
Trainset $50 million $36-$41 million
Major Station $300 million $300 million
Minor Station $40 million $40 million
Maintenance Facility $212 million $120 million
O&M per Seat Mile $0.068-$0.097/mile $0.084-$0.091/mile

($0.108-$0.155/km) ($0.134-$0.146/km)
O&M per Route Mile $80-$110 thousand/mile $172-$192 thousand/mile

($128-$176 thousand/km) ($275-307 thousand/km)
Source: CONNECT Tool defaults and consultant team estimates
5.4.4 CONNECT Results Summary

This section provides a summary of the key CONNECT results and categorizes the results by regional
geography/market, technological differentiation, and intercity travel mode share.
Regional Geography/Market Results
1. Given the limitations of the CONNECT model as well as the current trend lines, Seattle to
Portland is critical to any future UHSGT alternatives. This high-level coarse model only predicts
based on current trends and cannot accurately anticipate future significant changes in the
economic relationships between Cascadia region markets. A more detailed ridership and
revenue study is needed at a more precise level then that provided by CONNECT.
2. The CONNECT model, for all rail service levels (less than 79 mph [127 km/h], greater than 250
mph [402 km/h]), indicates that 12 round trips are the “sweet spot” for rail services before there
are diminishing returns. The more detailed analysis identified in #1, is critical to determine the
potential market. Such a study will also identify the impact of commuter and shorter intercity
trips less than 50 miles (80 km), now excluded from the modeling.
3. Given that the current model indicates a market for 12 round trips, short of a major dedicated
corridor investment, consideration should be given to analyzing the costs of additional service
increases on the current corridor (Amtrak Cascades and Sound Transit commuter) as an interim
step to build demand and the potential market share before embarking on building that new
corridor.
4. While the East-West corridor to Spokane could add a 15 to 25 percent increase in network
impact ridership, it requires initial subsidies to be viable.

5. The higher speed of maglev does not seem to significantly change the ridership/revenue
equation. More detailed study is needed.
6. Given the very high capital costs for the Portland to Sacramento market as a Core Express
dedicated corridor, and therefore a lessened opportunity to cover even O&M costs, it is
recommended to discontinue future consideration in the 2035-2055 time-frame for this
connecting corridor extension at the time of this study. California has not included a high-speed
rail extension from Sacramento to Oregon in its recently released draft 2018 State Rail Plan. The
California State Rail Plan does include references to potential high-speed rail connections to Las
Vegas and Phoenix in the 2040 vision.
Technology Differentiation Results
7. In 2035, maglev seems to cover O&M costs in most alternatives; a small subsidy may be needed
in the earlier period (2035) for HSR. By 2055, all corridor technological alternatives cover O&M
and assist in capital carrying costs to various degrees.
8. While maglev and HSR have different capital and operating benefits over time, the CONNECT
tool does not provide sufficient data to choose a specific technology at this time. More detailed
technical analysis is required to select among the feasible technologies being examined.
Intercity Travel Mode Share Results
9. Both technologies have the potential to shift a significant share of the intercity travel market to
rail. For these technologies at 12 round trips, 12 to 17 percent of the travel market by 2035
could be diverted to UHSGT.
10. Conversely, the utilization of capacity is relatively low, indicating an immature market or a
model input limitation. As noted in #1, a more detailed analysis of how the market economies
are changing needs to be completed to adequately predict future ridership and revenue.

SECTION 6
Implementing Ultra High-Speed Ground

Transportation
6.1 Funding and Financing
High-speed ground transportation projects require substantial capital to cover initial construction costs,
lifecycle costs (including maintenance), and operating expenses. Obtaining and identifying appropriate
financing and funding resources is a key success factor in the construction and operation of a high-speed
line.
This section summarizes feasible financing and funding options for the UHSGT project. The project team
does not recommend any specific funding and financing options, but rather provides a high-level
assessment of likely funding and financing study options and strategies for further analysis. The team
also assessed (at a high level) the potential eligibility of the project to access specific U.S. Department of
Transportation grant and loan programs, federal funding mechanisms, and infrastructure development
programs such as the proposed Canada Infrastructure Bank (CIB).
6.2 Overview of Funding and Financing Models

High-speed ground transportation projects require substantial levels of capital expenditure as well as
operating, maintenance, and lifecycle costs. In general, various public-private partnership (P3) models
and their application in the U.S. and Canada were considered. Funding and financing are defined as
follows: 38
• Funding refers to the different sources of funds (other than those provided through financing) that
can be used to pay for a project or service, such as farebox revenue, subsidies, and government
grants. It also may include planned future taxes or levies. Funding can provide resources for
operating costs, maintenance, lifecycle costs, and capital expenditure (CapEx).
• Financing refers to the tools used to access funds to pay for the CapEx of a project or service.
Examples of financing mechanisms include debt (where loan capital is repaid over time), equity
(direct investment, with a return to investors that reflects the level of risk), a mix of debt and equity,
and other sources such as capital leases.
The potential financing and delivery models, along with the distribution of risk and responsibilities for
each model, and some selected examples are shown across each component of the project lifecycle in
Figure 6-1. In general, delivery models available for a UHSGT project include design-bid-build, design-
build, private contract fee for service provision, design-build-operate-maintain, design-build-finance,
design-build-finance-operate, and privatization. The selected financing/delivery model chosen for the
UHSGT project should seek to achieve optimum risk transfer and highest value for money for the specific
project under consideration. Several of the options shown in Figure 6-1 involve mixed public and private
funding or financing (i.e. P3s).
38CH2M, 2017, Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation: Potential Funding and Financing Mechanisms.

SECTION 6. IMPLEMENTING ULTRA HIGH-SPEED GROUND TRANSPORTATION
Figure 6-1. Financing and Delivery models - Distribution of Risk for Various Project Delivery Options
Source: CH2M, 2017, Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation: Potential Funding and Financing Mechanisms.
6.2.1 Overview of Public-Private Partnerships

Traditional public-sector delivery of large-scale infrastructure projects often has been associated with
cost overruns. The P3 model aims to procure infrastructure more efficiently by contractually allocating
risks to the party that is best suited to manage them. Studies in Canada and elsewhere have shown that
allocating risk properly in an infrastructure project leads to major cost and time savings both during
construction and the operational life of the asset. 39
There are two main sources of revenue and three main payment structures for P3 models. Sources of
revenue include user fees (e.g., farebox revenue) and ancillary revenues (e.g., parking fees, commercial
leases). Payment structures include construction payments, availability payments, and a construction-
availability hybrid. The sources of revenue and payment structures are described below.
• User Fees: This refers to farebox revenue that is a direct payment by public riders on a passenger
rail service. Fares may be subject to regulation by the public authority to cap fare increases for
passengers. Often fare increases are tied to economic indicators such as the Consumer Price Index
39 CH2M, 2017, Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation: Potential Funding and Financing Mechanisms.

