(2)

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

GR No. 171947-48; December 18, 2008

FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the
Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily
liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit
for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

(In 1999, the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CROMB) filed an action for mandamus to compel the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and other government agencies to clean up the
Manila Bay. CROMB argued that the environmental state of the Manila Bay is already dangerous to their
health and the inaction of MMDA and the other concerned government agencies violates their rights to life,
health, and a balanced ecology guaranteed by the Constitution. CROMB also averred under the
Environmental Code, it is MMDAs duty to clean up the Manila Bay.

The trial court agreed with CROMB and ordered MMDA et al to clean up the Manila Bay. MMDA assailed the
decision on the ground that MMDAs duty under the Environmental Code is merely a discretionary duty
hence it cannot be compelled by mandamus. Further, MMDA argued that the RTCs order was for a general
clean up of the Manila Bay yet under the Environmental Code, MMDA was only tasked to attend to specific
incidents of pollution and not to undertake a massive clean up such as that ordered by the court.)

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-
up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific
pollution incidents;

(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality. Where the
quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will adversely affect its best u
sage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to
upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20.
Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean -
up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and
expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible
for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident
occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific
pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will
adversely affect its best usage. Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific
pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope
that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution
incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in
nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as
continuing mandamus , the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the
end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of
procedure for environmental cases.

20 days Temporary restraining order

(3)
Resident Marine Mammals vs Secretary of Department of Energy
Case Digest GR 180771 April 21 2015

Facts:

In 2002, the Department of Energy entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract with
JAPEX, a 100% Japanese corporation, which was later converted to a service contract, known as SC-46,
for the exploration, development and utilization of petroleum resources in an area that basically affects
the Tanon Strait. The President at that time was not a signatory to the SC-46 and such contract was not
submitted to the Congress for review.

Tanon Strait is a narrow passage of water in Cebu which harbors a biodiversity of marine life and is
declared by laws as a protected seascape. When JAPEX started its seismic surveys and drilling activities
over the area, petitions were filed assailing the constitutionality of SC-46. One petition protesting the
activities for its ecological impact was in the name of Resident Marine Mammals which are literally
toothed whales, turtles and such, joined in by human petitioners referred to as Stewards, in their
representative as well as personal capacity. Pres. Arroyo was also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner,
purportedly because of her express declaration and undertaking under the ASEAN Charter to protect
habitats and other environmental concerns.

FIDEC, an organization committed to the welfare of marginal fisherfolk in the area, also questioned the
SC-46 on the ground that service contracts are no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution, and that if
it were, SC-46 is still null and void because it did not comply with the Constitution, most especially the
safeguards that the Court laid down in La Bugal Blaan case.

Remedial Law

Issue 1: W/N the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, have standing as the real party-in-
interests in this suit
Yes. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizens suit. A citizens suit under
this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law on behalf of
minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not
real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest.

Issue 2: W/N the name of former President Arroyo impleaded in the petition as an unwilling co-plaintiff is
proper

No. The name of Pres Arroyo as an unwilling plaintiff impleaded in the petition should be stricken from
the title of the case.

First, under Rule 3, Sec 10 of the ROC, when the consent of a party who should be joined as plaintiff
cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant. This will put the unwilling party under the
jurisdiction of the court, which may properly implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling
partys name cannot be simply included in the petition without her knowledge or consent, as this would be
a denial of due process.

Second, impleading the former President for an act she made in performance of the functions of her office
is contrary to the public policy against embroiling Presidents in suits.

Political Law

Issue 3: W/N service contracts are no longer allowed by the 1987 Constitution

No. As settled in the La Bugal case, the deletion of the words service contracts in the 1987 Constitution
did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional
Commission show that in deliberating on Art XII Sec 2(4), they were actually referring to service contracts
as understood in the 1973 Constitution. The framers, in short, used the term service contracts in
referring to agreements involving technical or financial assistance.

Issue 4: W/N SC-46 is valid

No. The SC-46 is not valid because it did not comply with the Art XII, Sec 2 (4) of the Constitution. First,
it was not crafted in accordance with a general law that provides standards, terms and conditions; second,
it was not signed by the President for and on behalf of the Philippine government; and third, it was not
reported by the President to the Congress within 30 days of execution.

