RP v City of Davao (Environmental Law)

Republic of the Philippines v City of Davao

GR No. 148622
September 12, 2002

FACTS:

On August 11, 2000, The City of Davao filed an application for a Certificate of Non-
Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI.

ISSUES:

(1) Is an LGU like Davao exempt from the coverage of PD 1586?

(2) Is the project entitled to a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC)?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

Section 15 of Republic Act 7160,[5] otherwise known as the Local Government

Code, defines a local government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with
powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law.

Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no person, partnership or corporation shall

undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area
without first securing an Environmental Compliance certificate issued by the
President or his duly authorized representative

RULING:

(1) NO, IT IS WITHIN THE COVERAGE OF PD 1586. Found in Section 16 of the Local
Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the people's right to a balanced
ecology. Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao, cannot claim exemption
from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental
functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the
very same objective of PD 1586.

(2) YES. The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does not come close to any of the
projects or areas enumerated above. Neither is it analogous to any of them. It is
clear, therefore, that the said project is not classified as environmentally critical, or
within an environmentally critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but
to issue the Certificate of Non- Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the
performance of which can be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued by
the trial court in the case at bar.
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epublic of the Philippines v. The City of Davao

FACTS:

Respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the
Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau however, was denied on the
ground that the proposed project was within an environmentally critical area; that the City of Davao must
first undergo the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC). Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), and
the latter ruled in favor of respondent.

ISSUE:
WON the LGUs are excluded from the coverage of PD 1586, one which requires an environmental impact
assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)

HELD:
No.Section 4 of PD 1586 provides that "no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate
any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative." We note that LGUs
are juridical persons.
HOWEVER, after consideration of the evidence finding Artica Sports Dome is not within an
environmentally critical area neither being a critical project. The said project is not classified as
environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice
but to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can
be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the case at bar.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148622. September 12, 2002]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, in his capacity as

Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
CLARENCE L. BAGUILAT, in his capacity as the Regional Executive Director of DENR-
Region XI and ENGR. BIENVENIDO L. LIPAYON, in his capacity as the Regional Director of
the DENR-ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU (DENR-EMB), Region
XI, petitioners, vs. THE CITY OF DAVAO, represented by BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN, City
Mayor, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review [1] on certiorari assailing the decision[2] dated May 28, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33, which granted the writ of mandamus and injunction in favor
of respondent, the City of Davao, and against petitioner, the Republic, represented by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The trial court also directed petitioner to issue a Certificate
of Non-Coverage in favor of respondent.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On August 11, 2000, respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its
proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB), Region XI. Attached to the application were the required documents for its issuance, namely, a)
detailed location map of the project site; b) brief project description; and c) a certification from the City
Planning and Development Office that the project is not located in an environmentally critical area
(ECA). The EMB Region XI denied the application after finding that the proposed project was within an
environmentally critical area and ruled that, pursuant to Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1586,
otherwise known as the Environmental Impact Statement System, in relation to Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No, 1151, also known as the Philippine Environment Policy, the City of Davao must undergo the
environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC), before it can proceed with the construction of its project.
Believing that it was entitled to a Certificate of Non-Coverage, respondent filed a petition for
mandamus and injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Davao, docketed as Civil Case No. 28,133-
2000. It alleged that its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an
environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS system. Hence, it was the
ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a CNC in favor of respondent upon
submission of the required documents.
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, judgment granting the writ of mandamus and injunction is
hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner City of Davao and against respondents Department of Environment and
Natural Resources and the other respondents by:

1) directing the respondents to issue in favor of the petitioner City of Davao a Certificate of Non-Coverage, pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection with the construction by the City of Davao of the
Artica Sports Dome;

2) making the preliminary injunction issued on December 12, 2000 permanent.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The trial court ratiocinated that there is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and Letter of
Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA system), which requires local
government units (LGUs) to comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national
government, including government owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations,
firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA process for their proposed projects which have
significant effect on the quality of the environment. A local government unit, not being an agency or
instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed excluded under the principle of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.
The trial court also declared, based on the certifications of the DENR-Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO)-West, and the data gathered from the Philippine Institute of
Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), that the site for the Artica Sports Dome was not within an
environmentally critical area. Neither was the project an environmentally critical one. It therefore becomes
mandatory for the DENR, through the EMB Region XI, to approve respondents application for CNC after it
has satisfied all the requirements for its issuance. Accordingly, petitioner can be compelled by a writ of
mandamus to issue the CNC, if it refuses to do so.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied. Hence, the instant
petition for review.
With the supervening change of administration, respondent, in lieu of a comment, filed a
manifestation expressing its agreement with petitioner that, indeed, it needs to secure an ECC for its
proposed project. It thus rendered the instant petition moot and academic. However, for the guidance of
the implementors of the EIS law and pursuant to our symbolic function to educate the bench and bar, [4] we
are inclined to address the issue raised in this petition.
Section 15 of Republic Act 7160,[5] otherwise known as the Local Government Code, defines a local
government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity
with law. As such, it performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary. Governmental functions are
those that concern the health, safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the
public generally.[6] Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn
pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit. [7] When exercising governmental powers
and performing governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of the national government. [8] When engaged
in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local affairs. [9]
Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the peoples
right to a balanced ecology. [10] Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao, can not claim exemption
from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the
duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.
Further, it is a rule of statutory construction that every part of a statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part must be considered with other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the enactment. [11] The trial court, in declaring local government units as exempt from
the coverage of the EIS law, failed to relate Section 2 of PD 1586 [12] to the following provisions of the
same law:

WHEREAS, the pursuit of a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program necessitates the
establishment and institutionalization of a system whereby the exigencies of socio-economic undertakings can be
reconciled with the requirements of environmental quality; x x x.

Section 1. Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to attain and maintain a rational and orderly balance
between socio-economic growth and environmental protection.

xxxxxxxxx

Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The President of the
Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council,
by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person,
partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area
without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area, the President may by his proclamation
reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the
realignment of government personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.

Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or
operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. [13] The Civil Code
defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the local
government units[14] are juridical persons.[15] Undoubtedly therefore, local government units are not
excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.
Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said law intends to implement the policy of the state to
achieve a balance between socio-economic development and environmental protection, which are the
twin goals of sustainable development. The above-quoted first paragraph of the Whereas clause stresses
that this can only be possible if we adopt a comprehensive
and integrated environmental protection program where all the sectors of the community are
involved, i.e., the government and the private sectors. The local government units, as part of the
machinery of the government, cannot therefore be deemed as outside the scope of the EIS system. [16]
The foregoing arguments, however, presuppose that a project, for which an Environmental
Compliance Certificate is necessary, is environmentally critical or within an environmentally critical
area. In the case at bar, respondent has sufficiently shown that the Artica Sports Dome will not have a
significant negative environmental impact because it is not an environmentally critical project and it is not
located in an environmentally critical area. In support of this contention, respondent submitted the
following:

1. Certification from the City Planning and Development Office that the project is not located in an environmentally
critical area;

2. Certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO-West) that the project
area is within the 18-30% slope, is outside the scope of the NIPAS (R.A. 7586), and not within a declared watershed
area; and
3. Certification from PHILVOCS that the project site is thirty-seven (37) kilometers southeast of the southernmost
extension of the Davao River Fault and forty-five (45) kilometers west of the Eastern Mindanao Fault; and is outside
the required minimum buffer zone of five (5) meters from a fault zone.

The trial court, after a consideration of the evidence, found that the Artica Sports Dome is not within
an environmentally critical area. Neither is it an environmentally critical project. It is axiomatic that factual
findings of the trial court, when fully supported by the evidence on record, are binding upon this Court and
will not be disturbed on appeal.[17] This Court is not a trier of facts.[18]
There are exceptional instances when this Court may disregard factual findings of the trial court,
namely: a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; c) where there is a grave
abuse of discretion; d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; e) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; g) when the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; h) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; i) when the finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record;
and j) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties
and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [19] None of these exceptions,
however, obtain in this case.
The Environmental Impact Statement System, which ensures environmental protection and regulates
certain government activities affecting the environment, was established by Presidential Decree No.
1586. Section 2 thereof states:

There is hereby established an Environmental Impact Statement System founded and based on the environmental
impact statement required under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1151, of all agencies and instrumentalities of
the national government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations,
firms and entities, for every proposed project and undertaking which significantly affect the quality of the
environment.

Section 4 of PD 1151, on the other hand, provides:

Environmental Impact Statements. Pursuant to the above enunciated policies and goals, all agencies and
instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as
private corporations, firms and entities shall prepare, file and include in every action, project or undertaking which
significantly affects the quality of the environment a detailed statement on

(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking

(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented

(c) alternative to the proposed action

(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are consistent with the maintenance
and enhancement of the long-term productivity of the same; and

(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or nonrenewable resources, a finding must be made that such
use and commitment are warranted.