(CPI) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) plus a defined percentage. The farebox revenue is typically
used to cover the operation and maintenance expenditure costs.
• Ancillary Revenues: Ancillary revenues can be an important source of an overall financing package.
It includes non-farebox revenue such as parking, retail food and consumer goods concessions,
advertising, development rights (such as air rights over stations or other transit oriented
developments), utility rights, and sponsorships.
• Construction Payments: If the public partner has the funds to cover construction costs, lump sum
milestone payments or monthly “percentage complete” payments are used to pay for railroad
construction projects. It is common practice for the government to hire an independent engineer to
audit the work done by the private partner.
• Availability Payments (Aps): Availability payments are being made “available” to the private partner
for the provision of a transportation “service” after achieving a certain level of performance. The
private partner usually finances the design and construction costs and when the project is ready for
operation, it receives regular availability payments (APs) to cover the construction costs. Under this
structure, public funds should also be made available for operation and maintenance availability
payments. These are usually monthly payments over the life of the concession.
• Construction and Availability Payment Hybrid: Under this mixed payment structure, public funds
are made available (primarily for construction) to the private partner as either milestone or progress
payments during the design and construction of the project.
6.2.2 United States Funding and Financing Programs

This section provides an overview of funding and financing programs in the United States and outlines
the eligibility of an UHSGT project relative to each funding or financing program. There are public
programs that can provide both funding and financing for transportation projects, including grants,
credit programs, and in some cases carbon tax funding mechanisms. Table 6-1 summarizes funding and
financing programs available for high-speed rail projects and the UHSGT project’s eligibility.
6.2.2.1 Public Funding and Financing Programs

Public funding programs include federal grants under the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST)
Act and discretionary grants under the Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery
(TIGER) and Infrastructure for Rebuilding America (INFRA) programs. The UHSGT project would in
principle be eligible for two grant programs established under FAST or any other rail capital
infrastructure programs authorized and appropriated by US Congress:
• “Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements”. The fund has many types of potential
spending that it is meant to support, such as research and improving multi-modal connections.
• “Federal State Partnership for State of Good Repair”, which is focused on repair or improvement of
existing rail assets.
The project team analyzed the suitability and applicability of these rail capital infrastructure programs
for the recent Texas-Oklahoma Passenger rail study40. As authorized in the FAST Act, these grant
programs have potential authorization ranges between $500 million to $600 million. However, annual
appropriations have remained much lower than the authorization levels. For example, in fiscal year
40CH2M and ESH Consult, “Texas – Oklahoma Passenger Rail Study, Service Development Plan”, March 2017, prepared for Texas Department of
Transportation, in coordination with Oklahoma DOT.

2017, Congress only appropriated around $93 million between the two programs combined. Both
programs are constrained by a maximum level of 80 percent federal funding for each relevant project,
with a minimum of 20 percent of project funding required from other sources, such as state
governments. However, preference will be given to projects where the federal share is 50 percent or
less.
In addition to these programs, the U.S. DOT awards discretionary grants under the Transportation
Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) and Infrastructure for Rebuilding America (INFRA)
programs. In fiscal year 2017, TIGER program awarded $500 million in discretionary grants ranging
between $5 million and $25 million. The FAST Act authorized the INFRA program, which focuses on
highway and freight projects, and received an appropriation of roughly $1,500 million between fiscal
year 20117 and fiscally year 2018. TIGER and INFRA programs are not dedicated rail capital grant
programs. These programs have much larger program goals and objectives. However, they do have
significant amount of annual discretionary funding that could be used to finance eligible elements of the
UHSGT. These authorized programs, in recent years, have not been appropriated at a level that would
provide a significant federal capital contribution to a high-speed rail program.
Public financing programs include federal loans and credit programs such as the Transportation
Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) and the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement
Financing (RRIF) program. In 2015, President Obama established the Build America Transportation
Investment Center, which is a resource for cities and states to collaborate with the private sector to
support transportation infrastructure. It is commonly known as the “Build America Bureau” (BAB) and is
housed in the U.S. Department of Transportation. The BAB administers both the TIFIA and RRIF
programs. Additionally, the FAST Act aims to increase the level of P3 procurement in the U.S. The FAST
Act authorizes and provides funding for large transportation projects for fiscal years 2016 to 2020;
however, funds are currently obligated/appropriated on an annual basis.
The TIFIA program provides credit assistance for projects of regional and national significance. It
provides three types of assistance:
• Secured (direct) loan: to be paid back within 35 years of project completion.
• Loan guarantee: where repayments to lender must begin within five years of project completion.
• Standby line of credit: to supplement revenues in the first ten years of operation.
All transit capital projects which qualify for Federal assistance with capital costs of more than $50 million
are eligible for support via the TIFIA credit program, up to a maximum of 33 percent of the total eligible
project costs. Other key eligibility criteria under TIFIA stipulate that the project:
• Must be supported at least partially from user charges or other non-Federal dedicated funding
sources;
• Should be included in the relevant State’s transportation plan; and
• Must have senior debt available as part-financing which is rated investment grade.
Eligible projects are evaluated by the US Secretary of Transportation against eight statutory criteria,
including, impact to the environment; significance to the national transportation system; and the extent
to which they generate economic benefits, leverage private capital, and promote innovative
technologies.
Under the RRIF program, the Build America Bureau (BAB) is authorized to provide direct loans and loan
guarantees up to a total of $35 billion to finance development of railroad infrastructure. The maximum
level of any individual grant is one-tenth of the total project costs. The fund may be used to develop

new railways facilities (stations, depots and track), such as new intercity routes similar to the conceptual
UHSGT projects considered as part of this study.
The BAB expects to give funding priority to projects that provide public benefits, including benefits to
public safety, environment and economic development. RRIF has provided major financial assistance to
rail projects, such as a loan of $2,450 million provided to Amtrak in 2016 for expenditure on
infrastructure projects.
6.2.2.2 Private Financing Programs & Foreign Infrastructure Banks

Private financing programs include Private Activity Bonds 41 (PABs) and foreign infrastructure banks. The
PABs credit program is primarily focused on investment in freight transport and fixed crossings (such as
bridges). Funds released must be spent on the relevant project within five years. As noted previously,
the Brightline project in Florida recently sold $600 million in PABs. Bonds are available for projects
including, surface transport projects that require federal assistance; an international bridge or tunnel
that is eligible for federal assistance; and any facility for the transfer of freight from road to rail or vice
versa.
Several U.S. organizations have announced plans to enter into partnerships involving Chinese or
Japanese finance for rail schemes. For example, Texas Central Railways, LLC has already accepted US$40
million from the public-private Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and
Urban Development. The new rail line from Dallas to Houston is projected to cost $12 billion and to be
completed by 2021 if it proceeds. Another example of possible Japanese financing is a proposed US$10
billion high-speed maglev rail project planned to run from Baltimore to Washington. The Japan Bank for
International Cooperation has pledged a US$5 billion loan for the scheme.
Chinese initiatives in U.S. infrastructure financing have recently been complicated by transparency and
regulatory issues, but there have been several recent purchases of Chinese rolling stock by operators
such as the Chicago Transit Authority and the Los Angeles Metro. Given this landscape, we believe that
Chinese or Japanese infrastructure financing options could be considered for the UHSGT project.
6.2.2.3 Public-Private Partnerships (P3s)