(4)

Mosqueda vs Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association

G.R. No. 189185; August 16, 2016

Facts:

After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City

The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members,
namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et
al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance
 They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the
equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked
publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of Republic Act No. 7160

On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07
valid and constitutional

The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13] under the General
Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code;[14] that the ordinance, being based on a valid
classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from other
methods of pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk
caused by aerial drift;[15] and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and could
be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.

On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the
RTC.[22] It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being
unreasonable and oppressive;

The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and the
environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban
against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other.

Issues:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection
grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a
ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-
month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in
requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in
Davao City.

Ruling:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate powers
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance
with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be
appreciated.

Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their
exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of
Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically the
health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the City
of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line
separates authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government
and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of
local legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the States exercise of police power, the
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to 5ulfil the objectives
of the Government.[110] A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police
powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution;
the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.[112]Substantive due process requires that a
valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Governments action.[113] This means that in
exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact
the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate
public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without
unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the
plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three
months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the
ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of
business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.

The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking
without just compensation.

The position of the respondents is untenable.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes
confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause

The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection
secures every person within the States jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the States duly
constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs
impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to the
legitimate governmental objective.

Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals
determined according to a valid classification.[122] If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another.[123] In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2)
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable
to all members of the class.

In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies
herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means
and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial
spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons
or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.

Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift
causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification,
does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?We
answer in the negative.

The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any
mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that
may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to the
environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to
achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being underinclusive because the classification
does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate.[143] A
classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational
means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit;
AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring
Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

Principles:

Constitutional Law the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.

Political Law taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of
its property

(5)

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., vs.SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al.
G.R. No. 206510; September 16, 2014

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In

December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomaticclearance for the said vessel to
enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty. On January 6, 2013, the ship left
Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran
aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of
Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
 Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces
of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.

3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. Specifically, it

is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the act being challenged, and calls for more than just a generalized grievance. However,
the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject
matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the public right of citizens to
a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need
not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance
with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled
that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights,
they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.

Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy
who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting
in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing
official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against
the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over
the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
 During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the
conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067
and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically,
warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and
regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latters internal waters and the
territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy
sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the
coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting
from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with
the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this
Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes. A foreign warships unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage
to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-
standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the traditional uses of
the oceans as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its
disagreement with UNCLOS regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep
seabed commonly owned by mankind, pointing out that such has nothing to do with its the US
acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpios view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not
mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and
territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear international responsibility under Art. 31 in connection
with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the countrys
efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage
caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government
exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations
to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197
of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through
competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute.
Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal
States while navigating the latters territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the
territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they
will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated
for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be
inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation
of an environmental law is to be filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the
USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State
immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the
violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of
administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the
criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.

(6)
Paje vs Casino
G.R. No. 207257; February 3, 2015
Facts

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental Compliance

Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be implemented by RP Energy.

Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP
energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground that actual environmental
damage will occur if the power plant project is implemented and that the respondents failed to comply
with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the ECC. Both the
DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in invalidating the ECC and its amendments,
arguing that the determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of
a Petition for a Writ of kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.

Issues
 1. Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan;
and

2. Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan

Ruling

1. Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan
because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases)allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact and, thus,
constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because of the extraordinary nature of
the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.

2. Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is principally
predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political
and territorial boundaries.

A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an
ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or,
at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the
action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted relative to
the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the
issuance of the ECC.

(7)
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc., et.al. v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia (Philippines), et.al. (G.R. Nos. 209271, 209276, 209301 and 209430)
8 December 2015
BACKGROUND

In 1990, President Corazon Aquino signed Executive Order (EO) No. 430 creating the National
Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) which was tasked to identify and evaluate
potential hazards involved in initiating genetic engineering experiments and introducing new
species and genetically engineered organisms and recommend measures to minimize risks.

In 1991, NCBP formulated the Philippine Biosafety Guidelines which governs the regulation of the
importation or introduction, movement and field release of potentially hazardous biological
materials in the Philippines. The same was followed by the Guidelines on Planned Release of
Genetically Manipulated Organisms (GMOs) and Potentially Harmful Exotic Species (PHES).

On 29 December 1993, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) came into force. This is a
multilateral treaty recognizing the great potential of modern biotechnology for human well-being if
developed and used with adequate safety measures for the environment and human health.

In January 2000, an agreement was reached on the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena
Protocol), a supplement to the CBD, which aims to ensure an adequate level of safe transfer,
 handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology. The Philippines
signed the same on May 24 of the same year.

