Stolen Deposit Lawsuit

Case 1:17-cv-01580 Document 1 Filed 08/04/17 Page 1 of 17
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SEAN SMITH and ERIN WRONA

3673 Upton Street N.W.
Case No. 17-cv-1580
Washington, D.C. 20008
Plaintiffs,
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
v.
FEDERAL TITLE & ESCROW COMPANY

5335 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Suite 700,
CLOSE IT! TITLE SERVICES, INC.
TODD EWING
MELINA SCHIFFLETT
8217 Claremont Woods
Alexandria, Virginia 22309
JMZ EQUITIES, LLC
100 4th Avenue S., #404,
St. Petersburg, Florida 33701, and
JEFF ZORBO
100 4th Avenue S., #404,
St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
Defendants.
COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs Sean Smith and Erin Wrona bring this action against Defendants Federal Title
& Escrow Company (Federal Title), Close It! Title Services, Inc. (Close It!), Todd Ewing
(Ewing), Melina Schifflett (Schifflett), JMZ Equities LLC (JMZ Equities), and Jeff Zorbo
(Zorbo) for monetary damages, and, on information and belief allege as follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. Plaintiffs claims arise from the theft of $1.57 million that was intended to be
used by Plaintiffs to purchase a home located in Washington, D.C.
2. Plaintiffs contracted with Federal Title to conduct closing services, including
holding funds in escrow, in connection with their real estate purchase. Federal Title, Close It!,
and Melina Schifflett, an employee of Federal Title and/or Close It!, instructed Plaintiffs to
complete two wire transactions totaling over $1.77 million. Plaintiffs received two separate wire
confirmations via email to ensure Federal Title had received the funds. However, when
Plaintiffs arrived at Federal Title for closing, Ewing, the attorney conducting the closing,
informed Plaintiffs that Federal Title did not have possession of $1.57 million of the funds
Plaintiffs had wired.
3. The wiring instructions sent by Federal Title directed Plaintiffs to wire money to
an account in the name of Federal Title and Escrow Company, with further credit to JMZ
Equities, LLC, which is a limited liability company wholly-owned by Jeff Zorbo.
4. As a direct and proximate cause of the actions and inactions of Defendants,
Plaintiffs have been damaged in excess of $1.57 million.
PARTIES
5. Plaintiffs Sean Smith and Erin Wrona are married and are residents of the District
of Columbia.
6. Defendant Close It! Title Services, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the District of Columbia, with its principal place of business located at 5335
Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20015.
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7. Defendant Federal Title & Escrow Company is a title company organized and
existing under the laws of the District of Columbia, with its principal place of business located at
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20015. Upon information and
belief, Federal Title & Escrow Company is the trade name for Close It! Title Services, Inc.
8. Defendant Todd Ewing is an attorney licensed in the District of Columbia. Mr.
Ewing is Federal Titles founder. Mr. Ewing is also a partner in the law firm Tobin, OConnor
& Ewing, which shares office space with the Federal Title.
9. Upon information and belief, Defendant Melina Schifflett is a settlement
coordinator at Federal Title and holds a title producer license from the Commonwealth of
Virginia. Upon information and belief, Ms. Schifflett is employed by Federal Title in the District
of Columbia.
10. Defendant JMZ Equities, LLC is a limited liability company organized under the
laws of the State of Florida with its principal place of business located at 100 4th Avenue S.,
#404, St. Petersburg, Florida 33701.
11. Defendant Jeff Zorbo is the registered agent and sole owner of JMZ Equities,
LLC. Upon information and believe, Zorbo resides at 100 4th Avenue S., #404, St. Petersburg,
Florida 33701.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
1964 and 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1367. Plaintiffs assert causes of action arising under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and its state law claims are part of the same
case or controversy.
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13. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1965 and 28
U.S.C. 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred.
14. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Federal Title, Close It!, and Ewing
because they reside in the District of Columbia. The Court has personal jurisdiction over
Schifflett because she is employed in the District of Columbia and committed the tortious and
criminal acts in the District of Columbia. The Court has personal jurisdiction over JMZ Equities,
LLC and Jeff Zorbo because the acts committed to defraud Plaintiffs through their conspiracy
and corrupt practices were committed in the District of Columbia.
FACTS
15. On or about May 3, 2017, Plaintiffs entered into a sales contract to purchase a
