Pergamon Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., Vol. 21, No. 2,pp.

251-269, 1996
Copyright 0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved
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Aristotelian Chemistry: A Prelude to

Duhemian Metaphysics

Paul Needham*

In 1904 Joachim published an influential paper dealing with Aristotles Con-

ception of Chemical Combinationr which has provided the basis of much
more recent studies.* About the same time, Duhem3 developed what he regarded
as an essentially Aristotelian view of chemistry, based on his understanding of
phenomenological thermodynamics. He does not present a detailed textual
analysis, but rather emphasises certain general ideas. Joachims classic paper
contains obscurities which I have been unable to fathom and theses which do not
seem to be fully explained, or which at least seem difficult for the modern reader
to understand. An attempt is made here to provide a systematic account of the
Aristotelian theory of the generation of substances by the mixing of elements by
reconsidering Joachims treatment in the light of the sort of points which most
interested Duhem.
The work described in this paper was undertaken with a view to providing a
basis for presenting, evaluating and criticising Duhems understanding of what
was for him modern (i.e. 19th-century) chemistry. This latter project will be taken
up on another occasion. I hope the present paper will be of some value to a
broader philosophical readership in so far as it provides a fairly clear conception
of matter which might be called Aristotelian, even if it is not precisely Aristotles,
and raises certain clear problems of interpretation. It may also be of interest to
historians of chemistry in suggesting an analysis of the old chemical notion of a
mixt independent of atomic theories. Copyright 0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd.

Atomism, according to Aristotle, had no satisfactory way of accommodating

the distinction between a mere mechanical mixture, say of grains of barley and
wheat, and the generation of a new substance which sometimes results from the
*Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden.
Received 7 March 1995; in revised form 25 August 1995.
Harold H. Joachim, Aristotles Conception of Chemical Combination, Journal of Philology 29
(1904), 72-86.
e.g. J. E. Bolzan, Chemical Combination According to Aristotle, Ambix 23 (1976), 134144,
and references cited therein.
3Pierre Duhem, Le mixte et la combinaison chimique: Essai sur lkvolution dune idie (Paris: C.
Naud, 1902; reprinted Paris: Fayard, 1985). Originally published as La notion de mixte: Essai
historique et critique, Revue de Philosophie 1 (1900), 69-99, 167-197, 331-357, 43&467, 130-745.

251
252 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

mixing of two or more substances. Following Duhem, the old chemical term
mixt will be used for the result of a mixing of the latter kind, to distinguish it
from an aggregation of components which are merely juxtaposed in space in a
mixture of the first kind. A suitable term for this latter notion free from
unwanted associations is not easy to find, but for the few occasions when a
convenient term is required here I will speak of a juxtaposition. The component
parts of a juxtaposition, in the words of Joachim,
. still retain their distinctive natures. They form an aggregate, not a genuine unity.
If we symbolise the components as ABCD, the resultant is A + B + C + D. If we divide
it far enough, we shall reach parts which are A or B or C or D, and not (A + B + C
+ D): i.e. the smallest parts of the whole are different in character from the whole.4

In agreement with Joachim, Duhem formulates the contrasting notion by

saying that when bodies which generate a mixt are brought together,
Gradually, they disappear, they cease to exist, and in their place, a new body is
formed, distinguished by its properties from each of the elements which produced it by
their disappearance. In this mixt, the elements no longer have any actual existence.
They exist there only potentially, because on destruction the mixt can regenerate
them. And the characteristics which determine the mixt belong not only to the body
as a whole, but also to each part, however small, that the mind can cut out of the
homogeneous body.5

The notion of homogeneity which Duhem takes to distinguish mixts from

juxtapositions can be formulated as follows: if ~1one of the characteristics
which determine a mixt, i.e. a kind of mixt, rc is a quantity of material and c
is the relation is a part (not necessarily proper) of, then

M4 APE 4 1 v@). (1)

(Cf. Aristotle: if mixing has taken place, the mixture ought to be uniform
throughout, and, just as any part of water is water, so any part of what is
blended should be the same as the whole).7 Presumably parts are understood
to be spatial parts. This will be discussed later when the notion of an intensive
property, to which Joachim alludes, is interpreted as Duhem suggests in terms
of the way this notion is understood in thermodynamics.
Homogeneity only distinguishes mixts from juxtapositions. To distinguish
them from the elements, which are also homogeneous, mixts are regarded as
derived from elements. The elements so related to a mixt might be called
components, but unlike mechanical components, this term must be understood
40p. cit., note 1, pp. 7475.
50p. cit., note 3, p. 12.
6Peter Roper, Semantics for Mass Terms With Quantifiers, Nous 17 (1983) 251-265, calls this
the distributive reference condition and defines a homogeneous predicate as one which satisfies, in
addition, a cumulative reference condition (v)(n) * &)) 2 p(nup).
7Aristotle, On Coming-to-be and Passing-away, translated by E. S. Forster (Loeb Classical
Library, London: Heinemann, 1955), I. 10.
Aristotelian Chemistry 253