The funding and financing programs described above can be combined through P3s to plan, construct,
and operate large-scale transportation projects. Historically, U.S. states and municipalities have been
relatively reluctant to use P3 models for procurement compared with some other developed countries
such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The legislative patchwork of P3 rules and decision-
making by individual states in the U.S. poses a significant challenge to developing more public-private
partnerships. For example, approximately 66 percent of states have their own P3 enabling legislation in
the U.S. The UHSGT project is further complicated by not only multiple states, but also an international
border. Further detailed study of statutory and regulatory hurdles is warranted.
Projects in the U.S. have access to one of the deepest and most liquid capital markets in the world. In
the last 3 years, 371 infrastructure deals were completed in the U.S. Of these projects, 78 percent were
solely financed by bank debt, 16 percent were funded with capital market financing such as bonds, and
7 percent were funded with a mix of both bonds and bank debt. Public-private partnerships in the U.S.
41 As of the publication date of this report, the proposed Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, eliminates Private Activity Bonds as an available
financing source.

also have included a wide range of levels of equity participation. Examples of these partnerships in the
U.S. include the Indiana Toll Road and the Lyndon B. Johnson Freeway in Texas. 42
6.2.3 Canadian Funding and Financing Programs

Canada has one of the world’s most mature and stable P3 markets. Since 1993, over 177 public-private
deals have been completed with support and funding provided by the federal government. However,
the Canadian market is not only driven by the federal government alone, but is also promoted at the
provincial and municipal level.
6.2.3.1 PPP Canada

PPP Canada 43 specializes in P3s and is a world-class resource for P3 knowledge and expertise.
Additionally, the P3 Canada fund also has played an important role for engaging municipal involvement
in P3. Up to this point, the fund has invested in more than 20 public-private projects, leveraging C$6
billion in capital expenditure. The success of the Canadian P3 market is in large part due to the strong
political support that exists for P3 in Canada. This reduces political risks involved as procuring
authorities, private investors, and creditors have confidence that the mechanisms within the P3
agreement will be enforced.
The Canadian P3 model provides an example model of best practices that the UHSGT project could
adopt. Over 70 transportation infrastructure projects valued at more than C$30 billion have been
delivered since the financial crisis of 2008. However, due to the success of the program, PPP Canada will
cease operations at the end of 2017 and will be dissolved effective March 31, 2018. 44
6.2.3.2 Canada Infrastructure Bank

The CIB, once fully operational, could provide a potential key source to finance major infrastructure
projects such as the UHSGT project. The CIB could act as a center of expertise for advising all levels of
government on infrastructure transactions involving private-sector investment.
43 http://www.p3canada.ca/
44 CH2M, 2017, Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation.

Table 6-1. United State Funding and Financing Programs and Eligibility
Funding Program Project Eligibility Funding Available (U.S. Dollars) Actual Funding Distribution
(U.S. Dollars)
FAST Act Eligible for the “Consolidated Rail Infrastructure $500 to $600 million $93 million (FY17)
and Safety Improvements” and the “Federal
State Partnership for State of Good Repair”
programs.
Transportation Investment Generating TIGER and INFRA programs are not dedicated $500 million (FY17) $5 to $25 million per project
Economic Recovery (TIGER) rail capital grant programs; however, these
programs do have a significant amount of
Infrastructure for Rebuilding America (INFRA) annual discretionary funding that could be used $1.5 billion (FY17-FY18) Not Available
to finance eligible elements of the UHSGT.
Transportation Infrastructure Finance and All transit capital projects qualifying for federal 33% of eligible project costs Projects funded FY17:
Innovation Act (TIFIA) assistance with capital costs of more than $50 • $1,330 million - East Link Extension
million are eligible for support via the TIFIA (Seattle, WA)
credit program.
• $538 million - Mid-Coast Corridor
(San Diego, CA)
• $307 million - Westside Purple Line
Extension (Los Angeles, CA)
Railroad Rehabilitation Improvement and Funds may be used to develop new railway Loans up to 35 billion,
Financing program (RRIF) facilities (stations, depots, and track), such as grants up to $3.5 billion Not Available 45
new intercity routes similar to the UHSGT
project.
Private Activity Bonds (PABs) The PABs credit program is primarily focused on $4.1 billion Projects funded FY17:
investment in freight transport and fixed
• $600 million – Brightline (Miami to
crossings (such as bridges). All TIFIA projects are
eligible and have included public transport and West Palm Beach, FL) 46
intercity rail.
45 FRA indicates that the Brightline project may apply for federal loans under RRIF for further expansion from West Palm Beach to Orlando. See Federal Rail Administration, “All Aboard Florida –
Miami to Orlando Passenger Rail Service”. https://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0819 Accessed on December 12, 2017.
46 Roustan, W.K., “New Brightline express trains to roll in December, report says”, Sun Sentinel, November 28, 2017. http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/transportation/fl-reg-brightline-start-
20171128-story.html Accessed on December 12, 2017.

The Budget Implementation Act was passed on June 22, 2017, and implements the CIB. The Canadian
government is currently recruiting key senior-level personnel and aims to launch the CIB in late 2017.
The CIB’s mandate is to invest $35 billion into projects where the CIB’s participation will serve as a
catalyst for new forms of additional private investment into infrastructure in Canada or partly in Canada
(i.e., potentially projects with a physical link to the U.S.).
The CIB will invest strategically, prioritizing transformative projects including public transit plans and
transportation networks. Project screening criteria are expected to be on a project-by-project basis, but
a complete description of funding screening criteria has not been shared publicly. Table 6-2 outlines
high-level criteria based on the currently available public information.
Table 6-2. CIB Investment in Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation
Likely Unlikely Further
Potential Screening Criteria for Investment Meets
# Meets Meets Investigation
(based on currently available information) Criterion
Criterion Criterion Required
Strategic Criteria
1 Is UHSGT in the public interest? 
2 Does UHSGT have a public sponsor? 
3 Is UHSGT a transformative project? 
4 Is UHSGT a public transit and transportation project? 
5 Will UHSGT foster evidence-based decision-making? 
6 Is UHSGT a highly complex project? 
7 Is UHSGT in Canada or partly in Canada (i.e., physical 

U.S. link)?
Financial and Commercial Criteria
8 Does UHSGT generate revenue? 
9 Will UHSGT deliver a return? 
10 Will UHSGT attract private sector capital? 
Source: CH2M, 2017.
The CIB will serve as a catalyst for new forms of private investment for infrastructure in Canada (or
partially located in Canada). The UHSGT project meets the CIB’s strategic criteria, based on a preliminary
assessment, and the project could satisfy financial and commercial requirements for investment. The CIB
increases the financing options available for UHSGT when compared to current forms of financing, and
could increase the likelihood of successful procurement and delivery of the project.
6.2.4 International Funding and Financing Models

This section describes key elements of five recent international rail projects 47 and identifies the critical
mechanisms necessary to procure a large transportation project such as the UHSGT project. Table 6-3
summarizes international HSR rail projects and identifies lessons learned that could be applied in the
development of the UHSGT project.