In April 2002, the Department of Agriculture (DA) issued DA Administrative Order No. 08 which
provides rules and regulations for the importation and release into the environment of plants and
plant products derived from the use of modern biotechnology.

On 17 March 2006, EO No. 514 (EO 514) entitled, Establishing the National Biosafety Framework
(NBF), Prescribing Guidelines for its Implementation, and Strengthening the NCBP was issued. It
expressly provides that DAO 2002-08, NCBP Guidelines on the Contained Use of GMOs, except for
provisions on potentially harmful exotic species which were repealed, and all issuances of the
Bureau of Food and Drugs Authority (FDA) on products of modern biotechnology, shall continue to
be in force and effect unless amended by the issuing departments or agencies.

FACTS

On 24 September 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking was executed between International

Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), University of the Philippines
Los Baos Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), in pursuance of a
collaborative research and development project on eggplants that are resistant to the fruit and
shoot borer. Other partner agencies involved were UPLB through its Institute of Plant Breeding,
Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company (MAHYCO) of India, Cornell University and the Agricultural
Biotechnology Support Project II (ABSPII) of USAID.

The UPLB Field Trial Proposal states that the pest-resistant crop subject of the field trial was
described as a bio-engineered eggplant. The crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) were incorporated into the eggplant genome to produce the protein CrylAc which
is toxic to target insect pests. The latter is said to be highly specific to lepidopteran larvae such as
fruit and shoot borer (FSB), the most destructive insect pest of eggplant.

NCBP issued a Certificate of Completion of Contained Experiment which was conducted from 2007
to 3 March 2009 stating that during the conduct of experiment, all the biosafety measures have
been complied with and no untoward incident has occurred.

On 16 March 2010 and 28 June 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) issued biosafety permits
to UPLB.

Field testing commenced on various dates in the following approved trial sites: Kabacan, North
Cotabato; Sta. Maria, Pangasinan; Pili, Camarines Sur; Bago Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay, Laguna.

On 26 April 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents (Greenpeace, et.al.) filed a
petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus with prayer for the issuance of
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) alleging that the Bt talong field trials violate
their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology considering that:

- The required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under PD 1151 was not secured
prior to the project implementation

- There is no independent, peer-reviewed study on the safety of Bt talong for human

consumption and the environment
 - There was a study conducted showing adverse effects on rats who were fed Bt corn, local
scientists likewise attested to the harmful effects of GMOs to human and animal health

- Bt crops can be directly toxic to non-target species

- There is a failure to comply with the required public consultation under Sections 26 and 27
of the Local Government Code

- The case calls for the application of the precautionary principle, it being a classic
environmental case where scientific evidence as to the health, environmental and socio-
economic safety is insufficient or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation indicates
reasonable grounds for concern that there are potentially dangerous effects on human
health and the environment

The following reliefs are prayed for by Greenpeace, et.al., to wit:

- Issuance of a TEPO enjoining BPI and Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) from processing for field testing and registering as
herbicidal product Bt talong in the Philippines, stopping all pending field testing, and
ordering the uprooting of planted Bt talong; and

- Issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus commanding the ISAAAI, et.al.: (1) to submit to
an environmental impact statement system under the Environmental Management Bureau
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR-EMB); (2) to submit an
independent, comprehensive, and rigid risk assessment, field tests report, and regulatory
compliance reports; (3) to submit all issued certifications on public information, public
consultation, public participation and consent from the LGUs affected by the field testing;
(4) to submit an acceptable draft of an amendment of the NBF and DAO 2002-08; and (5)
for BPI of DA to conduct balanced nationwide public information on the nature of Bt talong
and Bt talong field trial, and a survey of its social acceptability.

On 2 May 2012, the SC issued the writ of kalikasan against ISAAA, EMB, BPI, FPA and UPLB,
ordering them to file a verified return.

The contentions of the respondents are as follows:

- All environmental laws were complied with, including public consultations in the affected
communities

- The Bt talong project is not covered by the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement Law

- There is a plethora of scientific works and literature, peer-reviewed, on the safety of Bt

talong for human consumption

- Allegations regarding the safety of Bt talong are irrelevant in the field trial stage as none of
the eggplants will be consumed by humans or animals

- There is a non-observance of the rule on hierarchy of courts

- Greenpeace, et.al. have no legal standing as they do not stand to suffer any direct injury as
a result of the Bt talong field tests

- The precautionary principle does not apply since the field testing is only a part of a
continuing study to ensure that the field trials have no significant and negative impact on
the environment
 SC, in a Resolution dated 10 July 2012, referred the case to the Court of Appeals.