in such a way that the components. . . are, as Joachim puts it, contained there
in altered form.8 This seems, however, to be too timid, and Duhems claim that
they are there only potentially, not as actual existents, clearly emphasises that
distinguishing mixts from elements must not endanger the distinction with
juxtapositions. Even Duhems is not, as we shall see, the happiest of formu-
lations. Joachims suggestion that the components, although contained in the
resultant [mixt], are contained there in altered form9 unfortunately creates an
impression, which must be removed, of conflict with the actuality/potentiality
distinction which is an essential part of the Aristotelian theory together with the
homogeneity requirement. But in trying to make this reasonably clear, partly by
emphasising considerations that would have been important for Duhem, partly
by pressing the standard logical distinction between subject and predicate, some
of the ideas traditionally associated with Aristotle fall by the wayside. For the
moment, however, let us return to Duhems clear and simple illustration. Sugar
and water disappear on dissolving, but the original sugar and water of sugared
water can be recovered by evaporation and condensation. Further chemical
separation would be required to reduce these mixts (which we call compounds)
to their elements. How Aristotelians envisaged the separation of sugar into
earth, water, air and firer0 raises difficulties for the modern reader who thinks
of an element as a basic kind of stuff, an Urbestandteil. Substantial steps in this
direction had been taken by the 17th century when Boyle was following what
was the standard practice of chemists in admitting a class of substances called
principles which, though not simple elements, are indecomposable . . . bodies
that the chemist is not able to resolve. I1 Lavoisier finally introduced the notion
of an element as whatever kind of substance is found to be indecomposable,
thus making the issue of the number and nature of the elements an empirical
matter. But as already hinted in allusion to Duhem, despite these and other

Op. cit., note 1, p. 14.

90p. cit., note 1, p. 15.
Cf. Metaphysics, VIII.5: There is. . . a certain problem over why it is that wine is not the matter
of vinegar, nor is it potentially vinegar, even though vinegar comes from it; . it is not the wine but
the water that is the matter of the vinegar. . All things that change into one another . . must
revert to their matter . . vinegar first turns to water and from there becomes wine, translated by
David Bostock, Aristotles Metaphysics, Books Z and H (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Bostock
suggests there is an unintended temporal implication here, and continues There is no more need for
an intermediate stage here (if wine is to come from vinegar) than there was in the change from wine
to vinegar. All that needs to be insisted upon is that neither is made of the other though there is a
common matter that both are made of (p. 278). It is argued in the paper that mixts cannot be said
to have water as a component element if this does not mean that the mixt can come from, or can
become, water. As for Aristotles initial problem in this passage, perhaps wine is not potentially
vinegar because this possibility is not encompassed by what Sarah Waterlow describes as the power
of the natural substance to attain structure . . there (being) only one type of change that depends
on the specific structure, namely that which results in the latters full development. Aristotle
identifies the behaviour that manifests substantial nature with a mere sub-class of all behavings of
which the substance in question is physically capable, Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotles
Physics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 3637.
Duhem, op. cit., note 3, p. 25.
254 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

differences that have arisen over two millennia, Joachim does perhaps overstate
the divergence when he says that the details of Aristotles theory are quite
remote from modern speculation.r2

II
Alteration for Aristotle, Joachim tells us, is in the last analysis a matter of the
mutual action of the elements inducing change in virtue of the contrariety of
their respective qualities, when one or other contrary quality prevails in the
conflict. l3 The fundamental qualities reduce to exactly four, forming two pairs
of contraries: moist and dry (or fluid and solid), and hot and cold (or rare and
dense). Considering the possible combinations in which these qualities can
occur, there are just four, since contraries are not of such a nature which
permits of their being coupled-for the same thing cannot be hot and cold, or
again, moist and dry.r4 As it will transpire, this must be understood in the sense
that the same thing cannot be all hot and all cold, or again, all moist and all dry.
What is hot and dry is fire; air is hot and moist, water is cold and moist, and
earth is cold and dry.
But it may happen that these qualities come together when bodies are mixed
in such a way that neither contrary completely prevails over the other, and the
result is something not entirely moist, nor completely dry, and not entirely hot,
nor completely cold. The result would be a mixt-something intermediate
between the absolute dryness of fire and the superlative moistness of air, and
between the absolute hotness of air and the superlative coldness of earth.
The fundamental qualities thus give way to dyadic relations hotter than,
dryer than, and so forth, where colder than is the converse of hotter than
and moister than the converse of dryer than. Fire is absolutely dry because
there is nothing dryer; it is superlatively dry, and so forth. This suggests that
dryer than be expressed by a dyadic predicate to which is reflexive and
transitive, in terms of which a relation n z,, p for 7~is as dry as p can be
defined as rr kDpp t,, z. Moister than, written kM, can be defined by

from which it follows that w D and x M, defined analogously, are coextensive:

whatever is as dry as K is also as moist as n. A second primitive kH, for is
hotter than, can be introduced as a reflexive and transitive relation, in terms of
which xH can be defined as before, together with its converse tc for colder
than and xc for as cold as. Further stipulations about the existence of upper
and lower limits are introduced in the form of an axiom
Op. cit., note 1, p. 17.
130p. cit., note 1, p. 81.
Aristotle, op. cit., note 7, 11.3.
Aristotelian Chemistry 255

together with a corresponding axiom imposing upper and lower bounds on 2 H.

The absolutely cold, or Cold for short, is the superlatively cold-which is as
cold as can be:

C(n) = Va(7T 2, o),

and similarly for H-superlatively hot or Hot, W-superlatively moist or

Moist, and D-superlatively dry or Dry. Finally, the elementary properties
F(ire), A(ir), W(ater) and E(arth) can be defined by

A@) = H(7c) A M(n)

W(n) E M(n) A C(n)

J!?(R)?5 c(X) A D(K).