Table 6-3. International High-Speed Rail Case Studies

Case Study Name Project Facts Funding/Financing Mechanism Relevance to the UHSGT Project
Perpignan to Figueres HSR The governments of France and Spain 80% of the project was financed by bank The case study is important for UHSGT
(France to Spain) constructed a new HSR line under a P3 debt totaling $679 million (an equal split of 6 partners as it highlights potential risks that
agreement. different mandated lead arrangers) and could be faced by governments when
government contributions of $1,379 million entering P3 agreements.
(equally split between the French and
Spanish Governments).
Intercity Express Program The IEP has been procured by the United Phase 2 of the IEP financing is leveraged at This is an innovative P3 project that shows
(IEP) Phase 2 HSR (United Kingdom (UK) Department for Transport as 90%. The financing included £2.2 billion how the government can incentivize the
Kingdom) a Design, Build, Finance, and Maintenance senior term loan split between 10 private sector to deliver the rolling stock for
PPP valued at £5.7 billion. The project is commercial lenders, Japan Bank for the long-term future of the rail system. The
procured in two phases and will replace the International Cooperation, and the IEP P3 leveraged new sources of finance while
aging intercity high-speed trains on the European Investment Bank. also minimizing the impact on the
East Coast Main Line, which travels from government’s budget.
London to Edinburgh, and the Great
Western Main Line.
Taiwan HSR Taiwan HSR is the first HSR system in Asia Bank debt amounted to $323 billion, which The case study indicates how operating
and the largest build-operate-transfer was provided by 25 local banks and was revenue could be used to potentially raise
infrastructure project in the world. solely guaranteed by the forecasted HSR debt from commercial and infrastructure
operating revenue. The Ministry of investment banks.
Transportation and Communications,
Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation, and the
bank consortium signed a “three-party
contract” that specified the procedures that
had to be followed in the case of a
termination of the build-operate-transfer
contract.
Tours-Bordeaux HSR (France) The HSR from Tours to Bordeaux links up The project has an 80:20 debt-to-equity Preliminary results indicate that farebox
with another HSR running to Paris. The HSR ratio. The project faced difficulty raising revenue from UHSGT should be adequate to
was procured as a 50-year P3 concession. capital because of the financial crisis cover the operating expenses of the projects,
affecting the Eurozone in 2012. To help the but will not cover all the initial capital
project go through, the French government invested. This shows that government funding
and the local authorities involved will likely be essential for the project to go
contributed subsidies to the project worth of forward.
€3 billion.

Case Study Name Project Facts Funding/Financing Mechanism Relevance to the UHSGT Project
Eglinton Crosstown Light Rail The Eglinton Crosstown LRT is part of The LRT was delivered as a design-build- This case study indicates the liquid Canadian
Train (LRT) (Canada) Metrolinx’s regional transportation plan finance-and-maintenance P3 model. The capital sources that the UHSGT project could
that aims to reduce congestion in Toronto. duration of the concession agreement is 30 have access to. The introduction of bank debt
The line will run along Eglington Avenue years. will require due diligence that may benefit
with about half the distance running UHSGT.
underground, with links to bus routes,
three subway stations, and various GO
Transit lines (regional public transport).
Gotthard Rail Link The Gotthard rail link is the world’s longest All financing responsibilities for the Gotthard This case study shows how a government can
(Switzerland) rail tunnel. The link became operational in rail link lie with the Swiss government. The raise funds for both infrastructure and rolling
2016. Swiss Federal Railways is responsible financing structure for the link is primarily stock through the taxing of motorized
for the operation and governance of the based on revenue streams from other transport and through sales tax, when a
rail link. transport operations, backed by Swiss project is sufficiently high profile to ensure
government borrowing capacity. In 2008, political and public backing. This project did
the Swiss parliament approved a budget of not rely on P3 or alternative sources of
CHF 13.2 billion (around US$13 billion at finance.
current exchange rates) for the Gotthard rail
link.

6.2.5 Summary of Learned Lessons

Given the case studies examined and the analysis of the Canadian, U.S., and international markets, there
are five key lessons applicable to the UHSGT project. They are outlined below.
1. Strong political support to progress private sector/P3 financing
If the project is to be procured under a P3 partnership, it will need strong political support from all
governments involved. In Canada, the existence of strong political support is essential to a successful
and thriving P3 market. Conversely, an absence of support can significantly hinder the development of a
mature P3 market. Political risk is one of the greatest risk factors associated with infrastructure
investment and a primary reason for reluctance by the private sector to invest in infrastructure projects.
This process does not depend primarily on the federal government. Canada’s experience demonstrates
that generating strong political support at the provincial and municipal level, along with established P3
legislation, is a key step towards successfully procuring a project, such as the UHSGT project, under a P3
agreement.
2. Strong and broad supply of infrastructure capital (capital market)
The existence of a strong, liquid capital market is essential to securing capital investment for
infrastructure deals. This is illustrated both in the U.S. and the Canadian market. As evidenced in the
Eglinton Crosstown LRT case study, the project could generate over $1 billion of private financing that
included bank financing, equity contributions from the consortium, and access to capital markets
without the need for any government contribution. This indicates that there is a strong supply side that
should be potentially interested in investing in the UHSGT project.
Building on this argument, it is important to engage the industry during the early stages of a project. For
instance, according to MyHSR (Malaysia), the government agency responsible for the Kuala Lumpur-
Singapore HSR, obtaining industry feedback is key to ensure a successful tender. It issued a Request for
Information as a market-sensing exercise to refine and validate options to ensure a successful tender
process. It recently organized two industry briefing sessions (in Singapore and London), which were
attended by representatives from about 300 international and local entities, in which topics such as
financing, technical issues, program, and timeline were discussed along with other general concerns.
3. Government guarantees and infrastructure bank support
The Tours-Bordeaux HSR case study illustrates the importance of institutional and governmental support
in the form of government-backed debt. The involvement of an infrastructure bank or the contribution
of a state subsidy could be determinants in mobilizing private investment in an HSR deal. This could be
particularly important in the UHSGT project as the high CapEx required implies that the project may
require significant ridership to achieve financial returns. This could be a deterrent for private investors;
however, contributions from government subsidies, a government-backed debt, or the involvement of
the CIB could encourage private investments.
4. Established procurement and delivery models
Efficient and established procurement methods are another key factor in a successful P3 agreement.
Most P3 activity is seen in areas where there are established procurement processes, such as Europe
(particularly in the United Kingdom and France), Australia, and Canada. This is another area where the
project can benefit from the Canadian practice. At the project level, ensuring that there is a trusted
partnership is fundamental to successful project delivery. To achieve this, it is important for both parties
to provide transparent and objective information about the level of performance under the contract.