On 12 September 2012, the parties submitted the following procedural issues before the CA: (1)
whether Greenpeace, et.al. has legal standing to file the petition for writ of kalikasan; (2) whether
the petition has been rendered moot and academic by the alleged termination of the Bt talong field
testing; and (3) whether the case presented a justiciable controversy

CA, in a Resolution dated 12 October 2012, resolved that: (1) the Greenpeace, et.al. possess legal
standing; (2) the case is not yet moot since it is capable of repetition yet evading review; and (3)
the alleged non-compliance with environmental and local government laws present justiciable
controversies for resolution by the court.

On 17 May 2013, CA rendered a decision in favor of the Greenpeace, et.al. finding that the
precautionary principle set forth in Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (the Rules) finds relevance in the case.

CA rejected the Motions for Reconsideration filed by ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and UPLBFI
rejecting the argument that CA violated UPLBs right to academic freedom. The writ stops the field
trials of Bt talong as a procedure, it does not stop Bt talong research. Thus, there is no assault on
academic freedom.

CA further justified its ruling by expounding on the theory that introducing a genetically modified
plant into our ecosystem is an ecologically imbalancing act.

Before the SC is a consolidated petition of ISAAAI, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and UPLBFI to reverse the
CA decision permanently enjoining the conduct of field trials for Genetically Modified eggplants.

ISSUES

1. WON Greenpeace, et.al. has a legal standing

2. WON the case is moot and academic

3. WON there is a violation of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative
remedies

4. WON the law on environmental impact statement/assessment applies on projects involving the
introduction and propagation of GMOs in the country

5. WON there is neglect or unlawful omission committed by the public respondents in the processing
and evaluation of the applications for Bt talong field testing

6. WON the Precautionary Principle applies

RULING

1. Yes. The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in
the Rules collapses the tradional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are
stewards of nature, and aims to further encourage the protection of the environment.
2. No. The case falls under the capable of repetition yet evading review exception to the mootness
principle, the human and environmental health hazards posed by the introduction of a genetically
modified plant which is a very popular staple vegetable among Filipinos is an issue of paramount public
interest.

3. No. The provisions of DAO 2002-08 do not provide a speedy or adequate remedy for the respondents
to determine the questions of unique national and local importance raised in this case that pertain to
laws and rules for environmental protection, thus Greenpeace, et.al. is justified in coming to the
Supreme Court.

4. Yes. EO 514 mandates that concerned departments and agencies, most particularly petitioners DENR-
EMB, BPI and FPA, to make a determination whether the EIS system should apply to the release of
GMOs into the environment and issue joint guidelines on the matter.

The Philippine EIS System (PEISS) is concerned primarily with assessing the direct and indirect impacts of
a project on the biophysical and human environment and ensuring that these impacts are addressed by
appropriate environmental protection and enhancement measures. It aids proponents in incorporating
environmental considerations in planning their projects as well as in determining the environments impact
on their project. There are six stages in the regular EIA process. The proponent initiates the first three
stages while EMB takes the lead in the last three stages. Public participation is enlisted in most stages.

Even without the issuance of EO 514, GMO field testing should have at least been considered for EIA
under existing regulations of EMB on new and emerging technologies, to wit:

g) Group V (Unclassified Projects): These are the projects not listed in any of the groups, e.g.
projects using new processes/technologies with uncertain impacts. This is an interim category
unclassified projects will eventually be classified into their appropriate groups after EMB evaluation.
(Emphasis supplied)

All government agencies as well as private corporations, firms and entities who intend to undertake
activities or projects which will affect the quality of environment are required to prepare a detailed
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prior to undertaking such development activity.

An environmentally critical project (ECP) is considered by the EMB as likely to have significant adverse
impact that may be sensitive, irreversible and diverse and which include activities that have significant
environmental consequences.

In this context, and given the overwhelming scientific attention worldwide on the potential hazards of
GMOs to human health and the environment, their release into the environment through field testing
would definitely fall under the category of ECP.

