'II

Auth: AC
Initials

1 June 1945

HEADQUARTRS EASTERN AIR COMAND

SOUTH EAST ASIA

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMh~ARY NUJ3B.R 40

1 June 1945

With the reopening and consolidating of the port

of Rarngoon the primary objective in the reconquest of

BHt:a has been achieved. Fighting has not yet stopped

but all organized resistance has ended.

Another chapter of the war in South East Asia

has therefore closed, and with it we cease publication

o'? this Summary which has been, in part, a record of

thc joint efforts of the Amrerican and British Air For-

ces in this campaign.

In the future, events will take a new course and

perhaps this publication will be revived in a diff-

erent setting; but, for the moment, suffice it to say

that our forces have made a glorious advance along the

rocd to Tokyo, We are glad to have had the privilege

of recording part of that advance.

By command of Lieutenant General STRATEvit1 R:

A, T. RICHARDSON
Group Captain, RAF
Chief of Intelligence Section
Office of DC/AS, OPTI

i
 HEADQUARTERS
EASTETN AIR 001MAND
SOUTH EAST ASIA

TO: All Personnel of Eastern Air Command, and all R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F.
Administrative and Service Units Which Have Supported E.A.C. Combat
Operations.

1. On 15 December 1943 Eastern Air ommnand was organized as an

integrated R.A.F.- A.A.F. air command, to which were also assigned
squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force and Royal Indian Air Force.
At that time I stated our mission and our mutual problems as follows:

"A resourceful, able and wily enemy must be blasted from the
jungles of Burma and driven from its skies in days to come. His
lines of communication must be obliterated, his shipping destroyed,
his will to resist crushed ...... our life line to China must be
strengthened and protected. Every ounce of energy of every man of
this Command will be required to accomplish this purpose. We must
merge into one unified force, in thought and in deed - a force
neither British nor American, with the faults of neither and the
virtues of both. There is no time for distrust or suspicion .....
We must establish in Asia a record of Allied air victory of which
we can all be proud in the years to come. Let us write it now in
the skies over Burma."

2. 'Tithithe fall of Rangoon our mission in Burma is accomplished

and our joint task fulfilled. As of 1 June 1945, I am relinquishing
command of Eastern Air Command. The United States Army Air Forces
units which have fought side by side with the air units of the British
Empire are being withdrawn.

3. It is with a feeling of sincere and frank regret that I bid

farewell to the personnel of Eastern Air Command. I take this opport-
unity to thank you all - both military and civilian personnel - for the
fine spirit of duty, the cooperation, and the loyalty you have shown
during this entire period. It has been my good fortune to become per-
sonally acquainted with many of you. I have been impressed beyond
words by your seriousness of purpose and your ability to work success-
fully together, with a minimum of friction and a maximum of accomplish-
ment. To my commanders and their staffs, to the ground crews and ser-
vice personnel, and above all to the gallant air crews who did the job
with the tools and ecuipment their brothers-in-arms so ably supplied,
I extend my heartfelt thanks for the victory your efforts have brought.

4 ' I relinquish command reassured through my association with you

that our combined efforts will, in the not too distant future, bring us
final victory. The triuaph of our cause will bring security for those
principles of democracy in defense of which we freely offered our all,
and which we will continue to do until Japan is smashed. Good luck to
each and every one of you, and may God bless you and preserve you to
see the day of final victory.

GEtrE E. S ,TRATE F,
Lieutenant General, U. S, A ir Forces
. :Comanding.
 p t ~

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$W3 IED
EASTERN AIR C0iMtlANI) WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUIAMARY

I June 1945 Number 40

TABLE ;OF CONENTS

Section Z EC Sit;3ti.ori Revs eo~

Burma Victory 1-2
Eastern Air Command: The Completion of a Mission 3-5
Scale of EAC Air Effort in South East Asia 6
Eastern Air Command Combat and Transport
Operations, 1944-1945 7-8
EAC Comments on Japanese Air Strength 9-10
Enemy ir activity; 24 - 30 lMay 1945 10
Review of Enemy Air Activity, Januiary - June 1945 11-12
---- urma Reconguored 13-17
Japanese Army Operational Air Strength in S.E.A. 18

Section II Technical Intelligence and Tactics

Spits of 17 Squadron Tangle With Oscars Again 1.2
B-24 Sights "Circle of Light" 3
ATAIU Study lircraft and Equipment on Airfields
Near Rangootn 4
Section III Objective Folder and Tart Chart Data
Railays in Burma and Siam: Review of Activities
During Six Months, Dec. 194 - Mal 1945 1=3
-Roads in Burma and.' Siam: Review of Activity and
Developments in 1945 4-6
., tha Notes and Notes on Waterwvays 7-
Coastal Shipping, Rangoon - Victoria Point:
Rewiowof ctivity Jan - y 1945 I
,.=:Inland aterways of Burma and Siam: Review of
Jap i3ctivity, January to May 1945 13-14
Bomb Damage Study at Rangoon 15-17
Stores and. Dumps in Burma: Review of Situation
cnd Atta;Ck3 ,JaIu-ryJ ry 1945 -
17r18

Section IV ar News Froia Other Fighting Fronts

Tli.e 1tr in tj Pacific

Section V Jap 1ntiai rcraft Defenses

Japanese Antiaircraft in Burma , January - May 1945 1.2
Jap g&ms Heavy 1 Guns in Rangoon 2-3
UA Fire Encountered To Include 28 May .1945 3

Section VI Special Reports From FE6C Tactical units

Weather Reconnaissance Plays Part in Burma Campaign 1-2

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41
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 BUMVj VIGTOR'Y

This is our Swan Song, and as such,

it is appropriate that we spend a
little time in'reflection and remi-
niscence. This 'campaign which is now
concluding in Burma has witnessed
one' 6f the most'smashing defeats in-
flicted on the Japanese. We have often
* talked of the ',Forgotten Front" buit
posterity mu't never forget 'that in
this campaign over 1I00,000 'Japanese
have been 'kil ed and new techniques
Sof aerial warare,' of air support and
air supply applied and perfected.
Spain was Napoleon's running sore;
Burma has been an ulcer in the side
of Hirohito'

But things were very different in 1942. The calamity of Pearl Harbor was followed
with brutal suddenness by the catastrophes of Manila and Singapore, We people of
the Western world seemed dazed while the little yellow, men spread out over the
coast 'f China, t'iough Malaya and the Dutch Fst Indies, through Oceania, until
they threateneda our very existence. We wre unprepared, and the ability of the
Japanese to eoist on the 'scantiest of' supplies, to travel light and'infiltrate
through the jungles, caused us to fall back and back with an ever-increasing rapidity.
vTwo
factors brought success to his tactics - command of the sea and command of the
air.

It was then that- we lost Rangoon. The Japanese could land where he liked, bomb where
he liked. In vain-that valiant handful of the AVG ahd RAF at Mingaladon and Toungoo
strove against overwhelming numbers to stem 'the rush. Daily, almost hourly, the lines
of communication,-of the British troops were cut and they were forced to'retreat, So
that movement backward continued until after incredible hardships, the remnants of
the forces straggled through the mountains into India and the Jap was too extended
to follow.

We had not many aircraft then. Curious as it may seem now, even Calcutta was in the
forward area with fighters based at Dum Dum, while light bombers staged through' this
field. We. planned then for the reconquest qf ,Burma, but Europe came first and the
Pacific second, It seemed as hough the Chin Hills which had so effectively halted
the Japanese advance would prove to be just as effective in preventing 'our return.
Roads did not oi.st and that mountain mass seemed an impenetrable barrier. The al-
ternative of a seaborne invasion was' impossible. Sufficient ships did not exist in
the theatre, and .in our helplessness, we realized why Burma had never before been
conquered from tIe north. . . -

In 1942-43 we 1oeld our own. Then the tide began to turn. The growing operations of
the life line to China over the Hump and the influx of more and better aircraft
began to point the way of the future, In' 1943 few people realized the significance
of the fact that-several lonely garrisons in the Naga Hills were being supplied and
reinforced entirely by air. Other indications were seen in the supplying of the long
range penetration columne of Wingate's' Chindits from the air and in the evacuation
of casualties from a hastily improvised strip in the heart of the jungle. The turning
point came in the Arakan campaign of the winter of 1943. First of all it was planned
-to supply an entire division by air, and then the unexpected happened. The Japanese'
used their old infiltration tactics to cut the communications of several brigades
on the western side of the Mayu range. In 1942 these brigades would have fallen back;
in 1943 they held their positions and were supplied by air. The Jap was foiled. He
sent his Oscars to sweep back those C-47s but they found aircraft of a different
calibre waiting and the enemy fighters were blown'out of the sky by the onslaught of
the Spitfires, ir supremacy had been gained, and with air supremacy came security.
of supply.

But now offensive fighters as well as defensi' ° were

developed the now tactics of air supply and a:

low 6

F
The tomans had a word for it heoh, the called their baggage "impedimenta". Supply
has always been the headache of a commander. It prevents hi advance, restricts
his movement, and offers a most vulnerable target to the enemy. Our new tactics
were to allow untramieled movement to : ur. own troops ,by giving. them the most
fluid supply line of all, and at the same time, to destroy completely the enemy's
capability of revictualling his forward troops. This was the basic concept of the
Wingate-Cochrane expedition and the reason why, during the Japanese thrust toward
Assam, the Allied divisions could form a ,cefensive box at Imphcl, secure in their
supply and after cutting the enermy's communications,. throw them back with terrific
slaughter. This same concept gave Merrll.'s Marauders that remarkable mobility
which enabled them to seize Myitkyina. So tnese tactics of air supply and air
blockade:became the key note of the whole campaign.

The bombers closed the ports and broke every link of the railway system. The
offensive fighters strangled the lines of communication and swept the airfields
clear. The transports, day in day out, supplied the ever-growing armies. The
defensive, fighters- gave them immunity..

That is the secret of the Battle of Burma. That is why the barrier of the Chin Hills
was no longer tunsurenountable and- why it became the "'Little Hump":. That is why the
armies of British,; .Indians, Americans and Chinese entered Burma from the north.
That is why the capture of Rangoon completed the reconquest of Burma instead of
beginning it.

* .MIN CJ 1'CTIVES OF ALLIED AIR ACTIVITIES IN

EAC

S(23, May through 29 May 1945)

StrateEgic:Air Foc "' .

Attacks on Bridge TF102, Bangkok - Singapore line, and troop and AA positions at
Moulmein. Mining of waters Kisseraing Island, Victoria Point and Fell Pa'ssage areas.

North Burma Air Task Force

Attacks on Lampang and Chiengmai airfields, troop positions near Taunggyi, patrols
and escorts.

221 Gro

Sweeps'of Aungba, Prome, Amherst, Kemapyu and Mokpalin areas by Mosquitos, Beau-
fighters and Spiffires. Attacks on troops and enemy positions in Pegu, Loikaw,
Letpadan, Prome, Taun.gyi and Thaton areas by B-25s and Mosquitos.

, Photo Recce Force

Covered main Jap airfields in Siam and areas in South Burma, Siam and the Andaman
Islands.

- S i .agI'. .

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Page 2 - Section -i
 _EASTERN AIR COAii.?iND: THE COMi PLETION O'F A T;,
;iON
This is our 40th an.la 1 Jee
,Iatelli.ence Sum- .
mary. In our first iumb I 'b:i d a mont hly
resume of air operations from the foration of the .:
Command in December 1943. In our- 1th number, we
brouiht the story up to the end. of 1944., Now we 'iJI
take up the tale, from the beginning of the yearto; '
the time of our disintegration,'' ' ' :

JanuarKy- The beginning of 1945 saw the Allies established in North Burma with
complete air superiority over the whole country. Everywhere our armies in Burma
were on the offensive. On 3 January, 15 Corps occupied Akyab, 14th Army captur-
ed Kanbalu and Ye-U and NOAC moved forward from. Bhamo to Loiwing. These ground ad-
vances were supported respectively by 224 Group, 221 Group and 10th Air Force.
Thunderbolts and Hurribombers provided the close support, B-25s operated a little
further back from the battleground, Mosqcuitos, BeaufiMhters and P-38s attacked
road, rail and river L of C and the fail-me-never Dakotas of the CCTF oarried the
supplies to nourish the troops. The classic campaign of an army moving and con-
queri.J onairborne Ls of C as be :nnin. Tie madxirum number of sorties in one
day hj topped 2000 by the end of 1944.. In January,. 1945, it topped 3000.

Liberators -and B-24s of the Strategic Air Force made many attacks on bridges on
the Bura-Siam Railway. This was their chief strategic target. Fifty-three of
them mad. a heavy daylight attack on Mandalay, and they were also used in force
on tactical targets as when 69 dropped 300 tons of bombs on Jap Hqs at Kyaukse
in support of 14 A-my and 48 of them destroyed stubbornly held positions east of
Kangaw in support..of 15 Corps. They also played their part in couiter airfield
activity.

Mieiktila, Heho, and Anisakan were the chief forward bases of the JAAF during
this month. They wer- constantly under attack by Mosquitos and Thunderbolts,
P-38s and P-51s concentrated on Nawnghkio and Nansang further east: B-24s bomb-
ed those in the neighborhood of Fahioon and made one excursion to Udonthani far
away in eastern Siam. The enemy ~ere forced to abandon their airfields in Upper
Burma and use. them a refuelling points only. About the middle of the month,
Ramree Island was invaded the seaborne landing having been preceded by a terrif-
ic aerial bombardment by Liberators and B-24s.RoLnd._,bout, this timethe sweeps
b3 Beaufighters, and.Hurricanes against shipping in Arakan waterways were intens-
ified, while B-25s and Thunderbolts made many attacks on the enemy still remain-
ing in the Arakan valleys. ; the end of the month, 14th Army had reached the
right bank of the Irrawaddy both above and below Mandalay,

February - A'month of hard-fou it battles for the Irrawaddy bridgeheads culmin-

ated.with the tank drive to 'eiktila and the fly-in to Thabutkon.. Never had
air cooperation been more effective and a new high maximum number of operational
sorties in one day was reached at 5768. This remains Eastern air Conmmand's re-
cord, though for three months, 3000 sorties per day was average. The great
propo.ruion of these sorties, averaging 70% were made by Transport .Supply aind
liaison aircraft.

The longest daylight missionsin formation weremade by Liberators on two days in

one week, when they attacked railway targets at Jumbhorn. Strateic Air .Force
continued to give attention to bridges on the Burma-Siam Railway, and in a tact-
ical role, they destroyed dumps at Madaya, just north of bMandalay. Their big-
gest effort, however, was when in coimpany with Superfortrssesses ofXX Bomber Com-
mand they dropped 700 tons of bombs on Jap dumps in the Victoria Lake district,
in north suburban Ranpon. B-25s continued to knock out railway bridges south
of-iandalay while others' burnt up Jap-held villages with napalms. P-38s and
P-47s in North Burma, Beaufighters and Mosquit'os in the central plain harassed
the enemy Ls of C relentlessly. Spitfires, Thunderbolts anddHurricanes gave
constant "cab-rank" rotection to the advancin, columns. The JAAF indulged in
only occasional 'snak raids 'at dabwn or dusk. and no challenge Was made to our
air power. ..

2 '1' -1 '2 -' - I

S ." Section I - Page 3

..
 (Continued)

Jarch - Mandalay and Lashio fell on 8 March, and with the reopening of the
Stilwell Highway from India to China, the first part of Admiral Mountbatten's
mrission was accomplished. M ndalay was a h.-.rd nut to crack with the Japs
holding out stubbornly in Fort Dufferin.

Rocket projectiles, 2000-lb bombs and low level lachine gun and cannon at-
tack-were used again and again on the old fort by Beaufighters, B-25s, Hurri-
canes and Thunderbolts before resistance was finally overcome. Lashio was a
more easily won prize, but B-25s had already destroyed Jap stren th there,,
while P-38s and P-47s prepared the way.

Another record was broken by 40 P-51s of the Air QGoilmndos who made the
longestfighter sweep hitherto in this theater when they attacked the air-
field at Don ±i-ng *from low level.. Bangkok was also attacked, this time by
night, by Libihrators and . 3-24s of the Strate ic Air Force. 'Their targets
were railway sidings, stations and workshops. They also destroyed bridges
on the Bm . ok-Sin _apore line and the Bangkok-Burma line was not forgotten.
Its longest bridge at Ben Lum Sum was brought down.

In the Arakan a fresh landing was-made at Letpan, under an umbrella of Spit-

fires and Hurricanes. In the Irrawaddy Delta and the Gulf of Martaban, as
well as on all navivable n'aterways, B:aufi hters rhubarbed in search of -ship-
ping. -25s attacked targets in and around Toungoo. Sixteen P-51s of the
Air Commando attacked the airfields at Min aladon simultaneously with a low
level attack by the same number on Hmawbi. This was followed up by an es-
corted Liberator and B-24 strike on the Victo.ria Dumps. Radar installations
at Great Coco in the Andamans were also destroyed by, StrateGic Air Force.

April - All month the-bomb line was advancing so rapidly that tactical tar-
,ets for Hurricanes and Thunderbolts were often among our own troops. VCP
technique was perfected. From Meiktila to Thazi, down. the railway to Toung-
oo the.y kept moving with the forward troops. Counter.airfield activity was
switched to Siam. P-51 were gain over Don Muang at low level, and whereas
before their March attack photos had showed 54 aircraft on this fiid, after
their April:attack they only showed two..

Ban Takli, Nakorn Sawan and Koke Kthiem were each attacked three times by
P-51s or P-4rs. At the end of the month a very heavy strike was made on
oirlmein. After being beaten up by Thunderbolts it was bombed. by B-24s.
B-24s and Liberators ma e another iid on the Siamese capital where their
tar"ets were the Thai and Samsen Power Sta.tions.

Returning to old targets with new methods, B-24s of 7th Bomb GrouA destroy-
ed over 20 bridges on the Burma-Siam Railway. They used a glide technique,
releasing their bombs at low level, which was here put into practice opera-
tionally for the first time with signal success.

Pyinmiaha where the aerodromes had been used by the JAAF as forward fields;
was smashed up by B-25s, shortly before the armys arrival. Toungoo was
nett on the list and its fall was preceded by a heavy bombardment from the
air.:. Maenty-three B-25s one day, 12 B-25s the following day, 39 B-24s the
next;'day and on the. fourth day the triumphal entry of 4 Corps. P-38s,
P- 4 7s and Beaufiahters attacked a variety of targets on the road from
Toungoo to Raengoon.,

In the Ar.kan, Taungup fel k 5 Corps were pursuing fleeing 4aps across
the road to Prome, ijrYi ey Wwere harried by Spitfires, Thunderblts,
Hurrica an at f the Sbrategic Air Force. The latter were
*eCa, des on the narrow road. Reaching forward the Strat-
ia:ombd
si. b .bc d lrst on th Tena Coast,

Page 4-"- Section I i

 ryA
EAC: The Cosiltion of a 7f x sion (Conclude,)

-Rang-oon fall the second part of Acdtviral

was taken and with its
1!untbattent 5 mis sion w s fuifiAll:?.
I~~c rof~ily planner co Lbined
operation, d efenses were oed nd finally n 'utr:1i(;dby heavies,
iedluirs and fighiter bo tlbrrs. Per troyps Vi re dotppd, n v l 1lindings
effected and after thorough aerial reco aissa le, trops tiere, landed
at the docks in tMh center oi,' the city, to link up. later with '14th Ayrmy,
troops from the nqgth. This then was, the cu].ain Jton of a csmai.sin in
thicoh thc air forces c:ooper tad' with the victor 3 u :ainy not .only by
rcconri:aissa=nce, stratu c, t ct Id . and lcse support strikes, hut by
taking, uponl it self to i ly that armyr also. It i;as proved that with
commaand of the ci r, ground txoocps can move it aht an
-without the normnal
Ls of C. Thw L of C of 14th l rk ha en 'thy: transport planes of East-
ern ir Coimiuand.

Rangoon 'eU on 3 tiay so most v 1 ay hap~ be en spent' in mopping up. l1ith

mnlny. f our squadrons pulled out a th4 monso on active over Burma, East-
emn ir Coir i.
d has be c to n et.'all JDbl4
dart~ids of the ay.

S- 25s =operating in twos Lnd t]r .e5.~ have rp _t diy struck at Jap posi-
tionis along ,hei r linesa of retreat. hen ne~cssary, they h vc o per ated
in force @: dust headgi arte rk; o r. lrtoris osiu tos have
patrolled the roads leadini; routh fromi the Shan St .tes thx uhev' Karonni
toPapun or i p ru,jthlnce by ro d or the . al: ee River to Ma4ul tin.
Spitfires, P!-5ls <:14 P-47s% hav s xt ve'iled .anoor end P-3Ss the north er :
front.

-Stratei c Air v'racch v tt. ckod.isi i ia, Jc tt : arid instrallations <<t

So ulaisiri, Tavoy tiyM r ui.
Further afield they haye w iae :yore..Attr k.i oern the , n"2kk-3in pc~reRail-
way, knocking out bxdga nd destroyIa the r>.ilw y ard s at Juiabhomn.
They 'also j'utL in ah ' y at t a-ek en L r t:~i i t. «f ortt il air. :l
this foreshadews forth ;r o:-. ensi;v ts, but ith t'£;l Ran<.oon,, the
dttl( ocf arlaa 311vr,

xast ;n lAir Or,, xnd, by. doi>ainc;.i h k ns, by 4?stxxy u ;the enemvy, Iby
supplying :acdo>op rtin i rn it~r~she ae its contribution
to "that victory - -its misf -e1 has.= i aypit /d.
u

3l l kvY, 19L5)

OlrumsA ?Kt. E&,. xi rcraft i

Los ses:o Over enaiir te ritory or as a result of enemy air action.

27 Ma~y One T+.ibertor (356 .F, Sqdn) hit by flak at 6000.: ft and
crashed whii~e on bombing m.
iss ion, Moulmein.
 'iclii&a I L L I0Rr I80JE !7r i tYi A

The following table, based

on1 sing ,il1ed reopot~ts , showvs
complete figures :for the pe~-
Lod 17 . 23° May 1945:
Aircraft iA~teked
75 1/O.5 :. 20/5 21/5 22/5 23/5TtCl

_Ta ctical _ __1_ 100.J10: 126 7 8~K7i

Pe; c~ ., 2 21
2hotoRe ~ ~ 4 .
gp Carrier
Combat Car go 1
LiaiLson C 1657 l2$ 1971 2722 13484 1814 L178 218

.2.

h Tonsof Troop Carried

Totals ____jj9 283. 2.

F'Ura belows Carried"a1

24 - 30 May 1945x'
.Ai craft spached

25 25 65 712 9? .w o ta~
Stratgc 2

Photo' Recce I ,~,6 ____

Ty) Carrier
Combat Cargo
& Liaison A/C 3o16 ~1270 16r1':616
Toas l L 69 701 1606 1299 1 ~ 680

Toys of CrogrrP

No. of Trop~sCarried., w . .. ._.

Totalps ~ . 0 ~~ 5 2 7

Pac b6 -Soctjon ;I
 EASTE', A CO A D COM3BAT AND TRANA T OPERATIONS. 19~ 19A

The following sta titiical outline

of the operations of aircraft of
Eastern Air Command, shows an ov
all picture of activity which, d
spite the obstacles faced, the va
distances involved, the hazardous
terrain,, the involved problems of
supply and maintenance, and, at times,
extremely difficult weather, have re-
duced enemy aerial effectiveness in
this zone of operations to nil. During
1944 alone,.aircraft sufficient to
equip 17.6 Jap squadrons of 25'aircraft
each were destroyed.