III

Some measure of how well this matches Aristotles thought might be gauged
by comparison with the following passage.

The simple bodies, then, . . . make up two pairs belonging to two regions; for Fire and
Air form the body which is carried along towards the limit while Earth and Water
form the body which is carried along towards the centre; and Fire and Earth are
extremes and very pure, while Water and Air are intermediates and more mixed.
Further, the members of each pair are contrary to the members of the other pair,
Water being the contrary of Fire, and Earth of Air, for they are made up of different
qualities. However, since they are four, each is described simply as possessing a single
quality, Earth a dry rather than a cold quality, Water a cold rather than a moist, Air
a moist rather than a hot, and Fire a hot rather than a dry.15

This last sentence is presumably what Joachim had in mind when he wrote

And since Fire, most of all Elements, possesses the power of heating, it is to be
regarded as Hot rather than Dry. Since Water most possesses the property of making
cold, it is to be regarded as Cold rather than Moist. Since Earth of all Elements most
0~. cit., note 7, 11.3.
256 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

resists the modification of its outline, it is Dry rather than Cold. And lastly since Air
most readily adapts its shape to its continent, it is Moist (Fluid) rather than Hot.16

Now this would seem to amount to an argument for the inadequacy of the
definitions of the elements proposed above, except that what Joachim himself
says immediately beforehand

By combining these qualities two and two (of course eliminating the contradicting
combinations, Hot-Cold and Dry-Moist), we get four pairs of qualities: and each
pair characterizes one of the four elements. Thus, the Hot-Dry is Fire, . . .

-seems to be in agreement with the above definitions, and Joachim nowhere

rescinds these remarks. Certainly the preceding passage is not developed as an
argument against the definitions.
I will suggest a way this apparently ineffable Aristotelian thought might be
accommodated. But first let us turn to what Aristotle says in the penultimate
sentence about the elements standing as contraries. This situation is nicely
pictured by representing the different degrees of the two primitive relations by
positions along two adjacent sides of a square (as in Fig. 1). Any body
instantiating the properties represented by any one of the corners is an element.
Things which are superlatively cold are represented by points along the lower
side of the square. Perhaps Aristotle is to be interpreted as saying that only
things which are both absolutely cold and absolutely moist are pure water, but
other bodies instantiating the qualities represented by other points along the
lower side-all absolutely cold-are impure water: not pure water, but still
essentially water. Let us say they are watery. Similarly, what is superlatively dry
but less than absolutely cold is earthy, and so on for fiery and airy stuff.
Quantities of impure elementary stuff are not mechanical mixtures. It will
transpire that they are not really full-blooded mixts either, and might therefore
be called improper mixts.
Before turning to the way the fundamental qualities are related to space,
which Aristotle touches upon in the first sentence of the above passage, the
theory of mixing must be developed further. Mixing is a process in which:

The Elements act on one another, when they are brought into contact, in virtue of the
contrariety of their respective qualities. And the Matter, which underlies them all,
changes from one to another, according as one or the other contrary quality prevails
in the conflict. If, e.g. Fire and Air come into contact, the Moist in the Air and the Dry
in the Fire act on one another. And if the Moist prevails over the Dry, the Matter,
which (as Hot-Dry) was Fire, becomes Hot-Moist: i.e. Fire has been destroyed, and
Air has come into being.17

Thus the transformation of the elements is in principle possible. This involves

the change in qualities of matter in virtue of which it is one element to qualities,
160p. cit., note 1, p. 81.
17Joachim, op. cit., note 1, pp. 81-82.
 A(ir) D F(k)
M Fiery

M Watery D
W(ater) E(arth)

- dryer -

in this same matter, in virtue of which it is another element. A quantity of

matter R, which is fire (i.e. Hot and Dry) comes into contact with a quantity p
of matter which is air (i.e. Hot and Moist), and if ps moistness prevails over 7~s
dryness, then the quantity which is the sum of n and p becomes all (i.e.
homogeneously) Moist, and retaining the absolute hotness of each part,
therefore becomes air. To say that the fire has been destroyed does not imply,
then, as Duhems wording might be taken to suggest, that any matter has gone
out of existence. The same quantities of matter exist throughout the change.
And properties certainly do not come into and go out of existence. What was
fire has simply become air. Elementary properties are not timeless in the
Aristotelian scheme, but time-dependent features of quantities, and should
really be written as relations between quantities and times.
Aristotle envisaged another general possibility to which mixing might lead:
suppose that neither contrary quality is present in such overwhelming force as to
prevail completely over the other. Suppose that, as the result of the interaction, the
Moist becomes less moist and the Dry less dry-so that e.g. in place of eight degrees
of Moist and eight degrees of Dry, we have a resultant quality which may be called
indifferently four degrees Moist or four degrees Dry:-then we should have a
,&&Y . . . [But] this would be an imperfect .~i<zq, because the Hotness of the Fire and
the Hotness of the air would remain unaffected. In a complete ,&z< . . . all four
Elements would enter into combination, and all four qualities would be modified.
Moreover . . . besides the tempering of Hot by Cold and Dry by Moist, a genuine
chemical combination involves a further process in which the tempered Hot operates
on the Dry and Moist.18
Joachim, op cit., note 1, p. 82.
258 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