5. Understanding of key delivery and operational risks

A successful financial and business case for major transportation infrastructure projects relies on robust
analysis of delivery and operational risks. Three risks—revenue risk, construction risk, and
technical/integration risk—should be assessed to identify the financial condition of a project. The
France-Spain project illustrates some of the consequences of not assessing these risks fully, particularly
revenue risk and technical integration risk.
The risks are described below:
• Revenue risk: The risk that project revenues—from user charges or other sources—are materially
different from forecast revenues, particularly if actual revenues are much lower than forecast,
resulting in a lower fare recovery ratio.
• Construction risk: Effective management of project schedule and budget, with appropriate transfer
of risk to the private sector, is fundamental to the success of infrastructure investment projects.
• Technical/integration risk: Rail systems are particularly affected by this risk because of the necessity
of integrating the project with civil infrastructure assets and connecting new rail routes with existing
infrastructure.
6.3 Cross-Border Issues

This section provides a high-level overview of existing governance models that are commonly used for
multi-state infrastructure projects in the U.S.
Cross-border and multi-state infrastructure projects require extensive coordination between the
relevant countries and/or states, and other key stakeholders. An effective governance structure should
support long-term investment across a range of financing options and delivery models. Coordination
must cover several complex issues related to planning and development of the overall business case,
while at the same time considering each state/country’s technical standards and regulatory, financial,
political, and institutional requirements.
Best practices illustrate that successful cross-border HSR projects have a governance structure with clear
lines of authority, responsibility, and a mandate to facilitate the coordination and implementation of the
project across the two different jurisdictions. Table 6-4 outlines eight multi-state governance models
used in the U.S. for developing and progressing passenger rail projects for different phases of project
development, drawing on the work carried out for the FRA Southeast Regional Rail Study. 48
Table 6-4. Description of Alternative Multi-State Governance Models
Phase of
No. Model Definition Examples
Development
1 Coordinated Where two or more states agree Visioning Pacific Northwest Rail Corridor (Amtrak
State Efforts to coordinate passenger rail Planning Cascades, see subsequent section)
efforts within their respective South Central High-Speed Rail Corridor
states.
2 Coalition/ Where multi-state partners Midwest High-Speed Rail Steering Group
Partnership convene on a voluntary basis to I-95 Coalition
carry out activities of common
Coalition of Northeastern Governors
interest. May also be carried out
Visioning Midwest Regional Rail Initiative Steering
in coordination with a non-profit
corporation. Planning Committee
Amtrak Northeast Corridor (NEC) Infrastructure
Master Plan
Working Group
48 CH2M, 2017, Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation: Cross Border Issues.

Table 6-4. Description of Alternative Multi-State Governance Models

Phase of
No. Model Definition Examples
Development
3 Single State Where an existing or newly Design Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac Corridor
Agency created entity within a single Construction Northern New England Passenger Rail
Contracting state addresses multi-state Authority
with or on interests, primarily through Operations and
Behalf of contractual arrangements with Maintenance
Other States other states.
4 Public- Where the government and the Design All Aboard Florida
Private private sector enter into an Construction Texas Central Railway
Partnership arrangement that allows for
greater private-sector Operations and Indianapolis-Chicago Hoosier State Service
participation in the delivery of Maintenance
transportation projects.
5 Multi-State Where two or more states Planning Southeast High-Speed Rail Corridor Project:
Commission coordinate multistate interests Preliminary Virginia-North Carolina
through a formal agreement that Design Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail
establishes a governing body.
Commission
6 Multi-State Where an independent entity, Design Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

Special often a distinct governmental Construction Authority
Authority body, delivers a limited number Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
of public services within defined Operations and
boundaries across state lines and Maintenance
can exercise a broad range of
typical governmental powers.
7 Federal- Where a body of federal, state, Planning Appalachian Regional Commission

State and, sometimes, local leaders NEC Infrastructure Operations and Advisory
Commission organize to address a critical Commission
need.
8 Freight Where freight railroads lead Design No current examples

Railroads delivery of passenger rail Construction
services.
Operations and
Maintenance
Source: CH2M, 2017, Ultra High-Speed Ground Transportation: Cross Border Issues.
6.4 U.S.– Canadian Cross-Border Arrangements

This section considers selected case studies for current cross-border arrangements for links between the
U.S. and Canada, to inform possible arrangements for cross-border high-speed services.
Canada and the U.S. are major trading partners: in 2015, Canada was the largest export market for the
U.S. and the second largest importer. There are various transportation modes that enable the flow of
goods between the two countries, and, across the Washington state and British Columbia border.
WSDOT has stewardship responsibilities for ground transportation within Washington, and has influence
over cross-border transportation services with BC. Similarly, the Ministry of Transportation and
Infrastructure for British Columbia has stewardship and planning responsibilities for most ground
transportation services within, or originating within, British Columbia.
In this context, some relevant current U.S.-Canada cross-border governance arrangements were
considered, drawing mainly on current practice and examples, while noting regulatory arrangements
and any controls on cross-border movements for each example described.

6.4.1 Amtrak Cascades Rail Service

Amtrak Cascades is the current passenger rail service that operates in the northwest corridor between
the U.S. and Canada (Eugene, Oregon, to Vancouver, BC). The service is owned by the states of
Washington and Oregon and operated by Amtrak (the U.S. National Railroad Passenger Corporation) in
partnership with British Columbia, over rail infrastructure owned by different “host railroads” that are
large publicly traded companies, such as UPRR in the U.S., and the Canadian National Railway. 49 Amtrak
pays these rail infrastructure managers for access to their tracks and supporting infrastructure; access in
the U.S. is on an incremental basis based on U.S. statutory requirements.
The funding of the service is primarily through the states of Oregon and Washington. In 2013, the U.S.
government shifted responsibility for funding the Cascades service to the states to comply with the
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA) of 2008. As a result, the Cascades services are
funded through farebox revenue and state funds. Washington funds most of the services; as of
December 2017, this funding covers six daily round trips between Seattle and Portland. Washington also
funds two daily round trips between Seattle and Vancouver, BC. Oregon funds two daily round trips
between Eugene and Portland.
U.S. passengers traveling to Vancouver do not need to disembark for an immigration inspection at the
Canadian border, as they pass through Canadian customs at Vancouver Pacific Central station when they
arrive. Amtrak has an agreement with British Columbia that allows north bound trains to pass through
the U.S. - Canadian border without stopping. Importantly, the agreement improves the passenger
experience, as it reduces delays at the international border and allows faster connections because
passengers can exit their station immediately after arriving.
As of 2016, the Cascades service has a farebox recovery ratio of 59 percent and is the eighth busiest U.S.
passenger route with a total annual ridership of 817,000. 50 The Cascades service has an on-time
performance target of 88 percent, with a running time of approximately 9 hours between Portland and
Vancouver over the 344-mile (554-km) distance. Given the economic strength of the region and the
projected population growth, there is a tremendous opportunity for a new high-speed system to provide
a higher-quality and more time-efficient service.
Similar arrangements and governance models are used for other Amtrak cross-border passenger
services between the U.S. and Canada, including the Maple Leaf service from New York City to Toronto
and the Adirondack service from New York City to Montreal. However, these services do not benefit
from a border pre-clearance facility, with negative impacts on journey time and passenger experience. 51
6.4.2 St. Lawrence Seaway (Joint Commission)