'A.,essful program of denying to the enemy the use of roads, rail lines, bridges,
cojinmunications and supplies has been accomplished and at the same time support has been
given to ground operations. The Command has succeeded in bringing to a successful acn-
elusion the longest, in duration and the largest (quantitatively) prs: zm of a.erial
uipply of ground forces by transport that has yet been accomplish yere,

In .chieving these results, 1.67 enemy .aircraft were destroyed o .destroyed

in aerial combat for each EIC' aircraft so lost in 1944.,, u total o aircraft
being lost in combat due to all causes..

: hter Effort

The tempo of fighter activity increased from 5416 sorties by 490 aircraft in January
19/4, a sortie rate of 11.1, to 13,255 sorties by 633 aircraft in December 1944, a
sortie rate of 2.09, .nd was" in large part responsible for the air superiority achieved
in Burma. Working iin cli-se tactical cooperation with the ground forces in Burma, the
fighter aircraft of i'~C played a vital role by destroying Japanese strong points and
.lines of communica:tin
.O.,

D'ring.:1944 lone, E4~ dispatched 113,115 fighter sorties against the enemy. The rate.
of activity was stepped up during the first quarter of 1945, resulting in 56,705
aorties being dispatched against the enemy during this period. From January 1944 -
March, 1945, 29,005: tons of bombs were dropped on the enemy. In the month of most in- .
tensive fighter operations, February 1945, 18,779 sorties were flown' by 78"1'aircraft
for a utilizationh rate of 24.0 per aircraft. During this one month, 4040 tons of
bombs, 5,350,586 rounds of ammunition, and 1325 pocket projectiles were expended,

Medium Bomber Effort

Medium bombers of the IAC have done a good job of disrupting the Japanese lines of
comrmunication in, Brma. Their most important activity has been the wholesale and con-
tinuous destruction of railway and road bridges linking Japanese lines of communica-
tion. There is ,no--do.ubit that this activity contributed significantly to the deterior-
.,in
.-ation of the Japanese position Burma. From 80 aircraft in January 1944, the medium
bomber, force of EAC grew/ to '95 aircraft in March 1945.' Concurrent with this increase
in str ngth, the intonsity, of utilization increased sharply from 4.0 sprties per
aircraft inJanuary 1944,;to 13.6 sorties per aircraft in March 1945.

During the period January 1944- March 1945, EAC medium bombers were dispatched on
159,873 sorties and dropped 16,036 ton' of bombs on the enemy. The effectiveness of
this activity is amply demonstrated'-by the breakdown of railway communications in
ean'ern Burma. ,

S'::-Heav Bomber Effort

zi
-The heavy boiber ozce of EAC has accomplished a remarkable job in the light of the
&normous disaced:inhvolved in strategic bombing missions against the Japanese in
BIrma and Siam~ '

.. - ... lll..' Section I - Page 7

/ - '
 It.1th argetain.Burm, he.v
oar-ond 19, soy: e iissions flown by EAG heavies were of 11-14 hours duration.
ou hth t utiici have been paucity f s-trategic t t;h'getc in c vy
borabur ofc-,c Lnave c lway;delivered .the punchvwhena needed, and have done much
toward -the. liquidation of Japanese installations.

BAC heavy bifo~or have ben most' effective against enemy shipping and harbor
installa tions. During 1944 alone, 1835 mines were dropped in Burma and Siam w-t~trwsays..

The BG heavy homber force almost doubled from 79 aircraft in January 1944 to .131.
aircraft in March 1945.,During this period, 8940 sorties 'were dispatched and 18,358
tons of bombs Wore dropped on enemy installations and lin s of , communication,

In Fobruc-ry 1945 Vdo ttainod the.highest utilization rete for heavy bombardment
aircraft in. this theater, With 140 aircraft inpossession. , 1186 ,sorties were flown
a rate of 8.5 sortie per Uzi rcr ft. Average duration'of sorties during this month -was
9.6 hours.

TrsportEffort

The air supply chart.: .transport aircraft of BAG is at times ,ptto be overlooked
by airrer It wilal nevo'be forgotten or minimized by. our ground forces in Burma.

In the course of a, year .and a halft"s effort: by these C-4 7s,. 'Dakotas and C-46s, no
unit at s too sr1 ll1_ or too isolated to be supplied, nor was any formation, be it.
dirviasion or corps, too large. No z tter whether they were static or on the move, they
wore providad. by air with almost evorything'they required. Food, clothing, ammunition,
cigarettes, h a,. hbrdGes, even mules : and locootives and the thousand and one other
things requird to rnaintain an army were flown from bases''in India to the front line
itself 0

The ntensitvr oc ir supply' effort and growth ha'? s been such thet, :.in the first four
months of 1945,ffA.cin tbnnage wa-s flown by EC to sustain completely 6.3 hypo-
thetical Aa cai nfantry division of appror mately 14,000 men each, using War
Department Staff Logistical 'Data) with all items necessary for jungle warfare, inclu-
ding airstri cons ruction materia.
From an estimL tod ,404,312 hours flown in 1944, transport effort grew to 323,538 -hours
in the first four 'Months of 1945; 331,707 total tons in 1944 to 346,600 in the first
four months of 1945; 377,403 men carried in 1944 to 356,053 in the first four months
of 1945; and,65,101 casualties in 1944 to 44,374T'in the first four months of 1945.

The following schedule 'illustrates the growith and volume of BAG air supply operations

Eastern
nLtComnd
iir Tratons- Janry1 19 April
lrtisTotalirs.-Totals Tons Carried Number of
Inc 1udirPer sonneli Men Casualties
._______Crried.

Jan 1988 a 5,455 . 181

F<
b 2770 a 9,169 651
Mar 4035 a 15,062 9,836 3.,301
dpr 6900 a 22,480 27,718 13,117
May 9924 , 23,768 b 27,176 ,59,248 6,217
Jun 8440 25,333 27,993 : 25,981 5,918
J1l 7582 26,221 26,310 .34,425 8,404
A1ug 9161 27,971 9,9666 -2, 080 6,909,
Sept 7924 27,300 28,118 29,821,' 5,696
Oct 10339 37,813 364018 40,031 5,805
Nov 12230 44,4+4445, 01 27,885 2,988
Dec 14926 55,363 :.58,359: 80,378 5,914

Tta 1J; 9621.9 a 331,707 377,403 65,101

Hos
Jan 374937 64,710 70, 00 : 66,9011014
Feb .45982 767~41 83 l- 73,995 7,02
Mar 54~72 93,509. 99,00 - 95,244'
Apr 51749 858,578 93,421l l1
a Data - avc,..lbl~e
cto
not% b - Oera-tS
 -- KEY-
SORTIES =EASTERN AIR COMI
TONS BOMBS j<
DROPPED

- H VY. BOMB.-

FF MI A M J J A $ 0 $ .0 3 F M A M
1944 - 95- -
TOTALS - SORTIES 5264 BOMBS OP. 7640 TONS

-MED. BOMB-

J F M A \M .J A $ 0 D J F M A M
/ ~ 19 45
TOTALS - SORTIES 10 812 BOMBS OP.It4821 TONS

J;: J A S 0 N 0 J F M A M
- 1944 --- 1945
TOTALS-SORrI I
y44 - 22SfM0 se/-
 Again the estimate of the overall strength -
of:the Japanese Air Force has risen and
again it is the Navy that has increased its
strength, with a slight reduction in Army
aircraft. The build up this week is shown
in Navy single-engined fighters in the
Kyushu Zone - 108 being added, making 343
Navy fighters in this zone. This is obviously
a Japanese necessity and must come.. from in-
-- creased prduction as no great movement can
be seen. .
There is very. little .evidence--of movement among the Japanese Army Air Forces, - a
transfer of possibly 10 twin-engined bombers from Zone 3A to Zone 10, and slight
fluctuations in single-engined fighters affecting about a score of aircraft. The
only area worthy of comment is Zone 5B, where the increase of 11 aircraft (mainly
single-engined fighters) takes the Army strength to.45 aircraft.
oher.hand., -have been greatly affected in the
The Japanese Navy Air Forces, on the ..
main Jap island zones and in Formosa. Twin-engined bombers and single-engined
fighters have been increased by the navy by 61 and 92 respectively, The combined
total strength of the two types ,now constitutes over 50. of Naval air strength.
Formosa has increased its .Naval-single-engined fighter and bomber strength by 27
aircraft, losing 12 in other Naval types.
'Zone lA No Army movement. The Navy has lost 15 twin-engined bombers(presumably
to one of the more southerly zones) and six recces (possibly to Manchuria -
Korea).
Zone 1B No Army movement, Naval decreases in single-engined bombers and fighters
and a small number of recces, for very small increases in other types,
brings the' Zone total down by 69 aircraft to a combined total of 852
aircraft, of which nearly 500 are Navy.
Zone 10C The Army in this.Zone has gained 10 twin-engined bombers (possibly from
China) but has lost 18 single-engined fighters. The. Navy has also
increased its bomber strength - by 59 aircraft - but fighters are not
affected, Another 23 floatplanes are offset against a corresponding loss
in flying boats and recces.
Zone ID The Army strength is not greatly affected here, only eight single-engined
fighters being added to the score. The Navy has been building up bombers
and single-engined fighter .strength, 28 and 108 additional aircraft
appearing in the totals, for the loss of 25 other type aircraft. This
Zone now shows a strength of 899 aircraft, of which 466 are fighters, and
172 twin-engined.bombers.

Zone 2 Six Army twin-engined bombers have gone and nine Navy recces arrived,
making a Zone total of 26 aircraft.
Zone 3A. The loss-of 10 Army twin-engined bombers lowers the Army total to 296
and the Zone to 313 aircraft.
Zone 3B No Army movement. The Navy has added 22 single-engined fighters and five
single-engined bombers and deleted one twin-engined bomber, nine float-
planes and two recces. This makes a combined Zone strength of 136, of
which 69 are single-engined fighters,.evidence of the defensive state of
the island,

Zone 5A No Naval aircraft, and of the eight Army aircraft reported last week, one
single-engined fighter is out, leaving six'recces and one single-engined
fighter.

Zone 5B A small increase - an Army addition of nine single-engined fighters and

two recces, making 45 Army planes and 36 Naval floatplanes.

Zones lE , 4A B, 6 No change:

• .9 . IfI"
 r : n.;~

EAG Cvuiw.4AtO f it
SAir Str(nth (Coaliia.)

T/E B T/EF 5/E B s/E F FP FB R TOTALS

33,3 171 942 316 1762

32 6 280 689 480 18 135 1928
....... ---
-- - ----- ---------- --- ----- _ _- ~_

TOTALS 659 280 1631 L80 1R L51 3 690

Fluctuatio is:

17 May 24 May

Army 1768 .1762 Decrease of 6 aircraft.

N11Ty 1823 1928 Increase of 105 aircraft.

3591 3690 Increase of 99 trrcrait

- - - - ,

ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY

(24 - 30 May 1945)

Again those Oscars have been.at our

forward troops, this time in the Mok-
palin area. Attacks were carried out
in this area on two occasions. Also
a believed Irving recce aircraft was
sighted SE. of Rangoon, over the Gulf
of Martaban.

On 25 May, six Oscars attacked our forward troops at Thabyegan, on the west bank
of the Sittang from Mokpalin, dropping.bombs and causing two personnel casual-
ties, Again on 29 May, two unidentified aircraft (pdssibly Oscars), dropped
bombs at Nyaungkashe, on the railway west of 1;okpalin and to the west of Thab-
yegan, inflicting light damage andcasualties,

An interesting sighting was made by a Liberator on 27 May, hen a believed

Irving recce was seen southeast of Rangoon over the Gulf of Martaban; the en-
emy aircraft was lost in cloud.

Diary of Enemy Air Operations and Sightings

24 May None reported.

27 May One possible Irving sighted at 16 0 25'N - 96055 ' E

(SE of Rangoon, over Gulf of Martaban) at 5500'.
Enemy aircraft lost in cloud.

28 May None reported.

29 May STwo unidentified aircraft bombed and strafed troops at

Nyaungkashe at 0300 hours. Small damage and .casualties
inflicted. , ' i i
30 May None reported, ;i ir0 1

Page 10 ' - Section I

JAPANESE AI? STRENGTiund PSPOST,6N, G -2 WASHING TONA ODC. 24 MAY '45
ZONE-IA ZONE-/B
KURLESK4/AFUO-OKIA/s6I
£/O//f//LSof4O oAEof/38~E
ol___-_________________ 1
ZONE-IC
C HOAS#I/&i/K/I(KUof/33 Er
j ZONE-ID
I/33O/SI/U K? SHS/KOKKfSQu gYUKYUS
ZONE-IE
'N TO 30ON
-I_

ANACHURIA
ZONE -2
&I KOREA
11 -

ZONE -3A
-

CHI/NA - HA/MAN
- -

Io/3EK.'H S/ H
7r-__________
ii I i ----
-11
it T
ARMY ARMYl) NAVY ARMY NAVY /1R/Il)' AVAK BARMYI NA/VY ARMY
I /P5 AH4N9ASEOI SIP BASER lA//'841 LI/P AISFPLANOA SE0 I/PRASED LAD BASED SI//P 6ASED LA/I'D ASEI
U ii I i 4-41 4 T 41 t-'

TIE BOMBERS 18 73 474 135I48 124 X30

SIE BOMBERS __ 251__ 120 4 65 _ _ 8
TI F/6HTERS 7 54 _ 54 9 _22._

S/EF/6HTE2S 61 180 214141 62 114 343 __821__18

FLOATPLANES 36 __ 731 108 139 30

_

FL KINGBOA S ____ 4 5 9
A'ECONNA/SJ'ANCE 19 18 48 39 24 _ 1 27 21 49 15
TOTALS 8YZ0/VE 105 0 82 355 0 497260 0 371180710001307
ZONE-38 ZONE -4A
J
IZONE-48
FORMOSA
ZONE-S ZONE-s
6(RMA -S/AM-/NVO CH/NA MALAYA - UMATR AN9A1fA/S PH/IL /PPINES rETkF'////E~e(ceptSMATRA-/f IA
,I-~-=F----7 1 .i. .i.i

ARMY1
i... i. i

4ARMY ARMY NAVKY ARMY iY4VY

-- - - - --

Navy NAVYr
WAVY
IA4Nh'85E/ H//PBASEFP aVPSf £I/PBASAD1I/BASED '//PBASEP MMOB4EP& S'/PBASED
4
1 /A9AIEI
S/PBASED

TIE BOMBERS 13 __ 1131 __31 _ _12 _ _

S/ifBOMBES __17 _ __ _ _

TIE F/GHTES ____25 _ __

S/ifFIGH TE*S 35 _ 34 70 _ 80 1 17 I_ __ 6
FLOAT PLANES __ 14 181_ 36,1,6
FL K/MG BOATS _ ____

L
FECONNAISSANCEI2
--
15 17
- - - - - + . o
16
11 wI..w.w II -
i
TOA~BZON
vs ar v v yj r vv I
68O0 6811161 0 114 11531 0 18 "I - - ___I _ _ I _ __II II___"I
10 _ _
1145 _ _I_
0 __
13611 3 0 201
I_ _ I_ _ I__n
-1TOTAL FO 9
 'A

.. : _

*E Itfr OrENEMY TIVITY

S(January to May, 1945)
a, the b ginning of this period, the Japanese
Army
•i ir 'Forces had at its disposal all the airfields
HiA landing grounds in southern and central Burma.
SConstant sweeps by- Allied Air Forces had certainly
kept them from basing large numbers of aircraft at
these fields, but the Jap system of staging never-
theless remained effective, As the ground forces
advanced and ::overran these airfields, and the
strength of the Allied Air Forces increased in num-
b.rs and range, the J.A.A.F. was pushed back from
Burma into Siam.
During. these months the estimated strength of enemy aircraft in the theatre has de-
clined from just over 300 to under 240. The general reason for this has been the
failure to replace losses rather than any withdrawal of units. Sumatra has throughout
the period claioed the largest proportion, of fighters in particular, but the slight
standard of intorcoption experienced by Superfortresses and Fleet Air Arm aircraft
over that island supports the theory that these units are mostly engaged in training.
As Burma was occupied, the 'strength in Siam and French Indo- China grew, but their re-
sponsibilities gw still more. The loss' of the Philippines increased the vulnerabil-
ity of the French Indo-China aod the southern coast trade routes with the: result that
aircraft once engaged in Burma or on the Tenasserim Coast are now at readiness at
Saigon or escorting convoys in the. South China Sea.
A month-by-mionth review i given hereunder of'enemy offensive and defensive air
activity and of the more interesting sightings-.made by both air and ground forces.
January. During_ thn s month, the islands and a/fs of Akyab and Ramree were recaptured
as a result of' landings .b troops of 15 .Corps, These operations necessitated a coecen-
tration of ship:p:!.; and numbers of Oscars and an occasional Lily attempted attacks on
shipping, beaclihead troc5 'coricentrations and airfields. One or two enemy recce flights
were made and fiteghtQos we scrambled for interception, without success. Intercepting,
Spitfires,P-38s cnd night Beaufighters claimed a total of seven enemy a/c destroyed
during the month over the Arakan coastal area. .
In Central Burma the 14th Army drive on Mandalay. and Meiktila was gathering momentum
and the already neutralized Shwebo airfield group fell. Crossings were made of the
Irrawaddy and the enemy. air forces attempted to :support their ground forces by bombing
and strafing. As our warning system had inevitably been outrun, the AA batteries had
to shoulder the m in responsibility for defense, claiming 1-1-6 for the month.
Attacks were-made on 7 Ja n on the iM River bridge and Ye-U by 17 Oscars, on 11 Jan by
two Lilys followed by 16 Oscars again on- Ye-U,'n 12 Jar,by 14 Oscars on Thabeikkyin
and Obbauk, ,again on l8 Jan by eight Oscars on Thabeikkyin and on 27 Jan and 31 Jan by
Lilys on OnbaukTaukdyan and Kalemyo a/fs. The main attacks were on troop .concentra-
tions and the a/f bases of the Allied close-support a/c, but little damage was caused,
Further afield there were interceptions or sightings of e/a by our strafing fighters,
bombers and P.R. a/c .ranging from Meiktila to Bangkok. Lilys and Oscars were the a/c
used by the ener.m in attacking, while sightings and attempted interceptions included
a Nell off Cape Negrais and biplanes over Bangkok, though the latter probably belonged
to the Siamese Air Force.
February. The earlier part of this month saw an intensification of enemy air activity
against our shipping and a/fs in the Akyab and Ramree areas, and on our long-range
fighter bases as f±ar north as Cox's Bazar. Little damage was caused by bombing and
'strafing and a Dinah which attempted to recce the area on 10 Feb was shot down by.a
Spitfire.

In Central Burma, the 14th Army reached the outskirt ch Madlay,to Thabutkon a/f
in the Meiktila group, and crossed the Irrawaddy aftertk Pakou.nEnem air
attacks were naimnl by Oscars against close-support a/fs and advai ggrgtii pyrces.
Allied a/c on patrols intercepted several of these attacks and 15 e/a .e desroyed
or damaged. Incl.udd in this number was a possible Irving recce aircraft. ',4'; "
The most interesting sighting of the month was by a Spitfire which reported a Jack.
During a/f vseeps, Mosquitos found a Sally taking off at Heho on 4 Feb and destroyed it,
and, later in the month while attacking Toungoo, found two Oscars at defensive readiness.
Liberators escorted by P-38s and Thunderbolts attacked Rangoon dumps on 11 Feb & found
Oscars,Tonys,and Tojos in defence.In the actiqn thaee
destroyed and two damaged. . , ;n
Review Of Enemr Air AQtivty (Concluded.
March. The major enemy air strike of this month took place on the night of 3-4 Mar
when simultaneous attacks were carried out by bombers and fighters on Akyab and Ramree
and also on Sinthe and Onbauk..In the latter strike, two Lilys were claimed as des-
troyed by a night Beaufighter. Damage and casualties were caused on these attacks.
No, offenive _activity wc.s attmpted during the eight days that followed. Enemy attacks
were made in the coastal region on 2,4 and 25 Mar. On 2 Mar,Ramree was attacked with
no damage,and on the night of 25 Mar single-engined a/c attacked shipping in Akyab
Harbour and an a/f with little result. A Beaufighter scrambled and shot down one of
the raiders, an Oscar, over Cheduba Strait.
Only one attack was reported from Central Burma, an a/f attack. Several sightings were
made in this general area and during sweeps of the a/fs remaining to the enemy, and
on 26 Mar, while sweeping the Rangoon area, P-1ls'found three Oscars over Hmawbi and
destroyed them. On 15 Mar, P-51s attacked Don Muang near Bangkok for the first time.
Enemy aircraft had been forced back to this base, seeking refuge from our fighters.
Complete surprise was achieved and the total score of 23-6-31 has been confirmed.
April. No enemy offensive air activity was encounterel in the coastal area during this
month. Several attacks were made on out airfields and forward troops along the 14th
Army front, On 7 Apr, two Lilys attacked Meiktila and Myohla, one being shot down by
AA. On 12 Apr, four Oscars attacking troops and MT south of Pyawbwe suffered 1-0-1
from AA. On 22 and 24 Apr, Oscars strafed and bombed our airfields at Lewe,Tennant
and Kalaywa, and on 24 Apr carried 6n to attack MT but were intercepted by Spitfires
and suffered 1-0-1, MT was the target for Oscars on 29 Apr and again Spitfires inter-
cepted, claiming one Oscar destroyed - the ground troops reporting another seen to
crash.

Single engined aircraft were sighted on several occasions by our aircraft engaged on
strafing and bombing operations but no unusual types or tactics were reported.

-a. Three enemy air attacks have been recorded during this month, all by bomb
carrying Oscars and all"'on our forward troops positions. On 11 May, an attack on Waw
cost the enemy one O.ear to 14 and caused no damage or casualties. On 25 May and
29 May, Thabyegan and Nyaungkashe, both west of the Sittang opposite Mokpalin, were
attacked with little damage. On 23 May, eight Oscars were sighted over Kemapyu but
no attack developed,

Several sightings have been made over enemy territory but no losses have been reported
as a result of interception. On'8 May a P.R.Spitfire was attacked over Moulmein at
24,000 feet by an Oscar, but successfully reached cloud cover. Liberators attacking
Port Blair on 17 May, sighted two single-engined enemy fighters over the target but
no attacks were made. The month closed in activity symbolic of the present incapacity
of the Japanese Army Air Force in this theatre. On 30 May, a Liberator returning
from a raid on shipping in the Sattahib area, sighted several grounded aircraft
Naung Jauk airfield. The boitber came down to 500 feet and with complete immunity in
four straffing runs, shot up two Dinahs and a single-engined-fighter.

Page 1 :- Section I
 BUPMA RE CONQU~J . x 7!

Rangoon is.o~ ors to: serve as :a :springboard to

Singapore as..well.as a supply cer r for our
troops in Burma.

A landirout e to China, as been built ov er ground

that: was ;irst won,.rom the enemy,.