Modern speculation requires more of chemical combination than what seems

to be involved in this theory of mixts. A clear distinction is drawn between
chemical kinds and the basic phase properties of solid, liquid and gas. The law
of definite proportions, established at the beginning of the 19th century,
provided a criterion by which what are now called compounds are distinguished
from solutions (be they in the solid, liquid or gas phase). There does not even
seem to be anything in Aristotle corresponding to the somewhat older notion of
a saturated mixt, where any further addition of material of the same kind as one
of the components is not taken up into the mixt but remains merely juxtaposed
with it. Nevertheless, the Aristotelian notion of a mixt can still be regarded as
laying the broad foundations for a notion which has since been further
qualified.
A proper mixt is a quantity of matter which instantiates the qualities
represented by a point within the interior of the square. Such points represent
combinations of some less that superlative degree of hotness together with some
less than superlative degree of dryness without being watery or airy-i.e.
without minimal degrees of hotness or dryness either. A fundamental difficulty
with this doctrine is the providing of an adequate criterion for marking the
boundaries of the distinction between the transformation of elements and the
formation of mixts. Sometimes, one contrary quality prevails over the other and
eliminates it. On other occasions, proper mixts are formed in which neither
quality prevails, but each is moderated. As Joachim puts it,

the amounts of the Elements (or the intensifies of the contrary qualities which they
bring with them) must be balanced if they are to combine. . When the constituents
are present in reasonably equal amounts, the contrary qualities which they involve
will (by reciprocal Action and Passion) lose more or less of their extremeness, or a
greater or lesser number of their degrees of intensity.19

The notion of the amount of a substance which may be equal or not to another
stands in need of explanation. But leaving this issue aside for the moment, talk
of reasonably equal amounts does not sound much like a way of establishing
a discontinuous boundary between the action of a qualitys prevailing over and
its balancing with another quality. The idea of one quality prevailing over
another provided a source of perplexity which has attracted criticism of the sort
illustrated by the following passage from Boyle.

For whereas Aristotle tells us, that if a drop of wine be put into ten thousand
measures of water, the wine being overpowered by so vast a quantity of water will be
turned into it, he speaks to my apprehension, very improbably. For though one
should add to that quantity of water as many drops of wine as would a thousand
times exceed it all, yet by this rule the whole liquor should both be a crama, a mixture
of wine and water, wherein the wine would be predominant, but water only; since the

190p. cit., note 1, pp. 82-83.

Aristotelian Chemistry 259

wine being added but by a drop at a time, would still fall into nothing but water, and
consequently would be turned into it.20

But Boyle does not deny the attractions of the idea:

And if this would hold in metals too, twere a rare secret for goldsmiths, and refiners;
for by melting a mass of gold, or silver, and by but casting into it lead or antimony,
grain after grain, they might at pleasure, within a reasonable compass of time, turn
what quantity they desire, of the ignoble into the noble metalls.

As an argument against Aristotle, it might be said that this involves a premise

of doubtful relevance such as that nature is not bounteous. But clearly Boyle is
right, that the mixture will acquire the taste and colour that are associated with
wine, even though they are faint at first, and Aristotles theory rules this out.
Some solutions must acquire proportions in a certain range before the
properties of interest to us emerge with sufficient force to be noticeable by
simple methods. Perhaps we reserve names such as brass for solutions in which
proportions within an appropriate range are realized; but that does not mean
that a mixture of a smaller quantity of zinc in copper is not a solid solution.
Grammatical considerations about the meaning of ,uui& as a process notwith-
standing, it seems that Aristotle was reluctant to enter into the details of how
the process of mixing and its opposite, decomposition, are actually carried out
and of describing them. But it is difficult to understand how he could have
overlooked the objection Boyle raises.
Even supposing that the result of mixing depends on how it is done, this
would mean that the resulting quality of the mixed substance is not a state of
the matter in which it inheres-the quality is not independent of the particular
path of changes which leads to its realization. Some such connection with the
process of formation seems to be suggested by the last sentence of the last but
one passage of Joachims quoted above. Now there is some truth in the
observation that the qualities of material may be related to the particular way
they were brought about. Particular qualities of substances like glass and steel
which confer on them the specific properties of brittleness and strength which
suit them to the uses to which they are put are dependent on the processes by
which they were formed and subsequently treated, and not merely on the kinds
and proportion of the elements of which they are composed. But many familiar
substances are, for much of the time, in such a condition that their properties
are independent of the history of their formation. Certainly, chemical kinds are
understood in this way. And a diagram such as the square above represents the
states of bodies in this sense of combinations of qualities which are independent
of their history, and is appropriately likened to a state diagram representing
equilibrium states of bodies. It will be assumed henceforth that the theory of
mixts is a theory of the states of matter in this sense, and no consideration is
Robert Boyle, The Sceptical Chymist (1661; reprinted, London: Dent, 191 l), p. 81
260 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

given to the chemical kinetics of mixing. Boyles argument can be seen in this
light. The proportions of wine and water are what determine the state, the
chemical kind, of the mixture, and not the details of the process by which the
mixing is brought about. Accordingly, the Aristotelian discontinuity between
the prevailance of one quality over another and the balancing of contrary
qualities will be disregarded: the addition of a quantity of salt to water produces
brine, no matter how small the quantity of salt. Boyles argument will be
pressed home in somewhat more general form later.

