PIL Finals Reviewer 2009B

Public international law finals reviewer 0
Public international law
Finals reviewer
PROF. HARRY ROQUE
* Bok * Ceejay * Tif * Gem * Tin *
This Finals Reviewer would not have been possible without the help of
the following:
~ Lora ~ PJ ~ Carol ~ Jerome ~ Ben ~ Cathe ~ Easter ~ Mike ~ Marco ~

Dave ~
UPLAW 2009B
Uplaw 2009b Always will b

I. IN GENERAL1
How is international law defined in the light of developments in international legal relations since the end of the
Second World War?
International law is a body of legal principles, norms and processes which regulates the relations of States and other
international persons, and governs their conduct affecting the interests of the international community as a whole.
II. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Art. 38, ICJ Statute:

1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it,
shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree
thereto.
Article 53, 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties

Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)
- A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the
What
purposes
are theof sources
the presentof international
Convention, a law?
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
As identified in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, these sources are as follows:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by contesting States;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; and
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
Sources of law refer to norms derived from international conventions or treaties, customs, and general principles of law. The
distinctive character of these norms is that they are created, or they acquire binding effect through the methods pointed above.
Treaty and custom are the primary sources of international law. While a treaty is a legal instrument which constitutes a
material source of norms, treaty- making is a norm- creating process, a method of formalizing the consent of States by which
they intend to be bound by the treaty. The formation of custom is as well as a norm- creating method. A formal source of
customary norms.
A number of writers have distinguished formal sources from material sources of international law. What is the
distinction?
Formal sources consist of the methods and procedures by which norms are created, and material sources are the substantive
evidence of the existence of norms. A rule, for example, will be considered legally binding as customary norm or custom on
account of the process or method by which it was created through the formation of general practice accepted as law. Hence,
custom as a norm- creating process is a formal source of law. Its content in terms of state practice arising from a sense of
legal duty is its material source.
The material sources supplies the substance of the rule to which the formal sources gives the force and nature of law.
What are the elements of international custom?

The elements of custom or customary international norm are :
1. general practice, characterized by uniformity and consistency
2. opinion juris sive necessitates, or recognition of the practices that are legally binding
State practice as an element of customary law must be both extensive and virtually uniform.(North Sea Case) Some degree
of uniformity is required. (Anglo- Norwegian case) In the Asylum case, it considers general practice as constant and uniform
usage practised by States in question. But in any event, universality of practice is not required.
1
Thanks to Bok, PJ, and Lora for this part.
Repetition of practice or actions of states is necessary. A customary norm of international law arises in consequence of the
repeated action of states. The element of repetition is basic to the formation of a rule of conduct. In the majority of instances
the repetition of specific actions in analogous situations can lead to the consolidation of such practice as a rule of conduct.
According to Judge Hudson: elements which must be present before a principle of international custom can be found to be
established:
a. concordant practice by a number of states with reference to a type of situation falling within the domain of
international relations
b. continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of time
c. conception that the practice is required by or consistent with prevailing international law
d. general acquiescence in the practice by other states.
How is opinion juris understood?

In the formation of international law norms through custom, States create law by what they do in practice or by their conduct.
Opinio Juris means that in doing so, they must believe that the practice or conduct is obligatory. They do so for the reason that
the practice is required by law, and not merely because of courtesy or political expediency.
Are judicial decisions and teaching of publicists sources of international law?

They are not sources of law as such. They are merely subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. They are
regarded as evidence of norms of international law. They are the means by which the rules of law may be verified. In other
words, they may be regarded as evidence of law.
What is a jus cogens norm?

A jus cogens or peremptory or is a norm which States cannot derogate or deviate from in their agreements. It is a mandatory
norm and stands on a higher category than a jus dispositivum norm which States can set aside or modify by agreement.
In general, how do norms of international law come into being?

They are created by States through definite norm- creating methods accepted or recognized by them as means of expressing
their consent as to the binding effect of those norms. Hence, international law is based on their normative consent.
The methods of creating or recognizing norms are referred to as sources of law. By means of treaty or convention and custom,
States create or recognize norms as binding law. Norms created by treaty are on the whole called conventional international
law; those by custom are called customary international law.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni (1949)

Kuroda, the commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the RP during WWII, was charged before the AFP
formed Military Commission, for having unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as such commander to
control the operations of members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war. Kuroda contests
the legality of of Executive Order No. 68 which established the National War Crime Office to prosecute those who have
offended war crimes. Kuroda argues that since the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare, he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international.
RP Consti. adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. EO68 and prescribing
rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals is valid and constitutional since Art. 2 of our Constitution
provides in its section 3, that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. So even without local legislation, the Constitution has
provided for the application of international law.
The rules & regulations of the Hague, Geneva Conventions form part of & are wholly based on the generally accepted
principles of international law. Even if RP is not a signatory to the Hague Conv. and signed the Geneva Conv. only in 1947, it
cant be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conv. form part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the 2 belligerent nations,
US and Japan, who were signatories to the 2 Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our
nation even if RP was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Consti has been deliberately general and
extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties
to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Yamashita v. Styer (1945)

Yamashita was the former commanding general of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and now charged before an
American Military Commission with the most monstrous crimes ever committed against the Americans and Filipinos. This is his
petition for habeas corpus and prohibition. Yamashita contends that the MC was not duly constituted, and, therefore without
jurisdiction and that there is against him no charge of an offense against the laws of war. The Court held that his petition for
habeas corpus is untenable since he seeks no discharge from confinement but merely his restoration to his former Prisoner of
War status. Likewise, his petition for prohibition can neither prosper since the MC is not made party respondent in this case.
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

International law (in particular IHL) evolved from custom & practice throughout history. Many of the basic ideas which prevail
today in the customs and usages of nations and became part of the international law emerged from the human mind centuries
before the Christian Era. Such is the idea that prisoners of war are entitled to humane treatment, that treasons of war should
be discountenanced, and that belligerents must abstain from causing harm to non-combatants.
RP is bound to comply with established rules in treating war criminals. Impelled by irrepressible endeavors aimed towards the
ideal, by the unconquerable natural urge for improvement, by the unquenchable thirstiness of perfection in all orders of life,
humanity has been struggling during the last two dozen centuries to develop an international law which could answer more
and more faithfully the demands of right and justice as expressed in principles which, weakly enunciated at first in the
rudimentary juristic sense of peoples of antiquity, by the inherent power of their universal appeal to human conscience, at last
were accepted, recognized, and consecrated by all the civilized nations of the world. Under these principles, Yamashita is
entitled to be accorded all the guarantees, protections, and defenses that all prisoners should have, according to the customs
and usages, conventions and treaties, judicial decisions and executive pronouncements, and generally accepted opinions of
thinkers, legal philosophers and other expounders of just rules and principles of international law. The seriousness or
unfathomable gravity of the charges against him must not be taken into consideration in order that true justice may be
administered in this case.
Nicaragua v. US (1986)
Nicaragua filed an Application instituting proceedings against the US in respect of a dispute concerning responsibility for
military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (mining of ports, air space infringement, support to the contras,
economic measures). Nicaragua contends that the US, in recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing, supplying and
otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding, and directing military and paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua, has
violated and is violating its express charter and treaty obligations to Nicaragua, and in particular the UN Charter, the Charter of
the Organization of American States, the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, and the Convention concerning the
Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The US declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute contained a reservation excluding from operation of the declaration:
"disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the
case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction". Invoking its multilateral treaty
reservation, US argues that adjudication of claims based on those treaties (i.e. UN Charter, OAS Charter) is barred. Thus the
effect of the reservation in question is not merely to prevent the ICJ from deciding upon Nicaragua's claims by applying the
multilateral treaties in question; it further prevents it from applying in its decision any rule of customary international law the
content of which is also the subject of a provision in those multilateral treaties (that all principles of customary and general
international law are barred, as these are subsumed and supervened by the provisions of the UN Charter.) The Court held that
such acts of the US constitute breaches of obligations under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of
another state, not to use force against another state, not to violate the sovereignty of another state.
Customary law operates independently of treaty law. It rather demonstrates that in the field in question, customary
international law continues to exist alongside treaty law. The areas governed by the two sources of law thus do not overlap
exactly, and the rules do not have the same content. But even if the customary norm and the treaty norm were to have exactly
the same content, this would not be a reason for the Court to hold that the incorporation of the customary norm into treaty-law
must deprive the customary norm of its applicability as distinct from that of the treaty norm. There are a number of reasons for
considering that, even if two norms belonging to two sources of international law appear identical in content, and even if the
States in question are bound by these rules both on the level of treaty-law and on that of customary international law, these
norms retain a separate existence. This is so from the standpoint of their applicability. In a legal dispute affecting two States,
one of them may argue that the applicability of a treaty rule to its own conduct depends on the other State's conduct in respect
of the application of other rules, on other subjects, also included in the same treaty. For example, if a State exercises its right
to terminate or suspend the operation of a treaty on the ground of the violation by the other party of a "provision essential to
the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty", it is exempted, vis-a-vis the other State, from a rule of treaty-law
because of the breach by that other State of a different rule of treaty-law. But if the two rules in question also exist as rules of
customary international law, the failure of the one State to apply the one rule does not justify the other State in declining to
apply the other rule. Rules which are identical in treaty law and in customary international law are also distinguishable by
reference to the methods of interpretation and application. A State may accept a rule contained in a treaty not simply because
it favors the application of the rule itself, but also because the treaty establishes what that State regards as desirable
institutions or mechanisms to ensure implementation of the rule. Thus, if that rule parallels a rule of customary international
law, two rules of the same content are subject to separate treatment as regards the organs competent to verify their
implementation, depending on whether they are customary rules or treaty rules.
Court must make a determination of state practice & opinio juris. Bound as it is by Art. 38 of its Statute to apply international
custom "as evidence of a general practice accepted as law", the Court may not disregard the essential role played by general
practice. In the field of customary international law, the shared view of the Parties as to the content of what they regard as the
rule is not enough. The Court must satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in the opinio juris of States is confirmed by
practice.

Conduct of a state must be consistent with the rule. The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as
customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence
of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules,
and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule,
not as indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's
conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.
Opinio juris can be deduced from attitude of states toward certain GA resolutions. This opinio juris may, though with all due
caution, be deduced from the attitude of the Parties and the attitude of States towards certain General Assembly resolutions,
i.e. the "Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the UN". The effect of consent to the text of such resolutions cannot be understood as merely
that of a "reiteration or elucidation" of the treaty commitment undertaken in the Charter. On the contrary, it may be understood
as an acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves. The principle of non-use of
force, for example, may thus be regarded as a principle of customary international law, not as such conditioned by provisions
relating to collective security, or to the facilities or armed contingents to be provided under Article 43 of the Charter. It would
therefore seem apparent that the attitude referred to expresses an opinio juris respecting such rule (or set of rules), to be
thenceforth treated separately from the provisions, especially those of an institutional kind, to which it is subject on the treaty-
law plane of the Charter.
Recognition that a rule is fundamental or a jus cogens establishes CIL. A further confirmation of the validity as customary
international law of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in Article 2 of the UN Charter of may be found
in the fact that it is frequently referred to in statements by State representatives as being not only a principle of customary
international law but also a fundamental or cardinal principle of such law. Nicaragua in its Memorial on the Merits states that
the principle prohibiting the use of force embodied in Article 2 "has come to be recognized as jus cogens" (jus cogens: a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. Art.
53, Vienna Convention.) The US, in its Counter-Memorial on the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility, found it material to
quote the views of scholars that this principle is a "universal norm", a "universal international law", a "universally recognized
principle of international law", and a "principle of jus cogens".
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969)

Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands have submitted to the Court certain differences concerning 'the delimitation as
between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf in the North Sea which appertain to each of them. The Court is
requested to decide what are the applicable 'principles and rules of international law'. Germany proposed that delimitation of
the continental shelf between the parties is governed by the principle that each coastal State is entitled to a just and equitable
share. Germany contents that making use of the equidistance method of Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Continental Shelf
Convention, had not become customary international law and was not under the circumstances the appropriate method. The
equidistance method could not be used where it would not achieve a just and equitable apportionment of the shelf. As for
Denmark and the Netherlands, delimitation should be governed by the principle of Art. 6, par. 2, and that where the parties
were in disagreement as to the boundary and special circumstances did not justify another boundary, then the boundary
between them is to be determined by the application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured. The boundary should be determined on the basis of
the exclusive rights of each Party over the continental shelf adjacent to its coast and of the principle that the boundary is to
leave to each Party every point of the continental shelf which lies nearer to its coast than to the coast of the other Party.
Netherlands and Denmark argue that the use of this method is not in the nature of a merely conventional obligation, but is, or
must now be regarded as involving, a rule that is part of the corpus of general international law;-and, like other rules of general
or customary international law, is binding on Germany automatically and independently of any specific assent, direct or
indirect, given by the latter. This contention has both a positive law and a more fundamentalist aspect. As a matter of positive
law, it is based on the work done in this field by international legal bodies, on State practice and on the influence attributed to
the Geneva Convention itself,-the claim being that these various factors have cumulatively evidenced or been creative of the
opinion juris sive necessitatis, requisite for the formation of new rules of customary international law. In its fundamentalist
aspect, the view put forward derives from what might be called the natural law of the continental shelf, in the sense that the
equidistance principle is seen as a necessary expression in the field of delimitation of the accepted doctrine of the exclusive
appurtenance of the continental shelf to the nearby coastal State, and therefore as having an a priori character of so to speak
juristic inevitability. The Court does not agree with the contentions of Netherlands and Denmark. In considering the
equidistance method, the International Law Commission's discussions reveal that not only was the notion of equidistance
never considered from the standpoint of its having a priori a character of inherent necessity: it was never given any special
prominence at all, and certainly no priority. The Court notes that the principle of equidistance, as it now figures in Art. 6, was
proposed by the ILC with considerable hesitation, somewhat on an experimental basis, at most de lege ferenda (ideal norm),
and not at all de lege lata or as an emerging rule of customary international law. This is clearly not the sort of foundation on
which Art. 6 of the Convention could be said to have reflected or crystallized such a rule. Denmark & Netherlands further
argues that even if, at the date of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, no rule of CIL in favor of the equidistance
principle and no such rule was crystallized in Art. 6, such a rule has come into being since the convention, partly because of its
own impact, partly on the basus of subsequent state practice. The Court does not agree

Provision should be norm-creating. It would be necessary that the provision should, at all events potentially, be of a
fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law. Considered in
abstracto the equidistance principle might be said to fulfill this requirement. Yet in the particular form in which it is embodied in
Art. 6, and having regard to the relationship of that Article to other provisions, this must be open to some doubt. In the first
place, Art. 6 is so framed as to put 2 ND the obligation to make use of the equidistance method, causing it to come after a
primary obligation to effect delimitation by agreement. Such a primary obligation constitutes an unusual preface to what is
claimed to be a potential general rule of law. Without attempting to enter into, still less pronounce upon any question of jus
cogens, it is well understood that, in practice, rules of international law can, by agreement, be derogated from in particular
cases, or as between particular parties,-but this is not normally the subject of any express provision, as it is in Art. 6. Secondly
the part played by the notion of special circumstances relative to the principle of equidistance as embodied in Art. 6, and the
very considerable, still unresolved controversies as to the exact meaning and scope of this notion, must raise further doubts as
to the potentially norm-creating character of the rule. Finally, the faculty of making reservations to Art. 6, while it might not of
itself prevent the equidistance principle being eventually received as general law, does add considerably to the difficulty of
regarding this result as having been brought about (or being potentially possible) on the basis of the Convention: for so long
as this faculty continues to exist, and is not the subject of any revision brought about in consequence of a request made under
Art. 13-of which there is at present no official indication-it is the Convention itself which would, for the reasons already
indicated, seem to deny to the provisions of Art. 6 the same norm-creating character as, for instance, Art. 1 and 2 possess.
Widespread & representative participation in the convention including specially affected states. Regarded necessary before a
conventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of international law might be that, even without the
passage of any considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative participation in the convention might suffice
of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests were specially affected.
Passage of time immaterial in the formation of a new rule of CIL. Although the passage of only a short period of time is not
necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was originally a
purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it might be,
State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually
uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;-and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.
* Sir: The ILC composed of experts is created by the UN GA to codify CIL. Since, their work deals with customary norms, their
drafts/works are subsidiary means of discovering CIL.
Southwest Africa Case (2nd Phase, 1966)

Southwest Africa (SWA) contends that South Africa, exercising administrative powers over the their territory by virtue of a
mandate practiced apartheid, i.e., has distinguished as to race, color, national or tribal origin in establishing the rights and
duties of the inhabitants of the Territory; that such practice is in violation of its obligations as stated in Article 2 of the Mandate
and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and that the Union has the duty forthwith to cease the practice of
apartheid in the Territory. Furthermore, South Africa, by virtue of the economic, political, social and educational policies applied
within SWA has failed to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the
Territory; that its failure to do so is in violation of its obligations as stated in the second paragraph of Article 2 of the Mandate
and Article 22 of the Covenant; and that the Union has the duty forthwith to cease its violations as aforesaid and to take all
practicable action to fulfill its duties under such Articles.
Court can only rule on legal rights/obligations. It had been attempted to derive a legal right or interest in the conduct of the
Mandate from the simple existence, or principle, of the "sacred trust". The sacred trust, it was said was a "sacred trust of
civilization" and hence all civilized nations had an interest in seeing that it was carried out. But in order that this interest might
take on a specifically legal character the sacred trust itself must be or become something more than a moral or humanitarian
ideal. In order to generate legal rights and obligations, it must be given juridical expression and be clothed in legal form. The
moral ideal must not be confused with the legal rules intended to give it effect. The principle of the "sacred trust" had no
residual juridical content which could, so far as any particular mandate is concerned, operate per se to give rise to legal rights
and obligations outside the system as a whole.
*Sir: This is a legal challenge brought by Ethiopia & Liberia against South Africa WRT the practice of apartheid (although
never mentioned here!!) The action is based on the mandate given to South Africa to promote the material & moral well-being
& social progress of inhabitants of the South West African territory. The Court did not decide on the merits because it did not
consider the case as involving a legal issue because there was no law prohibiting apartheid. The Applicants tried to derive a
legal right or interest in the conduct of the Mandate for South West Africa from the simple principle of the sacred trust. The
principles set forth here have been obliterated in latter cases. Fundamental equality is now considered an erga omnes
obligation since it is a fundamental human right.
Asylum Case Haya Dela Torre (Columbia/Peru, 1950)

Colombia cotends as the country granting asylum that it is competent to qualify the offence for the purpose of the said asylum,
within the limits of the obligations resulting in particular from the Bolivarian Agreement on Extradition, and the Convention on
Asylum, and of American international law in general and that Peru, as the territorial State, is bound in the case now before the
Court to give the guarantees necessary for the departure of Haya de la Torre from the country, with due regard to the
inviolability of his person. Peru, on the other hand, contends that the grant of asylum by the Colombian Ambassador at Lima to
Haya de la Torre was made in violation of Article 1, paragraph 1, and Article 2, paragraph 2, item I (inciso primera), of the
Convention on Asylum."
Custom = constant uniform usage. The Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this custom is established
in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party. The Colombian Government must prove that the rule invoked
by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question, and that this usage is the
expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the territorial State. This follows from
Article 38 of the Statute of the Court, which refers to international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.
In support of its contention concerning the existence of such a custom, the Colombian Government has referred to a large
number of extradition treaties which, as already explained, can have no bearing on the question now under consideration. It
has cited conventions and agreements which do not contain any provision concerning the alleged rule of unilateral and
definitive qualification such as the Montevideo Convention of 1889 on international penal law, the Bolivarian Agreement of
1911 and the Havana Convention of 1928. It has invoked conventions which have not been ratified by Peru, such as the
Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and 1939. The Convention of 1933 have, in fact, been ratified by not more than eleven
States and the Convention of 1939 by two States only. It is particularly the Montevideo Convention of 1933 which Counsel for
the Colombian Government has also relied on in this connexion. It is contended that this Convention has merely codified
principles which were already recognized by Latin-American custom, and that it is valid against Peru as a proof of customary
law. The limited number of States which have ratified this Convention reveals the weakness of this argument, and furthermore,
it is invalidated by the preamble which states that this Convention modifies the Havana Convention.
Kookooritchkin V. The Solicitor General (1948) (to be read in connection with the asylum case)
Kookooritchkin, a former Russian citizen, filed a petition for naturalization, accompanied with supporting affidavits of 2 citizens,
copy of a sworn declaration of intention and proper notice of the hearing. But due to the Japanese invation, the case was
suspended and the documents presented were destroyed. The case was reconstituted after the war and a resolution was
eventually issued granting the petition.
What constitutes a stateless refugee. Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of Soviet Russia. He disclaims allegiance
to the present Communist Government of Russia. He is, therefore, a stateless refugee in this country, belonging to no State,
much less to the present Government of the land of his birth to which he is uncompromisingly opposed. He is not against
organized government or affiliated with any association which upholds and teaches doctrine opposing all organized
governments. He does not believe in the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success
or predominance of his ideas. Neither is he a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy. He is not suffering from any
mental alienation or incurable contagious disease. Appellee's testimony, besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the
well-known fact that the ruthlessness of modern dictatorship has scattered throughout the world a large number of stateless
refugees or displaced persons, without country and without flag. The tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships toward all
opposition induced them to resort to beastly oppression, concentration camps and blood purges, & it is only natural that the
not-so-fortunate ones who were able to escape to foreign countries should feel the loss of all bonds of attachment to the hells
which were formerly their fatherland's. Petitioner belongs to that group of stateless refugees.
Certificate of arrival not essential, declarations or intention to become a Fil. citizen is sufficient to grant citizenship. The records
of the Bureau of Justice, where the declarations of intention to become a Filipino citizen were filed, had been lost or destroyed
during the battle for the liberation of Manila, & the certificate alluded to has not been reconstituted. Appellant's contention that
attachment of the certificate of arrival is essential to the validity of a declaration finds no support in the wordings of the law, as
Sec. 5 of Commonwealth Act no. 473 uses the words "has been issued.
Nuclear Test Cases (1974)

The Court has found that the claim of New Zealand/Australia no longer had any object and that the Court was therefore not
called upon to give a decision thereon. The proceedings instituted before the Court concerned the legality of atmospheric
nuclear tests conducted by France in the South Pacific; the original and ultimate objective of New Zealand/Australia is to
obtain a termination of those; France, by various public statements made in 1974, has announced its intention, following the
completion of the 1974 series of atmospheric tests, to cease the conduct of such tests; the Court finds that the objective of
New Zealand/Australia has in effect been accomplished, inasmuch as France has undertaken the obligation to hold no further
nuclear tests in the atmosphere in the South Pacific; the dispute having thus disappeared, the claim no longer has any object
and there is nothing on which to give judgment. With regard Frances declaration, the first of these statements is contained in a
communiqu which was issued by the Office of the President of the French Republic on 8 June 1974 and transmitted in
particular to the Applicant: ". . . in view of the stage reached in carrying out the French nuclear defence programme France will
be in a position to pass on to the stage of underground explosions as soon as the series of tests planned for this summer is
completed". Further statements are contained in a Note from the French Embassy in Wellington, a letter from the President of
France to the Prime Minister of New Zealand, a press conference given by the President of the Republic, a speech made by
the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the United Nations General Assembly and a television interview and press conference by the
Minister for Defence. The Court considers that these statements convey an announcement by France of its intention to cease
the conduct of atmospheric nuclear tests following the conclusion of the 1974 series.
Unilateral acts may have the effect of creating legal obligations. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of
unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Nothing in the nature of
a quid pro quo, nor any subsequent acceptance, nor even any reaction from other States is required for such declaration to
take effect. Neither is the question of form decisive. The intention of being bound is to be ascertained by an interpretation of
the act. The binding character of the undertaking results from the terms of the act and is based on good faith interested States
are entitled to require that the obligation be respected.
In the present case, the Applicant, while recognizing the possibility of the dispute being resolved by a unilateral declaration on
the part of France, has stated that, in its view, the possibility of further atmospheric tests has been left open, even after the
French statements mentioned above. The Court must, however, form its own view of the meaning and scope intended to be
given to these unilateral declarations. Having regard to their intention and to the circumstances in which they were made, they
must be held to constitute an engagement of the French State. France has conveyed to the world at large, including the
Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate its atmospheric tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take note
of these statements and rely on their being effective. It is true that France has not recognized that it is bound by any rule of
international law to terminate its tests, but this does not affect the legal consequences of the statements in question, the
unilateral undertaking resulting from them cannot be interpreted as having been made in implicit reliance on an arbitrary power
of reconsideration.
Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case (1995)
The Court handed down its decision that New Zealand's Request for an Examination of the Situation in accordance with
Paragraph 63 of the Court's 1974 Judgment in the Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France), made on 21 August 1995,
"does not fall within the provisions of the said paragraph 63 and must consequently be dismissed." Consequently,
New Zealand's request for provisional measures and the applications for permission to intervene submitted by Australia,
Samoa, Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia as well as the declarations of
intervention made by the last four States, all of which are proceedings incidental to New Zealand's main request, likewise had
to be dismissed. The Court limited the present proceedings to the examination of the following question: "Do the Requests
submitted to the Court by the Government of New Zealand on 21 August 1995 fall within the provisions of paragraph 63 of the
Judgment of the Court of 20 December 1974 in the case concerning Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France)?". In the Court's
view that question has two elements. The first element concerns the courses of procedure envisaged by the Court in
paragraph 63 of its 1974 Judgment, when it stated that "the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in
accordance with the provisions of the Statute"; the other concerns the question whether the "basis" of that Judgment has been
"affected" within the meaning of paragraph 63 thereof. In its examination of that question the Court found in the first place that
by inserting in paragraph 63 the above-mentioned phrase, the Court did not exclude a special procedure for access to it
(unlike those mentioned in the Court's Statute, like the filing of a new application, or a request for interpretation or revision,
which would have been open to the Applicant in any event). Secondly, however, the Court found that that special procedure
would only be available to the Applicant if circumstances were to arise which affected the basis of the 1974 Judgment. And
that, it found, was not the case, as the basis of that Judgment was France's undertaking not to conduct any further
atmospheric nuclear tests and only a resumption of nuclear tests in the atmosphere would therefore have affected it. It is not
possible for the Court now to take into consideration questions relating to underground nuclear tests; and that the Court
cannot, therefore, take account of the arguments derived by New Zealand, on the one hand from the conditions in which
France has conducted underground nuclear tests since 1974, and on the other from the development of international law in
recent decades - and particularly the conclusion, on 25 November 1986, of the Noumea Convention - any more than of the
arguments derived by France from the conduct of the New Zealand Government since 1974. It finally observes that its Order is
without prejudice to the obligations of States to respect and protect the natural environment, obligations to which both
New Zealand and France have in the present instance reaffirmed their commitment
Legality Of The Use Of A State Of Nuclear Weapons (1996)

The Secretary-General of the United Nations officially communicated to the Registrar the decision taken by the General
Assembly to submit a question to the Court for an advisory opinion: to request the International Court of Justice urgently to
render its advisory opinion on the following question: 'Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted
under international law?'."
Constitutes a legal question. The Court observes that it has already had occasion to indicate that questions "framed in terms of
law and rais[ing] problems of international law . . . are by their very nature susceptible of a reply based on law . . . [and]
appear . . . to be questions of a legal character".
It finds that the question put to the Court by the General Assembly is indeed a legal one, since the Court is asked to rule on the
compatibility of the threat or use of nuclear weapons with the relevant principles and rules of international law. To do this, the
Court must identify the existing principles and rules, interpret them and apply them to the threat or use of nuclear weapons,
thus offering a reply to the question posed based on law. The fact that this question also has political aspects, as, in the nature
of things, is the case with so many questions which arise in international life, does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a
"legal question" and to "deprive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it by its Statute". Nor are the political nature
of the motives which may be said to have inspired the request or the political implications that the opinion given might have of
relevance in the establishment of the Court's jurisdiction to give such an opinion.
The applicable law: UN charter, IHL, particular treaties. In the light of the foregoing the Court concludes that the most directly
relevant applicable law governing the question of which it was seised, is that relating to the use of force enshrined in the
United Nations Charter and the law applicable in armed conflict which regulates the conduct of hostilities, together with any
specific treaties on nuclear weapons that the Court might determine to be relevant.
Unique characteristics of nuclear weapons: highly destructive. The Court notes that in order correctly to apply to the present
case the Charter law on the use of force and the law applicable in armed conflict, in particular humanitarian law, it is imperative
for it to take account of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in particular their destructive capacity, their
capacity to cause untold human suffering, and their ability to cause damage to generations to come.
Provisions of the charter relating to the threat or use of force: not weapon specific. The Court then addresses the question of
the legality or illegality of recourse to nuclear weapons in the light of the provisions of the Charter relating to the threat or use
of force. In Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
another State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations is prohibited. This prohibition of the
use of force is to be considered in the light of other relevant provisions of the Charter. In Article 51, the Charter recognizes the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs. A further lawful use of force is envisaged in
Article 42, whereby the Security Council may take military enforcement measures in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter.
These provisions do not refer to specific weapons. They apply to any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed. The
Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific weapon, including nuclear weapons.
Necessity & proportionality. The entitlement to resort to self-defence under Article 51 is subject to the conditions of necessity
and proportionality. As the Court stated in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua:
"there is a specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and
necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law". The proportionality principle may thus not in
itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence in all circumstances. But at the same time, a use of force that is
proportionate under the law of self-defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in
armed conflict which comprise in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law. And the Court notes that the very
nature of all nuclear weapons and the profound risks associated therewith are further considerations to be borne in mind by
States believing they can exercise a nuclear response in self-defence in accordance with the requirements of proportionality.
In order to lessen or eliminate the risk of unlawful attack, States sometimes signal that they possess certain weapons to use in
self-defence against any State violating their territorial integrity or political independence. Whether a signaled intention to use
force if certain events occur is or is not a "threat" within Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter depends upon various factors.
The notions of "threat" and "use" of force under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter stand together in the sense that if the use
of force itself in a given case is illegal - for whatever reason - the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal. In short, if it is
to be lawful, the declared readiness of a State to use force must be a use of force that is in conformity with the Charter. For the
rest, no State - whether or not it defended the policy of deterrence - suggested to the Court that it would be lawful to threaten
to use force if the use of force contemplated would be illegal.
Rules on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of nuclear weapons as such. International customary and treaty law does not contain
any specific prescription authorizing the threat or use of nuclear weapons or any other weapon in general or in certain
circumstances, in particular those of the exercise of legitimate self-defence. Nor, however, is there any principle or rule of
international law which would make the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons or of any other weapons dependent on
a specific authorization. State practice shows that the illegality of the use of certain weapons as such does not result from an
absence of authorization but, on the contrary, is formulated in terms of prohibition.
No treaty which expressly prohibits nukes. It does not seem to the Court that the use of nuclear weapons can be regarded as
specifically prohibited on the basis of certain provisions of the Second Hague Declaration of 1899, the Regulations annexed to
the Hague Convention IV of 1907 or the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The pattern until now has been for weapons of mass
destruction to be declared illegal by specific instruments. But the Court does not find any specific prohibition of recourse to
nuclear weapons in treaties expressly prohibiting the use of certain weapons of mass destruction; and observes that, although,
in the last two decades, a great many negotiations have been conducted regarding nuclear weapons, they have not resulted in
a treaty of general prohibition of the same kind as for bacteriological and chemical weapons.
The Court notes that the treaties dealing exclusively with acquisition, manufacture, possession, deployment and testing of
nuclear weapons, without specifically addressing their threat or use, certainly point to an increasing concern in the
international community with these weapons; It concludes from this that these treaties could therefore be seen as
foreshadowing a future general prohibition of the use of such weapons, but that they do not constitute such a prohibition by
themselves. As to the treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga and their Protocols, and also the declarations made in connection
with the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it emerges from these instruments
that:
(a) a number of States have undertaken not to use nuclear weapons in specific zones (Latin America; the South Pacific) or
against certain other States (non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons);
(b) nevertheless, even within this framework, the nuclear-weapon States have reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in
certain circumstances; and
(c) these reservations met with no objection from the parties to the Tlatelolco or Rarotonga Treaties or from the Security
Council.
Cannot determine WON theres opinio juris. The Court then turns to an examination of customary international law to
determine whether a prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such flows from that source of law.
It notes that the Members of the international community are profoundly divided on the matter of whether non-recourse to
nuclear weapons over the past fifty years constitutes the expression of an opinio juris. Under these circumstances the Court
does not consider itself able to find that there is such an opinio juris. It points out that the adoption each year by the
General Assembly, by a large majority, of resolutions recalling the content of resolution 1653 (XVI), and requesting the
member States to conclude a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance, reveals the desire of a
very large section of the international community to take, by a specific and express prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons,
a significant step forward along the road to complete nuclear disarmament. The emergence, as lex lata, of a customary rule
specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as such is hampered by the continuing tensions between the nascent
opinio juris on the one hand, and the still strong adherence to the doctrine of deterrence(in which the right to use those
weapons in the exercise of the right to self-defence against an armed attack threatening the vital security interests of the State
is reserved) on the other.
International humanitarian law. After sketching the historical development of the body of rules which originally were called
"laws and customs of war" and later came to be termed "international humanitarian law", the Court observes that the cardinal
principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian law are the following. The first is aimed at the protection
of the civilian population and civilian objects and establishes the distinction between combatants and non-combatants; States
must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing
between civilian and military targets. According to the second principle, it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to
combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering. In
application of that second principle, States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use.
Martens clause. The Court also refers to the Martens Clause, which was first included in the Hague Convention II with Respect
to the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1899 and which has proved to be an effective means of addressing the rapid
evolution of military technology. A modern version of that clause is to be found in Article 1, paragraph 2, of Additional Protocol I
of 1977, which reads as follows:
"In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity
and from the dictates of public conscience."
The extensive codification of humanitarian law and the extent of the accession to the resultant treaties, as well as the fact that
the denunciation clauses that existed in the codification instruments have never been used, have provided the international
community with a corpus of treaty rules the great majority of which had already become customary and which reflected the
most universally recognized humanitarian principles. These rules indicate the normal conduct and behaviour expected of
States.
Turning to the applicability of the principles and rules of humanitarian law to a possible threat or use of nuclear weapons, the
Court notes that nuclear weapons were invented after most of the principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed
conflict had already come into existence; the Conferences of 1949 and 1974-1977 left these weapons aside, and there is a
qualitative as well as quantitative difference between nuclear weapons and all conventional arms. However, in the Court's
view, it cannot be concluded from this that the established principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict
did not apply to nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion would be incompatible with the intrinsically humanitarian character of the
legal principles in question which permeates the entire law of armed conflict and applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds
of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the future. In this respect it seems significant that the thesis
that the rules of humanitarian law do not apply to the new weaponry, because of the newness of the latter, has not been
advocated in the present proceedings.
The principle of neutrality. The Court finds that as in the case of the principles of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict,
international law leaves no doubt that the principle of neutrality, whatever its content, which is of a fundamental character
similar to that of the humanitarian principles and rules, is applicable (subject to the relevant provisions of the United Nations
Charter), to all international armed conflict, whatever type of weapons might be used.
Conclusions to be drawn from the applicability of international humanitarian law and the principle of neutrality . According to
one point of view, the fact that recourse to nuclear weapons is subject to and regulated by the law of armed conflict, does not
necessarily mean that such recourse is as such prohibited. Another view holds that recourse to nuclear weapons, in view of
the necessarily indiscriminate consequences of their use, could never be compatible with the principles and rules of
humanitarian law and is therefore prohibited. A similar view has been expressed with respect to the effects of the principle of
neutrality. Like the principles and rules of humanitarian law, that principle has therefore been considered by some to rule out
the use of a weapon the effects of which simply cannot be contained within the territories of the contending States. The Court
observes that, in view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, to which the Court has referred above, the use of such
weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict. It
considers nevertheless, that it does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear
weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance.
Furthermore, the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-
defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake. Nor can it ignore the practice referred to as
"policy of deterrence", to which an appreciable section of the international community adhered for many years.
Accordingly, in view of the present state of international law viewed as a whole, as examined by the Court, and of the elements
of fact at its disposal, the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the
use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival would be at stake.
Obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament. Given the eminently difficult issues that arise in applying the law on the use of
force and above all the law applicable in armed conflict to nuclear weapons, the Court considers that it needs to examine one
further aspect of the question before it, seen in a broader context. In the long run, international law, and with it the stability of
the international order which it is intended to govern, are bound to suffer from the continuing difference of views with regard to
the legal status of weapons as deadly as nuclear weapons. It is consequently important to put an end to this state of affairs:
the long-promised complete nuclear disarmament appears to be the most appropriate means of achieving that result.
In these circumstances, the Court appreciates the full importance of the recognition by Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of an obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear disarmament. The legal import of that
obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise
result - nuclear disarmament in all its aspects - by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations
on the matter in good faith. This twofold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations formally concerns the 182 States
parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or, in other words, the vast majority of the international
community. Indeed, any realistic search for general and complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, necessitates
the co-operation of all States.
The Paquete Habana (The Paquete Habana And The Lola) (1900)
The Court held that the capture of the fishing vessel was unlawful and without probable cause, on the ground that, as a rule of
international law, fishing vessels are exempt from capture as a prize of war. The Court ordered that the decree of the District
Court be reversed, and the proceeds of the sale of the vessel, together with the proceeds of any sale of her cargo, be restored
to the claimant, with damages and costs.
Ancient usage ripened to rule of international law. By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and
gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in fresh
fish, have been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war. The Court discussed the
history of the custom exempting coastal fishers from capture beginning with King Henry IVs orders to his admirals in 1403 to
the relevant practices of France, Holland, Prussia, and the US. The Court also noted cases in the past in different jurisdictions
which decided the issue in the same light. Also, the Court noted, legal writings and treatieses of legal experts and luminaries
which provide for the exemption of fishing/commercial vessels.
*Sir: The treaties which established the exemption of fishing vessels, though bilateral, became source of customary norm
because, during the period they were signed, there were only very few countries. Also, the signatories being maritime nations,
can be considered as specially affected states. The technique used by the court to establish the norm is through customary
law and subsidiary means as evidence of the norm.
Preah Vihear Temple Case (1962)

The Court held that the Temple of Preah Vihear was situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia and, in
consequence, that Thailand was under an obligation to withdraw any military or police forces, or other guards or keepers,
stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory. It also found that Thailand was under an obligation to
restore to Cambodia any sculptures, stelae, fragments of monuments, sandstone model and ancient pottery which might,
since the date of the occupation of the Temple by Thailand in 1954, have been removed from the Temple or the Temple area
by the Thai authorities.
Application of doctrines (general principles of law) of estoppel & acquiesence. The map was never formally approved by the
Mixed Commission, which had ceased to function some months before its production. While there could be no reasonable
doubt that it was based on the work of the surveying officers in the Dangrek sector, the Court nevertheless concluded that, in
its inception, it had no binding character. It was clear from the record, however, that the maps were communicated to the
Siamese Government as purporting to represent the outcome of the work of delimitation; since there was no reaction on the
part of the Siamese authorities, either then or for many years, they must be held to have acquiesced. The maps were
moreover communicated to the Siamese members of the Mixed Commission, who said nothing. to the Siamese Minister of the
Interior. If the Siamese authorities accepted the Annex I map without investigation, they could not now plead any error vitiating
the reality of their consent. The Siamese Government and later the Thai Government had raised no query about the Annex I
map prior to its negotiations with Cambodia in Bangkok in 1958. Thailand had nevertheless continued also to use and indeed
to publish maps showing Preah Vihear as lying in Cambodia. Moreover, in the course of the negotiations for the 1925 and
1937 Franco-Siamese Treaties, which confirmed the existing frontiers, and in 1947 in Washington before the Franco-Siamese
Conciliation Commission, it would have been natural for Thailand to raise the matter: she did not do so. The natural inference
was that she had accepted the frontier at Preah Vihear as it was drawn on the map, irrespective of its correspondence with the
watershed line. Moreover, when in 1930 Prince Damrong, on a visit to the Temple, was officially received there by the French
Resident for the adjoining Cambodian province, Siam failed to react. From these facts, the court concluded that Thailand had
accepted the Annex I map. Even if there were any doubt in this connection, Thailand was precluded from asserting that she
had not accepted it since France and Cambodia had relied upon her acceptance and she had for fifty years enjoyed such
benefits as the Treaty of 1904 has conferred on her. Furthermore, the acceptance of the Annex I map caused it to enter the
treaty settlement; the Parties had at that time adopted an interpretation of that settlement which caused the map line to prevail
over the provisions of the Treaty and, as there was no reason to think that the Parties had attached any special importance to
the line of the watershed as such, as compared with the overriding importance of a final regulation of their own frontiers, the
Court considered that the interpretation to be given now would be the same.
Corfu Channel Case (1949)

A british destroyer vessel struck a mine and was gravely damaged while passing through the Corfu Channel in the territorial
waters of Albania. The other destroyer was sent to her assistance and, while towing her, struck another mine and was also
seriously damaged. The Court held that Albania had breached its obligation under international law to notify states regarding
the danger of passing through a body of water due to presence of mines in its territorial sea.
Allowance for admission of circumstantial evidence, a general principle of law. The exclusive control exercised by a State
within its frontiers may make it impossible to furnish direct proof of facts which would involve its responsibility in case of a
violation of international law. The State which is the victim must, in that ease, be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences
of fact and circumstantial evidence; such indirect evidence must be regarded as of especial weight when based on a series of
facts, linked together and leading logically to a single conclusion.
In the present case two series of facts, which corroborate one another, have to be considered. The first relates to the Albanian
Government's attitude before and after the catastrophe. The laying of the mines took place in a period in which it had shown
its intention to keep a jealous watch on its territorial waters and in which it was requiring prior authorization before they were
entered, this vigilance sometimes going so far as to involve the use of force: all of which render the assertion of ignorance a
priori improbable. Moreover, when the Albanian Government had become fully aware of the existence of a minefield, it
protested strongly against the activity of the British Fleet, but not against the laying of the mines, though this act, if effected
without her consent, would have been a very serious violation of her sovereignty; she did not notify shipping of the existence of
the minefield, as would be required by international law; and she did not undertake any of the measures of judicial
investigation which would seem to be incumbent on her in such a case. Such an attitude could only be explained if the
Albanian Government, while knowing of the mine laying, desired the circumstances in which it was effected to remain secret.
The second series of facts relates to the possibility of observing the mine laying from the Albanian coast. Geographically, the
channel is easily watched: it is dominated by heights offering excellent observation points, and it runs close to the coast. The
methodical and well-thought-out laying of the mines compelled the minelayers to remain from two to two-and-a-half hours in
the waters. In regard to that point, the naval experts appointed by the Court reported, after enquiry and investigation on the
spot, that they considered it to be indisputable that, if a normal look-out was kept and if the lookouts were equipped with
binoculars, under normal weather conditions for this area, the mine-laying operations must have been noticed by these
coastguards. From all the facts and observations mentioned above, the Court draws the conclusion that the laying of the
minefield could not have been accomplished without the knowledge of Albania. As regards the obligations resulting for her
from this knowledge, they are not disputed. It was her duty to notify shipping and especially to warn the ships proceeding
through the Strait on October 22nd of the danger to which they were exposed. In fact, nothing was attempted by Albania to
prevent the disaster, and these grave omissions involve her international responsibility.
Chorzow Factory Case (Germany V. Poland) (1928)

The German empire had a contract with a company, where the company undertook to establish for the Reich and forthwith to
begin the construction of a nitrate factory at Chorzow, Upper Silesia. Subsequently, Poland and Germany signed a
Convention concerning the Upper Silesia of Geneva (Geneva Convention). A Polish was then delegated with the full powers to
take charge of the factory, thus, causing the end of the contract between Germany and the companies. Germany brought
action in behalf of the companies against Poland for the taking of the companies in violation of the Geneva Conventions.
States espousal of claims on behalf of its nationals. International law does not prevent one State from granting to another the
right to have recourse to international arbitral tribunals in order to obtain the direct award to nationals of the latter State of
compensation for damage suffered by them as a result of infractions of international law by the first State.
Reparation = indemnity for damages caused. It is a principle of international law that the reparation of a wrong may consist in
an indemnity corresponding to the damage which the nationals of the injured State have suffered as a result of the act which is
contrary to international law.
In estimating the damage caused by an unlawful act, only the value of property, rights and interests which have been affected
and the owner of which is the person on whose behalf compensation is claimed, or the damage done to whom is to serve as a
means of gauging the reparation claimed, must be taken into account. The damage suffered is equivalent to the total value -
but to that total only - of the property, rights and interests of this Company in that undertaking, without deducting liabilities.
The reparation due by one State to another does not however change its character by reason of the fact that it takes the form
of an indemnity for the calculation of which the damage suffered by a private person is taken as the measure. The rules of law
governing the reparation are the rules of international law in force between the two States concerned, and not the law
governing relations between the State which has committed a wrongful act and the individual who has suffered damage. The
damage suffered by an individual is never therefore identical in kind with that which will be suffered by a State; it can only
afford a convenient scale for the calculation of the reparation due to the State.
Reparation, defined. The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - a principle which seems to be
established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals - is that reparation must, as far as
possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed.

When restitution not possible, then reparation. Restitution in kind, or if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to
the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be
covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it - such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of
compensation due for an act contrary to international law.
Reparation, as applied in this case. This conclusion particularly applies as regards the Geneva Convention, the object of which
is to provide for the maintenance of economic life in Upper Silesia on the basis of respect for the status quo. The
dispossession of an industrial undertaking (which is prohibited by the Geneva Convention) then involves the obligation to
restore the undertaking and, if this be not possible, to pay its value at the time of the indemnification, which value is designed
to take the place of restitution which has become impossible. To this obligation, in virtue of the general principles of
international law, must be added that of compensating loss sustained as the result of the seizure. The impossibility of restoring
the Chorzw factory could therefore have no other effect but that of substituting payment of the value of the undertaking for
restitution; it would not be in conformity with the principles of law or with the wish of the Parties to infer from that agreement
that the question of compensation must henceforth be dealt with as though an expropriation properly so called was involved.
(Some notes on the case from BP v. Libya: The Chorzow Factory case is the leading case on the proposition that restitutio in
integrum is a recognized remedy of International Law. However, the judgment is not authority on the point, for the Claimant
(the German Government) did not claim restitutio in integrum, and anything the Court stated on the availability of that remedy
is obiter.)
*Sir: What is the general principle of law in the case? Reparation for the taking of property requires compensation. Reparation
is due when there is a breach of an obligation.
When an expropriation is legal, the amount of the reparation is the logistical value of the property taken at the time of the
expropriation. However, when there is an unlawful taking, the amount of reparation includes the intangible assets (loss of
profits).
Barcelona Traction, Light And Power Company Case (Belgium V. Spain) (1970)
The BTLPC, was incorporated in Toronto (Canada) for the purpose of creating and developing an electric power production
and distribution system in Catalonia (Spain). It formed a number of subsidiary companies, of which some had their registered
offices in Canada and the others in Spain. Some years after the first world war Barcelona Traction share capital came to be
very largely held by Belgian nationals. The servicing of the Barcelona Traction bonds was suspended on account of the
Spanish civil war. After that war the Spanish exchange control authorities refused to authorize the transfer of the foreign
currency necessary for the resumption of the servicing of the sterling bonds. Eventually, the company was declared bankrupt.
Belgium filed an application with the ICJ against the Spanish government seeking reparation of damages claimed to have
been caused to the Belgian national shareholders of the company.
Municipal law applied to international law. In the field of diplomatic protection, international law was in continuous evolution
and was called upon to recognize institutions of municipal law. In municipal law, the concept of the company was founded on a
firm distinction between the rights of the company and those of the shareholder. Only the company, which was endowed with
legal personality, could take action in respect of matters that were of a corporate character. A wrong done to the company
frequently caused prejudice to its shareholders, but this did not imply that both were entitled to claim compensation. Whenever
a shareholder's interests were harmed by an act done to the company, it was to the latter that he had to look to institute
appropriate action. An act infringing only the company's rights did not involve responsibility towards the shareholders, even if
their interests were affected. In order for the situation to be different, the act complained of must be aimed at the direct rights
of the shareholder as such (which was not the case here since the Belgian Government had itself admitted that it had not
based its claim on an infringement of the direct rights of the shareholders).
General Rule: State of the company can seek redress. International law had to refer to those rules generally accepted by
municipal legal systems. An injury to the shareholder's interests resulting from an injury to the rights of the company was
insufficient to found a claim. Where it was a question of an unlawful act committed against a company representing foreign
capital, the general rule of international law authorized the national State of the company alone to exercise diplomatic
protection for the purpose of seeking redress. No rule of international law expressly conferred such a right on the
shareholder's national State.
Exceptional circumstances. The Court considered whether there might not be, in the present case, special circumstances for
which the general rule might not take effect. Two situations needed to be studied: (a) the case of the company having ceased
to exist, and (b) the case of the protecting State of the company lacking capacity to take action.
As regards the first of these possibilities, the Court observed that whilst Barcelona Traction had lost all its assets in Spain and
been placed in receivership in Canada, it could not be contended that the corporate entity of the company had ceased to exist
or that it had lost its capacity to take corporate action. So far as the second possibility was concerned, it was not disputed that
the company had been incorporated in Canada and had its registered office in that country, and its Canadian nationality had
received general recognition. The Canadian Government had exercised the protection of Barcelona Traction for a number of
years. If at a certain point the Canadian Government ceased to act on behalf of Barcelona Traction, it nonetheless retained its
capacity to do so, which the Spanish Government had not questioned. Whatever the reasons for the Canadian Government's
change of attitude, that fact could not constitute a justification for the exercise of diplomatic protection by another government.
It had been maintained that a State could make a claim when investments by its nationals abroad, such investments being part
of a State's national economic resources, were prejudicially affected in violation of the right of the State itself to have its
nationals enjoy a certain treatment. But, in the present state of affairs, such a right could only result from a treaty or special
agreement. And no instrument of such a kind was in force between Belgium and Spain.
*Sir: What is the general principle of law in the case? A corporation has a juridical personality distinct from its shareholders.
Texaco V. Libya (1978)

Libya promulgated decrees purporting to nationalize all of the rights, interests and property of Texaco in Libya granted to them
jointly under 14 Deeds of Concession. The Companies objected to the decrees and claimed that such action by the Libyan
Government violated the terms and conditions of their Deeds of Concession. The Companies requested arbitration. The Sole
Arbitrator held that (a) the Deeds of Concession are binding on the parties, (b) by adopting the measures of nationalization,
the Libyan Government breached its obligations arising under the Deeds of Concession and (c) the Libyan Government is
legally bound to perform the Deeds of Concession and to give them their full force and effect. Libya argues that with respect to
nationalization, municipal law should govern and not international law. Several UN G.A. resolutions were invoked by both
parties. Thus the court had to look into the legal value and validity of such resolutions and their binding effect to the parties.
Legal value of resolutions to be determined on the basis of the circumstances under which they were adopted & analysis of
the principles they state. The legal value of the resolutions which are relevant to the present case can be determined on the
basis of circumstances under which they were adopted (ex. voting pattern) and by analysis of the principles which they state.
Resolutions in order to be binding must be accepted by the members escpecially those specially affected. With respect to the
first point, the absence of any binding force of the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations implies that such
resolutions must be accepted by the members of the United Nations in order to be legally binding. In this respect, the Tribunal
notes that only Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 was supported by a majority of Member States representing all of
the various groups. By contrast, the other Resolutions mentioned, and in particular those referred to in the Libyan
Memorandum, were supported by a majority of States but not by any of the developed countries with market economies which
carry on the largest part of international trade.
Distinguish between those stating an existing right & those introducing new principles. The appraisal of the legal value on the
basis of the principles stated, it appears essential to this Tribunal to distinguish between those provisions stating the existence
of a right on which the generality of the States has expressed agreement and those provisions introducing new principles
which were rejected by certain representative groups of States and having nothing more than a de lege ferenda (what the law
ought to be); value only in the eyes of the States which have adopted them; as far as the others are concerned, the rejection
of these same principles implies that they consider them as being contra legem (against the law). With respect to the former,
which proclaim rules recognized by the community of nations, they do not create a custom but confirm one by formulating it
and specifying its scope, thereby making it possible to determine whether or not one is confronted with a legal rule. As has
been noted by Ambassador Castaneda, "[such resolutions] do not create the law; they have a declaratory nature of noting
what does exist"
Resolution 1803 reflect the state of customary law based on adoption of majority of states & opinio juris . On the basis of the
circumstances of adoption mentioned above and by expressing an opinio juris communis, Resolution 1803 (XVII) seems to
this Tribunal to reflect the state of customary law existing in this field. Indeed, on the occasion of the vote on a resolution
finding the existence of a customary rule, the States concerned clearly express their views. The consensus by a majority of
States belonging to the various representative groups indicates without the slightest doubt universal recognition of the rules
therein incorporated, i.e., with respect to nationalization and compensation the use of the rules in force in the nationalizing
State, but all this in conformity with international law.
*Sir: The method of looking into voting patterns and employing the specially affected states doctrine do not fully and totally
assess WON a resolution is binding. State Practice + Opinio Juris still has to be proved. Sir does not approve of this method.
BP V. Libya
BP Exploration Company (BP) had a contractual agreement with the Government of Libya (Libya), which allowed BP to
operate in Libya for the extraction, processing and export of petroleum. The area in which BP was allowed to operate was
called Concession 65. However, Libya, in December 1971 passed the BP Nationalization Law, which nationalized the
operations of BP in Concession 65, restoring to the State ownership of all properties, rights, assets and shares in the
operations conducted in the said area, and then transferring these to a new company, the Arabian Gulf Exploration Company.
As a result of the Nationalization Law (which was rapidly implemented) BPs operations in Concession 65 were brought to a
complete halt and its staff were immediately excluded from the premises and facilities. The Arabian Gulf Exploration Company
had taken over Concession 65.
Applicable law in the case. Clause 28 of the concession agreement provides that should dispute arise, the applicable law shall
be the principles of the law of Libya common to the principles of international law, and only if such common principles do not
exist with respect to a particular matter, will resort be made to general principles of law. In the event that international law and
Libyan law conflict on the issue, general principles of law should apply to resolve the question.
The governing system of law is what the clause expressly provides, that in the absence of principles common to the Libyan
and International law, general principles of law, including those that may have been applied by international tribunals, should
apply.
Specific Performance not applicable here. In the decisions of tribunals, while arbitral tribunals can declare awards which
include the declaration of specific performance against a recalcitrant party, their powers and jurisdiction to do so rest carefully
on the parties consent.
Examined in the light of general principles of law, the legal systems analyzed here offer different solutions to the problem. Thus
these municipal systems of law profess allegiance to two divergent principles on the question. It is therefore NOT POSSIBLE
to hold that under general principles of law an agreement fundamentally abrogated by one party continues in force and is to be
specifically performed indefinitely until the innocent party terminates it, for under English and American law the sole remedy is
damages and in others specific performance does not lie against the State.
It is clear then, that there does not exist a uniform general principle of law that an agreement continues in effect after being
repudiated by one party but not the other, and there is no uniform principle which provides that specific performance is a
remedy available at the option of an innocent party.
Restitutio in integrum not applicable again. As to restitutio in integrum, while it has been claimed, especially in the form of
physical restoration, no tribunal has ever prescribed the remedy with regard to such property or parties as in these
proceedings. The concept has rather been employed at times as a principle for assessing the amount of damages due for
breach of an international obligation.
The impossibility of restitution and specific performance. The claim would not even be realistic; such an action, which has the
effect of turning back the clock would upset the current situation too profoundly and would have unforeseeable practical
consequences. Furthermore, if awarded now and the contract would still be allowed to exist indefinitely, the amount would be
so great it would be absurd.
A rule of reason therefore dictates a result which conforms to international law, evidenced by state practice and the law of
treaties, and to governing principles of English and American contract law. The conclusion is thus: when by exercise of
sovereign power a State committed a fundamental breach of a concession agreement by repudiating it through a
nationalization of the enterprise and its assets in a manner which implies finality, the concessionaire is not entitled to call for
specific performance by the Government of the agreement and reinstatement of his contractual rights, but his sole remedy is
an action for damages.
Payment of Damages. Under Public International Law, the norm is the payment of damages. Under the applicable systems of
law, BP is entitled to damages arising from Libyas wrongful acts. The principle of compensation is also recognized in the BP
Nationalization Law.
*Sir: This case also involves a concession contract, a contractual undertaking as previous cases, however, this case is
different because one of the parties is a state. As a consequence of which, specific performance and restituto in integrum is
not available.
Take note, this is the only decision that the restituto in integrum is impossible. Although as a matter of law, it is possible, but in
this case, it is impractical to order specific performance necause cannot compel a state because there is no coercive
apparatus in international law.
General principles of law: The General principles of a contract such as autonomy, mutuality, consensuality and obligatory are
observed. An obligation must be performed. The law between the parties must be complied with in good faith.
Here, it was not the LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY but IMPRACTICABILITY that restitution cannot be ordered.
* Reviewer notes:
The framework of the Tribunal with regards entitlement to specific performance, restitution in integrum and damages
Step one: Look at the principles of Libyan law common to international law. There are no certain conclusions as to the position
of Libyan law on the subject matter of the dispute.
Step two: Look at Public international law (Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties). Vienna Convention does not provide for
specific rules on remedies. Customary international law (particularly the practice of international tribunals) does not provide
explicit support for the proposition that specific performance and restitution in integrum are remedies available at the option of
a party suffering a breach by a contracting party.
Step three: Look at the general principles of international law (municipal legal principles existing in different legal systems).
English law the norm is damages and specific performance is the exception; it is only when damages are
inadequate that specific performance is resorted to.
German law- specific performance is the normal remedy and damages are resorted to only when it is not possible.
Danish law- same as German.
(The principles of these legal systems are principles of ordinary commercial law.
However, here, a State (Libya) is the respondent and normally, the remedies of restitution in king and specific performance are
unavailable against governmental authorities.
BP cannot ask for specific performance nor to be declared owner of any oil extracted in Libya. The breach because of the
Nationalization Law is made the basis of the amount of damages in favor of BP.
Passage Case (Portugal V. India)