In the.Arakan, anadon the lath Amy, and NAC

onts notable virctories have-been Avon in Burma.
This story chronicles the advances during 1945
that leg to victpry 0

The- beginning of this year ound.our troops on the Arakan as ,far . south as -.Foul Point
or the coast, and inland, advancing; south .;;along the 1Mayu adad Rivers, On3
'January our troops staged ,an amphibious 1andin on kyab. slali ::but even bef'ore- "
they st art ed, it krdwn that the 'Japiese .had_ evacuated . _and th islandwwas . taken
without 'ppositionp The capture of Akabhastenedthe- complete evacuation of' the
MayaPeninsula, bud, onz the Kal adan the .enemy;resisted vigorously. to-cover the re-
treat :1';his forces through Myohaung to yetnbyag.

Th third r wtck in January

1 saw a. further $mphiblocs
land ng,;h;tiie.Joz tie ebon
Peninsu .a, where Comindos spear-headed the attack, th amndir f
inb Li-ttle rcsistance was.. fir'st encountered but t;his, soon stifffene dn the rez was
hard ight in before the p eninsula was completely occupied. After t his,our forces
moved along the Daimagbon Chauingand landed on the mainland near, Kangaw;.. This was ;
an bttempt ,to ut the only good road along which the Japa nese could extricate their,
forcesfrom tihe inba area)arid the enemy defense providedsome o;f the .iercest
fi gtiiig sic
S~e-;Kohib /..:.

fi g h ht i lneg, s ensc t eeoa f t - cn

a d v an c i n g a l o n g t h e Ka l da nn w e r e o v c o i n g s om e
For c es
very t ough ac,
enemt rrs is theant cast
be forei46yoh aun it a .t thy:Araka and
by the middle of Febuary these forces had taken. the enemy center of -i.rbya
and.had
advancd south to 2nK o iKth the Kangaw garrison. It was now appreciated that
the mainenem forces had ,succeeded in evading the Ianaw trap,-:although not .without
sacri fi cJntg over 1000 troo;~s dl

hile these actions had been proco ndinqn the in4nland , 26t IidanDvisi on atthe
of January staged alaning on the Island of. ,nd mree and a.f ew days later Royal
-ari.nes lned d aohedu
&n ba The landing at Rarntee received praqtically no oppos i6n
but' resister ce lter d.ev elopedfrom one enemy battalion on ;theislartidiwch, aided
by the rou natia'e ofthe country., succeeded in del aying our forces;btt iallor-
ganized enemiy resistanc ceased by the middle of February. Small. parties of enemy
proved... ve ry elusiv and .even at the,,present :time it is, believed-that! some, str ag
glers re still on the is lan ~ On:the mainland after 3aw st AL xean Forces
continued their irch ,south ''d eventually captured Dalt, approx6pately 2a;,iles
Wn\of An and Tamandaz.,on the coast, 12 miles SW ,of Dalet.,. Meanwhile, Inda Army
trop s. had landed at Raywa) aihc ontth cOaet 1iles, of An.u -It was now apparent
that i was be coming the ,main concentration point of the enemy:as i prot'cted a..
Japan 5e-made road .over :.'he hills into ; Central Bur. As. we rmoved agnstgn,: en-
eny resistance sti.ffened and it was net until May that we occupied the village,
and altouglY the en eqyssuffered severe casualtieshe did eventually su coed in'
withdrawing the bulk of This men into Central Burma to' help his hard-pressed: troops ;
there.

The Japanese sti 1 reai ned ho weverapproximnatey two .battalions _inh t Taungi
area. 'To deal with these, pin the middle'of iiarch, a landinwas rae -atLettan, 40
miles north of Tau g ;., t first progress.. was fast -and opposition ight,.=bu7 t as 7
our forces neared Taunup, eneny resistance' stiffened, and aided byth. very dif'f'
icult type 'of' c u ntry , he halted our advance for some time. It was not -.until the
third week. of, .pril that we .. occupied the. town and the' Jacan ese withdrew towards
Prone. Our forces ' then advanced south. and occuped Sandoway and Gwa.:
 was to withdraw when pressed, but. he ..had no intention
: of ieding, trie towd way~s ov-e;r 'the 'r 3akj-an :one eding froin ' the othe~hr from

Taungup, if evients ,in Cenitral- Burma ha~d not- fored his k n

Fourteenth army - n.this front, at-the beginning df 1945, three main thrusts
were injirogress' one'by 2 Bri tish 'Division'along the road from Kalewa to Ye-U,
wrhich had reached the area of P;GiPg aing; 'the se'ndiid one' by 19 Yidcari Division was
south along the railway from Tunt ho to Kanbalu, both these under Command of 33
Corps, while_ the third by. C'Crsns along the A'ittha Valley throe4 Gangaw and Pauk
to the Irrawaddy. - ''

The ovement to Ye-U progressed well once the delaying stand at Pingaiflg was over-
com~, and in the first week ]oi Jauary e-U was occupied as was also thB weir at
Kabo. The latter was cat ur ed after a swift dash by an armored column which. moved
acioyss country to. prevent thq enemy damaging this' 'important irrigation point Mean-
while '19 Division ha d' cverme an enemy delaying' a cton at K.b-al u ad were at Tangon,
12 .ma..(northlof 2 _,Dvision. The Japanese attempte d dting
l action at the Mu
River: acros sing: but the is vas soon overcime andth t'wo disi ons linked up. From
this point the ice c to: 3hvebo 'started, with 2'=Divisi'on moving .alon the m.nain road
and 19 ivisionn :thI :east side of the railway." The' Biitishtros ran into: the
stronger opposition and the race was won b. the Indinrrm~ y troops, wh1 oentered
Shwebo on 7 January. Southwards from Shwebo the advance was continued by the British
Divlsion. which=wmwed swiftly-to the' tndawarea; l6 miles N.of Sa aing IHere the
outer 'defi:es f aextremely 'strong positionb'uilt. around the Sain hills were
encountered. i Enemy resistance becan stubborn 'and our progress . slow,

Ninet'eenth Division had meawhile moved east from Shebo '.to the Irrawaddy at a
myaing.' 'he ei antici p ated thismo've end ,ha'd strong forces available, in fact
at one time he had ideas himself of crossin the river: end of attp ti g to cut :our
cornmunications. First our troops. had to clear enemn pockets on the west bank; after
which, in' the third week of January;' a surprise crossing of the Irrawaddy was made
opposite, Ky aukniylaun .The eneni reaction was strong and he fought fier6iy support-
b a. lar e cncentrtfn of 'artillery. SYed
Fut hei north, a crssing at Thbeikkyin
me'V strong oppositio
ryso ' '

Durin..: this ' times 20' Indian Division hid been moing south along the Chindwin. Lit-
tie opposition' was encountered until Bualin, on the ~nywa 'Ye-U railway w~as each-
edi.arid here an enemy delaying action was overcome and our troops moved on to' attack
theLzxiver por of a~ionyi a. tresista'cE ''here.w-s stubborn but we finally occup id the
town on 19. January. South= of Monwa enemy defecnses were Enwuntered: for abou four
miles a fter''which he " withdrew, aAdour borces advanced swiftly and occupied a long
stret.ch.'of. the'northe i bank of the Irrawad, althoh the enemy still held on to
his defenses in°thfe'confli' nee ar ea of' the two iverb

The thrust~ down t he: nit tha River was also developing. The rain' eemy posit ions
were around Gan aw; these 'had been too strong ,for the Lightly aimed Lushai Bri ode.
When 4orps to6k over, these positionsvare soon overcome and a 'svift advance wa
made k= 7 Indian Division hrough Tilin and E>uk to Mk~itche on the 'Irrawaddywhile
22 East ABrian Brigade occupied. Seikpyu, on the =oppositeside of t iver t the
.oil center 'of Chauk; there the, East Africans made afeint crossing which caused the
eremy considera le worry' and provoked ,a strong reaction.

And now ::let :us retu.irn to the' fghi f urt he r north. 4n; Eder , 20 Divis on
forced a"crossing of the irrawady opposite I yinr .u a4a inst light opposition. The
Commander of the eEnemy 15th iyrmy now found himself in a position of several poss-=
ibilities. it Kyaukmyung 'he w-a eOng-aged in a stiff fight protectig. the northern
approach'es to Inda-a'; -northwest of/Sanain, the 2nd Division was poisd, for a
possible cmossing;1 20'Divjsion was on' his bank o f' the ive, opposite My nmu;whilO
we were: holding cy tch' and the' East Afxricans were' threatening his oil cent enrs of
Chauk '.nd Yenangyaung. '

At his; oin h : yb o .rmoves and bE'gan a sries of mis'takes

a Th~e~enmyc~mad deidd that'te inn
diil :major
trw n i force, thus engag-
ing - ing the pressure on 19 IDiv-
isona Kakiyun y tdrwngs for atction further south.
Page..1
14 iSctin
 __ _ _

VIcioruy~
" ""Furthest Jap Peneration
"m
S Battleine iJan. 1945
Battlehlne 28Mo1945
£3 'waina
} .I .
Scale in Miles

0 0 20 '40 60 80 00

_ _
Burma Reconquered (Continued) .
He did not appreciate that our operat ns at y he ani P okku were on a Corps
scale, and he decided that for the present these forges did not constitude a men-
ace, and accordingly threw what troops he had ,in this area into an. unnecessarily-
strongeffort against the East ifricans at Seikpyu.

Thus 14th Army's deception plan worked extremely well and 7 Division were presented
with a very lightly opposed crossing at Nyaungu on 14 February, the resultant
bridgehead being Quickly expanded and increased to virtually divisional strength.
Followingup were two brigades of 17 Division and a tank brigade, all of which 'grad-
ually concentrated in the: bridgehead while 7 Division beat off the small enemy at-
tacks which developed.

On 23. February, these brigades strongly headed by tanks, broke out of the&bridge-
head, 'crushed some hastily assembled 'eneiy forces at Tauntha, and moved through
1iahlaing and by 27 .ebruary were four miles from Miktila. 1-t this stage the
third brigade of 17 Division was flown in .nd the fii.ht was on for the all import-
ant communications of Meiktila. The"Japanese assembled all the forces available,
mostly L of C troops into scratch units and prepared to fight to the last. The
stand resulted in their annihilation, at least 2500 enemy being killed. Our troops
now consolidated their positions in the town in preparation for enemy attacks which
they knew would come,,

iMeanwhile, soon after gaining their bridgehead, 20 Division had been engaged in ex-
tremely.:hard fighting with major enemy forces, and to help them and further to con-
fuse the. enemy, 2 Division commenced to'cross the Irrawaddy at N;azun, eight miles
east of r.inmu. On the 19 Division front, due to action elsewhere, the enemy forces.
had begun to thin out by 12 February, and our troops hit the enemy hard and followed'
him up much swifter than -he had thought possible, toward iMandalay,

The enemy still believed in his offensive capabilities and arrogantly continued to
underestimate our forces. He thou.ht that by bringing in his 33rd irmy from NE
Burma he could, obliterate our forces at ivMeiktila, thus restoring his Ls. of .C, .ad
ihile this action was in progress, his 15th army was to hold. our force on the
Irrawaddy after which both arnies would push us back over the river. He,also order-
ed his forces based, on Yenanyauns to advance and destroy 7 Division' s bridgehead
and the East Africans on the west bank.

Accordingly, during the first part of iMarch, fierce fi hting developed around Meik-
tils and a brigade of 5 Indian Division was flown in as reinforcements, but the en-
emy succeeded in digging"in on the strip 'and supplieshad to be dropped by air, The
strip was eventually cleared but hard fighting in the area continued with sweeps by
armored columns the main feature.

On the northern part of the front, the enemy was beginning' to realize that .his
forces were not capable of holding our troops and Mandalay fell on 20 March, after
the Japs at last decided to abandon resistance at Fort Dufferin and to evacuate what
forces remained. Also by the middle of arch, resistance to our bridgeheads at
Liyinmu and Ngazun was weakening and our forces began a swift advance towvard the rail-
way line between Mandalay and Meiktila. Stubborn resistance was encountered at
Kyaukse and SE of Kuma, stands which 'we.j designed to enable the enemy to retreat.
into the hills to the east. He suffered considerable casualties but the bulk. of his
forces reached the hills and trekked SE towards Kalaw and Taunggyi. This resulted
in the Jap 15th .rmy being pushed 'out of the Burma battle, and despite all its ef-
forts it has not yet succeeded in re-entering it.

The actions north of Meiktila brought an end to the attacks on Meiktila itself and
enabled our troops to commence their move south in the early days of April. Thirty-
third Army, responsible for the 'defense to, t'he, south, offered extremely stiff resist-
ance, but.,our armor and heavy fire power was irresistable, and the enemy casualties,
were extremely heavy, culminating in a massacre by 17 Division at Pyawbwe. Fifth
Indian Division, h'o had previously moved into Mieiktila, then took up the advance
south and brushing aside what remained of enemy resistance, swept along at an ex-
tremely rapid rate. Enemy delaying attempts at amethin, Shwemyo and Pyinmana were
bypassed and then mopped and Toungoo was occupied by 2. April.
 The advance continued, and all nriy eforts b stem it failed, resistance being
overcome notably at Nyaunglebi and Pe3u. "e owa k;now that. the threat to Pe u
forced the en y to abandon Ranoon 'and took away his capabilities for defending it.
1fter Pegu, bad weather, demolitions, and mines delayed our advance but by 1 -aycur
spearheads were approaching Hleau, 29 miles from Rangoon. On 1 May a parachute and
amphibious landing h-was mde by 26 Division, an Arakan division, near Rangoon and by
3 May the city was in our hands after light resistance had been overcome. From Pegu,
5 Division moved SE and after overcoming two strong positions succeeded in gaining
the-line of the Sit tang in the Mokpalin area

To r6turn to 33 Corps - - -After the fall of Mandalay and the mopping up of the area
north of ieiktila) this Corps swung SWitowards the Irrawaddy, and 20 Division was
sent, completely to the J s surprise, in a swift dash along the road from eiktila
sJ
to Taugdwingyi fterconsblidation, two columns moved west and captured .Magwe on
23 Airil. l Seventh Division had aeanwhile been breaking out from their bridgehead
a.d in quick succession they captured Kya.kpadaung, Chauk, and Yanangyaung. The en-
eny opposing themr,:-ith their retreat cut at Magwe, Mere compelled to cross to the
west bank of the Irxrawaddy, where two brigades of 7 Division eventually followed
them,

i:Oter uhe fa1l of Miawe, the advance from Taungdwingyi continued, and after resist-
ance at Allanmyo had.been overcome, Prone was taken. The next enemy stand was at
minhla.l;6ii of'Ietpadan and once this was overcome our forces moved' swiftly
south a id c aiup with the man-oon garrison at a point 60 miles north of Rangoon
on -l Ma .... .

Thus the chief co imunications of Burma were now in our hands and the Japs, cut off
on the west of the Irrawaddy and in the Pegu Yomas, could only make for the hills
east o: the Sittang. This they have done, but about 4000 still remain NW and NE of
Prome, fighting hard to make their escape, while a further 10,000 remain in-the
Pegu Yomas waitipg ther chance to move east. Many will succeed, but will be only
a-ragged force when they reach their destination; many ill die from disease or be
killed by our troops,

NCAC: ,t the be inning of the year, Chinese Forces moved steadily along the road
from Bh'rmo to Namkham. Resistance was more slight than had been expected and by
17 January, Namkham had been taken and the advances continued towards Morn-Yu, the
junction of the Burma road to China. i junction with CEF Forces was made at Mong-
Yu by the end of January. The CEF Forces had cleared the Burma road from the Sal-
weeh, overcoming stiff opposition en route, and during January they cleared Wanting
and advanced to link up with NCiC Forces, which opened the road from Ledo to China
and convoys immediately began to pass through. The i. hting. in this area was help-
ed very much by eveints on the Shweli River, where American troops were pushing
across difficult country to cut the Lurma road near Narnphakka, and thus trap the
Japanese further inorth. This task was successfully accomplished and fierce fighfting
developed as the trapped Japs tried to fight their way south. At the cost of heavy
casualties, the enemy extricated his forces and thereafter little resistance was
encountered on this part of the front and in quick succession Kutkai,- Hsenwi, and
Lashio were captured, the latter place on 8 March.

On the central sector of' this front Chinese Forces had been moving steadily south
from the Shweli "and by the end of February had chased the enemy from Namtu and the
Bawdwin Mines, after vhich they advanced along the road to Hsipaw, overcoming tough
Japanese resistance en route, and captured the town in the middle of March,

Meanwhile, on the right flank, the British 36 Division had been moving. ahead. In
the beginning of the year the Irrawadci was' crossed. and little opposition was'.at
first encountered The main advance was SE to Mabein on the Shweli, which was tak-
en against light resistance, and the advance then continued toward lyitson. From
information now hIlid, wre .kno. t h enemy
isethought this was our main thrust, and
accordingly ,eakene Wo hejhBurma road and threw in his main effort
against -"'! extremely fierce and bloody fighting lasting
^
som. p ,"p enemy gave way, after which a swift advance was
made rough Mong Mit and.Mogok to Maymyo, where a junction
was ih19 Division troop ghail ously taken the town,
ase 16. -Section I troopi
Bur a Reconquered (Concluded)

After this it was evident that the enemy had decided on a complete withdrawal from
NE Burma. He fou ht where necessary to cover his retreat but gradually contact
was broken, and now his troops from this erea are either around Loilem and Taunggyi
or further south. There has been no fighting for some weeks and our garrison is
being considerably reduced.

Conclusion: The fi ht for the re-conquest of Burma is almost over. True, sever-
al thousands of enemy troops remain in the hills in the center of the country, but
their efforts are directed towards only one objective: escape, to join their com-
rades east of the Sittan . The majority of the Japanese Forces have either retreat-
ed to loulraein, now the main enemy center in Burma., or have been pushed into the
hills east of Thazi and TounLoo. Here they are fi hting to cover their retreat, and
to hold possible routes into Siam, until the monsoon slows our troops and impedes
rurther advance. The tendency of the .ma n portion o. these forces in the hills is
to mosve south., throuth P.aEun and Bilin to .Moulmein, and the enemy is at present try-
ing hard to keep open this escape route by holding the line of the Sittang at
o.'bkpalin. But his offensive capabilities have been completely blunted.

Thus in a brilliantly foared ciupaign, of less than a year, the Japs have been
.iriven from the heart of Burma, Rangoon, one of the best ports on the-coast, is in
our hands. This most important city of Burma will now supply our troops and will
serve as the base for our next mo'e'south towards Singapore and the East Indies,

Section I -Page 17
 2K>
_ NSE AR IY OPEaINALT AS NGT i

ISCUTI F4$T tSIA

This 'eek t s estimated total

strength of 240Iaircraft:
indicates an increase of
onlyy one 'medium bohbber over
the previous estimate,

For the first time in over a month the estimated.Order of Battle for the
Japanese Army Air Forces in South East 'lsia shows a 'nominal increase rather
than a decrease, In view of the obvious difficulties of replacements and
maintenance, continued decreases rather than stabilization at the current
figure is to be anticipated in the months'ahea d. By careful conservation
and strict itat-ions on operational use theoJapanese may hope to maintain
a force of some numbers, but it is unlikely 'ever to have more than a nui-
sance value.

It is interesting to note that at the end of 1944' the Japanese Air Order
of Battle vtm e estimated at 297 aircraft, with 98 of that total based in
Burma and only 35 in Siam and south Indo-China. The intervening months
have witnos od not only the loss of a ifth of that strength, but also
the retreat from all bases in Burma. With all their airfields in Siam and
Indo-China now subject to Allied attacks, further retreats may be anticipated.

NF
aval ar Stren th in South East Asia

The estimate of navesl: air strength shows an increase of three due to the
inclusion of a like number of torpedo bombers, making a total of 45 for
this wceek.

Disposition of' Nayl tircraft

Fighters Torpedo Bombers Rlecce Fis Total

Land Float

So.Indo-China 1 -12 13

Malaya 5 2 3 .4 18 32

5 3 3 4 30 45

oLCIAS >

"CLW

Page l18- Section I

$14 PAlETARMY, OPERA T10M4AL A/IR
STRE#GTH s A SVA
f JAPANESE
A RC AF720..,

/0 . 4

ify ..

S5/
~5 3 I
A ADA MAN
SEA

AREA FI5HTER! BOMBERS RECCE TOTALS

s/E T/E MED LIT SE IEI

SIAM 27 4/15 5 5I
N.md
ludo ia/0 /0C
So/ndc~ha 26 /0 7 /0 53
MALAYA /10--12 22
r. SUMATRA 62 25 /0 7 /04
TOTALS 135 25 26 32 22240
A/C SCAR NICK SALLY LILY PM'419
ipes TN

'...
i.,
 IaSSFIE
-

P.

r; .

L'".

CZ11

A TACTICS
x
 SPITS OF! 7 SO_IDRONTANWLE IT OSCAR GAIN
Enemy sneak raids against forward
formations are not new, nor are
the Nips' fighter tactics; however
they serve to reiterate how he fights.
In this 29 April encounter, he em-
ployed all the trimmings which he
loves; superiority in numbers,
excellent maneuverability and tricky
top cover, which made the most of
cloud as a screen. Again the Spits'
superior speed brought all four a/c-.,
safely home, after downing one enemy.

Four Spitfires were on patrol between Nyaunglebin and Pogu covering forward troops.
Red 1 was leading Red and Green sections back to base after completion of patrol
and was flying at 1500'. At 0710 approx 10 miles S of Toungoo, he saw six plus a/c
at 12 o'clock flying about 3000'.

Owing to the proximity to base it was thought that they were friendly a/c but a
careful watch was kept on them. When one banked against the skyline they were at
once recognized as Oscars.

Although each pilot had about 30 gallons of fuel left Red 1 gave the order to
jettison L/R tanks and turned east climbing into the sun using about Plus 7 boost.
He then positioned himself 2000 yards away from them at about 6000' up sun and
noticed the-main buncl of Oscars were diving down and strafing from ~000'. He
then looked around for their .top cover which consisted of two aT f in at 5000'
inandout-, of7/1.0coud rAs the /a gave no indication of seeing us, Red section
flew towards the tojp cover, but on coming within range they dived back into cloud
and could not be contacted again.

Red Section then turned south and from slightly up sun made an attack on the last
e/a. The e/a, eas diving gently down and as Red ,ection taw within range di a
l.ose chindaele to.Eort, each a/c 75-100 yards astern of each other. Red l put
the dot on the sixth a7c at 450 yards and held it there until 300 yards and just
as he was laying on deflection of one ring the a/c flew into cloud, At 200 yds,
he drew a bead on the fifth a/c and fired a 2- second burst allowing for a 300
angle off, while travelling at about 220 mph. Strike were not observed as the
nose of the Spitfire was covering the Oscar. When the nose was depressed again,
e/a was observed to bbreaking hard downto ort.