home located at 3673 Upton Street, N.W., Washington D.C. 20008. The following day,
Plaintiffs contracted with Federal Title to perform closing services for the purchase of the home.
The agreed upon purchase price of the home was $1,738,750.00.
16. On May 4, 2017, Schifflett emailed Plaintiffs and introduced herself as their
settlement coordinator from Federal Title and congratulated Plaintiffs on the purchase of their
new home.
17. On the same day, Plaintiffs were instructed via email from Federal Title
specifically, from Schifflettto wire the earnest money deposit to Federal Title for Federal Title
to hold in escrow.
18. Plaintiffs complied with Federal Titles instructions and directed their financial
institution to wire $200,000.00 to Federal Title.
4
19. Later that day, Plaintiffs received an email confirmation from Federal Title
confirming that the earnest money deposit in the amount of $200,000.00 had been received.
20. On May 8, 2017, Plaintiffs received an email forwarding a request from Schifflett
to wire the final closing amount to Federal Title for Federal Title to hold in escrow.
21. Attached to the email was a settlement statement containing all the pertinent
details regarding Plaintiffs real estate transaction. The settlement statement showed a credit for
the $200,000.00 earnest money deposit and showed a remaining balance owed of $1,572,097.70.
22. Also attached to the email was a memo from Schifflett at Federal Title that
contained wiring instructions for the balance due. The name on the Chase bank account to which
the funds were to be transferred was Federal Title and Escrow Company with further credit to
JMZ Equities, LLC.
23. Upon receipt of the email with wiring instructions, Smith contacted his financial
institution, Morgan Stanley, about wiring the remaining funds.
24. Prior to completing the wire transaction, Smith emailed Schifflett to inquire why
the bank account number listed on the wiring instructions was different from the bank account
number where the earnest money deposit had been wired. Smith wanted to confirm that the
wiring instructions contained the correct bank account number.
25. Schifflett replied to Smiths email and advised him that Federal Title used
different accounts for different amounts.
26. In reliance upon on Schiffletts assurances, Smith directed his financial institution
to wire the funds to Federal Title in the amount of $1,572,097.70.
27. On May 9, 2017, Plaintiffs received an email from Schifflett confirming that
Plaintiffs funds had been received.
5
28. Following the wire transfer, Schifflett communicated with Plaintiffs regarding
schedule changes and other logistical updates regarding closing.
29. Prior to closing, neither Schifflett nor anyone at Federal Title ever reached out
after May 8, 2017, to provide any other directions about wiring funds.
30. Based on all the circumstances, Plaintiffs reasonably believed the entire purchase
price was being held in escrow by Federal Title pursuant to the services Defendants contracted to
perform.
31. On June 19, 2017, Plaintiffs reported to Federal Titles offices located at 5335
Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 700, Washington, D.C., for closing. When Plaintiffs arrived, no
one asked them about the funds to close the transaction.
32. Ewing conducted the closing.
33. Ewing directed Plaintiffs to sign a number of documents to effectuate the real
estate transaction.
34. Midway through the closing, Ewing asked Plaintiffs about wiring the funds for
closing. Plaintiffs notified him that they had already wired the funds.
35. Ewing left the room. After discussions with Federal Title personnel, Ewing
returned and informed Plaintiffs that Federal Title did not have the funds in escrow.
36. Ewing then told Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs email had been hacked.
37. Ewing told Plaintiffs that the only way to close the real estate transaction was to
come up with an additional $1.57 million. Distraught over the shocking turn of events, the
apparent loss of $1.57 million, and the information conveyed by Federal Trial that this happened
as a result of Plaintiffs being hacked, Plaintiffs and their family wired an additional $1.57 million
to close the transaction.
6
38. The FBI was contacted immediately. It was determined that over the course of
the approximately six weeks since Plaintiffs executed the final wire transfer, their $1.5 million
had been wired out of the Chase account to which Plaintiffs had wired the money.
39. Several days later, Ewing contacted Smith and stated that that it was not Plaintiffs
who had been hacked. Instead, Ewing claimed that Federal Titles email had been hacked, such
that someone had supposedly commandeered Federal Titles computer servers, learned about
Plaintiffs transaction, and sent, from Schiffletts email account, the wiring instructions that led
to the theft of Plaintiffs funds. Neither Federal Title nor Ewing has provided any evidence of
such a hacking.
40. Plaintiffs have been unable to recover the $1.57 million that was wired pursuant
to Federal Titles instructions.