IV
A more interesting notion, from the present perspective, mentioned by
Joachim is the feature of qualities possessing intensities in virtue of which they
achieve a balance. Unfortunately, Joachim has little to say about this beyond
using it as a way of expressing degrees of hotness or dryness. It seems to mean
much more to Duhem, who regarded the recognition, as fully acceptable,
measurable properties autonomous from mechanics and suitable for the
objective description of nature, of features such as temperature and pressure,
together with the other so-called intensive properties of thermodynamics, as a
reinstatement of an Aristotelian view of nature supposedly discredited during
the scientific revolution. In his discussion of Aristotelian physics, Duhem
explains that the degree of heat . . . is not contained, as a part of the whole, in
a more intense degree of heat.* Duhem is getting at the idea that intensive
properties are not additive, as extensive properties are said to be. The notion of
an extensive property is perhaps not always explained in thermodynamics texts
with all the clarity that might be desired. But the general idea seems to be that
if a body is exhaustively divided into non-overlapping spatial parts, then the
value of a certain extensive property for the whole body is equal to the
arithmetical sum of the values of the same property for each of these parts. An
intensive property, on the other hand, has the same value for the whole as for
each of its spatial parts.22 This, in thermodynamics, is a condition of possessing
intensive properties and being in a state at all. A body has a temperature only
if all its spatial parts have the same temperature. Now something very much like
it seems to be involved in Aristotles theory, for we saw earlier that it was
natural to describe the results of certain changes by saying that a quantity of
matter is all moist, or all hot or all air. To say that, for some property p,, that
n is all Q is just to say that p is a homogeneous predication of 7c, or that 72is
homogeneously q. It is not easy to see how an understanding of mixt kinds
which makes them dependent on their history of formation is compatible with
the thesis of the homogeneity of mixts.
Pierre Duhem, Levolution de la mkznique (Paris: A. Joanin, 1903; reprinted Paris: Vrin, 1992),
p. 8.
221discuss this distinction in more detail in Macroscopic Objects: An Exercise in Duhemian
Ontology, forthcoming in Philosophy of Science.
Aristotelian Chemistry 261

Interpreting the fundamental qualities as intensive in the sense Duhem gives

to the notion might be taken to suggest that some of the earlier conditions be
revised. For example, the reflexivity condition imposed on the primitives might
be strengthened along the lines

An alternative way of proceeding is to view the primitive relation hotter than

as homogeneous in a sense analogous to (1) namely

Together with reflexivity, stated in the normal way as rct nn, this would imply

Given the definition of %n, (2) implies

This in turn suggests, given an axiom analogous to (2) for 2 n, the introduction
of a property of being in a state at all defined by

thus making explicit provision for quantities undergoing some process and not
at equilibrium. But this plan comes to nothing given the reflexivity axiom as
stated, which implies that all quantities are in a state. Perhaps a restricted form
of reflexivity such as

would be more appropriate for a fuller theory than envisaged here, encompass-
ing processes.
In describing the general feature of intensive properties it was necessary to be
quite clear that spatial parts are at issue. But is it necessary to explicitly mention
the qualification spatial? Are parts necessarily spatial, or is it possible that a
quantity could be a proper part of another and yet occupy the same place?
How, in particular, does Aristotles theory of mixts stand on the question
whether the original quantities mixed occupy the same place in the resulting

?f. R+er, op. cit., note 6, p. 261, who also lays down an appropriate analogue for the
cumulative reference condition.
262 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

mixt? Boyle certainly thought that any such notion was absurd, for he
continued the passage quoted above as follows:

since a pint of wine, and a pint of water, amount to about a quart of liquor, it seems
manifest to sense, that these bodies doe not totally penetrate one another, as one
would have it; but that each retains its own dimensions; and consequently, that they
are by being mingled only divided into minute bodies, that do but touch one another
with their surfaces, as do the grains of wheat, rye, barley etc. in a heap of several1 sorts
of corn: and unless we say, that as when one measure of wheat, for instance, is
blended with a hundred measures of barely, there happens only a juxtaposition and
superficial contact betwixt the grains of wheat, and as many thereabouts of the grains
of barley; so when a drop of wine is mingled with a great deal of water, there is but
an apposition of so many vinous corpuscles to a correspondent number of aqueous
ones; unless I say this be said, I see not how that absurdity will be avoyded, whereunto
the Stoical notion of mistion (namely by ad&yuaz~,or confusion) was liable, according
to which the least body may be coextended with the greatest: since in a mixt body
wherein before the elements were mingled there was, for instance, but one pound of
water to ten thousand of earth, yet according to them there must not be the least part
of that compound that consisted not as well of earth, as water.24

If ball-bearing atomism is not to be presupposed from the outset, Boyles

assumption can be put by saying that a quantity p can only occupy a region
having a certain fixed volume, so that if the sum 7~up has a greater volume
than p alone would have, part of this greater volume is entirely that which p
would have, and the remainder that which 7~alone would have. Now would it
be so unreasonable to say that p might be more tenuously-less densely-
spread over space occupied by some other quantity of material, as the Stoics
would have it, just as the strength of an electric field is changed when the empty
space it extends over is filled with various kinds of matter? At all events, I
cannot see that the Aristotelian theory must be construed as denying the
possibility of cooccupancy. Although there seems to be nothing in the
Aristotelian theory of mixts that would be inconsistent with the hypothesis that
the original quantities occupy the same place when brought together to form a
mixt, there is equally nothing motivating the introduction of this hypothesis.
What is characteristic of the Stoic formulation of the cooccupancy hypoth-
esis is that the original quantities retain their elemental character. This serves to
emphasise what was pointed out at the beginning and should be clear now, that
the claim, characteristic of the Aristotelian theory, that component elements are
only potentially present in a mixt removes the possibility of understanding this
use of component straightforwardly in its ordinary sense, and raises the
question of the advisability of applying the term in this context at all. For the
elements are defined by the possession of at least one of the comparative
qualities superlatively, and proper mixts, by lack of any superlative degree of

240p. cit., note 20, p. 82.