By now the leader of the Oscar formation was directly above Red 1 at 1500' and
was starting his attack. At the same time No. 4 of the formation who was about
100' above Red 1 did three flick rolls to starboard and came into position about
250 yards behind at 250 angle off. Red 1 using his superior speed did an aileron
turn to starboard and went straight down to' the deck, the fourth Oscar firing
at him, Nos 1 and 2 chasing him.
He drew away rapidly and climbed into sun at 4000. He then turned around and made
another pass from the beam, but this time the Oscar broke when he was 10001 away.
By pulling on the stick he was able to get a 900/450 shot but again no results
were observed,

The other Oscars had now organized themselves and formed up above and around him.
Red 1 was forced to dive away. Using Plus_18 pounds and aileron turns he soon
outdistanced them, climbed up again to 6000' and picked on enemy top cover of two'
a/c 1000' above and 1500 yards behind. Red 1 then positioned himself 1000 yards
up sun and due bort to his attack but asusual e turned gently into him and as
he came into range tightened up the turn so that he could only fire at them at a
frontal ugarter wth a short burst. He pulled straight up to 2000' above and
did a rolling attack on the No. 2 man firing a short burst from 500 yards but had
to break away before he could close in as the No, 1 of the formation was getting
into position to start firing.
104 {_,..
i'k.v14A:1'.

r' 1
.. _ ,r, ' . Y
Szts of W'7a,
VCS th Oscr Ar-2 in Concludedo

One a/c which had been flying on the same level about 2000 yards in front of them,
turned back and climbing into the sun, made a pass at Red 1 who, however, had been
watching him and broke down into him and climbed into the sun. This last e/a
showed no hurry to go home and not only did he remain as rear cover for the previous
a/o but turng bck and enga'ed :tithRed 1.

Red 1 had climbed above the Oscar and dived into the attack but immediately the
a/Zc turned into hi and, tightened his turn so that Red 1 was munable to get a shot.
Red 1 pulled up and did three consecutive rolling attacks on the Oscar, but each
time he tightened his turn and Red 1 was unable to fire.

Red 1 again positioned h iself up sun and made a pass at the Oscar who did a flick
half roll and dived for about 10001 zooming up behind Red 1 who also pulled up
again. Red 1 wihose 'petrol was now down to 15 gallons, made a last attack firing off
the remainder of his ammun.tion, but ur.s ble to obtain any strikes as the Oscar
kept ttrning inside him. Red 1 then returned to base.

When Red 1 ordered the sections to drop their Idng range tanks, Green 1 was unable
to do this so Green Section climbed to 4000' into the sun. By this time the e/a were
identified as Oscars II flying in loose pairs, one pair as top cover at 5000t. As
this top cover pair rolled over andc dived to attack the Red Section, Green 1 dived
through cloud and tagged on 2000 yds behind the No.2 of the enemy pair. This Oscar
made his attack and pulled up left, Green 1 pulled inside hin and closed to 500 yds.
The enemy No. 1 then observed Green 1 and pulled down 'to attack and the No. 2 began
to break violently left. Green 1 opened fire at 250 angle off at 400 yds and scored
strikes on his engine and observed flames from the port side of the engine cowling,
gave him a further burst. and the whole engine burst into flames. He rolled over
and went vertically into the deck with black smoke pouring from him. Aircraft fell
from about 1500 ft. It blew up on hitting the deck. As Green 1 broke off his attack
and pulled up into the sun, a single Oscar made a head-on attack on him, so he
dived below him anid thed the Oscar rolled on his back and made a rolling attack on
him. At this point, Green 1 was able to jettison his long range tank and as he was
about to break , he observed a further Oscar making a quarter attack from starboard
and another one nmaking a- similar attack from port,':a fourth attacking from astern
and below .CGreon. went violently right and downwards among the trees. By taking
violent evasive, action he lost them. As Green. 2 had only about.15 gallons of fuel
remaining wi. Green 1 began his attack, the section leader ordered him to return
to base. As he ;began to do this he saw Green its victim burning on the deck.

j-.

[ .'

Page S l :i , I^ ,^jU^iII
 /1-24 SIGHTS "CIRCLES OF LICHT

A B-24 of the llth Bomb Group on a

snooper mission over Truk during the
early morning hours of 3'May 1945,
encountered what may prove to be as
baffling a phenomena as the balls of
fire seen by the B-29s\while over the
Japanese mainland. (Excerpted From Hq.
AAF, POA, Air Intell,Memo No.4, 8 May
1945.)

The B-24 first observed two red-circles of light approaching the plane from below
while still over the Truk atoll. One light was on the right and the other was seen
on the left of-the B-24 The light on the left side turned back after one and one
half hours. The one on the right remained with the bomber until the B-24 was only
10 miles from Guam. From the time that the B-24 left the atoll, the light never
left its position on the right side, It was reported by the crew members as some-
times ahead, sometimes behind, and sometimes alongside the B-24 and always about
1200 to 1500 yds distant. !

At day break, the crew reported that this light climbed to 15,000 ft and stayed in
the sun. It was a short time afterward that the B-24 let down and went through a
300 foot .ndercast and lost sight of the light,

During the flight from Truk to Guam, the light was observed to change from an
orange color to a bright yellow or white like electric light. The light was also
described as sometimes looking like a phosphorous glow. This sequence of color
changes occurred at regular intervals. The light appeared to be about one foot in.
diameter and the cha-nges in color did not follcw a pattern of accelerrtion or de-
celeration. - .

The light followdc the B-24 in dives from 11,000 ft to 3000 ft, through sharp course
changes and even br'ief cloud cover always keeping its same relative position and
distance. At one time, the pilot turned into the&light and he definitely reports
no closure occurring. During the night high cirrus clouds masked the moonlight and
no part of object was observedexcept the light. At daybreak, the light changed to
a. steady white glow and a possible wing shape with a silver glow was noted by some
members of the crew.

Guam radar units reported no bogies plotted at any time that this light was within
its range. The crew imembers reported that the light finally left them when only 10
miles from Guam. The light was never close enough to the bomber to give -a single
blip on'the radar and therefore should-have been easily detected. Two blips with
IFF were not reported at this time, the B-24 being the only plane on the scope.

The report from the Guam radar units plus the fact that the light was always seen
on the right side of the B-24, and that even when the.bomber turned into the light,
no rate of closure was noted tends to make the possibility of a jet powered or
even a conventional 'type aircraft a doubtful one.

A preliminary evaluation by the Assistant Chief of Air Staff Intelligence gives

the ,following possibilities:

"It is believed the lights observed were those of an unknown type mounted on Japan-
observation
ese aircraft with the capabilities of an Irving on an experimental or
jet exhaust flame characteristics are apparent, the range and
mission. While certain
.length of light greatly exceed the known capabilities of friendly or enemy jet
of "Balls of
aircraft, While observations vary considerably from characteristics
Fire" recently soon over Japanese homeland, there is great need for intelligence
on all air rheno.oina.

'" - .:,s
8888j
ATATh STUDY A@ AND EQUIPMENT OA RIFELS NEAR RANGOON

4TAIU parties with ground troops and

in the sea borne invasion of Rangoon
have made a'partial examinationof
airfields and dumps in the area. Com-
plete reports, and photographs have
not been received to date but it ap-
pears from information at.hand that
considerable equipment of technical
interest has been recovered. A list
of items so far reported appears below.
(Information supplied and partly eval-
uated by ATAIU, SEA).

i4flgaladon Artsitr. Four nearly complete a/c were found, including:

1 - Unidentified type described as a single engine two

place recce-bomber, (Probably,Ki.30 'ANN')
1 - Sally 2
1'- Oscar 2
1 - Sonia

There were also miscellaneous parts of other Sallys, 0 bars,

a Frank, and some trainers,

Zas tkwinAirstr f 4 - Dinahs

1 - Oscar 2

Zay'tkwin DU:: T. Parts of:

2 - Sallys
1 - Dinah
"3 -Oscars
1 - Ida
17 - Engines

Hmawbi Airstrip, 6' - Tonys; three reported in good shape but not reflyable,

Hle uirstri. 7 - Dinahs

7 - Spare engines

There were no aircraft found at the following airfields Pabst, Highland Queen,
John Haig, Tongyi, and Cascade.

Dump an .Shop Area at Milestone 33 on Pegu Road.

Parts of: 2 - Helens,2 Dinahs, 2 Tojos., Oscar

Crated machine shop equipment was found.near the entrancd
to the dump.
Insein Dump. This appears to have been the main dugp area so far located.
Equipment found included: About 300 a/c engines ranging in condition from practic-
ally new to badly damaged. Some new types such as the Ha 45 used in FRANK were'among
them. . . Propellers, including three and four blade electric pitch change.

Also considerably quantities, of the following:

Radio equipment, direction finding equipment, engine instruments, autonmtic pilots,
navigation instruments and computers, bomb sights, bomb racks, machine guns varying
in caliber from 7.7mm to 40mm.

A metal salvage factory was located between ,Insein and

M e .rd scrap were prepared and pressed into bales for.
S vt also found in the dock. area of Rangoon.

Pige 4 - Section II
CAPTURED SAP A P

DINAH 3

The photographs here reproduced were received

f'rom TAI Unit SWPTA.

Both FRANK and DINAH 3 crashes have been ex-

amined by TAI Inspectors in the Burma Theater.

The FRANK shown, to the left, was repaired in

the Phil ippiresand has undergone test f'ights.

D)INAH 3 differs from earlier models chiefly in

the shape of the fusela, e nose section}?n the
FRANK irncoirorati~on of Ha 112 direct injection en-
gines in nacelles that extend beyond trailing
edge of the wing.Evidence of the use of water
methanol injection is present in some: ins4aric--
es.

The designation of the glider ws not ,een,

GLIDER
(UNDESIGNA TED)
 FIRST CRASHED Ki 30 'ANN'
EXAMINED BY ATAIU AT MINGALADON

The first crash examination, as far as is known, of an enemy aircraft tentative-

ly identified as Ki 30 'ANN' was made recently on Mingaladon Airstrip by an
ATAIU inspection party. Positive confirmation of the identification was not pos-
sible from plates and rmrkings but dimensions and general characteristics check
closely with what is known of 'AIN' (now considered obsolete.) Some salient facts
are listed below:
Purpose - 2 place recce-bomber. Empennage - Horizontal stabilizer and
elevators have straight taper leading
Description - S/E all metal low mid-
and trailing edges with squared tips.
wing monoplane., .
Fin and rudder were not found.
p-'an I? feet, 4 inches
Landing gear - Fixed with spats.
Len&th - 33 ft. (Approximate.)
ropellor - 3 blade, controllable
gag - Flat center panel, marked di- pitch;
hedral on outer panels. Straight ta-
per on leading and trailing edges Fuel tanks - Two tanks are located in
with rounded tips. each wing root and two in fuselage.
All are unprotected.
FlIps - Split type divided into two
sections. Armaent - Not recovered. Gun rmounts
Coc1it enclosure - Long greenhouse indicate single fix small caliber in
extends well aft of trailing edge of port wing only and flexible gun in
wine,.
after cockpit.

Enine - 'wir row, 14 cyl.radial not Bombs - Bombs are carried internally
positivjy ' ntified from plates. in a fuselage bomb bay, 8' 6" long.
Probably Ha . tomb loading and capacity not known.
The DIiAH 3 (left) was photographed
by TAIC, AAF, SWPA.Note the differ-
ence from the earlier Dinah shown
above and below.(Photos from TAIC)
 MAPLi r11

P/NA H-2
-. 0 ask-

DINAH 3, the latest version the well-known Japanese Army reconnaissance a/c, is
easily distinguished from earlier models by its long plexi-glass canopy faired
into the forward nose section of the fuselage, thus giving it a highly stream-
lined appearance. Another recognition feature is provided by the enlarged en-
gine nacelles, which extend beyond the trailing edge of the wing.

DINAH 3,has a greatly improved performance, being fitted with Mitsubishi Ha 112
Model 2 engines of approximately 1450 HP in place of the Mitsubishi Type 1 en-
gines of 1050 HP in Dinah 2. It now ranks as one of the fastest twin-engined
aircraft in the world. Comparative figures from TAIC are given below:

DINAH 2 DINAH
Span : 48' 3" 48' 3"
Length : 36' 3" 36' 3"
Weight, Gross : 11,882 lbs 12,405 Ibs
Maximum Range
Snormal fuel) 1795 miles 1915 miles
Maximum Speed 7 mph at 19,300'.

DECxia~lASSI
 DEC
[i~lE
I

A ."
 RAILWAYS IN BURMi ANiD SIAM
jREVI f1TOF ACTIVITY DURING SIX MONT HS
DEC tER
Br 4 IAY-

During the six months under reviews the

14th Army has recaptured thd; bulk of the
railw ay 'tracks south of Mo aung j and dxr-
ng this. periQd. Japtanese-held lines of
-communic ati on changed from linesa o sup-
puyt to lines of retreat.

At tIe- be'inning 'of the campaign,_ it was gene.raly accepted that

the railways could be int erdi cted in two ways; by the destruction of ' loco-
motives, and by the deaolition of key bridges. The former.was hard to accomn
plisb, because the Jai-apan.ese used the rie.h4ays -.almost .exclusively by night
and took great care to >uild almost impregnable-lace shelters at many points
along the railway' line. The latter vas also a dif ficult task because ci the
Japanese plan of tbuildirig one or more bypasses at the important bridges&

Bridgles became a focal point in: a stern contest between.our ;abil-

:Jap
ity to bomb them oult and the capacityrfor repair. In order to concen
trate bombing on selected- bridges, directives were issued from-time to"time
in consult ation a .th the A ny It was decided., that the a.gobnMaridaay
line was th'e *most important, wit h the,- Ye U"Y-vYwatatmg and the Sagaing.ShW%'ebd
section of nexlt; imtportance, and the ling; Mandal ay-Lashio of.. third importaicei
The- plari' was-.to get at least twao., breaks about - 30 mile s apart, and then try
to c.ean up allrollin-stock endo'cootives between the two.breaks. It was
also decided that. tatic ally the mot southerly bridge should be Toungoo
2.263 which was Tithire range of the -25s. Hence the picture on 20),December,
1944, was three breaks on the Rangoon-anda.lay line, Toun oo, inthe, and My-
ittha, wti attempts, being made to get Pyinmana and Kyaukse as complimentary
breaks to Sint-e and Myittha; three breas on the line between Shwebo and
WVuntho, for there wre few good .bridges south of Shvwebo; no break on the Ye-
U-Ywatauiag line, Toh conc cnt rated forts' were being made to put out the
Mu River bridge: an d three breaks on thie line. from andalay to Lashio. The
14th Any were now -raidly approaching Ye--U.

The Japs remlizizng the threat to the Ye-U branch line had been
steadily withdrawin rolling stock fro ru the north part of the line to, the south,
and had been using thieline from .Sagain ' to; Shwebo,: As the threat to Ye-U
, r~ewv -st ragerso the Jap s co mmaed' a very Lhorough .,demo liton program. All
bride of any size north of lnion w4Vere blown up and as the opposition at
Alon melted, more bridge were blown up towards Ywataung, wter ' a systematic
destruction of rolningsto ck was being carried out Iby pushing wagons overthe
emnbankient which oorn~ects Ywataung with the Ava Bridge. At the same timethe
Japs wer~e implementing their threat to take up the railw ay, line,. and PR w:-s
spotting, largeidumps of rails, wich were bpingloaded on to barges from
small jet-ties at Sagaing7, and' piles of burnt sleepers. Already locos and'
some rolling st
ck were bei n, run ino the IrraadClye blow the Ava irid de.

become ckar
It that the -Jars were withdrawing LAllthey could. in-
to Mandalay. Hence air strikes were mnade on Sa ing and efforts were made
to smash up iayjmyo yards -and iiitnge railway bridge. The Japanese, realiz-
ing that with -forward move:nent of our aircraft; the vulnerability of. the
Rangoon-Mandalay line was increasing, embarked on a coer ensive bypass
bridge building policy. They used. calltypes of construction, including fe
ry .ransipmnt poilis,and caulsew4 type bridges. At this time, too, the
Proe-Ragoon line be came of inc resing~ iportnce and this as reflected
by the Jap2~extensi6 oF bypTIas bili~ng in t~is area.

~8-~$~c±~r L ~
)-ag IJ
Railways in Burma
DECySIhp
and Siam (Continued
1 f
The extensive destructions north of Sagaing then led to a reconsid-
eration of whether or not the railway lines had been bombed too much. It was
most difficult to provide a nice balance between denial of the main routes to
the Japanese and preserving as much of the line as possible for our own use
after recapture This balance was intimately connected with the speed of ad-
vance by lando It was still evident that the rout e from Rangoon to Mandalay
was the most important, and the branch lines, Thazi-ivingyan, and Pjinmana-
Kyci.kpadaung were assuming a greater tactical importance as 14th Army pressed
close to them. As reards brides consultation took place with the Army as
to the number of breaks r.equired. Itas r iit r ined that as the greatest \
activity on the lines appeared t-obe.north of TOungoo, Bridge A.263 -t Toung-
oo. mnst be kept out, together with either Thawatti or Swa to form a double
break, also to be kept out were Pyinmana and Sinthe, Myi.ttha and Kyaukse.
Myitnge was -dropped out of the list, and it was considered that some break be-
tween'.T:aungdwingyi ard Pyinmana would be desirable,. On the. Ranp;on-Prome line,
bridges southof Letpadan and its spur lihe to Tharrawaddy were chosen.

At this -time' another point arose. Little serviceable rollingstock

.had so far been captur~ed owing to the denial policy of the Japanese. There-
fore the .Army pressed for an eubargo on the strafing of stationary rolling-
stock. The argument against this was the fact .that very seldom -ere moving
'trains, seen except at night , while the Jap was obviously protecting some of
his -wiagons by the use ofbiblast wall :particularly
, .as the new year had seen
many.po.werfiul stiikes -on such railway yards as .Toungoo ,-Pyinmana, Thazi and
Yamethin. Iihen it became obvious through'ni-ht rhubarbs of 24, 25'and 26 Jan-
uary that the Japs were still using, tle line to itsi xiaium capacity at night,
and that laded wagons were being leit stationary in railwcay stations during
the day, the embargo was rescinded and all rollingstock could be attacked. The
w-isdom of this move was im.ediately reflected in- the oil fires started among
rollingstock on the, Kyaukpadaung-Pyi ana Iines, for example, at Ttnagdwingyi
on- i7L- Februar,-v id 'long the. Thazi-Shwenyaun line which was packed with.
rollingsto.cko

At the end of February and be innrin of March, there was, the dram-
atic advance to Meiktila. This was a complete surprise to the Jap, whose
plcnls fr 'denial were(upset. Froa this point dates the time.timehen the J.p Hii
Coaand lost touch with the realities i'o.the situation, except that it was be-
.oming obvious to them that Burma could not be held for long in the face of our
.tankLs.which were nowvable to operate overbetter terrain. This speedy advance
and the.promise of even speedier.ones alt ~eed the plan for. imposing breaks in
the Ran pon-mi dalay line. Hitherto it had been a case for the .prevention of
material arrit rinr no init became a race to stop. withdrawal of .equipmiet,. The
effort, ut into breakin brid ges had not resulted in unqualified ;su ccess be-
cause the J.Sps had anticipated the attacks ,by. their tremendous bridge building
andSrepair eff.orus,:i Hov ever, suffidient delays had been inflicted as to "render
great help to our advancing a-'mies. The number of bridges, to be ttacked was
reduced, and at the same time included bridges.as far-south a A,.~ at Pyun-
1
taza. The' Air Force pressed, to attacks on Pazundaung, the 750 oridge ..ust
.north of Ran con; where activity was consistent but owing to-a lack of 2 5 0'
-spans nebessary ,.to repair any damage, it was decided to leave the. bridge sev-
erely .alone in the hope that it might be captured intact. Opinions were sway-
ed at this ti e ib: cause the fast moving army columns had captured Sinthe
Brid.e int act, and the Jap uardc? whose .job it was to blow up the bridge,, was
Staken prisoner a'ile he slept.

T ifinal st a1ea was be'in :rapidly reached, The Japanese realizing

that their lines :c omnuunrication between Rangoon and Prome were insecure
'

built a large b'pass bridAj at Myo(lin_, ndi thus provided themselves with two
railway routes -one on each side of the Irrawaddy, north dt'Henzada. Air at-;
tacks wiere still going on a ainst the bridges south of Letpadan. It was
equally .clear that the Japs were uncble to contain our fast moving- tank col-
umns which were speeding down the main line and had captured Pyinmana and
Toungoo in quick successions Pe -;as a-vitalpointto the Jap, for it was
t e:.inus of .his rail eI"t a

Page"2 - Section III

 960 1040
1000 102°

'V PASS SERVICEABLE 21/5/45 BAN DARA T.A.51. ZZ/5146

1464 B (/A$ UNSERVICEABLE 13/5/45
I H1it RANS'hP14ENT BRIDGE SERVICEABLE 13/5/45
N.1.'IYrASS SERVICEABLE

c'

151 27/5/45'
KAOPH1
of N1471
10sTT BYPASS SRVICEABLE 135/4
NErKAW Q277'rZS BYPASS SER~VICEABLE 7/5/45
K4WON KHlAN! Q123 BYPASS SERVICEABLE 27/5/45 26 22//I45
LAMAIH4 ni63 9 IIltPYi? Q 128 BYPASS SERYICEABLE 27/5/45

Kf~LUNPf 0167
BAN NAUNG LU Q3386 6Y PASS

BAN LONG GABAUNG Q365

NPEQNG WIWAT

T.F.5., RACBLJRJ 27/414

R&UI

UI T.F. 44 22/5/45

U LF 0OF 5 1A M

BURMA-SIAM
T.F. 121 27/5/45
BRIDGE SERVICEABILITY
CHART
^ ^RAILWAY BRIDGE UNSERVICEABLE
0 BY-PASS UNDER CONSTRUCTION

INFORMATION FROM PHOTOGRAPHS ONLY

29MAY 1945

S CA LE IN M IL E

96° 980 1000 1020

Ground report~s indicated that tr ps 'i re b ig t ianported by rail from Prome
to P ;u, -and wh n ths ovvtntwhch t'he Ai',r Fo~'ce h ocd e~onsiderbly by its
a ,tanks: was compoi. .ted,b dts re tf w e uand . n, ooon. hen Pe u
,aid l' a.noon f ell, the escalje line' r'pm Pe x.tao, T hnb y t wa nd continuaes to
be hhmnrered a'lon-ag ~esth h an ce3f to th'Amy'swi she s the
bornbin 2 bf bridges bs ;e m hcurt il~d,

During t sr dtrte ~r Fo-rce ve i 16 ±crbher :nd far

Cher afieald to knock ou',_ x ot ra il cent ers and bridges in Siam. At the be-
~inning ,{.moon was #1l1-At CgL -t-. ,t" o t t 4s p~ast ;red the Qn
tral Sta~tion while 13B 9s pqonpetely estroye&M roth rarallin. yard~s
It becam~e mor o and i or t&eMv d ntht tz.th~e :r:, bht tl ne ck7 of J ,p ailborne suav-
11li'. was be;tween PE; U n T;j b u±zat -t t has 1. t;r statihe Burm -Siam
line joined the iou4*-,res Q= .C~aos opeaticup rbm he Tenasserim
nirts could put their to d, r~ wx_
'hilea, cons der&le quatity of
suzpplies .:; brought inj r, 2 "=. liniMi": Thei 5 vvs fully aive to the
re.*
vulnr ability of. Pey iuoio4ePin tb hhokki s w1 as that there wer~e
very few bridges 'i ch Iwx'w w9* th t& ck(by i- 214s, awo' verr chst kkatha
-Kya

anid 1{.iinpaleo whe re t +a a peod of ejiair wivs odigions I~n order to keep
Ja eene uesn orestpise :o attuc1.. was chi&vecd b lternating between
bom bin a,,_b-,lo
d aq er :th.
tb Pc:Bi-iu 'S aeA t.n rout,Fce and
r oulm ~ l thc
r dBurs mna--Sia
.ou h n f2line,
~ a bAa u anin,a .o h e to
to Y&ewere ,chosen s, srand aies;,i. .the= ;sal~e tare 29s ver .ati lsng~nd finally
destr oe~d hd ni ba d
v1.AT t :.< n:;'k,>ar"anB 2 ceiiis cd°the Nakorn Chaisei br~d