41. Upon information and belief, the theft of Plaintiffs money was accomplished by
an enterprise formed by Federal Title, Close It!, Schifflett, JMZ Equities, and Zorbo.
Defendants enterprise is engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity for the purpose of
affecting interstate commerce. As a result of Defendants actions, Plaintiffs have been injured.
42. Upon information and belief, Defendants created a scheme to defraud Plaintiffs
for the purpose of obtaining money through fraudulent escrow accounts. Defendants used wire
communications in furtherance of the scheme by wiring the money they defrauded from
Plaintiffs out of the account.
43. Upon information and belief, Defendants committed multiple acts of wire fraud in
furtherance of this scheme. Defendants wired the money they defrauded from Plaintiffs out of
the account over a substantial period of time in multiple transactions.
7
44. Upon information and belief, Defendants committed more than two acts of
racketeering activity by sending fraudulent electronic communications and committing multiple
wire transactions. These acts were related and continuous. Defendants committed these acts to
steal money from Plaintiffs.
45. Upon information and belief, Defendants continue to mislead Plaintiffs about the
true location of their money, and have used interstate wire communications to fraudulently
conceal the location of the money.
46. The pattern of racketeering is an intentional and knowing series of acts of use of
interstate wire communications that began in early May 2017 and continues to this day.
COUNT I
Violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c))
(against all Defendants)
47. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation set forth in the preceding
paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
48. Defendants have formed an enterprise engaged in and whose activities affect
interstate commerce. Defendants are employed by or associated with the enterprise.
49. Defendants agreed to and did conduct and participate in the conduct of the
enterprises affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity and for the unlawful purpose of
intentionally defrauding Plaintiff.
50. Pursuant to and in furtherance of their fraudulent scheme, Defendants committed
multiple related acts of wire fraud.
51. The acts of wire fraud set forth above constitute a pattern of racketeering activity
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1961(5).
8
52. Defendants have directly and indirectly conducted and participated in the conduct
of the enterprises affairs through the pattern of racketeering and activity described above, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c).
53. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants racketeering activities and
violations of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), Plaintiffs have been injured by the loss of their $1.5 million
and other financial losses incurred as a result of the theft of their money.
54. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to judgment against the Defendants for a sum
including actual damages, treble damages, and attorneys fees.
COUNT II
Conversion
56. Defendants intentionally deprived Plaintiffs of its rights in the $1.57 million by
directing Plaintiffs to wire the funds to an account allegedly held by Federal Title, allegedly
holding them in escrow for Plaintiffs benefit in the real estate transaction, and then refusing to
use those funds to close the real estate transaction as they were intended.
57. Defendants unlawfully exercised ownership, dominion, or control over Plaintiffs
funds in repudiation of Plaintiffs rights.
58. Defendants actions were the proximate cause of Plaintiffs loss of $1.57 million
to cybercriminals and Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs in the amount of this loss, plus punitive
damages, attorneys fees, accrued interest, costs, and the expenses of this action.
9
COUNT III
Civil Conspiracy
paragraphs as if fully set forth therein.
60. Upon information and belief, Defendants acted in concert to commit an unlawful
actnamely, the theft of Plaintiffs funds.
61. Upon information and belief, Defendants entered into an agreement to inflict an
injury upon Plaintiffsnamely, the loss of $1.5 million.
62. Upon information and belief, as a result of Defendants agreement and resulting
actions, Plaintiffs suffered damages.
63. Upon information and belief, Defendants agreement and their actions taken in
furtherance of that agreement were willful and malicious.
64. Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs in the amount of their loss, plus punitive
COUNT IV
Negligence
(against Federal Title, Close It!, Ewing, and Schifflett)
(in the alternative to RICO, Conversion, and Civil Conspiracy)
66. Federal Title and its employees and agents assumed a duty to Plaintiffs to act as
escrow agent and as settlement agent for the sale of 3673 Upton Street, NW, Washington D.C.
20008.
67. Federal Title and its employees and agents breached their duty to act as escrow