Portugal has a territory in the Indian Peninsula made up of the three districts of Goa, Daman and Diu. The district of Daman
comprises, in addition to its littoral territory, two parcels of territory completely surrounded by the territory of India which
constitute enclaves: Dadra and Nagar-Aveli. Portugal has been passing through Indian territory through the years in order to
the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar- Aveli.
However in 1954, the Government of India prevented Portugal from exercising this right of passage. Portugal claims that there
was a local custom in its favor with the right of passage over the territory. Portugal claims that the denial of passage by India
was done due to Indias open campaign to annex Portugese territories.
Existence of local custom between two states. The Court says that it is difficult to see why the number of States between
which a local custom may be established on the basis of long practice must necessarily be larger than two. There is no reason
why long continued practice between two States accepted by them as regulating their relations should not form the basis of
mutual rights and obligations between the two States.
The dispute arises at the time of the creation of the obstacles. The question was put to the Court in respect of the dispute,
which has arisen between India and Portugal with regard to obstacles placed by India in the way of passage. It was in support
of this contention that it invoked its right of passage and asked the Court to declare the existence of that right. This being so, it
is the eve of the creation of these obstacles that must be selected as the starting point which to ascertain whether or not
Portugal possessed such a right.
Right of passage. With regard to private persons, civil officials and goods in general, there existed during the British and post-
British, periods a constant and uniform practice allowing free passage between Daman and the enclaves. This practice having
continued over a period extending beyond a century and a quarter unaffected by the change of regime in respect of the
intervening territory which occurred when India became independent. Practice was accepted as law by the Parties and has
given rise to a right and a correlative obligation.
In 1954, a right of passage over intervening Indian territory between coastal Daman and the enclaves and between the
enclaves, in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in general, to the extent necessary, as claimed by Portugal, for
the exercise of its sovereignty over the enclaves, and subject to the regulation and control of India.
There was a clear distinction between the practice permitting free passage of private persons, civil officials and goods in
general, and the practice requiring previous authorization, as in the case of armed forces, armed police, and arms and
ammunition. There was no right of passage in favour of Portugal involving a correlative obligation on India has been
established in respect of armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition. The course of dealings established between
the Portuguese and the British authorities with respect to the passage of these categories excludes the existence of any such
right. The practice that was established shows that, with regard to these categories, it was well understood that passage could
take place only by permission of the British authorities. This situation continued during the post-British period.
No breach of international obligation when custom was subject to regulation of the other party. In view of the tension then
prevailing in intervening Indian territory, the Court is unable to hold that Indias refusal of passage to the proposed delegation
and its refusal of visas to Portuguese nationals of European origin and to native Indian Portuguese in the employ of the
Portuguese Government was action contrary to its obligation resulting from Portugals right of passage. Portugals claim of a
right of passage is subject to full recognition and exercise of Indian sovereignty over the intervening territory and without any
immunity in favour of Portugal. Indias refusal of passage in those cases was, in the circumstances, covered by its power of
regulation and control of the right of passage of Portugal.
III. ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Reparations For Injuries Suffered In The Service Of The Un (1949)
ART. 1, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States:

The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a ) a permanent population;
b ) a defined territory; c ) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
UN Charter:
ART. 4: 1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations
contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these
obligations.
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
ART. 32: Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is
not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall
be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down
such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.
ART. 35 (2): A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council
or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the
dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
ART. 93(2): A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the
recommendation of the Security Council.
ART 34, ICJ Statute:

1. Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.
2. The Court, subject to and in conformity with its Rules, may request of public international organizations
information relevant to cases before it, and shall receive such information presented by such organizations on their
own initiative.
3. Wherever the construction of the constituent instrument of a public international organization or of an
international convention adopted thereunder is in question in a case before the Court, the Registrar shall so notify
the public international organization concerned and shall communicate to it copies of all the written proceedings.
The UN GA asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion submitting the following legal questions:
1. In the event of an agent of the United Nations in the performance of his duties suffering injury in circumstances
involving the responsibility of a State, has the United Nations, as an organization, the capacity to bring an
international claim against the responsible de jure or de facto government with a view of obtaining the reparation due
in respect of the damage caused (a) to the United Nations, (b) to the victim or to persons entitled through him?
2. In the event of an affirmative reply on point I (b), how is action by the United Nations to be reconciled with such rights
as may be possessed by the State of which the victim is a national?
Capacity, defined. Competence to bring an international claim is, for those possessing it, the capacity to resort to the
customary methods recognized by international law for the establishment, the presentation and the settlement of claims. (i.e.
protest, request for an enquiry, negotiation, and request for submission to an arbitral tribunal or to the Court in so far as this
may be authorized by the Statute).
Capacity of a state. A State can bring an international claim against another State. Such a claim takes the form of a claim
between two political entities, equal in law, similar in form, and both the direct subjects of international law. It is dealt with by
means of negotiation, and cannot, in the present state of the law as to international jurisdiction, be submitted to a tribunal,
except with the consent of the States concerned.
UNs international personality as evidenced by UN Charter, practice and conventions. The UN Charter by giving the UN legal
capacity and privileges and immunities in the territory of each of its Members; and by providing for the conclusion of
agreements between the UN and its Members. Conventions to which the UN is a party-has confirmed this character of the
UN, which occupies a position in certain respects in detachment from its Members, and which is under a duty to remind them,
if need be, of certain obligations. The UN was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions
and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international personality and the
capacity to operate upon an international plane.

Difference of rights possessed by a state and the UN. Whereas a State possesses the totality of international rights and duties
recognized by international law, the rights and duties of an entity such as the UN must depend upon its purposes and functions
as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice.
UN Capacity to bring claim against one of its members for breach of international obligations towards it. It is clear that UN has
the capacity to bring a claim for damage caused to the interests of the UN itself, to its administrative machine, to its property
and assets, and to the interests of which it is the guardian. When the UN has sustained damage resulting from a breach by a
Member of its international obligations, it is impossible to see how it can obtain reparation unless it possesses capacity to bring
an international claim.
Reparation guidelines. The measure of the reparation should depend upon the amount of the damage which the UN has
suffered as the result of the wrongful act or omission of the defendant State and should be calculated in accordance with the
rules of international law. To illustrate, the damage would include the reimbursement of any reasonable compensation which
the UN had to pay to its agent or to persons entitled through him and the expenditure in replacing a dead or disabled agent
engaged upon a distant mission.
UN Capacity to bring claims for damage caused to a victim. The Charter does not expressly confer upon the UN the capacity
to include, in its claim for reparation, damage caused to the victim or to persons entitled through him. But under international
law, the UN must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it
by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.
Organization has a capacity to exercise functional protection of its agents. In order that the agent may perform his duties
satisfactorily, he must feel that this protection is assured to him by the UN, and that he may count on it. To ensure the
independence of the agent, and, consequently, the independent action of the UN itself, it is essential that in performing his
duties he need not have to rely on any other protection than that of the UN (save of course for the more direct and immediate
protection due from the State in whose territory he may be). In particular, he should not have to rely on the protection of his
own State. If he had to rely on that State, his independence might well be compromised, contrary to the principle applied by
Article 100 of the Charter. And lastly, it is essential that whether the agent belongs to a powerful or to a weak State; to one
more affected or less affected by the complications of international life; to one in sympathy or not in sympathy with the mission
of the agent-he should know that in the performance of his duties he is under the protection of the UN. This assurance is even
more necessary when the agent is stateless.
The capacity of the UN to exercise a measure of functional protection of its agents arises by necessary intendment out of the
Charter.
When it claims redress for a breach of these obligations, the UN is invoking its own right, the right that the obligations due to it
should be respected.
UN Capacity to bring a claim against a defendant state which is not a member of the UN. Fifty States, representing the vast
majority of the members of the international community, had the power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being
an entity possessing objective international personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone, together with
capacity to bring international claims.
When the victim has a nationality, cases can clearly occur in which the injury suffered by him may engage the interest both of
his national State and of the UN. In such a case, there is no rule of law which assigns priority to the one or to the other, or
which compels either the State or the UN to refrain from bringing an international claim.
It does not matter whether or not the State to which the claim is addressed regards him as its own national, because the
question of nationality is not pertinent to the admissibility of the claim.
Mavrommatis Case (1924)

This dispute relates to Palestine and Britains wrongful refusal to recognize Mavrommatis rights acquired under contracts for
public works to be done in Palestine. Greece took up Mavrommatis case as it is a Greek subject.
Disputes, defined. A dispute is defined as a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests
between 2 persons. Greece is asserting its rights by claiming indemnity from Britain arguing that Britain treated Mavrommatis
in a manner incompatible with certain international obligations which they are bound to observe.
At first, the dispute was between a private person (Mavrommatis) and a State (Britain). But Greece took up Mavrommatis
case so it is now a dispute in international law.
Capacity of a state to bring claims from acts contrary to international law committed by another state. A state can take up the
case of its subjects when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from whom they have been
unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. So WON a dispute originates in a personal injury is irrelevant.
Greece, in the eyes of Britain, is the sole claimant.
Greece has the right to ensure respect for rules of international law. It is not substituting itself with the citizen, but is actually
asserting its own rights.
Certain Expenses Of The UN (1962)

The UN GA asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion "Do the resolutions authorized by the General Assembly to cover the costs
of the UN operations in the Congo (ONUC) and of the operations of the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East (UNEF),
"constitute 'expenses of the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations"?
Expenses, defined. "Expenses" of any organization are the amounts paid out to defray the costs of carrying out its purposes,
in this case, the political, economic, social, humanitarian and other purposes of the United Nations.
Expenditures must be tested by their relationship to the purposes of the United Nations in the sense that if an expenditure
were made for a purpose which is not one of the purposes of the United Nations, it could not be considered an "expense of the
Organization".
Purpose of the UN. The first two purposes as stated in paragraphs I and 2, may be described as pointing to the goal of
international peace and secunty and friendly relations. The third is the achievement of economic, social, cultural and
humanitarian goals and respect for human rights. The fourth and last purpose is to be a center for harmonizing the actions of
nations in the attainment of these common ends.
Responsibility of the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. It is only the Security Council which can require
enforcement by coercive action against an aggressor. The Charter makes it abundantly clear, however, that the General
Assembly is also to be concerned with international peace and security. Article 14 authorizes the General Assembly to
"recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the
general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the
present Charter setting forth the purposes and principles of the United Nations".
The powers of the UNSC and the UNGA. While it is the Security Council which, exclusively, may order coercive action, the
functions and powers conferred by the Charter on the General Assembly are not confined to discussion, consideration, the
initiation of studies and the making of recommendations.
The General Assembly is given the power not only to "consider" the budget of the Organization, but also to "approve" it. the
General Assembly is also given the power to apportion the expenses among the Members and the exercise of the power of
apportionment creates the obligation, specifically stated in Article 17, paragraph 2, of each Member to bear that part of the
expenses which is apportioned to it by the General Assembly. The provisions of the Charter which distribute functions and
powers to the Security Council and to the General Assembly give no support to the view that such distribution excludes from
the powers of the General Assembly the power to provide for the financing of measures designed to maintain peace and
security.
Article II par 2 empowers the General Assembly, by means of recommendations to States or to the Security Council, or to
both, to organize peacekeeping operations, at the request, or with the consent, of the States concerned.
Acts of the UN. When the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfillment of
one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization. If it is
agreed that the action in question is within the scope of the functions of the Organization but it is alleged that it has been
initiated or carried out in a manner not in conformity with the division of functions among the several organs which the Charter
prescribes, one moves to the internal plane, to the internal structure of the Organization. If the action was taken by the wrong
organ, it was irregular as a matter of that internal structure, but this would not necessarily mean that the expense incurred was
not an expense of the Organization.
Both national and international law contemplate cases in which the body corporate or politic may be bound, as to third parties,
by an ultra vires act of an agent. As the United Nations Charter included no procedure for determining the validity of the acts of
the organs of the United Nations, each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction. If the Security
Council adopted a resolution purportedly for the maintenance of international peace and security and if, in accordance with
such resolution, the Secretary-General incurred financial obligations, those amounts must be presumed to constitute
"expenses of the Organization".
Expenses, as applied in this case. It is apparent that the operations were undertaken to fulfill a prime purpose of the United
Nations, that is, to promote and to maintain a peaceful settlement of the situation. This being true, the Secretary-General
properly exercised the authority given him to incur financial obligations of the Organization and expenses resulting form such
obligations must be considered "expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2".
Even though certain expenses are "extraordinary" and "essentially different" from those under the "regular budget", they are
none the less "expenses of the Organization" to be apportioned in accordance with the power granted to the General
Assembly by Article 17, paragraph 2.
Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter could lead to the simple conclusion that "the expenses of the Organization" are the
amounts paid out to defray the costs of carrying out the purposes of the Organization.
A. STATES
1. TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
If state sovereignty is said to be absolute, how is it related to the independence of other States and to their equality
on the international plane?
From the standpoint of the national legal order, state sovereignty is the supreme legal authority in relation to subjects within its
territorial domain. This is the traditional context in referring to sovereignty as absolute. However, in the international sphere,
sovereignty realizes itself in the existence of a large number of sovereignties, such that there prevails in fact co- existence of
sovereignties under conditions of independence and equality.
The sovereignty of one state begins where the sovereignty of another state begins. That limitation is built into the nature of
state sovereignty under international law. To conceive it as unlimited as to negate its existence in the context of the co-
existence of sovereignties, resulting in the negation of international community composed of juridically equal states.
How is state sovereignty defined in international law?

The right to exercise in a definite portion of the globe the functions of a State to the exclusion of another state. According to
widely accepted opinion of Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas case, Sovereignty in the relations between states signifies
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein to the exclusion of any other
State, the functions of a State. The development of the national organization of States during the last few centuries, and, as a
corollary, the development of international law, have established this principle of the exclusive competence of the State in
regard to its own territory in such a way as to make it the point of departure in settling most questions that concern
international relations.
Again, it is important to view sovereignty in international law as the sovereignty of one State in relation to the sovereignty of
another State in conditions of co- existence.
Island Of Palmas Case

The island of Palmas is a single, isolated island found between Mindanao and Greenwich. Both US and Netherlands claim
territorial sovereignty over the island. US bases its title by cession from the Spaniards, claiming that Spain acquired title by
discovery in the 1500s. The Netherlands claims that the Dutch East Indies possessed and exercised rights of sovereignty
through conventions and agreements with the natives (Treaty of Suzerainty).
Territorial sovereignty, defined. It appears to follow that sovereignty in relation to a portion of the surface of the globe is a legal
condition necessary for the inclusion of such portion in the territory of a particular State. Sovereignty in relation to territory is
called territorial sovereignty.
Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence, in regard to a portion of the globe, is the
right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State. The development of the national
organization of States during the last few centuries and, corollarily, the development of international law, have established this
principle of the exclusive competence of the State in regard to its own territory in such a way as to make it the point of
departure in settling most questions that concern international relations.
Territorial sovereignty belongs always to one, or in exceptional circumstances to several, States, to the exclusion of all others.
The fact that the functions of a State can be performed by any State within a given zone is, on the other hand, precisely the
characteristic feature of the legal situation pertaining in those parts of the globe which, like the high seas or lands without a
master, cannot or do not yet form the territory of a State.
Territorial sovereignty [TS] is, in general, a situation recognized and delimited in space, either by so-called natural frontiers as
recognized by international law or by outward signs of delimitation that are undisputed, or else by legal engagements entered
into between interested neighbors, e.g. frontier conventions, or by acts of recognition of States within fixed boundaries.
Disputes with regards territorial sovereignty, how resolved. If a dispute arises as to the sovereignty over a portion of territory, it
is customary to examine which of the claiming States possesses a titlecession, conquest, occupation, etc.superior to that
advanced by the other State. However, if the contestation is based on the fact that the other Party has actually displayed
sovereignty, it cannt be sufficient to establish the title by which TS was validly acquired at a certain moment; it must also be
shown that the TS has continued to exist and did exist at the moment which, for the decision of the dispute, must be
considered critical. This demonstration consists in the actual display of State activities, such as belongs only to the territorial
sovereign.
Acquisition of title. Titles of acquisition of TS in present-day international law are either based on an act of effective
apprehension, e.g. occupation or conquest; or, like cession, presuppose that the ceding and the cessionary Powers or at least
one of them have the faculty of effectively disposing of the ceded territory. In the same way, natural accretion can only be
conceived of as an accretion to a portion of territory where there exists an actual sovereignty capable of extending to a spot
which falls within its sphere of activity. It seems therefore natural that an element which is essential for the constitution of
sovereignty should not be lacking in its continuation. So true is this that practice, as well as doctrine, recognizesthough
under different legal formulae and with certain differences as to the conditions requiredthat the continuous and peaceful
display of TS (peaceful in relation to other States) is as good as a title. The growing insistence with which international law,
ever since the middle of the 18 th century, has demanded that the occupation shall be effective would be inconceivable, if
effectiveness were required only for the act of acquisition and not equally for the maintenance of the right. If the effectiveness
has above all been insisted on in regard to occupation, this is because the question rarely arises in connection with territories
in which there is already an established order of things. Just as before the rise of international law, boundaries of lands were
necessarily determined by the fact that the power of a State was exercised within them, so too, under the reign of international
law, the fact of peaceful and continuous display is still one of the most important considerations in establishing boundaries
between States.

Correlative duty with regards territorial sovereignty. Territorial Sovereignty, as has already been said, involves the exclusive
right to display the activities of a State. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights
of other States, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war, together with the rights which each
State may claim for its nationals in foreign territory. Without manifesting its territorial sovereignty in a manner corresponding to
circumstances, the State cannot fulfill this duty.
Continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty. Although municipal law, with its complete judicial system, is able to recognize
abstract rights of property as existing apart from any material display of them, it has nonetheless limited their effect by the
principles of prescription and the protection of possession. International law, the structure of which is not based on any super-
State organization, cannot be presumed to reduce a right such as TS, with which almost all international relations are bound
up, to the category of an abstract right, without concrete manifestations.
The principle that continuous and peaceful display of the functions of State within a given region is a constituent element of TS
is not only based on the conditions of the formation of independent States and their boundaries, as well as on an international
jurisprudence and doctrine widely accepted.
Manifestations of TS asume different forms, according to time and place. Although continuous in principle, sovereignty cannot
be exercised in fact at every moment on every point of a territory. The intermittence and discontinuity compatible with the
maintenance of the right necessarily differ according as inhabited or uninhabited regions are involved, or regions enclosed
within territories in which sovereignty is incontestably displayed or again regions accessible from, e.g., the high seas. It is true
that neighboring States may by convention fix limits to their own sovereignty, even in regions such as the interior of scarcely
explored continents where such sovereignty is scarcely manifested, and in this way may prevent the other from any
penetration of its territory, e.g. the delimitation of Hinterland.
If, however, no conventional line of sufficient topographical precision exists, or if there are gaps in the frontiers otherwise
established, or if a conventional line leaves room for doubt, or if, as e.g. in the case of an island situated in the high seas, the
question arises whether a title is valid erga omnes, the actual continuous and peaceful display of state functions is, in case of
dispute, the sound and natural criterium [sic] of TS.
Intertemporal law. As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at successive periods is to be applied
(the so-called intertemporal law), a distinction must be made between the creation of rights and the existence of rights. The
same principle which subjects the act creative of a right to the law in force at the time the right arises, demands that the
existence of the right, i.e. its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions required by the evolution of law.
Discovery is not enough, only an inchoate title. If, on the other hand, the view is adopted that discovery does not create a
definitive title of sovereignty but only an inchoate title, such a title exists, it is true, without external manifestation. However,
according to the view that has prevailed since the 19 th century, an inchoate title of discovery must be completed within a
reasonable period by effective occupation.
An inchoate title could not prevail over the continuous and peaceful display of authority by another State; for such display may
prevail even over a prior, definitive title put forward by another State.
Principle of contiguity. Although States have in certain circumstances maintained that islands relatively close to their shores
belonged to them in virtue of their geographical situation, it is impossible to show the existence of a rule of positive
international law to the effect that islands situated outside territorial waters should belong to a State from the mere fact that its
territory forms the terra firma (nearest continent or island of considerable size). Not only would it seem that there are no
precedents sufficiently frequent and sufficiently precise in their bearing to establish such a rule, but the alleged principle itself
is by its very nature so uncertain and contested that even Govts of the same State have on different occasions maintained
contradictory opinions as to its soundness.
Dutch East Indies exercise of sovereignty. If the claim to sovereignty is based on the continuous and peaceful display of State
authority, the fact of such display must be shown precisely in relation to the disputed territory. It is not necessary that there
should be a special administration established in this territory; but it cannot suffice for the territory to be attached to another by
a legal relation not recognized in international law as valid against a State contesting this claim to sovereignty; what is
essential in such a case is the continuous and peaceful display of actual power in the contested region.
The acts of the Dutch East Indies are attributable to the state itself. The acts of the East India Company, in view of occupying
or colonizing the regions at issue must, in international law, be entirely assimilated to acts of the Netherlands State itself.
From the end of the 16th till the 19th century, companies formed by individuals and engaged in economic pursuits (Chartered
Companies) were invested by the State to whom they were subject with public powers for the acquisition and administration of
colonies.
It is not necessary that the display of sovereignty should go back to a very far distant period. It may suffice that such display
existed in 1898, and had already existed as continuous and peaceful before that date long enough to enable any Power who
might have considered herself as possessing sovereignty over the island, or having a claim to sovereignty, to have, according
to local conditions, a reasonable possibility for ascertaining the existence of a state of things contrary to her real or alleged
rights.
The Netherlands has proved the exercise of some acts of State authority and the existence of external signs of authority (flags,
coats of arms). These facts at least constitute a beginning of establishment of sovereignty by continuous and peaceful display
of state authority, or a commencement of occupation of an island not yet forming a part of the territory of a state; and such a
state of things would create in favour of the Netherlands an inchoate title for completing the conditions of sovereignty. Such
inchoate title, based on display of state authority, would prevail over an inchoate title derived from discovery, especially if this
latter title has been left for a very long time without completion by occupation; and it would equally prevail over any claim
which, in equity, might be deduced from the notion of contiguity.
*Sir:
US: Discovery Inchoate title Netherlands: Treaty

Huber: Discovery is not enough, international law Agreement of the Dutch with the natives allowed
prescribed that not only discovery but also the Dutch to exercise sovereignty over the islands
effective occupation through:
1. taxation
2. provision of defense
3. Spain never protested the exercise of
territorial rights by Netherlands
Critical Date (definition) regardless of what parties will do (subsequent events, etc.) the court will freeze the period of the
controversy to the date when the controversy became ripe for adjudication. And all the events after such date will be ignored.
Critical date in this case treaty of paris (1898)
United States could have won the case if they had shown that at the time there was no separation of church and state. By
showing that there were priests, civil registrar, collection of tribunes, etc., they would have shown Spanish occupation of the
islands.
Principle of Continguity presumption of sovereignty in favor of a particular state wherein islands relatively close to the shores
of a state belonged to them by virtue of their geographical proximity to each other.
In this case, the tribunal disregarded this because: no precedent, so uncertain and uncontested, contradictory
opinions, lacking in precision, and arbitrary results
* Reviewer notes:
The Critical Period is a juridical technique in the use or exclusion of evidence consisting of self- serving acts of parties at a
stage when it was evident that a dispute existed.
The court held that there was indeed cession through the treaty of Paris. However, Spain could not transfer to US more rights
than she herself possessed; and Spain did not have the island based on discovery. The island was only reported to have been
seen but there was no sign of possession or administration by Spain or any mention of a contract with the natives.
Although under international law in the 16th century, seeing without occupation amounted to discovery. However, IL
underwent modifications. Based on the INTERTEMPORAL LAW, the act which creates a right is subjected to the law in force
at the time the right arises. But the existence if a right must follow the conditions required by the evolution of law the 19 th
century IL which requires effective occupation to constitute territorial sovereignty.
SS Lotus Case (France V. Turkey)

There was a collision at the high seas between a French mail steamer Lotus with the Turkish collier Boz Kourt. The Boz Court
was cut in two and sank. 8 Turkish nationals on board died. The officer on watch on board Lotus was Lt. Demons, a French
citizen. Lt. Demons was arrested by the Turkish authorities and was subjected to trial in the Turkish courts. The French
government protested the actions of the Turkish authorities, protesting his arrest, demanding his release or obtaining transfer
of the case from the Turkish Courts to the French Courts. The parties submitted the conflict tot the Court at the Hague.
State discretion in applying local laws. The case under international law at present is that far from laying down a general
prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons,
property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in
certain cases by prohibitive rules. In other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and
most suitable.
Territioriality of criminal law is not absolute in international law. Though it is true that in all systems of law the principle of the
territorial character of criminal law is fundamental, it is equally true that all or nearly all these systems of law extend their action
to offences committed outside the territory of the State which adopts them, and they do so in ways which vary from State to
State. The territoriality of criminal law is not an absolute principle of international law and does not coincide with territorial
sovereignty.
Nationality of victim is not the sole basis of jurisdiction. Its not necessary to consider the contention that a State cannot punish
offences committed abroad by a foreigner simply by reason of the nationality of the victim. For this contention only relates to
the case where the nationality of the victim is the only criterion on which the criminal jurisdiction of the State is based. Such
argument could only be used in the present case if international law forbade Turkey to take into consideration the fact that the
offence produced its effects on the Turkish vessel and consequently in a place assimilated to Turkish territory in which the

application of Turkish criminal law cannot be challenged, even in regard to offences committed there by foreigners. But no
such rule of international law exists.
Jurisdiction can be determined by looking at the elements [effects] of the crime. It is certain that the courts of many countries,
even of countries which have given their criminal legislation a strictly territorial character, interpret criminal law in the sense
that offences, the authors of which at the moment of commission are in the territory of another State, are nevertheless to be
regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one of the constituent elements of the offence, and more
especially its effects, have taken place there. French courts have, in regard to a variety of situations, given decisions
sanctioning this way of interpreting the territorial principle.
Vessels are covered under the jurisdiction of the state whose flag they fly. Vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority
except that of the State whose flag they fly. In virtue of the principle of the freedom of the seas (absence of any territorial
sovereignty upon the high seas), no State may exercise any kind of jurisdiction over foreign vessels upon them. Thus, if a war
vessel, happening to be at the spot where a collision occurs between a vessel flying its flag and a foreign vessel were to send
on board the latter an officer to make investigations or to take evidence, such an act would undoubtedly be contrary to
international law.
But it does not follow that a State can never in its own territory exercise jurisdiction over acts which have occurred on board a
foreign ship on the high seas. A corollary of the principle of the freedom of the seas is that a ship on the high seas is
assimilated to the territory of the State the flag of which it flies, for, just as in its own territory, that State exercises its authority,
upon it, and no other State may do so.
All that can be said is that by virtue of the principle of the freedom of the seas, a ship is placed in the same position as national
territory but there is nothing to support the claim according to which the rights of the State under whose flag the vessel sails
may go farther than the rights which it exercises within its territory properly so called.
If a guilty act committed on the high seas produces its, effects on a vessel flying another flag or in foreign territory, the same
principles must be applied as if the territories of two different States were concerned, and the conclusion must therefore be
drawn that there is no rule of international law prohibiting the State to which the ship on which the effects of the offence have
taken place belongs, from regarding the offence as having been committed in its territory and prosecuting, accordingly, the
delinquent. This conclusion could only be overcome if it were shown that there was a rule of customary international law which
established the exclusive jurisdiction of the State whose flag was flown.
*Sir: The decision in the SS Lotus case has already been overturned by the UNCLOS.
Eastern Greenland Case

Norway, in its proclamation of July 10, 1931, said that it is taking possession of which is officially confirmed, and which is
placed under Norwegian sovereignty of Elrik Raudes Land in Eastern Greenland. This proclamation was criticized for its
failure to specify the limits of the occupation but it must have been intended that on the eastern side of the sea and the
western side the inland ice should constitute the limits of the area occupied. This 1931 Proclamation of Norway triggered the
controversy between Denmark and Norway. Denmark claims that the sovereignty which it enjoys over Greenland has existed
for a long, time, has been continuously and peacefully exercised, and until the present dispute, has not been contested by any
Power. Also, Denmark claims that Norway, by treaty or otherwise herself recognized Danish sovereignty over Greenland as a
whole and therefore cannot dispute it. Norway claims that Denmark possessed no sovereignty over the area which Norway
occupied on July 10, 1931, and that at the time of the occupation the area was terra nullius.
Constructive Possession. A claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular act or title such as a treaty of cession but
merely upon continued display of authority, involves two elements each of which must be shown to exist: the intention and will
to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such authority.
Another circumstance which must be taken into account by any tribunal which has to adjudicate upon a claim to sovereignty
over a particular territory is the extent to which the sovereignty is also claimed by some other Power. In most of the cases
involving claims to territorial sovereignty which have come before an international tribunal, there have been two competing
claims to the sovereignty, and the tribunal has had to decide which of the two is the stronger. One of the peculiar features of
the present case is that up to 1931 there was no claim by any Power other than Denmark to the sovereignty over Greenland.
Indeed, up till 1931, no Power disputed the Danish claim to sovereignty.
Loss of sovereignty by conquest. Conquest only operates as a cause of loss of sovereignty when there is war between two
States and by reason of the defeat of one of them sovereignty over territory passes from the loser to the victorious State. The
principle does not apply in a case where a settlement has been established in a distant country and its inhabitants are
massacred by the aboriginal population. Nor is the fact of "conquest" established. It is known now that the settlements must
have disappeared at an early date, but at the time there seems to have been a belief that despite the loss of contact and the
loss of knowledge of the whereabouts of the settlements one or both of them would again be discovered and found to contain
the descendants of the early settlers.
Loss of sovereignty by voluntary abandonment. There is nothing to show any definite renunciation on the part of the Kings of
Norway or Denmark. Also, despite having no intercourse with Greenland, the tradition of the Kings rights lived on, and in the
early part of the 17th Century, a revival of interest in Greenland on the part of both the King and of his people took place. That
period was an era of adventure and exploration. The example set by the navigators of foreign countries was inspiring, and a

desire arose in Norway and Denmark to recover the territory which had been subject to the sovereignty of the King's ancestors
in the past.
Norway: Denmark only possessed West Coast of Greenland. Court: Naaah!. The burden of proof lies on Norway to prove that
Denmark used the word Greenland only to mean the colonies on the West Coast. The geographical meaning of the word
"Greenland", i.e. the name which is habitually used in the maps to denominate the whole island, must be regarded as the
ordinary meaning of the word. In the opinion of the Court, Norway has not succeeded in establishing her contention. It is not
sufficient for her to show that in many of these legislative and administrative acts action was only to be taken in the colonies.
The fact that most of these acts were concerned with what happened in the colonies and that the colonies were all situated on
the West coast is not by itself sufficient ground for holding that the authority in virtue of which the act was taken whether
legislative or administrative was also restricted to the colonized area. Unless it was so restricted, it affords no ground for
interpreting the word Greenland in this restricted sense.
Estoppel and acquiescence by Norway. the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway and Sweden (Sweden had control over
Norway during this time), wrote to the British Minister in Stockholm that the King of Sweden and Norway agreed to renounce in
favor of the Kingdom of Denmark their claims over Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands. The letter was written because
Norway-Sweden was asking for the intervention of the British Prince Regent in settling its differences with Denmark, especially
with its financial obligations under the Treaty of Kiel.
A second series of undertakings by Norway, recognizing Danish sovereignty over Greenland, is afforded by various bilateral
agreements concluded by Norway with Denmark, and by various multilateral agreements to which both Denmark and Norway
were contracting Parties, in which Greenland has been described as a Danish colony or as forming part of Denmark or in
which Denmark has been allowed to exclude Greenland from the operation of the agreement.
Also, Denmark maintained that the promise by in 1919 by M. Ihlen, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign affairs, speaking on
behalf of his Government debarred Norway from proceeding to any occupation of territory in Greenland even if she had not by
other acts recognized an existing Danish sovereignty there.
*Sir: Although both sides were able to present evidence establishing their sovereignty over the area, such as expeditions,
granting of concessions, legislation, etc., what won it for Denmark was estoppel or acquiescence because of the Ihlen
Declaration. Although acquiescence is not a means of acquiring title, it is a proof of a better claim.
There is equal preponderance of evidence presented by both states as to their occupation of a certain portion of Greenland.
However, Norways possession was not in the concept of a title, i.e. there was no animus possidendi, which is one of the 2
requirements of sovereignty. It did not have the intent to possess in behalf of a sovereign. Remember that it is not only
physical possession that is important. There must also be intent.
Minquiers & Ecrehos Case (UK v. France), (1951)

Proof of territorial sovereignty: exercise of jurisdiction, local administration and legislation. Both UK and France seek to
establish sovereignty over the Minquiers Group and Ecrehos Group of islets and rocks by citing ancient title and treaties. UK
won because of ordinary local administration, specifically referring to: [1] Jersey courts exercising criminal jurisdiction for
nearly 100 years; [2] Jersey law requires the holding of inquests on corpses found in the area; [3] houses built in the area were
assessed for the levying of taxes; [4] licensing of fishing boats; [5] real estate contracts relating to property in the area were
registered in the public registry of deeds; [7] Jersey customs authorities established a custom house for the purpose of a
census.
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway), (1951)

Circumstances affecting delimitation. UK argues that the baseline should be the low-water mark on permanently dry land and
that the trace parallele method should be used. However, ICJ allowed Norways method of delimiting the fisheries zone
through the straight base-line method reckoned from the outer line of the skjaergaard because [1] this is in consonance with
geographic realities, diversity of facts and special circumstances; [2] this gives a simpler form to the belt; [3] general
toleration of the international community; [4] the 10-mile-maximium rule on the maximum length of the baseline does not apply
because it has always been opposed by Norway.
Skjaergaard; defined. A skjaergaard is made up of around 120,000 insular formations, lying along the coast of the mainland.
The clearest dividing line between land and sea is the skjaergaard, not the coast of the mainland.
Straight baselines method; defined. This method consists in selecting appropriate points on the low water mark and drawing
straight lines between them. Method applies to well-defined bays and cases of minor curvature of the coastline. The goal is to
provide a simpler form to the belt of the territorial waters.
Trace parallele method; defined. This method consists in drawing the outer limit of the belt of territorial waters by following the
coast in all its sinuosities. Method applies to ordinary coasts.
Criteria provide courts with basis for their decisions. The following are fundamental considerations inherent in the nature of the
territorial sea. First, the drawing of baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast.
Ratio for this is because it is the land which confers upon the coastal state the right to the waters off its coast. Second, the sea

areas lying within the baseline must be closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. Third,
the economic interest peculiar to the region, as evidenced by long usage, should be considered.
Western Sahara Case (1975)

Area was not terra nullius at the time of Spains colonialization. Terra nullius means a territory belonging to no one, over which
sovereignty can be acquired by occupation. This is because: [1] state practice indicates that a territory inhabited by tribes
having a socio-political organization is not terrae nullius; [2] Spain never treated its case as occupation, but merely
protection.
There are no legal ties so there can be no reversion to either Morocco or Mauritiana. Both Morocco and Mauritiana claim to
have legal ties with Western Sahara prior to its colonization by Spain through. Morocco claims to have immemorial
possession, and public display of sovereignty, uninterrupted and uncontested for centuries, as evidenced by the Arab
conquest in 7th Century AD. The court rejected this contention because there was no display of control, but merely of
allegiance of some of the nomadic people.
Mauritiana bases its claim on the Mauritian entity, which denotes the cultural, geographical and social entity existing in the
tribes of Western Sahara. The court rejected this contention because there was no common institution recognized by the
tribes.
In addition, the ICJ took note of the following facts: [1] the practice of taxation was done by the people of Western Sahara for
themselves; [2] the nomadic nature of the tribes is contrary to the concept of sovereignty; [3] there was no evidence the people
recognized any further allegiance outside their local leaders.
Preah Vihear Temple Case, (Cambodia v. Thailand), (1962)

Estoppel Principle. Siam (Thailand) is estopped from questioning the delimitation in the maps because [1] Siam did not react
to the map when it was so presented; [2] France (Cambodia) relied on Siams non-objection.
Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), (1986)

The dispute relates to the delimitation of part of the common barrier between the former colonies of Upper Volta (now, Burkina
Faso) and Sudan (now, Mali), as inherited from the French administration and existing at the moment of independence. ICJ
used the uti possidetis juris principle and looked into evidence of colonial heritage
Uti Possidetis Juris principle. This principle proves administrative boundaries or colonial heritage during the colonial period,
and imposes the obligation to respect pre-existing international frontiers in the event of State succession. It aims to secure
respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved. The rationale for this principle is that the
maintenance of the territorial status quo is seen as the wisest course in order to preserve what has been achieved by people
who have struggled for their independence and to avoid a disruption.
Effectivites; effective occupation; defined. Effective occupation is a mode of acquiring title which seeks to prove title to the
territory. This concept deals with the exercise of sovereignty of a state over a particular territory.
Effectivies; colonial effectivites; defined. State succession is a mode of acquiring title which seeks to prove administrative
boundaries. This concept deals with acts of administration.
Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), (1999)

A treaty between the colonial powers Germany and UK was entered into delimiting Southwest Africa. Later, Namibia became
independent from Germany; and Botswana was formed in the former British territory. The dispute relates to the location of the
boundary around the Kasikili/Sedudu Island between Namibia and Botswana.
Uti Possidetis Juris principle. There is no agreement in the treaty as to the exact boundary line; and neither is there proof of
effective occupation by Namibia and Botswana. In the absence of these circumstances, Namibia and Botswana, as
successors, must respect the boundary set by the colonial powers.
Libya v. Chad, (1994)

A treaty between the colonial powers France and Libya was entered into delimiting its frontiers. Later, Chad and Italy became
independent of France and Libya, respectively. The dispute relates to the expiration of the treaty with Chad citing the uti
possidetis juris principle and Italy arguing that there is no longer a boundary since the treaty has expired.
Uti Possidetis Juris principle. Successor states must respect the colonial boundaries of colonial rulers.
Theory of auto-imitatation. Notwithstanding the fact that the treaty provides for a mere 20-year effectivity, the theory of auto-
imitation provide that boundaries have a life of their own separate from the treaty itself because a boundary established by
treaty achieves permanence. This is in line with the need to prevent conflict and instability.
El Salvador v. Honduras, with Nicaragua intervening, (1992)

El Salvador and Honduras became independent states after the disintegration of the Spanish empire in Central America. Even
before their independence, Spanish Central America had overlapping administrative boundaries. Parties seek to have the
boundaries determined.
Uti Possidetis Juris principle. The principle will be used where the colonial boundaries are not clear as is in this case where
lack of sophisticated means of surveying led to cases of overlapping administrative boundaries.
Effective occupation. The ICJ did not look into effective occupation because the territories were subject to only 1 colonial
power.
Colonial effectivites. In order to determine the colonial boundaries, the ICJ looked into the colonial effectivites or
contemporaneous acts, which refer to the belief of one that he belongs to one or the other unit.
Clipperton Island Arbitration (France v. Mexico), (1931)

Clipperton island is terra nullius considering the territory was uninhabited and without administration. Sovereignty over the
island was declared by France from the moment its navy members landed on the island in 1858 and was published in a
Honolulu journal, The Polynesian in the same year.
Physical occupation; not necessary. France successfully acquired title by occupation. Physical occupation is not required
where: [1] territory is terra nullius; [2] at the time the occupying state makes its appearance there; and [3] taking of possession
and intent to possess is shown by a pubic declaration of sovereignty.
Eritrea v. Yemen, (1998)

The dispute relates to ownership over the red sea islands between Eritrea which claims title by succession, and Yemen which
claims title by reversion and historic title.
No title by succession. Italy, Eritreas predecessor, did not obtain title to the territory under the Treaty of Lausanne because it
was provided that the allied powers have yet to agree on who can claim sovereignty over the territory. Therefore, Eritrea did
not gain title by succession.
No historic title. Medieval Yemen had no concept of territorial sovereignty. Therefore, Yemen cannot claim title by automatic
reversion.
Primary question in territorial disputes. Splitting of award. The court will determine who has a better claim. The group of
islands need not be awarded to one claimant.
Effective occupation. Effective occupation, such as petroleum concessions, is prima facie evidence of title.
Portico doctrine. This is a method by which off-shore islands can be attributed to a States sovereignty. Islands near coastal
states must pertain to such states. The Mohabbakahs islands, located within the territorial sea of Eritrea, properly belongs to it.
Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia)
Indonesia and Malaysia lay claim over the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan. Both countries cite treaties, colonial effectivites, and
title by succession as proof of ownership.
Effective occupation. ICJ rule in favor of Malaysia because effective occupation was proved by its effective acts of
administration, specifically: [1] its regulation on gathering of turtle eggs; [2] its building of lighthouses; [3] its declaration of a
bird sanctuary.
Chinas Claim to the Spratlys Islands, Roque

When oil was discovered, many countries lay claim over it. China bases its claim on discovery, effective occupation, and
recognition. The Philippines bases its claim on effective occupation after Japan renounced its title over the islands. The article
discusses the modes of acquiring territory.
Modes of Acquiring Territory:

Effective occupation. Effective occupation is the official exercise of exclusive authority by an occupying state or any authorized
person, with or without physical occupation depending on whether or not the island is uninhabited (Clipperton Island
Arbitration). Note that territory must be terra nullius.
Acquisitive prescription. Acquisition of territory results where there is long and continued possession.
Other Principles Insufficient for the Acquisition of Territory:

Estoppel. Estoppel is a general principle of international law which precludes another claimant from acquiring title.

Discovery; inchoate title. Discovery alone gives the claimant merely an inchoate title. This must concur with effective
occupation for there to be acquisition of property (Island of Palmas Case). Note that territory must be terra nullius.
Possession. Possession is a strong evidence of title when coupled with effective occupation, but is not enough on its own for
the acquisition of title. Note that possession requires animus possedendi.
Constructive possession. There is constructive possession of the whole island or archipelago where a coast of the island, or
an island/islet/rock of the archipelago have been actually occupied by another state. There can be no constructive possession
where the occupied island is so far distant from the others in the group.
Contiguity. Contiguity merely raises a presumption of occupation.
Conquest. Conquest is a means by which territory can be acquired by an enemy through the complete and final subjugation of
the territory, coupled with the enemys declaration of its intention to conquer. Conquest was once an accepted norm, but is
now illegal.
2. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS) 2
a. INTERNAL WATERS
Internal waters are all waters landwards from the baseline of the territory (rivers, lakes, bays, etc). Sovereignty over these is
the same in extent as sovereignty over land, and is not subject to the right of innocent passage. However, in Saudi Arabia v.
Aramco the arbitrator said that according to international law ports of every state must be open to foreign vessels and can only
be closed when vital interests of the state so requires. But according to Nicaragua v. US, a coastal state may regulate access
to its ports.
Bays are well-marked indentations whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain land-locked
waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. To be considered a bay, the area of the indentation must be as
large as, or larger than, that of a semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that indentation ( the semi-
circle test).
Historic bays are those which are treated by the coastal state as internal waters on the basis of historic rights acknowledged
by other states.
* Sir: foreign vessels without a right to call on ports UNLESS there is a Treaty of Commerce, Friendship & Navigation. For
internal waters, the coastal State has absolute territorial jurisdiction, thus it may exclude all foreign vessels from its ports. If the
foreign vessel is merely passing through, the flag State has jurisdiction (French rule). If the vessel is docked, the coastal State
may exercise jurisdiction (English rule).
Nicaragua v. US (1986)
US military laid mines in Nicaraguan internal waters and in its territorial sea and along Nicaraguan ports causing material
damage to Nicaragua and innocent vessels. The US Government did not issue any public and official warning to international
shipping of the existence and location of the mines.
2
Thanks to Gem, Carol, Ben, and Jerome for this part. Also, the Art. 6 referred to in some of the cases is Art. 6 of the Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf.
Internal waters. Coastal States Sovereignty extends to internal waters and airspace. Coastal States Laws apply in Internal
Waters. The laying of mines within the ports of another State is governed by the law relating to internal waters, which are
subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State. The position is similar as regards mines placed in the territorial sea. It is
therefore the sovereignty of the coastal State which is affected in such cases. It is also by virtue of its sovereignty that the
coastal State may regulate access to its ports. On the other hand, it is true that in order to enjoy access to ports, foreign
vessels possess a customary right of innocent passage in territorial waters for the purposes of entering or leaving internal
waters.
Freedom of Navigation hampered. Such is guaranteed, first in the exclusive economic zones and beyond territorial waters and
on the high seas, it follows that any State which enjoys a right of access to ports for its ships also enjoys all the freedom
necessary for maritime navigation. If this right of access to the port is hindered by the laying of mines by another State, what is
infringed is the freedom of communications and of maritime commerce. At all events, it is certain that interference with
navigation in these areas prejudices both the sovereignty of the coastal State over its internal waters, and the right of free
access enjoyed by foreign ships.
b. TERRITORIAL SEA
This is the belt of sea outwards from the baseline and up to 12 nautical miles beyond. Regarding its width, the original rule was
the cannon shot rule, where the width was measured in terms of the range of shore-based artillery. This later became the 3-
mile rule. Under the UNCLOS, the rule is now 12 miles. Take note, however, that where the application of the 12-mile rule to
neighboring littoral states would result in overlapping, the dividing line is instead a median line equidistant from the opposite
baselines. But this equidistant rule does not apply where historic title or other special circumstances require a different
measurement.
The extent of the territorial sea depends on the baseline. The baseline is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large
scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State. The width of the territorial sea is measured from this line. There are 2
ways of drawing the baseline. The normal baseline is drawn following the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-
scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State. This line follows the curvatures of the coast and therefore would
normally not consist of straight lines. There is no fixed norm for determining this low-water line or mark, but the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case suggested using the mean between the high and low tides.
Archipelagic states instead use straight baselines. These are drawn connecting selected points on the coast without
appreciable departure from the general shape of the coast. This was the method used in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,
and is now in Art. 7(1) of UNCLOS. This article provides that straight baselines may be used where the coastline is deeply
indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity. Some guidelines to be observed
in using this method:
1. the drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast
2. the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of
internal waters
3. the baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations
4. take account of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and importance of which are clearly
evidenced by long usage
5. this method may not be applied in such a manner as to cut off the territorial sea of another State from the high seas
or an EEZ (ex. Singapore)
The sovereignty of the coastal state over its territorial sea, the airspace above it, and the seabed is the same as its sovereignty
over its land territory. However the sea is subject to the right of innocent passage by other states. The rule on innocent
passage applies to ships and aircrafts. Submarines however must surface.
Innocent passage is navigation through waters in an expeditious and continuous manner, which is not prejudicial to the peace,
good order, or security of the coastal state. Some examples of passage which is not innocent are fishing, polluting, weapons
practice, spying, research activities, and any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. Coastal states do have
rights of protection, which is the unilateral right to verify the innocent character of passage. Thus, they may take necessary
steps to prevent not innocent passage, and they may temporarily suspend the right of innocent passage if this is essential for
the protection of its security.
Take note that islands and rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life have their own territorial sea.
Within the territorial sea, the flag state has criminal and civil jurisdiction. However, there are exceptions. With respect to
criminal jurisdiction, the coastal state can exercise its criminal jurisdiction in connection with any crime committed on board the
ship during its passage if:
1. the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal state
2. the crime disturbs the peace of the country or good order of the territorial sea
3. the ships master or diplomatic agent/consular officer of the flag state requested the assistance of the local authorities
4. it is necessary to suppress illicit traffic in narcotic drugs.
The coastal state may exercise its civil jurisdiction by levying execution or arresting the ship only in respect of obligations or
liabilities assumed or incurred by the ship itself in the course of or for the purpose of its voyage through the waters of the
coastal state.
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (1951)

In 1935 Norway delimited a certain fisheries zone which was exclusively reserved to its nationals. This delimitation, using
straight baselines, was opposed by the UK. The coastal zone involved has a distinctive configuration (long and very broken).
The Court upheld this Norwegian delimitation.
Use the low-water mark. For the purpose of measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, it is the low-water mark as opposed to
the high-water mark, or the mean between the two tides, which has generally been adopted in the practice of States. This
criterion is the most favourable to the coastal State and clearly shows the character of territorial waters as appurtenant to the
land territory.
Straight baselines method. This method consists of selecting appropriate points on the low-water mark and drawing straight
lines between them. This has been validly done, not only in the case of well-defined bays, but also in cases of minor
curvatures of the coast line where it was solely a question of giving a simpler form to the belt of territorial waters.
Norways baselines were valid. But the Norwegian delimitation is still subject to certain principles which make it possible to
judge the delimitations validity under international law. The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it
cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act
of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the
delimitation with regard to other States depends upon international law. Certain basic considerations inherent in the nature of
the territorial sea bring to light certain criteria which, though not entirely precise, can provide courts with an adequate basis for
their decisions, which can be adapted to the diverse facts in question. Among these some reference must be made to the
close dependence of the territorial sea upon the land domain. It is the land which confers upon the coastal State a right to the
waters off its coasts. It follows that while such a State must be allowed the latitude necessary in order to be able to adapt its
delimitation to practical needs and local requirements, the drawing of base-lines must not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general direction of the coast. Another fundamental consideration is the more or less close relationship existing
between certain sea areas and the land formations which divide or surround them. The real question raised in the choice of
base-lines is in effect whether certain sea areas lying within these lines are sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be
subject to the regime of internal waters. This idea, which is at the basis of the determination of the rules relating to bays,
should be liberally applied in the case of a coast, the geographical configuration of which is as unusual as that of Norway. The
last consideration is that of certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and importance of which are clearly
evidenced by long usage.
El Salvador v. Honduras, Nicaragua Intervening (1992)

The legal status of the islands located in the Gulf of Fonseca became an issue of dispute; the question of the land frontier
followed in 1861. Border incidents led to mounting tension between El Salvador and Honduras and, ultimately, to an armed
conflict in 1969
Islands of the Gulf of Fonseca. None of the islands had been terra nullius in 1821, the date of independence. Thus,
sovereignty over the islands had been achieved according to the uti possidetis juris principle (colonial boundaries are
continually adopted). However, the application of this principle suffered from the lack of documents that might have testified
clearly the appertainance of the islands to one administrative district or the other. Thus the Court was forced to concentrate
more on the behaviour of the parties with regard to the islands after 1821. On this basis the Court found that El Tigre
appertained to Honduras and Meanguera and Meanguerita to El Salvador.
Gulf of Fonseca = Juridical Bay under UNCLOS and Historical Bay under Customary International Law. Considering the
dimensions and proportions, the Gulf would today be regarded as a juridical bay in accordance with UNCLOS. However, the
Gulf was not a single State bay but constituted a so called historical bay, which is neither defined in the 1958 Convention nor
in the Convention of 1982. From this fact the Court concluded that its decision had to be taken on the basis of customary
international law. Court looked at the Central American Court of Justice of 1917 conclusion that the Gulf of Fonseca effectively
constituted a "closed sea" belonging to all three coastal States communally, with the exception of a three mile zone
established unilaterally by each coastal State. Thus, the Central American Court viewed the Gulf of Fonseca as a
condominium resulting from the succession of the three States from Spain in 1821. Until then, the Gulf had been a single State
bay belonging to Spain alone. According to the Court, the decision of the Central American Court underlined the fact that at the
time of independence, no boundaries were delimited in the Gulf and thus the waters had remained undivided.
Court held that Gulf of Fonseca was a case of "historic waters", whereby the three coastal States had succeeded to communal
sovereignty. In contrast to the frontier delimited on land, the waters of the Gulf had never been divided or otherwise delimited
after the independence of the three coastal States. Thus, the communal succession for the three States was a logical
consequence of the uti possidetis juris principle with regard to the sovereignty of the Gulf.
United States vs. California (1965)

Case involves the interpretation of some terms used in the Submerged Lands Act. State of California and the Federal
government are trying to determine who owns and has jurisdiction over the subsoil, seabed of the continental shelf and the
resources located therein along the California. To resolve such, the Court discusses the definition of relevant maritime terms.
Jurisdiction. Federal government owns and has exclusive jurisdiction over such beyond 3 miles seaward from the coastline.
California owns and has exclusive jurisdiction over such within 3 miles or the tidelands along its coast (defined as the shore of
the mainland and of islands, between the line of mean high water and the line of mean lower low water).
Definitions. Court adopts the definitions in the International Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone:
Coastline - (Art. 8 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone)
(a) The line of mean lower low water on the mainland, on islands, and on low-tide elevations lying wholly or partly within
three geographical miles from the line of mean lower low water on the mainland or on an island; and
(b) The line marking the seaward limit of inland waters.
This includes modifications by natural or artificial means, and includes the outermost permanent harbour works that form an
integral part of the harbour system
"Island" - a naturally-formed area of land surrounded by water, which is above the level of mean high water;
"Low-tide elevation" - a naturally-formed area of land surrounded by water at mean lower low water, which is above the level of
mean lower low water but not above the level of mean high water;
"Mean lower low water" - the average elevation of all the daily lower low tides occurring over a period of 18.6 years;
"Mean high water" - the average elevation of all the high tides occurring over a period of 18.6 years;
"Geographical mile" - a distance of 1852 meters (6076.10333 U.S. Survey Feet or approximately 6076.11549 International
Feet).
Roadsteads - waters between islands, and waters between islands and the mainland are not per se inland waters.
"Inland waters" (Par. 2(b) Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone) waters landward of the baseline of the
territorial sea and includes:
(a) Any river or stream flowing directly into the sea, landward of a straight line across its mouth;
(b) Any port, landward of its outermost permanent harbor works and a straight line across its entrance;
(c) Any "historic bay," as that term is used in paragraph 6 of Article 7 of the
Convention, defined essentially as a bay over which the United States has traditionally asserted and maintained
dominion with the acquiescence of foreign nations;
(d) Semi Circle Test
Any other bay (defined as a well-marked coastal indentation having such penetration, in proportion to the width of
its entrance, as to contain landlocked waters, and having an area, including islands within the bay, at least as great
as the area of a semicircle whose diameter equals the length of the closing line across the entrance of the bay, or the
sum of such closing lines if the bay has more than one entrance), landward of a straight line across its entrance or, if
the entrance is more than 24 geographical miles wide, landward of a straight line not over 24 geographical miles long,
drawn within the bay so as to enclose the greatest possible amount of water. An estuary of a river is treated in the
same way as a bay.
US v. Louisiana (1969)
The issue is about the correct definition of Inland Waters. U.S. argues that the definitions of inland waters contained in the
International Convention on the Territorial Sea (ICTS) should prevail over Louisianas contention that it should be the Inland
Water Line (IWL) fixed by the Commandant of the Coast Guard in 1895.
Sustained the California cas. Court sustains the adoption of the ICTS definitions in the U.S. v. California case. The ICTS
definition prevails and it is as follows - "the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact
with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters."
Baseline. The line marking the seaward limit of inland waters, is also to be drawn in accordance with the definitions of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
Historic title. Whether particular waters are inland has depended on historical as well as geographical factors but as we said in
United States v. California, it is generally agreed that historic title can be claimed only when the "coastal nation has traditionally
asserted and maintained dominion with the acquiescence of foreign nations."
3 Zones of Navigable Seas under General Principles of IL

Inland, or internal waters Marginal, or territorial, sea High seas
Nearest to the nation's shores are Beyond the inland waters, and Outside the territorial sea, which
its. These are subject to the measured from their seaward are international waters not
complete sovereignty of the edge, is a belt known as the. subject to the dominion of any
nation, as much as if they were a Within it the coastal nation may single nation.
part of its land territory, and the exercise extensive control but
coastal nation has the privilege cannot deny the right of innocent
even to exclude foreign vessels passage to foreign nations
altogether.