The Sin,~z
Burt~~~~-r 4a.:r tcaeh.i.n t uer d ct i~iar ' Ct 5aofl5. the d4
iculty d iptni rtoz;z or w. v -Yf
n ktasI,
' ai the 004 nt e t-

batte; o thebr .d es, r s on ru d thu~ cth t:fowi of iate l ah.nv el? CO i ei~yttop
pedod, ra y k d It om p .ted that . lOe be aks w r n c ss ry
,

betwenioltn
tions d tQ f ?t o cto ~a i1 niaiuwhile such :RR
at ;bn a o ;tBan sues,ksa n eeh svil attacked to knock out .
yds supplying 'the ..ie with traffic, There were few large places. along theq$, na--+5 '
line itself, ivhe , t h,,Jap hnod c= tily ;,u lt s 3spursfspcrlse.d arhubffth 'teesco "
pli~c ted h ,tic;p~or ii ty K,o 4. can s ;.It thus be cite M.eds - £ B241s 1td
rairs who vr i o, to.be ,nwhich .r.salled i'J . z polbcdsb ;

t le n; w QfXmb,. n:d suq cteL 1icl

I1zon - ridlges IaI-633 at Lm coulo 5behit
va
A wather e6 fu~ss jalso k t t .. e: an~gdo, hi ;z z. ai:ln hA§Th ctedc 'a
feederr to :'the; r6ad'a runir rr cy^t h into thy. Hpaw-Ls aryva c: ecl r'ac e
r d asbei a hd'nor . h6, pite tfi bo bps aa n'}i i
day.1.Jinay, -;_
'f r 1 k(-cfdow3
12 sn4
I
i x y ows the r: have ,re ~ned :destro°y
edl to tie pr es'ft'd4SV
Since the successes in the h l1.'in s' Pave .r ofcontr'ol of the sea lanes
of the Japanese' outer zone, indications have, been : rhc 'gtitth. aaeebcm
cxc eod ag y n rvous th !Ka ity Y'3 the
'6io1,t ; n oh in ; , t. At)h~ inmdi
atelY; sywiintro s~. n h adt "c6iutry odea3. zith the o i tis na,:'r while airs.
attack s we ie
.ete a as~tj'br-ides'lr hng tt kk -,fin P enh fin , ~ot ably .. at
Krabinbuiri.N It: had alwua rs1 -Si bIn h,t I ti
}as ,aa ecndaZ' ;line t~a&
thn Bur na-iam aid. th is h db ; da vth"he dev.stating 4t cs o aXh o a org, Na
Ni erg, anc;;u hrn Juxb h rnChas b e Vi 'ii 1 k, n' a5cti vi terarournd yth e bro k n r .d . at
TIa 'burr .to gether= witih the .txv ty 6bseaivcd don the line :,f rnm Tunigeoa.to rron ha °
sho vn that thi;-route alo wel xsed ?occihei35%had .alreadyr deal.:;sv
blow at. Kuala-Lumpuar, which" t ,#the&r '4jath ipig ' t . iland str ks o ngr pofes,.
brought hiorn to theoJJto rthe .fn cessit 'for reorientinghis f"o rces. Ground reports in-
dicated that the area betwecx Uborn and Udorn was thbe site of new~4imps.o:~attac~jia, W:e
first oi:carried ott=on' Gunboi d koatand latterly the irout.,i fioxn J n
' tr >ur ng;
h s be;cmhardcht; }Ju 'bnornihas& again bL endevast ~dwLlc-t1re. are: yc -been adie
in the railway inr outh jr. e t M olin{rjtreumendods fliying cdistances,

th'. ralmoz_,tle
Ss~ctial brcs h l' tr'ategic ir Force is now busily' engaged
cakng._
in b the,rout es:'Lto
. -and ,out, f an jok, rout s vhi t ah ,11LL
 Review oejat t Develoinen t's in l915
In s in~g up Ja use 'ofroads~in supplyng
Sr mlia up to .theend'of l Z4it was said (EAc
WIS No.18) that roads alone had\ not .as yret
played a vital part except in their" forward
areas. Railways and- coasta'l shippin'g remained::
he backbone;;of the Japan ~e supplyr system.
In reviewg the, subject : for :the ensuing five'
months wh~ich, preceded the _fall of Raiagoon, it-
can be said that the samep remarks apply. The-
~'aps, ,in retreat for-; the whole:-period, -s'tll'
depended on those ralway5-'that wer'e' left' to
them anid, a s' far d s Rangoon, upon ' coastal
shipping as wie ll. It shou d jo t be assumed
from"'this that roads plyed.no part 6t.a1 in
the back areas. On. the: contrar~y, they were
uised , xesve obyp.,assing railway breas~
exd'fo~locI.-s ndump areas like' Rangoonnfroclusi..

Central -Burma -and the' Shan States =ire well provided with' road, in some cases running
parallel 'to: the rg2ltc , n others serving arecs where;i'no railways exist eg the
Arakan, and the Shah States. The road from.Lampang :via, Chiengrai and "KengLuxig to
Thazi eras 'groatl .. improvod by the Japs in 1943--44 and it was to
be expected that
they woc rn ae considerale; uae :of;:this for supply-and,withdra l1. It is well
ser'ved y the : Bsn ok.Chienginai'irailway and its uise seemed an obvious development:
This: development never took place~ and. it is ,estimated' that at' no' time; after the
15t o he: iut
oentry oif'lisnthal th t
En erwgaurm
ngathata :.,ealyyt
route,:oahan5r7n 1944;e
.it
in rem
94long coonryinte
gcheo u pe
arid-withdrawal canter and th~e railways radiating from it continiued to , rard
supplies until they were overrun.un

The failtu to use this tetil valuable: road route, leads to considerat ,.n of
the fact' that gexeol ;y paking the Japs a~Lvays used railways in preference to;
roads. This they. did 'in spite: of the acknowledged. greater vulnerability to f ttack.
ofk: the f orlers and may have ,been: due to .an iuffic'ien~t number of 'm'otor vehicles
-beng avaifable. Te . 'a was well'. supplyied vwi h raoling 'stock,'and ine pi'te cifheavy
losses was able to maintain a supply of. locomotiv'es of ;some. kind to ,'keep it in
motion. His' ambitious programme of building : t da d: woden .coastal vesls ' around
the, coasts of.,South & -lt:sia c'oupled with, vigorous coirandeering- ofthho vessels
Qf the ma.ritime ;native populat'ioni, enabled .him tomaintain .,a considerabl.e ,sea ,borne
supply line along tho TenasseriiriCast. M&t6 'bod vehiclies, on th.e other hand,
appear, to have been in short supply, and those available wore evidently of limited
ceapacity. and an a ,poor -state of serviceability:
The consistency of the informs iin :in this connection obtained from :Jap 'PGT inter-
rogations .ia also of interest. Most of them styte that, a 'te .disemnbarkation at 'port,
units ,.either came 'on: by: traehbicycled or marched tozs their-:forwar~d -ositions. 'The
few who wee able' to comne by Mt 'conf irmhtht the. vehicles were =;n bad' condition.'
The considera ble "'extent to which the humrble. ox, drawn ;cart w ,s used also points to
the .absenoee of 'a substantial quantity of 'mtor vehicles,. To, add totheir_ troubles
supply ..of MT fuel miens to,* have, be difficult. T~s is ~instanced by; a: report on'
a.journey by 11T !ver- the fir one-' Tangup , oad.'in November 1944.- Apparently the fuel'
was of such poor I ur li t thait, after each'sp, hcrbetradtb drained
and high grade fuel pours din before the. engine wouild , srt again.

The main task, therefores of the ir Forces engaged; on attacking communcations has
been to:disorganize rail traffric v, muchi as pobsible;, thus. the Jatp would. be forced
to depend upon rood 'transport in which respect hi was believed~ to be ywdakest.

Attaks:! erience in~ this theatre, has shown tha't, with few exceptions,. the
Roads in Burma an Siam(iontinuedi

Strategic attacks ~bnoroads have co sequently been mainly secondary to attacks on

railways. It was found, however, that considerable improvement' to the effects of
breaking a railway bridge could be achieved by disrupting the corresponding road
bridge; or, if this was not a suitable target, by destroying .a bridge on any section
of road which could form a bypass loop to the broken railway. The Japs,, well aware
of this danger, prepared additional bridges at crossings they thought would be
attacked. Two good examples of this are quoted.

1. TouO9,sgo road and rail bridge over the Kabaung Chaung. Here the Jap had a
road bypass-completed in readiness for our attacks, which began, late in December
1944.
2. Biin River. After losing the main road bridge the Japs built no less than
three wooden bridges, in addition to three railway bypasses This was probably the
most determined of all Jap efforts to keep a river crossing open and although it
never really succeeded, it has involved the air forces in a considerable effort to
maintain the breaks.

Strategic attacks wore also made on the Prome-Taungup road. Heavy bombers on 30 Dec
1944 destroyed the bridges at both ends and caused a heavy landslide in the region
of M.S.56 about midway along its length. With their customary speed the Japs made,
good the breaks and built bypasses; the road was in operation again, less than three
weeks later,. .

As soon as .the Allied advnce brought any road within range of our tactical squadrons,
the problem of its interruption underwent a change. Thunderbolts, 'urribombers,' Mos-'
quitos and B-25s would be concentrated on it to break'it up and maintain the breaks.
Following up their 'devastating treatment of the Kalewa - Ye-U road at the. end of
1944, tactical squadrons systematically interfered with enemy transport along the
lines of withdrawal -- Tilin-Pakokiu, Shwobo-Sagaing, Lashio-Mandalay and the Arakan
coastal road. Attacks on the bridges east.of Thazi as soon as Meiktila was captured
seriously handicappE d Jap movements. Later on, during the. race for Toungoo.between
14th Army and the main body of the Jap I5th Army, the systematic 1bombing of the road
bridges between Kems.pyU and Loilem and 'between Loikaw and Aungban played -a. big part
in enabling the 14th Army to win the race. The Japs built bypasses but the rate of
destruction was too fast.

One very important, though less spectacular form of attack was the continuous patrol-
ling by Beaus and Mosquitos. The rare occasions on which MT were actually caught are
evidence of the success achieved by their patrols in limiting Jap traffic to the
hours of darkness. Movement was further limited by night patrols whenever conditions
permitted. The delay occasioned thereby and the effort involved in preparing I T
hides and camouflage was all a contribution to the defeat of the Jap forces.

New Construction: Since Burma possesses a very considerable road system the Jap has'
not been obliged to build a great number of new roads. His policy appears to have
been to improve to MT standard any route which constituted the only way into or out
of a given area, and later to build a secondary route. By the end of 1943 he was
known to have made the Prome-Taungup road passable 'to MT throughout the year and by
December 1944 to have gone a long way to completing another and entirely new road
further north linking the Irrawaddy valley with the Arakan coast.

Reports wore also available suggesting that he was building a through road from
Komapvu (at the eastern end of the road running to Toungoo and the southern end of
the road running north to Lailem) due east to the Chiengmai area. There is photo-
graphic ovidence that by a circuitous route, the road, at least jeepable throughout,
has been completed; but.there is nothing to say that any great weight of wheeled
traffic can pass over it. It is most improbable that it can carry anything at all
in the monsoon.

Farther afield, the road running west from Bangkok to Nakorn Pathom, construction
of which was previously reported abandoned,was found early in March 1945 to be in
operation. This completed a continuous road from Bangkok to Moulmein parallel with
the railway. In the peninsular area it became known in April 1945 that he had built
fair weather road across from Tenasserim to the Siamese coast at Prachuab Girikhan.
HI has thus provided n lte tiv to the existing road across the Kra Isthmus
(Paknam - Ihao IHuagang
tEon III - Page 5
 E,{ SRftED
Roads in Burma andSiar(Concluded

Reports also suggest that construction is taking place on another road further south.
More interesting perhaps, than the roads vhich the Jap has built, most of which were
well khown before the period under review, are those which, contrary to expectation,
he has*not built. Chief among these are:

1. The extension from Ban Mea which would have linked Chiengmai with Chiengrai.
2. The section between Mong Pan and Mong Ton which would have linked Chiengmai
with Namsang, thus duplicating the longer route from NW Siam (Lampang-Chiengmai-
Kengtung-Namsang.Thazi),
3. The section between Mesoht an Tak(Raheang) which would have linked Moulmein
with either Uttaradit or Pitsanuloke on the Bangkok-Chiengmai railway.
4. The road from Waw to Sittang which would have completed the road frQm Pegu to
Martaban.
5. The section Myittha-Ban Wang Yai which would have provided a useful link between
the Burma-Siam Railwa. and the Tenasserim Coast.

The failure to complote those in Siam can be traced in some measure to lack of cooper-
ation from the Siamese themselves,coupled with the destruction of the Siamese cement
factory, which limited the construction of large bridges. Those in Burma were presum-
ably not completed from a general lack. of the necessary facilities arnd labot, all an
indication of the cumulative success of strategic bombing of rear supply lines and
installations

This belief is accentuated by the smll extent to which the Japs-have carried;: ut road
maintenance and repair. A-t no. time did he do more work than the absolute minimum de-
manded by military nececity. A good example of this is the main trunk road from
Rangoon-Mandalay. This w o once a two-way metalled road but the Japs.allowed it to
fall into disrepair. Inysome sections the surface disappeared, ruts were scored and
'traffic even had to leave the road and use the parallel cart tracks. Doubtless traffic
was delayed by the bad surfaces of many roads, but the Japs either could not, or
would not undertake extensive repairs, except in cases where complete cessation of
traffic was threatened.

The scene now shifts to a different area. Except in the Malay Peninsula, the roads are
few and those that exist are, by comparison, of limited capacity. Once again th. Japs
will have to rely mainly upon rail transport; once again they will have navigable
rivers and fleets of native boats to help them out. Already strateg ic bo-bin of their
railway bridges and aterways has taken place. Before long they will be facing attacks
on their roads similar to, albeit more intense than, those they have experienced in Burma.

Pa-e 6 -Section III DECLASSIFSIED

 ROAD NOE AD OTS N ATR~fi Y

BURMA:

r LacTakaw Ferry: This. was.covered on 15 May and nothing is reported.

A run ' pstxeam. from Takaw showed no alternative ferry in opera-
tion.
SIAJ~l'a,

ChienmaI44e oneo A further report on the construction of the road ' is now avail-
able.t sta tes that POW comprise the labor.and are driven to
words each day in lorries,
Some valuable information on serviceability of roads in Siam is provided in the
I.S.T.D. M>>onthly Summary dated 1 May 1945. It is obtained from a highly reliable
s5iamese sour e, s

Route No. 15 - Udorn - Thon Kaen All weather M.T.

dute No. '17 -Udorn - Nakon Panom All weather M. T.
Route: , o.['318 n -o Nakon Panom -All weather M.T.
TJ&3rn - Loey - Fair weather - unrietalled,

Route Nos. -19 & 19A - Ubon - Yasodhorn - Roiet -MahasaraIam -

KhonKaen- All .weather M.T.

Iran (N231 T joi S r _S28. 'This road runs south from Trazg (QN1213) and.
to the east of the Trang - Ban Kan Tang railway. Interpretation
of photographs of December 194 and February 1945revreatlthe
following particulars,(CPICD.IR T/247,,1 May 145 refers:.)
Ter~i. . Fairly flaundulating in places.
. idth. . '.Average15-.20 ft.
Surface Condition. No definite statement possible due, to ' small
leofphotoraph., i'pears to. be in good condition, probably
of :Ireent construction. Constructional activity seen 4-3/4 miles
pouth.of Trang.
Classification. Fair weather M.T.
Concelmnt. ffective coverin plantations for almost'entire
length. Dep,.loyment 'generally possible, though limited.

T rfes. QN129276 - Bridge over streum. 60 ft steel or rasonry.

QN137275 - Bridge over stream. 80 ft steel or masonry.
4N191089 - Bridge over Khlong Lamleng. 195 ft (approx).
QS201843 (approx) Bridge or causeway (incomplete)),
Reference to te sketch map of loutes in Malaya, published in AC, WIS 'No. 38 dated
18 *Y. 45; indictbs..that development of this road wll provide a useful west coast
through route beteon Takuapa rand Setul as soon as:the section between Krabi and
Phang Nga, reported as under construction, is complete.
Krabi. S7299- Ban Kan n(Q 3.
3 This road follows a different alignment from
that shoa on JO f 'Routes;; iii Malay. map dated 10 May. It is described in CPIC, DIR
T.248, bs".. ;c ov good quality survey cover. From riabi to' a pdint M6557 it
in yonit
follows th3 K:igninent shown on the map. Here it divides, one fork running south to
Ban Sikao (;'733)' and then east to Tavoy, the other running roughly B to Huey Yod,
whore it joins ther? cin NS"- road running south to Trang.

Krabi Ban Kax Tan via S k Small scle of photographs precludes any definite
statement but tc} following details are given in CPIC, DIR T.2+8:

Surface and Width. Krabi - (QM6557) - Laterite, 20-30 ft.

Ban Sikao - (QM6557) f- No statement possible
on surface. idth 020 Pft.
Bnn Sika~o - Ban Kan rang - Iterite 2O-3Ot.

D~epont. Very restricted except uing dry season

R~~~H$" Section II - Page 7

Road Notes and Noteos on terwaJjs
ULoWI 0
ncluded° :aT

Targ ts. QN0531 "° 250 ft bridge across the Kantang river.
QN1125 (approx) . 190 " 200 ft bridge across stream.

No details available of any other bridge but t Ls seen that most large streams
are provided with perma ent or temporary brioc;5 some under construction. A ground
source whose information is dated styt 1.943-44
d that no road runs north of Huy Yod
to Dhungsong although a track bet.1-7een the two plces5was used by vegetable growes.

Eastern
, Branch Tob' Point
Thissection. 4657 (on the. ilos
is'rotghry50i °rbi. Bn an
Bn KnTang road) - huey Tod
-

Ban hay go ThiT~T~n~~SI;~'~;is

secM. is roughly O 1 long. ' h interpreta tion states
probebly, lterto20-25 ft. a g.round source whose . nformat .on is dated November -1943 -

Alay 1944,
stated .that the section Rueyy'cod - Trang had a laterite surface and could
take two-way tr6fi ;c '
V T,.

S rface. and WiGdth. Wac. all weather two-way traffic.

-' Kan.nTa'Very restriced due to proximityof joungle
rn ndjlnsations. .Limited to sections li'P -

p^ssinbgthrough paddy.
O
T rtas. 100410 ft bridge over Khlong - Maenai
u~ng.
130 ft rail and road bridge over Nhlung
Lam Phrsa.
Several other brides .xis t of whidoh pirt ciii 1"
are not at present available,
Generally, it c an. bc aidc that all the large streams rre bridged and that the sn ll
st reins..' probablyt are :

Trap bh Taliv4 ° This road 46 milr3in cr th.runs

1 and W::joining the west coast
ld
roa withthhe main Bangkok-Sintgapore Railwy Sallscale srve y photo cover 'of Feb
and tlpril 1945 has been- examined and the , rsifs ' re' 'given ii CPIC Detailed Inter-
protation Report --
No.
TR46. The fol.ow:ng ex::-tre r're mde:
mr.

ur2Licc and h, pPridoWs' lyr et .fled. Average 15 ft. Fit for

light ,inh dryV season .
D lyet.
p esy
FiSr! excopt in the hill section.
Targ~t. i11 bi~ame.ar <sento be bridged but~L
si uf 1lcaie f cove'r preclude definite
ststeIr 4 LJon any of.: them.
: .: :: W way: .

Mea Chao Bht. Sugges9t

oirs have beean a d ,b sed on .,round rep-rte that the
enemy ar transporting suplP les north of Bangkok b y w .terws y. B 24s:on 23 May brought
back vial repo ts which provide corroborati' ve aei e. tOnabombing msion e.
ral sma~i:boats and barges were seen in the riveri inehe Ohs at:re ; and barge
was seen at Chainat being unloaded At the same time MT and tents Dreseen in fr
places,,1l0 miles N 'of Ban Takli and at tL2023 near Ba
i Moauk station whe e the
railway runs te in two i.ies.,f 'the rive°..
R Meklon . Photo cover of 21 iay at Ra jburi, shows conitinued lt Ty'Three pontoon 'tiv

ferries areal 't h e .N ban of't tbe bridOe a nd. one pontoon ferry at the S bazk la nuing
,stage.: Nine rivr.craft. .re. seennear the ferries

There :is roeaon to beliv o tha!t the Jpsare .ill using nater transport between the
! eklong River and Ba kok* It ..,ppoaL ,, tht nhe originca1 route used by them, t'.: looks
~f wirc ire bbbo7 d 1: tmonth, hs bepnso bdly ams ed hat the Japs- ar;aoblied
to use the tidal cnals fur ther sdut, Thse h ve several -disidvantages, not the
least' being that tugs can only tow two ba rges at a. time instead of 8-10, as in the
locked canals.

P e go - Sectin II -O
 MOULMEIN-TAVOY

~id~e over Yehoo Onauxi '

Note masonry pier' for
possible new bridge. (177/
618 16 March No.2 and 3)

5901 two-span bridge at Kaleinyaung over

'7tvoy River. (177/631 20 March No. 2)

140' bridge three miles north of Nankye L

over the Leipok Chaurg. (177/631 20 March
1945 No. 1)

Previous information on this route is

contained in CPIC DIR T-190;'25 November
1944; and in EAC WIS Nos. 19 and 20, 5
and 12 January 1945, Section III.

nr A
i* B. 4
 _ ttDESLA the mITdV
VflENIE AT'FTY MA" 19'
Coacjtwise shipping in the Glf of ,Martaban
an lao .g the Tenasserim Coast, of Prime
imcportance to the Japs in Burma, first as
Smeans of s ~p y and late- as a means of
1:Withd °awaJ, has been attacked contjinuously
and relen~t e y. by airo'raft. oif iastern Air
Coin: nd...Theeattacks, combined with .hip-
ping strikes by 2 2 Grdup, surface engage&
nments- by naval fares ttd mining by the
*tx teo cL4tr.orc have tall played apar '
-in ,converting coal .craft. into rapidly
*sh inking assets and. in denying the z e of
coastal v tens to the .apanse.
The '.follo ~ing extracts. are typical of many.
re brts and-repro enktfhe hazards awaiting
craft' which attempted to arsn the gauntl.et
but in many instances succeeded only in
±' n .g.a tery grave.

cuod jstriI es are 'eee. du~n, e s 'is of attacks with cannon on a standard
toodoncoaste at plot1s repo-rtoL{powsi.tion nteulofMatb.l63 tN7Q4
ood hen.1aT
:t soon, fircs;a ufowhichatb-washaving
been started in,the hvessel 63 an3'_4oily

Exrat N A az -M- ieifize Basin

Strikes are seen durng . sres: of a tro s on a standard wooden coaster, reported
by th. Pilot at1425'N, 970 52'1F Wh'5 lst .seem the vessel wag burning' fiercely.
One end of t'r eba ha, dropped wahile the ;other remains in its u$1Y 1 position..
Numerous.strikos arc lIo seen, during attt cks on. a heavily camoufla ged powered
vso .tp lt's~o tcd position 34© 251 N 970 .531t "
77dn A Sortie.e port No0.'23 -i eruar 4

A70' standard Jp woo 16booast a nd Tav.oy schooner were seen moving into the
mouth.of ;the Saiwee 1i- tw=o iles ,south, of inthakyun. 1)V:.i-made four attacks on: the
coaster, three on the schooner, .and .F made five: on the coaster and, two ,.pn thy,
schooner. Th coo,ter c aught .fir'e twice lond:rf'ter the 'second time the 'flames caught
tho. whip w s loft, blazing and drifting, out of control. It was
~~Teholdand obbr
loaded.. The schooner lost its spail and its mast.