The St. Lawrence Seaway is a system of locks, canals, and channels that cross eastern Canada and the
northeastern U.S., from Lake Ontario to the Atlantic Ocean. It facilitates transport of cargo ships from
the Atlantic Ocean to the end of Lake Superior.
Some of the locks are managed by the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation in Canada, while
others are managed by the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation in the U.S. The river section
downstream of Montreal, which is fully within Canadian jurisdiction, is regulated by the offices of
Transport Canada in the Port of Quebec.
An International Joint Commission was established in 1954. It helps with dispute settlement regarding
the use of boundary waters and provides advice to Canada and United States on issues related to water
resources. The joint commission decisions are not binding; it merely offers recommendations to both


governments. Even though the recommendations are not binding, they are usually accepted by both
governments.
6.4.3 Ferry Services Between Washington State and British Columbia

There are five separate ferry operators that provide direct services from Washington state to Victoria,
B.C. These involve traditional ferries, high-speed ferries, passenger-car ferries, and passenger-only
ferries. The Washington ferry network is the largest in the U.S.; it has 20 terminals and 10 routes
servicing 10.5 million vehicles and more than 23 million people annually. 52 British Columbia Ferries (BC
Ferries) is a publicly owned company subsidized by the BC government and the federal government of
Canada. It provides a range of major passenger and vehicle ferry services between BC and Washington.
There is no single entity that governs or regulates these maritime services. All operators, either state-
owned or private, comply with the existing collaborative law enforcement that exists between the U.S.
and Canada regarding lawful travel and trade. Since 2009, passports are required for all border
crossings. A brief identification check is carried out on all passengers before boarding the ferry, but
passengers pass through customs and immigration at the destination country.
6.4.4 Coach Services Between Washington State and British Columbia

Greyhound Lines, commonly known as Greyhound, is an intercity bus serving almost 4,000 destinations
within North America. Greyhound offers a service from Seattle to Vancouver, and an express bus (“Bolt
Bus”) from Seattle to Portland. Other private operators of cross-border coach services include Quick
Shuttle. As with the ferry services, there is no single entity that controls and regulates the coach
services. While these services can be marginally faster and cheaper than the current Amtrak service,
they are often also subject to traffic congestion along their route, which is likely to worsen as traffic
increases.
There are 13 roadway border crossings between Washington and British Columbia. The most highly used
of the 13 are the four westernmost crossings near Vancouver. Coaches (and all other road traffic) are
subject to full border controls at each of these crossings.
6.5 Selected International Examples of Governance Models

for High-Speed Rail
6.5.1 London–Paris High-Speed Rail
The London–Paris HSR route is an example of a vertically separated railway, with several service
operators and infrastructure managers under an overall governance framework mandated by the
European Commission, which applies to both the UK and France. 53
HS1 is the UK infrastructure manager of 109 km of high-speed track running from London’s St. Pancras
International Station to the Channel Tunnel. SNCF Reseau is the French infrastructure manager
responsible for the rail network between the Channel Tunnel and Paris, and for almost all other rail
infrastructure within France. Eurotunnel is the infrastructure manager for the Channel Tunnel. The
revenue stream for all three infrastructure managers is primarily in the form of access fees that the
operating companies (OpCos), in particular Eurostar, pay to use the track and associated facilities (such

as signaling and electrification systems). Eurostar is the international operator of passenger services
between London and Paris/Brussels.
A trans-European regulatory and governance framework has been developed by the European
Commission, which applies equally to HS1, Eurotunnel, SNCF Reseau, Eurostar, and other operators such
as freight companies. Additionally, the British and French governments have certain rights and
responsibilities for the Channel Tunnel and cross-border services, primarily relating to safety, security,
and land ownership, implemented originally through the 1992 Treaty of Canterbury. The overall
governance framework, illustrated in Figure 6-2, provides for regulation of passenger rail services
between the two countries, and constrains and defines cash-flow streams between the key
stakeholders.
As can be seen in Figure 6-2, a concession agreement was originally granted to Eurostar by the two
governments. Eurostar has entered into access agreements with the infrastructure managers, under
which Eurostar is responsible for paying access charges to the three infrastructure managers. To
constrain monopoly power and produce incentives for efficiencies, the infrastructure managers are
regulated by British and French economic regulators as shown below. The joint Inter-Governmental
Commission (IGC) retains certain responsibilities as the economic and safety regulator of the Channel
Tunnel. However, it has in practice delegated most of its economic regulation responsibilities to the UK
regulator, the Office of Rail and Road (ORR).
Under a system known as “juxtaposed controls” agreed between Belgium, France, and the UK, pre-
clearance immigration checks for Eurostar cross-channel services take place before boarding the train,
rather than upon arrival. Immigration entry checks are carried out at UK stations before embarkation by
the French Border Police. When traveling from Belgium or France to the UK by Eurostar, passengers
clear immigration through exit checks from the Schengen Area, as well as UK immigration entry checks,
before boarding the train. However, on Eurostar during customs checks passengers remain, and
continue to take place upon arrival after leaving the train.
Figure 6-2. Governance and Regulatory Framework for London-Paris HSR Passenger Services
6.5.2 Kuala Lumpur–Singapore High-Speed Rail

The Kuala Lumpur (KL) to Singapore High Speed Rail line is a proposed 350-km cross-border high-speed
rail link between Malaysia and Singapore that is due to be operational by 2026. The travel time from KL
to Singapore should be reduced to 90 minutes compared to the current rail travel time of up to 7 hours.
The project will deliver eight new stations, with seven in Malaysia and one in Singapore.