5. Yes. It must be stressed that DAO 2002-08 and related DA order are not the only legal bases for
regulating field trials of GM plants and plant products. EO 514 clearly provides that the NBF applies to
the development, adoption and implementation of all biosafety policies, measures and guidelines and
in making biosafety decisions concerning the research, development, handling and use, transboundary
movement, release into the environment and management of regulated articles.

The NBF requires the use of precaution, as provided in Section 2.6 which reads:

2.6. Using Precaution. In accordance with Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 and the relevant
provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in particular Article 1, 10 (par. 6) and 11 (par. 8), the
precautionary approach shall guide biosafety decisions. The principles and elements of this approach are
hereby implemented through the decision-making system in the NBF.
It likewise contains general principles and minimum guidelines that the concerned agencies are expected
to follow and which their respective rules and regulations must conform with. In cases of conflict in
applying the principles, the principle of protecting the public interest and welfare shall always prevail, and
no provision of the NBF shall be construed as to limit the legal authority and mandate of heads of
departments and agencies to consider the national interest and public welfare in making biosafety
decisions.

Notably, Section 7 of NBF mandates a more transparent, meaningful and participatory public consultation
on the conduct of field trials beyond the posting and publication of notices and information sheets,
consultations with some residents and government officials, and submission of written comments,
provided in DAO 2002-08.

The Supreme Court found that ISAAAI, et.al. simply adhered to the procedures laid down by DAO 2002-08
and no real effort was made to operationalize the principles of NBF in the conduct of field testing of Bt
talong. Said failure means that the DA lacks mechanisms to mandate applicants to comply with
international biosafety protocols. For these reasons, the DAO 2002-08 should be declared invalid.

Parenthetically, during the hearing at the CA, Atty. Segui of the EMB was evasive in answering the
questions on whether his office undertook the necessary evaluation on the possible environmental impact
of Bt talong field trials and the release of GMOs into the environment in general. While he initially cited
lack of budget and competence as reasons for their inaction, he later said that an amendment of the law
should be made since projects involving GMOS are not covered by Proclamation No. 2146, entitled
Proclaiming Certain Areas and Types of Projects as Environmentally Critical and Within the Scope of the
Environmental Impact Statement System Established Under Presidential Decree No. 1586.

The Supreme Court took the above as an indication of the DENR-EMBs lack of serious attention to their
mandate under EO 514 to ensure that environmental assessments are done and impacts identified in
biosafety decisions.

Section 6 of EO 514 likewise directed the DOST, DENR, DA and DOH to ensure the allocation of funds for
the implementation of the NBF as it was intended to be a multi-disciplinary effort involving the different
government departments and agencies.

The petitioners government agencies clearly failed to fulfil their mandates in the implementation of the
NBF.

6. Yes. The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s, expressing the normative idea
that governments are obliged to foresee and forestall harm to the environment. The Rules
incorporated the principle in Part V, Rule 20, which states:

SEC.1. Applicability. When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between
human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the
case before it.

The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the
doubt.

SEC 2. Standards for application. In applying the precautionary principle, the following factors, among
others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to present or future
generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of the environmental rights of
those affected.
When the features of uncertainty, possibility of irreversible harm, and possibility of serious harm coincide,
the case for the precautionary principle is strongest. The Supreme Court found all three (3) conditions
present.

While the goal of increasing crop yields to raise farm incomes is laudable, independent scientific studies
revealed uncertainties due to unfulfilled economic benefits from Bt crops and plants, adverse effects on
the environment associated with the use of GE technology in agriculture, and serious health hazards from
consumption of GM foods. For a biodiversity-rich country like the Philippines, the natural and unforeseen
consequences of contamination and genetic pollution would be disastrous and irreversible.

Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-implementation of the NBF in the crucial stages of risk
assessment and public consultation, including the determination of the applicability of the EIS
requirements to the GMO field testing, are compelling reasons for the application of the precautionary
principle.

There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of the GMOs into the environment threatens to
damage our ecosystems and not just the field trial sites, and eventually the health of our people once the
Bt eggplants are consumed as food.

Adopting the precautionary approach, the Supreme Court ruled that the principles of the NBF need to be
operationalized first by the coordinated actions of the concerned departments and agencies before
allowing the release into the environment of genetically modified eggplant.

Further, the precautionary approach entailed inputs from stakeholders, including marginalized famers, not
just the scientific community. This proceeds from the realization that acceptance of uncertainty is not only
a scientific issue, but is related to public policy and involves an ethical dimension.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

1. The conduct of Bt talong field testing is permanently enjoined.

2. DAO 2002-08 is declared null and void.

3. Any application for contained use, field testing, propagation and commercialization, and
importation of GMOs is temporarily enjoined until a new administrative order is promulgated in
accordance with law.