S 1kes are seen on ~standard wooden o aster which hen first seen was. headedS
at the mouth of 'the Salween P; rrat a point off-shore b et een tom villages of
KaobwadNan
but wias sot nTevse
ablaze by repeated strike
okeaieatotre nhr
aft and' when last" hnnorthwar
seen wasn wll
alight.
27 . oroe~p -2 March l4
Four ue los ii ofh orst :100' coaster pith 12-14 oil drums 'on the dockw are seen..
It appeared to be new. The crew' of eight oere ,seen to jump overboard,* Sixc cannon
attacks and two _ a oax'. v ere3 .made; l rge fl :.mesand 'black smeta was seen spreading
ofier the whole dock,

A 1501 motor driven cargo.:ship , with p;onC or two layers Qf boxes on side, 200/300
tons S bound at about 5K .s .1l pp funne " ft bel3ictred kst el hull. Eight attacks
c;nno , se
with bel
lno 3 t rod ne-,From ste. to stern scoring each t.m. _hits
 ECLSI FED
__B

Coastal Shipping Rangoon Etc._Continued:

No. 22 Sqdn. - SortieReport No.20 6 Marchj
Amherst. i mile off shore one 120' coaster metal hull, high prop, bursitg from
stem to stern from previous attack, lying N-S. A second coaster lying E-W 200 yds
in sh.re slightly SW from the first, looked as though it was burned out, blackened
metal hull.
7 dn RA- SortieReort N.49- 20 March 19
At an island about three miles SSW of Hope Point at approx. 15°18' N, 9 7 o 4 2 ' E,
an 80' coaster type vessel, possibly of metal heavily camouflaged with netting
and a slightly smaller lugger-type craft, were found moored 100 yards off-shore
in a small bay on the S side of the island. Another smaller craft, broad beamed,
and with superstructure, was seen beached close by. About 10 attacks were made on
the two floating vessels, hitting both. An explosion was caused in the wheelhouse
of the coaster, but though it-smouldered, no fire appeared. Pieces were seen to
fly off the lugger.
22 Sgdn. RAF - Sortie Report No.50 - 21 March 1945
Under SE corner of small island twe miles W of Hope Point one 120' coaster,
camouflaged with netting and bamboo framework green and brown in color over the
bridge and well deck, and one 80' powered barge with high poop, no mast, colored
gray, (two winches on fire deck) were lying at anchor ."J" made three attacks on
large and two on the smaller, "Q i.ade 6 attacks on the larger vessel. Attacks were
hard to bring to bear owing to proximity of island 2/300 yards away. Both craft
were heavily hit with holes and splinter damage from numerous cannon hits.
177 S n RAF - Sortie Report No. 62 - 27 March 194
Six miles W of Kwanyaik steamer of tug type, probably coaster 80/100'proceeding
S at about 10/13 ,knots Hits and a flash resulted from this attack, but no smoke.
177 Sdn. RAF - SortieR,.c;_ rt ._ -. 27 Marc 19A5
Approx. eight miles NE of Amherst a luggertype craft about 80' long loaded was
given four attacks, a flash of flame resulted and the load was smouldering as a/c
left.
177 Sgdn. RAF - Sortie Report No. 62 - 27 March 19
Four miles due S of Abit, a -loaded 75' lugger with 15 people on board was attacked.
eight times. On the sixth attack a big mushroom of black smoke rose to 50'. Ship
did not catch fire and eventually ran aground on a sandbank three miles due N of
Amherst. Three or four people were seen 'to be swimming and a few bales on deck
were smouldering.
46th B.S .Fliht Intell Report- Mission May_194
Shiping at Tayoy: 2 x 01' coastal vessels in river immediately S of jetties were
hit and probably destroyed. Clouds obscured accurate observation of damage. A
concentration of seven small river craft (Est. 50'-60t) five miles S of Tavoy in
Tavoy River were possibly damaged by near misses.
9th BS. Flight Intell: Report - 1Vission .iMay 1_ 4
0
Shiin Mer g: 1 x 160? coaster left burning and listing at 12 26'N - 98023'E
40': barge 'in the vicinity was missed.

9th B S.B Flitgheport-nt Mission,-lt 1.

Ane 701 - 100 1 coaster sunk at 1218/9849 in the Great Tenasserim River,
another
coaster of similar size in the same area was missed.

9nd LMay
B .S._Fliht Intell _Report 5 l9

BombingResults: Interroalon.
and sunk. Possible
Tavoy Ark: Onen Tavoy schooner, or coaster reported attacked,
area by near miss. N6 further damage reported on
damage to another schooner in
shipping in this are.

Page 10 - Section III .

Coo sty

It
1
__
J
_
IttY~80Jnt~
___DEC

wa~s obviously ndIpossible to prevent all

ti E Vic.j: (Cant nucd)

craft.from. using coastal waters and

AS IIE
4

some, siliig
sa a ht and lying up camouflaged in chaungs during the day,
were able to get througfh,

The following notes and table,. based on CFIC 'J" reports, briefly set, out activity
at the more important points from Victoria Point nortlmrards where, shipping has
normally been photographed..

It should be borne in mind that pho.Jtogra tic cover wats- obtained much less fre-
quently during latoe April and May than during February and March, but the
diminution ,of shipping -activity from March onwards, coincident with the re-taking
of Meiktila and The ultimate liberation of Rangoon, is apparent,

E13. The reporst refers only to wooden coasters together with certain 902 motor
lug ers which have been seern at'Mergui and M5oulnein. It does not include local
craft.

During January the port of Rangoon was reasonably active with 34-arrivals and
34 departures disclosed by sevenrcovers, More frequent cover during early February
enabled a more exacot estima te of arivl>s to, he made, and at that time it. was
considered that approximately three coasterzs ere arriving daly" Subsequently
t
this activi y decli ed considerably and by the end of the month no more than one
coazster wars teffCji<,~ tihe port ai~Lg. Uther falling
ur off in arrivals w st
noticed.in March n nd this was continued into pri2. up to the evacuation of the
city by the 'Js: ,

Moulmein shoved some activity in aith estimated departures of 19 coasters,

January,
presumably 1;tlo. Ranacon loaded with supplies conveyed by the Burma-Siam Railway.
From early February until late March arrivals and departures remained at approx-
mately one evorf'two c ys. it this ti .e the cumulative effect ofT the many attacks
on bridges on the Bursa-SSiam line became evident in the almost complete cessation
of activity at Moulme n, there being no arrivals of coasters at the port foar a
period of 16 days from 22 March, end- no departures for a.. period of 28 days.
During a1pril and May only three arrivals and two departures have been reported.
During the entire pceiod oly three co-sters were photographed at Martaban, one
of which had arrived from Moulmein. The faoot that many more coasters were seen
at Moulmein than at Wartaban suggested that they wore engaged in conveying to and
from. Rangoon those supplies which could not be havndled by the land routes.

The use of Heinzo Basin as a hide out and possible repairing point was confirmed
during January and early February but activity subsequently declined considercably
and no coastar has been photographedd there sice 28 March

Tavoy, where lttle of note had been seen for a considerable time, -showed some
activity during February and early Ma.rch, in which period 12 coasters arrived
and a similar number left. These may possibly 3heGe been evacuatin; stores pre-
viousy built up inahe vicinity of Tavoy..

as
Notwithstaniding two bombing attaches during the month, Mllerguiw considerably
busier during January than at the end of 1944, arrivals being slightly greater
than one coaster per day. This activity remained fairly constant until the latter
part of %lrch, and for c period the port was seen to be more active than Rangoon,
but since that ime alctivity has subsided, with but few significant changes in
shipping sightod.

Khao uagang and Victoria Point have been relatively inactive during the period,
though six coaster,s were seen to have arrived during the period 21 Feb to 12 M1ar.
The 3a cr of ^ ctivity in that area would appear te tie up with a similar lack of
activity at Panam Chuniphorn, on the other side of the Kra Isthmus.

~8~Ab~ i~DiSection III - Pagzfe 11

 SHIPPING AR,IVALS APED DEPARTURES AT EIGHT KEY BURMA-SIAM PORTS

Period Kra n ivioulmein Martaban ____

Dep tures Arrivals .De t tures Arrivals Detre

1945 Arrivals
..... G..
'GTh G.T. G.T. GT G.T.
January 34 470 34 4870 10 1440 .13 .1830. 1 150. 1 150
Feb 1--10 22 3010 -0 2,890 5 630 5>60' 1 180 1 .180
Feb 11-20 10 1360. 15 2060 . 5 660 3 420 - - -
Feb 21-Ma-c2 1 1 10..11' 1500 2 270 .3 39.0 - -\co -n
Niar 3-12 3 'l0 2 300 5. 660 7 .960 (;Io,, ein -.
Mar 13-22 1;. 20 5 670. 5 700 3 400 - - 1 150
"r 23-Apr 1_ 00- - - - -
2)Q>5' 3 /F0 1 1. J ,.n

Peid.. A1 ve'neCa
a. p De tures
s.1945. .®.Ar rivals Dep'tures Arrivalis Dej)Ttares

January 8 1240 10 1560 - - 1 120 30 4850 30 3840

Feb 1-110 2 300 4 580 2 360 2 330 4 740 8. 1300
Feb 11-20 - ot covered 6 .960 4 660 6 .1360 7 1540
r21-Mar 2 1:120 1 120xs 2 360 4 660 7 1000 3 450
Mar 3-12 1 150 - 2 270' 2 270 8 1.020 10 1230
PT.r 13-22 2 300 - -- 1 160. 10 1630 10 1410
" 23 -Apr 1l .. 2 300 -. - - 3 520 4 _ 760

Period Victoia Point Khao Huagang

1945 Lroivap Departes Arval.______ eart re

January 1 260 - - 7 1000 . 10 1560

Feb 1-10 w - - 1 P100 .. 1 150,
Feb 1-20 . - - - - 2 280
It 21-Mar 2.,:-.- «.3 '490 ' 2 270
Mar 3-12? - - 3. 400 .--

Par 13--22 1 '. 0 2 360 1 150 ~ 4 550

Mar 23-pr l, 660 4 660 3 4802 .... 3
 DECtASSIFIED
JAPANESE WOODEN CASTERS

The profile drawing shown above of a standard Japanese wooden coaster

was prepared by the Admiralty from photographs included in CPIC SEA Interpreta-
tion Report (J.30).
These coasters are estimated to have a length of 95-100' and a beam
of 22-24'. The two-masted wooden hulls have a round counter stern and a clipper
bow with or without a bowsprit. The decked forecastle is forward of the foremast
and the hold extends from this to deckhouse. The latter has a small wheelhouse
over it. The mainmast is either stepped through the after part of the deckhouse
or immediately aft of it. There is a permanent awning aft extending from main-
mast to stern. A ship's boat is carried slung over the stern from stout wooden
davits. A temporary wooden bulwark is usually fitted amidships.
Engines of the diesel type are fitted below the deck and superstruct-
ure and a thin exhaust pipe projects above the top of the deckhouse.
The vessel is rigged with auxiliary sail on the foremast. One or two
headsails and a fore and aft sail may be set.
Reports indicate that wooden ships of this and similar types are be-
ing built in numbers at many places in Japanese occupied territory for transport-
ing supplies.
 DE LA SIFI ED
INLAND WATERzYS OF BURI -ND SIAM

REVIEW OF JAP ACTIVITY JhNUARY TO MAY 1945

In Burma and Sia.m inland waterways have ibr centuries been

the main thoroughfares of the inhabitant s - estern civiliza-
tion has brought wi'th it alternatives in the form of railways
and motor vehicles. It has also brought with it the power
driven, rivercraft, development of Which by1942 had. reached a
very advanced stage in Burm~a with the existence of the large
fleet of paddle steamers, screw steamers and cargo flats, be-
longing to the Irrawaddy Flotilla Co. In Siam, too, the exist-
ence in 1939 of 2000 motor launche , 300 steam launches, over
and above 72,000 native craft, is-also an indicatipn of the im-
portance to the modern Siarese nation of their waterways.

The river systems of Burma and Siam possess certain similarities. Both.
countries are served by a long shallow river rising in mountainous country to the
north, running generally in a southerly direction and fed by a few important
tributaries. Each river in its lower reaches flows into the sea through a flat,
low-lying plain. Here the similarity ends. The Irrawaddy delta channels are
controlled by high bunds following, generally, the winding alignment of the wat-
er courses. The ienam Chao Bhraya and Menam Suphan re part of a vast irriga-
tion scheme, the canals of which form a square meshed network over the fertile
rice growing area of Central Siam..

In Burma, when the allies evacuated in 1942, the great majority of the
steamers and flats were denied' to the Japs by Allied action. Such vessels of
importance as were lest had all been sunk or disabled by Allied aircraft by the
middle of 1944.

In 1944-1945 with the prospect of withdrawal from Burm along railways

and roads under constant air attacks and requiring continuous efforts to keep
in repair, it was natural for the Japs to mak the fullest possible uise of'the
Chindwin and Irrawaddy Rivers. These, by virtue of the direction in which they
run, were peculiarly suitable for the Jap purpose. The absence of power driven
vessels was counterbalanced by the 3-4 knot current with'which the Jap soldier
could drift on rafts or on commandeered native small craft of which there was
an almost unlimited supply.

It was discovered that, though the Japs were usin these craft mainly
for troops, they did on numerous occasions use them for the evacuation of sup-
plies. Principal among these was oil, and the attempts in the early months of
1945 to evacuate as much as possible from the Chauk-Lanywa-Yenangyaung oil. re-
gion, revealed that the Japs were using an int.resting deception method. Be-
sides loading up smpans with drums. of oil, they adopted the ingenious device
of attaching drums to the underside of bamboo rafts, many of which contrap-
tions must have floated downstream unmolested before the ruse was discovered.

This 'valuable means of transoort. which was available to the Japanese

was not left unattended by Allied aircraft. Beaufi htor and Mosquito sweeps
up and down the Irrawaddy, Hurricane and Spitfire rhubarbs over the Chindwin
River and Arakan waterways have all been tasks familiar to pilots for the
past two years. In the first months of 1945, the swift moves of the J1th Arnmy
across the Irrawaddy necessitated sudden large scale retirement of Jap troops
to avoid isolation. This involved them in hurried crossings in which. no time
was available for concealment.

;" ' oion III - Page 13

 11 xff1
ie - nland Waterwa sof Burma and Siam (Co luded)

',,Concentrations of small boats or .rafts-at 'suchplaces as M rinmu, Pakokku, Paan,

and Prome to mention only a few, were observed and attacked by Mosquitos, Beau-
Alititers and less frequently but with equal success by B-25s.

The effects of these attacks- can never be accurately .assessed. By their

nature it was rot always possible to observe final rosults, and-in addition to
the physical results there are the incalculablem mrale effects to be borne in
mind. Concentrations ass ciated with troop :aovments were usually found close
to the river bank during the day and it was rarely that boat loads, of Ja sol-
diers were actually caught in rid-stream. However, the boats themselves, were
usually well .riedled and many more than those oriinal.. r clai d. were seen,
from, later. pheteot raphs, to be resting on the bottom. These bots were usually
commandeered from'a .ther: ow ors, .the Jap's -often unloading on the bank whatever car-
go was'being carried and hiakin off with the boat. Hii "anded action of this
sort combined with the frequency with which'patrolling aircraft appeared and
shot them up is reported.to have led the average Burmese boatman ,to the:conclu-
sion that, like the pdiceman, his life was not a happy one, This in turn led
to a marked reluctance "enhis :art to at all during dayigt,ail or on iion-
light ni hts.

±is the 14th Army push d cbuthwards, JSpaase moveents in the Irrawaddy
delta larea came in for' attenti'o .This. areca, containi% the Headquarters of a
J .p division and several thousan
n tr(oops, posessdd of a. sin ;le railway, and a *~

few isolated.roads, was largely dependent for coraunictions on the local gigs,
...bar es and sarpans supplemented by ' few surviving creek steamers. The Japs al-
so built a number. of. 40-60 foot motor bots which, a< cordine to ground informaz-
ti.on,.made frequent and' regular jou3rn ys along the Twnto Canal on their way to
Jap units in the delta, To .cvuntract
this, systeratic pitrols by Beaufihters
reularly bombed out -she area, sinking, and damaging a -laro variety of vessels,
ran ,in from the 30 foot hand-propelled saapan to the 300 foot .lats moored at
La-Ubin, nIi nlarch, round reports indicate. the' presence. of4 a number of motor
torpedo boats :i the& Kungyan n area but a torou ,h search lastin sevral days .
failod to locate any large :number. It is ,beLeved that they were carefully
camouflaged and moved every. day toy avoid deteio n.

Siamese waterways still re in outside the norma1 range- of A11-lied straf-

ing aircraft. Ground information, backed up by photo reconnaissance; in larch
of this year,- indicated that Jap supplies and troops ere being moved.- by water-
way in, Siamese barges, towed by, power launches. This was believed to be a de-
velopment arisin; from the destruction of certain strategic railway bridges
:which had sucessfully cut all through lines into Ban kbk f±Tm.the south, west
and. north,.

The Menan Chao Bhraya, as previously mentioned, helps"'to feed-an, ex-

tensive. anrd complex irrigation system, c~introlled by dams. and sluices. The
main arteries 'Ofthis system are navigable; canals and have been sed for years
for!.transport ' purposes,

In
orderto put a stop to thi.s t r'ax fic, six Ri F Liberators on., L8 April,
delivereda low.level attack on the Damneun aduak-Phareon Chaisri canl locks.
These,canals which togethe:r form, a watoerway link between B~npngand Bangkok
were believed to be in:use.as a bypass loop to the broken Nakorn Chaisri 'and
RarmaVI rai, lway brid ;es. The attack resulted in four out of the six lock sates
being destroyed and1, according, to one reliable infoDrmant, the, traffic in the,
canals has irtully ceased. .Othr c als in te' sytem aebcbleeved tos be
ScarryinEI Je m3ilitary as .well as normacl civiliasn tra~ffic; wi'Cth sigis: of iilitay
activity ,aThong t1 barges plyn the 1.i n Meklon, the enamz Chao hra~a and
-

~.ts t ibujari.es. ~d
oubt ;the Jja~s' Mill~ continue to use the wteways of
siam .;j
solong as £:nility ne~sity'~ dom.'ncd

1'ae 4 Son IIIO~eL~sIFED

 BOWB DAMAGE STUDY AT RANGOON

Throughout the war in Burma,

'Rangoon has been the focal
point of Japanese administrative
and supply activity. This was a
natural development in "vie of
its geographical position as the
center of-rail and' sea' transport
and 'of Burmese commerce generally.

Upon occupying Rangoon, the Japanese imprQved and exploited its capabilities,
During the first year of occupation, sea traffic into Rangoon was relatively
unimpeded and. cargo vessels used the port extensively to bring in supplies for
..military opera ions' ah~ ak e out :raw materials for the Japanese war economy.
The completiqn .of.ithe BrmaaSiam Railway futher increased the importance of
SRangeon as a supply and comuniuictions center.

The earliest Allied air efforts against Rangoon' were directed a-gainst sea..
-'cbmmunieations by the bombingof dock areas, nd laying aerial mines in the
°
river and harbpr &tea, with the;result tht large shipping to Rangoon was-
virtually suspended early in-1944. Prior to this" time, however,; vast quantities
'of supplies had been landed in Rangoon and extensive-supply dumps were developed
in: the area north phof- he 4city.; Existing facilities were utilized and dispersed
storage in iuts andin coversd and uncovered revetments was established.

urther. efforts to reduce Bangoon s importance as a communications center

iicluded direbt att'ack u'po6 its railway yards arid stations, Kemmendine, Central
and MalagonQ anId seii:comoti.~ Q orkshops, as well as attacks on communications
outside :-the nga' re hch, neertheless, served to isolate Rangoon from:
incoming or .outgoiri traffic.

As'binmeros ,heavyattacks on communications reduced the flow of suppies to

Burma i'lowJaianese military requipents,,a program of supply area bombing
4-as :idsbituted, reduce available :sto cs below ;working requirements at the
-earliest datea...

Unfortunately grbund source information.on dump activity was relatively, sparse,

photo reconnaissance provided much information, but many of the dumps were in.
heavily wooded-areas and- photo interpreters could not definitely assessresults.
tUponh the capture of Rangoon an .EAG observern visited most of the areas subjected
to bombing to obtain first hand impressions; of .ombing eff'ectivness and his
comments arc set forth below:

Central S 'tation:Though station buildings were badly damaged the yards; could
have been made serviceable with little difficulty.

Malaon Yards: Destruction, particularly of roundhouse and south end of yards

vwas -ery thorough. Very heavy and well distributed concentrations of large
craters made the yards valueless and reconstruction would have required much
time, effort and materials.

Kemmendine: This station was virtually undamaged except for small amount of Jap
demolition. These yards were' most used by Japanese after Malagon and Central
were attacked. Comparison of conditions at these three RR yards made it appear
that only very heavy concentrations of heavy bombs will make a RR yard difficult
or nearly impossible to repair,

Insein Locomotive Workshog3: Through numerous attacks, these had suffered

considerable damage, generally as shown by Photo Interpretation reports. The
two large northerly shops had suffered the least damage and though much of the
roof had been destroyed, the working floor ant .
to have suffered little bomb-damage though *,,- :

Lino, "" '- r Section III - Page 15

Important machines on the floor were generally protected by individual revetments.
The Japanese had apparently intended to take much of. the machinery away by rail-
way. They had loaded good machinery on flat cars(were probably pressed for time)
and definite evidence of efforts to destroy this machinery was observed. It is
probable that much of this machinery came from the more completely destroyed
sections of the plant. Though it is likely that the plant remained slightly
active until the fall of Rangoon, its productive capacity was undoubtedly greatly
reduced. Bombing of port areas was discontinued after large vessels ceased to
use the port. At both Keighly and Sule Pagoda wharves, bomb damage to godowns
was quite extensive. The reinforced concrete wharves themselves were almost
undamaged by bombing, such damage as was observed appeared to be new, the result
of Japanese denial measures,

The importance of Insein Technical Institute and adjoining dump areas as an

aircraft supply and maintenance center was suspected but never firmly established
through intelligence sources. It is clear on ground check that it was an important
objective worthy of heavier attack than was delivered against it. Aircraft engines,
propellers, instruments, radio quipment and armament were kept there and a belly
tank production unit was operated. Hundreds of belly tanks and quipment for
their manufacture was observed. As some belly tanks were crated it is possible
that this prodtction was also used to supply areas outside Burma.