The governance model for the KL–Singapore HSR system considers the agreed delivery model, the
system’s operational characteristics, and the overall regulatory and market environment in the countries
involved. This governance model is presented in Figure 6-3. As can be seen in Figure 6-3, similar to the
St. Lawrence Seaway, there is a bilateral agreement between the two countries to establish a joint
commission, the “Bilateral Committee,” which consists of representatives of both governments. The
Bilateral Committee is responsible for regulation and management of the compliance framework for
access to the HSR infrastructure and assets, the certification and licensing needed, and the
harmonization between the two countries (including the dispute settlement process).
Figure 6-2. Regulatory Framework for Kuala Lumpur–Singapore HSR line

As with the European model used for London–Paris services, for the KL–Singapore HSR line there is a
vertical separation of infrastructure managers and operating companies. One key difference between
the KL–Singapore model and the London–Paris model is that, as can be seen in Figure 6-3, the
infrastructure managers outsource the operation of most rail assets to the assets company (AssetsCo).
Commercial access agreements are envisaged between AssetsCo and the OpCos, under which the
AssetsCo allows access to the OpCos in return for access payments.
The Malaysian and Singaporean governments have agreed on a set of arrangements for CIQ (Customs,
Immigration and Quarantine) to provide pre-clearance checks for international passengers between KL
and Singapore at the relevant departing station; for example, passengers boarding at KL for the direct
express service to Singapore would clear customs and border checks at CIQ facilities in the new Bandar,
Malaysia international station in KL. However, passengers boarding at domestic Malaysian stations to
travel to Singapore will need to disembark at Iskandar Puteri station in Southern Malaysia, where the
domestic service terminates. CIQ checks will then be carried out at Iskandar Puteri station before
passengers can board a short shuttle service to Singapore. The same arrangements apply in reverse for
passengers traveling from Singapore to domestic Malaysian stations.
6.5.3 France-Spain New High-Speed Line under a P3 Model: Perpignan to

Figueres
This HSR project involved the development of a 45-km high-speed link from Perpignan (France) to
Figueres (Spain), including an 8-km tunnel to pass through the Pyrenees. The concession was awarded at
the beginning of 2004. The line was constructed under a P3 agreement that involved the winning
consortium TP Ferro (a joint venture between two construction companies, Eiffage from France and ACS
from Spain) and the two governments. More than half of the CapEx was equally funded by the two
governments, while the remaining CapEx was provided through equity from the TP Ferro shareholders
and through bank debt. TP Ferro’s revenues were from track access and energy supply charges, both of
which are related to the traffic levels of the line.
The initial HSR passenger traffic was around 35 percent of the level forecast by the concessionaire,
mainly due to capacity issues and significant competition from air services due to the development of
low-cost services in this corridor. Similarly, freight traffic was only 15 percent of the level forecast by the
concessionaire. The low freight traffic was primarily due to:
• An infrastructure limit on track access in Spain, as a large portion of freight traffic requires a change
of gauge between the two countries
• A lack of powerful, interoperable locomotives for the route
Due to these issues, most of the international traffic has been carried on the old (existing) rail line. Given
the poor performance of the new line, TP Ferro was unable to repay its debt and it commenced
insolvency processes.
The concession agreement covered the actions to be taken in the case of bankruptcy of the
concessionaire. The two governments were responsible for ensuring a continuous service. When TP
Ferro became insolvent, the operation of the line was awarded to two infrastructure managers (one
Spanish, ADIF, and one French, SNCF Reseau). Furthermore, the two governments were responsible for
repaying the non-performing loans and for compensating the shareholders for their contributions in
equity that had not been recovered by the revenues of the company.
6.6 Categories of Governance Models: Initial Issues

Based on the case studies summarized above and considering the range of financing and delivery
models described in Section 6.2, some common features and initial issues were identified for four broad
categories of governance models. Most of the governance models outlined in this section are not
specific to any financing solution for the construction phase of the project. The exception is the
P3/Private Finance model, which represents a combined financing and governance model, where the
private sector is involved in financing the project.
This section discusses these broad categories and initial issues, including consideration of advantages
and disadvantages of each type of model.
6.6.1 P3/Private Finance

Major rail projects often implement some form of P3 arrangement to involve the private sector in
certain elements of the project. The project sponsor and public partner will typically aim to achieve the
best technical solution using the least public funding. Therefore, the public authority will often seek to
share its responsibilities for project delivery and project finance with a private partner. It is critical for
the public partner to make sure the private partner selected can succeed in both areas when developing
a P3 agreement.

The selected P3 structure needs to allocate risks to the party best able to bear them, which will depend
on the type and scale of the project and the maturity of the market for each element of the project. For
example, the rolling stock leasing market in the UK is now quite mature and stable, so UK government
agencies can proceed with a P3 solution for procurement of new rolling stock with some confidence. In
the U.S., the market is generally less mature (for projects promoted at the state level, at least), and so
this element would typically be procured through other methods, with the public sector taking more
risk.
P3 models also entail specific types of delivery risk, for example, the risk that the public sector is
required to bail out a failed private sector provider if major risks occur. This scenario is illustrated by the
France-Spain P3 line, where extremely low traffic compared to forecast led to the bankruptcy of the
AssetsCo. P3 agreements and international agreements between countries should allow for this
possibility and provide clauses to guarantee the operation of the service and other consequences of a
bankruptcy of the infrastructure manager (such as re-tendering of the concession, management of the
line during the transition, compensation to the different parties, etc.).
6.6.2 Single Country Delivery and Management for Operations

An agency based in a single country that provides services to or on behalf of other countries is a feasible
option for operating cross-border high-speed rail services, irrespective of the financing model used for
the construction phase. A version of this model is used for the current Amtrak Cascades service and has
close analogues among the U.S. multi-state models considered in Section 6.3. Also, this governance
model is used for delivery of rail services through the Gotthard tunnel through the Alps.
6.6.3 Joint Commission or Joint Project Company

Another popular model is forming a joint commission that will act as the delivery agency/regulator for
the project, representing both countries. This model typically requires a formal agreement between the
two countries that will identify the funding, powers, and responsibilities of the joint commission.
This model should ensure that the objectives of both countries are considered when planning and
delivering the infrastructure project. The joint commission should have the capability to address issues
and disputes such as cost-sharing; this issue proved important for the St. Lawrence Seaway. Establishing
a joint commission can take time and may be complex, depending on differences in regulatory and
governance frameworks. One way to potentially avoid this issue is to create a joint project company,
where the two countries still have representatives and equity, but the regulatory and legal procedures
are more straightforward.
6.6.4 Vertical Separation Models

In Europe, vertical separation is required for provision of rail services between the infrastructure
manager and the (usually incumbent) operating company. Vertical separation is usually helpful for the
development of competition and achieving more efficient railway systems. This model is illustrated by
the London-Paris HSR route, where the infrastructure managers (HS1, Eurotunnel, and SNCF Reseau) are
responsible for managing the assets (i.e., the track and associated infrastructure) and the OpCos
(primarily Eurostar) are responsible for the operation and maintenance of train services. The revenue
streams for the OpCos are primarily derived from farebox revenue while the revenue streams for the
infrastructure managers from are track access charges from the OpCos. A similar structure has been
developed for the KL-Singapore route. However, for the KL-Singapore HSR line, the infrastructure
managers outsource the network management to an AssetsCo.