(8)

Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan

G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012

FACTS:
Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the future, respondent Province of
Aklan planned to expand the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay. Thus, on May 7,
2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan Province issued a resolution, authorizing Governor Carlito
Marquez to file an application with respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) to reclaim the 2.64
hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan. In the same year, the Province deliberated on the possible
expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to
maximize the utilization of its resources.

After PRAs approval, on April 27, 2010, respondent Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-Environmental Management Bureau-Region VI (DENR-EMB RVI) issued to the Province
Environmental Compliance Certificate-R6-1003-096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the
Reclamation Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing
jetty port.

On May 17, 2010, the Province finally entered into a MOA with PRA which stated that the land use
development of the reclamation project shall be for commercial, recreational and institutional and other
applicable uses. It was at this point that the Province deemed it necessary to conduct a series of public
consultation meetings.

On the other hand, the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Malay and petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (BFI), an organization composed of some 160 businessmen
and residents in Boracay, expressed their strong opposition to the reclamation project on environmental,
socio-economic and legal grounds.

Despite the opposition, the Province merely noted their objections and issued a notice to the contractor on
December 1, 2010 to commence with the construction of the project. Thus, on June 1, 2011, BFI filed with
the Supreme Court the instant Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of
Continuing Mandamus. Thereafter, the Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
and ordered the respondents to file their respective comments to the petition.

The Petition was premised on the following grounds, among others:

a) the Province failed to obtain the favorable endorsement of the LGU concerned;

b) the Province failed to conduct the required consultation procedures as required by the Local
Government Code (LGC).

The Province responded by claiming that its compliance with the requirements of DENR-EMB RVI and PRA
that led to the approval of the reclamation project by the said government agencies, as well as the recent
enactments of the Barangay Council of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay
favorably endorsing the said project, had categorically addressed all the issues raised by the BFI in its
Petition. It also considered the Petition to be premature for lack of cause of action due to the failure of BFI
to fully exhaust the available administrative remedies even before seeking judicial relief.

ISSUES:

WON the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing this case?

WON there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project?

RULING:

On the issue of prematurity due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies

 The Court held that the petition is not premature for failing to exhaust administrative remedies and
to observe the hierarchy of courts as claimed by the respondents.

The Court reiterated their ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals where they clarified that the rule
regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not applicable where,
among others, there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention such as in the
instant case. The rule may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy or where the protestant has no other recourse.

Meanwhile, the new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides a
relief for petitioner under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special civil action that may be
availed of to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law and which provides for the
issuance of a TEPO as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself.

The writ of continuing mandamus allows an aggrieved party to file a verified petition in the proper
court when any government agency or instrumentality or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty xxx in connection with the enforcement
or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, xxx and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Such proper court may be the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred, the
Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court.

Here, the Court found that BFI had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law to determine the questions of unique national and local importance raised that pertain to
laws and rules for environmental protection.

Moreover, the writ of continuing mandamus permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment
in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the courts decision and,
in order to do this, the court may compel the submission of compliance reports from the respondent
government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor compliance with its decision.

On the issue of whether or notthere was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for
the project

The Court found that there was no proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project.

The Local Government Code (LGC) establishes the duties of national government agencies in the
maintenance of ecological balance and requires them to secure prior public consultations and approval of
local government units. In Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary, the Court emphasized that, under the
Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: (1) prior consultation
with the affected local communities, and (2) prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
The absence of either of such mandatory requirements will render the projects implementation as illegal.

Here, the Court classified the reclamation project as a national project since it affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities. In one ruling, the Court noted that such
national projects mentioned in Section 27 of the LGC include those that may cause pollution and bring
about climate change, among others, such as the reclamation project in this case.

Also, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides that project proponents should initiate public consultations
early in order to ensure that environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are taken into
consideration in the EIA study and the formulation of the management plan.
 Thus, the law requires the Province, being the delegate of the PRAs power to reclaim land in this
case, to conduct prior consultations and prior approval. However, the information dissemination conducted
months after the ECC had already been issued was insufficient to comply with the requirements under the
LGC.

Furthermore, the lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent
endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the Sangguniang
Bayan in 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of the Province.