The Mental Hospital just north of Dump "F", though never a designated target .due
to the possibility that it might actually contain a limited number of patients)
was known to be an important supply area. It did receive a fairly heavy bombing
during the attack on Dump "F" and inspection shows much damage, a large part
confined to the second floor. Large quantities of automotive pafts were stored
in the area and damage: was extensive, including destruction of many tires, bat-
teries, and small: parts. Much of the usable supplies had been looted at the time
of inspection. Some cases were observed in which damage to buildings had occurred
without fire, in which case the supplies were relatively undamaged.

Areas devoted to'dumps were visted. Almost nothing of civilian use remained in
the dumps at time of inspection. Looting of dump areas proceeded for almost a week,
from the- time of Japanese leaving until British: forces -arrived. Judging largely
from -burned romains, and the fact that ammunition in large quantities remained in
the dumps, it appears that the dumps had all been well stocked during the periods
Sof bombing. .

Dump areas were generally well served by roads which were largely all weather
with brick surface, Though the surfacing, was uneven and not to be compared with
a first class highway, it lid permit movement of transport throughout the dump
areas in all weather. Storage was well dispersed ;and in huts with or without
revetments, and in open or, covered revetments. Most revetments were covered with
about two feet of earth over wooden beams, though in some cases the cover was
as light as 12 inches. In a few cases cover was three to four feet of earth, The
vast majority of damage had been secured by incendiaries from 500 Ib aimable .
clusters. This was also true of covered revetments, though numerous instances'
were observed in "which: the incendiary had buried itself for about 10 inches of
its length in the revetment cover without causing fire or other damage, In only
a very few cases was damage observed which could be. attributed to H.E.

Though it is not possible to make a firm estimate of the percentage of destruction

secured in.the various dumps, it may be roughly stated that "A", "B" and '!F"
dumps suffered damage well in excess of 50% and that other dumps attacked appeared
to have suffered almost 50% damage.

Dump "A" was devoted almost exclusively to ammunition storage ranging from 25
calibre rifle cartridges to 150mm howitzer shells. Much of this ammunition had
been burned out and had exploded.

Dump "F" was P.O.L, stoage ad MT repair depot. Damage wasp great throughout the
area. Four largo underground storage tanks were situated across the road from
the Mental Institute and none of these wer 5ho h d cetted
stores had-been destroyed.! I A .- I
Bage 16 - Section. III
 Bo o CDonegoStud
Cc Ii AflfIan I

Dump "B" semccd to be miscellaneous storage including large areas devoted.to

medical suppli-e, sports equipent, reading .and writing materials, building
ma.terials, pac muule. hrneno s., saddles and equipment. Dama o was;widespread.

.Dump -"C"' The use of thi south end could not be definitely established, though
it appeared tha t it'might have been a barracks and mdssing area. Damage in this
sector was believed due to Jap denial. In the northerly section which had been
bombed by XX Bomber Cormand was a large MT-repair center which had apparently
been seriously damaged and disrupted by the attack. MT had been kept in the
revetments and machine tools and motors were very well protected either with
individual roveotenots, special sunken recesses within main revetments or even
a special slit trench containing a single lathe and motor, 100 or more feet
from any other installation.

Obviously the Japanrso were willing to sacrifice efficiency of production to

.:attack.
secure protection from bombing

The peninsula e::Lencding N into Royal Lake., from the SE corner of the lake had
never been attacked, though it had been reported as petrol storage. Examination
showedththt hough. some petrol had been stored here, its particular function
w as as an'MT park. Several tanks, special derrick vehicles and two truck locos
were seen here. The truck locos were completely unserviceable and no effort
was made to obtain technical detail. One appeared to have been powered by an
ordinary truck gasoline engine and the other by what was probably a small diesel
engine,. .

Rangoon University ,hich ha d been used as a Japanese Headquarters area was

bomb.d by Stratueic Air- Force. The damage within' the University grounds was. as
extensive'as s~ o n by P.Ireports., but ;was not by any means'complete. In many
cases there w, exte nsive top floor damage -;here the lovwA floor was virtually
undamaged. T' ropf' was tile on light steel truss and the second floor was. 4"
concrete slab. Locals report . that as many as .400 Japs, a large' proportion of
whom were officers, were killed, in this, a tta.cik.;

:: 194
eview of Situationand. Atachs -Jan 1945 to May

The natural centre of supply lines

into Burma being Rangoon, the Japanese,
during theirthree year occupation of
the country,, built up here their larg-
est stocks of supplies. Brought in by
coasters and by rail, the supplies
awaited onward transhipment to meet
the needs of the Imperial Army fight-
ing on the Indo-Burma border.

The main dumps in Rangoon were situated north of the city at Victoria Park, and
near Insein Mental Hospital. It was confirmed by photographic interpretation that
the bulk of the enemy supplies in Burma were stored here. From Rangoon northwards
were other depots and dumps, along the main L's of C's to North Burma, the various
sites becoming smaller and more dispersed as the fighting line was reached.

It w .s estimated in January 1945 that. there were enough stores built up in Burma
to sustain six months to a year's fighting on the scale of 1944. With the persis-
tent attack during 1944 on the enemy's supply routes from Siam and Malaya, and
attacks along the South China and French Indo-China routes following the recapture
of Leyte, the task of keeping supplies above requirement level proved increasingly
difficult ±or the Japanese.

Between February and March 1945, supplies into Burma dwindled to a trickle. Consid-
erable effort from the beginning of rearwas therefore directed towards the
interdiction of the routes leading no fa.., oon.
Section III - Page 17

'y"-
e-
At 'e8aie
t time tacks were directed against dumps. The heaviest strikes which
were on .ngoon itselfand the o ther -majordmps further forward w ere undertaken
by Strategic Air Force on occasions in cooperation with XX Bomber Command. Attacks
against depots,-immediately behind the fighing line were carried out by the tact-
ical formations of Eastern 'Air Command.

For the following reasons the latter; task was not easy:

1. The Japanese dispersevery widely., the_- .stores in any single dump,

2. The dumps are aaost entirely concealed from _aerial . observation.
3.' Nopermanent _or somi.permanent ,structuresare built t house supplies.

Concealment, an art in which the Japanese are .highly skilled was a.problem largely
overcome by means of : reports.from ground sources of the cc stence o stores and
dumps, .and the' tatical reconnaissance squadz'ons ,who:Phpdinted the camps by _low-
flying observation. In this way continuous attacks were maintained by medium and
fighter-bombers. Fromnaerial :observation resultEs of these attacks were difficult to
assess,'arndgound check was, the only sure method. Ground check at Settawr showed
the 'pains tkcn 'by' they.Ja pstin concealment; supplies bing of 4oadedfrom, trtoks
and manhandled' into. d mps in t iejungle to .void MT turn round~ A g±ound Check on
stores dumps. at' oi1ktIlpa.found; that ost .of-the dumps could ±nttbe seen on vertica .
photos but might b%4. s~o on, good qunlity .obl .c4ies It was also found' that altnos
every pagoda jth to.n ntined. storesof: ome kindand, in t J
used pagodas 'alltrough the campaign for storage. Nevertheless the regular attacks
maintained ahead of the 14thArmy'sdvaiice are shown by captured documents to have
reduced the enem s b Iity to meet the :requirements of hats rotreatihgtroe Iii
Febriryu lh4, ae:a blow"was struck.'by Strategici r Force And XX Bomber Command
at the 'main dumps in.IRangoon This was the first occasion in South jEaistAsiaon
which more than 100 4rp ft, have participated in. one operation. Altogether 6'74
short "tons' of b&b ere- put- .down on to. the,'extensive Victoria Park area, 'doubt-
less nce i ttint.revi on of Japanese estimates of -the ir Ability to sustain their
armies in Bu. FolloLing up this attack-..came. further heavy 'blows by' B-29s And
Liberators. On 9, 11 and 17 March nearly 1000 tons -were dropped on believed petrol
and ammunition stores. In April a further 275 'short 'tons were dropped by Strategic
Air Force completing the series of heavy attacks whiich.only ceased When the ground
forces converged on Rangoon. The: ±es lts. of the6rai;ds we difficult to assess
from the air, but impressions of a ground observer subsequent to the.,apture"of
Rangoon show that:.iost of the-'i~Ssuffered'.sp a x moately 50 damage. (See pre-
ceding article, this'iction ).

,. to'assess accurately' from photo interpretation

It is difficult as stressed-above
the damage done by air atacks on'dumps,It 'can be said, however, that not only in
ard areas also, by redu.cing his ability to fight they
Rangoon itself but in t .::forw
undoubtedly did hasten the defeat .of the 'Japanese army i Surma.

Page 18~ Seet IA

i2~4 "

EkLASE
 1

zA 'AP

I1 'J/

7 ,

r / /
.
 T AGAINST J^P
(To c 4
Situation Review i "

Chinese troops occupy Nanning. The Japanese were

carrying out a general withdrawal northward along
the Liuchow - Kwelin corridor. The Chinese reg-
istered more gains in the Paoching sector. Mediums
and fighters o- the 14th At' again successfully at-
tacked the enemys lines of coimmunications.

GROUND SITUATION: The chief center of interest in China was in the Nanning sector.
Llements of the Chinese 156 and 159 Divisions occupied the city on 27 May. Troops
of these two divisions continued to press northward following the enemy withdrawal,
and lighting was reported just south of Pinyang, on the banning-Liuchow road. It
was believed that the enemy would withdraw to the Kweilin area and relinquish con-
trol o the fianning-Liuchow corridor. There ,iere also indications that the enemy
would give up his lest River L of C. .l.ong the Kweichow-Kwan si RR, the enemy con-
tinued his orderly withdrawal toward Liuchow, and Chinese troops were engaged with
the uapanese rear guard forces near Ishan. It was reported that the Japanese llh
Army had already begun its withdrawal northward from Liuchw*. To the south, French
troops, with elements of the Chinese 157 Division, attacked enemy positions at Tra-
Linh, but were beaten back.

In Hunan Province, General Wang 'ao-iu's forces eliminated the Japanese threat to
Chihkiang.Since the start of the Chinese counter-oiffensive in this sector on 8 lia,
the Japanese suffered an estimated 11,000 casualties. The Chinese, reinforced with
American trained and equipped troo s and aur La campaign veterans, succeeded in
pushing the eneny back to position. just west of Paochin, where his ill-fated drive
started from. Heavy fighting was reported in the immediate ..'aoching area and the
enemy was busily engaged in the construction of defensive positions.

South of the Yellow River, more enemy ithdrawals were reported north of Hsihsiakou.
The Chinese eliminated the Japanese salient Cwhich had cut the important Tensiang-
Lushih road. In this general area, eight Chinese Divisions cohtinued to press their
attacks on the anemy. Hsihsiakou. was reported to be Wi:thin range of Chinese mortar
and the town was being beseiged from three sides. It was estimated that the enemy
strength in this area had been reduced to 10,000, and the threat to Sian from this
direction was removed. In the coastal areas, he enemy evacuated Lanchi and Kinhwa.
The Japanese also began their withdrawal from the port of J-enchow, but it was be-
lieved that this evacuation would not be completed until the enemy, moving over-
land from the Pioochow area, had passed asnchow.

AIR SITUATION: Adverse weather conditions some hat restricted the close support
operations on the Paoching front. On 23 May, P-40s and P-51s attacked troops and
positions west of Paoching and killed. 50 enemy troops, knocked put a number of
machine gun and mortar positions. The following day, fighters again attacked the
same area, killing an estimated 450 troops. iiiht intruder P-61s successfully at-
tacked MT, locomotives, troops, and stores in the Ichang and Chansha area. Through-
out this period, fighters and mediums carried out a number of sweeps along the
Pinhan and Tungpu RRs successfully, attacking locos, MT, RS, and bridges. On 26
May, 'ustans, on an offensive sweep along the Yangtze, destroyed one 75' tugboat,
one 60' motor boat, iour 125' barg es, 17 junks, and two warehouses. On the same
day, other fighters on sweeps in the Siang River Valley and Tun-ting Lake areas,
destroyed or damaged 133 junks, eight barges, 29 MT, 26 RS, and fired 16 buildings.

On 27 M.y, 36 P-51s and ei St P-40s on offensive sweeps in Central China destroyed

eight RR bridges, s-ank a numbr o.ibarges and steamers, killed 39 enemy troops and
105 horses, and badl' daaged nine locomotives and 11 RS. On the same day, B-25s.
attacked five targets along the Pinhan RR between Hankow and Hsuchang, destroying
trackage, knocking out 1 bridge, and .daraging locomotives and RS,. Other Mitchells
bombed a storage depot at Chenghsicn.
 \ erse weather has hampered fighting on Okinawa.
S ' "i v ,ains. on Luzon,. - indanao and Tarlkan. ieilent-
News
less air attacks.against Jap installations.

Torrential downpours on Okinawa have turned the island into a quagmire and serious-
ly hampered ground movement. In spite of this added handicap, American forces con-
tinue to move forward all along the line. iarine units, on 24. Say, pus hed700 yards
beyond Asato River ag ainst considerable opposition to gain control of two-thirds of
the capital: on the E flank Amy units gained 800 yards along a 2000 yard front.
During this dal 15 enemy planes were snot do wn over the isi-..nd. Of four bombers car-
rying suicide troops, thr.e wore shot down by AA and one dropped 15 paratroops on
Yontan. These troops were wiped out by small arms fire, but not before they had de-
stroyed seven parked planes and damaged others. The next day, under hoavy mortar
barrage, iMarine units expanded their bridgehead across the Asato River r.nd tanks mov-
.;d across into N-ha. Further ains. were reported S and SE of Yonabaru. After days
of bitter fighting the enemy strongpoint of Shuri is crumbling and its complete fall
is imminent, Rain an. mud slowed all forward movement around Naha on 26 May, and
Arrmy units seized high ground 300 yards S of Yonabaru. Suicide attacks against tanks
continued with the enemy employing cone shaped explosive charges on the end of long
sticks, powerful enough to penetrate several inches of armor. Another type is hooked
over gun barrels, which when exploded destroys the gun. Banzai counter. attacks, al-
though costly to the enemy have inflicted severe casualties to US units. Though bad
weather has to some degree caused a slackening off of suicide plane attacks, it has
also limit ed valuable ground support from US fighters based on the island.

On Luzon new gains have been made in all sectors. In thb area E of Ba,.uio, patrols
have been active. On 25 May, Mt Kadang, approximately six miles due E of Baguio, was
reached and tWo days later it. Kanote was reached, about two miles NNE of 't. K,dang.
To the E, the 32nd and 25th Divisions have made cont ;ct 'N of Imugan, bringing to an
end all organized resistance in this area. The 25th Division in its advance N along
highway No. 5 seized Santa Fe on 26 iay and the' final stages of the campaign for
Northern Luzon are at hand. -n the area E of Ipo Dap, the 43rd Division has been en-
gaged in mopping up the area with. patrols m.oving to commranding positions 2800 yards
to the NE against scattered opposition. The 38th Division has been extensively pa-
troling along the Mariquina and aosoboso Rivers and ,-round 'a&wa Dan. On the E coast,
the 1st Cavalry Division has been consolidating positions around Infanta, with pa-
trols fanning out to the N and Wv. Further progress has been reported from-indanao.
Following the link up of the 108th Regt CT and the 31st Division on the Sayre Hihway,
these forces have expanded the corridor to the E. The 24th Division in the Davao
area has eliminated all nemy resistance around Ikintal and patrols have pushed to the
N and NiT against scattered opposition. The 26th Australian Brigade on.the Tarakan
has pushed N to clear the- : coast and reach Cape Djoeata at the northern tip of the
island, D'oeata was found.to be unoccupied and large supply dumps were captured.
Night counter attacks have been repulsed and in general there have only been local
gains in other sectors oi the island.

The air assault against Jap installations continues unabated. Targets on Borneo are
receiving increasingly heavy raids. On 24 May, 11 B-25s started lrge fires among
buildings at Jesselton; Brunei B.ay personnel and supply areas were attacked by six
B-25s; Sibu' dumps and bivouacs were bombed by 12 B-24s and buildings at Bintulu were
destroyed by six B-24s. The sarne buildings were hit, fires and explosions were caus-
ed at Sibu by 16 B-24s; 17 B-25s started fires in revetments and eight P-38s left
buildings aflame at Kudat; 16 P-38s furrished ground support at Tarakan. Luzon 'tar-
gets were struck by 413 planes. On 26 iay, B425s destroyed buildings at Brunei Bay;
11 P-38s demolished buildings and dry dock areas at Jesselton and damaged barracks at
Kudat; 35 B-24s furnished ground support at Tarakan. Luzon was hit by 593. sorties.
The same day Formosa was.hit by 49 B-25s which destroyed or damaged fuel storage
tank, a sugar refinery, alcohol planes, RR installations, rolling stock and numerous
buildings. Search planes on 27 May, destroyed three "seatrucks, demolished barracks,
hit coastal guns and-silenced an AA position at Sandakan Harbor. Over Formosa, 53
B-25s started fires in RE yards at Tansui left alcohol, sugar plants and RR install-
ations in flames at Kobi and hit an alcohol plant at Koshun. Over Luzon, 565 sorties
were flown.

Page 2 - Section IV -N
 SEA~OF
The War Against Japan ',
_ -
k
-
..
^

KOREA
SCALE . i

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I
500 MILES
1

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JAPANESE OCCUPIED
29 MAY 1945
TERRITORY SEA
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LID
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5
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LUSHIH 0
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OPERATIONAL
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OHIE A. CHINA
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./-:
4

_4
, s ' A
 i

IL
 AANEE
..
AITI4RCRAFT INBURMA-JAIN MAY 1945
_ _...Y-Y~i.~
. . .I ... . p ._. .._:_jA...Z(.M:. ,9

The first five months of 1945 saw

the Jap AA in Burmla put forth its
major effort, and also saw its de-
cline, Wlith the fall of Rangoon,
the enemy lost the only major gun-
defended area in Burma. Very few
heavy guns remai.in:of 'tT 200 odd
which were at one time in Burma.
At least half of the 50 guns in Ran-
goon had to be destroyed because
they could not be moved, and apparently
efforts to extricate the mobile guns
have been unsuccessful. Most.of these
may have been.,diverted to ground sup-
port -- few have reached the Moulmein
area. The light AA guns might have
been witldrawn from Burma for further
use, but most of these' probably were
commandeered for ground use, and it
is doubtful if many were saved.

February and March 1945 marked the peak of our air effort against Burma with
approximately 20,000 combat sorties flown each month. The Japs, without air support,
could counter with nothing but an inadequate AA defense. Over 200 planes were hit
each month, or about 1% of'the sorties, but most of the hits caused only minor
damage. However, 'considering the hopelessness of the situation and the shortage of
guns and ammuition, the Jap AA gunner showed surprisingly good training and morale.
Some areas, pa.rticulrly Rangoon, achieved high rates of hits until the last.
Reports of intense rflle fire against planes from the routed and retreating isolated
groups of enemyr/cemitostrate the high quality AA defense training of the Jap soldier.

The iniadquacy of heavy AA guns, both in quality and quantity, is one of the Jap's
major problems, probably second only to shortage of planes. That the Jap AA gunner
does a good job with what he h1s is apparent from a study of the preliminary fire-
encountered figures for Liberators and B-24s of Strategic Air Force, for the first
four months of 1945. May figures are excluded because there was little AA left to
fire'in this month, Durtng the four months there were 3829 Libs over targets, of
which 2138 or 56% reported A fire. Of these, 220 were hit, 5.7% of the total
sorties, or 10% of the planes reporting fire. The hits were eight planes lost, six
severe damage (washout), 23 moderate damage and 185 minor damage. Thus the Jap
gunner made good scores in hits, but a surprisingly high proportion of-hits were
minor damage. It is difficult to explain 'the distribution of classes .of damage
among the hits. The lack of a Jap air force meant there were no damaged planes shot
down by fighters, but this cannot explain the high percentage of minor damage.

A majority of the Libs were hit by HAA. This is entirely normal; the mission of
HAA is to defend against heavy bombers -- but here 'again the distribution of hits
is surprising. Of the 3829 sorties, 1711 reported HAA fire, and 143 were hit by it,
for a. hit score of 8.4.. The 'hits were two lost, three severe damage, 10 moderate
damage and 128 minor damage.

Over Rangoon', where the Japs had some modern equipment, 88mm German-type guns with
good fire control, the hits scored were even higher. Of 636 Libs over Rangoon in
the first four months' of 1945, 507 reported AA fire, and 84. were hit,, for a score
of 17%. However, only one plane was lost, missing, two were severely damaged, four
suffered moderte damge and 77 minor damage. For unknown cause, the excellent
shdooting resulted in obn y negligible loss and damage,

The fact that 8m gns were part of the R°ngoon defenses", indicates: the high
priority given t diene infioys, for this type gun is badly needed for defenses
neare ,home. "'h t- 'g<l a~
j rSd4 s used here also shows high priority for this
es are equipped with radar, even in
is a frlt recn cdhevea int, aid ffew. batt
more important defended reao-s. I
_i
Japanese ntiaircra~ l-> inI Burm Concludedj

Except for Rangoon and a few centers with small HAA defenses the AA in Burma
was
light AA guns and machine guns, hopelessly inadequate in total numbers. However,
the total hits against our aircraft were about equally divided between HAA,
LAA and
MG, and the lighter weapons shot down more planes than HAA, though the total
losses
were never serious.

There are now no adequately defendeT areas in Burma or Siam, and none in Malaya and
Sumatra except for Singapore and the oil fields in the Palambang area. The
records
show, however, that the Jap AA gunner will do a good job with what equipment
he has,
and that aircraft disregarding Jap flak, neglecting flak evasion or otherwise
giving the AA a ,good target, may expect a hot welcome.

JAP 88 EAVYANTIAIRCRFT GUNS IN RANGOON

The following is a preliminary re-

port based on notes taken by a flak
liaison officer on a few AA sites
in Rangoon. A more complete report
will be prepared when. the inspection
of antiaircraft sites is complete.

Site 6B. Old Race Course, map reference QL518367. This six-gun battery, known to be
one of the most accurate of the Rangoon defenses, consisted of 88mm naval
type Model 99 (1939) guns, probably with radar control. Very little is
known about this type gun, except from captured documents as no guns had
previously been captured. It probably is a modification of the German 88mm
Flak 36 gun. The guns were of naval pattern, with pedestal mounts. A
base ring was bolted to a platform of railway sleepers. The guns had been
destroyed, as they were too immobile to be transported rapidly. (Captured
British'3.7 inch AA guns were left behind for the same reason). The breech
block was of the vertical type, and there-was no loading tray or rammer,
nor any signs of the belt loading mechanism which a POW claimed was capable
of a rate of fire of 25 rounds per m: nute. On the left of each gun was a
fuse setting device, consisting of three fuse cutters in line and in a
vertical- position. There were cables running to each gun and other evidence
that a predictor or director was used, Date of manufacture apparently was
1942.