Before an environmental impact statement is issued by a lead agency, all agencies having jurisdiction over, or
special expertise on, the subject matter involved shall comment on the draft environmental impact statement made
by the lead agency within thirty (30) days from receipt of the same.
 Under Article II, Section 1, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 1586, the declaration of
certain projects or areas as environmentally critical, and which shall fall within the scope of the
Environmental Impact Statement System, shall be by Presidential Proclamation, in accordance with
Section 4 of PD 1586 quoted above.
Pursuant thereto, Proclamation No. 2146 was issued on December 14, 1981, proclaiming the
following areas and types of projects as environmentally critical and within the scope of the Environmental
Impact Statement System established under PD 1586:

A. Environmentally Critical Projects

I. Heavy Industries

a. Non-ferrous metal industries

b. Iron and steel mills
c. Petroleum and petro-chemical industries including oil and gas
d. Smelting plants

II. Resource Extractive Industries

a. Major mining and quarrying projects

b. Forestry projects

1. Logging
2. Major wood processing projects
3. Introduction of fauna (exotic-animals) in public/private forests
4. Forest occupancy
5. Extraction of mangrove products
6. Grazing

c. Fishery Projects

1. Dikes for/and fishpond development projects

III. Infrastructure Projects

a. Major dams
b. Major power plants (fossil-fueled, nuclear fueled, hydroelectric or geothermal)
c. Major reclamation projects
d. Major roads and bridges

B. Environmentally Critical Areas

1. All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preserves and
sanctuaries;
2. Areas set aside as aesthetic potential tourist spots;
3. Areas which constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened species of indigenous
Philippine Wildlife (flora and fauna);
4. Areas of unique historic, archaeological, or scientific interests;
5. Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural communities or tribes;
6. Areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities (geologic hazards, floods, typhoons,
volcanic activity, etc.);
7. Areas with critical slopes;
8. Areas classified as prime agricultural lands;
9. Recharged areas of aquifers;
10. Water bodies characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions;
 a. tapped for domestic purposes
b. within the controlled and/or protected areas declared by appropriate authorities
c. which support wildlife and fishery activities

11. Mangrove areas characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions:

a. with primary pristine and dense young growth;

b. adjoining mouth of major river systems;
c. near or adjacent to traditional productive fry or fishing grounds;
d. which act as natural buffers against shore erosion, strong winds and storm floods;
e. on which people are dependent for their livelihood.

12. Coral reefs, characterized by one or any combinations of the following conditions:

a. with 50% and above live coralline cover;

b. spawning and nursery grounds for fish;
c. which act as natural breakwater of coastlines.

In this connection, Section 5 of PD 1586 expressly states:

Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. All other projects, undertakings and areas not declared by the President as
environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall not be required to submit an environmental
impact statement. The National Environmental Protection Council, thru the Ministry of Human Settlements may
however require non-critical projects and undertakings to provide additional environmental safeguards as it may
deem necessary.

The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does not come close to any of the projects or areas enumerated
above. Neither is it analogous to any of them. It is clear, therefore, that the said project is not classified as
environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice
but to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can
be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33, in Civil Case No. 28,133-2000, granting the writ of mandamus and
directing the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to issue in favor of the City of Davao a
Certificate of Non-Coverage, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection
with the construction of the Artica Sports Dome, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006

HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L.

HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO HENARES, petitioners,
vs.
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
 RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas
(CNG) as alternative fuel.

Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation Study of 1996, 1 the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the National Capital Region, 2 a study of the Asian
Development Bank,3 the Manila Observatory4 and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources5 (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines,
including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant
emission of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against
the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.

Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and
liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine
combustions have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall
quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine
combustion when these react to other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons,
oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia,
moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form nitric acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also
cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants. According to petitioner, another emission, carbon
monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can
disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO affects the nervous system
and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.6

Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the country will use natural gas
while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel stations are being phased-out, still with the projected
doubling of power generation over the next 10 years, and with the continuing high demand for motor
vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful
emissions. Petitioners refer us to the study of the Philippine Environment Monitor 2002 7, stating that
in four of the country's major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM 10, a
finer PM which can penetrate deep into the lungs causing serious health problems, is estimated at
over US$430 million.8 The study also reports that the emissions of PMs have caused the following:

Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about US$140 million.

Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued at about US$120 million.

Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro Manila (averaging twice a
year in Davao and Cebu, and five to six times in Metro Manila and Baguio), costs about
US$170 million. This is a 70 percent increase, over a decade, when compared with the
findings of a similar study done in 1992 for Metro Manila, which reported 33 million cases. 9
Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing that
vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive
pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and
there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms among school children and 15.8 to
40.6 percent among child vendors. The studies also revealed that the children in Metro Manila
showed more compromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that
these are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.

To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the
use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which
although containing small amounts of propane and butane, 10 is colorless and odorless and
considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal and
petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces
NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs;
and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although, according to petitioners, the only drawback of CNG
is that it produces more methane, one of the gases blamed for global warming. 11

Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of
mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section
16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section 414 of
Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."

Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners' motion to implead the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent.

In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General, cites Section 3, Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court and explains that the writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since
the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is
required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.15 Further citing existing
jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to a discretionary act, a ministerial act,
which a mandamus is, is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of
his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done.

The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke, prohibits
the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor
General, Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even mention the existence of CNG as alternative fuel and
avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs, the respondents
cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel.