Stable Coastline Policy not convincing enough. The policy in favor of a certain and stable coastline, strong as it is, would
necessarily outweigh countervailing policy considerations under the Submerged Lands Act. We recognized in California the
desirability of "a single coastline for both the administration of the Submerged Lands Act and the conduct of our future
international relations."
c. STRAITS
Straits used for international navigation (to navigate between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another part of the high
seas or an EEZ) are under the purview of UNCLOS, but the legal regime in such straits in which passage is regulated in whole
or in part by long-standing international conventions in force specifically relating to such straits is not affected. Through these
waters, ships and aircraft of all countries are allowed transit passage, as long as they proceeded without delay and without
threatening the bordering states.
Transit passage is the exercise of the freedoms of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of expeditious and
continuous transit (thus they must proceed without delay) of the strait. During transit passage, foreign ships, including maritime
scientific research and hydrographic survey ships, may not carry out any research or survey activities without the prior
authorization of the bordering states. Transit passage is inapplicable in three instances:
1. if there exists through the strait a route through the high seas or an EEZ of similar convenience, in which case the
freedoms of navigation and overflight would apply
2. if the strait is formed by an island of a state bordering the strait and its mainland, and there exists seaward of the
island a route to the high seas or EEZ of similar convenience, in which case the right of innocent passage would
apply
3. if the strait is between a part of the high seas or EEZ and the territorial sea of another state, in which case the right of
innocent passage would apply.
Bordering states have the following duties:

1. not to impede the right of transit passage
2. to give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation or overflight within or over the strait of which they have
knowledge
3. not to suspend transit passage.
Ships and aircraft exercising the right of transit passage have the following duties:
1. to proceed without delay through or over the strait
2. refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of States
bordering the strait, or in any manner in violation of the principles in the UN Charter
3. refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless
necessary due to force majeure or distress
4. to comply with the other provisions of UNCLOS.
Also, foreign vessels may not carry out research and survey activities without the prior authorization of the bordering States.
Take note that these duties (of bordering States and foreign vessels) are also applicable to archipelagic sea lanes passage.
States alongside the straits however are able to regulate navigation and other aspects of passage.
Corfu Channel Case (1949)

A squadron of British warships, the cruisers Mauritius and Leander, and the destroyers Saumarez and Volage, left the port of
Corfu and proceeded northward through a channel previously swept for mines in the North Corfu Strait. Several ships struck a
mine and were damaged. UK sues People's Republic of Albania
Albanias failed its Duty it is liable. Obligation incumbent upon Albanian authorities consisted in notifying for the benefit of the
shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the British warships of the
imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them.
BASIS of such an obligation:

1. elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than
in war
2. the principle of freedom of maritime communication
3. every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.
Albania was aware of the minelaying since the geography of the strait easily allowed Albanian lighthouse watchers to view
such activities.
Innocent passage through straits is a right recognized by international law. The decisive criterion is its geographical situation
as connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact of its being used for international navigation. The nature of the Channel

satisfies this criterion. It has been a useful route for international maritime traffic. A total number of 2, 884 ships have passed
through the Channel in a period of 1 year and 9 months. Passage through it therefore cannot be prohibited by a coastal State
in time of peace. Combat formation determines if a passage is innocent.
* Sir: international straits are subject to non-suspendible rights of innocent passage.
d. ARCHIPELAGOS
Archipelagic states are those which are made up wholly of one or more archipelagos. For these states, the straight baselines
are drawn between the outermost points of the outermost islands, provided these points are sufficiently close to one another
and that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the water area to land area ratio is between
1:1 and 9:1. All waters inside these baselines are archipelagic waters. Some guidelines in drawing the baselines:
1. the length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3% of all the baselines may reach
up to 125 miles
2. the drawing of the baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago
3. such baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations
4. these shall not be applied in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas or EEZ the territorial sea of another State
While archipelagic states have sovereignty over a sea area enclosed by the baselines, all other states enjoy the right of
innocent passage through designated sea lanes. Foreign ships and aircraft also have the right of archipelagic sea lanes
passage, which refers to continuous, expeditious, and unobstructed passage in sea lands and air routes through or over the
archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea of the archipelagic state in transit between one part of the high seas or an
EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ (similar to transit passage). An archipelagic state shall respect existing
agreements with other states and shall recognize traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities of the immediately
adjacent neighboring states in certain areas, including the maintenance and replacement of submarine cables, falling within
archipelagic waters.
Take note that under UNCLOS, the waters inside the archipelagic baselines are called archipelagic waters. And while
archipelagic states may designate sea lanes and air routes suitable for continuous and expeditious passage over these
archipelagic waters, if the archipelagic state does not designate such lanes, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may
still be exercised through routes normally used for international navigation. This is criticized as being unduly burdensome for
archipelagic states. (Archipelagic waters also inside baselines, like internal waters)
Under the Philippine Constitution, all waters connecting the islands are internal waters. Thus when the country ratified the
UNCLOS, a declaration was added, providing that:
The signing of the Convention shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereign rights of the Republic of the
Philippines under and arising from the Constitution Such signing shall not in any manner affect the sovereign rights of the
Republic under and arising out of the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Washington The provisions of the Convention on
archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not nullify or impair the sovereignty of the Philippines as an archipelagic State over
the sea lanes and do not deprive it of authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty, independence, and security.
e. THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE
This is an area of water not exceeding 24 nautical miles from the baseline. It thus extends 12 nautical miles from the edge of
the territorial sea. The coastal state exercises authority over that area to the extent necessary to prevent infringement of its
customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitation authority over its territorial waters or territory and to punish such infringement.
Take note that the power of control does not change the nature of the waters. Beyond the territorial sea, the waters are high
sea and not subject to the sovereignty of the coastal state.
* Sir: this was added as a response to ships which would linger in areas beyond the States jurisdiction, thus beyond the
States criminal jurisdiction, but would do acts inimical to the coastal State. Remember that the jurisdiction is limited; beyond
the 4 areas, follow the regime of the EEZ. Take note that this is the only optional regime.
f. THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
This refers to (a) the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coastal state but outside the territorial sea, to
a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth allows exploitation; and (b) the seabed and subsoil of areas
adjacent to islands. Under specified circumstances the continental shelf can extend up to a distance of 350 miles.
The coastal state has the right to explore and exploit its natural resources, to erect needed installations, and to erect a safety
zone over its installations with a radius of 500 meters. These rights do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or any
express proclamation. This right does not affect the right of navigation of others. Moreover, this right does not extend to non-
resource material in the shelf area such as wrecked ships and their cargoes. Coastal states also have the right to regulate,
authorize, and conduct marine scientific research on the continental shelf.
Take note that artificial islands or installations are not islands under UNCLOS, though coastal states may establish safety
zones and prescribe safety measures around them. Islands do have their own continental shelves.
* Sir: compare the rights of the coastal State for the EEZ (resources = all encompassing) and the continental shelf. For the
latter, only for living resources permanently attached/sedentary.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969)

This case concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea, which involved Denmark, the Netherlands, and
Germany. Denmark and the Netherlands both wanted to apply the equidistance principle, while Germany opposed as this
would disproportionately reduce its area, due to the concave German coastline.
Delimitation is a process which involves establishing the boundaries of an area already, in principle, appertaining to the coastal
State and not the determination de novo of such an area. Delimitation in an equitable manner is one thing, but not the same
thing as awarding a just and equitable share of a previously undelimited area, even though in a number of cases the results
may be comparable, or even identical.
Inherent right to territory. The rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land,
and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural
resources. In short, there is here an inherent right. In order to exercise it, no special legal process has to be gone through,
nor have any special legal acts to be performed. Its existence can be declared but does not need to be constituted.
Furthermore, the right does not depend on its being exercised. It follows that the notion of apportioning an as yet undelimited
area, is quite foreign to, and inconsistent with, the basic concept of continental shelf entitlement.
Equidistance method not obligatory. It has never been doubted that the equidistance method of delimitation is a very
convenient one. Yet this does not suffice to convert what is a method into a rule of law, making the acceptance of the results of
using that method obligatory in all cases in which the parties do not agree otherwise, or in which 'special circumstances'
cannot be shown to exist.
Appurtenance (of the continental shelf) to a State Proximity. Thus the question of which parts of the continental shelf
'adjacent to' a coastline bordering more than one State fall within the appurtenance of which of them, remains to this extent an
open one, not to be determined on a basis exclusively of proximity. Even if proximity may afford one of the tests to be applied
and an important one in the right conditions, it may not necessarily be the only, nor in all circumstances, the most appropriate
one.
More fundamental: natural prolongation or continuation of land territory or domain or land sovereignty of the coastal state, into
& under the high seas, via the bed of its territorial sea which is under full sovereignty. Submarine areas do not really appertain
to the coastal State because they are near it. What confers the ipso jure title which international law attributes to the coastal
State in respect of its continental shelf is the fact that the submarine areas concerned may be deemed to be actually part of
the territory over which the coastal State already has dominion, in the sense that, although covered with water, they are a
prolongation or continuation of that territory, an extension of it under the sea. Thus whenever a given submarine area does not
constitute a natural extension of the land territory of a coastal State, even though that area may be closer to it than it is to the
territory of any other State, it cannot be regarded as appertaining to that State; or at least it cannot be so regarded in the face
of a competing claim by a State of whose land territory the submarine area concerned is to be regarded as a natural
extension, even if it is less close to it.
Opposite v. Adjacent. For opposite States the natural prolongations may meet and overlap, and can only be delimited by a
median line; and, ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and minor coastal projections, the disproportionally distorting effect of
which can be eliminated by other means, such a line must effect an equal division of the particular area involved. This type of
case is different from that of laterally adjacent States on the same coast with no immediately opposite coast in front of
it. Whereas a median line divides equally between 2 opposite countries areas that can be regarded as being the natural
prolongation of the territory of each of them, a lateral equidistance line often leaves to 1 of the States concerned areas that are
a natural prolongation of the territory of the other. The distorting effects of lateral equidistance lines under certain conditions of
coastal configuration are nevertheless comparatively small within the limits of territorial waters, but produce their maximum
effect in the localities where the main continental shelf areas lie further out. There is also a direct correlation between the
notion of closest proximity to the coast and the sovereign jurisdiction which the coastal State is entitled to exercise and must
exercise, not only over the seabed underneath the territorial waters but over the waters themselves, which does not exist in
respect of continental shelf areas where there is no jurisdiction over the superjacent waters, and over the seabed only for
purposes of exploration and exploitation.
Delimitation must be by agreement, arrived at in accordance with equitable principles:

(a) the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go
through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the automatic application of a certain method of
delimitation in the absence of agreement; they are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are

meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists upon its own position without contemplating any modification
of it;
(b) the parties are under an obligation to act in such a way that, in the particular case, and taking all the circumstances into
account, equitable principles are applied; for this purpose the equidistance method can be used, but other methods exist and
may be employed, alone or in combination, according to the areas involved;
(c) the continental shelf of any State must be the natural prolongation of its land territory and must not encroach upon what is
the natural prolongation of the territory of another State.
Inequity of the equidistance method, in certain geographical circumstances:

(a) The slightest irregularity in a coastline is automatically magnified by the equidistance line as regards the consequences for
the delimitation of the continental shelf. Thus it has been seen in the case of concave or convex coastlines that if the
equidistance method is employed, then the greater the irregularity and the further from the coastline the area to be delimited,
the more unreasonable are the results produced. So great an exaggeration of the consequences of a natural geographical
feature must be remedied or compensated for as far as possible, being of itself creative of inequity.
(b) Where there is no outer boundary to the continental shelf, it happens that the claims of several States converge, meet and
intercross in localities where, despite their distance from the coast, the bed of the sea still unquestionably consists of
continental shelf. A study of these convergences shows how inequitable would be the apparent simplification brought about by
a delimitation which, ignoring such geographical circumstances, was based solely on the equidistance method.
Can use different methods. No objection need be felt to the idea of effecting a delimitation of adjoining continental shelf areas
by the concurrent use of various methods. Equity does not necessarily imply equality. There can never be any question of
completely refashioning nature, and equity does not require that a State without access to the sea should be allotted an area
of continental shelf, any more than there could be a question of rendering the situation of a State with an extensive coastline
similar to that of a State with a restricted coastline. But here, there are 3 States whose North Sea coastlines are in fact
comparable in length and which, have been given broadly equal treatment by nature except that the configuration of one of the
coastlines would, if the equidistance method is used, deny to one of these States treatment equal or comparable to that given
the other two. An inequity is created merely because one coastline is roughly convex and the other concave. It is not a
question of totally refashioning geography whatever the facts of the situation but, given a geographical situation of quasi-
equality as between a number of States, of abating the effects of an incidental special feature from which an unjustifiable
difference of treatment could result.
Criteria to consider:
1. Geology. The continental shelf is an area physically extending the territory of most coastal States into a species of platform.
The appurtenance of the shelf to the countries in front of whose coastlines it lies is a fact, and it can be useful to consider the
geology of that shelf in order to find out whether the direction taken by certain configurational features should influence
delimitation.
2. Geography. The principle is that the land dominates the sea; it is consequently necessary to examine closely the
geographical configuration of the coastlines of the countries whose continental shelves are to be delimited. Since the land is
the legal source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial extensions to seaward, it must first be clearly
established what features do in fact constitute such extensions.
3. Unity of any deposits. The natural resources of the subsoil of the sea in those parts which consist of continental shelf are
the very object of this legal regime. Yet it frequently occurs that the same deposit lies on both sides of the line dividing a
continental shelf between two States, and since it is possible to exploit such a deposit from either side, a problem immediately
arises on account of the risk of prejudicial or wasteful exploitation by one or other of the States concerned. All that is needed is
to refer to the undertakings entered into by the coastal States of that sea with a view to ensuring the most efficient exploitation
or the apportionment of the products extracted.
4. Reasonable degree of proportionality which a delimitation effected according to equitable principles ought to bring about
between the extent of the continental shelf appertaining to the States concerned and the lengths of their respective coastlines,
these being measured according to their general direction in order to establish the necessary balance between States with
straight, and those with markedly concave or convex coasts, or to reduce very irregular coastlines to their truer proportions.
The choice and application of the appropriate technical methods would be a matter for the parties.
Libya v. Malta (1985)

This concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf between Libya and Malta. The Mediterranean is bordered by Tunisia
(east), Italy (north), Greece (west) and Libya (south). Malta is a group of islands situated in the Mediterranean, to the south of
Italy and to the north of Libya. Libyas coast is significantly larger than that of Malta.
RE: UNCLOS, which provided that the delimitation of the continental shelf be effected by agreement on the basis of
international law, in order to achieve an equitable solution. The Convention sets a goal to be achieved, but is silent as to the
method to be followed to achieve it. It restricts itself to setting a standard, and it is left to States themselves, or to the courts, to
endow this standard with specific content.
Relation to EEZ & legal basis of continental shelf rights. The two institutions - continental shelf and EEZ are linked together
in modern law. Since the rights enjoyed by a State over its continental shelf would also be possessed by it over the sea-bed
and subsoil of any EEZ which it might proclaim, one of the relevant circumstances to be considered for the delimitation of the
continental shelf of a State is the legally permissible extent of the EEZ appertaining to that same State. This does not mean
that the concept of the continental shelf has been absorbed by that of the EEZ; it does however signify that greater importance
must be attributed to elements, such as distance from the Coast, which are common to both concepts. Although the institutions
of the continental shelf and the EEZ are different and distinct, the rights which the EEZ entails over the sea-bed of the zone
are defined by reference to the regime laid down for the continental shelf. Although there can be a continental shelf where
there is no EEZ, there cannot be an EEZ without a corresponding continental shelf. It follows that the distance criterion must
now apply to the continental shelf as well as to the EEZ. What this means is that where the continental margin does not extend
as far as 200 miles from the shore, natural prolongation, which in spite of its physical origins has throughout its history become
more and more a complex and juridical concept, is in part defined by distance from the shore, irrespective of the physical
nature of the intervening sea-bed and subsoil. The concepts of natural prolongation and distance are therefore not opposed
but complementary.
Equitableness of result is primary. The delimitation of a continental shelf boundary must be effected by the application of
equitable principles in all the relevant circumstances in order to achieve an equitable result.
Some equitable principles: the principle that there is to be no question of refashioning geography, or compensating for the
inequalities of nature; the related principle of non-encroachment by one party on the natural prolongation of the other (the
coastal State enjoys sovereign rights over the continental shelf off its coasts to the full extent authorized by international law in
the relevant circumstances); the principle of respect due to all such relevant circumstances; the principle that although all
States are equal before the law and are entitled to equal treatment, "equity does not necessarily imply equality", nor does it
seek to make equal what nature has made unequal; and the principle that there can be no question of distributive justice.
Factors which werent considered in this case: landmass, relative economic positions of the Parties, security considerations,
and the principle of equality.
Proportionality is considered. What the Court intended was proportionality was to be used as a means of identifying and then
correcting the kind of distortion that could arise from the use of a method inapt to take adequate account of some kinds of
coastal configuration.
Delimitation process:
1. Make a provisional delimitation by using a criterion and a method both of which are clearly destined to play an important role
in producing the final result.
The law applicable to claims relating to continental shelves located less than 200 miles from the coasts of the States on a
criterion of distance from the Coast or on the principle of adjacency as measured by distance. Thus the choice of the criterion
and the method to be used to arrive at a provisional result should be made in a manner consistent with the concepts
underlying the attribution of legal title. In this delimitation between opposite coasts, the tracing of a median line between those
coasts, by way of a provisional step, is the most judicious manner of proceeding with a view to the eventual achievement of an
equitable result. Take note that the median line drawn is only provisional. Were the Court to treat it as final, it would be
conferring on the equidistance method the status of being the only method the use of which is compulsory in the case of
opposite coasts. Under existing law, it must be demonstrated that the equidistance method leads to an equitable result in the
case in question. To achieve this purpose, the result to which the distance criterion leads must be examined in the context of
applying equitable principles to the relevant circumstances. Also remember that, to achieve an equitable result in a situation in
which the equidistance line is prima facie the appropriate method, all relevant circumstances must be examined, since they
may have a weight in the assessment of the equities of the case which it would be proper to take into account and to reflect in
an adjustment of the equidistance line.
2. Examination of the provisional solution in light of the requirements derived from other criteria, which may call for a correction
of the initial results.
Due to the great difference in length of the coasts and the general geographical context (the Maltese islands appear as a
relatively small feature in a semi-enclosed sea), in order to ensure the achievement of an equitable solution, the delimitation
line must be adjusted so as to lie closer to the coasts of Malta. Within the area with which the Court is concerned, the coasts of
the Parties are opposite to each other, and the equidistance line between them lies broadly west to east, so that its adjustment
can be satisfactorily and simply achieved by transposing it in an exactly northward direction. This line meets the requirements
of the test of proportionality, and is equitable, given all relevant circumstances.
Guinea v Guinea-Bissau (1985)

The case regarding the marine delimitation was removed from the list of cases of the ICJ because both parties mutually
dropped the case. Their main reason was that both parties agreed on establishing an international agency for the join
exploitation of the maritime zone in question.
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (1978)

Though the Court was primarily focused on the issue of jurisdiction in this case, the relevant issue is whether or not certain
islands under Greek sovereignty are entitled to a continental shelf of their own and entitle Greece to call for the boundary to be
drawn between those islands and the Turkish Coast.
No jurisdiction. ICJ has no jurisdiction since Turkey did not accept such jurisdiction in the Rome Communique.

Turkeys Theory: islands in question are mere protuberances of the Turkish continental shelf and have no continental shelf of
their own. (Court did not decide on this issue since it had no jurisdiction but I think Sir. Harry agreed with Turkeys theory since
based on the map, to grant continental shelves would encroach in the territorial sea of Turkey)
The issue of whether these islands have their own continental shelf concerns matters of entitlement (do the island deserve
shelves), delimitation (whats the area of these shelves) and territorial status (will it encroach on established national
boundaries)
*According to the other reviewer, Sir said that in this case the principles in the Sipadan case and Eritrea-Yemen arbitration
would apply. In our discussion, Sir said that the method of half effect could be applied.
Tunisia v. Libya
Libya and Tunisia requested the ICJ to determine what principles and rules of international law may be applied for the
delimitation of the area of the continental shelf appertaining to Libya and to that of Tunisia; decide according to equitable
principles, and the relevant circumstances which characterize the area, as well as the new accepted trends in the Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea; and clarify the practical method for the application of these principles so they can delimit
without difficulty
The Method of Half-effect. The delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable principles considering all relevant
circumstances. The area to be delimited constitutes a single continental shelf as the natural prolongation of both States, so
principle of natural prolongation cannot be used.
The area is delimited by two lines. In defining the angulation of the initial line, the Court took note of the existence of the line
employed de facto by each Party dividing their petroleum concessions. As for the second line, the change in direction of the
coast is a fact which must be taken into account. Note that in this case the land territory of the two States is adjacent but
because of the change in direction of the coast of Tunisia it seems opposite at some point. The initial delimitation line indicated
by the ICJ will therefore extend from the outer limit of the territorial sea until its intersection with the parallel of latitude of the
point on the coast of the Gulf of Gabes. In determining the angulation of the second like the existence of the Kerkennah
Islands (Tunisia) should be considered. The Kerkennah Islands is surrounded by islets and low-tide elevations. Some effect
must be attributed to it. The Court has to take into account not only the islands, but also the low-tide elevations which, while
they do not, as do islands, have any continental shelf of their own, do enjoy some recognition in international law for certain
purposes. However, if the ICJ lets the line run parallel to the island coastline that would be giving the islands too much weight.
Hence, half-effect must be used. The technique involves drawing two delimitation lines, one giving to the island the full effect
attributed to it by the delimitation method in use, and the other disregarding the island totally, as though it did not exist. The
delimitation line actually adopted is then drawn between the first two lines, either in such a way as to divide equally the area
between them, or as bisector of the angle which they make with each other, or possibly by treating the island as displaced
toward the mainland by half its actual distance therefrom.
Anglo-French Arbitration (1979)

This involved the delimitation of the continental shelves of France and UK in the North Sea. In this case, the Court considered
the effect of certain geological features to the delimitation.
The Equidistance-Special Circumstances method. Under Article 6 the equidistance principle ultimately possesses an
obligatory force which it does not have in the same measure under the rules of customary law. But the equidistance-special
circumstances rule means that the obligation to apply the equidistance principle is always one qualified by the condition
"unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances". The role of the "special circumstances" condition is to
ensure an equitable delimitation and the combined "equidistance-special circumstances rule", in effect, gives particular
expression to a general norm that, failing agreement, the boundary between States abutting on the same continental shelf is to
be determined on equitable principles. Consequently, the question whether the use of the equidistance principle or some
other method is appropriate for achieving an equitable delimitation is very much a matter of appreciation in the light of the
geographical and other circumstances.
Opposite states. Throughout the English Channel where the coasts of France & the UK are opposite each other the boundary
should, in principle, be the median line equidistant from the respective coasts. The relationship of "opposite" or "adjacent"
States is nothing but a reflection of the geographical facts. The distinction drawn between the two geographical situations is
one derived not from any legal theory but from the very substance of the difference between the two situations. Whereas in
"opposite" States a median line will normally effect a broadly equitable delimitation, a lateral equidistance line extending
outwards from the coasts of adjacent States for long distances may result in an inequitable delimitation by reason of the
distorting effect of individual geographical features. It is the combined effect of the side-by-side relationship of the two States
and the prolongation of the lateral boundary for great distances to seawards which may be productive of inequity and is the
essence of the distinction between "adjacent" and "opposite" coasts situations.
First step: the legal frame to be used is that of delimitation between opposite States. The first step should be to determine
the course of the median line within the Channel. Take note that the Hurd Deep-Hurd Deep Fault Zone, a geographical feature,
wasnt considered by the Court given the essential geological continuity of the area (the Hurd Deep were just discontinuities in
the seabed and subsoil which didnt disrupt the essential unity of the continental shelf).
Features of the Channel considered in this case. The Channel Islands (not constitutionally part of the UK, but direct
dependencies of the British Crown which were treated as part of the UK, since the UK was the responsible authority wrt the
continental shelf) are situated on the French side and within the arms of a gulf on the French coast. The presence of these
islands in that particular situation disturbs the balance or the geographical circumstances which would otherwise exist between
the Parties in this region as a result of the broad equality of the coastlines of their mainlands. The legal framework is that of
two opposite States one or which possesses island territories close to the coast of the other State.
Factors not considered: navigational defence and security interests in the region.
Principle of natural prolongation, not absolute. The question is what areas of continental shelf are to be considered as legally
the natural prolongation of the Channel Islands rather than of France. In international law, the concept of the continental shelf
is a juridical concept which connotes the natural prolongation under the sea not of a continent or geographical land mass but
of the land territory of each State. This means that the scope and the conditions for its application are not determined
exclusively by the physical facts of geography but also by legal rules. Moreover, it is clear (given the special circumstances
provision & emphasis on equitable principles) that the force of the cardinal principle of natural prolongation of territory is not
absolute, but may be subject to qualification. The principle of natural prolongation of territory cannot be said to require that the
continental shelf to the north and northwest of the Channel Islands should be considered as automatically and necessarily
appurtenant to them rather than to France. Yet, if the force of the principle of natural prolongation of territory were absolute, a
small island would block the natural prolongation of the territory of the nearby mainland in the same way, if not always to the
same extent, as a larger island. The question of the appurtenance to the Channel Islands of the areas of continental shelf
extending to their north and north-west is not therefore resolved merely by referring to the principle of natural prolongation.
The principle of natural prolongation of territory is neither to be set aside nor treated as absolute in a case where islands
belonging to one State are situated on continental shelf which would otherwise constitute a natural prolongation of the territory
of another State. The application of that principle in such a case has to be appreciated in the light of all the relevant
geographical and other circumstances, as well as on any relevant considerations of law and equity.
Principles of equity. Under customary law, the method adopted for delimiting the boundary must ensure that the delimitation
accords with equitable principles. The question is whether the Channel Islands should be given the full benefit or the
application of the principle of natural prolongation in the areas to their north and northwest or whether their situation close to
the mainland of France requires, on equitable grounds, some modification of the application of the principle in those areas.
The doctrine of the equality of States cannot be considered as constituting such an equitable ground (as this would have the
effect of refashioning geography). Any ground of equity is to be looked for in the particular circumstances of the case and in
the particular equality of the two States in their geographical relation to the continental shelf of the Channel.
Characteristics of the area: approximate equality of the mainland coastlines, resulting in equality of their geographical relation
to the continental shelf of the Channel, if the Channel Islands are left out of account. If the Channel Islands are given full
effect, this will result in a substantial diminution of the area of continental shelf which would accrue to France. This fact
appears to be, prima facie, a circumstance creative of inequity and calling for a method of delimitation that in some measure
redresses the inequity. If this conclusion is tested by applying the equidistance-special circumstances rule, the presence of
the Channel Islands must be considered, prima facie, as a "special circumstance" justifying a delimitation other than the
median line.
The two-fold solution wrt Channel Islands: First, to maintain the appropriate balance between the two States in relation to the
continental shelf as riparian States of the Channel with approximately equal coastlines, the primary boundary between them
shall be a median line. In delimiting its course in the Channel Islands region the Channel Islands themselves are to be
disregarded, since their continental shelf must be the subject of a second and separate delimitation.
Second step: to delimit a second boundary establishing, vis--vis the Channel Islands, the southern limit of the continental
shelf held by the Court to be appurtenant to the French Republic in this region to the south of the mid-Channel median line.
Features considered. The essential continuity or the continental shelf of the English Channel and Atlantic region has been
emphasized. It is also common ground that, geologically the slight southwesterly trend of the continental shelf of the Channel
extends westwards into the Atlantic region along the line of the Hurd Deep Fault Zone. The continental shelf of the Atlantic
region is not confined within the arms of a comparatively narrow channel but one extending seawards front the coasts of the
two countries into the open spaces of the Atlantic Ocean. In consequence, the areas of continental shelf to be delimited lie off,
rather than between, the coasts or the two countries. A further consequence is that the continental shelf extends to seawards
of the coasts of the two countries for great distances. The actual coastlines of the two countries abutting on the continental
shelf to be delimited are comparatively short, and that their geographical relation to each other vis--vis the continental shelf to
be delimited is one of lateral rather than opposite coasts. Another is that the UKs coastal frontage project further into the
Atlantic than that of France. This has the tendency to make the UK coast obtrude upon the continental shelf situated to
seawards of the more westerly facing coast of the French Republic in that region. Another is France and the UK arent the only
States which abut on the Atlantic continental shelf.
Legal framework used. Under Art. 6, in the absence of agreement and unless another boundary is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary is to be the line which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured. There is nothing in the language of Art. 6 to imply that in situations
failing under paragraph 1 the virtues of the equidistance principle as a method of effecting an equitable delimitation are in any
way superior to those which it possesses in situations falling under paragraph 2. The appropriateness of the equidistance or
any other method for the purpose of effecting an equitable delimitation in any given case is always a function or reflection of
the geographical and other relevant circumstances of the particular case. In short, the equitable character of the delimitation
results not from the legal designation of the situation as one of "opposite" States but from its actual geographical character as
such. Similarly, in the case of "adjacent" States it is the lateral geographical relation of the two coasts, when combined with a
large extension of the continental shelf seawards from those coasts, which makes individual geographical features on either
coast more prone to render the geometrical effects of applying the equidistance principle inequitable than in the case of
"opposite" States. The greater risk in these cases that the equidistance method may produce an inequitable delimitation thus
also results not from the legal designation of the situation as one of "adjacent" States but from its actual geographical
character as one involving laterally related coasts.
In this case, due to the separation of the 2 coasts by a wide expanse of sea, the area (Atlantic region) is considered as a case
of opposite States.
A special circumstance: the prolongation of the Scilly Isles (UK) some distance further westwards than the Ushant island
(France), which justifies a boundary other than the strict median line. However this doesnt authorize the use of any method in
order to effect an equitable delimitation.
Modified equidistance method. In a large proportion of delimitations, where a particular geographical feature has influenced
the course of a continental shelf boundary, the method of delimitation adopted has been some modification or variant of the
equidistance principle rather than its total rejection. Here the problem also arises precisely from the distorting effect of a
geographical feature in circumstances in which the line equidistant from the coasts of the two States would otherwise
constitute the appropriate boundary. The appropriate method is to take account of the Scilly Isles as part of the coastline of the
UK but to give them less than their full effect in applying the equidistance method. Just as it is not the function of equity in the
delimitation of the continental shelf completely to refashion geography, so it is also not the function of equity to create a
situation of complete equity where nature and geography have established an inequity.
Half-effect. In one instance, the method employed was to give half, instead of full, effect to the offshore island in delimiting the
equidistance line. This method consists in delimiting the line equidistant between the two coasts, first, without the use of the
offshore island as a base-point, and, secondly, with its use as a base-point; a boundary giving half-effect to the island is then
the line drawn midway between those two equidistance lines. This method appears to be an appropriate and practical method
of abating the disproportion and inequity which otherwise results from giving full effect to the Scilly Isles as a basepoint for
determining the course of the boundary.
* Sir: the method of half effect = proceed first as if the island doesnt exist, then shift the lines.
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (1933)

Denmark sued Norway for occupying certain territories in Eastern Greenland. Both countries are claiming that the have the
superior claim over this area.
Doctrine of Sovereignty Actually Exercised. Two elements each of which must be shown to exist:
a. the intention and will to act as sovereign
b. some actual exercise or display of such authority
Examples: Tax collection, monopoly activity/grants, law making and enforcement
Authority, recognition in conventions/treaties, public utilities concessions,
hunting/fishing expeditions, maritime permits authority, lighthouses!!!
WON Greenland as used in the documents of this period intended to include the East Coast because at that time, the East
Coast was yet unknown Yes! An examination of the maps of the 17th and 18th centuries shows that the general features and
configuration of the East coast of Greenland were known to the cartographers. Even if no evidence of any landings on the
coast have been produced, the ships which hunted whales in the waters to the East of Greenland sighted the land at intervals
and gave names to the prominent features which were observed. Indeed, "Greenland" as a geographical term was even more
used in connection with the East coast than with the West coast, as the term "Straat Davis" was often used to describe the
West coast, or colonized area, of Greenland.
g. THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
Before the acceptance of the doctrine on the exclusive economic zone, all waters beyond the contiguous zone were
considered high seas over which no state had control. The doctrine developed due to the desire of coastal states for better
conservation and management of coastal fisheries.
The EEZ is an area extending not more than 200 nautical miles beyond the baseline. The coastal state has rights over the
economic resources of the sea, seabed, and subsoil but this right does not affect the right of navigation and overflight of
other states. Coastal states also have the right to regulate, authorize, and conduct marine scientific research in the EEZ.
The provisions on the EEZ are both a grant of rights to and an imposition of obligations on coastal states relative to the
exploitation, management, and preservation of the resources found within the zone. Coastal states have 2 primary obligations.
First, they must ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the living resources of the EEZ are not
subject to over-exploitation. This includes the duty to maintain and restore populations of harvested fisheries at levels which
produce a maximum sustainable yield. Second, they must promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living
resources. They must determine the allowable catch of living resources, and if they dont have the capacity to harvest the
allowable catch, they must grant access to other states. Highly migratory species of fish and marine mammals are accorded
special protection.
The delimitation of overlapping EEZs between adjacent states is determined by agreement. And take note that islands have
their own EEZs.
Spain v. Canada (1996) [ Facts only]

This is a dispute relating to Canadas amendment of the Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, by virtue of which Canada
pursued, boarded and seized a fishing vessel the Estai; flying the Spanish flag) on the high seas in order to put a stop to the
overfishing of Greenland halibut by Spanish fishermen.
Arguments:
European Communitys position - the arrest of a vessel in international waters by a State other than the State of which the
vessel is flying the flag and under whose jurisdiction it falls, is an illegal act under both the NAFO Convention and customary
international law, and cannot be justified by any means.
Canadas Position - dispute concerns the adoption of measures for the conservation and management of fisheries stocks
with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area and their enforcement
Spains Position - Spain argues that the term conservation and management measures" must be interpreted in accordance
with international law, so it must exclude any unilateral measure by a State which adversely affected the rights of other States
outside that State's own area of jurisdiction.
Doctrine:
In international law only 2 types of measures taken by a coastal State could, in practice, be regarded as "conservation and
management measures":
[1] those relating to the State's exclusive economic zone; and
[2] those relating to areas outside that zone, in so far as these came within the framework of an international agreement
or were directed at stateless vessels.
Measures not satisfying these conditions were not conservation and management measures but unlawful acts pure and
simple.
*Sir: mustnt submit vessels guilty of illegal fishing to incarceration, but must promptly release them upon the posting of a cash
bond.
M/V "SAIGA" (No.2) Case (1999)

The Saiga is a Cypriot oil tanker that was arrested and boarded by Guinean authorities when it was sailing south of the
southern limit of the exclusive economic zone of Guinea. The applicants are challenging the validity of the arrest and want
damages. Guinea is insisting that they had jurisdiction to arrest and invoke hot pursuit.
Saigas Nationality UNCLOS GENUINE LINK TEST. Article 91, paragraph 1, of the Convention provides: "There must exist
a genuine link between the State and the ship." Two questions need to be addressed in this connection.
(a) The first is whether the absence of a genuine link between a flag State and a
ship entitles another State to refuse to recognize the nationality of the ship.
(b) The second question is whether or not a genuine link existed between the
Saiga and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines at the time of the incident.
EEZ Guinea could only apply its customs laws with regard to artificial islands, installations and structures. (article 60,
paragraph 2). The Tribunal notes that, under the Convention, a coastal State is entitled to apply customs laws and regulations
in its territorial sea (articles 2 and 21). In the contiguous zone, a coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or
territorial sea;
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory of territorial sea.
However, in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has jurisdiction to apply customs laws and regulations in
respect of artificial islands, installations and structures (article 60, paragraph 2). The Convention does not empower a coastal
State to apply its customs laws in respect of any other parts of the exclusive economic zone not mentioned above.
Exception State of Necessity (ART 58 - OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW phrase). 2 CONDITIONS FOR STATE
OF NECESSITY TO APPLY NOT MET. As set out in article 33, paragraph 1, of the International Law Commission's Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, are:
(a) the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the
State against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards which the obligation existed.
In endorsing these conditions, the Court stated that they "must be cumulatively satisfied" and that they "reflect customary
international law".

Hot Pursuit defense denied (Article 111 UNCLOS) All the requirements must be cumulatively complied with. Guinea did not
comply with several. No visual or auditory signals to stop could have been given to the Saiga. and the alleged pursuit was
interrupted when the patrol boats were recalled before they resumed the chase.
Camouco Case (2000)

The Camouco is a fishing vessel flying the flag of Panama. Its owner is "Merce-Pesca (S.A.)", a company registered in
Panama. It was boarded by the French surveillance frigate Floral in the exclusive economic zone of the Crozet Islands. The
French refuse to release the vessel and the Master until a bond is posted (exhaust local remedies)
Local remedies need not be exhausted in order to file an application. Article 292 provides for an independent remedy and not
an appeal against a decision of a national court. No limitation should be read into article 292 that would have the effect of
defeating its very object and purpose. Indeed, article 292 permits the making of an application within a short period from the
date of detention and it is not normally the case that local remedies could
Municipal authorities are allowed to attach provisional liberty with the posting of a bond provided the amount is reasonable.
Article 292 of the Convention is designed to free a ship and its crew from prolonged detention on account of the imposition of
unreasonable bonds in municipal jurisdictions, or the failure of local law to provide for release on posting of a reasonable
bond, inflicting thereby avoidable loss on a ship owner or other persons affected by such detention. Equally, it safeguards the
interests of the coastal State by providing for release only upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security
determined by a court or tribunal referred to in article 292, without prejudice to the merits of the case in the domestic forum
against the vessel, its owner or its crew.
Reasonableness of Bond Amount. The basis is the value of the detained vessel and of the cargo seized, the amount of the
bond imposed by the detaining State and its form but the value of the vessel alone may not be the controlling factor in the
determination of the amount of the bond or other financial security if there is no evidence to support the assessment.
h. DELIMITATION OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES
Regarding the delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts, neither of them is entitled to
extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines of
each of them, unless they agree to do so, or if historic title or other special circumstances make it necessary to delimit the
territorial seas in other ways.
The delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts must be done by agreement
on the basis of international law (ex. equitable principles which have a normative character as part of general international
law). Pending this they may make provisional arrangements of a practical nature, and they must not jeopardize or hamper the
reaching of a final agreement. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the parties shall resort to
peaceful means of dispute settlement.
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases it was held that the equidistance method did not represent general international law.
Since then, certain equitable principles have been recognized as guidelines for delimitation:
1. Delimitation shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law.
2. The principle of non-encroachment by one party on the natural prolongation of the other.
3. Prevention any cut off of the sea ward projection of the states concerned.
4. Delimitation is to be effected by applying equitable criteria and by using practical methods capable of ensuring, with regard
to the geographical configuration of the area and other relevant circumstances, an equitable result.
5. There is a presumption that the equitable solution is an equal division of the overlapping areas of the continental shelves of
the disputing states.
The application of equitable principles makes reference to relevant circumstances, such as:
1. General configuration of the coasts of the parties
2. Where there is a geographical situation of quasi-equality between a number of states, it is necessary to abate effects of an
incidental special feature which might result in unjustified, different treatment. ( to avoid the effects of a concave coast, the
location of islands of one state near the other, and the eccentric alignment of small islands lying off a peninsula).
3. The geological structure of the sea-bed and its geomorphology (or surface features)
4. The disparity of coastal lengths in the relevant area.
5. The general geographical framework or context.
6. The conduct of the parties, such as the de facto line produced by the pattern of grants of petroleum concessions in the
disputed area.
7. The incidence of natural resources (oil and natural gas) in the disputed area.
8. The principle of equitable access to the natural resources of the disputed area.
9. Defense and security interests of the disputing states.
10. Their navigational interests.
11. Consistency with the general direction of the land boundary.

In the Libya v. Malta and Gulf of Maine cases, the delimitation was done in two steps. First, a provisional delimitation line was
provided. Next, the provisional solution was examined, taking account of special circumstances. If necessary, the initial results
were corrected.
In the Gulf of Maine case, the ICJ stated that there are no rules, in general customary international law, specifically prescribing
the application of any particular equitable criteria or the use of particular practical methods in delimitation. Instead customary
international law merely contains a general requirement of the use of equitable criteria and practical methods capable of
implementing them. It is special international law that must be looked into, to see whether that law includes some rule
specifically requiring the Parties, and the ICJ/arbitral tribunal, to apply certain criteria or specific practical methods to the
delimitation (ex. 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf).
Art. 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention provides for a single technique for continental shelf delimitation (a median for
maritime areas between opposite coasts, and a lateral equidistance line for coasts of adjacent States). This method is inspired
by and derives from this equitable criterion: that the equitable solution, at least prima facie, is an equal division of the areas of
overlap of the continental shelves of the two States. However the applicability of this method is subject to the condition that
there are no special circumstances in the case which would make that criterion inequitable (i.e. unreasonable division). This
articles states:
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other,
the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the
absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median
line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of
each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories two adjacent States the boundary of the continental shelf shall
be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by
special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest point
of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (1994)
In this case, Canada & the US asked the Court to delimit both the continental shelf and the exclusive fishing zone in the Gulf of
Maine area, using only a single boundary. The Gulf of Maine area is a broad oceanic indentation, which is shaped like a
rectangle, bordered on the 3 sides by land, and on the fourth by the Atlantic Ocean.
1. Determine the starting point of the line. In this case, the starting point was chosen by the Parties (point A). While the Court
may use another starting point, it wont for in the delimitation of a maritime boundary, both conventional and customary
international law give priority to the criterion that delimitation must be sought through agreement between the Parties.
2. Some factors. Geological factors are insignificant, given the essentially continuous geological structure of the strata
underlying the whole of the continental shelf. There is unity and uniformity in the whole sea-bed, as the continental shelf of the
area is just an undifferentiated part of the continental shelf of the American eastern seaboard; thus geomorphological factors
are insignificant. The same goes for the water column. It isnt possible to discern any genuine, sure and stable natural
boundaries in so fluctuating an environment such as the waters of the ocean. It would be futile to seek any element which
could be a stable natural boundary. Thus, the great mass of water in the delimitation area, just like the sea-bed, also
possesses that character of unity and uniformity which makes it impossible to discern any natural boundary capable of serving
as a basis for carrying out a delimitation.
3. The applicable principles and rules of international law. (What are the rules, methods applicable?)
Principles under Art. 6. Any delimitation of the continental shelf effected unilaterally by one State, regardless of the views of
the other/s concerned, is in international law not opposable to those States. States have a duty to negotiate with a view to
reaching an agreement and to do so in good faith with a genuine intention to achieve a positive result. Any delimitation must
be effected by agreement between the States concerned either by the conclusion of a direct agreement or by some alternative
method which must be based on consent. And any agreement or other equivalent solution should involve the application of
equitable criteria - those derived from equity which are not in themselves principles and rules of international law.
Fundamental norm in delimitation: the boundary be determined according to the applicable law, in conformity with equitable
principles, having regard to all relevant circumstances, in order to achieve an equitable result. A more complete, precise
reformulation of the fundamental norm, prescribed by general international law for all maritime delimitations between
neighbour states:
(1) No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those
States. Such delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an agreement, following negotiations conducted in good
faith and with the genuine intention of achieving a positive result. Where, however, such agreement cannot be achieved,
delimitation should be effected by recourse to a third party possessing the necessary competence.
(2) In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the application of equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods
capable of ensuring, with regard to the geographic configuration of the area and other relevant circumstances, an equitable
result.

Continental Shelf Convention inapplicable. If the goal is only a delimitation of the continental shelf, then the mandatory
application of Art. 6 is undisputed. However, the goal of this proceeding is to draw a single delimitation line for both the
continental shelf and the superjacent fishery zone. It is doubtful whether a treaty obligation which is in terms confined to the
delimitation of the continental shelf can be extended to a field which is evidently greater and fundamentally different. To do so
would make the maritime water mass over the shelf a mere accessory of the latter, and this is unacceptable.
Equitable criteria. There has been no systematic definition of the equitable criteria for use in international maritime delimitation.
Examples of criteria used: (classic formula) that the land dominates the sea; the equal division of the areas of overlap of the
maritime and submarine zones appertaining to the respective coasts of neighboring States, in cases where there are no
special circumstances; whenever possible, the seaward extension of a State's coast shouldnt encroach on areas that are too
close to the coast of another State; the prevention, as far as possible, of any cut-off of the seaward projection of the coast or of
part of the coast of either of the States concerned; and in certain circumstances, the appropriate consequences may be drawn
from any inequalities in the extent of the coasts of two States into the same area of delimitation. The essential fact to
remember is that the criteria are not rules of law and therefore mandatory in the different situations, but "equitable", or even
"reasonable", criteria, and that what international law requires is that recourse be had in each case to the criterion, or the
balance of different criteria, appearing to be most appropriate to the concrete situation.
Proposed methods by the Parties. The US proposed the method of the perpendicular (a vertical line, perpendicular to the
general of the coast). Canada relied on the equidistance method.
Regarding the method to be used. None of the potential methods for delimitation has intrinsic merits which would make it
preferable to another in the abstract. There is no single method which intrinsically brings greater justice or is of greater
practical usefulness. The greater or lesser appropriateness of one method or another can only be assessed with reference to
the actual situations in which they are used, and the assessment made in one situation may be entirely reversed in another.
Nor is there any method of which must be preferred, a method with whose application every delimitation operation could begin,
albeit subject to its effects being subsequently corrected or it being even discarded in favor of another, if those effects turned
out to be clearly unsatisfactory. There must be willingness to adopt a combination of different methods whenever that seems to
be called for by differences in the circumstances that may be relevant in the different phases of the operation and with
reference to different segments of the line. Thus the Court decided this independently of the proposals.
Adjacent v. Opposite. Art. 6 contemplate 2 distinct hypothetical situations, but this doesnt mean that the basic criterion (equal
division) behind these provisions are different, or that the method doesnt use the same technique. The distinction is only due
to the different geographical situations referred to (lateral equidistance line for adjacent coasts, median line for opposite
coasts). In appreciating the appropriateness of the equidistance method as a means of achieving an equitable solution, regard
must be had to the difference between a 'lateral' boundary between adjacent States and a 'median' boundary between
'opposite' States." The coasts of two States may be adjacent at certain places and opposite at others (as in this case). On this
latter hypothesis, difficulties might arise of a practical nature in particular since every effort should be made to prevent the
partial relationship of adjacency from ultimately predominating over the partial relationship of oppositeness, or vice-versa. It
might become apparent that adjustments were necessary for this purpose, or even recourse to a different method.
Applicable equitable criteria in this case: geography + auxiliary criteria. Remember that this involves a delimitation of 2 distinct
elements by means of a single line. This precludes the use of any criteria which are inappropriate for the delimitation of either
element. The Court will apply criteria derived from geography, mainly the geography of coasts, which has (primarily) a physical
aspect and (secondarily) a political aspect. Some corrections must be made to certain effects of its application that might be
unreasonable, so that the concurrent use of auxiliary criteria may appear indispensable, such as length of coastlines, the
equitableness of correcting the result when a coastline is cut off, and the presence of geographical features (islands, groups of
small islands).
Applicable practical methods. The practical methods can only be methods appropriate for use against a background of
geography. Moreover, the methods used must be just as suitable for the delimitation of the sea-bed and its subsoil as for the
delimitation of the superjacent waters and their fishery resources. Thus, only geometrical methods will serve. Given the
configuration of the Gulf of Maine coastline, the delimitation line isnt a unidirectional line. Take note that at the northeastern
sector the coasts are laterally adjacent, while at the closing sector the coasts are opposite. Thus in the first sector, the
boundary is a lateral delimitation line. In the second, the line is a median line.
4. The Delimitation
a. First Segment. The practical method to be applied must be a geometrical one based on respect for the geographical
situation of the coasts between which the delimitation is to be effected, and at the same time suitable for producing a result
satisfying the criterion for the division of disputed areas. Thus the equidistance method isnt used, but the method of drawing
perpendiculars. Accordingly, one may justifiably draw from point A two lines respectively perpendicular to the two basic coastal
lines. These perpendiculars form, at point A, on one side an acute angle of about 82' and on the other a reflex angle of about
278'. It is the bisector of this second angle which should be adopted for the course of the first segment.
b. Second Segment.