agent and as settlement agent by not enacting adequate security protocols. Specifically, upon
10
information and belief, Defendants failed to take even basic security measures to secure their
email accounts, including:
a. Using an email address that requires additional forms of authentication;
b. Using digital, encrypted signatures for messages;
c. Using encrypted communication with clients; and
d. Frequently changing passwords.
68. Further, Defendants did not follow-up with Plaintiffs to inquire about the funds to
close the transaction. Rather, after the money was wired, Defendants did nothing for six weeks
until Plaintiffs arrived at closing and Defendants stated they had not received the funds.
69. Defendants negligence in securing their email accounts and not following up or
having a policy of orally confirming large monetary transfers was the proximate cause of
Plaintiffs loss of $1.57 million.
70. Cybercrime, and this alleged hacking scheme in particular, are well-known risks
within the real estate industry. Real estate trade associations have warned title companies and
realtors to advise customers that they will never send wiring instructions by email. Defendants
did not follow this practice.
71. Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs in the amount of their loss, plus punitive
COUNT V
Breach of Contract
(against Federal Title and Close It!)
paragraph as though fully set forth herein.
11
73. Federal Title and its employees and agents entered into a contract with Plaintiffs
as escrow agent and settlement agent for Plaintiffs purchase of 3673 Upton Street, NW,
Washington D.C. 20008.
74. Upon information and belief, Federal Title and its employees and agents breached
their obligations under the contract to act as escrow agent and as settlement agent by converting
Plaintiffs funds or by failing to enact proper security measures.
75. Upon information and belief, if Defendants did not intentionally convert the
funds, then they failed to take even basic security measures to secure their email accounts,
including:
e. Using an email address that requires additional forms of authentication;
f. Using digital, encrypted signatures for messages;
g. Using encrypted communication with clients; and
h. Frequently changing passwords.
76. Further, Defendants did not follow-up with Plaintiffs to inquire about the funds.
Rather, after the money was wired, Defendants did nothing for six weeks until Plaintiffs arrived
at closing and Defendants stated they had not received the funds.
77. Defendants breach of contract to protect Plaintiffs funds was the direct and
proximate cause of Plaintiffs loss of $1.57 million. Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs in the
amount of this loss, plus punitive damages, attorneys fees, accrued interest, costs, and the
expenses of this action.
COUNT VI
Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
(against Federal Title and Close It!)
12
79. Defendants willfully acted to frustrate the purposes of the contract for escrow and
closing services by failing to protect Plaintiffs financial information and funds wired into
escrow.
80. Defendants breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to protect
Plaintiffs interests was the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiffs loss of $1.57 million.
Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs in the amount of this loss, plus punitive damages, attorneys
fees, accrued interest, costs, and the expenses of this action.
COUNT VII
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
(against Federal Title, Close It!, and Ewing)
82. Defendants had a fiduciary duty to protect the Plaintiffs financial information
and assets and to hold the funds for the real estate transaction in escrow. Defendants breached
this duty by converting Plaintiffs funds.
83. Alternatively, Defendants duty required them to adopt reasonable and necessary
measures to safeguard their email accounts and computer system against intrusion by
cybercriminals. Defendants ignored this duty by failing to adopt even the most basic safeguards
against unauthorized intrusion. Defendants acts and/or omissions permitted cybercriminals to
hack Schiffletts email account and gain access to Schiffletts communications with Plaintiffs.
As a result of this access, the cybercriminals were able to impersonate Schifflett and deceive
Plaintiffs into authorizing their bank to wire $1.57 million into a bank account controlled by the
cybercriminals.
84. Defendants breach of their fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs was the direct and
proximate cause of Plaintiffs loss of $1.57 million. Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs in the
13
amount of this loss, plus punitive damages, attorneys fees, accrued interest, costs, and the
expenses of this action.
COUNT VIII
Legal Malpractice
(against Ewing)
86. Ewing, presented himself as a specialist in real estate law who had supervised and
conducted many transactions for the sale of real property in Washington, D.C.
87. As the attorney completing Plaintiffs closing, Ewing had the duty to protect