The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749
and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover, he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under
Section 2616 of Rep. Act No. 8749, that is required to set the specifications for all types of fuel and
fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for improved efficiency and reduced emissions.
He adds that under Section 2117 of the cited Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to implementing the
emission standards for motor vehicles, and the herein respondents cannot alter, change or modify
the emission standards. The Solicitor General opines that the Court should declare the instant
petition for mandamus without merit.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the administrative and regulatory
powers to implement measures in accordance with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act
No. 8749, specifically Section 218 and Section 21.19 Petitioners state that under these laws and with
all the available information provided by the DOE on the benefits of CNG, respondents cannot ignore
the existence of CNG, and their failure to recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as alternative
fuel while air pollution brought about by the emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the
environment and the people, is tantamount to neglect in the performance of a duty which the law
enjoins.

Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be issued
pursuant to the very same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that the Solicitor
General invokes.

In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO BRING THE

PRESENT ACTION

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY LAW

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE TO

IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE OF REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY
VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS (CNG)

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIRE PUBLIC

UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS20

Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition
before us? Second, Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as
alternative fuel?

According to petitioners, Section 16,21 Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the policy statement that
bestows on the people the right to breathe clean air in a healthy environment. This policy is
enunciated in Oposa.22 The implementation of this policy is articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749. These,
according to petitioners, are the bases for their standing to file the instant petition. They aver that
when there is an omission by the government to safeguard a right, in this case their right to clean air,
then, the citizens can resort to and exhaust all remedies to challenge this omission by the
government. This, they say, is embodied in Section 423 of Rep. Act No. 8749.

Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government agencies clothed
with power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies'
awareness and knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the
responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents' functions and a writ of
mandamus should issue against them.

The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent government agencies,
the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel.
The Solicitor General explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission
standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only goes as far as setting the maximum
limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. The
Solicitor General avers that the petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up with a
policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.

Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only procedural. Petitioners
challenge this Court to decide if what petitioners propose could be done through a less circuitous,
speedy and unchartered course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his ponencia in
the Oposa case,24 describes as "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."

Now, as to petitioners' standing. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case
before this Court. Even respondents do not question their standing. This petition focuses on one
fundamental legal right of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a party's
standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's
discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of
technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these
cases demand that they be settled promptly.

Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance to petitioners for it
concerns the air they breathe, but it is also impressed with public interest. The consequences of the
counter-productive and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due to emissions of motor
vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. On these considerations, the legal
standing of the petitioners deserves recognition.

Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and if the writ could issue
against respondents.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1)
against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any
tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 we said,

It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused,

of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to
fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control or
review the exercise of discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the
duty be absolutely expressed, it must however, be clear. The writ will not issue to
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to
do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ
neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a
power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. (Emphasis
supplied.)

In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced hinges on a
constitutional and a statutory policy already articulated in operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No.
8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically provides
that when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of implementing the policy falls on respondent
DOTC. It provides as follows:

SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the emission
standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided in this Act. To further improve
the emission standards, the Department [DENR] shall review, revise and publish the
standards every two (2) years, or as the need arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for
all major pollutants to ensure substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and
welfare of the general public.

Paragraph (b) states:

b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and LGUs, shall develop an
action plan for the control and management of air pollution from motor
vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air Quality Framework . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission
standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are
concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor
vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely
the LTFRB.

In Oposa26 we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. We also said, it is clearly the duty of the responsible
government agencies to advance the said right.

Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for issuance
of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative
fuel. Although both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel,
particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a program on the use of CNG
by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program
for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. The program recognized, among
others, natural gas as a clean burning alternative fuel for vehicle which has the potential to produce
substantially lower pollutants; and the Malampaya Gas-to-Power Project as representing the
beginning of the natural gas industry of the Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O. No. 290
cites as one of its objectives, the use of CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport. Furthermore,
one of the components of the program is the development of CNG refueling stations and all related
facilities in strategic locations in the country to serve the needs of CNG-powered PUVs. Section 3 of
E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002, designated the DOE as the lead agency
(a) in developing the natural gas industry of the country with the DENR, through the EMB and (b) in
formulating emission standards for CNG. Most significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC,
working with the DOE, to develop an implementation plan for "a gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization
in PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon through the issuance
of directives/orders providing preferential franchises in present day major routes and exclusive
franchises to NGVs in newly opened routes" A thorough reading of the executive order assures us
that implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant
petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.

Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a
writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing.
Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty.
Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor
vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4
"to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to
operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys."

Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for
the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. 27 The need for future changes in both
legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when
what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch
dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves
the environmental problems raised in this petition.

In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced and healthful
ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice"
in Oposa,28 where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the rainforests,
so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation to clean air.
In Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the
Constitution even if the right is "assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve
the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be
lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come. . ." 29

It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed
on the protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics
are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as
these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to
reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are
unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a
grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us
that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex
environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is
taken.

WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.