Stage one. This involves the determination of the median line. Remember, the choice of method is essentially dependent on
geography. In this case (given the rectangular shape of the area and the quasi-parallelism between the lines used in the
delimitation, and the fact that the coasts are opposite), the application of any method of geometrical origin can in practice only
result in the drawing of a median delimitation line. Such a line can only be one approximately parallel to the approximately
parallel lines of the two opposite coasts.
Stage two. The back of the Gulf is entirely occupied by the continuous coast of Maine, a component state of the US, and the
terminal point of the international boundary with Canada is situated much farther to the northeast in the Grand Manan
Channel, at a corner of the rectangle which geometrically represents the shape of the Gulf proper. Thus it is impossible to
disregard the difference in length between the respective coastlines of the two States which border on the delimitation area. A
correction is thus needed. The total length of the US coastline in the Gulf is approximately 284 nautical miles. The overall
length of the Canadian coastline is approximately 206 nautical miles. The ratio between the coastal fronts of the Parties on the
Gulf of Maine as is thus 1.38 to 1. This ratio should be reflected in the location of the second segment of the delimitation line.
The appropriate method should be to apply the ratio selected to a line drawn across the Gulf where the coasts of Nova Scotia
and Massachusetts are nearest to each other. It would then be proper to shift the median line drawn in such a way as to reflect
this ratio along the line Cape Cod-Chebogue Point. The presence of some islands and isles must also be considered, i.e. Seal
Island. It is some two and-a-half miles long. However it would be excessive to treat the coastline of Nova Scotia as transferred
south-westwards by the whole of the distance between Seal Island and that coast, and it is appropriate to give the island half
effect, so that the ratio to be applied for determining the location of the corrected median line will be approximately 1.32 to 1 in
place of 1.38 to 1. Since it is only a question of adjusting the proportion by reference to which the corrected median line is to
be located, the islands effect is a small transverse displacement of that line, not an angular displacement, with limited practical
impact. The central segment of the delimitation line will correspond, over its entire length, with the corrected median line as so
established. It will begin where this line intersects, within the Gulf, the bisector drawn from point A and constituting the first
segment, and end on reaching the closing line of the Gulf.
c. Third Segment. This is the longest portion. This is the segment which lies outside and over against the Gulf of Maine. In
principle, the determination of the path of this segment must depend on that of the two previous segments. The portion of the
line now to be determined will inevitably be situated in the open ocean. From the geographical point of view, there is no point
of reference, outside the actual shores of the Gulf that can serve as a basis for carrying out the final operation required. It is
obvious that the only kind of practical method which can be considered for this purpose is a geometrical method - the drawing
of a perpendicular to the closing line of the Gulf.
In conclusion, taking point A as a fixed point and assigning letter B to the meeting-point between the first two segments as
above defined, letter C to the meeting-point between the second and third segments on the closing line of the Gulf, and letter
D to the point where the first segment reaches, to seaward, the last place on its path where the claims of the two Parties
overlap, the delimitation line fixed between the maritime jurisdictions of Canada and the US will be the line successively
connecting points A, B, C and D.
5. Verification of the equitable character of the result. This is necessary only for the third segment, which is the real subject of
the dispute due to the potential resources of the subsoil and the fisheries. Some enquiry whether, in addition to the factors
provided by the geography of the Gulf itself, there are no others that should be taken into account, is an understandable step.
It might well appear that other circumstances ought properly to be considered in assessing the equitable character of the result
produced by this portion of the delimitation line. These other circumstances may be summed up by the data provided by
human and economic geography, and are thus ineligible for consideration as criteria to be applied in the delimitation process
itself, may be relevant in assessing the equitable character of a delimitation first established on the basis of criteria borrowed
from physical and political geography (ex. Historical presence in the area, activities pursued like fishing and conservation of
resources, & socioeconomic aspects) . In this case, the Court concluded that there are absolutely no conditions of an
exceptional kind which might justify any correction of the delimitation line that was drawn. The delimitation was effected in
compliance with the governing principles and rules of law, applying equitable criteria and appropriate methods accordingly,
thus producing an equitable overall result.
i. THE HIGH SEAS
These are all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State. The high seas are
subject to 6 freedoms:
1. freedom of navigation
2. freedom of overflight
3. freedom of fishing
4. freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines
5. freedom to construct artificial islands and structures
6. freedom of scientific research.
Freedom of overflight belongs to both civilian and military aircraft. Freedom of fishing also includes the duty to cooperate in
taking measures to ensure the conservation and management of the living resources of the high seas.

Every State, whether coastal or land-locked, has the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas. The flag state has
exclusive jurisdiction over its ships on the high seas to the extent not limited by agreement. By legal fiction, a ship is a floating
part of the flag state. A warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship can board the latter only if there is a
reasonable ground for suspecting that:
1. the ship is engaged in piracy
2. the ship is engaged in slave trade
3. the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag state of the warship has jurisdiction
4. the ship is without nationality
5. though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is really of the same nationality as the warship.
Piracy refers to the following acts:

1. any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; or against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
2. any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a known pirate ship or aircraft;
3. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating any of the above acts.
Take note that the contiguous zone is part of the high seas.
Hot pursuit is allowed where there is good reason to believe that the ship has violated laws or regulations of a coastal state.
This must commence when the foreign vessel is within the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial waters, or the
contiguous zone of the pursuing state. It may continue to the high seas if the pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not
necessary that, at the time when the foreign ship within the territorial sea or contiguous zone receives the order to stop, the
ship giving the order should likewise be within the territorial sea or contiguous zone. If the foreign ship is in the contiguous
zone, it may be pursued only for violations of the rights of the coastal state in the contiguous zone. Mutatis mutandis, the right
of hot pursuit shall also apply to violations of applicable laws and regulations of the coastal state in the EEZ or the continental
shelf including the safety zones of the shelf. Hot pursuit must stop as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial waters of
its own state or of a third state. Hot pursuit may be carried out only by warships or military aircraft, or any other ship or aircraft
properly marked for that purpose.
Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship has satisfied itself by such practicable means as may be
available that the ship pursued is within the limits of the territorial sea or, as the case may be, within the contiguous zone, EEZ,
or above the continental shelf. The pursuit may only be commenced after a visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at
a distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship.
In the event of a collision or any other incident of navigation concerning a ship on the high seas, involving the penal or
disciplinary responsibility of the master or of any other person in the service of the ship, no penal or disciplinary proceedings
may be instituted against such person except before the judicial or administrative authorities either of the flag State or of the
State of which such person is a national. In disciplinary matters, the State which has issued a master's certificate or a
certificate of competence or license shall alone be competent, after due legal process, to pronounce the withdrawal of such
certificates, even if the holder is not a national of the State which issued them. No arrest or detention of the ship, even as a
measure of investigation, shall be ordered by any authorities other than those of the flag State.
j. CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF LIVING RESOURCES OF THE HIGH SEAS
All states have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject to their treaty obligations, the rights
and duties of coastal states, and the UNCLOS provisions. In line with this, all states have the duty to take, or to cooperate with
other states in taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living
resources of the high seas (e.g. determining the allowable catch).
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (1999)

Australia and New Zealand alleged that Japan had failed to comply with its obligation to cooperate in the conservation of the
southern blue fin tuna (SBT) stock by undertaking unilateral experimental fishing for southern bluefin tuna in breach of its
obligations under Arts 64 and 116 to 119 of UNCLOS in relation to the conservation and management of the SBT. They are
also asking for provisional remedies in the form of an order commanding Japan to desist from such unilateral experimental
fishing.
Highly Migratory Species must be protected! Under art 64, read together with arts 116 to 119, of the Convention, States
Parties to the Convention have the duty to cooperate directly or through appropriate international organizations with a view to
ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of highly migratory species.
SOUTHERN BLUE FIN TUNA, A HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES OF FISH! The list of highly migratory species contained in
Annex I to the Convention includes southern bluefin tuna: thunnus maccoyii;
Provisional Remedies granted catch limit set (Japan made a clear commitment that the 1999 experimental fishing
programme will end by 31 August anyway). PROVISIONAL MEASURES AIMS TO PRESERVE RIGHTS AND HARM TO
ENVIRONMENT. In accordance with art 290 of the Convention, the Tribunal may prescribe provisional measures to preserve
the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment. MEASURES SHOULD
BE TAKEN TO PRESERVE RIGHTS AND AVERT MORE DETERIORATION. Although the Tribunal cannot conclusively
assess the scientific evidence presented by the parties, it finds that measures should be taken as a matter of urgency to
preserve the rights of the parties and to avert further deterioration of the southern blue fin tuna stock.
k. RIGHT OF LAND-LOCKED STATES TO AND FROM THE SEA
A land-locked state is one which has no sea-coast. These states have the right of access to and from the sea and the freedom
of transit through the territory of a transit state (a state, with or without a sea-coast, situation between a land-locked state and
the sea, through whose territory traffic in transit passes). Traffic in transit shall not be subject to any customs duties, taxes, or
other charges, except those levied for specific services rendered in connection with such traffic.
l. INTERNATIONAL SEABED AREA
These are areas of the seabed and the ocean floor, and their subsoil, which lie beyond any national jurisdiction. These are the
common heritage of mankind and may not be appropriated by any state or person. All rights in the resources of the Area are
vested in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority (the International Sea-Bed Authority) shall act. These resources
are not subject to alienation. The minerals recovered from the Area, however, may only be alienated in accordance with the
relevant provisions of UNCLOS. The Enterprise is the organ of the Authority which shall carry out activities in the Area directly
as well as the transporting, processing, and marketing of minerals recovered from the Area, and shall have its principal place
of business at the seat of the Authority.
m. MARINE POLLUTION
Marine pollution prevention and control arising from land-based sources, sea-bed-activities subject to national jurisdiction,
activities in the Area, vessels and others are covered quite extensively under UNCLOS. States are bound to prevent and
control marine pollution from any source and are liable for damage caused by violation of their international obligations to
combat such pollution.
* Sir: marine pollution cases are different from quasi-delicts, for the latter requires proof of negligence in order to recover
damages. Under the TOVALOP and CRISTOL, there is no need to prove fault for there is an immediate duty to pay for the
clean-up. However, shipping and oil companies are required to pay only up to a certain amount (based on an oil fund). This
arose as a response to the Exxon incident. Take note that the US doesnt recognize a ceiling. Also, in cases of gross
negligence, the companies will lose the benefit of limited liability and will become liable for the amount needed for the clean-
up.
n. NAVIGATION
Every State has the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas. It is the States right to decide the conditions by which it
will accord the right to fly its flag. No ship may change its flag during its voyage except in case of transfer of ownership or on
the basis of change of registry. If a ship sails under the flag of 2 states, it is considered as having no nationality and may not
claim any of the nationalities represented by these flags with respect to any other State. Only the flag state may exercise
criminal jurisdiction over the master or any person in the service of the ship. This is a departure from the SS Lotus case. Also
the flag state shall have the duty to require the ships master, without danger to the crew or passengers, to render assistance
to any person at sea in danger of being lost, or to rescue persons in distress.
o. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Peaceful settlement of disputes is compulsory. If a bilateral settlement fails, UNCLOS requires submission of the dispute for
compulsory settlement in one of the tribunals clothed with jurisdiction. The alternatives are the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea, the ICJ, or an arbitral tribunal constituted under the Convention.
p. PEACEFUL USE OF THE OCEANS
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under UNCLOS, states shall refrain from any threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of
international law embodied in the UN Charter.
q. ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL OBJECTS
States have the duty to protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature found at sea.

INTERNAL TERRITORIAL ARCHIPELAGO CONTIGUOUS EEZ CONTINENTAL HIGH SEAS
WATERS SEAS ZONE SHELF
Definition Waters on the An adjacent belt of A grp. of islands, A zone contiguous An area beyond Seabed and subsoil All parts of the
landward side of sea, which does including parts of to the territorial sea and adjacent to of submarine areas sea that are not
the baseline of not exceed 12 islands, that may not the territorial that extend beyond included in the
the territorial sea. nautical miles from interconnecting extend beyond 24 sea, which the territorial sea exclusive
Includes waters the baselines. waters & other nautical miles from extends 200 throughout the economic
of lakes, rivers, Under the natural features the baselines nautical miles natural prolongation zone, in the
ports, and bays UNCLOS, which are so closely from the of its land territory to territorial sea or
roadsteads are interrelated that such baseline the outer edge of the in the internal
part of the form an intrinsic continental margin, waters of a
territorial sea. geographical, or to a distance of State, or in the
economic & political 200 miles from the archipelagic
entity, or which baselines whichever waters of an
historically have is greater. archipelagic
been regarded as State.
such
Sovereignty, Coastal state has Coastal state has Archipelagic states Coastal state does These are Coastal state has Not under
Jurisidction absolute civil & sovereignty (over sovereignty extends not exercise limited. certain sovereign jurisdiction,
criminal airspace, seabed, to the archipelagic sovereignty but Sovereign rights over the sovereignty of
jurisdiction subsoil) , limited by waters, the airspace protective rights only for continental shelf, any state
the right of above these waters, jurisdiction. the purpose of though it doesnt
innocent passage the seabed, subsoil, exploring, form part of its Ships under
and the resources. Coastal state has exploiting, territory. These the flag of 1
Flag state This sovereignty is jurisdiction only conserving, and sovereign rights state shall be
exercises civil, exercised subject to over customs, managing the dont affect the legal subject to the
criminal jurisdiction the right of fiscal, immigration, natural status of superjacent exclusive
with EXCEPTIONS archipelagic sea or sanitary laws & resources, waters and airspace jurisdiction of
1. Criminal lanes passage. regulations living or over the waters. such state.
consequences nonliving, in the
extend to coastal waters, seabed, For collisions,
state, disturbs the and subsoil. no penal
peace, good order, proceedings
request for Jurisdiction is may be
assistance, drug limited, with instated except
traffic regard to before the
2. Civil those artificial islands judicial or
incurred by ship and administrative
itself, connected installations, authorities of
with the voyage marine either the flag
scientific state or of the
research, and state of which
protection, persons in the
preservation of service of the
marine ship is a
environment national
Rights of the To adopt laws, To suspend the right Coastal states To explore, Sovereign rights to FOR ALL
Coastal State regulations relating of passage wrt must make a claim exploit, explore, exploit STATES:

to innocent specified areas if to its contiguous conserve, & natural resources Freedoms of
passage essential for the zone for their manage natural (mineral & other the high seas
protection of the pertinent rights to resources, nonliving resources - navigation
When necessary states security and exist (this zone is living or of the seabed & - overflight
wrt navigational without only optional, the nonliving, in the subsoil, & living - lay submarine
safety, require discrimination among others are waters, seabed, organisms at the cables,
foreign ships to foreign ships mandatory). The or subsoil. harvestable stage, pipelines
use sea lanes, contiguous zone if either immobile on or - construct
traffic separation To designate sea claimed will be To construct, under the seabed or artificial
schemes lanes & air routes superimposed on operate, & use are unable to move islands,
the EEZ. If there is artificial islands except in constant installations
Rights of protection Prescribe traffic no claim, the area & installations physical contact with - fishing
(includes right to separation schemes will be part of the the seabed or - scientific
temporarily for safe passage of high seas. To lay subsoil) research
suspend innocent ships via narrow submarine
passage if channels in such Exercise necessary cables & To construct, operate To visit
essential for lanes control to prevent pipelines & use artificial warships
protection of its violations wrt islands &
security) Substitute other sea customs, fiscal, Freedoms of installations Hot pursuit
lanes, traffic sanitary, navigation &
separation schemes immigration overflight To lay submarine Immunity of
cables & pipelines warships, ships
Punish Establish safety owned or
infringement of the zones around Exclusive right to operated by a
laws related to the artificial islands, authorize & regulate state & used
4 areas installations drilling on the shelf only on govt
non-
To exploit the subsoil commercial
via tunneling service

Duties of Not to hamper the Respect rights of Conserve & Not to FOR ALL
Coastal States innocent passage third states under manage the infringe/interfere with STATES:
of foreign ships existing agreements resources rights & freedoms of To fix
other States, e.g. conditions for
To give appropriate Recognize traditional Promote navigation grant of
publicity to any fishing rights, other optimum nationality to
danger to legitimate activities utilization Not to impede the ships (right to
navigation, of of adjacent laying, maintenance fly its flag)
which it has neighboring states of cables, pipelines
knowledge, within Exercise
its territorial sea Respect existing In laying jurisdiction &
submarine cables cables/pipelines, to control in
laid by other states & have due regard to administrative,
passing through its those already in technical,
waters without position social matters
making a windfall over ships
flying its flag
Allow the
maintenance and To render
replacement of such assistance
cables
Rights of Third NO right of Right of innocent Right of innocent Right to innocent To lay To lay submarine To prevent,
States innocent passage passage passage passage submarine cables and pipelines punish the
cables & transport of
EXCEPT when No charge may be Right of archipelagic Right to transit pipelines To repair existing slaves
the establishment levied on foreign sea lanes passage passage cables, pipelines
of a straight vessels by reason Freedoms of To repress
baseline encloses only of their navigation & piracy
as internal waters passage overflight
those which had To suppress
not previously illicit traffic in
been considered narcotic drugs,
as such

Duties of Third Submarines, Ships and aircraft in To abide by the Due regard to In laying psychotropic
States underwater archipelagic sea rules and the rights & cables/pipelines, to substances
vehicles must lanes passage shall regulations set by duties of the have due regard to
navigate on the not deviate more the coastal state coastal state those already in To suppress
surface & show than 25 miles to position unauthorized
their flag either side of the Comply with the broadcasting
lanes during laws, IF BEYOND 200-MI.
Comply with passage regulations of ZONE: Punish the
coastal states the coastal The duty to make breaking of
rules, regulations Respect applicable state annual payments or submarine
relating to innocent sea lanes and traffic contributions in kind cables
passage separation schemes Foreign ships after the first 5 years
must respect of production except To cooperate in
When required, the safety in case of a conservation,
foreign ships must zones developing state, management of
use designated established by which is a net living resources
sea lanes, traffic the coastal importer of mineral
separation State resources from its
schemes continental shelf
Foreign nuclear-
powered ships,
those carrying
nuclear, inherently
dangerous/noxious
substances, during
innocent passage,
must carry
documents &
observe special
precautionary
measures

3
3. JURISDICTION & IMMUNITIES
Bernas, An Introduction to International Law (for easier reading; Higgins & Brownlie articles are in the digest)
> Jurisdiction authority to affect legal interests.
Kinds:
1. jurisdiction to prescribe norms of conduct (legislative jurisdiction)
2. jurisdiction to enforce the norms prescribed (executive jurisdiction)
3. jurisdiction to adjudicate (juridical jurisdiction)
> 5 traditional bases of jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes under international law: Territorial, wherein jurisdiction is based
on whether jurisdiction is based on the place where the offense is committed (Lotus case); Protective, wherein jurisdiction is
based on the nationality of the offender (Nottebohm case); Protective, wherein jurisdiction is based on whether the national
interest is injured; Universal, wherein jurisdiction is conferred in any forum that obtains physical custody of the perpetuator of
certain offenses considered particularly heinous and harmful to humanity (Eichmenn v. Atty-General of Israel); Passive
Personal, wherein jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the victim.
> Effective nationality link doctrine (Nationality Principle) determines which of 2 states of which a person is a national will be
recognized as having the right to give diplomatic protection to holder of dual nationality (Nottebohm).
*Sir:
Jurisdiction
1. Territorial jurisdiction
2. Universal jurisdiction regardless of where, what nationality of victim or offender.
Ex. Act so offensive, crimes v. intl order, piracy, war crimes, crimes & crimes against humanity, torture, genocide
3. alternative bases for exercise of jurisdiction: nationality offender (RP Civil Code)
Brownell v. Sunlife
Action to compel payment on an endowment policy payable to a Japanese, under the Trading with the Enemy Act.
Exclusive jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the nation within its territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of
no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of
its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power in which
would impose such restriction. All exceptions to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be
traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. This consent may be either express
or implied. The consent of a Senate to the operation of a foreign law within its territory does not need to be express; it is
enough that said consent be implied from its conduct or from that of its authorized officers. Ratification can be given tacitly as
well as expressly. Tacit ratification takes place when a State begins the execution of a treaty without expressly ratifying it.
The ratification of or concurrence of the RP to the agreement for the extension of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is clearly
implied from the acts of the President of the RP and of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the enactment of RAs 7,
8, and 477. US laws have no extraterritorial effect. The application of said law in the RP is based concurrently on said act
(Philippine Property Act of 1946) and on the tacit consent thereto and the conduct of the RP Government itself in receiving the
benefits of its provisions.
People v. Lol-Lo And Saraw

Appeal against conviction for piracy.
Universal jurisdiction over piracy. CFI has jurisdiction over the crime of piracy, which is robbery or forcible depredation on the
high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Pirates are in
law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy
unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime
was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to
crimes."
*Sir: Even without domestic executing lawso why not for enforced disappearances? Extra-judicial killings? Against Osama,
who has 2 Filipina wivesif he hides here, can we use People v. Lol-lo? YES! The lack of domestic law does not make the act
any more legal.
RPC extraterritorial clauses now, restating cases
Tubb & Tedrow v. Griess

Petition against US prosecution for misappropriation.
Limit on sovereignty. Since such part of the US Army is stationed in the RP with permission of our government, & petitioners,
who belong to the military personnel of that army, are charged with violations of Articles of War for offenses committed in areas
3
Thanks to Tin and Cathe for this part.
under the control of the US Army, a settled principle of international law gives said army jurisdiction over their person & the
offenses charged. IL rule: a foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of
its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil & criminal jurisdiction of the place; the agreement for the stationing of the
US Army or a part of its forces in the RP implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over their troops during the time covered by such
agreement, & permits the allied general or commander-in-chief to retain that exclusive control & discipline which the
government of his army may require.
Haw Pia v. The China Banking Corporation

Petition to compel cancellation of mortgage with sequestered bank.
Sequestration v. confiscation. Confiscation is not allowed under the Hague Regulations. There was no confiscation here but a
mere sequestration. Under international law, the occupying power can effect a liquidation that is in the form of a mere
sequestration. In the effort of occupying powers to control enemy property within their jurisdiction in order to avoid their use in
aid of the enemy and to increase their own resources, they had to resort to such measures of preventionwhich do not
amount to a straight confiscation, as freezing, blocking, placing under custody, and sequestrating the enemy private property.
Measures of prevention are not repugnant to Hague Regulations. This is based on [1] writings of well-known writers on
International Law, [2] express authorization granted under the Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs
of US and of other civilized countries, and [3] Trading with the Enemy Acts of the US and other civilized countries. Thus, there
was valid tender of payment to BOT which discharged Haw Pias obligation.
Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa (District Court)

Alvarez sues US & paid kidnapper after he was acquitted on charges for which he was brought to the US.
Kidnapping not an actionable norm under ACTA. On the Alien Tort Claims Act: US does not recognize a prohibition against
transborder kidnapping, nor can it be said that there is international acceptance of such a norm. At the time of Alvarez's
abduction, the US-Mexico Extradition Treaty did not extend to transborder abduction and there was no separate treaty with
such a prohibition. Our review of the international authorities and literature reveals no specific binding obligation, express or
implied, on the part of the US or its agents to refrain from transborder kidnapping. Nor can we say that there is a universal
consensus in the sense that we use that term to describe well-entrenched customs of international law. Because a human
rights norm recognizing an individual's right to be free from transborder abductions has not reached a status of international
accord sufficient to render it obligatory or universal, it cannot qualify as an actionable norm under the ATCA. Aspiration has
not yet ripened into obligation.
But, extraterritorial application does not automatically give rise to extraterritorial enforcement authority. That Congress may
have intended the reach of a criminal statute to extend beyond our borders does not mean that Congress also intended to give
federal law enforcement officers unlimited authority to violate the territorial sovereignty of any foreign nation to enforce those
laws, or to breach international law in doing so. Although we recognize that the kidnapping and murder of DEA agents abroad
necessitates the exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, absent a clear directive, we cannot conclude that Congress
has given the DEA unlimited enforcement powers abroad. Alvarez's arrest, and hence his detention, were arbitrary because
they were not pursuant to law. Consequently, Alvarez established a tort committed in violation of the law of nations.
On the Federal Torts Claims Act: Although the injuries were suffered in Mexico, the proximate cause of such injuries (planning,
scheming, etc.) were done in the US, and so it falls under the headquarters doctrine exception to the foreign activities
exception. And although the waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA excludes intentional torts such as false arrest, this
exclusion is followed by an important proviso: It does not apply if the intentional tort is committed by an investigative or law
enforcement officer. The DEA agents who orchestrated Alvarez's arrest are law enforcement officers as defined by the FTCA
because they are empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.
Because the primary tortious act was the initiation and planning of Alvarez's abduction by the DEA agents, his claim falls
squarely within this law enforcement proviso, and thus the intentional tort exclusion does not apply.
*Sir: Valid extradition under intl law treaty and offense must satisfy rule of double criminality (both at time of happening or
commission and at the time of request, the offense must be defined in both territories). [2007 Bar]
You are not required to extradite (for torture, etc.) from a country notorious for violation of torture, etc. (incluing the death
penalty) treaty
Political crimes are defined in Extradition Treaty as being non-extraditable; person accused for such may apply for refugee
status, be an asylum seeker.
Sosa v. Machain (Supreme Court)

Claimant seeks damages for illegal arrest & wrongful detention.
ACTA only jurisdictional, no cause of action given. FTCAs foreign country exception bars all claims based on any injury
suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred. The Alien Torts Statute is a
jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action. The reasonable inference from history & practice is that the ATS was
intended to have practical effect the moment it became law, on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause
of action for the modest number of IL violations thought to carry personal liability at the time: offenses against ambassadors,
violation of safe conducts, & piracy. In deriving a standard for assessing Alvarez's claim, it suffices to look to the historical
antecedents, which persuade this Court that federal courts should not recognize claims under federal common law for
violations of any IL norm with less definite content & acceptance among civilized nations than the 18th-century paradigms
familiar when the ATS was enacted. ([F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has becomelike the pirate & slave trader
before himhostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind) In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, Actionable
violations of IL must be of a norm that is specific, universal, & obligatory. A single illegal detention of less than a day, followed
by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities & a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary IL so well defined as to
support the creation of a federal remedy.
*Sir: SC: show injury from an official act; requirement: no break in the causation of events (commission must be in the US
territory). On Sosa: ACTA is available for victims of intl crimes; if served by summons in US. ACTA does not apply
jurisdiction-giving only; no cause of action provided in the law; kidnapping is not included in the list of actionable crimes.
ACTA: for Hilao v. Marcosdamages for political murders, enforced disappearances.
ACTA: amended by Bush; now, available only for torture (before, included violation of law of nationswar crimes, crimes
against humanity, slavery, torture)
Is kidnapping an intl crime?
Eichmann v. Attorney-General Of Israel

Appeal of conviction for crimes against humanity during the Holocaust.
Universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity; manner of arrest does not affect jurisdiction. On jurisdiction: The principle
of territorial sovereignty merely requires that the State exercise its power to punish within its own borders, not outside them;
that subject to this restriction every State may exercise a wide discretion as to the application of its laws and the jurisdiction of
its courts in respect of acts committed outside the State; and that only in so far as it is possible to point to a specific rule
prohibiting the exercise of this discretion . . . is a State prevented from exercising it. That view was based on the following two
grounds: (1) It is precisely the conception of State sovereignty which demands the preclusion of any presumption that there is
a restriction on its independence; & (2) Even if it is true that the principle of the territorial character of criminal law is firmly
established in various States, it is no less true that in almost all of such States criminal jurisdiction has been extended . . . so
as to embrace offences committed outside its territory. . .
However, it is the universal character of the crimes in question which vests in every State the power to try those who
participated in the preparation of such crimes, and to punish them therefor. It follows that the State which prosecutes and
punishes a person for that offence acts solely as the organ and agent of the international community, and metes out
punishment to the offender for his breach of the prohibition imposed by the law of nations. . . .
On manner of arrest (kidnapping from Argentina):
(a) In the absence of an extradition agreement between the State to which a "fugitive offender" has been brought for trial
and the country of "asylum" . . . and even if there existed such an agreement . . . but the offender was not extradited . . . in
accordance therewith, the Court will not investigate the circumstances in which he was detained and brought to the area
of jurisdiction (Sir: the Ma-and-Pa doctrine, originally from Ker v. Illinois).
(b) This also applies if the offender's contention be that the abduction was carried out by the agents of the State
prosecuting him, since in such a case the right violated is not that of the offender, but the sovereign right of the State
aggrieved.
(c) the aggrieved State may condone the violation of its sovereignty and waive its claims, including the claim for the return
of the offender to its territory, and such waiver may be explicit or by acquiescence.
Appellant is a "fugitive from justice" from the point of view of the law of nations, since the crimes that were attributed to him are
of an international character and have been condemned publicly by the civilised world; therefore, by virtue of the principle of
universal jurisdiction, every country has the right to try him. This jurisdiction was automatically vested in the State of Israel on
its establishment in 1948 as a sovereign State. Therefore, in bringing the appellant to trial, it functioned as an organ of
international law and acted to enforce the provisions thereof through its own law. Consequently, it is immaterial that the crimes
in question were committed when the State of Israel did not exist, and outside its territory The moment it is admitted that the
State of Israel possesses criminal jurisdiction both according to local law and according to the law of nations, it must also be
conceded that the Court is not bound to investigate the manner and legality of the [arrest and]detention...
Ker v. Illinois
Ker was kidnapped from Peru & brought to Cook County, US to face larceny & embezzlement charges.
Irregularity in manner of getting custody does not affect jurisdiction. Due process of law is complied with when the party is
regularly indicted by the proper grand jury in the state court, has a trial according to the forms and modes prescribed for such
trials, and when in that trial and proceedings he isnt deprived of rights to which he is lawfully entitled. For mere irregularities in
manner in which he was brought into the custody of the law, he isnt entitled to say that he shouldnt be tried for the crime with
which he is charged in a regular indictment.
This treaty (of extradition), or any other treaty, doesnt provide that a party fleeing from the US to escape punishment for crime
becomes thereby entitled to an asylum in the country to which he has fled. It isnt contended that Peru couldnt have ordered
Ker out of the country on his arrival, or at any period of his residence there. Nor can it be doubted that Peru could, of its own
accord, without any demand from the US, have surrendered Ker to an agent of Illinois, and this surrender wouldve been valid
within the dominions of Peru. The right of the Peruvian government to voluntarily give a party, in Kers condition, an asylum in
that country is quite a different thing from his right to demand and insist upon security in such an asylum. The treaty, so far as
it regulates the right of asylum, is intended to limit this right in the case of one who is proved to be a criminal fleeing from
justice; so that, on proper demand and proceedings had therein, the government of the country of the asylum shall deliver him
up to the country where the crime was committed. And to this extent, the treaty does regulate or impose a restriction upon the
right of the government of the country of the asylum to protect the criminal from removal. In this case, the treaty wasnt called
into operation or relied upon.
*Sir: origin of the Ma-and-Pa doctrine.
Bernas: Immunity from Jurisdiction

General rule: the jurisdiction of a state within its territory is complete and absolute.
Categories of exceptions: Sovereign immunity, which covers both a head of state and the state itself, & Immunity of the
representative of states or diplomatic and consular immunities.
State immunity the principle that the state may not be sued without its consent found in the Philippine Constitution is both
municipal law and also international law applicable to foreign states. This is based on the principle of equality of states: par in
parem non habet imperium. The immunity of the sovereign head is seen as also communicated to the sovereign state.
Diplomatic and consular immunities - much of the law governing diplomatic relations is customary law. Official representatives
of a state are given immunities and privileges, which are personal (they benefit the person), when they are within the territory
of another state. But the purpose of the immunities given is functional, that is, to enable them to perform their functions
properly. On the part of the receiving state there lie certain obligations to protect the representative and his property and
office.
*Sir: Seeming difference between sovereign immunity and immunity of an IO: none really, when we agree to limit territorial
jurisdiction via the Bases Agreement (among others), employees are immune for both functional and full immunity.
Tendency: narrow construction of immunity: covers only sovereign acts
Limits on Sovereignty:
-US-RP Bases Agreement transitory provision: complete immunity to limited immunity (limited to sovereign acts as opposed
to proprietary acts)
-but when sovereign? Proprietary? What about when building bases? Or the ZTE contract (state enterpriseact of Chinese
state? China has no concept of private entities)? When buying helicopters, armaments (for defense)still sovereign acts.
Difficult cases: transportationcivilian and sovereign character, if during on-going armed conflicts, private vessels
commissioned by the state, if there is no conflict?
-RTC of Makati: no complete immunity
Tests:
1. Nature of act whether sovereign or proprietary.
2. Personality of contracting parties trumped by purpose test (armaments sold by private entities to state to be used
for defense).
Ex Parte Pinochet
Pinochet extradited by Spain while he was in London seeking medical treatment, for crimes committed, primarily in Chile,
during his term as head of state of Chile (he became head of state after a successful coup).
Double criminality doctrine; sovereign & functional immunity. Not all the crimes as charged are extradition crimes, so, Pinochet
can be extradited WRT charges after Sept. 29, 1988 (date when Torture became a crime in the UK). Principle of Double
Criminality requires that the conduct complained of must constitute a crime under the law of both Spain and of the UK. The
relevant date is the conduct datemeaning, that the conduct should be a crime in the UK at the time it was committed, and
not at the time the extradition was sought (request date).
Pinochet as a former head of state enjoys immunity ratione materiae, but torture as defined under the Torture convention
cannot be a public function, so he does not enjoy immunity WRT these acts committed after 09-29-88.
Torture is now an international crime on its own. IL prohibiting torture has the character of jus cogens or a peremptory norm,
i.e. one of those rules which have a particular status. Universal Jurisdiction over torture is justified by its jus cogens nature.
Important points from the torture convention:
1) Torture under the Convention can only be committed by "a public official or other person acting in an official capacity",
but these words include a head of state. A single act of official torture is "torture";
2) Superior orders provide no defence;
3) If the states with the most obvious jurisdiction (the Art. 5(1) states) do not seek to extradite, the state where the alleged
torturer is found must prosecute or, apparently, extradite to another country (universal jurisdiction).
4) There is no express provision dealing with state immunity of heads of state, ambassadors or other officials.
5) Since Chile, Spain and the UK are all parties to the Convention, they are bound under treaty by its
provisions WON such provisions would apply in the absence of treaty obligation. Chile ratified the
Convention with effect from Oct. 30, 1988 and the UK with effect from Dec. 8, 1988.
RATIONE PERSONAE RATIONE MATERIAE4
of the Ambassador Under the Vienna Convention
Immunity of Head of state:
- State immunity probably grew from the historical immunity of the person of the monarch. Such personal immunity
of the head of state persists to the present day: the head of state is entitled to the same immunity as the state itself.
4
immunity by reason of the subject-matter; attaches to the official acts of every acting or former State organ
Immunity of Ambassadors
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 19615 covers the immunity of the Ambassador. It provides that:
the Ambassador shall enjoy his immunity and privileges from the moment he takes up post.
After his post is over, he shall still enjoy these privileges and immunity until he leaves the country or on
expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but shall subsist until that time, even in case of armed conflict.
He shall continue to enjoy immunity with respect to acts performed in the exercise of his functions (Art. 39(2); limited
immunity; ratione materiae).
-Basic Principle Of IL that one sovereign state (the - immunities & privileges the Ambassador enjoyed ceases
forum state) does not adjudicate on the conduct of a the moment he leaves the country after his post. But, to
foreign state. preserve the integrity of the activities of the foreign state
during the period when he was ambassador, it is necessary
to provide that immunity is afforded to his official acts during
his tenure in post. If this were not done the sovereign
immunity of the state could be evaded by calling in question
acts done during the previous ambassador's time.
- foreign state is entitled to procedural immunity from -This continuing partial immunity is different from that
the processes of the forum state. enjoyed ratione personae while he was still in post.
- immunity extends to both criminal & civil liability.
- head of state is entitled to the same immunity as -Since he no longer represents his state, he merits no
the state itself. particular privileges or immunities as a person.
- diplomatic representative of the foreign state in the
forum state is also afforded the same immunity in
recognition of the dignity of the state which he
represents.
-Immunity is ratione personae, attaching to the -Under Art. 39(2), the ambassador, like any other official of
person of the head of state or ambassador and is a the state, enjoys immunity in relation to his official acts done
complete immunity, rendering him immune from all while he was an official. This limited immunity is to be
actions or prosecutions whether or not they relate to contrasted with the former immunity ratione personae which
matters done for the benefit of the state. gave complete immunity to all activities, public or private.
There is no established rule of IL that requires state immunity ratione materiae to be accorded in respect of prosecution for an
international crime.
*Sir: without abandoning the customary norms on immunities, the Lords ruled that immunity extends only to sovereign acts.
International crime duty to prosecute; acting in behalf of the international order.
Pinochet case but acts were committed while he was the sovereign of Chile & sovereigns have immunity from suits
Extradition in UK criminal
House of Lords reviewed the nature of his acts; immunity pertains only to sovereign acts, not including commission of
international crimesRome Statute: immunity is not a defense against charges of international crimes.
Hilao v. Estate Of Marcos

Does the US have jurisdiction over a case involving foreign sovereign for acts done in the RP, with no nexus to the US (after
Court found that Marcos was not immune, acts of torture are not acts of state, acts of torture violate customary intl law)?
No sovereign immunity against charges of torture. US Alien Tort Statute provides a forum for claims by aliens for torture that
has occurred elsewhere. It requires a claim by an alien, a tort and a violation of international law. The prohibition against
official torture carries with it the force of jus cogens norm which enjoys the highest status in international law. All states believe
that torture is wrong, all that engage in torture deny it, and no state claims a sovereign right to torture its own citizens. Under
international law, any state that engages in official torture violates jus cogens. Note that RP filed a brief stating that its foreign
relations with the US would not be adversely affected if claims against Marcos were litigated in the US.
*Sir: -Cory waived immunity important since immunity could still be claimed. Victims of Japans comfort women policy
ACTA claim for enslavement during wartime dismissed since Japan didnt waive immunity (if it did, sovereign acts can be
prosecuted).
Normative value of law: even sovereign acts are not immune to make it unwise to commit the violation
Jusmag Philippines v. NlRC

Petition assailing Labor Arbiters jurisdiction over termination of an employee of an agency of the US.
5
Art. 29- immunity from arrest
Art. 31- immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction
Art. 39 (1)- the ambassador's privileges shall be enjoyed from the moment he takes up post
(2) When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have come to an end, such privileges and immunities
shall normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but shall subsist until
that time, even in case of armed conflict. However, with respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions as a
member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist."
Sovereign immunity: contract in discharge of governmental function. A suit against such as agency is a suit against the US
Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the US has not waived or consented to the suit, the
complaint against JUSMAG cannot not prosper. Immunity of State from suit is a universally recognized principle. In
international law, "immunity" is commonly understood as an exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction
of another state. This is anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert
jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal).
The doctrine of Immunity is restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperil) and cannot be extended to
commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis) The contract was entered into in the discharge of its governmental
functions, the sovereign state cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
US v. Reyes
Discrimination case against store manager in an exchange in JUSMAG.
No functional immunity WRT acts outside official duties. Bradford was sued in her private or personal capacity for acts
allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official functions, the case falls within the exception to the
doctrine of state immunity. Unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against
the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a
suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. A public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction, for example, under Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which admits of
exceptions of the general rule of a diplomatic agents immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state: (c) an action
relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official
functions.
*Sir: jurisprudence in this regard is in flux (excess of authority = not w/in ambit of immunity)
Wylie v. Rarang
Libel case against US army personnel in charge of the publication.
No functional immunity WRT tortuous acts. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against
them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. Public officials can be
held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted
ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit The doctrine cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and
non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. An act or omission that is ultra
vires cannot be part of official duty, but is a tortious act.
*Sir: SC: act in official capacity because of the nature of the publication (attached to the organization) or because of
function/capacity in which you acted.
Nature of immunity: jurisdiction not application if sovereign act.
SC: no immunity because the act constituting quasi-delict (is this consistent with doctrine?) coverage is not applicable to
negligent or bad faith act.
WHO v. Aquino
Smuggling case involving a WHO official.
Invoking functional immunity: certification from DFA. RA 75, meant to safeguard the jurisdictional immunity of diplomatic
officials in the Philippines, declares as null and void writs or processes sued out or prosecuted whereby inter alia the person of
an ambassador or public minister is arrested or imprisoned or his goods or chattels are seized or attached and makes it a
penal offense for "every person by whom the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every
officer concerned in executing it" to obtain or enforce such writ or process. Judge Aquino should have quashed the search
warrant application. Court bound by DFA certification as to official capacity.
*Sir: Case is authority for: WHO is not subject to local jurisdiction. There is a procedure to invoke immunity from suit before
local courts: submission to court of a certificate from the DFA characterizing the organization, to which local courts should
defer.
US v. Ruiz
Action to compel US to award of harbour works contract.
State immunity not lost when state enters into sovereign contracts. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from
being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles
of independence and equality of States. Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish

thembetween sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. But, the restrictive application of State immunity is
proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the US and the RP, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes. The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract by a state but the legal nature of the act.
Lyons, Inc. v. USA

Collection case under a stevedoring contract at the US Naval Base.
State immunity lost when state enters into proprietary contract. Case dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
but SC said, generally, the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission.
However, considering that the US Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with appellant for
stevedoring & miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay area, a US Navy Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an
action before our courts for any contractual liability that that political entity may assume under the contract.
Minucher v. CA
Iranian Labor Attache claims damages after he was framed of heroin trafficking by a US drug enforcement agent.
No functional immunity WRT personal acts.Whether such claim arises from criminal acts or from tort, there can be no question
that private respondent was sued in his personal capacity for acts committed outside his official functions duties. CA gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the civil case on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply-because of the [self-
serving] Diplomatic Note, the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of
jurisdiction over his person. It may at once be stated that even if the Calzo enjoys diplomatic immunity, a dismissal of the case
cannot be ordered on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person, but rather for lack of a cause of action because even if
he committed the imputed act and could have been otherwise made liable therefor, his immunity would bar any suit against
him in connection therewith and would prevent recovery of damages arising therefrom.
In Shauf v. CA: Authorities state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public
official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers
and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises
where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may haw mused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
*Sir: MFR ruling is wrong, No basis to give immunity to a DEA agent. DEA agent definitely not a diplomatic agent (under the
Vienna convention). [twice asked in last 5 Bar exams]
In RP, our diplomats have multiple designations. Third Secretaries are also Vice Consuls, accredited (determines diplomat
status).
There shouldnt be immunity, no legal basis for immunity, no bases agreement, VFA is problematiclimits exercise of
sovereignty over offenses by visiting forces in RP (offenses in unofficial acts, under US authority who certifies that it is service-
related), specialized regime as to custody WRT unofficial acts, US can request custody pending litigation but after trial until
decision, RP gets custody upon request.
Holy See v. Rosario

Action for reconveyance & damages by first buyer against seller Holy See, after failure to complete payment.
DFA certification confirms sovereign immunity. The Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for
ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, it has an independent government of its own,
with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its
traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world. Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter
into transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is
the Holy See that is the international person. RP has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The property
was donated to the Holy See for it to establish its diplomatic premises but was forced to sell after failure to evict squatters.
Test: whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged
regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a
sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the DFA.
The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic
immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts (ICMC v. Calleja). Where the plea of immunity is recognized
and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm
of the government in conducting the country's foreign relations (WHO v. Aquino).
Remedy: a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause
through diplomatic channels

*Sir: involves a sovereign mini-state
SEAFDEC v. Acosta
Illegal termination case.
Functional immunity for international agency. SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity, enjoying
functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. One of the basic
immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs &
processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an
organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may
interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such objection
to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-
states. Important: non-political purpose + autonomy.
ICMC v. Calleja
Petition for Certification Election of rank and file members of the labor union in ICMC, a Vietnam War refugee processing
center, non-profit & UN registered.
Functional immunity for IO. International Organization is generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement
between two or more states. Under contemporary international law, such organizations are endowed with some degree of
international legal personality such that they are capable of exercising specific rights, duties and powers. They are organized
mainly as a means for conducting general international business in which the member states have an interest. The UN is an
international organization dedicated to the propagation of world peace. The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC
and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger
of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the DOLE would
defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with
international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the
organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.
Liang (Huefeng) v. People

Bitch oral defamation case against an ADB economist.
DFA certification disregarded. SC disregarded the office of protocol from the DFA stating that Liang is covered by immunity
from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and th RP regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in
the RP. The MfR focused on the diplomatic immunity of officials and staff of ADB from legal and juridical processes in the
Philippines and the constitutional and political basis of that immunity. It should be made clear that nowhere in the assailed
Decision is diplomatic immunity denied, even remotely.
*Sir: calling someone a bitch is not related to a sovereign function.

The certificate (Liang was entitled to immunity) required in WHO v. Aquino was disregarded.
John Doe v. UNOCAL

Burmese citizens sue for enslavement under the ATCA, alleging that private security guards forced them to dislocate & then
make dams.
Successful ACTA claim. For purposes of establishing standing to seek injunctive relief to halt American corporation's
involvement in gas pipeline project in Myanmar because of alleged continuing violations of human rights, Burmese citizens
living in refugee camps in Thailand demonstrated existence of credible threat that they would be subjected to human rights
violations allegedly committed in furtherance of pipeline project by showing that they are in danger of being forcibly repatriated
to Myanmar, either as result of Burmese attacks on refugee camps or Thai refoulement actions. If plaintiff establishes standing
to seek damages, court need not undertake separate standing inquiry for equitable relief. Issuance of injunction to halt
American corporation's involvement in gas pipeline project in Myanmar because of Burmese government's alleged continuing
violations of human rights was not likely to halt alleged human rights violations, where bulk of corporation's initial capital
investment had already been made, and operation of pipeline was within discretion of parties who were not parties to lawsuit.
*Sir: John Doe v. UNOCAL: pipeline in Myanmar; indigenous people forced to leave & then work. Claim in Federal Court under
ACTA. UNOCAL was invested in as a separate company (joint venture). Myanmar: controlling shares in local subsidiary.
Issue: why principal company was held liable? Minority shares, management was with the ruling junta. Relation of acts of junta
& personality of the mother company (passive investor). Court: enforced slavery prohibition, even by non-state actors. Federal
Court said: no control over Myanmar. Special Circuit Court: reversed, held UNOCAL liable.
Congo v. Belgium
International arrest warrant against Congo Foreign Minister protested as violation of customary IL WRT diplomats absolute
immunity; Minister has since left the government.

Functional immunity violated, state responsibility.Diplomatic and consular agents, certain high-ranking officials in a state, such
as the Head of State, Head of Government, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other states,
both civil and criminal. Immunities accorded to ministers of foreign affairs in customary IL are accorded to ensure the effective
performance of their functions on behalf of their states and not for their personal benefit. After the ICJ considered the nature of
the functions exercised by a minister of foreign affairs, it concluded that his functions are such that, throughout the duration of
his office, he when abroad, enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. This immunity and inviolability
protect the individual concerned from any act of authority of another state which would hinder him or her in the performance of
his or her duties. There can be no distinction from acts which were performed in an official capacity and in a private
capacity.
ICJ is unable to conclude that there exist exceptions under customary IL in regard to national courts upon examination of the
rules concerning immunity or criminal responsibility of persons having official capacity contained in the legal instruments
creating international criminal tribunals. State Practice also does not show the existence of exceptions to the ministers of
foreign affairs immunity under customary IL. The decisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo international Military Tribunals and of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia do not deal with the question of immunities incumbent ministers
of foreign affairs before national courts where they are accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity.
Belguim violated the immunities of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Congo. The mere issue and the circulation of the
a/w, WON it significantly interfered with Yerodias diplomatic activity, constituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium towards
Congo, in that it failed to respect the immunity of that Minister and, more particularly, infringed the immunity from criminal
jurisdiction and the inviolability enjoyed by him under IL.
USA v. Purganan & Crespo

Jimenez contests arrest warrant issued against him ICOW an extradition request by the US.
Extradition; treaty.The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in the
petition, supported by its annexes & the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; & whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the
requesting state in bringing the accusedor the fugitive who has illegally escapedback to its territory, so that the criminal
process may proceed therein. By entering into an extradition treaty, RP is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or
soundness of the legal & judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability & the willingness of the latter to grant
basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
Extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an
extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to
a courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail.
Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would
escape again if given the opportunity. Potential extraditees do not have the right too a hearing for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest nor the right to bail granted by the RTC.
Bernas:
> Extradition the surrender of an individual by the state within whose territory he is found to the state under whose laws he is
alleged to have committed a crime or to have been convicted a crime. It is a process that is governed by treaty. The legal right
to demand extradition and the correlative duty to surrender a fugitive exist only when created by treaty, which may cover
specific crimes only or all offenses considered criminal by both states. Most treaties exclude religious and political offenses,
although the latter have never been precisely defined. But a state may surrender a fugitive if surrendering him is not contrary
to the states constitution.
> Principles on Extradition:
1. No state is obliged to extradite unless there is a treaty
2. Differences in legal system can be an obstacle to interpretation of what the crime is
3. Religious and political offenses are not extraditable.
> procedure is normally through diplomatic channels (how extradition rules ca be bypassed: US v. Alvarez-Machain; how due
process requirements work in an extraditin case: Secretary of Justice v. Lantion; USA v. Purgana & Crespo).
4. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility
Art. 2: internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consists of an action or omission:
a. attributable to the State under IL; &
b. constitutes a breach of an intl obligation of the State.
Attribution of Conduct: Organ of state (Arts. 4, 6, 7); individual or group (Arts. 5, 8, 9, 10, 11).
Art. 12: breach - act of the State is not in conformity with what is required by the obligation.
Art. 16: State aiding or assisting another State in committing an internationally wrongful act (IWA).
Art. 17: State directs & controls another State in committing an IWA.
Art. 18: State coerces another State in committing an IWA.
Defenses against attribution: wrongfulness of the act precluded if done:
Art. 21: in lawful measure of self-defense under the UN Charter.
Art. 22: as a countermeasure under these Draft Articles.
Art. 23: due to force majeure.
Art. 24: done to save a life in distress, no other reasonable means.
Art. 25: in necessity.
Art. 26: no preclusion if wrongfulness is ICOW an obligation arising under a preemptory norm of general IL.
Art. 29: legal consequences of IWA do not affect continued duty to perform the obligation breached.
Art. 30: obligations in case of IWA:
a. cease the act, if continuing;
b. offer assurances of non-repetition.
Art. 31; responsible State obliged to make reparation for injury caused. Injury includes any damage, whether material or
moral, caused by the States IWA.
Art. 32: internal law cant justify failure to comply with obligations
Art. 35: responsible State obliged to make restitution (re-establish situation before IWA) to the extent that restitution is not
materially impossible & burden is not out of proportion to benefit of restitution rather than compensation.
Art. 36: responsible State obliged to compensate for damage caused, if no restitution possible, covering any financially
assessable damage including loss of profit established.
Art. 37: responsible State obliged to give satisfaction if no restitution or compensation possible, consisting of
acknowledgment of breach, expression of regret, formal apology, not out of proportion to injury, not in a way so as to
humiliate the responsible State.
Art. 40: rules apply WRT serious breach under an obligation arising under a preemptory norm of general IL.
Art. 42: injured State invoking anothers responsibility, if breach is owed to:
a. the State individually
b. group of State, including injured one, or intl community as a whole& the breach:
i. specially affects the State
ii. so radically changes the position of other states WRT further performance of the obligation
Art. 48: non-injured State invoking responsibility obligation breached is owed to group of states, including that State, & is
established for protection of collective interest, & obligation owed to intl community as a whole. Claim under first part: for
cessation & promise of non-repetition, & reparation, for the injured State or of beneficiaries.
Art. 49: injured State taking countermeasures against responsible state to induce compliance with obligation; limited to
non-performance at time of taking the countermeasures, in such a way as to allow resumption of performance.
Art. 50: countermeasures do not affect: obligation to refrain from threat or use of force, fundamental human rights
protection, humanitarian obligations prohibiting reprisals & obligations under preemptory norms of general IL. Taking
countermeasures wont excuse from dispute settlement procedure & respecting inviolability of diplomatic/consular agents,
premises, archives, documents.
Art. 51: commensurate countermeasures: gravity of IWA, rights affected.
Art. 52: before countermeasures, demand fulfillment of obligation & notify responsible State of decision to take
countermeasures & offer to negotiate. If necessary to protect rights, take countermeasures, but not if (or suspend, if
already taken) IWA has ceased & dispute is pending in appropriate tribunal/court (restraint or suspension not required if
responsible State fails to implement settlement procedures in good faith).
Art. 53: terminate countermeasures upon compliance with obligation.
*Sir: what if a RP Army private shot a US Army personnel while drunk? Could a foot soldier bring about state responsibility
assuming attack against the state? The act will engage SR because he is an agent of the state so he acts as part of an organ
of the state (army). Is it being an ultra vires act a defense? No.
2007 Bar: Mayors EO banning contraceptives in private clinics so poor people lost access to family planning technology. Is
this constitutional? No. Privacy (number of kids)expanded due process rights. Is this a violation of intl law? Could Mayor
engage SR in behalf of the state? Yes (even ultra vires acts).
> When do you incur SR? Requisites (Art. 2):
a. breach of intl obligation
b. attributable to state (attribution)
> Source of the principle of SR: ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. How binding? See North Sea Continental Shelf
cases: ILC Articles (Continental Shelf Convention)mandate of ILC is to codify intl law; composed of experts (subsidiary
source of IL) nominated by states but acts independently & representative of all legal regimes of the world; reflects or is
evidence of customary law
> Evidence of Customary Norms ILC codified the norms:

1. State practice: representative of decisions held by courts all over
2. opinion juris: not under any compulsion to codify norms under IL but only norms they feel are law.
> Does the Draft Articles say when there is SR? Sir: no, it only says when there is breach of a treaty or a norm. To determine
SR, look at substantive law. After 80 years of drafting, there is no conclusion on SR because there is no Convention adopting
it. The only way to finish the project was to leave the identification of SR to substantive law.
Intl Tribunal: between State and person in its territory. Now, beyond the nationality principle, no distinction as to nationality.
> Minimum standard for treatment of people in your territory: not fixed; based on circumstances.
Duty: due diligence in protection of aliens and their property in your territory. Gives rise to breach of obligation WRT treatment
of aliens and their property.
Draft Articles:
1. Prove both elements: breach + attribution
2. new obligation arises: responsibility to cease and desist, assurance of non-repetition & reparation (restoration to
status quo ante or compensation if no restoration possible; extinguish all consequencesChorzow Factory case) .
> State responsibility in a nutshell:
1. Art. 2-if theres a breach, new obligations arise
-this article is the contentious article: what constitutes breach
2. Art. 30-to cease & desist; to guarantee non-repetition
3. Art. 31-reparation to status quo ante
> Who can engage state responsibility:
1. State organs - Art. 4: always (least problematic); Organs under IL includes all branches & instrumentalities of the govt as
defined under constitutional or internal law.
2. private individuals- (most problematic)
Art. 5- empowered
Art. 8- acting upon instruction or control (Nicaragua v. US)
Art. 9- de facto
Art.10- successful insurrectional movement
Art.11- acts ratified by the State itself
> Illustrations: Pinoys employed as security guards in US Bases in Iraq. The contras in Nicaragua (US funded but Court said
that low level support is insufficient to engage SR). Are they acting as agents? In Burma, UNOCAL used security guards
against indigenous peoples to drive them away from their ancestral domains and then to force them to build dams, US
provided funds; claim was WRT slavery; had a compromise agreement but preliminary ruling was that US was liable for
agency; defense: for security. In RP, private security guards used in cell sites against NPAs, if they engage in firefights, under
IHL, are the security guards combatants (for the state) in non-intl armed conflict?
Bernas:
> Standard for the protection of aliens:
Doctrine of national interest or equality of treatment aliens are treated in the same manner as nationals of the state where
they reside. Good: same benefits. Bad: it the state is tyrannical and its municipal laws are harsh and violative of human rights
even of its own citizens, then aliens would also be subject to such harsh laws.
Minimum international standard however harsh the municipal laws might be against a states own citizens, aliens should be
protected by certain minimum standards of humane protection. Widely accepted standard but abstract.
> Corporations and shareholders:
Barcelona Traction case: Belgium lacked jus standi to exercise diplomatic protection of shareholders in a Canadian company
with respect to measures taken against that company in Spain. When a state admits into its territory foreign investments or
foreign nationals it is bound to extend to them the protection of the law and to assume obligations concerning the treatment
afforded them. But such obligations are not absolute. In order to bring a claim in respect of the breach of such an obligation, a
State must first establish its right to do so. Whenever a shareholders interests are harmed by an act done to the company, it is
to the latter that he has to look to institute appropriate action.
Corfu Channel Case

UK claims against Albanias mines planted in the Corfu Channel; Albania claims that its sovereignty was violated when UK
later swept the Strait for more mines.
Failure to protect aliens in territory. The laying of the minefield could not have been accomplished without the knowledge of
Albania (location, length of coast as to strait, guard posts as strategic places). It was her duty to notify shipping and especially
to warn the ships proceeding through the Strait on Oct. 22 of the danger to which they were exposed. Nothing was attempted
by Albania to prevent the disaster, & these grave omissions involve her international responsibility.
Albania would have been justified in view of these exceptional circumstances, in issuing regulations in respect of the passage,
but not in prohibiting such passage or in subjecting it to the requirement of special authorization. The passage was innocent
both in its principle, since it was designed to affirm a right which had been unjustly denied, and in its methods of execution,
which were not unreasonable in view of the firing from the Albanian battery on May 15th. The Court can only regard the alleged
right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force which cannot find a place in international law. As regards the
notion of self-help, the Court is also unable to accept it: between independent States the respect for territorial sovereignty is an
essential foundation for international relations. Certainly, the Court recognises the Albanian Governments complete failure to
carry out its duties after the explosions and the dilatory nature of its diplomatic Notes as extenuating circumstances for the
action of the United Kingdom. But, to ensure respect for international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must declare that
the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.
Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v. France)

French agents destroyed a Greenpeace, Intl vessel, the Rainbow Warrior, while in harbour in New Zealand. New Zealand
prosecuted 2 captured French agents of the Directorate General of External Security.
Acts of organs of state. A communiqu from the Prime Minister of France confirmed that agents acted under its instructions, &
promised reparation. Dispute over Frances demand for release & New Zealands claim for compensation. The UN
Secretary-General's ruling required France to pay US $7 million to New Zealand and to undertake not to take certain defined
measures injurious to New Zealand trade with the European Communities. The ruling also provided that Major Mafart and
Captain Prieur were to be released into French custody but were to spend the next 3 years on an isolated French military base
in the Pacific.
US diplomatic staff and consular staff in Iran (US v Iran)

US Embassy & staff in Iran were seized by protestors, without Iranian authorities attempting to prevent such but with later
statements of support by the Ayatollah.
Ratification of private acts. The Court said that the initial take-over of the embassy was not attributable to the state. Attribution
would be present only when it is established that the acts were carried out in response to specific instructions from a
competent organ of the State. The first statements made by the Iranian govt were not sufficient to make the militants the
agents of the state. But as to the second statement, the showing of support and encouragement of the detention of the
hostages made the militants acts that of the Iranian State. This gave rise to Irans international responsibility for the acts.
*Sir: Art. 11 state acknowledges and adopts the conduct

1. no evidence to link mobs attack to Iran
2. failure to protect the premises of the embassy/diplomatic mission
Chorzow Factory Case

Polands alleged illegal expropriation liability to German owners.
Failure to protect aliens property rights. Poland has a positive duty to respect and afford protection to the property rights of
aliens living in its territory. In international law, any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation (note:
wipe out as much of the consequences & return to status quo ante, & restitution or compensation).
State Responsibility, Harris Case book (1994 & 2004 editions)
*Sir: IL breach: gross negligence in duty of protecting aliens

> Standard (not a definitive formula): nationality, and minimum standard of treatment
> Substantive norm: Neer Claim
> In the RP, the Melo Commission said that there was command responsibility liability only as far as Palparan went. So if GMA
praises Palparan in her SONA for a job well don, is there ratification under Art. 11?
1994 edition
Union Bridge Company Claim (US v. Great Britan)

Union Bridge claims damages arising out of the removal of the material from Port Elizabeth to the Imperial Military Railways,
Bloemfontein, by Harrison, the storekeeper of the Cape Govt Railways at Port Elizabeth, an agent of the British govt, without
Union Bridges consent, and its subsequent sale.
Act of state organ. Harrison purported to act upon instructions given to him, and in doing so, he committed 2 mistakes in as
much as it 1) was neutral property; and 2) was intended for a road, an not a railway bridge. The consignment of the material to
Blomfontein was a wrongful interference with neutral property, and it was within Harrisons duty, as railway storekeeper, to
forward material by rail, and he did so under instructions which fix liability on the British govt. This liability is not affected by the
fact that this was done under a mistake, or that the British had no intention to appropriate the material. Applicable ILC Draft
article: Art. 4
Youmans Claim (US v. Mexico)

A mob killed 3 US nationals & Mexican polices attempt to quell the mob, under the Mayors instructions, led to the open firing
upon the house & more killings.
Act of state organ; failure to protect aliens in territory. Mexico is liable for the acts of the soldiers whether 1) outside the scope
of their authority; or 2) done in a private capacity. Clearly, it is not intended by the rule to say that no wrongful act of an official
acting in the discharge of duties entrusted to him can impose responsibility on a govt under IL because such wrongful act
must be considered to be outside the scope of his competency. If this were the meaning intended by the rule, then no
wrongful act committed by an official could ever be considered as acts for which the govt could be held liable. The soldiers
participation in the murder cannot be considered as acts in their private capacity when it is clear that at the time of the
commission of these acts, the neb were on duty under the immediate supervision and in the presence of a commanding
officer. Duty: to exercise due diligence to protect the person and property of aliens. Applicable ILC Draft articles: Arts. 4 & 7
Zafiro Claim (Great Britain v. US)

Claim WRT acts of a Chinese crew of the Zafiro, a private ship commissioned by the US military, in looting houses in Cavite
during the Spanish-US War of 1898; defense: soldiers on shore leave.
Act of state organ. US is liable for the whole damage as the Chinese crew of Zafiro are shown to have participated to a
substantial extent, and the part chargeable to unknown wrongdoers cannot be identified. But interest is not allowed because a
considerable, though unascertainable part of the damage is not chargeable to the Chinese crew of the Zafiro. There was no
effective control of the Chinese crew at the time when the real damage took place. The nature of the crew, the absence of civil
or military control ashore, and the situation of the neutral property, were circumstances calling for diligence on the part of those
in charge of the Chinese crew to see to it that they were under control when they went ashore in a body. Applicable ILC Draft
article: Art. 4
Bolivar Railway Company Claim (Great Britain v. Venezuela)

Claims were brought by Bolivar arising out of the revolution in Venezuela that brought Castro to power & against Castro
himself, after his assumption to power.
Successful insurrectionists. Claims in respect of contractual obligations incurred by both the old and new governments were
allowed, but claims incurred by an unsuccessful revolution against Castro were not allowed. If the personal responsibility of
Castro were the question for decision, it might be possible to hold him responsible for the claims incurred by the 2 nd revolution
as growing out of the revolution he had led. However, such is not the ground on which successful revolutions are charged,
through the govt, with responsibility. Responsibility comes because it is the same nation. Nations do not die when there is a
change of government. These are but expressions of a change of national will. The nation is responsible for the debts
contracted by its titular government until the obligation is discharged. The nation is responsible for the obligations of a
successful revolution from its beginning, because, it represented ab initio a changing national will, crystallizing in the finally
successful resultsuccess demonstrated that from the beginning it was registering the national will. App. ILC Draft article: Art.
10.
*Sir: Art. 10 is the codification of this case.
2004 edition
Neer Claim (US v. Mexico)

US claims damages for Mexicos failure to exercise due diligence in prosecuting the murderer of an American.
Standard of treatment of aliens in territory. The proprietary of governmental acts should be put to the test of international
standards, and that the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage,
to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency. Whether the insufficiency proceeds from deficient
execution of an intelligent law or from the fact that the laws of the country do not empower the authorities to measure up to
international standards is immaterial.
Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran

Claimants contend that their property interests in the housing Project have been unlawfully taken by the Government of Iran
which has deprived them of the effective use, control and benefits of their property by means of various actions authorizing,
approving and ratifying acts and conditions that prevented Starrett from completing the Project.
Expropriation Even Without Nationalization Law. The Court noted that the Government of Iran did not issue any law or decree
according to which the Zomorod Project or Shah Goli expressly was nationalized or expropriated. However, it is recognized in
international law that measures taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are
rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated, even though the State does not purport to have
expropriated them and the legal title to the property formally remains with the original owner.
Assumption of control over property by a government does not automatically and immediately justify a conclusion that the
property has been taken by the government, thus requiring compensation under international law. In this case it cannot be
disregarded that Starrett has been requested to resume the Project. It has been proved that at least by the end of January
1980 the Government of Iran had interfered with the Claimants' property rights in the Project to an extent that rendered these
rights so useless that they must be deemed to have been taken.
Claimants rely on precedents in international law in which cases measures of expropriation or taking, primarily aimed at
physical property, have been deemed to comprise also rights of a contractual nature closely related to the physical property. In
this case it appears from the very nature of the measures taken by the Government of Iran in January 1980 that these
measures were aimed at the taking of Shah Goli. The property interest taken by the Government of Iran must be deemed to
comprise the physical property as well as the right to manage the Project and to complete the construction in accordance with
the Basic Project Agreement and related agreements, and to deliver the apartments and collect the proceeds of the sales as
provided in the Apartment Purchase Agreements.
*Sir: no need for direct taking, there may be a serious interference in property rights so as to render them useless= creeping
expropriation or constructive expropriation
> US v. Iran Tribunal: Art. 5 should not be strictly construed, even without a nationalization law.
Rankin v. Iran: US ex-pat left Iran & claims unearned wages. Basis of claim: failure to observe due diligence in protecting
property rights of aliens. He said that Iran supported the expulsion of aliens, cancelled contracts & allowed general turmoil &
disorder to propagate. He must prove wrongful, arbitrary act (breach) & attribution. Court: no breach; the Revolutionary
Guards were not insurrectionists; no proof that the Guards coerced him to leave; he felt unsafe & freely decided to leave; no
compensation.
> Dr. Bregers Case: no breach: given 6 months to leave; all aliens dont have the right to stay, it must be with the consent of
the state.
> Amoco v. Iran: 30-year-long Khemco Agreement. Revolutionary Govt declared the agreement null & void via 1980 Single
Article Act for the nationalization of Iranian oil industry, govt took over. Court: nationalization is not illegal per se but it is illegal
if done to escape obligations entered into by the state, & if there is no prompt & adequate compensation (includes lucrum
cessans).
>State organ
-which state must espouse before the ICJ?
Nottebohm case: claimant of Liechtenstein citizenship. Guatemala says that he is German so it confiscated his property as
prize of war (as an Ally). Liechtenstein says that there was a breach since he is not German. Court: State with genuine link
with him was Germany (born there; applied for Liechtenstein citizenshipordinarily requires residence for 3 years, but he
asked for dispensation of such without explanation; no permanent residence or business in Liechtenstein; temporary visits
only; has lived in Guatemala & wants to stay; hasty application for citizenship). Liechtenstein cant espouse.
5. VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
> Treaty means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation (Art. 2,
Vienna Convention the Law of Treaties [VCLOT]).
> International Organizations (IOs) cannot enter into treaties. Only states can enter into treaties
> Convention which allowed IOs to enter into treaties never took effect.=> states are still unwilling to vest IOs with the power to
enter into treaties.
> do not confuse IOs with the persons authorized to enter into treaties.
> Immunity of international organizations
IOs an organization that is set up by treaty among two or other states. Thus, only states are members of IOs (Advisory
Opinion on the Use of Nuclear Weapons). IOs have international personality (Reparations case: international personality of the
UN). In the case of other organizations, the charter itself might specifically endow it with international personality. But if it does
not, it may be implied from the functions of the organization, as in the case of the UN. IOs powers and privileges are limited by
the constituent instrument that created them (Advisory Opinion on the Use of Nuclear Weapons).
Immunities basis is not sovereignty but the need for the effective exercise of their functions.
> Cases for definition of treaties: Abaya and Vibal

> Treaties:
1. unless theres a specification that ratification is required, mere signature = intent to be bound
2. principle of autonomy= binding only upon signatories/ parties
3. what agents must show to bind the state in a treaty: FULL POWERS
4. effect of signature authentication of text
5. heart of a treaty= pacta sunt servanda6 -Art. 26
6. Binding nature on parties: on whom:
General Rule: signatories only: principle of autonomy under domestic law
Exception:
a. Codifies customary norm binds all, treaty restates it only, no signing needed.
b. Art. 35 express acceptance (pacta tertiis: intended to be binding on third states provided they accepted in writing)
c. Art. 36 assent prescribed; pour autrui grant rights to third states
7. When treaties are invalid:
a. lack of full powers
b. violation of jus cogens
c. new customary law/emergence of new norm
d. fraud and inducement
6
Latin for "pacts must be respected." This means that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith.
e. corruption
f. coercion
g. error of fact of situation
8. Grounds for non-compliance:
1. Fundamental change [Art. 62, VCLOT]
2. new customary law in conflict (valid now invalid) (wars, now illegal - crime of aggression) [Art. 64, VCLOT]
3. Fraud in inducement [Art. 49, VCLOT]
4. Coercion [on representative, Art. 51; by threat or use of force, Art. 52, VCLOT]
5. Error of Fact [Art. 48, VCLOT]
6. Supervening impossibility of performance [Art.61, VCLOT]
> exception to consensuality of states: peremptory norm of general IL or jus cogens customary norm that is non-derogable
= all countries, WON they were injured, can sue
> Art. 62-rebus sic stantibus7 has never been formally invoked!
> Barcelona Traction Case: erga omnes obligationremedial principle, allows all states to have standing. On the other hand,
jus cogenssubstantive/normative principle
> if treaty requires ratification? Overt act required to be manifested, deposit instrument of ratification with the body specified as
depositary or to the UN Secretary General if none is specified (Vienna Convention: in Bern, Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs
> effect of non-deposit with UN SG? Cant be enforced in any UN agency, including the ICJ.
Some Principles in the VCLOT:
ART. 11. Means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty: The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be
expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or
by any other means if so agreed.
ART. 18 Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force: A State is obliged to
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that
such entry into force is not unduly delayed.
ART. 26 Pacta sunt servanda: Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith.
ART. 27 Internal law and observance of treaties: A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to Art. 46.
ART. 31 General rule of interpretation: 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its
preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion
of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
7
Latin for things thus standing. This is a doctrine in international treaty law that stands for the proposition that a treaty may become
inapplicable owing to a fundamental change of circumstances.
ART. 43 Obligations imposed by international law independently of a treaty: The invalidity, termination or
denunciation of a treaty, the withdrawal of a party from it, or the suspension of its operation, as a result of the application of
the present Convention or of the provisions of the treaty, shall not in any way impair the duty of any State to fulfil any
obligation embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under international law independently of the treaty.
ART. 45 Loss of a right to invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the
operation of a treaty: A State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending
the operation of a treaty under ARTs. 46 to 50 or ARTs. 60 and 62 if, after becoming aware of the facts:
(a) it shall have expressly agreed that the treaty is valid or remains in force or continues in operation, as the case may
be; or
(b) it must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced in the validity of the treaty or in its maintenance
in force or in operation, as the case may be.
ART. 53 Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens): A treaty is void if, at
the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present
Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
Definition of treaty
Abaya v. Ebdane
Petition challenging the award of a road project to a Japanese firm.
Loan Agreement + Exchange Of Notes = Executive Agreement. The procurement process for the implementation of the CP I
project is governed by EO 40 and its IRR, not RA 9184. EO 40 expressly recognizes as an exception to its scope and
application those government commitments WRT bidding and award of contracts financed partly or wholly with funds from
international financing institutions as well as from bilateral and other similar foreign sources.
Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated Dec. 27, 1999 between the Japanese
Government and the RP Government is an executive agreement. The Exchange of Notes expressed that the two governments
have reached an understanding concerning Japanese loans to be extended to the Philippines and that these loans were
aimed at promoting our countrys economic stabilization and development efforts.
An "exchange of notes" is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its
assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of
exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of
legislative approval.
It is stated that "treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda of understanding, modus
vivendi and exchange of notes" all refer to "international instruments binding at international law." Both the 1969 Vienna
Convention and the 1986 Vienna Convention do not distinguish between the different designations of these instruments.
Instead, their rules apply to all of those instruments as long as they meet the common requirements.
Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are
no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments: treaties and conventions. They
sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated "agreements"
or "protocols". The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements, whether
denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise, begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment.
*Sir: Test in IL: whether the act is sovereign or proprietary in character
Dbm v. Kolonwel Trading; Vibal v. Kolonwel; Deped v. Kolonwel (Abaya Ii)

Petition contesting award of World Bank-ADB book project for the DepEd to Vibal, et al. in spite of earlier finding of conflict of
interest. SC said that RTC lacked jurisdiction due to the failure to comply with the protest mechanism: 1) the protest must be in
writing, in the form of a verified position paper; 2) the protest must be submitted to the head of the procuring entity; and 3) the
payment of a non-refundable protest fee. The protest mechanism is a built-in administrative remedy embodied in the law itself.
It was not prescribed by an administrative agency tasked with implementing a statute through the medium of interpretative
circulars or bulletins. There is no reason why the policy behind Section 55.l on the procedure for protest cannot be applied to
foreign-funded procurement projects & RA 9184 doesnt show that Congress intended such a variance in the protest
procedure.
The question as to WON foreign loan agreements with international financial institutions (Loan No. 7118-PH) partake of an
executive or international agreement within the purview of the Sec. 4 has been answered in the affirmative in Abaya, which
declared that the RP-JBIC loan agreement was to be of governing application over the project and that the JBIC Procurement
Guidelines, as stipulated in the loan agreement, shall primarily govern the procurement of goods necessary to implement the

main project. Under the fundamental international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, embodied in Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 9184,
the Philippines, as borrower, bound itself to perform in good faith its duties and obligation under Loan No. 7118- PH. Thus, the
IABAC was legally obliged to comply with, or accord primacy to, the WB Guidelines on the conduct and implementation of the
bidding/procurement process in question.
*Sir: Regarding the protest requirements under Sec 55:-this is not true! There was already an award hence, no need to
protest. RA 9184 not only prohibits but also penalizes conflict of interest why? Coz it defeats the purpose of competitive
bidding!
Definition of ratification
Lim v. Executive Secretary

Constitutionality of the Balikatan joint exercise by the US and RP military.
Binding Treaty. The holding of "Balikatan 02-1" must be studied in the framework of the treaty antecedents to which the
Philippines bound itself. The first of these is the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). It is this treaty to which the V FA adverts and
the obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm. It is the VFA which gives continued relevance to the MDT despite the
passage of years. But since the terminology used in the VFA is ambiguous, we refer to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements (Article 31 & 32): the cardinal rule of
interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention
likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as
well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. On activities, SC has the view that it was
deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn
in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques
of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation's marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in
distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian
missions, and the like. But they cannot engage in combat.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and international agreements to
which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution. In particular, the Mutual Defense Treaty
was concluded way before the present Charter, though it nevertheless remains in effect as a valid source of international
obligation.
In Philip Morris v. CA, it was stated that the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by
any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation
as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation.
[But SC said that[ A treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not
allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
SC cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south, as reported from the saturation coverage of the media. As
a rule, SC does not take cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their truth,
accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. The
determination thereof involves basically a question of fact. The present subject matter is not a fit topic for a special civil action
for certiorari.
*Sir: whatever you call it, treaty, exec agreement- does not matter it is still binding its all the same
Bayan v. Zamora
Constitutionality of the VFA.
Valid Treaty Despite Treatment As Ea Only By The Other State. A treaty is defined under Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties as "an international instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by international
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in 2 or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation."
Section 25, Article XVIII reads: "After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except (1) under a treaty (2) duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and (3) recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State." Under this provision, it the VFA a treaty? Yes, the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the
other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. US need not submit the VFA to the US Senate for
concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, because this is to accord too strict a meaning to the phrase.
It is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA merely as an executive agreement (EO) because, under international law,
an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. In international law, there is no difference between treaties and EOs in their
binding effect upon states, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. In any case, the
records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has stated that the US government has fully
committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the US acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself
further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is a compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
An EO is binding. Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading states that EOs are binding even without concurrence of
the Senate or Congress because the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usageThe validity of these has never been seriously
questioned by our courts.
Ratification is an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government, as the case may be, through which
the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. It is equivalent to final acceptance. The consent to be bound is expressed by
ratification when:
[1] the treaty provides for such ratification,
[2] it is otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be required
[3] the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or
[4] the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative,
or was expressed during the negotiation.
The power to ratify is vested in the President and not in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. The role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative
in character. The President acted within the confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. Even if he
erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under Section 21, instead of Section 25, still, the President may not
be faulted or scarred, much less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious
manner.
*Sir: issue: VFA-concurred in by our senate, but not by the US senate.

SC: VFA still binding on us/is still a binding treaty because it is not our business to dwell into the domestic law of the other
contracting party; we are satisfied with the Senators pronouncement that the US will recognize it.
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary

Mandamus petition to compel transmittal to the Senate the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the Intl Criminal Court (being
held the DFA) for ratification, claiming that Senate has the power to ratify & the RP has a ministerial duty to ratify the treaty
since we signed it already.
Ratification Is Executive; Cant Compel Transmittal. SC: no to both. Isagani Cruz on the treaty-making process:
1. Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his authorized
representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other
negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the
proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations.
2. Signing is the step primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the
good faith of the parties; but, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is
required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is
allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.
3. Ratification which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty
concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more
closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests
4. Exchange of the instruments of ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date
has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the
treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its signature.
The DFA signing is not equal to ratification. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the
ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the
representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by
which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a
state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. Thus, the President has the discretion even after
the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative WON to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the requirement of
ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a
treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying
that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons.
The power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate is limited only
to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which
has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the
President alone, which cannot be encroached by SC via a writ of mandamus. SC has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to
enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.
*Sir: ratification is compliance with the process to make it binding: 1) signing of senate; 2) concurrence of senate
> Senate concurrence: what triggers it? Transmittal by Executive, not a ministerial act. But after signing, bound not to defeat
the spirit of the treaty & comply with requirement of ratificationtransmittal to Senate.
Issue on procedure: EO 459, Sec. 7: shall (no discretion on submission for concurrence).
Salonga Petition
Challenge to RTC order transferring Daniel Smith from the Makati City Jail to US custody under an agreement based on the
VFA. Issues:

(1) WON the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) applies to the VFA - there is no room for application of the MDT in the VFA as there
is no external armed attack on the Philippines to speak of.
(2) whether the word visit means what it says, as applied in light of the understanding and the assurances made during the
ratification by the Senate of the VFA and, more importantly, in the context of current practices of the US armed forces - it is
incumbent upon this Court to inquire as to the actual length of time US military personnel stay in the Philippines, especially
those in Mindanao, under the guise of a visit pursuant to the VFA - US military personnel are in the Philippines the whole year
round, without any geographical and time limitations. Such presence could not, by any stretch of imagination, be considered
as temporary visits.
Grounds
1. MDT does not apply to the VFA/ contrary to the clear intent of the VFA, US military forces do not merely visit the
Philippines but stay on indefinitely see issue 1
2. GADALEJ in entering into patently unconstitutional agreements with US Ambassador and transferring custody over Smith
the US Authorities, considering that:
a. VFA derogates and infringes on the exclusive power of the SC to promulgate rules of procedure (Art. VIII Sec. 5 par.
5 1987 Constitution)
b. VFA violates petitioners rights to due process and equal protection on custody of Smith
3. VFA is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 25 Art. XVIII of the Constitution. It cannot be used to justify the transfer of
custody of Smith.
4. CAs GADALEJ in recognizing the agreement between US Ambassador and Sec. Romulo as binding on the Philippines
and declaring the Smith petition moot see Constitutional requirements cited in Bayan v, Zamora WRT Art. XVIII, Section
25.
5. Public respondents gravely abused their discretion when they transferred custody of Smith to US authorities without court
authority.
Reservations To The Convention On The Prevention & Punishment Of The Crime Of Genocide
A State which has made and maintained a reservation which has been objected to by one or more of the parties to the
Convention but not by others, can be regarded as being a party to the Convention if the reservation is compatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention; otherwise, that State cannot be regarded as being a party to the Convention. If a party
to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention,
it can in fact consider that the reserving State is not a party to the Convention; if, on the other hand, a party accept the
reservation as being compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the reserving State
is a party to the Convention. An objection to a reservation made by a signatory State which has not yet ratified the Convention
can have the legal effect indicated in the reply to Question I only upon ratification. Until that moment it merely serves as a
notice to the other State of the eventual attitude of the signatory State; an objection to a reservation made by a State which is
entitled to sign or accede but which has not yet done so is without legal effect.
*Sir: you can make reservations on provisions as long as they are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Convention hence, no reservation on the norm
Nicaragua v. US
US contested jurisdiction since Nicaragua allegedly had not yet ratified the instruments relating to the compulsory jurisdiction
of the PCIJ.
Valid declaration of intent to ratify. The Court notes that the Nicaraguan declaration was valid at the time when the question of
the applicability of the new Statute, that of the ICJ, arose, since under the system of the PCIJ a declaration was valid only on
condition that it had been made by a State which had signed the Protocol of Signature of the Statute. It had not become
binding under that Statute, since Nicaragua had not deposited its instrument of ratification and it was therefore not a party to
the Statute. However, it is not disputed that the 1929 declaration could have acquired binding force. All that Nicaragua need
have done was to deposit its instrument of ratification, and it could have done that at any time until the day on which the new
Court came into existence. It follows that the declaration had a certain potential effect which could be maintained for many
years. Having been made "unconditionally" and being valid for an unlimited period, it had retained its potential effect at the
moment when Nicaragua became a party to the Statute of the new Court. The Court considers that, having regard to the
source and generality of statements to the effect that Nicaragua was bound by its 1929 declaration, it is right to conclude that
the constant acquiescence of that State in those affirmations constitutes a valid mode of manifestation of its intent to recognize
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. It further considers that the estoppel on which the US has relied and which would
have barred Nicaragua from instituting proceedings against it, cannot be said to apply to it.
*Sir: Treaty-making Process:

1. Preliminaries
2. Negotiations
3. Signing
4. Ratification
-if ratification is not required, signing enough; if ratification is required, signing is only for authentication of the document and
there arises another obligation: duty not to do anything to defeat the purpose of the treaty prior to ratification.
-state agent must have authority to negotiate: full powers, lack thereof makes it void ab initio.

6. VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS; VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS AND
OPTIONAL PROTOCOLS
*Sir:
Diplomatic Immunities:
1. Ambassadors, consuls, etc full immunities
2. Spouses and kids
3. Diplomatic staff functional immunities
4. Household staff
Diplomatic immunity applies only:
1. To the accredited state
2. While in transit to & from the accredited state & the sending state/diplomatic station
-does not apply when he is on vacation!
Bernas:
> Act of State Doctrine arose from a series of cases in the US where the issue was whether US courts could consider the
validity of acts of a foreign state alleged to be in violation of international law.
> Diplomatic immunities WRT political relations of states; codification of the law is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (1961).
Diplomatic relations are purely by mutual consent. Before the head of mission is sent to the receiving state (RS), an agrement
must first be obtained. RS is under no obligation to give reasons for refusing an agrement (Art. 4).
Art. 1: which diplomatic representatives enjoy immunities; degrees.
Art: 3: functions of the diplomatic mission.
Art. 9: persona non grata.
Art. 22, 23, 24, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39: rights and privileges of the diplomatic mission.
Art. 41: duty to respect laws of receiving state.
Art. 42: prohibition on professional or commercial practice for personal profit in the RS.
> Consuls and consular immunities - Consuls attend to administrative and economic issues such as the issuance of visas;
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1967).
The head of a consular post is admitted to the exercise of his functions by an authorization from the RS termed an exequatur.
There is no prescribed form. RS may at any time notify the sending state (SS) that the consular officer is persona non grata or
that any other member of the consular staff is not acceptable. SS shall either recall or terminate his functions with the consular
post.
Art. 5: Consular functions
Art. 27, 31, 33: RS must protect the consular premises, archives and interests of the SS.
Art. 34: freedom of movement
Art. 35: freedom of communication
Art. 36: communication and contact with nationals of the sending state
Art. 41: personal inviolability of consular officers
Art. 42: notification of arrest, detention or prosecution
Art. 43: immunity from jurisdiction
Art. 44: liability to give evidence
Art. 45: waiver of privileges and immunities
Vienna Conventions
Diplomatic Relations Consular Relations
Functions Art. 3 Art. 5
1.representing sending State (SS) in receiving (a) protecting interests of SS, its nationals, both individuals &
State (RS); bodies corporate
2. protecting in RS the interests of the SS & its (b) furthering devt of commercial, economic, cultural &
nationals, scientific relations & promoting friendly relations between SS
3. negotiating with RS Government, & RS
4. ascertaining by all lawful means conditions & (c) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions & devts in RS
devts in RS, & reporting to the Govt of the SS; commercial, economic, cultural & scientific life, reporting to SS
(HLR: espionage; allowed if not made available & giving info to persons interested;
elsewhere), (d) issuing passports & travel documents to SS nationals &
5. promoting friendly relations between the SS & visas or documents to persons wishing to travel to SS;
the RS, & developing their economic, cultural & (e) helping & assisting nationals of SS;
scientific relations. (f) acting as notary, civil registrar, in similar capacities, &
2. Nothing here shall be construed as preventing performing certain functions of an administrative nature, not
the performance of consular functions by a contrary to RS laws
diplomatic mission. (g) safeguarding interests of SS nationals in succession
mortis causa in RS, per laws of RS
(h) safeguarding, per RS laws, interests of minors & persons

lacking full capacity who are nationals of SS
(i) per RS procedure, representing or arranging representation
for SS nationals before RS tribunals & authorities, to get
provisional measures for preservation of rights & interests of
absent nationals
(j) transmitting judicial & extrajudicial documents or executing
letters rogatory or commissions to take evidence for SS courts
(k) exercising rights of supervision & inspection per laws of SS
in respect of SS vessels & aircraft & crew
(l) extending assistance to vessels & aircraft in (k) & to their
crews, taking statements regarding the voyage, examining &
stamping the ship's papers, &, without prejudice to the powers
of RS authorities, conducting investigations into any incidents
during the voyage, & settling disputes of any kind between the
master, officers & seamen per SS laws
(m) performing functions entrusted to a consular post by SS,
not prohibited by RS laws or not objected to by RS in the
agreement
Classes of Art. 14 Art. 9
Heads 1. Heads of mission are divided into 3 classes: 1. Heads of consular posts are divided into 4 classes:
1. ambassadors or nuncios accredited to (a) consuls-general;
Heads of State, & other heads of mission of (b) consuls;
equivalent rank; (c) vice-consuls;
2. envoys, ministers & internuncios (d) consular agents.
accredited to Heads of State; 2. Par. 1 of this Art. in no way restricts the right of any of the
3. charges d'affaires accredited to Ministers Contracting Parties to fix the designation of consular officers
for Foreign Affairs. other than the heads of consular posts.
2. Except as concerns precedence & etiquette,
there shall be no differentiation between heads
of mission by reason of their class.
Precedence Art. 16 Art. 16
as to Heads 1. Heads of mission shall take precedence in 1. Heads of consular posts shall rank in each class according
their respective classes in the order of the date to the date of the grant of the exequatur.
and time of taking up their functions in 2. If the head, before obtaining the exequatur
accordance with Article 13. is admitted to the exercise of his functions provisionally, his
2. Alterations in the credentials of a head of precedence shall be determined according to the date of the
mission not involving any change of class shall provisional admission; this precedence shall be maintained
not affect his precedence. after the granting of the exequatur.
3. This article is without prejudice to any practice 3. Order of precedence as between 2 or more heads who
accepted by the RS regarding the precedence of obtained the exequatur or provisional admission on the same
the representative of the Holy See. date shall be determined per the dates on which their
commissions or similar instruments or the notifications
referred to in par. 3 of Art. 11 were presented to RS.
4. Acting heads of posts shall rank after all heads &,
as between themselves, rank according to the dates they
assumed functions as acting heads per in the
notifications given under par. 2 of Art. 15.
5. Honorary consular officers who are heads shall rank in
each class after career heads, in the order & per rules laid
down in the foregoing paragraphs.
6. Heads shall have precedence over consular officers not
having that status.
Multiple Art. 5 Art. 18
Posts 1. SS may, after it has given due notification to Two or more States may, with the consent of RS, appoint the
RSs concerned, accredit a head of mission or same person as a consular officer in that State.
assign any member of the diplomatic staff to
more than 1 State, unless there is express
objection by any of the RSs.
2. If SS accredits a head of mission to 1 or more
other States it may establish a diplomatic
mission headed by a charge d'affaires ad interim
in each State where the head of mission has not
his permanent seat.
3. A head of mission or any member of the
diplomatic staff of the mission may act as

representative of the SS to any IO.
Art. 6
Two or more States may accredit the same
person as head of mission to another State,
unless objection is offered by the RS.
Temporary Art. 19 Art. 15
head 1. If the post of head of the mission is vacant, or 1. If the head of a consular post is unable to carry out his
if the head of the mission is unable to perform functions or the position of head of consular post is vacant, an
his functions, a charge d'affaires ad interim shall acting head of post may act provisionally as head of the
act provisionally as head of the mission. The consular post.
name of the charge d'affaires ad interim shall be 2. The full name of the acting head of post shall be notified
notified, either by the head of the mission or, in either by the diplomatic mission of the SS or, if that State has
case he is unable to do so, by the Ministry for no such mission in the RS, by the head of the consular post,
Foreign Affairs of the SS to the Ministry for or, if he is unable to do so, by any competent authority of the
Foreign Affairs of the RS or such other ministry SS, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the RS or to the
as may be agreed. authority designated by that Ministry. As a general rule, this
2. In cases where no member of the diplomatic notification shall be given in advance. RS may make the
staff of the mission is present in the receiving admission as acting head of post of a person who is neither a
State, a member of the administrative and diplomatic agent nor a consular officer of the SS in the RS
technical staff may, with the consent of the RS, conditional on its consent.
be designated by the SS to be in charge of the 3. The competent authorities of the RS shall afford assistance
current administrative affairs of the mission. and protection to the acting head of post. While he is in
charge of the post, the provisions of the present Convention
shall apply to him on the same basis as to the head of the
consular post concerned. RS shall not, however, be obliged to
grant to an acting head of post any facility, privilege or
immunity which the head of the consular post enjoys only
subject to conditions not fulfilled by the acting head of post.
4. When, in the circumstances referred to in paragraph 1 of
this Article, a member of the diplomatic staff of the diplomatic
mission of the SS in the RS is designated by the SS as an
acting head of post, he shall, if the RS does not object
thereto, continue to enjoy diplomatic privileges and
immunities.
Persona non Art. 9 Art. 23
grata 1. RS may at any time & without having to 1. RS may at any time notify SS that a consular officer is
explain its decision, notify SS that the head of persona non grata or that any other member of the consular
the mission or any member of the diplomatic staff is not acceptable. SS shall either recall the person or
staff of the mission is persona non grata or that terminate his functions with the consular post.
any other member of the staff of the mission is 2. If SS refuses or fails within a reasonable time to carry
not acceptable. SS shall either recall the person out its obligations under par., RS may either withdraw the
or terminate his functions with the mission. A exequatur from the person or cease to consider him as a
person may be declared non grata or not member of the consular staff.
acceptable before arriving in RS territory. 3. A person appointed as a member of a consular post may be
2. If SS refuses or fails within a reasonable declared unacceptable before arriving in the territory of RS or,
period to carry out its obligations under par. 1, if already in RS, before entering on his duties with the
RS may refuse to recognize the person as a consular post. SS shall withdraw his appointment.
member of the mission. 4. In cases in pars. 1 & 3 of this Article, RS is not obliged to
give to SS reasons for its decision.
Exemption Art. 36 Art. 50
from duties 1. RS shall permit entry of & grant exemption 1. RS shall permit entry of & grant exemption from all customs
& customs from all customs duties, taxes, and related duties, taxes, & related charges other than charges for
charges other than charges for storage, cartage storage, cartage & similar services, on:
and similar services, on: (a) articles for the official use of the consular post;
1. articles for the official use of the mission; (b) articles for the personal use of a consular officer or
2. articles for the personal use of a diplomatic members of his family forming part of his household, including
agent or members of his family forming part of articles intended for his establishment. The articles intended
his household, including articles intended for his for consumption shall not exceed the quantities necessary for
establishment. direct utilization by the persons concerned.
2. The personal baggage of a diplomatic agent 2. Consular employees shall enjoy the privileges &
shall be exempt from inspection, unless there exemptions specified in paragraph 1 of this Article in respect
are serious grounds for presuming that it of articles imported at the time of first installation.
contains articles not covered by the exemptions 3. Personal baggage accompanying consular officers &
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, or members of their families forming part of their households

articles the import or export of which is shall be exempt from inspection. It may be inspected only if
prohibited by the law or controlled by the there is serious reason to believe that it contains articles other
quarantine regulations of the RS. Such than those referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 of
inspection shall be conducted only in the this Article, or articles the import or export of which is
presence of the diplomatic agent or of his prohibited by the laws and regulations of the RS or which are
authorized representative. subject to its quarantine laws and regulations. Such inspection
shall be carried out in the presence of the consular officer or
member of his family concerned.
Tax Art. 34 Art. 49
exemption A diplomatic agent shall be exempt from all dues 1. Consular officers and consular employees and members of
& taxes, personal or real, national, regional or their families forming part of their households shall be exempt
municipal, except: from all dues and taxes, personal or real, national, regional or
1. indirect taxes of a kind which are normally municipal, except:
incorporated in the price of goods or services; (a) indirect taxes of a kind which are normally incorporated in
2. dues & taxes on private immovable property the price of goods or services;
in RS territory, unless he holds it on behalf of the (b) dues or taxes on private immovable property situated in
SS for the purposes of the mission; the territory of RS, subject to the provisions of Article 32;
3. estate, succession or inheritance duties levied (c) estate, succession or inheritance duties, and duties on
by the RS, subject to par. 4 of Article 39; transfers, levied by the RS, subject to the provisions of
4. dues & taxes on private income having its paragraph (b) of Article 51;
source in the RS & capital taxes on investments (d) dues and taxes on private income, including capital gains,
made in commercial undertakings in the RS; having its source in the RS and capital taxes relating to
5. charges levied for specific services rendered; investments made in commercial or financial undertakings RS;
6. registration, court or record fees, mortgage (e) charges levied for specific services rendered;
dues and stamp duty, WRT immovable property, (f) registration, court or record fees, mortgage dues and stamp
subject to the provisions of Article 23. duties, subject to the provisions of Article 32.
2. Members of the service staff shall be exempt from dues and
Art. 23 taxes on the wages which they receive for their services.
1. SS & the head of the mission shall be exempt 3. Members of the consular post who employ persons whose
from all national, regional or municipal dues & wages or salaries are not exempt from income tax in the RS
taxes in respect of the premises of the mission, shall observe the obligations which the laws and regulations of
whether owned or leased, other than such as that State impose upon employers concerning the levying of
represent payment for specific services income tax.
rendered.
2. This exemption shall not apply to such dues &
taxes payable under RS law by persons
contracting with SS or the head of the mission.
Use of SS Art. 20 Article 29
flag & The mission and its head shall have the right to 1. The SS shall have the right to the use of its national flag &
emblem use the flag and emblem of the sending State on coat-of-arms in the RS per provisions of this Article.
the premises of the mission, including the 2. The national flag of the SS may be flown & its coat-of-arms
residence of the head of the mission, and on his displayed on the building occupied by the consular post & at
means of transport. the entrance door thereof, on the residence of the head of the
consular post & on his means of transport when used on
official business.
3. In the exercise of this right, regard shall be had to the laws,
regulations and usages of the RS.
Inviolability Art. 22 Art. 31
of premises 1. Premises of the mission shall be inviolable. 1. Consular premises shall be inviolable to extent herein
The agents of the RS may not enter them, provided.
except with the consent of the head of the 2. RS authorities shall not enter that part of the consular
mission. premises which is used exclusively for the purpose of the work
2. RS is under a special duty to take all of the consular post except with the consent of the head of the
appropriate steps to protect the premises of the consular post or of his designee or of the head of the
mission against any intrusion or damage and to diplomatic mission. Such consent may be assumed in case of
prevent any disturbance of the peace of the fire or other disaster requiring prompt protective action.
mission or impairment of its dignity. 3. Subject to par, 2 of this Article, RS is under a special duty to
3. Premises of the mission, furnishings & other take all appropriate steps to protect the consular premises
property thereon & the means of transport of the against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any
mission shall be immune from search, disturbance of the peace of the consular post or impairment of
requisition, attachment or execution. its dignity.
4. Consular premises, furnishings, property of the consular
Art. 30 post & its means of transport shall be immune from any form
1. Private residence of a diplomatic agent shall of requisition for purposes of national defence or public utility.
enjoy the same inviolability & protection as the If expropriation is necessary for such purposes, all possible

premises of the mission. steps shall be taken to avoid impeding performance of
2. His papers, correspondence &, except as in consular functions, & prompt, adequate & effective
par. 3 of Art. 31, property, shall also enjoy compensation shall be paid to the SS.
inviolability.
End of Art. 43 Art. 25
function The function of a diplomatic agent comes to an The functions of a member of a consular post shall come to an
end, inter alia: end inter alia:
1. on notification by SS to RS that the function of (a) on notification by SS to RS that his functions have come
the diplomatic agent has come to an end; to an end;
2. on notification by RS to SS that, in (b) on withdrawal of the exequatur;
accordance with par. 2 of Article 9, it refuses to (c) on notification by RS to SS that the RS has ceased to
recognize the diplomatic agent as a member of consider him as a member of the consular staff.
the mission.
Tax Art. 28 Art. 39
exemption The fees and charges levied by the mission in 1. The consular post may levy in RS territory the fees &
of fees & the course of its official duties shall be exempt charges provided by SS laws for consular acts.
charges from all dues and taxes. 2. The sums collected in the form of the fees & charges in par.
1 of this Article, & the receipts for such fees & charges, shall
be exempt from all dues & taxes in the RS.
Inviolability Art. 29 Art. 40
of The person of a diplomatic agent shall be RS shall treat consular officers with due respect & shall take
agent/officer inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person,
arrest or detention. The receiving State shall freedom or dignity.
treat him with due respect and shall take all
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his Art. 41
person, freedom or dignity. 1. Consular officers shall not be liable to arrest or detention
pending trial, except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant
to a decision by the competent judicial authority.
2. Except in the case specified in par. 1 of this Article, consular
officers shall not be committed to prison or liable to any other
form of restriction on their personal freedom save in execution
of a judicial decision of final effect.
3. If criminal proceedings are instituted against a consular
officer, he must appear before the competent authorities.
Nevertheless, the proceedings shall be conducted with the
respect due to him by reason of his official position &, except
in the case specified in par. 1 of this Article, in a manner which
will hamper the exercise of consular functions as little as
possible. When, in the circumstances in par. 1 of this Article, it
has become necessary to detain a consular officer, the
proceedings against him shall be instituted with the minimum
of delay.
Art. 42
In the event of the arrest or detention, pending trial, of a
member of the consular staff, or of criminal proceedings being
instituted against him, RS shall promptly notify the head of the
consular post. Should the latter be himself the object of such
measure, RS shall notify SS through the diplomatic channel.
Immunity Art. 31 Art. 43
from 1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from 1. Consular officers & consular employees shall not be
jurisdiction; the criminal jurisdiction of RS. He shall also amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative
exceptions enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative authorities of RS in respect of acts performed in the exercise
jurisdiction, except in the case of: of consular functions.
1. a real action relating to private immovable 2. The provisions of par. 1 of this Article shall not, however,
property situated in RS territory, unless he holds apply in respect of a civil action either:
it on behalf of SS for purposes of the mission; (a) arising out of a contract concluded by a consular officer or
2. an action relating to succession in which the a consular employee in which he did not contract expressly or
diplomatic agent is involved as executor, impliedly as an agent of the sending State; or
administrator, heir or legatee as a private person (b) by a third party for damage arising from an accident in RS
& not on behalf of SS; caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft.
3. an action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic
agent in RS outside his official functions.
2. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give

evidence as a witness.
3. No measures of execution may be taken in
respect of a diplomatic agent except in the
cases under herein sub-par.s (a), (b) & (c) of
par. 1, & provided that such measures can be
taken without infringing the inviolability of his
person or residence.
4. Such immunity from RS jurisdiction does not
exempt him from SS jurisdiction.
Waiver of Art. 32 Art. 45
immunity 1. The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic 1. SS may waive, WRT a member of the consular post, any of
agents & of persons enjoying immunity under the privileges & immunities provided for in Arts. 41, 43 & 44.
Article 37 may be waived by SS. 2. The waiver shall in all cases be express, except as in par. 3
2. Waiver must always be express. of this Article, & shall be communicated to RS in writing.
3. Initiation of proceedings by a diplomatic agent 3. The initiation of proceedings by a consular officer or a
or by a person enjoying immunity from consular employee in a matter where he might enjoy immunity
jurisdiction under Article 37 shall preclude him from jurisdiction under Article 43 shall preclude him from
from invoking immunity from jurisdiction in invoking immunity from jurisdiction in respect of any counter-
respect of any counter-claim directly connected claim directly connected with the principal claim.
with the principal claim. 4. The waiver of immunity from jurisdiction for the purposes of
4. Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect civil or administrative proceedings shall not be deemed to
of civil or administrative proceedings shall not be imply the waiver of immunity from the measures of execution
held to imply waiver of immunity in respect of the resulting from the judicial decision; in respect of such
execution of the judgment, for which a separate measures, a separate waiver shall be necessary.
waiver shall be necessary.
Start & end Art. 39 Art. 53
of 1. Every person entitled to privileges & 1. Every member of the consular post shall enjoy herein
immunities immunities shall enjoy them from the moment he privileges & immunities from the moment he enters RS
& privileges enters RS territory on proceeding to take up his territory on proceeding to take up his post or, if already in its
post or, if already in its territory, from the territory, from the moment when he enters on his duties with
moment when his appointment is notified to the the consular post.
Ministry for Foreign Affairs or such other ministry 2. Members of the family of a member of the consular post
as may be agreed. forming part of his household & members of his private staff
2. When the functions of a person enjoying shall receive the privileges & immunities from the date from
privileges & immunities have come to an end, which he enjoys privileges & immunities per par. 1 of this
such privileges & immunities shall normally Article or from the date of their entry into RS territory or from
cease at the moment when he leaves the the date of their becoming a member of such family or private
country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in staff, whichever is the latest.
which to do so, but shall subsist until that time, 3. When the functions of a member of the consular post have
even in case of armed conflict. But, WRT acts come to an end, his, his familys, his private staffs privileges &
performed by such a person in the exercise of shall normally cease at the moment when the person
his functions as a member of the mission, concerned leaves RS or on the expiry of a reasonable period
immunity shall continue to subsist. in which to do so, whichever is the sooner, but shall subsist
3. In case of the death of a member of the until that time, even in case of armed conflict. In the case of
mission, the members of his family shall the persons in par. 2 of this Article, privileges & immunities
continue to enjoy the privileges & immunities to shall come to an end when they cease to belong to the
which they are entitled until the expiry of a household or to be in the service of a member of the consular
reasonable period in which to leave the country. post, provided, that if such persons intend leaving RS within a
4. In the event of the death of a member of the reasonable period thereafter, their privileges & immunities
mission not a national of or permanently resident shall subsist until the time of their departure.
in RS or a member of his family forming part of 4. But, WRT acts performed by a consular officer or a consular
his household, RS shall permit the withdrawal of employee in the exercise of his functions, immunity from
the movable property of the deceased, except jurisdiction shall continue to subsist without limitation of time.
any property acquired in the country the export 5. In the event of the death of a member of the consular post,
of which was prohibited at the time of his death. the members of his family forming part of his household shall
Estate, succession & inheritance duties shall not continue to enjoy the privileges & immunities accorded to
be levied on movable property the presence of them until they leave RS or until the expiry of a reasonable
which in RS was due solely to the presence period enabling them to do so, whichever is the sooner.
there of the deceased as a member of the
mission or as a member of the family of a
member of the mission.
Respect for Art. 41 Art. 55
RS laws 1. Without prejudice to their privileges & 1. Without prejudice to their privileges & immunities, it is the
immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying duty of all persons enjoying such privileges & immunities to
such privileges & immunities to respect RS laws. respect the laws & regulations of RS. They also have a duty

They have a duty not to interfere in the internal not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.
affairs of that State. 2. The consular premises shall not be used in any manner
2. All official business with RS entrusted to the incompatible with the exercise of consular functions.
mission by SS shall be conducted with or 3. Par. 2 of this Article shall not exclude the possibility of
through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of RS or offices of other institutions or agencies being installed in
such other ministry as may be agreed. part of the building in which the consular premises are
3. Premises of the mission must not be used in situated, provided that the premises assigned to them are
any manner incompatible with functions of the separate from those used by the consular post. In that event,
mission per the Convention, rules of general IL the said offices shall not be considered to form part of the
or special agreements between the SS & RS. consular premises.
No profit Art. 42 Art. 57
A diplomatic agent shall not in RS practice for 1. Career consular officers shall not carry on for personal
personal profit any professional or commercial profit any professional or commercial activity in RS.
activity. 2. Privileges & immunities shall not be accorded:
(a) to consular employees or to members of the service staff
who carry on any private gainful occupation in RS;
(b) to members of the family of a person referred to in sub-par.
(a)
of this paragraph or to members of his private staff;
(c) to members of the family of a member of a consular post
who
themselves carry on any private gainful occupation in RS.
Armed Art. 44 Art. 26
conflict RS must, even in case of armed conflict, grant RS shall, even in case of armed conflict, grant to members of
facilities in order to enable persons enjoying the consular post & members of the private staff, other than
privileges & immunities, other than RS nationals, RS nationals, & to members of their families forming part of
& members of the families of such persons their households irrespective of nationality, necessary time &
irrespective of their nationality, to leave at the facilities to enable them to prepare their departure & to leave
earliest possible moment. It must, if needed, at the earliest possible moment after the termination of the
place at their disposal necessary means of functions of the members. It shall, if needed, place at their
transport for themselves & their property. disposal necessary means of transport for themselves & their
property other than property acquired in RS the export of
which is prohibited at the time of departure.
End of Art. 45 Art. 27
relations If diplomatic relations are broken off between 2 1. In the event of the severance of consular relations between
States, or if a mission is permanently or 2 States:
temporarily recalled: (a) RS shall, even in case of armed conflict, respect & protect
1. RS must, even in case of armed conflict, the consular premises, together with the property of the
respect & protect the premises of the mission, consular post & the consular archives;
with its property & archives; (b) SS may entrust the custody of the consular premises, with
2. SS may entrust the custody of the premises of the property contained therein & the consular archives, to a
the mission, with its property & archives, to a third State acceptable to RS;
third State acceptable to RS; (c) SS may entrust the protection of its interests & of its
3. SS may entrust the protection of its interests nationals to a third State acceptable to RS.
& of its nationals to a third State acceptable to 2. In the event of the temporary or permanent closure of a
RS. consular post, sub-par. (a) of herein par. 1 shall apply. In
addition,
(a) if SS, although not represented in RS by a diplomatic
mission, has another consular post in the territory of that
State, that consular post may be entrusted with the custody of
the premises of the consular post which has been closed, with
the property contained therein & the consular archives, &, with
the consent of RS, with the exercise of consular functions in
the district of that consular post; or
(b) if SS has no diplomatic mission & no other consular post
in RS, sub-pars/ (b) & (c) of par. 1 of this Article shall apply.
Agent/officer Art. 38 Art. 71
who is a RS 1. Except insofar as additional privileges & 1. Except in so far as additional facilities, privileges &
national/ immunities may be granted by RS, a diplomatic immunities may be granted by RS, consular officers who are
permanent agent who is a national of or permanently nationals of or permanently resident in RS shall enjoy only
resident resident in RS shall enjoy only immunity from immunity from jurisdiction & personal inviolability in respect of
jurisdiction, & inviolability, in respect of official official acts performed in the exercise of their functions, & the
acts performed in the exercise of his functions. privilege in par. 3 of Article 44. So far as these consular
2. Other members of the staff of the mission & officers are concerned, RS shall also be bound by the
private servants who are nationals of or obligation laid down in Article 42. If criminal proceedings are

permanently resident in RS shall enjoy privileges instituted against such a consular officer, the proceedings
& immunities only to the extent admitted by RS. shall, except when he is under arrest or detention, be
However, RS must exercise its jurisdiction over conducted in a manner which will hamper the exercise of
those persons so as not to interfere unduly with consular functions as little as possible.
the performance of the functions of the mission. 2. Other members of the consular post who are nationals of or
permanently resident in RS & members of their families, &
members of the families of consular officers in par. 1 of
this Article, shall enjoy facilities, privileges & immunities only in
so far as these are granted to them by RS. Those members of
the families of members of the consular post & those
members of the private staff who are themselves nationals of
or permanently resident in RS shall likewise enjoy facilities,
privileges & immunities only in so far as these are granted to
them by RS. RS shall exercise its jurisdiction over those
persons in such a way as not to hinder unduly the
performance of the functions of the consular post.
Commonalities Diplomatic Relations; Consular Relations

Articles 1: Definitions
Establishment by mutual consent:
Art. 2. The establishment of diplomatic relations between States, & of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual
consent.
Art. 4.
1. A consular post may be established in the territory of the RS only with that State's consent.
2. The seat of the consular post, its classification and the consular district shall be established by the SS and shall be subject
to the approval of the RS.
3. Subsequent changes in the seat of the consular post, its classification or the consular district may be made by the SS only
with the consent of the RS.
4. The consent of the RS shall also be required if a consulate-general or a consulate desires to open a vice-consulate or a
consular agency in a locality other than that in which it is itself established.
5. The prior express consent of the RS shall also be required for the opening of an office forming part of an existing consular
post elsewhere than at the seat thereof.
Size of Mission; Consular Staff: DR - Art. 11; CR - Art. 20: subject to agreement, RS may require that the size of a mission be
kept within limits considered by it to be reasonable & normal, having regard to circumstances & conditions in RS & to the
needs of the particular mission, & RS may equally, within similar bounds & on a nondiscriminatory basis, refuse to accept
officials of a particular category.
Nationality of members of diplomatic staff of mission (Art. 8); of consular officers (Art. 22): should in principle be of the
nationality of SS. They may not be appointed from among persons having the nationality of RS, except with the consent of that
State which may be withdrawn at any time. RS may reserve the same right WRT nationals of a third State who are not also
nationals of SS.
Establishment of mission (Art. 12); or consular post (Art. 6): must be with consent of the RS (which may allow consular officer
to exercise functions outside his post).
Notification as to members of mission, family of a member of mission, private servants (Art. 10); as to members of consular
posts, family member forming part of his household, private staff (Art. 24. 1[a-d] & 2):
1. RS Ministry for Foreign Affairs, or other ministry as may be agreed, shall be notified of:
1. appointment of _________, arrival & final departure or termination of functions with the mission;
2. arrival & final departure of a person belonging to the __________ &, where appropriate, fact that a person becomes or
ceases to be a member of the family of a member of the mission;
3. arrival & final departure of ________ of persons in par. (a) of this paragraph &, where appropriate, fact that they are
leaving such employ;
4. engagement & discharge of persons resident in RS as members ______ or private servants [staff] entitled to privileges &
immunities.
2. Where possible, prior notification of arrival & final departure shall also be given.
Assistance/accommodation in getting facilities of the mission (Art. 21); of the consular post (Art. 30): RS shall either
facilitate acquisition on its territory by SS of premises necessary for _____ or assist the latter in obtaining some other
accommodation, including those for its members.
Inviolability of archives & documents of mission (Art. 24); consular post (Art. 33): at any time, wherever they are
Full facilitiesof the mission (Art. 25); consular post (Art. 28): RS shall accord full facilities for the performance of the

functions of the _________.
Freedom of movement of members of the mission (Art. 26); consular post (Art. 34):
Subject to its laws and regulations concerning zones entry into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of national
security, the RS shall ensure freedom of movement & travel in its territory to all members of the ______.
Freedom of communication of themission (Art. 27); consular post (Art. 35):

1. RS shall permit & protect freedom of communication on the part of the mission [consular post] for all official purposes. In
communicating with the Government, the diplomatic missions & other consulates [consular posts], wherever situated, of the
sending State, the mission [consular post] may employ all appropriate means, including diplomatic [or consular couriers],
diplomatic [or consular bags] and messages in code or cipher. However, the mission [consular post] may install & use a
wireless transmitter only with the consent of RS.
2. The official correspondence of the mission [consular post] shall be inviolable. Official correspondence means all
correspondence relating to the mission [consular post] and its functions.
3. The diplomatic [consular] bag shall be neither opened nor detained. Nevertheless, if the competent authorities of RS have
serious reason to believe that the bag contains something other than the correspondence, documents or articles referred to in
par. 4 of this Article, they may request that the bag be opened in their presence by an authorized representative of SS. If this
request is refused by the authorities of SS, the bag shall be returned to its place of origin.
4. The packages constituting the diplomatic [consular] bag shall bear visible external marks of their character & may contain
only official correspondence & documents or articles intended exclusively for official use.
5. The diplomatic [consular] courier shall be provided with an official document indicating his status & the number of packages
constituting the diplomatic [consular] bag. Except with RS consent he shall be neither a RS national, nor, unless he is a SS
national, a permanent RS resident. In the performance of his functions he shall be protected by the RS. He shall enjoy
personal inviolability & shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.
6. SS, its diplomatic missions [its consular posts] may designate diplomatic [consular] couriers ad hoc. In such cases, par. 5 of
this Article shall also apply except that the immunities mentioned shall cease to apply when such a courier has delivered to the
consignee the diplomatic [consular] bag in his charge.
7. A diplomatic [consular] bag may be entrusted to the captain of a ship or of a commercial aircraft scheduled to land at an
authorized port of entry. He shall be provided with an official document indicating the number of packages constituting the bag,
but he shall not be considered to be a diplomatic [consular] courier. By arrangement with the appropriate local authorities, the
diplomatic [consular] post may send one of its members to take possession of the bag directly & freely from the captain of the
ship or of the aircraft.
Social security exemption for a diplomatic agent (Art. 33); members of the consular post (Art. 48):
1. Subject to par. 3 of this Article, _______ WRT services rendered by them for the SS, [& members of their families forming
part of their households,] shall be exempt from social security provisions which may be in force in the RS.
2. The exemption in par. 1 of this Article shall apply also to members of the private servants [staff] who are in the sole employ
of a _________, on condition:
(a) that they are not nationals of or permanently resident in the RS; &
(b) that they are covered by the social security provisions which are in force in the SS or a third State.
3. ________ who employ persons to whom the exemption in par. 2 of this Article does not apply shall observe the obligations
which the social security provisions of the RS impose upon employers.
4. The exemption in pars. 1 & 2 of this Article shall not preclude voluntary participation in the social security system of the RS,
provided that such participation is permitted by that State.
5. The provisions of this Article shall not affect bilateral or multilateral agreements concerning social security concluded
previously & shall not prevent the conclusion of such agreements in the future. [par. 5 is not in CR]
Exemption from military service of diplomatic agents (Art. 35); members of the consular post & members of the families
forming part of their households (Art. 52): RS shall exempt _______ from all personal services, from all public service of any
kind whatsoever, & from military obligations such as those connected with requisitioning, military contributions & billeting.
Inviolability in a Third State of a diplomatic agent (Art. 40); consular officer (Art. 54)
1. If a ______ passes through or is in the territory of a third State, which has granted him a visa if a visa was necessary, while
proceeding to take up or return to his post or when returning to the SS, the third State shall accord to him inviolability & all
immunities provided for by the other Articles of the present Convention as may be required to ensure his transit or return. The
same shall apply in the case of any member of his family [forming part of his household] enjoying such privileges & immunities
who are accompanying the _______ or traveling separately to join him or to return to the SS.
2. In circumstances similar to those specified in paragraph 1 of this Article, third States shall not hinder the transit through their
territory of other members of the administrative & technical or service staff of a mission [consular post] or of members of their
families [forming part of their households], through their territories.
3. Third States shall accord to official correspondence & to other official communications in transit, including messages in code
or cipher, the same freedom and protection as the RS is bound to accord under the present Convention. They shall accord to
diplomatic [consular] couriers who have been granted a visa, if a visa was necessary, & to consular bags in transit, the same
inviolability & protection as the RS is bound to accord under the present Convention.