Aristotelian Chemistry 263

any quality. Moreover, a mixt is homogeneous. So if a quantity of mud is a mixt

formed from a quantity 71of earth and a quantity p of water, then

(Mud(7r up) A d E 7z up) 3 Mud(o).

I.e. each part of any mud is mud, and therefore has properties inconsistent with
the properties of earth and of water, and so no mud is partly water and partly
earth. A second reason for not speaking of mixts as composed of elements, or
having elements as components, will be spelt out shortly. But on the issue of the
interpretation of parts, it should be clear that the Aristotelian theory provides
for an alternative way to the atomists of avoiding the conclusion that two
quantities of material occupy the same place. For definiteness of interpretation,
then, it will be assumed henceforth that distinct (separate) quantities occupy
distinct (separate) regions of space, and that parts are always to be understood
as spatial parts.
A correction to this last example should be made before proceeding further.
Since proper mixts are represented by points in the interior of the square, and
involve no superlative degrees of any quality, then if mud is a mixt it cannot be
considered to be derived from just two non-contrary elements like water and
earth. Joachim, as we saw, says that every mixt involves all four elements. But
it is not clear why a mixt cannot be considered to be derived from just three,
which would suffice to counter the extremes of both the primitive comparative
qualities. At all events, regarding mud as derived from earth, water and air does
not affect the substantial point of the last paragraph.

Speaking of the elements from which a mixt might be considered to have been
derived is more clearly consistent with the actual/potential distinction than talk
of components. Duhem suggested that a mixt actually formed by mixing certain
substances can be decomposed, yielding these original substances again. It was
pointed out above that the actual/potential distinction does not imply the
disappearance of any quantities of matter. But an original quantity rr of water
mixed with earth and air to form mud loses its property of being water. Then
there is no saying whether decomposition and reconstitution of the elements
will result in the same quantity n becoming water again or some other quantity.
All that can reasonably be required is that some part of the mud become water.
The present interpretation of quantities of material means that they retain their
identity through any change they undergo by virtue of the mereological criterion-
same parts, same whole. But there is no observable indication of which quantities,
presented after a process of mixt formation and decomposition, are identical
with which of those originally mixed.
264 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

Modern speculation since the end of the 18th century on chemical reactions
is based on the law of the conservation of mass, which would direct that the
quantity of water obtained after complete decomposition and recovery of the
parts be of equal mass to the original quantity of water. As Duhem puts it,

. . when contemporary science is constrained to transform the results of the

Aristotelian analysis, the changes that it brings are sometimes linked in such an exact
way with ancient ideas that they seem to complement and enrich them rather than
profoundly modifying them. Aristotle had seen that a mixt or a group of elements can
never be born without at the same time a mixt or a group of elements being
destroyed. . . . Modern chemistry completes and makes the principle precise by
showing us that the mass destroyed is always equal to the mass created.2s
But this is definitely an addition. It was Newton who introduced the concept of
mass, and the old concept of heaviness, explained in terms of the appropriate
place in the universe to which the uncompounded elements would place
themselves seems irrelevant to the characteristics of a mixt on the Aristotelian
view. Can anything be made of the notion of a measure of the amount of a given
quantity of material involved in mixture on the Aristotelian view? Although he
was evidently concerned with such questions as whether the part [will] show the
same ratio between its constituents as the whole,26 Aristotle himself seems to
have shown no interest in pressing matters so far. Accordingly, it would seem
that in pursuing this idea here a further step is taken away from the theory
which Aristotle actually developed. On the other hand, it does provide a way of
forging a link between otherwise puzzlingly unconnected features.
Let us first consider whether there is any appropriate Aristotelian analogue,
however weak, of the modern notion of a compositional formula like H,O.
Joachim and Duhem, if not Aristotle, speak of different degrees of hotness and
dryness, and these might well be taken to characterise different kinds of mixts.
A natural restriction to introduce at the outset is that there is a finite number
of distinctions among kinds of mixts. This might be taken to suggest, as
Joachim seems to, that the orderings of hotter and dryer things should be
considered discrete, generating a finite number of combinations of a degree of
hotness with a degree of dryness. Samples of various airy substances might then
serve as standards of specific degrees of hotness which could be labelled
H,, . . , H,, and various watery substances might serve as standards of specific
degrees of dryness which could be labelled D,, . . . , D,. A chemical formula
for each mixt might then be written in the form HiDi, with O<i<n, O<j<m, and
the expressions can also be used as predicates by writing HiD,{z).
Contrast this with the expression E,A,F,W, for a quatemary compound
which Bolzan 27 quotes approvingly from Joachim, who sees it as representing

25Op. cit., note 3, p. 183.