The em placements 'ere in a shallow arc with a 6ommand Post and Battery
*Commanders Post in the center. The guns were evenly spaced about 15 to
20 yards apart. There was an ammunition hut and living quarters behind
the Coym-and Post, about 30 yards away. The quarters were destroyed, but
the ammunition hut, with considerable ammunition was untouched.

The Command Post was elaborate, consisting of a predictor emplacement,

height-finder emplacement, and a third emplacement possibly for a telescope.
In the center was a small pit, presumably for the battery commander. All
the Command Post emplacements were connected by covered in trenches, and ' .. 1
below the site commander's position was a small dugout, apparently for
sleeping accommodation. The three main emplacements in the Command Post
weres equipped with bamboo camouflage roofs which ran on wooden rails.
Beside the Command Post ws a bamboo scaffolding 25 feet high, probably
used by a spotter, although there was no platform on top.

The whole site had been kept in excellent repair and all the details of
a perfect AA gun battery site were found. The kitchen garden, water tanks
at each gun position,.covers for field telephones, gun manning roster
boards and elaborate metal 'covering *for the gun cables were all in evidence.

S S o.n.
. ..'x .
*0.0
(r^a I~~tto V .~^ -^ ^
J pmm Heavy

eGL
Antiaircraft
.... Iaa-v'ite. About
Guns iipfan
50 yds to the l
goo

le-, tof the arc of guns was what is

sai
thought to be a gun-I laying radar site. In an
emplacement 'was
a hut about f rnThe
a mtefie1
nh1igh, witLhin which was a
lot of radio
fCtu all dismantled. or destroyed.
On the oof ,ofE .the huat was a circular screen about 150 cm
inldiametr: I wsf flat, and housed on a mounting Very
similar to tha t for a 1150 car; searchlight~ There was a. spec k-
mjrg tube beside the :5.nstalle tion leading- to the room below.
S- rchli ht Site(A'4)This cons iste:d of a searchlight cluster site with four 150
g.oi.alk QL5433&25. cm S/Ls sited in sepa :rate emplacements about 10 yds apart; in
a shallow arc, inr the center of which was a Command Post,
which h&ad app :rently canto mocd some sound locators, possibly
two, with a searchli, :ht comparator. The and reflectors Ions
II ~of the: lights had bee simashed, but they were otherwise in- ,n
tact. The only evidern ices of the sound locators and comparator
were three tripod sta,nds and a square platform plate. No
evideno _, of listening horns was seen. The pits for the
lod~.tors were approxi Lmately 10 feet in diameter.
Liar Sito47. R3ace Course Allemplacements were empty' and overgrowtn. None appeared to
(~X~40~0S.have l°eet occupied fo,r at least six months.

1'A
. .
F IRm ES 1JQUN tERFTO l'
i..r :..a..
e .o. .. :::.,auiu.:.. w... .. ,,- .-.
;... :.....w..,:. n..R. ........ :.a. . ........ ,.......: .v..:.,:w w ic.::.."LY..

latto *1c Time Type ... Heigpht fcc. Int. Wr...... .Y_.. W..v.... Remy? rkui..::

23/5 BlWdiKU - LM. MStrafe cec. mod. 17 Sqdn. From vicof'

p135793 .Spits P69Ss. flak.
truck.
27/5 FININPADLAW - HAP, 47 Sqdn. 1 Mi W~est
QS3565~ Mo sq" IHninpadaw

23/5 AATU b IUA acc. - 47 Sqdn.

Mosq . .,._.._.r.. .. a. ,.o

22/5 I\T £s>i

ND::':.w SA ,M gen. meag. S . .F. One a/c
A
1;1'~ mace. gibs minor dam_

28/5 KYONIDO - 20mm int;. 81 Sq. From near

QN7311 Poss.mor. .,. . .d. .rrt-.. .. :, .... v«r...,,o..
B-25
+ .. v.w.,..... w,.
ferry ldg.
. u..isw.n+.,...r.-- .rw"+ wrr

27/5 MOUL3i,N 11383 HmA, LAA6400 acc, mea g. SAF One -I/c
QS2299 mod. Libs sho t down,
6 a/c hit

27/5 '+ _ _- -~- 47 Sq.

22/5 TAKO - SL1,MG miace. meag. S.A.F.

1P13'75 LAA Libs
.u..,_s...v....,_......._......,........ .,....... .. ,. ._._...,.....,.._._.. .,

20/ 5 QF2964 - MG sc, meag. 434 Sqdn.

B3-25

Section V- g3
 c .
ii

it -'Mf 1'

f.
'
ti". .f I

r'r i!. f;

ENEMY AA DEFENSES IN BURMA AND SIAM "^,

g:,,,,,, sa#ip

From Photo Intelligence PQ Rreports, PID, No. 1, 17 AAF/PID, 7 PTS, CPIC, SEA,
to include cover 24 May 1945 (PQ 150), and superseding all previous tables.
Only occupied, probably occupied and possibly occupied sites are listed.

Burmua
Date of Date of
boc ation site No. Grid Coordinates Occupied By Last Cover
Site No. Grid Coordinates Occupied By La .st Cover
AMHERST QS155489 2 LAA 15/5 226 bAA, 6 MG Poss 22/5
QSl 52487 1 LAA 15/5 227-1/2 1 IAA
ANANKWIN Q5657008 1 LAA 12/5 CHIENGMAI 21 QD8I+84 HAA 27/5
QS659254 2 HAA Prob CHIF2 GRAI L/G 5 LU7804 MG Prob 5/10
AUNGBAN A/F IX191023 4 MG 1/4 8 LU8108 MG Prob 1/2
BURMA-SIAM RAILWJAY 10 LU811 MG Prob 1/2
Mile 7 1 By bridge over brook 1 MG Poss DON MUANG A/F 7 1M015348 HAA 22/5
7-1/2 1 1 MG Poss 12/4
8 LL988327 MG 22/5
8 1 Main line loop 2 MG Poss 12/4 10 11999344 MG 22/5
8-1/2 2 MG Posa 11 11001343 LAA 22/5
12-3/4 1 1 MG Poss 11/1 20 1110033 LAA 22/5
14 1 QS485161 1 bAA 11/1 21 119934 MG 22/5
22 1 QS595072 1 LAA Prob 23 11017328 HAA 22/5
32-1/2 1 Khnonkhan 2 MG Poss 30/3 HNOHNGPLADUI(
1/1
2 11175237 bAA 24/5
37-1/4 1 Between Shitpyit 3NG 4 11174230 MG 24/5
Bridges 5 11164232 HAA 24/5
50-1/2 1 Between RR and road 1 MG Poss 7/4 6 LL177233 HAA 24/5
58 1 Kyandau Bridge 2 MG Poss 1/1 JUMEHORN 1 UK2323 MG
81-1/2 1 Ban Nuang Lu Sta 4 IAA Poss 12/4 KANCHANABURI 1 FF694512 HAA 92/5
GAMONZEEIK 1 UK918E66 LAA Poss 22/5
2 LAA FOSS 25/2 4 PP7348
HERO 6 11(351150 3 MG Pro b 11/4 10 Nr RR Sta. MG Prob 22/5
7 11342158 4 HAA Prob dumy 11/4 16 PP71150 5 HAA 22/5
9 11383158 4 MG 11/4 KHAO HUAGANG 2 U0678859 LAA Poss 20/3
11371163 3 LAA 3 U0680864 MG 20/3
111/4 4 U0673863 MG 20/3
11(356363 8 MG
15 11355135 1 LAA 11/4 KCRAT A/F NO. 1 NE Corner of ./G LAA 10/4
16 LM357128 6MG 114 LAW~ FA PHA 1 LQ963889 HAA 19/5
17 11346153 3 LAA LAMPANG A/F 1 QE4613 MG
19 11345157 3 LAA 10 QE3912 LAA 7/5
11 7/5
20 IM342181 4 HAA 9/2 QE4714 LAA
7/5
21 11346135 4 MG 14/4 13 QE4812 MG
22 M1395116 1 MG 19/3 NAKORN SAWAN 1. RVi5 1990 KG 22/5
24 11398120 4 MG 18/2 NAN A/F 1 RV1974 MG 12/2
HNINPALE 2 Q1802845 2 bAA Frob 14/5 PAK NAM P110 2 RQ183015 LAA Poss 22/5
5 Q1179 1819 3 HAA Prob 20/4 PTI'SANUL1'E 6 850 yds N of Sta. LAA Prob 9/4
HNINPADAW 10 QS365443 4 LAA Poss 3 MG 5/4 7 RL3584 MG 29/3
32 Q5365424 2 HAA Prob 5/4 PRONG ISLAND 1 J3A25.5430 LAA
KA LAW 2 11094 003 1 MG2 Foss 2/3 RAJBURI 2 90 yda W of bridge LAA Prob 1s/4
KALAWTHUT 1 Q355498 1 HAA 12/2 SATTAHIIB 1 LW360777 HAA 12/4
KUNLON NO. 1luG 1 11515474 3 LAA Prob 3 1i284793 HAA Dp 12/4
MARTABAN 2 QN218027 2 MG Prob 9/5 4 LW356750 HAA DP 12/4
3 QN219027 3 MG Prob /5 5 1W314796 LAA
5 QN221C25 1 LAA 1/4 SURASDHANI 1 UtJ250560 MG Poss 9/5
MAYANBINCH{AUNG L/G 2 PY7 50897 4 LAA Prob 18/4 UBONQRArCHATHANI 1 From S end of runway MG 25/2
4 PY740894 1 MG 18/4 (15 14 N-14 53'E) 280 yds at 115
6 PY744907 1 MG 18/4 2 2060 yds at 230° 1 LAA 13/4
MLERGUI A/F 2 PY598616 2 HIA 2015 UTTARADIT 1 W of Sta. sidings 5 10
4 PY589598 3 IAA, 2 M 205
5 PY63.7623 2 HAA, 2 LAA 11/5 Car Nicobar Island
6 PY586581 1 bAA 20/5
7 P1602625 3 LAA, Poss dumm4vy20/5 564828 2 HAA Dum, 5 MG Pose 18/5
9 PY628581 1 HAA, 1 LAA 20/5 552827 6 HAA, 3 LAA 18/5
11 PY628640 3 HAA, Prob dunm 573845 3 IAA 22
13 PY596608 1 LAA l iO/4 551824 3 LAA 17/3
15 Pf565612 1 LAA 539889 4 LAA 27/2
17 PY586581 1 LAA 11/5 566853 4 IAA Prob 27/2
19 PY567621 2 bAA 20/5 551831 3 LAA 1 /5
21 PY627594 3 HAA 530875 ,1 ivn 2/2
MOULMEIN 3 QS229996 3 LAA 15/5 562847 1 LAA 18/5
4 Q3228989 2 HAA, 2 HAA Possdun15/5
5 Q$228971 Prob dun 15/5 Andaman Islandls
7 Q5238931 2 HAA 15/5
9 Q5230997 1 LAA 15/5 PORT BLAIR 1 TB577851 4 HAA, 2] LAA 15/5
11 Q227997 1 LAA 15/5 2 TB619863 4 LAA 13/5
18 Q5224973 2 LAA orAG Pro b i5/5 3 TB596832 3 LAA 15/5
NAMSANG A/F 7 LN416296 6 MG18/2 4 TB588895 2 MG Foss :3/5
8 LN492325 6 MG Pro b 11/4 5 TB583889 2 MG 4/5
TAVOY A/F 3 P0173 597 2 LAA Poss 16/5 6 TB602829 4 HAA Durnmqy 14/2
7 P0161 614 3 IAA Pass 16/5 8 TB588887 1 'LAA 15/5
THAN BY1JZAYAT 3 QS335359 9 TB614868 1 LAA 9/11
4 QE332357 2 HAA 4/4 16 TB608881 1 LAA 15/5
VICTORIA POINT 4 U04670 1 MG 9/5 18 TB600854 2 MG 15/5
5 U04670 2 MG 9/5 20 TB609856 2 LAA 15/5
YEBAWNGYI 1 UD 761704 2 MG 14/12 21 TB610852 1 LAA 15/5
22 TB602930 2 LAA Pro b 13/5
Siam 23 TB583885 1 LAA 29/3
24 TB586888 2 LAA 20/4
AYUTHYA 1 119890 IAA 26/4 25 TB595829 2 LAA 14/2
BANGK(OK 1 11907207 HAA, 4 MG Pm
b 12/5 26 TB614878 3 MG 5/11
15 LL949092 HAA, 2 LAA 19/5 27 TB587889 1 LAA 15/5
22 11850120 HAA 12/5 28 TB583825 3 HAA, 1:LAA 1i1/5
23 11860030 MG Poss(On tower)19/5 29 TB588876 1 LAA s/s
24 11925095 MG 19/5 30 TB575&88 2 bAA 14/2
25 11955095 1 LAA 15/4 31 TB575819 2 LAA 13/3
26 11895156 1 MG Foss 19/5 32 TB582821 4 LAA Pos; is 13/5
27:-,27
-1189311--- LAA Fos s -- Z5- 33 TB597842--- - 2-IAA--- is/5
(11915088) 34 TB602846 2 LAA 15/5
(11916087) 35 TB595844 1 LAA 15/5
28 (LI916o8s) 4 HAA, 2 MG Foss 19/5 1 TB621862 US
Several 14 20/4
(11917384) 6 TB62 6866 1 bAA 29/3
SL 9 LL847074 1 LAA 2 TB595855 3 MG 12/4
SL 11 11860110 1 LAA Poss 3 TBS 91847 2 L.AA 18/5
BANGKOK-CHIENGLAI 1 TB591869 3 HAA, DP 1 LAAfProb 15/5
RAI lWAY 19/4sf 2 T1B574912 3 HAA,DP 1 LAA is/s
9/47 2 HAA
Mile 167-1/2 Ban Pla Kot MG Foss 19/s 15 TB513850 7/4
190-1/2 Bridge #38 MG Prob
192-1/4 Bri dge #39 MG Foss Nancowriw Islandi
196-3/4 RQ510631 MG Prob 72
RQ505625 bAA 9/4 1 378452 2 IAA 1s/5
213-1/2 Bridge #43 MG Foss 9/4 2 380450 4LA 18/5
219 Bridge #44 MG 91/4 3 379454 2 LAA Prob
18/5
223-3/4 Bridge #45 MG Poss 26/4 4 378457 4 IAA 18/5
364+ QE7613 bAA DPi1 386450 3 HAA DP
BANG PA IN 11971715 MG
26/4 Status of Jap AA Searchlight Sites
BAN PAJI. 1M144983 MG
LAA or MG 18/4
BAN PAKCHAN UJ8427 18/4
BAOP0NG- 11143237 LAA Burma
BANG SANG RONG 11984099 bAA 12/3
BAN TAKL I A/F From rump ay intersec. LAA Poss 22/5 MER(U I AA 4 FY589598 Foss Occupied 30/4
350 yds at 2000
BURMA SIAM RAIlWAY Siam
Mile 87-1/2 2 bAA 13/2
1 MG BANGKOK~ LL937128 X9/5
11847074
89-1/4 2 MG V3 SATTAHIB LW332820 12/4
91-1/2 5 MG Prob
93-3/4 3MG 7/4 L357788 Occupied 12/4
Level crossing 2 MG Prab
26/4 11356757 32/4
94-1/4 26/4
94-3/4 100 yds E of S end 9 MG Foss
of rd bridge Andiaman Islands
96-1/4 40 yd s E of R MG Prob Occupied is/5
96-1/2 PORT BLABR 18588887
S end Br. Q.378 MG Prob
15/s
In hutted camp be- MG TB595885
98-1/2 is/s
TB58 9871
side line. 14/2
105-1/4 Hut ted camp erdiof RR TB583823
TB(07846 20/4
105-3/4 Dhamayieu Sta. TB 600843 13/5
107 Junction RR and rd 3 LA is/s
2MG Foss15 TB6a2854
158-1/2 Era Si Mum 15/5
18/5 18590875
221-1/2 Ban Tha Lo Dump 2 bAA
TB583885 15/5
2 LA A, 2 MG Prob 18/5
S(r - - - - -- w - " !

DECLASSIFE
 ",THER REC(OIL __ .D.

"Rangoon before the monsoon" was a major

aim of the Allied air and land forces in
the Burma campaign. Its successful attain-
ment, dependent on regular air supply over
the mountains, and challenged by the pre-
mature advent of monsoon-type weather in
Lower Burma, was ensured by thoroughgoing
and systematic use of weather reconnaissance,

One of the factors in the Burma campaign leading up to the capture of Rangoon
was
the part played by weather. The troops of the Fourteenth Army and the squadrons of
EAC wsere not only fighting to beat the Japs and take Rangoon but to do it before
the rains of the impending monsoon washed out.roads and prevented the lightning
strikes that were so much a part of the success of the campaign. Even during the
last weeks of April leading up to D-Day the weather was there, always on the. verge
of hindering or preventing the crucial air-borne and amphibious operations that
took: place on 1 MVay and the days immediately following. It's altogether too, true
that no one can actually do anything to change the weather, but a systematic method
of observation and analysis from numerous ground stations and weather reconnaissance
aircraft in flight enables skilled forecasters to foretell the coming weather suffi-
ciently to alloy proper planning in and around existing weather. The work of the
10th Weather Scquadron and the 2nd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron did just that
during the Bu:r a campaign,

To cover the v-e.a ther over India, Burma, and adjacent areas, the 10th Weather Squadron,
under the Comiu.nd of Colonel Richard E. Ellsworth has established a far-flung net-
work of observation and forecasting stations. To supplement this coverage, the 2nd
Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, flying B-25s and F-5Es, fill in the blank spots on
the weather map with observations taken daily on long range weather reconnaissance
flights over the Bay of Bengal, the Andaman Sea, enemy territory, and areas other-
wise inaccessible ,to grind personnel. During the Burma campaign leading up to the
fall of Rangoon all facilities of this network of weather reporting agencies were
used to get all possible information concerning the Burma weather to the right people
at the right time. The work of the 2nd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron during the
recent climax of the Burma campaign can be divided into three phases a-s follows:
1. Support was given the Combat Cargo Task Force operations over the Arakan Yoma
by a flight of three aircraft staging.from Comilla. Daily patrols are maintained
over the Arakan range giving air.to air in-flight weather reports to planes of
the- CCTF telling them where the weather is at all times. This program is still
in progress because the armies in Burma still need to be supplied by air to a
great extent. The avertge schedule consists of two flights daily using either a
B-25 or an F-5, or both, to give general area coverage when the weather is fairly
good and specific route coverage when the weather is bad. Routes for the most
part follow the ridge of the Arakan Yoma, with an occasional dog-leg out to the
coast or inland to the Irrawaddy River. The entire range is covered with the
missions sometimes extending as far south as the immediate vicinity of Rangoon.

2, General area weather reconnaissance of the source areas for Burma weather in
the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea played another major role. During the two
weeks prior to D-Day at least one mission daily was dispatched from the home
base at Gushkara, India, deep into the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal. All
observ Lions on theee flights were radioed immediately to Weather Central at
Barrackpore nd first hand post-flight reports given to tactical units at Cox's
Bazar or Akyab at the end of each flight. The flights for the CCTF also made
hourly observations of the weather over Burma and radioed these direct to Weather
Central in the same manner and upon the completion of their flights also landed
at Cox's Bazar or kyab for de-briefing. During this period much severe weather
was encountered over the Bay .and Rangoon area,, as t.e Inter-Tropical Front was
situated in the immediate vicinity of southern Burm throughout the entire oper-
ation, There was also a, line of ttunderstorms running from N-S about 50 miles
off the west coast of Burma. Either of these areas 'of l)5ad weather - if their
exact location had been'unknohn," could have completely prevented the air-borne
and amphibious operations if they had made an unforecast move over the land are'as
to be invaded. Complete area weather reconnaissance enabled foreca ters to follow
these zones accurately from hour to hour and from day to day,

~E LA' flED
 ~t r~c n ais ?nePlay Part0onc _dedc

on 22 of the missions into?athe! &ndn:an ea. a Skilled oco:tno rapher was carried on the
8--25 in addition to thy, reg.ular CrO. to keep a on stunt ceck on the ;
ire of the seo
an the in as oi coa~st Rio that ac urate1, forec sing could be done for the
amphibious
landings below [nr oan..
3. The climactic . of ope1:ations
_haso came. in the .- ero rins:aofz.Co{ argot reconnissance
fligbhts that woe'o mad : duraimj
~of the two nml ghts prior to to. ctu J.droprz.
, para-,
troopers on R'angoo n and on the final ni;ht of th1e opera flea. On each of the two
nights preceding the open tionX3a 4 .
wo ,.:-th£r ocon' ;aisyne -<ro h nd ete
rrocecud directly to the d1 op zone o er the route W ohevsed. T _he ete oeatr
cunner°anid the pietcsa the weather exactly a s i t would exi s tduring t'.c. cr iti cal
hlours of the, :(v X o nj h
etigwhc
}wstoh pea ar ~ u.T
,sa a nyJweather
gn.,but good, but was_ still. overt lon .l. On
h i t of!theac tua l
Operation the Deaganwt outr ri:Lving over the. drp-zone 30Gn rutsrior2;
final: brie.f'mi only onO houir mrior to take-of '. tim.e for the teroop crisof
"std
the let and 2nd U.iir,
r Connd r
ro cupS ". heweater as deflnitely 3 ',not goodCwsith se1.1t-m
ter od thundor tormc along the route and 5om- lo wTs tratus inte vicinity of thee drop,
zone. ho ever, it v ms
'till considered operationa~ol and th.}forc"story on the groun'd
informed the piloto of the h z rdcs.,of=the i ssiox1n and ere c.'.1,0 to te,1.thor eac
V haLt tecy ould f id * .Theootor eonnssn ' icraf
r - t sta=yeyd out over the crop-
d
pijg zone and. route until1 the -47s V re situhted proceeding en course to t heir tarrget.
Tho weather h.a:wro a dofinitoly operattio .al at that tire if it had
turned for the C J''o .ot e C-41~ would have xboon informed by radio arn.(thIn miassons
re -routed or cane?.lo.d by the.f l ight comrno andor * L tr thait day hen r in or coronts
c~dsufplies . e re low7n to th drop zone L .:o!er w thor reconnaissance a.ircraft iS
on'the eone this t lli g wea-'ther ainform atonfrom p) s ie ot o lae{atall tines"
_1..
until the finaldcoeyr ,cd.~

Durin g the two w hp{:r;ori prece~ding;tihe captureof I?°ngoou._a totul of sor t? c 44

ws flown in . -d.i oc +;or :ndirect supprt of te oer 1ti on, ~P rox rnL toly 200 offic rs
and enl.isted Yneni of the 10th1. Wot .t r ,Squadron. and all aircratf t'ad persornnel of the
2nd Yrde ther econ ; once Squadron were ful tyieployed or o bt i 1ig° anfdistributing
all the evai2-,1b 7 o:!athor mifo rwation. .

Thus i p or h tthe old ad oge- ver ou~e t J a o tt e hte b t n

does a nything abu t tsneeds >t ob. nmdifihd. ''-hit e'h± eonsssc z h
ground weather -rice uU ized to tho 1<nuai . ,rt w ather on be epZtaoteid fr l ta Pu: and
is move'Ments, forecra t
G',rP ni"?ik to 3e cri ti c l momentt C fa t ctic lopen +'tet i:.

Ya~e SctonVI.
.