4. The obligations of third States under pars 1, 2 & 3 shall also apply to the persons mentioned respectively in those
paragraphs, & to official communications & to diplomatic [consular] bags, whose presence in the territory of the third State is
due to force majeure."
Provisions specific to each:

Diplomatic Relations:
Art 4
1. SS must ensure that the agrment of RS has been given for the person it proposes to accredit as head of the mission to
that State.
2. RS is not obliged to give reasons to the SS for a refusal of agrment.
Art 7. Subject to Arts 5, 8, 9 & 11, SS may freely appoint the members of the staff of the mission. In the case of military, naval
or air attaches, RS may require their names to be submitted beforehand, for its approval.
Art 13
1. Head of the mission takes up his functions in the RS either when he has presented his credentials or when he has notified
his arrival & a true copy of his credentials has been presented to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the RS, or such ministry as
may be agreed, per the practice in the RS which shall be applied in a uniform manner.
2. Order of presentation of credentials or of a true copy will be determined by date & time of the arrival of the head.
Art 37
1. Family members of a DA forming part of his household shall, if they are not nationals of the RS, enjoy the privileges &
immunities in Arts 29 to 36.
2. Members of the administrative & technical staff, with family members forming part of their households, if not nationals of or
permanently resident in RS, enjoy the privileges & immunities in Arts 29 to 35, except that immunity from civil & administrative
jurisdiction of the RS in Art. 31.1 shall not extend to acts performed outside the course of their duties. They shall also enjoy the
privileges in Art 36.1, as to articles imported at the time of first installation.
3. Members of the service staff who are not nationals of or permanently resident in the RS enjoy immunity as to acts
performed in the course of their duties, exemption from dues & taxes on the emoluments received due to their employment &
the exemption contained in Article 33.
4. Private servants of members of the mission shall, if they are not nationals of or permanently resident in the RS, be exempt
from dues & taxes on the emoluments received due to their employment. In other respects, they may enjoy privileges &
immunities only to the extent admitted by the RS. RS must exercise its jurisdiction over those persons in such a manner as not
to interfere unduly with the performance of the functions of the mission.
Art 46 SS may with the prior consent of RS, & at the request of a third State not represented in RS, undertake the temporary
protection of the interests of the third State & of its nationals.
Consular Relations
Art 7 SS may, after notifying States concerned, entrust a consular post established in a particular State with the exercise of
consular functions in another State, unless there is express objection by one of the States concerned.
Art 8. Upon appropriate notification to RS, a consular post of SS may, unless RS objects, exercise consular functions in RS on
behalf of a third State.
Art 10
1. Heads of consular posts are appointed by SS & are admitted to the exercise of their functions by RS.
2. Formalities for appointment & admission of the head of a consular post are determined by the laws, regulations & usages of
SS & of RS respectively.
Art 12
1. Head of a consular post is admitted to the exercise of his functions by an authorization from RS termed an exequatur,
whatever the form of this authorization.
2. A State which refuses to grant an exequatur is not obliged to give to the SS reasons for such refusal.
3. Subject to Arts. 13 & 15, head of a consular post shall not enter upon his duties until he has received an exequatur.
Art 14 As soon as the head is admitted even provisionally to exercise of his functions, RS shall immediately notify competent
authorities of the consular district & ensure that necessary measures are taken to enable the head of a consular post to carry
out the duties of his office & to have the benefit of the Convention.
Art 17
1. In a State where SS has no diplomatic mission & is not represented by a diplomatic mission of a third State, a consular
officer may, with RS consent, & without affecting his consular status, be authorized to perform diplomatic acts. Such
performance by a consular officer shall not confer any right to claim diplomatic privileges & immunities.
2. Consular officer may, after notification addressed to RS, act as representative of SS to any inter-governmental organization.
He shall be entitled to enjoy privileges & immunities accorded to such a representative by customary IL or by intl agreements;
in respect of the performance by him of any consular function, he shall not be entitled to any greater immunity from jurisdiction
than that to which a consular officer is entitled under the Convention.
Art 32
1. Consular premises & residence of the career head of which SS or any person acting on its behalf is the owner or lessee
shall be exempt from all national, regional or municipal dues & taxes, other than such as represent payment for specific
services rendered.
2. Tax exemption in par. 1 shall not apply to such dues & taxes if, under RS law, they are payable by the person who
contracted with SS or with the person acting on its behalf.
Article 36. (US v. AVENA)
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to SS nationals:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with SS nationals & to have access to them. SS nationals shall have the
same freedom WRT communication with & access to consular officers of SS;
(b) if he so requests, competent authorities of RS shall, without delay, inform the consular post of SS if, within its consular
district, a SS national is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by such person shall also be forwarded by said authorities without delay. Said authorities shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a SS national who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse & correspond
with him & to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any SS national who is in prison,
custody or detention in pursuance of a judgment. Consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who
is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
2. The rights in par. 1 shall be exercised in conformity with RS laws, subject to the proviso that said laws must enable full effect
to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.
Art 37. If relevant information is available to competent authorities of RS, such authorities shall have the duty:
(a) death of a SS national: inform without delay the consular post in whose district the death occurred;
(b) inform competent consular post without delay of any case where the appointment of a guardian or trustee appears to be in
the interests of a minor or other person lacking full capacity who is a SS national. The giving of this information shall be without
prejudice to the operation of RS laws concerning such appointments;
(c) if a vessel, having the nationality of SS, is wrecked or runs aground in RS territorial sea or internal waters, or if an aircraft
registered in SS suffers an accident on RS territory: inform without delay the consular post nearest to the scene of the
occurrence.
Art 44
1. Members of a consular post may be called upon to attend as witnesses in the course of judicial or administrative
proceedings. A consular employee or a member of the service staff shall not, except in par. 3, decline to give evidence. If a
consular officer should decline to do so, no coercive measure or penalty may be applied to him.
2. The authority requiring the evidence of a consular officer shall avoid interference with the performance of functions. When
possible, take such evidence at his residence or at the consular post or accept a statement from him in writing.
3. Members of a consular post are under no obligation to give evidence concerning matters connected with the exercise of
their functions or to produce official correspondence & documents, & are entitled to decline to give evidence as expert
witnesses WRT SS law.
Art 46
1. Consular officers & consular employees & family members forming part of their households shall be exempt from all
obligations under RS laws in regard to the registration of aliens & residence permits.
2. Par. 1 shall not apply to any consular employee who is not a permanent employee of SS or who carries on any private
gainful occupation in RS or to any member of the family of any such employee.
Art 47
1. Members of the consular post shall, WRT services rendered for SS, be exempt from any obligations in regard to work
permits imposed by RS laws concerning the employment of foreign labour.
2. Members of the private staff of consular officers & of consular employees shall, if they do not carry on any other gainful
occupation in the RS, be exempt from the obligations in par. 1.
Art 51 Death of a member of the consular post or of family member forming part of his household, RS:
(a) permit export of the movable property of the deceased, except property acquired in RS the export of which was prohibited
at the time of his death;
(b) not levy national, regional or municipal estate, succession or inheritance duties, & duties on transfers, on movable property
the presence of which in the RS was due solely to the presence in that State of the deceased as a member of the consular
post or as a member of the family of a member of the consular post.
Chapter III - Regime Relating to Honorary Consular Officers & Consular Posts headed by such Officers
Art 58
1. Arts. 28, 29, 30, 3439, 54.3 & 55.2 & 3 shall apply to consular posts headed by an honorary consular officer. The facilities,
privileges & immunities of such consular posts shall be governed by Arts. 5962.
2. Arts. 42, 43, 44.3, 45 & 53 & 55.1 shall apply to honorary consular officers. Facilities, privileges & immunities of such
consular officers shall be governed by Arts. 6367.
3. Herein privileges & immunities shall not be accorded to members of the family of an honorary consular officer or of
a consular employee employed at a consular post headed by an honorary consular officer.
4. Exchange of consular bags between 2 consular posts headed by honorary consular officers in different States shall not be
allowed without the consent of the 2 RSs concerned.
US Diplomatic Staff And Consular Staff In Iran (US v. Iran)

US Embassy & staff in Iran were seized by protestors, without Iranian authorities attempting to prevent such but with later
statements of support by the Ayatollah.
Failure To Protect Embassy & Staff. The failure of the Iranian security forces to protect the Embassy or take any step to
liberate the staff members amounted to a violation of Irans duties under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to
take all appropriate steps to protect the embassy premises and staff.

Case Concerning Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. US)
Mexico claims breaches of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (WRT communication) in the treatment of 52
Mexicans convicted & sentenced to death in the US.
Failure To Notify Of Rights. On notice, without delay is not necessarily to be interpreted as immediately upon arrest, nor can
it be interpreted to signify that the provision of the notice must necessarily precede any interrogation, so that the
commencement of interrogation before the notification would be a breach of Art. 36. But the Court observes that there is still a
duty upon the arresting authorities to give the information to an arrested person as soon as it is realized that the person is a
foreign national, or once there are grounds to think that the person is probably a foreign national. US was in breach of its
obligations to 51 individuals.
There are 3 elements in Art. 36 (1b). If a State breaches its obligation under Art. 36 (1b) in not notifying the Consular Post of
the other state of the detention of the latters nationals, it also breaches Art. 36 (1a) because it precluded the consular officers
of the other State to communicate with and have access to their nationals, as well as Art. 36 (1c) because it precluded the
consular officers of the other State from visiting their detained nationals and from arranging for legal representation of their
nationals.
The remedy to make good these violations of its obligations should consist in requiring the US to permit effective review &
reconsideration of these nationals cases by the US courts, with a view to ascertaining whether in each case the violation of
Art. 36 committed by the competent authorities caused actual prejudice to the defendant in the process of administration of
criminal justice. Thus, it should take account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention and guarantee that
the violation and the possible prejudice caused by the violation will be fully examined and taken into account in the review and
reconsideration process. Lastly, review and reconsideration should be both of the sentence and of the conviction.
B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS8
1. THE UN CHARTER AND THE USE OF FORCE
Article 2(3), UN Charter

All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that, in
carrying on its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
Article 25, UN Charter

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council
in accordance with the present Charter.
8
Thanks to Tif and Eps for this part.
The Security Council shall consist of fifteen members of the United Nations. The Republic of China,
France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The
General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of
the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance of the contribution of Members
of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes
of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under
Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall refrain from voting.
Notes:
General Rule: The UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force between members against their territorial integrity
or political independence (Art. 2[4], UN Charter)
Exception: (a) inherent right to individual or collective self defense (Art. 51, UN Charter)
(b) when allowed by the Security Council (Art. 42, UN Charter)
If theres already armed conflict, apply IHL; in general use, UN Charter
Until when can you allege self-defense until the SC has taken cognizance of the matter (thus, self defense cannot
be forever)
armed attack is determined in Nicaragua vs. US
Caroline Case (1842)

SS Caroline was set on fire by British assailing forces while moored in New York, claiming that the destruction was a public act
of force, in self defense. The Caroline was used by American sympathizers of Canadian rebels against the British to provide
arms and ammunitions. US forces retaliated by burning a British steamer while in US waters.
Anticipatory self defense. US Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote to Lord Ashburton: [I]t will be for Her Majestys
Government to show, upon what state of facts, and what rules of national law, the destruction of the Caroline is to be
defended. It will be for that Government to show a necessity of self defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the
necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or
excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.
*This case is authority on the concept of anticipatory self-defense.
Nicaragua vs. US (1986)

The US allegedly planned and undertook activities directed against the new government of Nicaragua, specifically the mining
of ports and waters, operations against oil installations and naval base, infringement of air space, and support for the
mercenary army, the contra force. The US claimed collective self defense in behalf of El Salvador as justification for its actions.
The armed attack, necessity, and proportionality requirements. The general rule prohibiting force allows for certain exceptions.
First, the inherent right which any state possesses in the event of an armed attack, covers both collective and individual self
defense. The parties agree that whether the response to the attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of the
necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in self defense. In the case of individual self defense, the exercise of
this right is subject to the state concerned having been a victim of an armed attack. Reliance on collective self defense of
course does not remove the need for this. There is no rule in customary international law permitting another states to exercise
the right of collective self defense on the basis of its own assessment of the situation.
Request for exercise of collective self defense also needed. Thus, in customary international law, there is no rule permitting
the exercise of collective self defense in the absence of a request by the State which regards itself as the victim of an armed
attack. The requirement of a request is additional to the requirement that such a State should have declared itself to have
been attacked.
Principle of non-intervention. The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs
without outside interference. A prohibited interference must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is
permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the
very essence of prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force, either in the
direct from of military action, or in the indirect form of support to subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State.
These are therefore wrongful in the light of both the principle of non-use of force, and that of intervention.

Collective counter-measure in response to conduct not amounting to an armed attack. While an armed attack would give rise
to an entitlement to collective self defense, a use of force of a lesser degree of gravity cannot produce any entitlement to take
collective counter-measures involving the use of force. The acts of which Nicaragua is accused, even assuming them to have
been established and imputable to that State, could only have justified proportionate counter-measures on the part of the
victim States (El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica). They could not justify counter-measures taken by a third State (the US) and
particularly could not justify intervention involving the use of force.
*ICJ rejected the USs self defense argument and held that the US infringed the prohibition on the use of force due to some of
its activities.
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons (1996)

The UN General Assembly requested the ICJs Advisory Opinion on the question: Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in
any circumstance permitted under international law?
Prohibition is subject to exceptions. This prohibition of the use of force (Art. 2, para 4, UN Charter) is to be considered in the
light of other relevant provisions of the Charter (Art. 51, on the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed
attack occurs; Art. 42, whereby the Security Council may take military enforcement measures in conformity with Chapter VII).
Resort to self defense under Art. 51 is subject to certain restraints (the conditions of necessity and proportionality, submission
to which is a rule in customary international law). The proportionality principle may thus not in itself exclude the use of nuclear
weapons in self defense in all circumstances.
UN Charter does not refer to a specific weapon. These provisions do not refer to specific weapons. They apply to any use of
force, regardless of the weapons employed. The Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific
weapon, including nuclear weapons.
Additional considerations. It suffices for the Court to note that the very nature of all nuclear weapons and the profound risks
associated therewith are further considerations to be borne in mind by States believing they can exercise a nuclear response
in self defense in accordance with the requirements of proportionality.
Signaled intention to use force. Whether a signaled intention to use force if certain events occur is or is not a threat within
Art. 2, para 4 of the Charter depends upon various factors. If the envisaged use of force is in itself unlawful, the stated
readiness to use it would be a threat prohibited under Art. 2, para 4. If its is to be lawful, the declared readiness to use force
must be a use of force that is in conformity with the Charter. Possession of nuclear weapons may indeed justify an inference of
preparedness to use them. Whether this is a threat depends upon whether the particular use of force envisaged would be
directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State, or against the Purposes of the UN or whether it
would necessarily violate the principles of necessity and proportionality.
Legality of the Use of Force Yugoslavia vs. US (1999)

Yugoslavia applied for provisional measures to stop the US from using force against it. The US, along with other NATO-
member countries bombed various targets in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia based the ICJs jurisdiction On Art. IX of the Genocide
Convention, which the US ratified but made a reservation.
ICJ has no jurisdiction because US did not consent to the submission of the dispute. Genocide Convention does not prohibit
reservations. Yugoslavia did not object to the US reservations to Art. IX. Said reservation had the effect of excluding that
Article from the provisions of the Convention in force between the parties. In consequence, Art IX cannot found the jurisdiction
of the Court to entertain a dispute between Yugoslavia and the US alleged to fall within its provisions. It cannot therefore
indicate any provisional measure whatsoever in order to protect the rights invoked therein.
Oil Platforms Case Iran vs. US

Iran instituted proceedings against the US, claiming that attacks on Iranian offshore oil production complexes by the US Navy
constituted a "fundamental breach" of various provisions of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights
between the US and Iran, as well as of international law. Serving as backdrop for these attacks is the conflict between Iran and
Iraq in the 1980s. The US claimed that the acts are self defense measures, contemplated under Art. XX, para 1(d) of the
Treaty, to protect US interests as the reason for the attacks.
The Court points out that the US has not claimed to have been exercising collective self-defense on behalf of the neutral
States engaged in shipping in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, in order to establish that it was legally justified in attacking the
Iranian platforms in exercise of the right of individual self-defense, the United States has to show that attacks had been made
upon it for which Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were of such a nature as to be qualified as "armed attacks"
within the meaning of that expression in Article 51 of the UN Charter, and as understood in customary law on the use of force.
The United States must also show that its actions were necessary and proportional to the armed attack made on it, and that
the platforms were a legitimate military target open to attack in the exercise of self-defense. Evidence failed to support the
contentions of the US.

*Sir said that the Court had not decided on whether unilateral use of force is valid in this instance .However, note that the
Court held that US actions cannot be justified as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the US
under the Treaty, as interpreted in the light of international law on the use of force
2. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in
accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice
and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

All members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
A State which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security
Council.

Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any
case to which it is a party.
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the
other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or
decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.

The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion
on any legal question.
Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General
Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.
Article 1, ICJ Statute

The International Court of Justice established by the Charter of the United Nations as the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations shall be constituted and shall function in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.
Article 34 (1), ICJ Statute

1. Only States may be parties in cases before the Court.

The Court shall be open to the States Parties to the present Statute.
The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other States shall, subject to special provisions contained in
treaties in force, laid down by the Security Council, but in no case shall such conditions place the parties in a position of
inequality before the Court.
Notes:
The ICJ was established by the UN Charter
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN
The ICJ Statute forms an integral part of the UN Charter
States Parties to the ICJ Statute:
o UN members are ipso facto parties
- each UN member undertakes to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case to which it is a party; if there is failure
to comply, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may make recommendations or decide upon
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment
- States not UN Members may become a party on conditions determined in each case by the GA, upon
recommendation of the Security Council
States not Parties to the ICJ Statute (Art. 35, ICJ Statute): Court shall be open to such States under conditions laid
down by the Security Council, subject to special provisions contained in treaties in force
International Organizations may initiate a proceeding as long as States are still the parties.
A. APPLICABLE LAW

The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized
by the contesting States;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.
This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties
agree thereto.

The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case.
B. JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties or conventions in force.
The States Parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation,
the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part
of several or certain States, or for a certain time.
Notes:
How does Court acquire jurisdiction? By consent of the parties
How does a State manifest its consent?
(a) ad hoc basis (or voluntary appearance, where parties refer the dispute to the Court)
(b) parties recognize the jurisdiction as compulsory in a treaty
(c) Optional Clause (Art. 36 (2), ICJ Statute) (or parties recognize the jurisdiction as compulsory in a separate
declaration)
- jurisdiction over a State is compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State
accepting the same obligation
- period of effectivity may be either:
indefinite
for a fixed period of years
upon notification of termination (see Nicaragua vs. US)
- reservations may be made:
ratione personae reservations relating to other parties
ratione temporis reservations relating to time
ratione materiae reservations as to subject matter
- Such reservations do not limit the discretion of the Court to determine its own competence since ultimately the ICJ
can decide to take cognizance of the dispute.
- Can you withdraw unilaterally from such declaration? Yes, provided notice is given to the other party within a
reasonable time (Nicaragua vs. US)
What is the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the ICJ? (Art. 36)
(a) any matter which the parties may refer to it
(b) matters provided by the UN Charter, treaties or conventions
(c) legal disputes concerning:
- the interpretation of a treaty;
- any question of international law;
- the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
- the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation

Dispute: disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views of interests between two persons; to
constitute a dispute, no actual breach or harm is necessary.
C. ADVISORY OPINIONS

The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an
advisory opinion on any legal question.
Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by
the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within
the scope of their activities.

The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be
authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.

In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the present
Statute which apply in contentious cases to the extent which it recognizes them to be applicable.
PROVISIONAL MEASURES

The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional
measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
INTERVENTION

Should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in
the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene. It shall be for the Court to
decide upon this request.
Notes:
3rd party intervening need not be an indispensable party
Requisite: a legal interest in the subject matter of the case which may be affected by the decision. (much lower
threshold than the requirement in ordinary civil cases)
DEFAULT BY ONE PARTY

1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which States other than those concerned in the
case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such States forthwith.
2. Every State so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this right, the
construction given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it.
Cases on Jurisdiction
Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua - Nicaragua v. US (1986)

In this case, Nicaragua asserted that the Court had jurisdiction over its application because both Nicaragua and the US had
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under the Optional Clause. The US contended that the Court lacked
jurisdiction on the following grounds: (1) that Nicaraguas acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ was not in
force in 1945, for failure to ratify the Statute of the PCIJ, such that Art. 36 (5) of the ICJ Statute did not apply to it; 2) three days
before the application had been filed the US had filed a notification stating that the compulsory jurisdiction shall not apply to
disputes with any Central American State, said notification to take effect immediately; and that 3) US had made a reservation
in its Optional Clause whereby disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, which could affect 3 rd states which are parties to the
to the treaty but are not participating in the proceedings before the Court, were excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court.

ICJ held that it had jurisdiction. The ratification of the ICJ Statute by Nicaragua gave its previous declaration under the PCIJ
Statute the binding force which it previously lacked. Moreover, the US declaration could only be terminated on reasonable
notice. A declaration under the Optional Clause was a unilateral and voluntary act. Once made, however, it created a legal
obligation binding upon the State which made it. Finally, the ICJ concluded that it would be impossible for a ruling not to affect
third parties such as El Salvador. Therefore, the reservation of the US prevented the Court from entertaining the claims based
on violations of multilateral treaties such as the UN Charter and the OAS Charter. It however found that the effect of the
reservation did not exclude the application of principles of international customary law, which were enshrined in treaty law
provisions.
Lockerbie Case - Libya v. UK (1988)

A bomb exploded on board a Pan Am plane over Lockerbie, Scotland. UK and US accused two Libyan nationals of placing the
bomb aboard the plane and issued a declaration enjoining Libya to surrender the two men. In its application, Libya seeks to
enforce the obligations of the States under the Montreal Convention, under which Libya had the right to investigate the alleged
offense and exercise domestic jurisdiction. The UK maintained that the Court lacked jurisdiction because there was no dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, and even if such dispute existed, the UN Security Council
Resolutions which required Libya to surrender the two accused prevailed over the provisions of the Montreal Convention.
The Court held that it had jurisdiction. A dispute is defined as a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views
or of interest between two persons. In this case, the parties differed on the question of whether the destruction of the aircraft
was governed by the Montreal Convention. Moreover, the UN SC Resolutions were adopted after Libya filed its application.
Since admissibility had to be determined as at the date on which the application was filed, subsequent cognizance of the SC
and the issuance of said resolutions could not remove any jurisdiction which the Court possessed at the date of filing of the
application.
ELSI Case - US v. Italy (1989)

The application made by the US concerned the allegedly illegal requisition by Italy of two US corporations. US claimed that
Italy violated the provisions of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaty between the two. It also submitted that
the doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies was not applicable to an action brought under the said treaty due to lack of
reference to such doctrine. Italy, on the other hand, maintains that the claims should have been brought before Italian
municipal courts.
The Court held that it had jurisdiction, its jurisdiction being based upon the Statute of the Court and the FCN Treaty. The Court
stated the doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies was a fundamental rule of customary international law and was not
rendered inapplicable simply because of the absence of words making it specifically applicable to a certain type of action.
However, since Italy failed to establish that a remedy existed under municipal law which was available to the US corporations,
the claim is admissible. (Notes: The doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies is available when a state brings a case in the
exercise of its diplomatic protection of its nationals/ espouses a claim of its national. It is not required when the state brings a
case as the injured party (i.e. the injury is caused to the state itself such as in the US Diplomatic and Consular Staff case).
South-West Africa Cases - Ethiopia and Liberia vs. South Africa (1966)
Ethiopia and Liberia instituted applications alleging contravention of duties by South Africa as Mandatory under the League of
Nations Mandate for South West Africa. Every mandate contained a jurisdictional clause providing for a reference of disputes
to the PCIJ, now the ICJ by virtue of Article 37 of the ICJ Statute. South Africa however challenged the jurisdiction of the Court
by contending that since the League of Nations and PCIJ were dissolved then the rights and obligations under the Mandate
relating to the administrative supervision by the League and submission to the PCIJ had become extinct.
The Court held that it had jurisdiction, notwithstanding the dissolution, because the obligation of South Africa to submit to
compulsory jurisdiction had effectively transferred to the ICJ. Although the League ceased to exist in April 1946, the UN
Charter had entered into force in November 1945, and the three parties had ratified such Charter and become UN members.
By the effect of Art. 92 and 93 of the UN Charter and Art. 37 of the ICJ Statute, South Africa had bound itself to accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in lieu of the PCIJ. Deciding on the merits, the Court rejected the claims of Ethiopia and
Liberia. Court held that the individual member States of the League of Nations had no right of direct intervention relative to the
mandatories since this was the prerogative of the League organs. And though States retained the rights which they
possessed as members of the League of Nations despite the dissolution of the organization, it did not mean that by and upon
such dissolution they acquired rights which they never did individually possess.
Phosphates Case - Nauru v. Australia (1992)

Nauru was placed under UN Trusteeship, with Australia, New Zealand and the UK as joint Administering Authority. Australia
was to exercise full powers of legislation, administration and jurisdiction over Nauru on behalf of the Administering Authority.
Nauru instituted proceedings against Australia, maintaining that it had breached its trusteeship obligations by failing to
rehabilitate parts of Nauru from which phosphates had been extracted. Australia claimed lack of jurisdiction on two grounds:
1) since the case involved the responsibility of third States which had not consented to the Courts jurisdiction; and 2) it made
a reservation in its declaration that jurisdiction does not apply to any dispute where the parties have agreed or shall agree to
have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement.

st
ICJ held that it had jurisdiction. As to the 1 ground, Court held that the fact that New Zealand and the UK were not parties to
the proceedings did not render the application inadmissible. The present case differed from the Monetary Gold case since the
interests of New Zealand and the UK did not constitute the very subject matter of the decision which the Court would give. A
finding by the Court regarding the responsibility attributed to Australia by Nauru might have implications for the legal situation
of the two other States concerned but no finding in respect of that legal situation would be needed as a basis for the Courts
decision in this case. Moreover, the interests of New Zealand and the UK are protected by Article 59 of the ICJ Statute
(decision only binds the parties). As to the 2nd ground, Australia claimed that the termination of the trusteeship should be
considered as recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement. ICJ held that Australias declaration expressly provided
that this limitation on jurisdiction applies to disputes between States, which Nauru was not prior to its independence.
Case Concerning East Timor - Portugal v. Australia (1995)

Portugal commenced proceedings against Australia, in which it maintained that by concluding an agreement and continuing
negotiations with Indonesia over the delimitation of the continental shelf between Australia and East Timor, Australia infringed
the rights of the people of East Timor to self- determination and permanent sovereignty over their natural resources and the
rights of Portugal as administering power. Australia contended that the Court could not rule upon the application without ruling
on the rights and obligations of Indonesia, which had not consented to the jurisdiction of the Court.
ICJ had no jurisdiction. The Court refrained from exercising jurisdiction, as it could not rule upon the dispute between Australia
and Portugal without having to rule upon whether Indonesias entry into East Timor was lawful. The very subject matter of the
decision would necessarily be a determination of whether Indonesia acquired power to conclude treaties on behalf of East
Timor, which determination could not be made without the consent of Indonesia. (Notes: doctrine applies both to advisory
opinion and contentious cases; case is authority for the definition of erga omnes obligation)
*Sir said this case is authoritative in relation to the erga omnes obligation of sates to respect the right to self-determination.
Cases on Provisional Measures
Application of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Genocide - Bosnia v. Yugoslavia (1993)
Bosnia and Herzegovina instituted proceedings against Yugoslavia accusing it of responsibility for the commission of genocide
in Bosnia. At the time it filed its application, Bosnia asked the Court to grant, as provisional measures, that Yugoslavia cease
all acts of genocide and cease providing support for any group engaging in military or paramilitary activities against Bosnia. It
also requested that the Court indicate that Bosnia had the right to seek and receive assistance in defending itself.
The Court granted the request for provisional measures. It stated that it should not indicate such measures unless the
provisions invoked by the applicant or found in the ICJ Statute appeared, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction
of the Court might be established. The object of the power to indicate provisional measures of protection was to ensure that
irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which might subsequently be adjudged to belong to one of the parties.
Moreover, the Court could only indicate provisional measures to be taken by the parties but not by 3 rd States who would not be
bound by the eventual judgment.
Lockerbie Case - Libya v. US (1998)

Libya requested the Court for provisional measures to enjoin the US from the use of any force against Libya. Previous to this,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 748 determining the failure of Libya to surrender the two accused as a threat to
international peace and security.
The Court denied the request for provisional measures. It reasoned that since Libya and the US are UN members, they are
obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. Such obligation prevails over the duty of the parties
under the Montreal Convention. An indication of the measures requested by Libya would be likely to impair the rights, which
appear prima facie to be enjoyed by the United States by virtue of the Security Council Resolution.
Cases on Dispute
Admissions Case (1948)

The GA requested the Court to give an advisory opinion on whether a UN member may make its consent to admission of other
States dependent on conditions not expressly provided by Article 4 of the UN Charter. It was contended by some States that
the Court should not give its opinion for the reason that the subject matter of the request was political.
Art. 4 of UN Charter set sufficient conditions for UN membership. Dealing with the preliminary objection, the Court ruled that
the question was a purely legal one. Interpretation of a treaty provision is an essentially judicial task. Given its legal nature, the
Court is not concerned with the political motives, which may have inspired the request at hand. Dealing with the question, the
Court answered in the negative. It said that the conditions stated in Art. 4 are exhaustive, namely: a candidate must be 1) a
state; 2) peace-loving; 3) must accept the obligations of the charter; 4) must be able to carry out these obligations; 5) must be
willing to do so. These are not merely the necessary but also the sufficient conditions for membership.
Free Zones Case France vs. Switzerland (1932)

A series of treaties between France and Switzerland established customs-free zones. France claims that by virtue of the
Peace Treaty of Versailles, the regime of free zones had been abrogated. The Court took cognizance of the case despite the
fact the matters addressed to it were of great economic importance, as the matters arose in the context of legal questions to
be answered. The legal dispute here is essentially Frances right to withdraw unilaterally from a treaty. Deciding on the merits,
the court said that there was no abrogation because the text itself of the Special Arbitration Agreement states that the
countries are to settle between themselves the status of the free zones because of an inconsistency. An inconsistency does
not automatically operate to involve the abolition of the free zones.
Mavrommatis Case Greece vs. UK (1924)

Greece brought suit against Britain in its capacity of Mandatory of Palestine to determine the validity of certain concessions for
public works in the Jordan valley granted by the Ottoman authorities to Mavrommatis, a Greek national. Questions were
raised as to a) whether there was a dispute between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations, since only
States or members of the League of Nations may appear before it and b) whether there was a dispute even if one of the
parties denies the existence of the dispute.
The Court defined a dispute as a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two
persons. At first, the dispute was between a private person and a State. Subsequently, however, Greece took up the case.
Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subject, which it is entitled to protect under international law, before
an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter, the State is the sole claimant. Also, it is the function of the Court to determine
if there is a dispute based on the facts of the case and not on the assertions of the parties.
UN Headquarters Advisory Opinion (1988)

PLO established an observer mission in New York upon invitation by the UN. Years later, the US Government passed a law
making unlawful the establishment or maintenance within the US of a PLO office. The UN Sec-Gen pointed out that the US is
under obligation to permit PLO personnel to enter and remain in the US to carry out their official UN functions, in accordance
with the Headquarters Agreement. When assurance was not given by the US, the UN Sec-Gen said that a dispute existed
between the US and UN and invoked the dispute settlement procedure in Sec. 21 of the Headquarters Agreement. US
countered that there was no dispute.
Dispute defined. Whether there exists an international dispute is a matter for objective determination. PCIJ defined a dispute
as a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interest between 2 persons. Opposing attitudes of
the parties clearly establish the existence of a dispute.
Cases on Advisory Opinion
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons - WHO Request (1996)

The WHO Dir-Gen submitted the following question to the ICJ for an advisory opinion: In view of the health and environmental
effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under
international law including the WHO Constitution?.
The ICJ refused to give an advisory opinion. The question in this case relates not to the effects of the use of nuclear weapons
on health, but to the legality of the use of such weapons in view of their health and environmental effects. Whatever those
effects might be, the WHOs competence to deal with them is not dependent on the legality of the acts that caused them. None
of the WHOs functions has a sufficient connection with the question before it for that question to be capable of being
considered as arising within the scope of [the] activities of the WHO.
International organizations are governed by the principle of speciality they are invested by the States which create them
with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common interests whose promotion those States entrust to them. To
ascribe to the WHO the competence to address the legality of the use of nuclear weapons even in view of their health and
environment effects would be tantamount to disregarding the principle of speciality.
Monetary Gold Case - Italy vs. France, UK and USA (1954)

UK and Italy lay claim to gold taken by Germans from Rome. Italy claims the gold under the allegation that Albania has
committed an international wrong against Italy and must thus pay compensation. UK was claiming the gold in satisfaction of
the Corfu Channel decision. Albania, who had not accepted the Courts jurisdiction, refrained from making any application to
the dispute.
The Court cannot decide such a dispute (WON Albania committed a wrong against Italy and must compensate) without the
consent of Albania. Here, Albanias legal interest would not only be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-
matter of the decision.
Certain Expenses in the UN (1962)

The expenses involved are those relating to UN operations in Congo and the Middle East in pursuance of Security Council and
General Assembly Resolutions. The UN GA requested an advisory opinion on whether these are expenses of the Organization
with the meaning of Art 17, para 2 of the UN Charter.

The ICJ agreed to give an advisory opinion, saying that the power of the Court to give advisory opinion is derived from Art. 65
of the Statute. The power granted is of a discretionary character. The Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even by giving
advisory opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding their activity as a Court. Therefore, the Court can give an advisory
opinion only on a legal question. But even if the question is a legal one, it may nonetheless decline to do so. The Court finds
no compelling reason why it should not give the advisory opinion requested. It has been argued that the question put to the
Court is intertwined with political questions, and that for this reason the Court should refuse to give an opinion. The Court,
however, cannot attribute a political character to a request which invites it to undertake an essential judicial task, namely, the
interpretation of a treaty provision.
Western Sahara Case (1975)

The UN GA requested an advisory opinion on the following questions: Was Western Sahara at the time of colonization by
Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)? and, if yes, What were the legal ties between this territory and the
Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?
The ICJ finds no compelling reason to deny the request. Art. 65, para 1 is permissive and, under it, that power is of a
discretionary character. In exercising this discretion, the ICJ, like the PCIJ, has always been guided by the principle that, as a
judicial body, it is bound to remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial character even in giving advisory opinions. It has
been said in previous opinions that the reply of the Court represents its participation in the activities of the UN and, in principle,
should not be refused. The Court has further said that only compelling reasons should lead it to refuse to give an advisory
opinion.
In general, an opinion given by the Court will furnish the GA with elements of a legal character relevant to the future treatment
of the decolonization of Western Sahara. In any event, to what extent or degree its opinion will have an impact on the action of
the GA is not for the Court to decide. The function of the Court is to give an opinion based on law, once it has come to the
conclusion that the questions put to it are relevant and have a practical and contemporary effect and, consequently are not
devoid of object or purpose.
As to lack of consent, the Court said that it recognized that lack of consent might constitute a ground for declining to give the
opinion requested if, in the circumstances of a given case, considerations of judicial propriety should oblige the Court to refuse
an opinion. I short, the consent of an interested State continues to be relevant, not for the Courts competence, but for the
appreciation of the propriety of giving an opinion.
Bostwana vs. Namibia (1999)

The ICJ was requested to determine, on the basis of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1890 and the rules and principles of
international law, the boundary between Namibia and Botswana around Kasikili/Sedudu Island and the legal status of the
island. The request was made through a Special Agreement between the 2 states to submit the dispute to the ICJ.
Neither Botswana nor Namibia is a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, both of them consider Art. 31 of the
Convention as applicable in interpreting the Anglo-German Treaty inasmuch as Art. 31 reflects customary international law.
*The ICJ acquired jurisdiction because the parties consented to the ICJs jurisdiction and acknowledged that the Anglo-
German Treaty is binding on them.
Eastern Carelia Case (1923)

The Council of the League of Nations requested the PCIJ to give an advisory opinion upon this question: Do Arts. 10 and 11
of the Treaty of Peace between Finland and Russia, signed at Dorpat, and the annexed Declaration of the Russian Delegation
regarding the autonomy of Eastern Carelia, constitute engagements of an international character which place Russia under an
obligation to Finland as to the carrying out of the provisions contained therein?. Russia and Finland are in dispute regarding
the Declaration, with Finland saying that it forms part of the contract and that the Treaty was signed on the terms that the
Declaration was as binding as the Treaty itself. Russia argued that the Declaration was not by way of contract, but was merely
declaratory of an existing situation.
The Court refused to give an advisory opinion. As Russia is not a member of the League of Nations, the case is one under Art.
17 of the Covenant (in the event of dispute between an member and non-member, the latter shall be invited to accept the
obligations of membership for the purpose of such dispute, and if accepted, Art. 12 to 16 shall be applied with modifications).
Such consent, however, had never been given by Russia. On the contrary, it has on several occasions clearly declared that it
accepts no intervention by the League of Nations. It appears to the Court that that there are other cogent reasons which
render it very inexpedient that the Court should attempt to deal with the present question. As Russia, refused to take part, it is
doubtful if sufficient materials would be available to allow any judicial conclusion on whether Finland and Russia contracted on
the terms of the Declaration as to the nature of Eastern Carelias autonomy. The question put to the Court is not one of
abstract law, but concerns directly the main point of the controversy and can only be decided by an investigation into the facts
underlying the case. Answering the question would be substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute between the parties.
Palestinian Wall Case (2004)