Plaintiffs assets, confidential information, and legal interests that were implicated in the
transactions required to purchase the home, and not to convert his own clients funds. Since
Ewing and/or his agents intended to conduct these transactions electronically, by emails and wire
transfers, rather than in person meetings or telephone calls, Ewing had the further duty to secure
his email account and computer system against intrusion by cybercriminals. As a legal
professional who regularly performed and/or supervised large financial transactions that were
conducted electronically, Ewing should have been aware of the danger of cybercrime and
imposture.
88. To represent Plaintiffs competently and protect him from cyber and other forms of
crime, Ewing had a duty to take reasonable and necessary security precautions, such as the
installation of appropriate protective software and the use of two-factor authentication. Ewing
had a duty to take measures including, but not limited to, the following:
i. Reasonable measures to secure Ewings client files, and communications
with clients;
14
ii. Reasonable measures to secure Ewings email account and computer,
including the data contained within them, from unauthorized third parties;
iii. Reasonable measures to prevent Ewings email account from being used
by unauthorized third parties;
iv. A strict policy of orally confirming instructions for the electronic transfer
of funds belonging to clients. This policy should include advance
notification to clients that funds should not be transferred unless Ewing
orally confirmed any emailed instructions;
v. Oral confirmation, following the electronic transfer of funds, to establish
that the funds were actually received by the intended party;
vi. The immediate investigation of any incident involving crime or
cybercrime, to determine its cause, its perpetrator, and the possibility of
remedying or mitigating any loss; and
vii. The preservation of all Electronically Stored Information (ESI).
89. Further, Ewing had a duty to provide a certain standard of representation to
Plaintiffs, which he failed to do, including, but not limited to:
viii. Providing competent representation;
ix. Acting with reasonable diligence and promptness, and not neglecting
matters;
x. Maintaining confidentiality of information and communications; and
xi. Preservation of client funds and property.
90. If Defendants did not accomplish the conversion of Plaintiffs funds acting in
concert through the above-alleged conspiracy, then as a result of Ewings failure to take any of
the aforementioned precautionary measures, cybercriminals were able to hack Federal Titles
15
email system and gain access to communications with Plaintiffs. The cybercriminals were then
able to impersonate Schifflett and Federal Title and mislead Plaintiffs into wiring the $1.57
million to the erroneous account purportedly controlled by cybercriminals on May 8, 2017. If
Defendants own version of the facts is accurate, Defendants had no communication with
Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs bank and did not realize the money was erroneously sent until the parties
arrived at closing on June 19, 2017.
91. If Ewing had initially acted competently and taken reasonable and necessary steps
to secure Federal Titles email system, the email account would not have been hacked and
Plaintiffs would have purchased the home with their original funds. If Ewing had eventually
acted competently by noticing that the email had been hacked and that Plaintiffs payment was
being transferred to an erroneous account, or if Ewing had attempted to orally confirm the proper
receipt of Plaintiffs deposited funds, Plaintiffs could have acted to cut off the funds to the
erroneous account and the stolen funds would have been recovered. Ewing, however, acted
recklessly, without concern for his clients funds, was ignorant to the threat of cybercrime, and
did nothing to protect his clients information and assets from this form of fraud.
92. If Defendants did accomplish the conversion of Plaintiffs funds acting in concert
through the above-alleged conspiracy, then Ewing breached his duty to his clients through his
involvement and/or failure to prevent the conspiracy.
93. Ewings disregard of his duty to protect his clients assets and information was a
direct and proximate cause of Plaintiffs loss of $1.57 million to cybercriminals and Ewing is
liable to Plaintiffs in the amount of this loss, plus punitive damages, attorneys fees, accrued
interest, costs, and the expenses of this action.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to:
a. Order Defendants to pay Plaintiffs compensatory damages of $1.57 million;
b. Order Defendants to pay Plaintiffs treble damages pursuant to RICO;
c. Order Defendants to pay Plaintiffs punitive damages for conversion and civil
conspiracy;
d. Order Defendants to pay Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys fees, accrued interest,
costs, and the expenses of this action; and
e. Order such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Michael S. Nadel

Michael S. Nadel (D.C. Bar #470144)
Jennifer B. Routh (D.C. Bar #1032060)
MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
500 North Capitol Street, NW
(202) 756-8000
Counsel for Plaintiffs Sean Smith and Erin Wrona
17

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Case 1:17-cv-01580 Document 1 Filed 08/04/17 Page 1 of 17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SEAN SMITH and ERIN WRONA

FEDERAL TITLE & ESCROW COMPANY

NATURE OF THE ACTION

used by Plaintiffs to purchase a home located in Washington, D.C.

2. Plaintiffs contracted with Federal Title to conduct closing services, including

Plaintiffs had wired.

Equities, LLC, which is a limited liability company wholly-owned by Jeff Zorbo.

4. As a direct and proximate cause of the actions and inactions of Defendants,

Plaintiffs have been damaged in excess of $1.57 million.

Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20015.

8. Defendant Todd Ewing is an attorney licensed in the District of Columbia. Mr.

9. Upon information and belief, Defendant Melina Schifflett is a settlement

#404, St. Petersburg, Florida 33701.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

and corrupt practices were committed in the District of Columbia.

The agreed upon purchase price of the home was $1,738,750.00.

institution to wire $200,000.00 to Federal Title.

JMZ Equities, LLC.

institution, Morgan Stanley, about wiring the remaining funds.

wiring instructions contained the correct bank account number.

different accounts for different amounts.

to wire the funds to Federal Title in the amount of $1,572,097.70.

Plaintiffs funds had been received.

schedule changes and other logistical updates regarding closing.

one asked them about the funds to close the transaction.

32. Ewing conducted the closing.

to close the transaction.

to Federal Titles instructions.

Defendants enterprise is engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity for the purpose of

Plaintiffs out of the account.

the account over a substantial period of time in multiple transactions.

racketeering activity by sending fraudulent electronic communications and committing multiple

steal money from Plaintiffs.

conceal the location of the money.

paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

interstate commerce. Defendants are employed by or associated with the enterprise.

intentionally defrauding Plaintiff.

50. Pursuant to and in furtherance of their fraudulent scheme, Defendants committed

multiple related acts of wire fraud.

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1961(5).

violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c).

including actual damages, treble damages, and attorneys fees.

paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

57. Defendants unlawfully exercised ownership, dominion, or control over Plaintiffs

funds in repudiation of Plaintiffs rights.

paragraphs as if fully set forth therein.

actnamely, the theft of Plaintiffs funds.

injury upon Plaintiffsnamely, the loss of $1.5 million.

actions, Plaintiffs suffered damages.

furtherance of that agreement were willful and malicious.

paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

email accounts, including:

a. Using an email address that requires additional forms of authentication;