260p. cit., note 7, 1.10.
Op. cit., note 2, p. 141.
Aristotelian Chemistry 265

the proportions of component elements in the mixt flesh, much as we express

Water as H20.28 It is difficult to see the point of trying to maintain such a close
analogy with the modern notion of a compositional formula for those who raise
no objection to the transformation of the elements and regard them as
ephemeral as mixts themselves. What is proposed here as a more natural
Aristotelian notion of a chemical formula is only analogous to the modern
notion in suggesting a representation for a kind in terms of the relevant
properties suggested by the theory. The inappropriateness of this conception of
component elements will soon become more evident when we consider how a
measure of the amount of the element from which a mixt can be considered to
be derived might be based on a formula of the kind HiDj
The i degrees of hotness in HiDj might be considered to be derived from
quantities of superlatively hot and superlatively cold material in amounts
standing in the proportion (n - i): i, and from quantities of superlatively moist
and superlatively dry material in amounts standing in the proportionj: (m -1).
The discreteness of the qualities must be understood to mean that if a quantity
of superlatively cold elementary stuff were mixed with a quantity of superla-
tively hot elementary stuff in amounts standing in the ratio i: (n - z),then the
resulting mixt would be i degrees hot, but only further addition of sufficiently
much of a Cold element would have any effect in modifying the mixt by
reducing the hotness one degree. That is to say, proper parts of a given quantity
of elementary stuff may be of the same amount as the whole. Otherwise, the
ordering of the parts would have to be discrete, and this is difficult to
accommodate on the natural view of space as infinitely divisible and the
assumption that parts are spatial parts, or any other way of understanding the
Aristotelian conception of matter as continuous. But the assumption of
discreteness for hotter and dryer things is, as Boyles argument has it, difficult
to understand. For if the addition of any quantity of some elementary
substance less than sufficient to effect a change of one degree in a fundamental
quality is taken up by the mixt after coming to equilibrium, then it ceases to
be that element. So the addition of any further insufficient quantity of the
same element meets with no quantity of the element with which to jointly
effect a change of one degree. If there were component elements of mixts,
this particular problem might be circumvented, but only at the price of
abandoning the Aristotelian distinction between mixts and juxtapositions.
But since I cannot see how the latter can be coherently combined with the
doctrine of prevailing by stages, even if that should be Aristotelian too, I
suggest that the primitive comparative qualities be considered dense.29 A

Op cit., note 1, p.16, fn 4.

290r at least not necessarily discrete. There might not actually be a quantity whose degree of
some quality is intermediate between two given degrees. A proper formulation would have to take
account of the temporal factor, and is not pursued here.
266 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

finite number of mixt kinds must then be understood in terms of what is and
is not a perceptible difference from standard samples of airy and watery stuff:
chemicals are like colours.
Returning now to the ratios of stuffs with contrary superlative qualities, the
moist material which stands to the dry in the proportions j: (m -j) may be
partly water and partly air, or it may be entirely water or entirely air. The dry
material might also be partly earth and partly fire, or entirely one or the other.
The only constraint is that the dry and the moist material together contributes
hot and cold material in the ratio (n - i):i, so that any depletion of cold from
the air-water mix must be made good by a corresponding excess of earth in the
earth-fire mix.
A quantity of some mixt does not, therefore, have any unique decomposition
into component elements. This is the second reason for avoiding speaking of
mixts as having component elements.
Nevertheless, there might be other circumstances which do determine the
elemental decomposition of a specific quantity of a given kind of mixt. In the
passage quoted at the beginning of section III Aristotle speaks of fire and
earth as extreme and very pure, carrying bodies up or down, whereas air and
water are more mixed. This sense of mixture has not entered the present
considerations at all yet. How might the lightness or heaviness of bodies be
related to their elemental composition?
Heavy bodies might be said to fall because of their constituent earth, and to
rise because of their fire content. But speaking of constituent earth is, we have
seen, an unfortunate turn of phrase. Sarah Waterlow draws attention to yet
another reason for this. The essentially locamotory natures which Aristotle
attributes to the elements would threaten the stability of mixts as the elements
make off in different cosmic directions if they were actually present in the mixt.
But his solution poses a problem: it is implausible to hold that a compound
(mixt) wholly lacks the locomotory characteristics of all its elements. . . And
how is this to be explained except on the supposition that earth is not totally
absent, i.e. not merely potentially present . . , ?.30 Earth is, however, totally
absent from an Aristotelian mixt, and the problem must be resolved in a
different way.
As already explained, the present analysis concerns the states of bodies at
equilibrium. A quantity might not be at equilibrium, but falling, say, because a
previous violent motion removed it to a position from which its natural motion
is now restoring it to its equilibrium position. It is the equilibrium position
appropriate to the earth content of a particular quantity of a mixt HiDj that
must be considered to provide a further feature, over and above its chemical
constitution, determining the decomposition into its elements. Thus, what

30Waterlow, op. cit., note 10, p. 85.