The UN GA requested the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on the legal consequences rising from the Israels construction of
the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, considering the rules and principles of
international law, including the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant GA and Security Council Resolutions.
The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction, striking down all arguments questioning its power to give advisory opinion.
Article 12, para 1 was not violated. A request for an advisory opinion is not in itself a "recommendation" by the General
Assembly "with regard to [a] dispute or situation". Under Article 24 the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security". In that regard it can impose on States "an explicit obligation of compliance if
for example it issues an order or command . . . under Chapter VII" and can, to that end, "require enforcement by coercive
action". However, the Court would emphasize that Article 24 refers to a primary, but not necessarily exclusive, competence.
The General Assembly does have the power, inter alia, under Article 14, to "recommend measures for the peaceful
adjustment" of various situations. "[Tlhe only limitation which Article 14 imposes on the General Assembly is the restriction
found in Article 12." As regards the practice of the UN, both the GA and the SC initially interpreted and applied Article 12 to the
effect that the Assembly could not make a recommendation on a question concerning the maintenance of international peace
and security while the matter remained on the Council's agenda. However, this interpretation has evolved subsequently.
Indeed, the Court notes that there has been an increasing tendency over time for the General Assembly and the Security
Council to deal in parallel with the same matter concerning the maintenance of international peace and security. The Court
considers that the accepted practice of the General Assembly, as it has evolved, is consistent with Article 12, paragraph 1, of
the Charter. The Court is accordingly of the view that the General Assembly, in seeking an advisory opinion from the Court, did
not contravene the provisions of Article 12, paragraph 1.
SC failed to act on the matter, thus the GA acted properly in requesting for the advisory opinion. Resolution 377 A (V) States
that: "if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to
making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures . . .". The Court observes that twice the Security
Council failed to act as contemplated in resolution 377 A(V). It does not appear to the Court that the situation in this regard
changed between 20 October 2003 and 8 December 2003.
The request for an advisory opinion was on a legal question within the meaning of Art. 96, para 1 of the UN Charter and Art.
65, para 1 of the ICJ Statute. As regards the alleged lack of clarity of the terms of the GA's request and its effect on the "legal
nature" of the question referred to the Court, the Court observes that this question is directed to the legal consequences
arising from a given factual situation considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva
Convention and relevant SC and GA resolutions. The question submitted by the GA has thus, to use the Court's phrase in
Western Sahara, "been framed in terms of law and raise[s] problems of international law"; it is by its very nature susceptible of
a reply based on law; indeed it is scarcely susceptible of a reply otherwise than on the basis of law. In the view of the Court, it
is indeed a question of a legal character.
Lack of clarity in drafting does not deprive the Court of Jurisdiction. The Court would point out that lack of clarity in the drafting
of a question does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. Rather, such uncertainty will require clarification in interpretation, and
such necessary clarifications of interpretation have frequently been given by the Court.
Court may give an opinion even on an abstract legal question. The Court does not consider that what is contended to be the
abstract nature of the question posed to it raises an issue of jurisdiction. Even when the matter was raised as an issue of
propriety rather than one of jurisdiction, in the case concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the
Court took the position that to contend that it should not deal with a question couched in abstract terms is "a mere affirmation
devoid of any justification" and that "the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question, abstract or otherwise"
That a party to the contentious dispute did not give its consent does not divest the Court of jurisdiction to give an advisory
opinion. The Court observes that the lack of consent (by Israel) to the Court's contentious jurisdiction by interested States has
no bearing on the Court's jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion. "The consent of States, parties to a dispute, is the basis of
the Court's jurisdiction in contentious cases. The situation is different in regard to advisory proceedings even where the
Request for an Opinion relates to a legal question actually pending between States. The Court's reply is only of an advisory
character: as such, it has no binding force. It follows that no State, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, can
prevent the giving of an Advisory Opinion which the United Nations considers to be desirable in order to obtain enlightenment
as to the course of action it should take. The Court's Opinion is given not to the States, but to the organ which is entitled to
request it; the reply of the Court, itself an 'organ of the United Nations', represents its participation in the activities of the
Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused." The Court did however examine the opposition of certain interested
States to the request by the General Assembly in the context of issues of judicial propriety.
The issue is not a bilateral matter between Israel and Palestine and it cannot deny giving an opinion on that ground. Given the
powers and responsibilities of the United Nations in questions relating to international peace and security, it is the Court's view
that the construction of the wall must be deemed to be directly of concern to the United Nations.
Giving of advisory opinion will not impede resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Court is aware that, no matter what
might be its conclusions in any opinion it might give, they would have relevance for the continuing debate on the matter in the
General Assembly and would present an additional element in the negotiations on the matter. Beyond that, the effect of the
opinion is a matter of appreciation. The Court has heard contrary positions advanced and there are no evident criteria by
which it can prefer one assessment to another. The Court is conscious that the "Roadmap", which constitutes a negotiating
framework for the resolution of the conflict. It is not clear, however, what influence the Court's opinion might have on those
negotiations: participants in the present proceedings have expressed differing views in this regard. The Court cannot regard
this factor as a compelling reason to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.
That the construction of the wall is but one aspect of the conflict will also no prevent the giving of advisory opinion. The Court
does not however consider this a reason for it to decline to reply to the question asked. The Court is indeed aware that the
question of the wall is part of a greater whole, and it would take this circumstance carefully into account in any opinion it might
give. At the same time, the question that the General Assembly has chosen to ask of the Court is confined to the legal
consequences of the construction of the wall, and the Court would only examine other issues to the extent that they might be
necessary to its consideration of the question put to it.
That the Court does not have at its disposal requisite facts and evidence to enable it to reach its conclusions will also not
prevent the giving of advisory opinion. The Court observes that the question whether the evidence available to it is sufficient to
give an advisory opinion must be decided in each particular instance. The Court has at its disposal the report of the Secretary-
General, as well as a voluminous dossier submitted by him to the Court, a written statement updating his report, written
statements submitted by numerous other participants which contain information relevant to a response to the question put by
the General Assembly. The Court finds that it has before it sufficient information and evidence to enable it to give the advisory
opinion requested by the General Assembly. The circumstance that others may evaluate and interpret these facts in a
subjective or political manner can be no argument for a court of law to abdicate its judicial task. There is therefore in the
present case no lack of information such as to constitute a compelling reason for the Court to decline to give the requested
opinion.
WON the advisory opinion would serve a useful purpose is not important since it is the requesting which has the right to
decide on its usefulness. With regard to the argument that the General Assembly has not made it clear what use it would make
of an advisory opinion on the wall, the Court would recall, what it stated in its Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons: "Certain States have observed that the General Assembly has not explained to the Court for what precise
purposes it seeks the advisory opinion. Nevertheless, it is not for the Court itself to purport to decide whether or not an
advisory opinion is needed by the Assembly for the performance of its functions. The General Assembly has the right to decide
for itself on the usefulness of an opinion in the light of its own needs." It follows that the Court cannot decline to answer the
question posed based on the ground that its opinion would lack any useful purpose. The Court cannot substitute its
assessment of the usefulness of the opinion requested for that of the organ that seeks such opinion. Furthermore, and in any
event, the Court considers that the General Assembly has not yet determined all the possible consequences of its own
resolution. The Court's task would be to determine in a comprehensive manner the legal consequences of the construction of
the wall, while the General Assembly - and the Security Council - may then draw conclusions from the Court's findings.
C. THE INDIVIDUAL9
1. HUMAN RIGHTS
Crash Course In Basic International Human Rights Law10
What is the notion of human rights?
The concept of human rights refers to that corpus of internationally and universally-recognized rights that are inherent
in every human being, i.e., they are inextricably attached to every person from the time that person becomes a human being 11.
In essence, these are the rights that every aspect of human civilization recognize as the barest minimum that every human
being is entitled to without further qualifications; a residual core of an entire system of rights that cannot further be reduced.
This recognition based on absolute consensus of the international community makes human rights universal in character. As a
logical extension of the inherent character of human rights, human rights are also considered inalienable, or cannot be either
disposed of or taken away voluntarily or involuntarily. They are also imprescriptible, meaning they cannot be understood as
having been waived or forgone by the mere failure to assert or vindicate them through the passage of time. Human rights
abuses, for example, could go on for a number of years in one state without any ostensible opposition but such fact cannot be
used to argue that the people of that state have already surrendered or waived vindication of their rights at any time in the
future. Human rights are also inviolable. Any denial or transgression of these rights constitutes a continuing violation; there
may be justifications for these, which would in certain cases be sufficient to exempt the perpetrators from any legal
consequence, but this does not change the fact that there has been a violation12. One characterization of human rights that
9
Thanks to Ceejay, Marco, Dave, and MJ for this part.
10
Thanks to ceejay balisacan for this portion.
11
There is debate, of course, if the recognized human right to life would apply to the unborn or the human fetus at the time of conception;
but this is a different matter of debate altogether. For our purposes, we use human rights as the rights of every human being, regardless of
what each legal system defines as a person.
12
Contrast this to the modifying circumstances of criminal law where a person may not only be exempt from liability, but there may also be
a pronouncement that no crime has been committed in the first place. This is because criminal laws are defined by legislation, and therefore
the existence of a crime is a function of how one legal system defines the circumstances in which the crime is considered to have arisen. In
has spurred a lot of debates that are ongoing until now is that human rights are indivisible. Ideally, this notion presupposes that
human rights, being the irreducible core of a system of rights, cannot be subdivided so that one portion can be denied and the
other granted. In essence, this argument proposes that the right to a fair trial, for example, cannot be granted only to be
nullified by the subsequent denial of the right against cruel and unusual punishment. An accused, therefore, who has been
given all the due process requirements of an impartial trial but who, when found guilty, would be subjected to inhumane
conditions of confinement can claim a violation of human rights nevertheless. The problematique comes in when certain
human rights coincide with those that are perceived to be hard to attain for example, the right to life is undeniable, but the
right to education remains a matter of financial capacity.
Where do we find human rights in the present international legal system?
The concept of human rights can be found in numerous treatises and other scholarly works, but those that fall within
the rubric of the international legal system are those which originated from the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. The enshrinement of human rights in these instruments was motivated by the desire to prevent
the repetition of the atrocities committed during World War II. Particularly, in the UN Charter, faith is reaffirmed in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of every human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small13. The express purposes of the United Nations include achieving international cooperation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without discrimination as to race, sex, language, or religion 14. The UN Charters
reference to fundamental human rights found an authoritative expression in 1948 when the General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a compilation of 31 articles articulating what the international community believes are
the most basic and fundamental rights that every human being is entitled to.
What is the legal status of the UDHR?
A General Assembly Resolution of the UN may be evidentiary of the existence of a customary norm of international
law that is binding on all states. However, such customary status would depend on many factors like the existence of opinio
juris to the contrary, or the number of states-signatories, or the normative character of the content of the resolution 15. The
UDHR, therefore, is not a legally binding instrument per se just like all other UN GA Resolutions. The ICJ, however, has made
a categorical pronouncement that the content of the UDHR already embodies principles that are legally binding 16. On such
basis, we can validly argue that the UDHR principles have already been elevated to the status of customary law.
How are human rights enforced?
Ideally, human rights are enforced domestically, where legal systems have evolved their own laws punishing the
violation of human rights17. In default of such laws, one can have resort to international law, but only if all other available local
remedies have been exhausted. Human rights conventions have put in place mechanisms for the redress of human rights
violations that can be brought even by individuals (no need for espousal by their states, especially if the state itself is accused
of the violation) examples of these are the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established under the American
Convention on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. In
the absence of such international mechanisms (as the case is in Asia, where the only human rights court established was the
one in the Arab conference), human rights violations may be addressed in the UN Human Rights Council. The HRC, however,
can only act on cases by investigation and recommendation. It undertakes a periodic review of all UN members human rights
records no country can be spared from the review and make recommendations to the General Assembly accordingly. It
can also consider emergency situations of human rights violations and make the same recommendations to the GA.
the case of human rights, since they do not arise from any legislation but are inherent in every civilizations notion of justice, their violation
will always be considered violations although liability may also be modified in a certain limited number of cases to be discussed infra.
13
Preambular Clause, UN Charter.
14
Article 1 (3), UN Charter.
15
In the 1951 ICJ Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, the ICJ recognized that the Convention on Genocide
was approved unanimously by the UN GA, and so its normative content is necessarily binding on all states. Any reservation to the
convention, therefore, should only be confined to the non-normative provisions. Otherwise, the reserving party may be deemed as not
having been a signatory at all.
16
In US v. Iran or the Hostages Case, the ICJ held Iran liable for the wrongful deprivation of liberty and the imposition of physical
constraint in conditions of hardship towards the American hostages in the US Embassy. Such rights, according to the Court, as embodied
in the UDHR, are legally binding in character, the violation of which would constitute a breach of a states international obligation.
17
Obligations to protect and promote human rights may be embodied in domestic legislation to give it full force and effect. However, if a
state has ratified a human rights convention, it cannot modify its treaty obligation through domestic legislation. Article 27 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a State may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty. Once a state signs a treaty, therefore, it can only enact domestic legislation to implement the treaty, or even afford more
protection than what the treaty provides, but it can never lower the standards of obligation embodied in the treaty.
Ultimately, then, further measures need to be sanctioned by the GA. If an act is properly attributable to a state under
international law, a human rights violation would entail the international responsibility of that state 18. A case can therefore be
brought before the ICJ provided that the cause would be espoused by a state, and provided further that such state espousing
would have sufficient legal interest in the dispute. In sum, therefore, human rights enforcement very largely is centered on
domestic legislation and international treaty obligations. In default of both, an individual would find it hard to litigate a case of
violation. The UN can only step in to bring a case before international attention. If the human rights abuse becomes so
widespread and systematic as to constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace, then the Security Council can step
into the picture provided all the requisites are present and all procedures are complied with as provided in Chapter 7 of the UN
Charter.
What is the position of international human rights law vis--vis international humanitarian law?
Both of these bodies of international law aim at protecting the interests of every individual. However, international
human rights law applies at all times and at all places, given their inherent and universal nature. In contrast, international
humanitarian law becomes applicable only during instances of armed conflict. Does human rights law apply during armed
conflicts? YES. Since human rights are inviolable and inherent, they can never be modified by contextual realities, even of
armed conflict. Human rights will follow every human being wherever and whenever. In armed conflicts, therefore, both human
rights and humanitarian law would apply simultaneously.
Is the exercise of human rights absolute in character?
NO. International human rights instruments, which are the concrete codifications of the human rights embodied in the
UDHR, recognize that the exercise of fundamental human rights (like speech, expression, assembly, liberty of movement, and
religion) may be subject to certain lawful limitations. For such limitations to be lawful, however, they should pass the three-fold
test of lawfulness: (1) THE TEST OF LEGALITY. The limitations must be embodied in the law so that citizens, who have every
right to exercise their human rights to the fullest extent, can be validly given notice of such limitations. (2) THE TEST OF
PURPOSE. The limitations must be imposed for one or more specified legitimate purposes, and such purposes should also be
known to the public. (3) THE TEST OF PROPORTIONALITY. The exercise of human rights is always presumed to be
undertaken in a democratic society. Using these standards, the nature and extent of the limitations on the exercise of human
rights must be adequately proportional to the purposes for which they were imposed. The test is not whether the limitations are
desirable or not harmful, but whether there is a clear and compelling social purpose that will be served by such act of
limitation.
What are the current existing human rights instruments?
MANY. Aside from the UN Charter and the UDHR, there are multifarious instruments, conventions, treaties, and
protocols regarding human rights. The most popular ones are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Optional Protocols to these two, the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. For our purposes, we will tackle the two most widely-recognized
instruments embodying the most comprehensive list of human rights the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
Why is there a seeming dichotomy between civil and political rights on one hand and economic, social and cultural
rights on the other?
The split between the ICCPR and the ICESCR is reflective of the ongoing debates between those who believe that
human rights ought to be universal and those who say that they are culturally relative. This universalism-cultural relativism
debate owes to the fact that developed Western states maintain that civil and political rights must be afforded protection
alongside economic, social and cultural rights, and such standard must be the same all over the world. Cultural relativists, on
the other hand, believe that the protection of rights is a matter relative to the culture of a particular society. The notable
adherents of this view (mainly the strongman rulers of Asia like Mahathir and Lee Kuan-Yew) believe that, for example, Asian
communities do not find it objectionable to sacrifice a measure of their civil and political rights in favor of economic rights ,
especially if economic development would result to benefits accruing to the entire community (Asians, they argue, are
communitarian in nature while Westerners are individualist in orientation, hence the refusal to derogate civil and political rights
even for the sake of collective development). The debate is still ongoing, and the West have made many pronouncements that
the cultural relativist argument is being used merely to justify strong state measures aimed at economic development but
entailing sacrifices of civil and political rights. In the meantime, the single human rights document formerly prepared by the UN
Commission on Human Rights were split into two after much debate. The ICCPR, notably, was more palatable to all
18
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1988).
concerned states because it contains absolute rules that are easily concretized, while the ICESCR (which prescribes as
human rights such rights as education, employment, and adequate standard of living) was viewed as heavily contingent on the
level of economic development of the state.
Are there common provisions to the ICCPR and ICESCR?
YES. Common Article 1 of the two conventions recognize the Right to Self-Determination, by virtue of which all
peoples have the right to determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development 19.
Further, all peoples may, for their own ends freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources and that in no case may a
people be deprived of its own means of subsistence 20. The recognition of the right to self-determination arose from a UN GA
Resolution which equated the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation to a denial of human
rights and a violation of the UN Charter21.
What do states undertake upon being parties to the ICCPR?
Each State party undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the...Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status 22. The legal duty to ensure enjoyment of these rights
implies an obligation to take positive steps to see to it first, that domestic laws are modified when necessary in order to comply
with the States international legal obligations; and second, that these laws are indeed effectively implemented in practice by
all public organs and officials, such as the courts (including administrative tribunals), prosecutors, police officers, prison
officials, schools, the military, hospitals and the like.
What are the rights guaranteed under ICCPR?
These are the right to life (art. 6;7), the right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, including a prohibition on being subjected to medical or scientific experimentation without ones free consent (art.
7;8), the right to freedom from slavery, the slave-trade and servitude [art. 8(1) and (2)], the right to freedom from forced and
compulsory labor [art. 8(3)], the right to liberty and security of person, including freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention (art
9;9), the right of persons deprived of their liberty to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person (art. 10;10), prohibition of imprisonment merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation (art.
11), liberty of movement and freedom to choose ones residence [art. 12(1)], the right to be free to leave any country, including
ones own [art. 12(2)], the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter ones own country [art. 12(4)], certain legal
safeguards against unlawful expulsions of aliens lawfully in the territory of a State party (art. 13;11), the right to a fair hearing in
criminal and civil cases by an independent and impartial tribunal (art. 14;12), freedom from ex post facto laws and the
retroactive application of heavier penalties than those that could be imposed when the crime was committed (art. 15), the right
to recognition as a person before the law (art. 16), the right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with ones
privacy, family, home or correspondence or to unlawful attacks on ones honor and reputation (art. 17;13), the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion (art. 18;14), the right to freedom of opinion and of expression (art. 19;15), prohibition of war
propaganda and of advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence
(art. 20;16), the right to peaceful assembly (art. 21), the right to freedom of association (art. 22), the right to marry freely, to
found a family and to equal rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution (art.
23;17), the right of the child to special protection without discrimination; the right to be registered upon birth and the right to a
nationality (art. 24;18), the right to popular participation in public affairs; the right to vote in periodic elections by universal and
equal suffrage and secret ballot, as well as the right to have access to public service (art. 25;19), the right to equality before
the law and the equal protection of the law (art. 26;20), and the right of minorities to enjoy their own culture, religion and
language (art. 27.21).
Can states derogate from their legal obligations under the ICCPR? Are there non-derogable rights?
19
Common Article 1, par.1, ICCPR and ICESCR.
20
Common Article 1, par.2, ICCPR and ICESCR.
21
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960).
22
Article 2, ICCPR.
23
YES. Article 4 of the ICCPR is known as the Derogation Clause . The strict conditions that govern the right of the
States parties to resort to derogations from their legal obligations under said Article are:
(1) the condition of a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation. The State party envisaging a derogation must be
facing a situation of exceptional threat that jeopardizes the nations life, thus excluding minor or even more serious
disturbances that do not affect the functioning of the States democratic institutions or peoples lives in general.
(2) the condition of official proclamation: the existence of a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation must be
officially proclaimed. As was explained during the drafting of article 4, the purpose thereof was to prevent States from
derogating arbitrarily from their obligations under the Covenant when such an action was not warranted by events24.
(3) the condition of non-derogability of certain obligations. Article 4(2) of the Covenant enumerates some rights from which no
derogation can ever be made even in the direst of situations. These rights are: the right to life (art. 6), the right to freedom from
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art. 7), the right to freedom from slavery, the slave-trade and
servitude (art. 8(1) and (2)), the right not to be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation (art.
11), the prohibition of ex post facto laws (art. 15), the right to legal personality (art. 16) and, lastly, the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion (art. 18). However, it follows from the work of the Human Rights Committee that it is not
possible to conclude a contrario that, because a specific right is not listed in article 4(2), it can necessarily be derogated from.
Consequently, some rights may not be derogated from because they are considered to be inherent to the Covenant as a
whole; one such example is the right to judicial remedies in connection with arrests and detentions as set out in article 9(3)
and (4); others may also be non-derogable because they are indispensable to the effective enjoyment of the rights that are
explicitly listed in article 4(2), such as the right to a fair trial for persons threatened with the death penalty. The Committee has
further held under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR that the right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal is an
absolute right that may suffer no exception.
(4) the condition of strict necessity. This condition means that the State party can only take measures derogating from its
obligations under the ... Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation; as compared to the
ordinary limitation provisions dealt with above, the condition of strict necessity compels a narrow construction of the principle
of proportionality, in that the legislative measures taken must as such be strictly required by the exigencies of the emergency
situation; and, secondly, any individual measure taken on the basis of that legislation must likewise be strictly proportionate. It
is thus necessary to consider whether the measures concerned are strictly required in order to deal with the emergency
situation.
(5) the condition of consistency with other international legal obligations. On the basis of this condition, the Human Rights
Committee is, in principle, authorized to examine whether measures of derogation might be unlawful as being inconsistent with
other international treaties, such as, for instance, other treaties for the protection of the individual or even international
humanitarian law or customary international law.
(6) the condition of non-discrimination. The measures of derogation may not involve discrimination solely on the ground of
race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin (art. 4(1) in fine). This is an important condition since it is particularly in
emergency situations that there is a risk of imposing discriminatory measures which have no objective and reasonable
justification.
(7) the condition of international notification. In order to avail itself of the right of derogation, a State party must, lastly, also
fulfill the conditions set out in article 4(3) of the Covenant, by immediately submitting a notification of derogation to the other
States parties through the Secretary-General. In this notification it must describe the provisions from which it has derogated
and ... the reasons by which it was actuated. A second notification must be submitted on the date on which it terminates such
derogation.
How are the provisions of the ICCPR implemented?
23
Article 4 (1): In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the
States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international
law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. (2): No derogation from
articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision.
24
UN doc. E/CN.4/SR.195, p. 16, para. 82; explanation given by Mr. Cassin of France.
Under the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol, there are three procedures for implementing the provisions of the ICCPR:
(1) the reportorial procedure25, (2) the inter-State communications procedure26, and (3) the individual communications
procedure27.
What do states undertake upon being parties to the ICESCR?
Each State party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the ... Covenant by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures (art. 2(1)). Although the Covenant thus
provides for progressive realization and acknowledges the constraints due to limits of available resources, the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasized in General Comment No. 3 that it also imposes various obligations which
are of immediate effect. In the view of the Committee, two of these are of particular importance, namely: first, the undertaking
in article 2(2) to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the ... Covenant will be exercised without discrimination on certain
specific grounds; and second, the undertaking in article 2(1) to take steps, which in itself, is not qualified or limited by other
considerations. In other words, while the full realization of the relevant rights may be achieved progressively, steps towards
that goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after the Covenants entry into force for the States concerned. Such
25
ICCPR, Article 40 (1) The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which
give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights: (a) Within one year of the entry into
force of the present Covenant for the State Parties concerned; (b) Thereafter whenever the Committee so requests. (2) All reports shall be
submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit them to the Committee for consideration. Reports shall
indicate the factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the implementation of the present Covenant. (3) The Secretary-General of the United
Nations, may, after consultation with the Committee, transmit to the specialized agencies concerned copies of such parts of the reports as
may fall within their field of competence. (4) The Committee shall study the reports submitted by the States Parties to the present
Covenant. It shall transmit its reports, and such general comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties. The Committee may
also transmit to the Economic and Social Council these comments along with the copies of the reports it has received from States Parties to
the present Covenant. (5) States Parties to the present Covenant may submit to the Committee observations on any comments that may be
made in accordance with paragraph 4 of this article.
26
ICCPR, Article 41 (1) A State Party to the present Covenant may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence
of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its
obligations under the present Covenant. Communications under this article may be received and considered only if submitted by a State
Party which has made a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be received
by the Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration. Communications received under this article shall be
dealt with in accordance with the following procedure: (a) If a State Party to the present Covenant considers that another State Party is not
giving effect to the provisions of the present Covenant, it may, by written communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State
Party. Within three months after the receipt of the communication the receiving State shall afford the State which sent the communication
an explanation, or any other statement in writing clarifying the matter which should include, to the extent possible and pertinent, reference
to domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending, or available in the matter; (b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both
States Parties concerned within six months after the receipt by the receiving State of the initial communication, either State shall have the
right to refer the matter to the Committee, by notice given to the Committee and to the other State; (c) The Committee shall deal with a
matter referred to it only after it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the matter, in
conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the rule where application of the remedies is
unreasonably prolonged; (d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining communications under this article; (e) Subject to
the provisions of subparagraph (c), the Committee shall make available its good offices to the States Parties concerned with a view to a
friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the present Covenant; (f)
In any matter referred to it, the Committee may call upon the States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), to supply any
relevant information; (g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), shall have the right to be represented when the
matter is being considered in the Committee and to make submissions orally and/or in writing; (h) The Committee shall, within twelve
months after the date of receipt of notice under subparagraph (b), submit a report: (i) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is
reached, the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached; (ii) If a solution within the
terms of subparagraph (e) is not reached, the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts; the written submissions
and record of the oral submissions made by the States Parties concerned shall be attached to the report. In every matter, the report shall be
communicated to the States Parties concerned. (2) The provisions of this article shall come into force when ten States Parties to the present
Covenant have made declarations under paragraph 1 of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the States Parties with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at
any time by notification to the Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter which is the
subject of a communication already transmitted under this article; no further communication by any State Party shall be received after the
notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been received by the Secretary-General, unless the State Party concerned has made a new
declaration.
27
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Article 1: A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims
of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it
concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party to the present Protocol.
steps should be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the
Covenant.
What are the rights guaranteed under the ICESCR?
These are the right to work, including the right to gain ones living by work freely chosen or accepted (art. 6);
the right to enjoy just and favorable conditions of work, including fair remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of
any kind (art. 7); the right to form trade unions and join the trade union of ones choice (art. 8); the right to social security,
including social insurance (art. 9); protection and assistance to the family; marriage to be freely entered into; maternity
protection; protection and assistance to children and young persons (art. 10); right to an adequate standard of living, including
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions (art. 11); the right to the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health (art. 12); the right to education (art. 13;35); the undertaking to develop
detailed plans of action where compulsory primary education is not yet secured (art. 14;36); the right to take part in cultural life,
to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which one is the author (art. 15).
Is the exercise of the rights under the ICESCR absolute in character?
NO. The ICESCR contains a general limitation in article 4, whereby the State may subject the enjoyment of the rights
guaranteed by the Covenant only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with
the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. Furthermore,
limitations relating to the exercise of specific rights are also contained in article 8(1)(a) and (c), where the exercise of the right
to form and join trade unions, as well as the right of trade unions to function freely, may be subjected to no restrictions other
than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public
order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. From the travaux prparatoires relating to article 4 it is clear
that it was considered important to include the condition that limitations had to be compatible with a democratic society, that is
to say, a society based on respect for the rights and freedoms of others; otherwise, it was suggested, the text might instead
very well serve the ends of dictatorship.
Can states derogate from their legal obligations under the ICESCR?
NO. Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR does not contain any provision permitting derogations from the legal obligations
incurred thereunder.
How are the provisions of the ICESCR implemented?
Under article 16 of the ICESCR, the parties undertake to submit reports on the measures which they have adopted
and the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized therein, and it is the UN Economic and Social
Council that is formally entrusted with monitoring compliance with the terms thereof (art. 16(2)(a)). However, since the early
arrangements for examining the periodic reports were not satisfactory, the Council created, in 1985, the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as an organ of independent experts parallel to the Human Rights Committee set up
under the ICCPR. The Committee consists of eighteen members who serve in their individual capacity. As is the case with the
Human Rights Committee, the reports submitted by the States parties are considered in public meetings and in the presence
of representatives of the State party concerned. The discussion is designed to achieve a constructive and mutually rewarding
dialogue so that the Committee members can get a fuller picture of the situation prevailing in the country concerned, thereby
enabling them to make the comments they believe most appropriate for the most effective implementation of the obligations
contained in the Covenant.
2. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
International Criminal Tribunals28
A. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (THE TADIC CASE)
On 30 April 1992, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) conducted a bloodless take-over of the town of Prijedor with the
aid of the military and police forces. The actual take-over was conducted in the early hours of the morning when armed Serbs
took up positions at checkpoints throughout Prijedor, with soldiers and snipers on the roofs of the main buildings. Military posts
were erected all over the city and the Serbian flag with four Cyrillic S's was flown from the City Hall. Yugoslav Peoples Army
28
Thanks to ceejay balisacan for this portion
(JNA) soldiers, wearing a variety of uniforms, occupied all of the prominent institutions such as the radio station, medical
centre and bank. They entered buildings, declared that they had taken power and announced their decision to rename the
Prijedor Municipality Srpska optina Prijedor (Serb Municipality of Prijedor). Muharem Nezirevi, the Editor-in-Chief of Radio
Prijedor at the time, was summoned to the radio station in the early morning of 30 April 1992. When he arrived, the radio
station was surrounded by soldiers. Milomir Staki, who before the take-over had been Vice Chairman of the Municipal
Assembly and afterwards became the Chairman of the Serb Municipal Assembly, explained on the radio what had happened
and the SDS's intentions with regard to Prijedor municipality. The attack on the nearby town of Kozarac on 24 May 1992,
which included two days of artillery barrage and an assault by a mechanised brigade of troops, resulted in the killing of some
800 civilians out of a population of around 4,000. When the town had been captured, the Bosnian Serb forces proceeded to
round up and drive out of the area on foot the entire non-Serb population. During the course of the ethnic cleansing of
Kozarac, many more civilians were beaten, robbed and murdered by Bosnian Serb paramilitary and military forces.
During the occupation of Kozarac, Duko Tadi participated in the collection and forced transfer of civilians. As the
refugees were herded down the old Prijedor-Banja Luka road in the direction of Kozarua, many of them were singled out and,
once removed from the column, were shot by members of the Bosnian Serb forces. After the take-over of Prijedor and the
outlying areas, the Serb forces confined thousands of Muslim and Croat civilians in the Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje
camps. The establishment of these camps was part of the Greater Serbia plan to expel non-Serbs from the Prijedor
Municipality. During confinement, both male and female prisoners were subjected to severe mistreatment, which included
beatings, sexual assaults, torture and executions. They were also subjected to degrading psychological abuse, by being
forced to spit on the Muslim flag, sing Serbian nationalist songs or to give the Serbian three-fingered salute. Drinking water at
Omarska was often denied to the prisoners for long periods and was, in any event, unsuitable for human consumption,
causing sickness. There was very little in the way of lavatories; prisoners had to wait hours before being allowed to use them,
and sometimes risked being beaten if they asked to use them. Prisoners were often forced to defecate and urinate in their
rooms. There were no effective washing facilities, and men and their clothes quickly became filthy and skin diseases were
prevalent, as were acute cases of diarrhoea and dysentery. The crowded rooms were stifling in the summer heat and often
guards refused to open windows in rooms crowded to overflowing, or demanded the handing over of any possessions
prisoners had managed to retain as the price of an open window or a plastic jar of water.
On 7 May 1997, the Trial Chamber rendered its judgement, convicting Duko Tadi on the basis of individual criminal
responsibility (Article 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal) with (1) Crimes against humanity (Article 5 of the Statute -
persecutions on political, racial and/or religious grounds; inhumane acts), and (2) Violations of the laws or customs of war
(Article 3 thereof - cruel treatment). He was meted out a prison sentence of 20 years. Both the Defense and the Prosecution
appealed the Trial Chambers Decision on different grounds. The Defense relies on the argument that there has been a denial
of the right to a fair trial and that there has been a mistake of facts. The Prosecution raises issues of international law, which
will be discussed below:
ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RAISED BY THE PROSECUTION ON APPEAL
Whether or not the victims were protected persons under Article 2 of the Tribunals Statute (Trial Chamber held that
some of them were not; Appeals Court found that the victims are protected persons, and so the convictions of Tadic
were increased)
1. When can there be grave breaches of international humanitarian law under Article 2 of the Tribunals Statute?
When the conflict is international in character and the victims were protected persons.
2. When can a conflict be considered as international in character?
An armed conflict is international if it takes place between two or more States. In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict
breaking out on the territory of a State, it may become international if (i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its
troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other State.
3. What is the extent of control necessary to conclude that a group is a de facto organ of a state?
International rules do not always require the same degree of control over armed groups or private individuals for the purpose
of determining whether an individual not having the status of a State official under internal legislation can be regarded as a de
facto organ of the State. The extent of the requisite State control varies. Where the question at issue is whether a single
private individual or a group that is not militarily organised has acted as a de facto State organ when performing a specific act,
it is necessary to ascertain whether specific instructions concerning the commission of that particular act had been issued by
that State to the individual or group in question; alternatively, it must be established whether the unlawful act had been publicly
endorsed or approved ex post facto by the State at issue. By contrast, control by a State over subordinate armed forces or
militias or paramilitary units may be of an overall character (and must comprise more than the mere provision of financial
assistance or military equipment or training). This requirement, however, does not go so far as to include the issuing of specific
orders by the State, or its direction of each individual operation. Under international law it is by no means necessary that the
controlling authorities should plan all the operations of the units dependent on them, choose their targets, or give specific
instructions concerning the conduct of military operations and any alleged violations of international humanitarian law. The
control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to
the conflict) has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing,
training and equipping or providing operational support to that group. Acts performed by the group or members thereof may be
regarded as acts of de facto State organs regardless of any specific instruction by the controlling State concerning the
commission of each of those acts.
4. Who are protected persons?
Article 4(1) of Geneva Convention IV (protection of civilians), applicable to the case at issue, defines protected persons -
hence possible victims of grave breaches as those "in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they
are not nationals". In other words, subject to the provisions of Article 4(2), the Convention intends to protect civilians (in enemy
territory, occupied territory or the combat zone) who do not have the nationality of the belligerent in whose hands they find
themselves, or who are stateless persons. In addition, as is apparent from the preparatory work, the Convention also intends
to protect those civilians in occupied territory who, while having the nationality of the Party to the conflict in whose hands they
find themselves, are refugees and thus no longer owe allegiance to this Party and no longer enjoy its diplomatic protection.
Nationals of a neutral State or a co-belligerent State are not treated as protected persons unless they are deprived of or do
not enjoy diplomatic protection. In other words, those nationals are not protected persons as long as they benefit from the
normal diplomatic protection of their State; when they lose it or in any event do not enjoy it, the Convention automatically
grants them the status of protected persons.
5. Were the victims in this case protected persons?
YES. In the instant case the Bosnian Serbs, including Tadic, arguably had the same nationality as the victims, that is, they
were nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, it has been shown that the Bosnian Serb forces acted as de facto organs
of another State, namely, the FRY. Thus the requirements set out in Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV are met: the victims
were protected persons as they found themselves in the hands of armed forces of a State of which they were not nationals. It
might be argued that before 6 October 1992, when a Citizenship Act was passed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the nationals of
the FRY had the same nationality as the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely the nationality of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. Even assuming that this proposition is correct, the position would not alter from a legal point of view.
Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV, if interpreted in the light of its object and purpose, is directed to the protection of civilians to
the maximum extent possible. It therefore does not make its applicability dependent on formal bonds and purely legal
relations. Its primary purpose is to ensure the safeguards afforded by the Convention to those civilians who do not enjoy the
diplomatic protection, and correlatively are not subject to the allegiance and control, of the State in whose hands they may find
themselves. In granting its protection, Article 4 intends to look to the substance of relations, not to their legal characterisation
as such. Hence, even if in the circumstances of the case the perpetrators and the victims were to be regarded as possessing
the same nationality, Article 4 would still be applicable. Indeed, the victims did not owe allegiance to (and did not receive the
diplomatic protection of) the State (the FRY) on whose behalf the Bosnian Serb armed forces had been fighting.
Whether or not crimes against humanity can be committed for purely personal motives (Trial Chamber held in the
negative29; Appeals Court held that motives are an irrelevant factor to consider in dealing with crimes against
humanity)
1. Is mens rea relevant in crimes against humanity?
ONLY TO A CERTAIN EXTENT. It may be inferred from the words directed against any civilian population in Article 5 of the
Statute that the acts of the accused must comprise part of a pattern of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a
civilian population and that the accused must have known that his acts fit into such a pattern. There is nothing in the Statute,
however, which mandates the imposition of a further condition that the acts in question must not be committed for purely
personal reasons, except to the extent that this condition is a consequence or a re-statement of the other two conditions
mentioned.
2. Can crimes against humanity be committed for purely personal reasons?
YES. The weight of authority supports the proposition that crimes against humanity can be committed for purely personal
reasons, provided it is understood that the two aforementioned conditions that the crimes must be committed in the context
of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian population and that the accused must have known that his acts,
in the words of the Trial Chamber, fitted into such a pattern are met. The conclusion is therefore warranted that the relevant
29
In the Judgment, the Trial Chamber identified, from among the elements which had to be satisfied before a conviction for crimes against
humanity could be recorded, the need to prove the existence of an armed conflict and a nexus between the acts in question and the armed
conflict. As to the nature of the nexus required, the Trial Chamber found that, subject to two caveats, it is sufficient for the purposes of
crimes against humanity that the act occurred in the course or duration of an armed conflict. The first caveat was that the act be linked
geographically as well as temporally with the armed conflict. The second caveat was that the act and the conflict must be related or, at
least, that the act must not be unrelated to the armed conflict. The Trial Chamber further held that the requirement that the act must not
be unrelated to the armed conflict involved two aspects. First, the perpetrator must know of the broader context in which the act occurs.
Secondly, the act must not have been carried out for the purely personal motives of the perpetrator.
case-law and the spirit of international rules concerning crimes against humanity make it clear that under customary law,
purely personal motives do not acquire any relevance for establishing whether or not a crime against humanity has been
perpetrated. The Trial Chamber correctly recognised that crimes which are unrelated to widespread or systematic attacks on a
civilian population should not be prosecuted as crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity are crimes of a special
nature to which a greater degree of moral turpitude attaches than to an ordinary crime. Thus to convict an accused of crimes
against humanity, it must be proved that the crimes were related to the attack on a civilian population (occurring during an
armed conflict) and that the accused knew that his crimes were so related. However, the Appeals Chamber does not consider
it necessary to further require, as a substantive element of mens rea, a nexus between the specific acts allegedly committed
by the accused and the armed conflict, or to require proof of the accuseds motives. Consequently, in the opinion of the
Appeals Chamber, the requirement that an act must not have been carried out for the purely personal motives of the
perpetrator does not form part of the prerequisites necessary for conduct to fall within the definition of a crime against
humanity under Article 5 of the Tribunals Statute.
Whether or not all crimes against humanity require a discriminatory intent (Trial Chamber held in the affirmative;
Appeals Court reversed the decision, declaring that discriminatory intent is not a requirement for crimes against
humanity)
1. Does a textual interpretation of the Tribunals Statute warrant the conclusion that discriminatory intent is necessary for all
crimes against humanity?
NO. The ordinary meaning of Article 5 makes it clear that this provision does not require all crimes against humanity to have
been perpetrated with a discriminatory intent. Such intent is only made necessary for one sub-category of those crimes,
namely persecutions provided for in Article 5 (h). A logical construction of Article 5 also leads to the conclusion that, generally
speaking, this requirement is not laid down for all crimes against humanity. Indeed, if it were otherwise, why should Article 5(h)
specify that persecutions fall under the Tribunals jurisdiction if carried out on political, racial and religious grounds? This
specification would be illogical and superfluous. It is an elementary rule of interpretation that one should not construe a
provision or part of a provision as if it were superfluous and hence pointless: the presumption is warranted that law-makers
enact or agree upon rules that are well thought out and meaningful in all their elements. The interpretation of Article 5 in the
light of its object and purpose bears out the above propositions. The aim of those drafting the Statute was to make all crimes
against humanity punishable, including those which, while fulfilling all the conditions required by the notion of such crimes,
may not have been perpetrated on political, racial or religious grounds as specified in paragraph (h) of Article 5. In light of the
humanitarian goals of the framers of the Statute, one fails to see why they should have seriously restricted the class of
offences coming within the purview of crimes against humanity, thus leaving outside this class all the possible instances of
serious and widespread or systematic crimes against civilians on account only of their lacking a discriminatory intent. For
example, a discriminatory intent requirement would prevent the penalization of random and indiscriminate violence intended to
spread terror among a civilian population as a crime against humanity. A fortiori, the object and purpose of Article 5 would be
thwarted were it to be suggested that the discriminatory grounds required are limited to the five grounds put forth by the
Secretary-General in his Report and taken up (with the addition, in one case, of the further ground of gender) in the statements
made in the Security Council by three of its members. Such an interpretation of Article 5 would create significant lacunae by
failing to protect victim groups not covered by the listed discriminatory grounds. The experience of Nazi Germany
demonstrated that crimes against humanity may be committed on discriminatory grounds other than those enumerated in
Article 5 (h), such as physical or mental disability, age or infirmity, or sexual preference. Similarly, the extermination of class
enemies in the Soviet Union during the 1930s (admittedly, as in the case of Nazi conduct before the Second World War, an
occurrence that took place in times of peace, not in times of armed conflict) and the deportation of the urban educated of
Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge between 1975-1979, provide other instances which would not fall under the ambit of
crimes against humanity based on the strict enumeration of discriminatory grounds suggested by the Secretary-General in his
Report.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL)
The trial resulted from numerous war crimes attributed to the Empire of Japan (the entire list of atrocities was cited in
the decision and it is long. Very long.) as having been committed during the entire period immediately preceding, and during,
the World War II. The judgment of the Tribunal first lists down all the sources of international legal obligations of Japan towards
the Allied Powers and all nations that they occupied during the war, such obligations having been found to have been
breached. These obligations, together with their corresponding sources, are:
1. Obligations to preserve the territorial and administrative independence of China.
United States Declaration of 1901

Identic Notes of 1908
Nine-Power Treaty of 1922
Covenant of the League of Nations of 1920
2. Obligations to preserve for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of China, the so-
called "Open Door Policy".
United States Declaration of 1900 to 1901

3. Obligations to suppress the manufacture, traffic in, and use of opium and analogous drugs.
Opium Convention of 1912

League of Nations of 1925
Opium Convention of 1931
4. Obligations to respect the territory of Powers interested in the Pacific.
Four-Power Treaty of 1921

Notes to Netherlands and Portugal of 1926
Covenant of the League of Nations of 1920
5. Obligations to keep inviolate the territory of neutral Powers.
Hague V of 1907
6. Obligations to solve disputes between nations by diplomatic means, or mediation, or arbitration.

Four-Power Treaty of 1921
Hague of 1907
Pact of Paris of 1928
7. Obligations designed to ensure the pacific settlement of international disputes.
Hague of 1899
Hague of 1907
Pact of Paris of 1928
8. Obligation to give previous warning before commencing hostilities.
Hague III of 1907
9. Obligations relative to humane conduct in warfare.
Hague IV of 1907, Geneva Red Cross of 1929

Geneva P.O.W. of 1919
In addition, the relevant principles of international law enunciated in the decision of the Tribunal were those made in response
to the jurisdictional challenge posed by the accused Japanese war officials. These jurisdictional defenses are:
1. The Allied Powers acting through the Supreme Commander have no authority to include in the Charter of the
Tribunal and to designate as justiciable "Crimes against Peace" (Article 5(a));
2. Aggressive war is not per se illegal and the Pact of Paris of 1928 renouncing war as an instrument of national
policy does not enlarge the meaning of war crimes nor constitute war a crime;
3. War is the act of a nation for which there is no individual responsibility under international law;
4. The provisions of the Charter are "ex post facto" legislation and therefore illegal;
5. The Instrument of Surrender which provides that the Declaration of Potsdam will be given effect imposes the
condition that Conventional War Crimes as recognized by international law at the date of the Declaration (26 July,
1945) would be the only crimes prosecuted;
6. Killings in the course of belligerent operations except in so far as they constitute violations of the rules of warfare or
the laws and customs of war are the normal incidents of war and are not murder;
7. Several of the accused being prisoners of war are triable by court martial as provide by the Geneva Convention
1929 and not by this Tribunal.
To these defenses the Tribunal quotes the same passage in the Nuremberg Tribunal decision before which the same
challenges were raised by German war officials. The passage reads:
The Charter [referring to the Charter creating the Tribunal] is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the
victorious nations but is the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation. The question is what was
the legal effect of this pact (Pact of Paris August 27, 1928)? The Nations who signed the pact or adhered to it
unconditionally condemned recourse to war for the future as an instrument of policy and expressly renounced it. After the
signing of the pact any nation resorting to war as an instrument of national policy breaks the pact. In the opinion of the
Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy necessarily involves the proposition that such
a war is illegal in international law; and that those who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible
consequences, are committing a crime in so doing. The principle of international law which under certain circumstances
protects the representative of a state cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law. The
authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be freed from punishment in
appropriate proceedings. The maxim 'nullum crimen sine lege' is not a limitation of sovereignty but is in general a principle
of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked
neighbouring states without warning is obviously untrue for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing
wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished. The
Charter specifically provides . . . 'the fact that a defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall
not free him from responsibility but may be considered in mitigation of punishment.' This provision is in conformity with the
laws of all nations . . . The true test which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations is not the
existence of the order but whether moral choice was in fact possible.
The Tribunal also established the rationale for holding responsible government officials for the ill-treatment of prisoners during
the war. In placing the burden of ensuring the proper treatment of prisoners upon the government (rather than merely the
military officers actually engaged in war in the field) of the state holding them in detention, the Tribunal ratiocinated:
Prisoners taken in war and civilian internees are in the power of the Government which captures them. This was not
always the case. For the last two centuries, however, this position has been recognised and the customary law to this
effect was formally embodied in the Hague Convention No. IV in 1907 and repeated in the Geneva Prisoner of War
Convention of 1929. Responsibility for the care of prisoners of war and of civilian internees (all of who we will refer to as
"prisoners") rests therefore with the Government having them in possession. This responsibility is not limited to the duty of
mere maintenance but extends to the prevention of mistreatment. In particular, acts of inhumanity to prisoners which are
forbidden by the customary law of nations as well as by conventions are to be prevented by the Government having
responsibility for the prisoners.
In the discharge of these duties to prisoners Governments must have resort to persons. Indeed the Governments
responsible, in this sense, are those persons who direct and control the functions of Government. In this case and in the
above regard we are concerned with the members of the Japanese Cabinet. The duty to prisoners is not a meaningless
obligation cast upon a political abstraction. It is a specific duty to be performed in the first case by those persons who
constitute the Government. In the multitude of duties and tasks involved in modern government there is of necessity an
elaborate system of subdivision and delegation of duties. In the case of the duty of Governments to prisoners held by
them in time of war those persons who constitute the Government have the principal and continuing responsibility for their
prisoners, even though they delegate the duties of maintenance and protection to others.
In general the responsibility for prisoners held by Japan may be stated to have rested upon:
1. Members of the Government;
2. Military or Naval Officers in command of formations having prisoners in their possession;
3. Officials in those departments which were concerned with the well-being of prisoners;
4. Officials, whether civilian, military, or naval, having direct and immediate

control of prisoners.
It is the duty of all those on whom responsibility rests to secure proper treatment of prisoners and to prevent their ill-
treatment by establishing and securing the continuous and efficient working of a system appropriate for these purposes.
Such persons fail in this duty and become responsible for ill-treatment of prisoners if:
1. They fail to establish such a system.
2. If having established such a system, they fail to secure its continued and efficient working.
Each of such persons has a duty to ascertain that the system is working and if he neglects to do so he is responsible. He
does not discharge his duty by merely instituting an appropriate system and thereafter neglecting to learn of its
application. An Army Commander or a Minister of War, for example, must be at the same pains to ensure obedience to his
orders in this respect as he would in respect of other orders he has issued on matters of the first importance.
Nevertheless, such persons are not responsible if a proper system and its continuous efficient functioning be provided for
and conventional war crimes be committed unless:

1. They had knowledge that such crimes were being committed, and having such knowledge they failed to
take such steps as were within their power to prevent the commission of such crimes in the future, or
2. They are at fault in having railed to acquire such knowledge.
If, such a person had, or should, but for negligence or supineness, have had such knowledge he is not excused for
inaction if his Office required or permitted him to take any action to prevent such crimes. On the other hand it is not
enough for the exculpation of a person, otherwise responsible, for him to show that he accepted assurances from others
more directly associated with the control of the prisoners if having regard to the position of those others, to the frequency
of reports of such crimes, or to any other circumstances he should have been put upon further enquiry as to whether
those assurances were true or untrue. That crimes are notorious, numerous and widespread as to time and place are
matters to be considered in imputing knowledge.
A member of a Cabinet which collectively, as one of the principal organs of the Government, is responsible for the care of
prisoners is not absolved from responsibility if, having knowledge of the commission of the crimes in the sense already
discussed, and omitting or failing to secure the taking of measures to prevent the commission of such crimes in the future,
he elects to continue as a member of the Cabinet. This is the position even though the Department of which he has the
charge is not directly concerned with the care of prisoners. A Cabinet member may resign. If he has knowledge of ill-
treatment of prisoners, but elects to remain in the Cabinet thereby continuing to participate in its collective responsibility
for protection of prisoners he willingly assumes responsibility for any ill-treatment in the future.
Army of Navy Commanders can, by order, secure proper treatment and prevent ill-treatment of prisoners. So can
Ministers of War and of the Navy. if crimes are committed against prisoners under their control, of the likely occurance of
which they had, or should have had knowledge in advance, they are responsible for those crimes. If, for example, it be
shown that within the units under his command conventional war crimes have been committed of which he knew or should
have known, a commander who takes no adequate steps to prevent the occurrence of such crimes in the future will be
responsible for such future crimes.
Department Officials having knowledge of ill-treatment of prisoners are not responsible by reason of their failure to resign;
but if their functions included the administration of the system of protection of prisoners and if they had or should have had
knowledge of crimes and did nothing effective, to the extent of their powers, to prevent their occurrence in the future that
they are responsible for such future crimes.
C. THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL
The trial resulted from the war crimes and other atrocities imputed to German war officials during the World War II.
Like the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, the decision of the Tribunal in Nuremberg lists down (at length) all the atrocities allegedly
committed by Germany during the war, particularly in European states that they have occupied and against the Jewish people
who have become primary victims of its Aryanist campaign. For the purposes of international law, the following are some of the
essential principles enunciated by the Tribunal in response to the various defenses raised by the accused German war
officials.
1. FIRST DEFENSE: The humanitarian law provisions of the Hague Convention do not apply because some of the
states who participated in the War were not parties to the Convention. The Tribunal rejects this proposition and
categorically states that the provisions of the Hague Convention are articulations of customary international law
relating to warfare and so all states are bound to them regardless of conventional obligations:
It is argued that the Hague Convention does not apply in this case, because of the "general participation "
clause in Article 2 of the Hague Convention of 1907. That clause provided:
"The provisions contained in the regulations (Rules of Land Warfare referred to in Article 1 as well as in the
present Convention do not apply except between contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are
parties to the Convention."
Several of the belligerents in the recent war were not parties to this Convention.
In the opinion of the Tribunal it is not necessary to decide this question. The rules of land warfare expressed in
the Convention undoubtedly represented an advance over existing international law at the time of their
adoption. But the Convention expressly stated that it was an attempt " to revise the general laws and customs
of war," which it thus recognised to be then existing, but by 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention were
recognised by all civilised nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war
which are referred to in Article 6 (b) of the Charter.
2. SECOND DEFENSE: The rules of warfare ceased to be applicable by the time the occupied territories were
incorporated into Germany because, by then, they are to be treated as German territory and Germany can choose to
deal with such territories as though they were part of it. The Tribunal rejects this argument, saying that the doctrine of
subjugation is not applicable as long as there remains a force of resistance within the occupied territories, and as
long as such territories were not sufficiently shown to have been incorporated into the occupying power through
evidence:

A further submission was made that Germany was no longer bound by the rules of land warfare in many of the
territories occupied during the war, because Germany had completely subjugated those countries and
incorporated them into the German Reich, a fact which gave Germany authority to deal with the occupied
countries as though they were part of Germany. In the view of the Tribunal it is unnecessary in this case to
decide whether this doctrine of subjugation, dependent as it is upon military conquest, has any application
where the subjugation is the result of the crime of aggressive war. The doctrine was never considered to be
applicable so long as there was an army in the field attempting to restore the occupied countries to their true
owners, and in this case, therefore, the doctrine could not apply to any territories occupied after the 1st
September, 1939. As to the war crimes committed in Bohemia and Moravia, it is a sufficient answer that these
territories were never added to the Reich, but a mere protectorate was established over them.
3. THIRD DEFENSE: There were committed no crimes against humanity during the war. The Tribunal only partly
disagrees with this, because there was no sufficient evidence to establish that, before 1939, crimes against humanity
have been committed. However, after 1939, crimes against humanity have undoubtedly been committed either
through (1) war crimes, which are also crimes against humanity or (2) crimes committed in the execution of an
aggressive war, the latter being under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and as such would also constitute crimes against
humanity:
With regard to crimes against humanity, there is no doubt whatever that political opponents were murdered in Germany
before the war, and that many of them were kept in concentration camps in circumstances of great horror and cruelty. The
policy of terror was certainly carried out on a vast scale, and in many cases was organised and systematic. The policy of
persecution, repression and murder of civilians in Germany before the war of 1939, who were likely to be hostile to the
Government, was most ruthlessly carried out. The persecution of Jews during the same period is established beyond all doubt.
To constitute crimes against humanity, the acts relied on before the outbreak of war must have been in execution of, or in
connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting and horrible as
many of these crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of, or in connection with, any
such crime. The Tribunal therefore cannot make a general declaration that the acts before 1939 were crimes against humanity
within the meaning of the Charter, but from the beginning of the war in 1939 war crimes were committed on a vast scale, which
were also crimes against humanity; and insofar as the inhumane acts charged in the Indictment, and committed after the
beginning of the war, did not constitute war crimes, they were all committed in execution of, or in connection with, the
aggressive war, and therefore constituted crimes against humanity.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Rome Statute)30
Overview
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court. This was done so to create a permanent tribunal which would
deal with grave crimes that threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world. This Tribunal shall be complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions.
PART 1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COURT
Art 1 Establishes the ICC as a permanent institution having jurisdiction over most serious crimes of national concern and shall
be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.
Art 3 The seat of the Court is in the Netherlands at Hague
Art 4 The Court shall have international legal personality. It shall also have such legal capacity as may be necessary for the
exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.
PART 2 JURISDICTION, ADMISSIBILITY, AND APPLICABLE LAW
Art 5 Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the Court is limited to the following crimes
a) Genocide
b) Crimes against humanity
c) War crimes
d) Crime of aggression Court shall exercise jurisdiction over this once a provision is adopted defining this crime.
Art 6 Genocide
- acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:
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(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Art 7 Crimes against humanity

-any of the following acts when committed as part of a (1) widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population (2) with knowledge of the attack
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization,
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
However, the last element should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics
of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or organization. In the case of an emerging widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population, the intent clause of the last element indicates that this mental element is
satisfied if the perpetrator intended to further such an attack.
Attack directed against a civilian population in these context elements is understood to mean a course of conduct involving
the multiple commission of acts referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute against any civilian population, pursuant to
or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.
Art 8 War Crimes

The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as
part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
There is no requirement for a legal evaluation by the perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict or its character as
international or non-international;
In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the
conflict as international or non-international;
There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed
conflict that is implicit in the terms took place in the context of and was associated with.
2. For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons
or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established
framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to the four
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against persons taking no
active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors
de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:

(d) Paragraph 2 (c) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar
nature.
Article 11 Jurisdiction ratione temporis
1. The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute.
2. If a State becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with
respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute for that State, unless that State has made a
declaration under article 12, paragraph 3.
Article 12 Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction
1. State Party accepts the jurisdiction of ICC
2. Before exercising jurisdiction, one or more of the following States shall be Parties to the Statute or shall have accepted the
jurisdiction of ICC
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime
was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
3. If the acceptance of a State not a Party to this Statute
-by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in
question.
Art 13 Exercise of jurisdiction if:
(a) referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party

(b) referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations; or
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with article 15
Article 14
Referral of a situation by a State Party
Article 15 Prosecutor
1. The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court.
2. The Prosecutor shall analyse the seriousness of the information received.
3. If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall
submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation.
4. If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the supporting material, considers that there is a reasonable
basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize
the commencement of the investigation, without prejudice to subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the
jurisdiction and admissibility of a case.
5. The refusal of the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize the investigation shall not preclude the presentation of a subsequent
request by the Prosecutor based on new facts or evidence regarding the same situation.
6. If, after the preliminary examination referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Prosecutor concludes that the information
provided does not constitute a reasonable basis for an investigation, he or she shall inform those who provided the
information. This shall not preclude the Prosecutor from considering further information submitted to him or her regarding the
same situation in the light of new facts or evidence.
Article 16 Deferral of investigation or prosecution

No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the
Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court
to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.
Article 17 Issues of admissibility
1. A case is inadmissible where:
(a) It is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) It has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute
the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to
prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by
the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having
regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as
applicable:
(a) The proceedings made to shield the person concerned from criminal responsibility
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially,
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse
or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and
testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
Article 20 Ne bis in idem
1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court with respect to conduct which formed
the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
2. No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in article 5 for which that person has already been
convicted or acquitted by the Court.
3. No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by
the Court with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process
recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
Article 21 Applicable law
1. The Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law,
including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world
including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime,
provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally
recognized norms and standards.
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human
rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age,
race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.