6.7 Study Findings

This section identified potential financing and governance models that should be considered for the
Vancouver-Seattle-Portland UHSGT project and examined existing structures and models applied in
practice on existing cross-border infrastructure and comparable international systems. The applicability
of these models was assessed with reference to selected case studies.
As outlined in Section 6.2, there is a variety of financing and delivery arrangements that offer different
profiles of risks and responsibilities between private and public partners. The current U.S.-Canada
arrangements discussed in Section 6.4 demonstrate that the two countries are already cooperating
effectively on other transportation and infrastructure projects, and have already developed solutions for
some complex cross-border issues such as arrangements for Customs and Borders Protection.
To manage the cross-border issues and identify an appropriate governance and finance structure for the
Vancouver-Portland UHSGT project, the regulatory environment and funding capability of each country
should be assessed in more detail. Identifying the country-specific issues is a critical step in determining
which governance structure and financing model is most appropriate to use for the project. As explained
below, this would be a key area of focus for any future work.

SECTION 7
Next Steps - Recommendations

Successful development of UHSGT between Vancouver, BC, Seattle, and Portland, Oregon faces many
challenges ahead related to technology choices, planning and permitting, funding and financing,
navigating an international intergovernmental agreement to manage and oversee a complex project,
and system construction and operation. These challenges can be overcome with sufficient preparation
and commitments. To lay this groundwork, development of UHSGT in Cascadia will require further study
to address informational gaps, and assess the practicality and business case for a project with higher
resolution. A series of recommended action items are outlined below for consideration.
7.1 Cascadia Transportation System

• Perform a next phase corridor planning study to include:
– A conceptual corridor design analysis (technology neutral) that would identify any specific issues
that arise when using one technology over another.
– Potential station locations and service scenarios relative to market demand.
– International HSR projects and US/Canadian infrastructure projects including enterprise lessons
learned and their application to this UHSGT corridor.
– Transportation system market trends and projections including land use and congestion.
– Operational models that enhance multimodal integration and increase transportation system
efficiency.
– Analysis of the economic environment and structural changes to the relationship between
Cascadia sub-regions to accurately examine potential demand.
7.2 Ridership
• Enhance ridership evaluation to inform and support the corridor planning study that incorporates:
– A better understanding of potential ridership origin and destination (O/D) and trip preference
including demand elasticity by conducting a robust, corridor-wide travel survey and stated
preference survey.
– Advanced travel demand modeling between Vancouver-Seattle-Portland with more
sophisticated capability than is available with CONNECT.
– Optimizing service offering by examining tradeoffs of maximizing revenue vs. maximizing
ridership.
– Market share, including an estimate of latent demand and sensitivity to changes in congestion,
fuel/energy and parking costs.
7.3 Governance and Economic Framework

• Set up an initial, informal U.S./Washington-Oregon and Canada/British Columbia governmental
commission to assist in the planning of the next steps in this program, including determining by
phase the formal institutional framework to progress this cross-border international program.

SECTION 7. NEXT STEPS
• Expand governance and economic framework of corridor planning (business case) study that
examines:
− Structural growth and shifts in the regional economy, which may be affected by changes in the
US and Canadian economies (consistent with last sub-bullet under 7.1).
− Benefit/cost analysis with emphasis on transportation costs of all modes, travel time savings,
reliability, including congestion, health, safety, and environmental costs.
− Public and private partnership scenarios.
− Plausible economic impacts changes to sectors and industries over time.
− Sensitivities to latest assumptions such as fuel/energy prices, and connected and autonomous
vehicles.
− Governance and regulatory structure conducive to moving regional priorities and the cross-
border bi-national and bi-state program forward.
7.4 Funding and Financing

• Further evaluate funding and financing mechanisms to inform and support corridor business case
study that looks at:
– Risk analyses to assess optimum risk transfer and highest value of money (VfM).
– Regulatory challenges and advancing investment opportunities such as infrastructure banks.
– Applicability of alternative transportation funding mechanisms such as carbon fees.
– Financial responsibilities and cost sharing model options.
– Revenue and farebox recovery.
7.5 Stakeholder Involvement

• Strengthen focused involvement of key stakeholders who could help guide and advocate, and
provide financial and additional resource assistance from public and private sectors to successfully
develop and implement corridor planning and business case study.
7.6 Short-Term Rail Planning Consistent with the Longer-

Term UHSGT program
• Conduct rail planning consistent with this study that includes an examination of the following
– Steps required for a subsequent round of incremental improvements to the existing Pacific
Northwest Rail Corridor.
– The expansion of rail services, north from both Portland and Seattle to Vancouver, to determine
right-of-way, geographic, railroad, or capacity limitations.
• In a separate but coordinated study/plan process, examine future rail service on the East-West
Stampede Pass corridor from Seattle to Spokane.

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DRAFT FINAL REPORT

Ultra High-Speed Ground

Washington State Department of

CH2M HILL, Inc.

PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION iii

PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v

PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ix

RRIF Railroad Rehabilitation Improvement and Financing

x PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

1.2 Study Purpose and Approach

PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 1-1

1-2 PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Vision for Ultra High-Speed Ground

Figure 2-1. Professional Network Connections of Seattle and Vancouver Residents

PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 2-1

2-2 PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

2.2 Cascadia Megaregion Context

Figure 2-2. Cascadia Megaregion

9 Todorovich, P. and Y. Hagler, 2011, High Speed Rail in America.

10 Todorovich, P. and Y. Hagler, 2011, High Speed Rail in America.

PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 2-3

2.2.2 Transportation Network

11 Except the Point Defiance Bypass, which is owned by Sound Transit.

2-4 PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Figure 2-5. Amtrak Cascades Passenger Miles

12 WSDOT, 2016, Amtrak Cascades: 2016 Performance Data Report.

PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 2-5

Table 2-2. Existing Travel Choices Portland to Seattle

13 Todorovich, P. and Y. Hagler, 2011, High Speed Rail in America.

14 Price of business class ticket.

15 Price of business class ticket.

16 Todorovich, P. and Y. Hagler, 2011, High Speed Rail in America.

2-6 PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

High-speed Rail 220 mph 250 mph 1,500 4.7 miles 4%

Maglev 270 mph 375 mph 824 5.7 miles 10%

3.1 High-Speed Rail (Steel Wheel)

PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 3-1

Table 3-2. Length of the World’s High-Speed Rail Network by 2035

Lines Under Construction 16 countries 8,859 miles

Lines Planned 36 countries 22,126 miles

Total 43 countries 56,294 miles

3.1.1 Future Development of High-Speed Rail

3.2 Magnetic Levitation (Maglev)

3.2.1 Electromagnetic Suspension

3-2 PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

3.2.2 Electrodynamic Suspension

Figure 3-2. Schematic Diagram of EDS Maglev System

PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 3-3

Figure 3-3. Shanghai Maglev Train

3.2.3 Future Development

Figure 3-4. Chuo Shinkansen Map

3-4 PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Lines under construction 1 country 177.5 miles (285.6 km)

Lines planned 1 country + various studies 95 miles (152 km)

3.3.1 Hyperloop Case Uses

PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 3-5

3.3.2 Current Development and Studies

3-6 PREPARED FOR WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION