THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 160933, November 24, 2010

NICEAS M. BELONGILOT, Petitioner,
vs.
ROLANDO S. CUA, ROEL ERIC C. GARCIA, LORENZO R.
REYES, AUGUSTO P. QUIJANO, IANELA G. JUSI-BARRANTES
and SALVADOR P. RAMOS, Respondents.
PONENTE: BRION, J.

Facts:
Petitioners wife, Leonarda was the owner of several parcels
of land covered by OCT 0-359. In 1979, Juanito Constantino
forcibly entered and took possession of certain lots covered
by the OCT, and converted them into a fishpond. Leonarda
filed an ejectment complaint against Juanito in the PARAB.
On 21 May 2001, the PARAB directed Juanito to vacate.
Juanito moved to reconsider, but was denied. On 8 October
2001, Juanito filed a notice of appeal in PARAB, but was
dismissed on 16 April 2002 for late filing.

On 22 May 2002, PARAB issued a writ of execution. On 21

May 2002, Juanito filed a petition for injunction with
application for a TRO in DARAB, without asking for
reconsideration of the dismissal of his notice of appeal. On
31 May 2002, the writ was enforced and evicted Juanito.
On 15 November 2002, the DARAB issued a TRO in Juanitos
favor. On 21 November 2002, Leonarda moved to dismiss
the petition for injunction alleging that DARAB has no
jurisdiction over the petition because Juanito failed to moved
to reconsider the 16 April 2002 PARAD order.

When Juanito harvested bangus and sugpo fingerlings from

fishpond and sold them, petitioner filed a complaint for
qualified theft at PNP Bulacan. Meanwhile, on 27 December
2002, the DARAB granted Juanitos application for a writ of
injunction and enjoined the implementation of the writ of
execution. On 20 January 2003, petitioner filed with
Ombudsman an amended criminal complaint for violation of
Section 3(e) RA 3019 against respondents in their capacity
as officers and members of DAR and DARAB, respectively.

On 10 June 2003, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint

on the ground that the issue of jurisdiction of DARAB to act
on the petition for injunction and issuance of TRO despite of
finality of PARAD decision due to late filing of notice of
appeal is better addressed to the courts which has
supervisory powers over administrative agencies performing
quasi-judicial functions. Petitioner moved to reconsider, but
was denied on 20 October 2003 ruling that Juanitos non-
filing of a motion for reconsideration was not fatal to his
case. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the proper mode of appeal assailing the
Ombudsman decision [criminal action] is petition review
on certiorari under Rule 45 and not petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. [NO. But is allowed when the substance
of the petition satisfies the requirements of a Rule 65
petition for certiorari]
2. Whether or not Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed the complaint. [YES]
3. Whether or not DARABs grant of writ of injunction was
not proper to the prejudice of petitioner. [YES]

Ruling:

Petition is Granted.

I. Procedural Issue

We note at the outset that the petitioner, in seeking to annul

the Ombudsmans Resolution and Order dated June 10,
2003 and October 20, 2003,[18] respectively, filed with this
Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

In Soriano v. Cabais,[19] this Court had the occasion to

discuss the appropriate recourse to take from decisions or
resolutions of the Ombudsman, and said:

In Fabian, we ruled that appeals from the decisions

of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. This ruling
has been repeatedly reiterated in subsequent cases and
continues to be the controlling doctrine.

Here, petitioners complaint is criminal in

nature. In Estrada v. Desierto, we held that the remedy
of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of
the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal
cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original
action for certiorari with this Court, not with the Court
of Appeals. In cases when the aggrieved party is
questioning the Office of the Ombudsmans finding
of lack of probable cause, as in this case, there is likewise
the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to be filed with this
Court and not with the Court of Appeals. This rule was
subsequently restated in Acua v. Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon where we held that the remedy of an aggrieved
party in criminalcomplaints before the Ombudsman is to
file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

The petitioners complaint before the Ombudsman, charging

the respondents with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, is undoubtedly criminal in nature. The
petitioners recourse to this Court should have, therefore,
been through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, instead
of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Thus,
from a procedural perspective, the OSGs claim that the
petitioner availed of the wrong remedy appears to be
correct.

We would have readily agreed with the OSGs

conclusion had the petitioner simply dwelt on errors of law in
his petition. Our reading of the petition, however, and as our
discussions below will show, readily reveals that the petition,
while entitled and presented as a petition for review
on certiorari, in fact, outlines and charges acts that
collectively constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Ombudsman.[20] In other words, while the petitioner followed
the Rule 45 procedures, the substance of the petition
handily satisfies the requirements of a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari. Thus viewed, the issue before us is whether
the procedure and its form or substance should have
primacy.

Our choice when faced with this kind of conflict,

particularly one that involves grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, is clear. No less
than the Constitution under Section 1, Article VIII expressly
directs the Judiciary, as a matter of power and duty, not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable but, to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. We,
thus, have the duty to take cognizance of the allegations of
grave abuse of discretion; in the performance of this duty,
we see no legal stumbling block if we deviate from the
requirements of form and procedure that stand in the way in
favor of substance.[21]
II. The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue

Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public
officer concerned, which is equivalent to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.[22]

A careful review of the petition and an examination of

the records reveal a collective pattern of action done
capriciously, whimsically and without regard to existing rules
and attendant facts that shows a clear case of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
the exercise of judgment. We discuss all these below.

a. The Ombudsman erred in refusing to act on the

petitioners criminal complaint

The Ombudsman, in its resolution of June 10, 2003, did

not give a definitive ruling on whether there was probable
cause to hold respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019; instead, it dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the issue was better addressed to the Court
which has administrative and supervisory powers over
administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial
functions.[23]

To justify its refusal to take cognizance of the

complaint, it cited the 1980 case of Citizens League of Free-
Workers v. Court of Industrial Relations.[24] We find this
reliance misplaced, as the facts and ruling in this cited case
are totally foreign to the present case. This cited case dealt
with the issue of whether this Court could review the Court
of Industrial Relations refusal to act on a late breaking
development in the case the unions motion for
reinstatement and payment of backwages whose denial was
alleged to be constitutive of an unfair labor practice act. The
Court ruled that it was grave abuse of discretion for the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations to refuse to
consider and resolve the belatedly brought unfair labor
practice charge: the labor courts action was rigid and severe
in its application of the Industrial Peace Act (Commonwealth
Act No. 103), and disregarded the fact that the new charge
referred to new developments related to the unfair labor
charge already pending with the labor court.

This ruling involving a labor case under the Industrial

Peace Act has no relevance whatsoever to the issue
presented before the Ombudsman, i.e., whether there was
probable cause to indict respondents for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. If the ruling is remotely related at all,
it is on the point of whether the lower tribunal should act on
a matter that, by law, is under its jurisdiction. From this
perspective, the cited law, in fact, supports the petitioners
case. In the same manner that the labor court should have
entertained the belated charge of unfair labor practice, the
Ombudsman should have squarely ruled on the question of
whether probable cause exists in the criminal complaint
brought before it.

We note that instead of ruling on the issue of probable

cause, the Ombudsman simply held that the propriety of the
restraining order and injunction the DARAB ordered is a
matter better addressed to the Court which has
administrative and supervisory powers over administrative
agencies performing quasi-judicial functions.[25] In short, the
Ombudsman viewed the case as a recourse the
petitioner had taken against the restraining order and
injunction the DARAB issued, not as a criminal charge
for having violated the anti-graft law in issuing the
restraining order/injunction. In this light, the
Ombudsmans action is undoubtedly one tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, as it made the wrong considerations in
ruling on the probable cause issue.[26]

The Ombudsmans duty to act on the petitioners

complaint is undisputed. The mandate of the Ombudsman is
expressed in Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution which
states:

Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as

protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases,
notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof.

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution enumerates the

powers, functions, and duties of the Ombudsman, among
which is to:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,

any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

The Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) likewise

provides:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of

the Ombudsman shall have the following power, functions
and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
 inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it
may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of government, the
investigation of such cases.

These constitutional and statutory provisions grant the

Ombudsman full and unqualified authority, as well as the
duty, to investigate and prosecute violations of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. They embody the duty to
rule on probable cause issues that the Ombudsman cannot
shirk away from. By ruling as it did, the Ombudsman
effectively ran away from this duty.

b. The Existence of Probable Cause

The Ombudsman attempted to remedy its error by

stating in its Order denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, that [t]he alleged procedural infirmities
committed by the public respondents in issuing the
Restraining Order and the Resolution do not, by themselves,
establish a demonstrable violation of the provision of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019.[27] Generally, we do not interfere with the
Ombudsmans authority to determine the presence or
absence of probable cause, except when the finding is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. But when, as in this case, the
Ombudsman does not take essential facts into consideration
in the determination of probable cause, our intervention is in
order to correct the grave abuse of discretion.[28]

A finding of probable cause simply requires the

existence of facts that are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held
for trial. The facts of this case establish sufficient basis to
find probable cause to institute a charge for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In

addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including

the Government or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to
officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits
or other concessions.

Reduced to its elements, a violation under this provision

requires that:

1. the accused must be a public officer discharging

administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. he must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3. that his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.[29]

Among these elements, the first element is a given while the

third element is in part dependent on the second element;
the injury the petitioner suffered would be undue if the
second element is present. The second and critical element
provides the different modes for violating Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.

In Uriarte v. People,[30] this Court explained that Section 3(e)

of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the
accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality,
or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross
inexcusable negligence. There is manifest partiality when
there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection
to favor one side or person rather than another. Evident bad
faith connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and
patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral
obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive
or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-
interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. Gross inexcusable
negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of
even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[31]In
issuing the TRO and preliminary injunction, and accepting
Constantinos appeal, the respondents demonstrated
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable
negligence, which, oddly enough, the Ombudsman failed to
take into consideration in determining the existence of
probable cause.[32]

A glaring characteristic of the Ombudsmans handling of

the petitioners Section 3(e) charge is its patent failure to
note and consider the DARABs omission to observe the
most basic rules in considering a petition for
injunction and TRO, as we outline below.

First, the respondents granted the petition for injunction

when nothing could anymore be enjoined because the act
sought to be prevented or prohibited had already been
accomplished. We stress that the DARAB issued a TRO and a
preliminary injunction on November 15, 2002 and December
27, 2002, respectively. These came after the DARAB sheriff
had executed and placed the petitioner in possession on May
31, 2002, pursuant to the final and executory order of
PARAD Sapora. The execution was evidenced by the sheriffs
Implementation Report dated June 5, 2002.[33] The settled
rule is that an injunction would not lie where the acts sought
to be enjoined have become fait accompli an accomplished
or consummated act.[34]

Second, the respondents entertained the injunction

petition despite Constantinos failure to attach an affidavit of
merit, as required by Section 1, Rule X of the 1994 DARAB
Rules of Procedure (1994 DARAB Rules), which provides:

SECTION 1. Preliminary Injunction When Granted. A

preliminary injunction, restraining order or a status quo
order may be granted by the Board or any two (2) of its
Members or the Adjudicator, when it is established on the
basis of allegations in the sworn complaint or motion
which shall be duly supported by affidavits of merit
that the acts being complained of, if not enjoined,
would cause some grave and irreparable damage or
injury to any of the parties in interest so as to render
ineffectual the decision in favor of such party. Should
the Board or the Adjudicator believe that it is necessary to
post a bond, it shall fix the amount of the bond to be
executed by the party applying for the injunction in favor
of the party sought to be enjoined to answer for the
damages the latter might suffer thereby, if it is finally
determined that the complainant or petitioner is not
entitled thereto. Upon the filing and approval of such bond,
injunction may be issued.

The above situation raises questions not only on the

propriety of the TRO and the preliminary injunction, but for
purposes of the criminal complaint before the Ombudsman
on the character of the action made in relation to those who
acted.
 Apart from the questionable grant of the TRO and
preliminary injunction, the respondents also considered the
petition as an appeal, and ordered the elevation of the
records of the case, completely ignoring the fact that the
PARAD decision had not only become final, but had long
been executed.

Constantino received the May 21, 2001 PARAD

decision, through his counsel, on June 11, 2001; he filed a
motion for reconsideration on June 19, 2001. On September
27, 2001, Constantino received the PARADs order denying
his motion.[35] When Constantino filed his notice of appeal on
October 8, 2001, a total of 18 days had lapsed.[36]Section 1,
Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules provides for a period of
only 15 days from receipt of an order, resolution or decision
of the adjudicator to appeal it before the DARAB.[37] The
respondents, however, declared that the notice of appeal
was filed on time, erroneously counting the 15-day period
from the time Constantino himself received the PARAD
decision on June 14, 2001.[38] Under Section 4(b), Rule V of
the 1994 DARAB Rules, notice to the counsel is notice to the
party himself.

Neither can Constantinos petition for injunction be

considered as a certiorari petition (recognized under Section
3, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules [39] against the PARAD
order dismissing his notice of appeal. The provision declares
that a petition for certiorari filed with the DARAB cannot be
entertained without filing a motion for reconsideration with
the Adjudicator a quo within five days from receipt of the
order subject of the petition.

Under the above-listed circumstances, we hold that

enough indicators exist to convince a reasonable man that
the respondents grossly neglected to note and consider the
facts and the law in the petition for injunction filed before
them, to the proven prejudice of the petitioner. The
Ombudsman joined this chorus of neglect and committed
grave abuse of discretion when through the use of wrong or
irrelevant considerations and its own failure to properly
examine the underlying DARAB case it concluded that there
was no reason to charge the respondents of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. To be sure, the respondents
may have a valid defense against such charge, but the
merits of the petitioners case and the respondents defenses
must be ventilated in an appropriately filed criminal case
before the proper forum. In the meanwhile, the filing of a
criminal case is in order and one must first be brought
before the proper courts.

Lest this Decision be misinterpreted, we reiterate that

not every error of the Ombudsman in the determination of
probable cause can be directly submitted to this Court for
remedial action. We can only directly intervene through the
extraordinary writ of certiorari when, as in this case, a grave
abuse of discretion exists.