Aristotelian Chemistry 261

might be called the chemical features determining the mixt kind are indepen-
dent of position (height), allowing that the same kind of mixt can be found
anywhere in space (or within the sublunar region). The chemical properties of
a mixt are independent of the physical aspects of material relating to position
in space. But a quantity of a mixt kind HiDi which is at equilibrium at a given
distance from the centre of the universe has a determinate quantity of earth in
its constitution or none at all because all the dryness is contributed by fire. (This
somewhat clumsy formulation is a consequence of the otherwise natural
mereological assumption that there is no null quantity.) If the determination
of the quantity of earth can be related to the purely chemical measure of
amount by virtue of position determining a balance between the opposing
forces of fire and earth, then the overall decomposition into elements can be
more definitely determined. Thus, suppose position, or rather height, deter-
mines an earth-to-fire ratio of p: q. Then we have a ratio of Hot (contributed by
air and fire) to Cold (contributed by water and earth) of (n - i): i, which might
be written

A+F n-i
=--.-. (3)
W+E i

Similarly, we have a Moist-to-Dry ratio arising from the four elements which
can be written

W+A j
=-.
E+F m-j

Together with the earth-to-fire ratio

E
-=- P
F q

definite ratios of water to air, water to earth and air to fire are thereby
determined.
Taking account of locomotory powers thus resolves the indefiniteness which
was the basis of the second reason for not speaking of the component elements
of a mixt. It might therefore be said that a mixt can be considered to be
decomposable (in principle-it remains, as the history of chemistry shows, to
explain how) into, and perhaps even to be derived from, definite quantities of
elementary stuff. Homogeneity remains a sufficient reason for not speaking of
elemental components in terms of what is in, as distinct from what might
become of, the mixt.
268 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

VI

Seeing the relevance of heaviness and lightness in this way might be

considered to give some account of what Aristotle says in the first sentence of
the passage from II.3 of De generatione et corruptione quoted above at the
beginning of Section III. It addresses the fundamental problem . . . of the
conceptual relationship between the theory that defines fire etc. as Hot-Dry
etc., and that which defines them by reference to natural places without having
to raise Solmsens question Has Aristotle his own version of the wave/particle
problem?31 even if it does raise quantitative issues foreign to Aristotle. But
other aspects of the Aristotelian picture have been sacrificed. The doctrine of
the prevailence of one of a pair of contraries over the other was abandoned, and
with that the mode of transformation of the elements described by Joachim.
The leading idea has been the homogeneity of mixts emphasised by Duhem, and
this has in turn led to the predominance here of the condition of equilibrium or
the state of matter. (The process by which a mixt is actually formed has been
laid aside here for separate treatment rather than abandoned altogether.) The
homogeneity of mixts precludes any natural understanding of the idea of
components of mixts on pain of contradiction, and Duhem, we saw, takes
homogeneity to imply that the elements no longer have any actual existence.
They exist there only potentially (my emphasis). But what can they be?
Quantities exist both before and after mixing, as well as while parts of a mixt,
and make no call for qualifications of potential existence. A reconciliation of
this idiom with what Aristotle says might be sought, however, by taking him to
be looking for a formulation which retains the copula, allowing him to speak of
what the mixt is. In this sense, it is possibly earth and fire (say). Here we have
a de re modal predication of the stuff of the mixt, i.e. of a quantity of material.
But this formulation is at best obscure. That which after decomposition is a
quantity (the greatest) of the same kind as one of the original quantities from
which the mixt was derived may well not be identical with that original
quantity. What is possible for a mixt is merely that some of its parts may
become elements; there are no mutually separate parts uniquely capable of
being any particular kind of element. It-the mixt-is not both possibly all
earth and possibly all fire. And what is not all earth is not earth, what is not all
fire is not fire, and so on. Duhems sugared water is possibly partly water and
partly sugar. But there is no saying which part is uniquely possibly water and
which uniquely possibly sugar. 32 If it was acceptable for Aristotle that some
part of the mixt may become water when other parts may equally well become
Waterlow, op. cit., note 10, p. 87, fn.
32Stated in terms of the theory of mass predicates, what is possible is the mass disjunction of
being water and being sugar. Mass disjunction involves existential quantification over the parts, but
this existential quantification cannot be moved outside the scope of the possibility operator. There
are no two mutually separate and jointly exhaustive parts of the sugared water one of which is
possibly water and the other possibly sugar.
Aristotelian Chemistry 269

water instead, it is understandable that such indeterminism in response to

conditions inducing decomposition might be regarded as a weakness.33 But
however this may be, it brings me to my third reason for not speaking of
component or constituent elements of Aristotelian mixts. Although there may
be a sense in which a mixt might be considered to be derived from, or
decomposable into, elements, they are not present in the mixt, not even
potentially: of no parts of the mixt is it true that they are possibly of one or
other elemental kind. The possibility of a determinate decomposition discussed
in the last section concerns determinate quantities in the sense of definite
amounts or measures, and not the sense of quantity used here to describe
values of the variables a, p, and so on.
The prime purpose of this study has been to establish a connection with
phenomenological thermodynamics as Duhem conceived it rather than provide
a comprehensive and consistent interpretation of what Aristotle actually said.
But given the allusions Aristotles commentators make to modern chemistry,
the problems discussed here may have some interest for establishing of a
coherent understanding of Aristotle himself.

Acknowledgements-I am grateful for comments on an earlier draft from Per-Erik Malmnls and an
anonymous referee. Research on which the paper is based was supported by the Swedish
Humanistisk-samhallsvetenskapliga forskningsradet.

33A view more like the Stoic conception of mixture is offered in the article mentioned in note 22.
Whether some alternative formulation can be found which does not rely on the predication of a
distinct domain of quantities persisting through change-for example, in terms, of states applying
to spatial regions at various times-remains to be seen. Note that spatial regions considered in the
traditional Newtonian way persist through time.