PART 3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
Article 22 Nullum crimen sine lege (No crime if there is no law punishing it)
The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition
shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.
Article 23 Nulla poena sine lege

A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute.
Article 24 Non-retroactivity ratione personae
1. No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute.
2. In the event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final judgement, the law more favourable to
the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply.
Article 25 Individual criminal responsibility
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of
whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its
commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of
persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such
activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step,
but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. However, a
person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be
liable for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily
gave up the criminal purpose.
Article 26 Exclusion of jurisdiction over persons under eighteen
Article 29 Non-applicability of statute of limitations
The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to any statute of
limitations.
Article 30 Mental element
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;

(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur
in the ordinary course of events.
3. For the purposes of this article, "knowledge" means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur
in the ordinary course of events. "Know" and "knowingly" shall be construed accordingly.
Article 31 Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility
1. In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute, a person shall not be
criminally responsible if, at the time of that person's conduct:
(a) The person suffers from a mental disease

(b) The person is in a state of intoxication unless the person has become voluntarily intoxicated under
such circumstances that the person knew, or disregarded the risk, that, as a result of the intoxication, he or
she was likely to engage in conduct constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(c) The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person or, in the case of war
crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the person or another person or property
which is essential for accomplishing a military mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of force
in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person or property protected.
(d) The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been caused
by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm
against that person or another person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat,
provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided. Such a
threat may either be:
(i) Made by other persons; or

(ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person's control.
Article 32 Mistake of fact or mistake of law
1. A mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility only if it negates the mental element
required by the crime.
2. A mistake of law as to whether a particular type of conduct is a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be
a ground for excluding criminal responsibility. A mistake of law may, however, be a ground
Article 33 Superior orders and prescription of law
1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person
pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not
relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless:
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the
superior in question;
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are
manifestly unlawful.
International Humanitarian Law
A. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS31
The First Convention
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August
1949.
WHEN DOES IT APPLY

Art. 2. In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the
said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
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Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall
remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if
the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.
WHAT IS REQUIRED [who are the protected people; how to treat them]
Art. 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar
criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to
the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to
the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other
provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.
Art. 4. Neutral Powers shall apply by analogy the provisions of the present Convention to the wounded and sick, and to
members of the medical personnel and to chaplains of the armed forces of the Parties to the conflict, received or interned in
their territory, as well as to dead persons found.
Art. 5. For the protected persons who have fallen into the hands of the enemy, the present Convention shall apply until their
final repatriation.
Art. 7. Wounded and sick, as well as members of the medical personnel and chaplains, may in no circumstances renounce in
part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the
foregoing Article, if such there be.
Art. 9. The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International
Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the
conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of wounded and sick, medical personnel and chaplains, and for their relief.
CHAPTER II. WOUNDED AND SICK

Art. 12. Members of the armed forces and other persons mentioned in the following Article, who are wounded or sick, shall be
respected and protected in all circumstances.
They shall be treated humanely and cared for by the Party to the conflict in whose power they may be, without any
adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions, or any other similar criteria. Any attempts upon
their lives, or violence to their persons, shall be strictly prohibited; in particular, they shall not be murdered or exterminated,
subjected to torture or to biological experiments; they shall not wilfully be left without medical assistance and care, nor shall
conditions exposing them to contagion or infection be created.
Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to be administered.
Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex. The Party to the conflict which is compelled to
abandon wounded or sick to the enemy shall, as far as military considerations permit, leave with them a part of its medical
personnel and material to assist in their care.
Art. 13. The present Convention shall apply to the wounded and sick belonging to the following categories:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of
such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that
such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a Government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civil members of military
aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of
the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany.
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the
Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions in international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the
invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and
respect the laws and customs of war.
Art. 14. Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the wounded and sick of a belligerent who fall into enemy hands shall be
prisoners of war, and the provisions of international law concerning prisoners of war shall apply to them.
Art. 15. At all times, and particularly after an engagement, Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible
measures to search for and collect the wounded and sick, to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their
adequate care, and to search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled.
Whenever circumstances permit, an armistice or a suspension of fire shall be arranged, or local arrangements made,
to permit the removal, exchange and transport of the wounded left on the battlefield.
Likewise, local arrangements may be concluded between Parties to the conflict for the removal or exchange of
wounded and sick from a besieged or encircled area, and for the passage of medical and religious personnel and equipment
on their way to that area.
DUTY TO RECORD THE WOUNDED/SICK/DEAD

Art. 16. Parties to the conflict shall record as soon as possible, in respect of each wounded, sick or dead person of the adverse
Party falling into their hands, any particulars which may assist in his identification.
These records should if possible include:
(a) designation of the Power on which he depends;
(b) army, regimental, personal or serial number;
(c) surname;
(d) first name or names;
(e) date of birth;
(f) any other particulars shown on his identity card or disc;
(g) date and place of capture or death;
(h) particulars concerning wounds or illness, or cause of death.
As soon as possible the above mentioned information shall be forwarded to the Information Bureau described in Article 122 of
the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, which shall transmit this information
to the Power on which these persons depend through the intermediary of the Protecting Power and of the Central Prisoners of
War Agency.
Parties to the conflict shall prepare and forward to each other through the same bureau, certificates of death or duly
authenticated lists of the dead. They shall likewise collect and forward through the same bureau one half of a double identity
disc, last wills or other documents of importance to the next of kin, money and in general all articles of an intrinsic or
sentimental value, which are found on the dead. These articles, together with unidentified articles, shall be sent in sealed
packets, accompanied by statements giving all particulars necessary for the identification of the deceased owners, as well as
by a complete list of the contents of the parcel.
RIGHT TO BURIAL
Art. 17. Parties to the conflict shall ensure that burial or cremation of the dead, carried out individually as far as circumstances
permit, is preceded by a careful examination, if possible by a medical examination, of the bodies, with a view to confirming
death, establishing identity and enabling a report to be made. One half of the double identity disc, or the identity disc itself if it
is a single disc, should remain on the body.
Bodies shall not be cremated except for imperative reasons of hygiene or for motives based on the religion of the
deceased. In case of cremation, the circumstances and reasons for cremation shall be stated in detail in the death certificate
or on the authenticated list of the dead.
They shall further ensure that the dead are honourably interred, if possible according to the rites of the religion to
which they belonged, that their graves are respected, grouped if possible according to the nationality of the deceased, properly
maintained and marked so that they may always be found. For this purpose, they shall organize at the commencement of
hostilities an Official Graves Registration Service, to allow subsequent exhumations and to ensure the identification of bodies,
whatever the site of the graves, and the possible transportation to the home country. These provisions shall likewise apply to
the ashes, which shall be kept by the Graves Registration Service until proper disposal thereof in accordance with the wishes
of the home country.
As soon as circumstances permit, and at latest at the end of hostilities, these Services shall exchange,
through the Information Bureau mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 16, lists showing the exact location and markings
of the graves, together with particulars of the dead interred therein.
THOSE WHO AID THE WOUNDED ARE NOT TO BE HARMED

Art. 18. The military authorities may appeal to the charity of the inhabitants voluntarily to collect and care for, under their
direction, the wounded and sick, granting persons who have responded to this appeal the necessary protection and facilities.
Should the adverse Party take or retake control of the area, he shall likewise grant these persons the same protection and the
same facilities.
The military authorities shall permit the inhabitants and relief societies, even in invaded or occupied areas,
spontaneously to collect and care for wounded or sick of whatever nationality. The civilian population shall respect these
wounded and sick, and in particular abstain from offering them violence.
No one may ever be molested or convicted for having nursed the wounded or sick.
The provisions of the present Article do not relieve the occupying Power of its obligation to give both physical and
moral care to the wounded and sick.
Chapter III. Medical Units and Establishments

Art. 19. Fixed establishments and mobile medical units of the Medical Service may in no circumstances be attacked, but shall
at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict. Should they fall into the hands of the adverse Party, their
personnel shall be free to pursue their duties, as long as the capturing Power has not itself ensured the necessary care of the
wounded and sick found in such establishments and units.
MEDICAL UNITS GONE BAD

Art. 22. The following conditions shall not be considered as depriving a medical unit or establishment of the protection
guaranteed by Article 19:
(1) That the personnel of the unit or establishment are armed, and that they use the arms in their own defence, or in that of the
wounded and sick in their charge.
(2) That in the absence of armed orderlies, the unit or establishment is protected by a picket or by sentries or by an escort.
(3) That small arms and ammunition taken from the wounded and sick and not yet handed to the proper service, are found in
the unit or establishment.
(4) That personnel and material of the veterinary service are found in the unit or establishment, without forming an integral part
thereof.
(5) That the humanitarian activities of medical units and establishments or of their personnel extend to the care of civilian
wounded or sick.
Chapter IV. Personnel

Art. 24. Medical personnel exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of the wounded or
sick, or in the prevention of disease, staff exclusively engaged in the administration of medical units and establishments, as
well as chaplains attached to the armed forces, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances.
CAPTURED HEALTH WORKER/HELPERS

Art. 28. Personnel designated in Articles 24 and 26 who fall into the hands of the adverse Party, shall be retained only in so far
as the state of health, the spiritual needs and the number of prisoners of war require.
Personnel thus retained shall not be deemed prisoners of war. Nevertheless they shall at least benefit by all the
provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949. Within the framework of
the military laws and regulations of the Detaining Power, and under the authority of its competent service, they shall continue
to carry out, in accordance with their professional ethics, their medical and spiritual duties on behalf of prisoners of war,
preferably those of the armed forces to which they themselves belong. They shall further enjoy the following facilities for
carrying out their medical or spiritual duties:
(a) They shall be authorized to visit periodically the prisoners of war in labour units or hospitals outside the camp. The
Detaining Power shall put at their disposal the means of transport required.
(b) In each camp the senior medical officer of the highest rank shall be responsible to the military authorities of the camp for
the professional activity of the retained medical personnel. For this purpose, from the outbreak of hostilities, the Parties to the
conflict shall agree regarding the corresponding seniority of the ranks of their medical personnel, including those of the
societies designated in Article 26. In all questions arising out of their duties, this medical officer, and the chaplains, shall have
direct access to the military and medical authorities of the camp who shall grant them the facilities they may require for
correspondence relating to these questions.
(c) Although retained personnel in a camp shall be subject to its internal discipline, they shall not, however, be required to
perform any work outside their medical or religious duties.
During hostilities the Parties to the conflict shall make arrangements for relieving where possible retained personnel, and shall
settle the procedure of such relief.
None of the preceding provisions shall relieve the Detaining Power of the obligations imposed upon it with regard to the
medical and spiritual welfare of the prisoners of war.
Art. 30. Personnel whose retention is not indispensable by virtue of the provisions of Article 28 shall be returned to the Party to
the conflict to whom they belong, as soon as a road is open for their return and military requirements permit.
Pending their return, they shall not be deemed prisoners of war. Nevertheless they shall at least benefit by all the
provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949. They shall continue to
fulfil their duties under the orders of the adverse Party and shall preferably be engaged in the care of the wounded and sick of
the Party to the conflict to which they themselves belong.
On their departure, they shall take with them the effects, personal belongings, valuables and instruments belonging to
them.
Art. 31. The selection of personnel for return under Article 30 shall be made irrespective of any consideration of race, religion
or political opinion, but preferably according to the chronological order of their capture and their state of health.
As from the outbreak of hostilities, Parties to the conflict may determine by special agreement the percentage of
personnel to be retained, in proportion to the number of prisoners and the distribution of the said personnel in the camps.
Chapter V. Buildings and Material

Art. 33. The material of mobile medical units of the armed forces which fall into the hands of the enemy, shall be reserved for
the care of wounded and sick.
The buildings, material and stores of fixed medical establishments of the armed forces shall remain subject to the
laws of war, but may not be diverted from their purpose as long as they are required for the care of wounded and sick.
Nevertheless, the commanders of forces in the field may make use of them, in case of urgent military necessity, provided that
they make previous arrangements for the welfare of the wounded and sick who are nursed in them.
The material and stores defined in the present Article shall not be intentionally destroyed.
Chapter VI. Medical Transports

Art. 35. Transports of wounded and sick or of medical equipment shall be respected and protected in the same way as mobile
medical units.
Should such transports or vehicles fall into the hands of the adverse Party, they shall be subject to the laws of war, on
condition that the Party to the conflict who captures them shall in all cases ensure the care of the wounded and sick they
contain.
The civilian personnel and all means of transport obtained by requisition shall be subject to the general rules of
international law.
Art. 36. Medical aircraft, that is to say, aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of wounded and sick and for the transport
of medical personnel and equipment, shall not be attacked, but shall be respected by the belligerents, while flying at heights,
times and on routes specifically agreed upon between the belligerents concerned.
They shall bear, clearly marked, the distinctive emblem prescribed in Article 38, together with their national colours
on their lower, upper and lateral surfaces. They shall be provided with any other markings or means of identification that may
be agreed upon between the belligerents upon the outbreak or during the course of hostilities.
Unless agreed otherwise, flights over enemy or enemy-occupied territory are prohibited.
Medical aircraft shall obey every summons to land. In the event of a landing thus imposed, the aircraft with its
occupants may continue its flight after examination, if any.
In the event of an involuntary landing in enemy or enemy-occupied territory, the wounded and sick, as well as the
crew of the aircraft shall be prisoners of war. The medical personnel shall be treated according to Article 24 and the Articles
following.
Chapter VII. The Distinctive Emblem

Art. 38. As a compliment to Switzerland, the heraldic emblem of the red cross on a white ground, formed by reversing the
Federal colours, is retained as the emblem and distinctive sign of the Medical Service of armed forces.
Nevertheless, in the case of countries which already use as emblem, in place of the red cross, the red crescent or the
red lion and sun on a white ground, those emblems are also recognized by the terms of the present Convention.
Art. 40. The personnel designated in Article 24 and in Articles 26 and 27 shall wear, affixed to the left arm, a water-resistant
armlet bearing the distinctive emblem, issued and stamped by the military authority.
Such personnel, in addition to wearing the identity disc mentioned in Article 16, shall also carry a special identity card
bearing the distinctive emblem. This card shall be water-resistant and of such size that it can be carried in the pocket. It shall
be worded in the national language, shall mention at least the surname and first names, the date of birth, the rank and the
service number of the bearer, and shall state in what capacity he is entitled to the protection of the present Convention. The
card shall bear the photograph of the owner and also either his signature or his finger-prints or both. It shall be embossed with
the stamp of the military authority.
The identity card shall be uniform throughout the same armed forces and, as far as possible, of a similar type in the
armed forces of the High Contracting Parties. The Parties to the conflict may be guided by the model which is annexed, by
way of example, to the present Convention. They shall inform each other, at the outbreak of hostilities, of the model they are
using. Identity cards should be made out, if possible, at least in duplicate, one copy being kept by the home country.
In no circumstances may the said personnel be deprived of their insignia or identity cards nor of the right to wear the
armlet. In case of loss, they shall be entitled to receive duplicates of the cards and to have the insignia replaced.
Chapter VIII. Execution of the Convention

Art. 46. Reprisals against the wounded, sick, personnel, buildings or equipment protected by the Convention are prohibited.
Art. 47. The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present
Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their
programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire
population, in particular to the armed fighting forces, the medical personnel and the chaplains.
Chapter IX. Repression of Abuses and Infractions

DUTY TO LEGISLATE
Art. 49. The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for
persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following
Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to
have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its
own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for
trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions
of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be
less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those following, of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949.
Art. 50. Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed
against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
Art. 53. The use by individuals, societies, firms or companies either public or private, other than those entitled thereto under
the present Convention, of the emblem or the designation " Red Cross " or " Geneva Cross " or any sign or designation
constituting an imitation thereof, whatever the object of such use, and irrespective of the date of its adoption, shall be
prohibited at all times.
By reason of the tribute paid to Switzerland by the adoption of the reversed Federal colours, and of the confusion
which may arise between the arms of Switzerland and the distinctive emblem of the Convention, the use by private individuals,
societies or firms, of the arms of the Swiss Confederation, or of marks constituting an imitation thereof, whether as trademarks
or commercial marks, or as parts of such marks, or for a purpose contrary to commercial honesty, or in circumstances capable
of wounding Swiss national sentiment, shall be prohibited at all times.
Nevertheless, such High Contracting Parties as were not party to the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929, may grant
to prior users of the emblems, designations, signs or marks designated in the first paragraph, a time limit not to exceed three
years from the coming into force of the present Convention to discontinue such use provided that the said use shall not be
such as would appear, in time of war, to confer the protection of the Convention.
The prohibition laid down in the first paragraph of the present Article shall also apply, without effect on any rights
acquired through prior use, to the emblems and marks mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 38.
The Second Convention
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea.
Geneva, 12 August 1949.
Art 2. In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party,
even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties
thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the
said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.
Art 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following
provisions:

criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the
above-mentioned persons:
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly
(2) The wounded, sick and shipwrecked shall be collected and cared for.
the conflict.
Art 4. In case of hostilities between land and naval forces of Parties to the conflict, the provisions of the present Convention
shall apply only to forces on board ship.
Forces put ashore shall immediately become subject to the provisions of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949.
Art 5. Neutral Powers shall apply by analogy the provisions of the present Convention to the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked, and to members of the medical personnel and to chaplains of the armed forces of the Parties to the conflict
received or interned in their territory, as well as to dead persons found.
Art 7. Wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, as well as members of the medical personnel and chaplains, may in no
circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special
agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if such there be.
Chapter II. Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked

Art 12. Members of the armed forces and other persons mentioned in the following Article, who are at sea and who are
wounded, sick or shipwrecked, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances, it being understood that the term
"shipwreck" means shipwreck from any cause and includes forced landings at sea by or from aircraft.
Such persons shall be treated humanely and cared for by the Parties to the conflict in whose power they may be,
without any adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions, or any other similar criteria. Any
attempts upon their lives, or violence to their persons, shall be strictly prohibited; in particular, they shall not be murdered or
exterminated, subjected to torture or to biological experiments; they shall not wilfully be left without medical assistance and
care, nor shall conditions exposing them to contagion or infection be created.
Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to be administered.
Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex.
Art 13. The present Convention shall apply to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea belonging to the following categories:
such armed forces.
such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a Government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military
the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany.
Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the
OBLIGATIONS OF THE RESCUED

Art 14. All warships of a belligerent Party shall have the right to demand that the wounded, sick or shipwrecked on board
military hospital ships, and hospital ships belonging to relief societies or to private individuals, as well as merchant vessels,
yachts and other craft shall be surrendered, whatever their nationality, provided that the wounded and sick are in a fit state to
be moved and that the warship can provide adequate facilities for necessary medical treatment.
Art 15. If wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons are taken on board a neutral warship or a neutral military aircraft, it
shall be ensured, where so required by international law, that they can take no further part in operations of war.
Art 16. Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked of a belligerent who fall into enemy
hands shall be prisoners of war, and the provisions of international law concerning prisoners of war shall apply to them. The
captor may decide, according to circumstances, whether it is expedient to hold them, or to convey them to a port in the
captor's own country, to a neutral port or even to a port in enemy territory. In the last case, prisoners of war thus returned to
their home country may not serve for the duration of the war.
Art 17. Wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons who are landed in neutral ports with the consent of the local authorities, shall,
failing arrangements to the contrary between the neutral and the belligerent Powers, be so guarded by the neutral Power,
where so required by international law, that the said persons cannot again take part in operations of war.
The costs of hospital accommodation and internment shall be borne by the Power on whom the wounded, sick or
shipwrecked persons depend.
Art 18. After each engagement, Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures to search for and collect
the shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to
search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled.
Whenever circumstances permit, the Parties to the conflict shall conclude local arrangements for the removal of the
wounded and sick by sea from a besieged or encircled area and for the passage of medical and religious personnel and
equipment on their way to that area.
DUTY TO NOTIFY
Art 19. The Parties to the conflict shall record as soon as possible, in respect of each shipwrecked, wounded, sick or dead
person of the adverse Party falling into their hands, any particulars which may assist in his identification. These records should
if possible include:
(a) designation of the Power on which he depends;
(b) army, regimental, personal or serial number;
(c) surname;
(d) first name or names;
(e) date of birth;
(f) any other particulars shown on his identity card or disc;
(g) date and place of capture or death;
(h) particulars concerning wounds or illness, or cause of death.
As soon as possible the above-mentioned information shall be forwarded to the information bureau described in Article 122 of
the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, which shall transmit this information
to the Power on which these persons depend through the intermediary of the Protecting Power and of the Central Prisoners of
War Agency.
Parties to the conflict shall prepare and forward to each other through the same bureau, certificates of death or duly
authenticated lists of the dead. They shall likewise collect and forward through the same bureau one half of the double identity
disc, or the identity disc itself if it is a single disc, last wills or other documents of importance to the next of kin, money and in
general all articles of an intrinsic or sentimental value, which are found on the dead. These articles, together with unidentified
articles, shall be sent in sealed packets, accompanied by statements giving all particulars necessary for the identification of the
deceased owners, as well as by a complete list of the contents of the parcel.
Art 20. Parties to the conflict shall ensure that burial at sea of the dead, carried out individually as far as circumstances
permit, is preceded by a careful examination, if possible by a medical examination, of the bodies, with a view to confirming
death, establishing identity and enabling a report to be made. Where a double identity disc is used, one half of the disc should
remain on the body.
If dead persons are landed, the provisions of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949 shall be applicable.
Art 21. The Parties to the conflict may appeal to the charity of commanders of neutral merchant vessels, yachts or other craft,
to take on board and care for wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons, and to collect the dead.
Vessels of any kind responding to this appeal, and those having of their own accord collected wounded, sick or
shipwrecked persons, shall enjoy special protection and facilities to carry out such assistance.
They may, in no case, be captured on account of any such transport; but, in the absence of any promise to the
contrary, they shall remain liable to capture for any violations of neutrality they may have committed.
Chapter III. Hospital Ships

Art 22. Military hospital ships, that is to say, ships built or equipped by the Powers specially and solely with a view to assisting
the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to treating them and to transporting them, may in no circumstances be attacked or
captured, but shall at all times be respected and protected, on condition that their names and descriptions have been notified
to the Parties to the conflict ten days before those ships are employed.
The characteristics which must appear in the notification shall include registered gross tonnage, the length from stem
to stern and the number of masts and funnels.
Art 23. Establishments ashore entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949 shall be protected from bombardment or attack from the
sea.
Art 24. Hospital ships utilized by National Red Cross Societies, by officially recognized relief societies or by private persons
shall have the same protection as military hospital ships and shall be exempt from capture, if the Party to the conflict on
which they depend has given them an official commission and in so far as the provisions of Article 22 concerning notification
have been complied with.
These ships must be provided with certificates from the responsible authorities, stating that the vessels have been
under their control while fitting out and on departure.
Art 28. Should fighting occur on board a warship, the sick-bays shall be respected and spared as far as possible. Sick-bays
and their equipment shall remain subject to the laws of warfare, but may not be diverted from their purpose so long as they are
required for the wounded and sick. Nevertheless, the commander into whose power they have fallen may, after ensuring the
proper care of the wounded and sick who are accommodated therein, apply them to other purposes in case of urgent military
necessity.
Art 29. Any hospital ship in a port which falls into the hands of the enemy shall be authorized to leave the said port.
Art 30. The vessels described in Articles 22, 24, 25 and 27 shall afford relief and assistance to the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked without distinction of nationality.
The High Contracting Parties undertake not to use these vessels for any military purpose.
Such vessels shall in no wise hamper the movements of the combatants.
During and after an engagement, they will act at their own risk.
Art 33. Merchant vessels which have been transformed into hospital ships cannot be put to any other use throughout the
duration of hostilities.
Art 35. The following conditions shall not be considered as depriving hospital ships or sick-bays of vessels of the protection
due to them:
(1) The fact that the crews of ships or sick-bays are armed for the maintenance of order, for their own defence or that of the
sick and wounded.
(2) The presence on board of apparatus exclusively intended to facilitate navigation or communication.
(3) The discovery on board hospital ships or in sick-bays of portable arms and ammunition taken from the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked and not yet handed to the proper service.
(4) The fact that the humanitarian activities of hospital ships and sick-bays of vessels or of the crews extend to the care of
wounded, sick or shipwrecked civilians.
(5) The transport of equipment and of personnel intended exclusively for medical duties, over and above the normal
requirements.
Chapter IV. Personnel

Art 36. The religious, medical and hospital personnel of hospital ships and their crews shall be respected and protected;
they may not be captured during the time they are in the service of the hospital ship, whether or not there are wounded and
sick on board.
Chapter V. Medical Transports (very similar to medical land transports)

Art 38. Ships chartered for that purpose shall be authorized to transport equipment exclusively intended for the treatment of
wounded and sick members of armed forces or for the prevention of disease, provided that the particulars regarding their
voyage have been notified to the adverse Power and approved by the latter. The adverse Power shall preserve the right to
board the carrier ships, but not to capture them or seize the equipment carried.
By agreement amongst the Parties to the conflict, neutral observers may be placed on board such ships to verify the
equipment carried. For this purpose, free access to the equipment shall be given.
Chapter VI. The Distinctive Emblem (same pa rin)

Art 41. Under the direction of the competent military authority, the emblem of the red cross on a white ground shall be
displayed on the flags, armlets and on all equipment employed in the Medical Service.

Nevertheless, in the case of countries which already use as emblem, in place of the red cross, the red crescent or the red lion
and sun on a white ground, these emblems are also recognized by the terms of the present Convention.
Chapter VIII. Repression of Abuses and Infractions (same)
Art 50. The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for
persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following
Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to
have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its
own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for
trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions
of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be
less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.
Art 51. Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed
against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
The Third Convention
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.
Art 2. In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party,
even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the
said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.
Art 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
provisions:
criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to
the above-mentioned persons:
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
the conflict.
DEFINITION OF POW
Art 4. A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories,
who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
such armed forces.

such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:[
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military
the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization, from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall
provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.
Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:
(1) Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it
necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going
on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed
forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them
with a view to internment.
(2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or
non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international law, without
prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10,
15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral
or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist,
the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting
Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in
conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the present
Convention.
Art 5. The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the time they fall into the power of the
enemy and until their final release and repatriation.
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of
the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
Art 7. Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present
Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if such there be.
Part II. General Protection of Prisoners of War

Art 12. Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or military units who have captured
them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given
them.
Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention and
after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention.
When prisoners of war are transferred under such circumstances, responsibility for the application of the Convention rests on
the Power accepting them while they are in its custody.
Nevertheless, if that Power fails to carry out the provisions of the Convention in any important respect, the Power by
whom the prisoners of war were transferred shall, upon being notified by the Protecting Power, take effective measures to
correct the situation or shall request the return of the prisoners of war. Such requests must be complied with.
Art 13. Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power
causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a
serious breach of the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to
medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the prisoner
concerned and carried out in his interest.
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and
against insults and public curiosity.
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.
Art 14. Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honour.
Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as favourable
as that granted to men.
Prisoners of war shall retain the full civil capacity which they enjoyed at the time of their capture. The Detaining
Power may not restrict the exercise, either within or without its own territory, of the rights such capacity confers except in so far
as the captivity requires.
Art 15. The Power detaining prisoners of war shall be bound to provide free of charge for their maintenance and for the
medical attention required by their state of health.
Part III. Captivity

Section 1. Beginning of Captivity
Art 17. Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of
birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information.
If he wilfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or
status.
Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of
war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or
equivalent information, and date of birth. The identity card may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of
the owner, and may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add concerning persons
belonging to its armed forces. As far as possible the card shall measure 6.5 x 10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. The
identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but may in no case be taken away from him.
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from
them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to
unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity, shall be handed
over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be established by all possible means, subject to the provisions
of the preceding paragraph.
The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.
Art 18. All effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses, military equipment and military documents, shall remain in
the possession of prisoners of war, likewise their metal helmets and gas masks and like articles issued for personal protection.
Effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding shall likewise remain in their possession, even if such effects and articles
belong to their regulation military equipment.
At no time should prisoners of war be without identity documents. The Detaining Power shall supply such documents
to prisoners of war who possess none.
Badges of rank and nationality, decorations and articles having above all a personal or sentimental value may not be
taken from prisoners of war.
Sums of money carried by prisoners of war may not be taken away from them except by order of an officer, and after
the amount and particulars of the owner have been recorded in a special register and an itemized receipt has been given,
legibly inscribed with the name, rank and unit of the person issuing the said receipt. Sums in the currency of the Detaining
Power, or which are changed into such currency at the prisoner's request, shall be placed to the credit of the prisoner's
account as provided in Article 64.
The Detaining Power may withdraw articles of value from prisoners of war only for reasons of security; when such
articles are withdrawn, the procedure laid down for sums of money impounded shall apply.
Such objects, likewise sums taken away in any currency other than that of the Detaining Power and the conversion of
which has not been asked for by the owners, shall be kept in the custody of the Detaining Power and shall be returned in their
initial shape to prisoners of war at the end of their captivity.
Art 19. Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far enough
from the combat zone for them to be out of danger.
Only those prisoners of war who, owing to wounds or sickness, would run greater risks by being evacuated than by
remaining where they are, may be temporarily kept back in a danger zone.
Prisoners of war shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation from a fighting zone.
Section II. Internment of Prisoners of War

Chapter I. General Observations
Art 21. The Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to internment. It may impose on them the obligation of not leaving,
beyond certain limits, the camp where they are interned, or if the said camp is fenced in, of not going outside its perimeter.
Subject to the provisions of the present Convention relative to penal and disciplinary sanctions, prisoners of war may not be
held in close confinement except where necessary to safeguard their health and then only during the continuation of the
circumstances which make such confinement necessary.
Prisoners of war may be partially or wholly released on parole or promise, in so far as is allowed by the laws of the
Power on which they depend. Such measures shall be taken particularly in cases where this may contribute to the
improvement of their state of health. No prisoner of war shall be compelled to accept liberty on parole or promise.
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, each Party to the conflict shall notify the adverse Party of the laws and regulations
allowing or forbidding its own nationals to accept liberty on parole or promise. Prisoners of war who are paroled or who have
given their promise in conformity with the laws and regulations so notified, are bound on their personal honour scrupulously to
fulfil, both towards the Power on which they depend and towards the Power which has captured them, the engagements of
their paroles or promises. In such cases, the Power on which they depend is bound neither to require nor to accept from them
any service incompatible with the parole or promise given.
Art 22. Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee of hygiene and
healthfulness. Except in particular cases which are justified by the interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be
interned in penitentiaries.
Prisoners of war interned in unhealthy areas, or where the climate is injurious for them, shall be removed as soon as
possible to a more favourable climate.
The Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in camps or camp compounds according to their nationality,
language and customs, provided that such prisoners shall not be separated from prisoners of war belonging to the armed
forces with which they were serving at the time of their capture, except with their consent.
Chapter II. Quarters, Food and Clothing of Prisoners of War

Art 25. Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favourable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who
are billeted in the same area. The said conditions shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall
in no case be prejudicial to their health.
The foregoing provisions shall apply in particular to the dormitories of prisoners of war as regards both total surface
and minimum cubic space, and the general installations, bedding and blankets.
The premises provided for the use of prisoners of war individually or collectively, shall be entirely protected from
dampness and adequately heated and lighted, in particular between dusk and lights out. All precautions must be taken against
the danger of fire.
In any camps in which women prisoners of war, as well as men, are accommodated, separate dormitories shall be
provided for them.
Art 26. The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners of war in good health
and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies. Account shall also be taken of the habitual diet of
the prisoners.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who work with such additional rations as are necessary for the
labour on which they are employed.
Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to prisoners of war. The use of tobacco shall be permitted.
Prisoners of war shall, as far as possible, be associated with the preparation of their meals; they may be employed
for that purpose in the kitchens. Furthermore, they shall be given the means of preparing, themselves, the additional food in
their possession.
Adequate premises shall be provided for messing.
Collective disciplinary measures affecting food are prohibited.
Art 27. Clothing, underwear and footwear shall be supplied to prisoners of war in sufficient quantities by the Detaining Power,
which shall make allowance for the climate of the region where the prisoners are detained. Uniforms of enemy armed forces
captured by the Detaining Power should, if suitable for the climate, be made available to clothe prisoners of war.
The regular replacement and repair of the above articles shall be assured by the Detaining Power. In addition, prisoners of war
who work shall receive appropriate clothing, wherever the nature of the work demands.
Chapter III. Hygene and Medical Attention

Art 29. The Detaining Power shall be bound to take all sanitary measures necessary to ensure the cleanliness and
healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics.
Prisoners of war shall have for their use, day and night, conveniences which conform to the rules of hygiene and are
maintained in a constant state of cleanliness. In any camps in which women prisoners of war are accommodated, separate
conveniences shall be provided for them.
Also, apart from the baths and showers with which the camps shall be furnished prisoners of war shall be provided
with sufficient water and soap for their personal toilet and for washing their personal laundry; the necessary installations,
facilities and time shall be granted them for that purpose.
Art 30. Every camp shall have an adequate infirmary where prisoners of war may have the attention they require, as well as
appropriate diet. Isolation wards shall, if necessary, be set aside for cases of contagious or mental disease.

Prisoners of war suffering from serious disease, or whose condition necessitates special treatment, a surgical
operation or hospital care, must be admitted to any military or civilian medical unit where such treatment can be given, even if
their repatriation is contemplated in the near future. Special facilities shall be afforded for the care to be given to the disabled,
in particular to the blind, and for their. rehabilitation, pending repatriation.
Prisoners of war shall have the attention, preferably, of medical personnel of the Power on which they depend and, if
possible, of their nationality.
Prisoners of war may not be prevented from presenting themselves to the medical authorities for examination. The
detaining authorities shall, upon request, issue to every prisoner who has undergone treatment, an official certificate indicating
the nature of his illness or injury, and the duration and kind of treatment received. A duplicate of this certificate shall be
forwarded to the Central Prisoners of War Agency.
The costs of treatment, including those of any apparatus necessary for the maintenance of prisoners of war in good
health, particularly dentures and other artificial appliances, and spectacles, shall be borne by the Detaining Power.
Chapter VI. Discipline

Art 39. Every prisoner of war camp shall be put under the immediate authority of a responsible commissioned officer belonging
to the regular armed forces of the Detaining Power. Such officer shall have in his possession a copy of the present
Convention; he shall ensure that its provisions are known to the camp staff and the guard and shall be responsible,
under the direction of his government, for its application.
Prisoners of war, with the exception of officers, must salute and show to all officers of the Detaining Power the external marks
of respect provided for by the regulations applying in their own forces.
Officer prisoners of war are bound to salute only officers of a higher rank of the Detaining Power; they must, however, salute
the camp commander regardless of his rank.
Art 42. The use of weapons against prisoners of war, especially against those who are escaping or attempting to escape, shall
constitute an extreme measure, which shall always be preceded by warnings appropriate to the circumstances.
Section III. Labour of Prisoners of War

Art 49. The Detaining Power may utilize the labour of prisoners of war who are physically fit, taking into account their age, sex,
rank and physical aptitude, and with a view particularly to maintaining them in a good state of physical and mental health.
Non-commissioned officers who are prisoners of war shall only be required to do supervisory work. Those not so
required may ask for other suitable work which shall, so far as possible, be found for them.
If officers or persons of equivalent status ask for suitable work, it shall be found for them, so far as possible, but they may in no
circumstances be compelled to work.
Art 50. Besides work connected with camp administration, installation or maintenance, prisoners of war may be compelled to
do only such work as is included in the following classes:
(a) agriculture;
(b) industries connected with the production or the extraction of raw materials, and manufacturing industries, with the
exception of metallurgical, machinery and chemical industries; public works and building operations which have no military
character or purpose;
(c) transport and handling of stores which are not military in character or purpose;
(d) commercial business, and arts and crafts;
(e) domestic service;
(f) public utility services having no military character or purpose.
Should the above provisions be infringed, prisoners of war shall be allowed to exercise their right of complaint, in conformity
with Article 78.
Art 52. Unless he be a volunteer, no prisoner of war may be employed on labour which is of an unhealthy or
dangerous nature.
No prisoner of war shall be assigned to labour which would be looked upon as humiliating for a member of the
Detaining Power's own forces.
The removal of mines or similar devices shall be considered as dangerous labour.
Section V. Relations of Prisoners of War With the Exterior

Art 69. Immediately upon prisoners of war falling into its power, the Detaining Power shall inform them and the Powers on
which they depend, through the Protecting Power, of the measures taken to carry out the provisions of the present Section.
They shall likewise inform the parties concerned of any subsequent modifications of such measures.
Art 70. Immediately upon capture, or not more than one week after arrival at a camp, even if it is a transit camp, likewise in
case of sickness or transfer to hospital or to another camp, every prisoner of war shall be enabled to write direct to his
family, on the one hand, and to the Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123 , on the other hand, a
card similar, if possible, to the model annexed to the present Convention, informing his relatives of his capture, address and
state of health. The said cards shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not be delayed in any manner.
Art 71. Prisoners of war shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards. If the Detaining Power deems it
necessary to limit the number of letters and cards sent by each prisoner of war, the said number shall not be less than two
letters and four cards monthly, exclusive of the capture cards provided for in Article 70, and conforming as closely as possible
to the models annexed to the present Convention. Further limitations may be imposed only if the Protecting Power is satisfied
that it would be in the interests of the prisoners of war concerned to do so owing to difficulties of translation caused by the
Detaining Power's inability to find sufficient qualified linguists to carry out the necessary censorship. If limitations must be
placed on the correspondence addressed to prisoners of war, they may be ordered only by the Power on which the prisoners
depend, possibly at the request of the Detaining Power. Such letters and cards must be conveyed by the most rapid method at
the disposal of the Detaining Power; they may not be delayed or retained for
disciplinary reasons.
Prisoners of war who have been without news for a long period, or who are unable to receive news from their next of
kin or to give them news by the ordinary postal route, as well as those who are at a great distance from their homes, shall be
permitted to send telegrams, the fees being charged against the prisoners of war's accounts with the Detaining Power or paid
in the currency at their disposal. They shall likewise benefit by this measure in cases of urgency.
As a general rule, the correspondence of prisoners of war shall be written in their native language. The Parties to the
conflict may allow correspondence in other languages.
Sacks containing prisoner of war mail must be securely sealed and labelled so as clearly to indicate their contents,
and must be addressed to offices of destination.
Section VI. Relations Between Prisoners of War and the Authorities

Chapter I. Complaints of Prisoners of War Respecting the Conditions of Captivity
Art 78 Prisoners of war shall have the right to make known to the military authorities in whose power they are, their requests
regarding the conditions of captivity to which they are subjected.
They shall also have the unrestricted right to apply to the representatives of the Protecting Powers either through
their prisoners' representative or, if they consider it necessary, direct, in order to draw their attention to any points on which
they may have complaints to make regarding their conditions of captivity.
These requests and complaints shall not be limited nor considered to be a part of the correspondence quota referred
to in Article 71. They must be transmitted immediately. Even if they are recognized to be unfounded, they may not give rise to
any punishment.
Prisoners' representatives may send periodic reports on the situation in the camps and the needs of the prisoners of war to the
representatives of the Protecting Powers.
Chapter II. Prisoner of War Representatives

Art 79. IIn all places where there are prisoners of war, except in those where there are officers, the prisoners shall freely elect
by secret ballot, every six months, and also in case of vacancies, prisoners' representatives entrusted with representing them
before the military authorities, the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross and any other organization
which may assist them. These prisoners' representatives shall be eligible for re-election.
In camps for officers and persons of equivalent status or in mixed camps, the senior officer among the prisoners of
war shall be recognized as the camp prisoners' representative. In camps for officers, he shall be assisted by one or more
advisers chosen by the officers; in mixed camps, his assistants shall be chosen from among the prisoners of war who are not
officers and shall be elected by them.
Officer prisoners of war of the same nationality shall be stationed in labour camps for prisoners of war, for the
purpose of carrying out the camp administration duties for which the prisoners of war are responsible. These officers may be
elected as prisoners' representatives under the first paragraph of this Article. In such a case the assistants to the prisoners'
representatives shall be chosen from among those prisoners of war who are not officers.
Every representative elected must be approved by the Detaining Power before he has the right to commence his
duties. Where the Detaining Power refuses to approve a prisoner of war elected by his fellow prisoners of war, it must inform
the Protecting Power of the reason for such refusal.
In all cases the prisoners' representative must have the same nationality, language and customs as the prisoners of
war whom he represents. Thus, prisoners of war distributed in different sections of a camp, according to their nationality,
language or customs, shall have for each section their own prisoners' representative, in accordance with the foregoing
paragraphs.
Chapter III. Penal and Disciplinary Sanctions

I. General Provisions
Art 82. A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining
Power; the Detaining Power shall be justified in taking judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of any offence
committed by a prisoner of war against such laws, regulations or orders. However, no proceedings or punishments
contrary to the provisions of this Chapter shall be allowed.

If any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Power shall declare acts committed by a prisoner of war to be
punishable, whereas the same acts would not be punishable if committed by a member of the forces of the Detaining Power,
such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments only.
Art 85. Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall
retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.
II. Disciplinary Sanctions

Art 89. The disciplinary punishments applicable to prisoners of war are the following:
(1) A fine which shall not exceed 50 per cent of the advances of pay and working pay which the prisoner of war would
otherwise receive under the provisions of Articles 60 and 62 during a period of not more than thirty days.
(2) Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the present Convention.
(3) Fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily.
(4) Confinement.
The punishment referred to under (3) shall not be applied to officers.
In no case shall disciplinary punishments be inhuman, brutal or dangerous to the health of prisoners of war.
Art 91. The escape of a prisoner of war shall be deemed to have succeeded when:
(1) he has joined the armed forces of the Power on which he depends, or those of an allied Power;
(2) he has left the territory under the control of the Detaining Power, or of an ally of the said Power;
(3) he has joined a ship flying the flag of the Power on which he depends, or of an allied Power, in the territorial waters of the
Detaining Power, the said ship not being under the control of the last named Power.
Prisoners of war who have made good their escape in the sense of this Article and who are recaptured, shall not be
liable to any punishment in respect of their previous escape.
Art 92. A prisoner of war who attempts to escape and is recaptured before having made good his escape in the sense of Article
91 shall be liable only to a disciplinary punishment in respect of this act, even if it is a repeated offence.
A prisoner of war who is recaptured shall be handed over without delay to the competent military authority.
Art 93. Escape or attempt to escape, even if it is a repeated offence, shall not be deemed an aggravating circumstance if the
prisoner of war is subjected to trial by judicial proceedings in respect of an offence committed during his escape or attempt to
escape.
In conformity with the principle stated in Article 83, offences committed by prisoners of war with the sole intention of
facilitating their escape and which do not entail any violence against life or limb, such as offences against public property, theft
without intention of self-enrichment, the drawing up or use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian clothing, shall occasion
disciplinary punishment only.
Prisoners of war who aid or abet an escape or an attempt to escape shall be liable on this count to disciplinary
punishment only.
III. Juridicial Proceedings

Art 99. No prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by
international law, in force at the time the said act was committed.
No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of
the act of which he is accused.
No prisoner of war may be convicted without having had an opportunity to present his defence and the assistance of
a qualified advocate or counsel.
Art 100. Prisoners of war and the Protecting Powers shall be informed as soon as possible of the offences which are
punishable by the death sentence under the laws of the Detaining Power.
Other offences shall not thereafter be made punishable by the death penalty without the concurrence of the Power on
which the prisoners of war depend.
The death sentence cannot be pronounced on a prisoner of war unless the attention of the court has, in accordance
with Article 87, second paragraph, been particularly called to the fact that since the accused is not a national of the Detaining
Power, he is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance, and that he is in its power as the result of circumstances independent of
his own will.
Art 101. If the death penalty is pronounced on a prisoner of war, the sentence shall not be executed before the expiration of a
period of at least six months from the date when the Protecting Power receives, at an indicated address, the detailed
communication provided for in Article 107.
Art 102. A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same courts according to
the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions
of the present Chapter have been observed.

Art 105. The prisoner of war shall be entitled to assistance by one of his prisoner comrades, to defence by a qualified
advocate or counsel of his own choice, to the calling of witnesses and, if he deems necessary, to the services of a competent
interpreter. He shall be advised of these rights by the Detaining Power in due time before the trial.
Failing a choice by the prisoner of war, the Protecting Power shall find him an advocate or counsel, and shall have at
least one week at its disposal for the purpose. The Detaining Power shall deliver to the said Power, on request, a list of
persons qualified to present the defence. Failing a choice of an advocate or counsel by the prisoner of war or the Protecting
Power, the Detaining Power shall appoint a competent advocate or counsel to conduct the defence.
The advocate or counsel conducting the defence on behalf of the prisoner of war shall have at his disposal a period
of two weeks at least before the opening of the trial, as well as the necessary facilities to prepare the defence of the accused.
He may, in particular, freely visit the accused and interview him in private. He may also confer with any witnesses for the
defence, including prisoners of war. He shall have the benefit of these facilities until the term of appeal or petition has expired.
Particulars of the charge or charges on which the prisoner of war is to be arraigned, as well as the documents which
are generally communicated to the accused by virtue of the laws in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power, shall be
communicated to the accused prisoner of war in a language which he understands, and in good time before the opening of the
trial. The same communication in the same circumstances shall be made to the advocate or counsel conducting the defence
on behalf of the prisoner of war.
The representatives of the Protecting Power shall be entitled to attend the trial of the case, unless, exceptionally, this
is held in camera in the interest of State security. In such a case the Detaining Power shall advise the Protecting Power
accordingly.
Art 106. Every prisoner of war shall have, in the same manner as the members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power,
the right of appeal or petition from any sentence pronounced upon him, with a view to the quashing or revising of the
sentence or the reopening of the trial. He shall be fully informed of his right to appeal or petition and of the time limit within
which he may do so.
Part IV. Termination of Captivity

Section I. Direct Repatriation and Accommodation in Neutral Countries
Art 109. Subject to the provisions of the third paragraph of this Article, Parties to the conflict are bound to send back to their
own country, regardless of number or rank, seriously wounded and seriously sick prisoners of war, after having cared for them
until they are fit to travel, in accordance with the first paragraph of the following Article.
Throughout the duration of hostilities, Parties to the conflict shall endeavour, with the cooperation of the neutral
Powers concerned, to make arrangements for the accommodation in neutral countries of the sick and wounded prisoners of
war referred to in the second paragraph of the following Article. They may, in addition, conclude agreements with a view to the
direct repatriation or internment in a neutral country of able-bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long period of
captivity.
No sick or injured prisoner of war who is eligible for repatriation under the first paragraph of this Article, may be
repatriated against his will during hostilities.
Art 110. The following shall be repatriated direct:

(1) Incurably wounded and sick whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished.
(2) Wounded and sick who, according to medical opinion, are not likely to recover within one year, whose condition requires
treatment and whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished.
(3) Wounded and sick who have recovered, but whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely and
permanently diminished.
The following may be accommodated in a neutral country:
(1) Wounded and sick whose recovery may be expected within one year of the date of the wound or the beginning of the
illness, if treatment in a neutral country might increase the prospects of a more certain and speedy recovery.
(2) Prisoners of war whose mental or physical health, according to medical opinion, is seriously threatened by continued
captivity, but whose accommodation in a neutral country might remove such a threat.
The conditions which prisoners of war accommodated in a neutral country must fulfil in order to permit their
repatriation shall be fixed, as shall likewise their status, by agreement between the Powers concerned. In general, prisoners of
war who have been accommodated in a neutral country, and who belong to the following categories, should be repatriated:
(1) Those whose state of health has deteriorated so as to fulfil the condition laid down for direct repatriation;
(2) Those whose mental or physical powers remain, even after treatment, considerably impaired.
If no special agreements are concluded between the Parties to the conflict concerned, to determine the cases of
disablement or sickness entailing direct repatriation or accommodation in a neutral country, such cases shall be settled in
accordance with the principles laid down in the Model Agreement concerning direct repatriation and accommodation in neutral
countries of wounded and sick prisoners of war and in the Regulations concerning Mixed Medical Commissions annexed to
the present Convention.
Section II. Release and Repatriation of Prisoners of War at the Close of Hostilities
Art 118. Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.
In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded between the Parties to the conflict with
a view to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any such agreement, each of the Detaining Powers shall itself establish and
execute without delay a plan of repatriation in conformity with the principle laid down in the foregoing paragraph.
In either case, the measures adopted shall be brought to the knowledge of the prisoners of war.
The costs of repatriation of prisoners of war shall in all cases be equitably apportioned between the Detaining Power and the
Power on which the prisoners depend. This apportionment shall be carried out on the following basis:
(a) If the two Powers are contiguous, the Power on which the prisoners of war depend shall bear the costs of repatriation from
the frontiers of the Detaining Power.
(b) If the two Powers are not contiguous, the Detaining Power shall bear the costs of transport of prisoners of war over its own
territory as far as its frontier or its port of embarkation nearest to the territory of the Power on which the prisoners of war
depend. The Parties concerned shall agree between themselves as to the equitable apportionment of the remaining costs of
the repatriation. The conclusion of this agreement shall in no circumstances justify any delay in the repatriation of the prisoners
of war.
Section III. Death of Prisoners of War

Art 120. Wills of prisoners of war shall be drawn up so as to satisfy the conditions of validity required by the legislation of their
country of origin, which will take steps to inform the Detaining Power of its requirements in this respect. At the request of the
prisoner of war and, in all cases, after death, the will shall be transmitted without delay to the Protecting Power; a certified
copy shall be sent to the Central Agency.
Death certificates, in the form annexed to the present Convention, or lists certified by a responsible officer, of all
persons who die as prisoners of war shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau
established in accordance with Article 122. The death certificates or certified lists shall show particulars of identity as set out in
the third paragraph of Article 17, and also the date and place of death, the cause of death, the date and place of burial and all
particulars necessary to identify the graves.
The burial or cremation of a prisoner of war shall be preceded by a medical examination of the body with a view to
confirming death and enabling a report to be made and, where necessary, establishing identity.
The detaining authorities shall ensure that prisoners of war who have died in captivity are honourably buried, if
possible according to the rites of the religion to which they belonged, and that their graves are respected, suitably maintained
and marked so as to be found at any time. Wherever possible, deceased prisoners of war who depended on the same Power
shall be interred in the same place.
Deceased prisoners of war shall be buried in individual graves unless unavoidable circumstances require the use of
collective graves. Bodies may be cremated only for imperative reasons of hygiene, on account of the religion of the deceased
or in accordance with his express wish to this effect. In case of cremation, the fact shall be stated and the reasons given in the
death certificate of the deceased.
In order that graves may always be found, all particulars of burials and graves shall be recorded with a Graves Registration
Service established by the Detaining Power. Lists of graves and particulars of the prisoners of war interred in cemeteries and
elsewhere shall be transmitted to the Power on which such prisoners of war depended. Responsibility for the care of these
graves and for records of any subsequent moves of the bodies shall rest on the Power controlling the territory, if a Party to the
present Convention. These provisions shall also apply to the ashes, which shall be kept by the Graves Registration Service
until proper disposal thereof in accordance with the wishes of the home country.
PART V. Information Bureaux and Relief Societies for Prisoners of War

Art 123. A Central Prisoners of War Information Agency shall be created in a neutral country. The International Committee
of the Red Cross shall, if it deems necessary, propose to the Powers concerned the organization of such an Agency.
The function of the Agency shall be to collect all the information it may obtain through official or private channels
respecting prisoners of war, and to transmit it as rapidly as possible to the country of origin of the prisoners of war or to the
Power on which they depend. It shall receive from the Parties to the conflict all facilities for effecting such transmissions.
The High Contracting Parties, and in particular those whose nationals benefit by the services of the Central Agency,
are requested to give the said Agency the financial aid it may require.
The foregoing provisions shall in no way be interpreted as restricting the humanitarian activities of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, or of the relief societies provided for in Article 125.
The Fourth Convention
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.
Art. 2. In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace-time, the present Convention shall apply to all
cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the
said occupation meets with no armed resistance.

Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall
remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if
the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.
Art. 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
provisions:
criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the
above-mentioned persons:
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
the conflict.
WHO ARE THE PARTIES PROTECTED

Art. 4. Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find
themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they
are not nationals.
Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it. Nationals of a neutral State who find
themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected
persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.
The provisions of Part II are, however, wider in application, as defined in Article 13.
Persons protected by the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field of 12 August 1949, or by the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, or by the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, shall not be considered as protected persons within the meaning of the present
Convention.
Art. 8. Protected persons may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the
present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if such there be.
Part II. General Protection of Populations Against Certain Consequences of War

Art. 13. The provisions of Part II cover the whole of the populations of the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction
based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion, and are intended to alleviate the sufferings caused by war.
Art. 15. Any Party to the conflict may, either direct or through a neutral State or some humanitarian organization, propose to
the adverse Party to establish, in the regions where fighting is taking place, neutralized zones intended to shelter from the
effects of war the following persons, without
distinction:
(a) wounded and sick combatants or non-combatants;
(b) civilian persons who take no part in hostilities, and who, while they reside in the zones, perform no work of a military
character.

When the Parties concerned have agreed upon the geographical position, administration, food supply and
supervision of the proposed neutralized zone, a written agreement shall be concluded and signed by the representatives of the
Parties to the conflict. The agreement shall fix the beginning and the duration of the neutralization of the zone.
Art. 18. Civilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm and maternity cases, may in no
circumstances be the object of attack but shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.
States which are Parties to a conflict shall provide all civilian hospitals with certificates showing that they are civilian
hospitals and that the buildings which they occupy are not used for any purpose which would deprive these hospitals of
protection in accordance with Article 19.
Civilian hospitals shall be marked by means of the emblem provided for in Article 38 of the Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, but only if so
authorized by the State.
The Parties to the conflict shall, in so far as military considerations permit, take the necessary steps to make the
distinctive emblems indicating civilian hospitals clearly visible to the enemy land, air and naval forces in order to obviate the
possibility of any hostile action.
In view of the dangers to which hospitals may be exposed by being close to military objectives, it is recommended that such
hospitals be situated as far as possible from such objectives.
Art. 19. The protection to which civilian hospitals are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside
their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy. Protection may, however, cease only after due warning has been
given, naming, in all appropriate cases, a reasonable time limit and after such warning has remained unheeded.
The fact that sick or wounded members of the armed forces are nursed in these hospitals, or the presence of small
arms and ammunition taken from such combatants and not yet been handed to the proper service, shall not be considered to
be acts harmful to the enemy.
Art.24. The Parties to the conflict shall take the necessary measures to ensure that children under fifteen, who are orphaned or
are separated from their families as a result of the war, are not left to their own resources , and that their maintenance, the
exercise of their religion and their education are facilitated in all circumstances. Their education shall, as far as possible, be
entrusted to persons of a similar cultural tradition.
The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate the reception of such children in a neutral country for the duration of the
conflict with the consent of the Protecting Power, if any, and under due safeguards for the observance of the principles stated
in the first paragraph.
They shall, furthermore, endeavour to arrange for all children under twelve to be identified by the wearing of identity
discs, or by some other means.
Part III. Status and Treatment of Protected Persons

Section I. Provisions common to the territories of the parties to the conflict and to occupied territories
Art. 27. Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their
religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be
protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.
Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected persons shall be treated
with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in
particular, on race, religion or political opinion.
However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as
may be necessary as a result of the war.
Art. 28. The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military
operations.
Art. 31. No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain
information from them or from third parties.
Art. 34. The taking of hostages is prohibited.
Section II. Aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict

Art. 35. All protected persons who may desire to leave the territory at the outset of, or during a conflict, shall be entitled to do
so, unless their departure is contrary to the national interests of the State. The applications of such persons to leave shall be
decided in accordance with regularly established procedures and the decision shall be taken as rapidly as possible. Those
persons permitted to leave may provide themselves with the necessary funds for their journey and take with them a
reasonable amount of their effects and articles of personal use.
If any such person is refused permission to leave the territory, he shall be entitled to have refusal reconsidered, as
soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose.

Upon request, representatives of the Protecting Power shall, unless reasons of security prevent it, or the persons
concerned object, be furnished with the reasons for refusal of any request for permission to leave the territory and be given, as
expeditiously as possible, the names of all persons who have been denied permission to leave.
Art. 38. With the exception of special measures authorized by the present Convention, in particularly by Article 27 and 41
thereof, the situation of protected persons shall continue to be regulated, in principle, by the provisions concerning aliens in
time of peace. In any case, the following rights shall be granted to them:
(1) they shall be enabled to receive the individual or collective relief that may be sent to them.
(2) they shall, if their state of health so requires, receive medical attention and hospital treatment to the same extent as the
nationals of the State concerned.
(3) they shall be allowed to practise their religion and to receive spiritual assistance from ministers of their faith.
(4) if they reside in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war, they shall be authorized to move from that area to the
same extent as the nationals of the State concerned.
(5) children under fifteen years, pregnant women and mothers of children under seven years shall benefit by any preferential
treatment to the same extent as the nationals of the State concerned.
Art. 40. Protected persons may be compelled to work only to the same extent as nationals of the Party to the conflict in whose
territory they are.
If protected persons are of enemy nationality, they may only be compelled to do work which is normally necessary to
ensure the feeding, sheltering, clothing, transport and health of human beings and which is not directly related to the conduct
of military operations.
In the cases mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs, protected persons compelled to work shall have the benefit of the
same working conditions and of the same safeguards as national workers in particular as regards wages, hours of labour,
clothing and equipment, previous training and compensation for occupational accidents and diseases.
If the above provisions are infringed, protected persons shall be allowed to exercise their right of complaint
in accordance with Article 30.
Art. 42. The internment or placing in assigned residence of protected persons may be ordered only if the security of the
Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.
If any person, acting through the representatives of the Protecting Power, voluntarily demands internment, and if his
situation renders this step necessary, he shall be interned by the Power in whose hands he may be.
Art. 44. In applying the measures of control mentioned in the present Convention, the Detaining Power shall not treat as
enemy aliens exclusively on the basis of their nationality de jure of an enemy State, refugees who do not, in fact, enjoy the
protection of any government.
Section III. Occupied territories

Art. 47. Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the
benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions
or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the
Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.
, in order to induce them to work for the Occupying Power, are prohibited.
Art. 64. The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or
suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of
the present Convention.
Subject to the latter consideration and to the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the tribunals
of the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all offences covered by the said laws.
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential
to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the
territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or
administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them.
Art. 68. Protected persons who commit an offence which is solely intended to harm the Occupying Power, but which does not
constitute an attempt on the life or limb of members of the occupying forces or administration, nor a grave collective danger,
nor seriously damage the property of the occupying forces or administration or the installations used by them, shall be liable to
internment or simple imprisonment, provided the duration of such internment or imprisonment is proportionate to the offence
committed. Furthermore, internment or imprisonment shall, for such offences, be the only measure adopted for depriving
protected persons of liberty. The courts provided for under Article 66 of the present Convention may at their discretion convert
a sentence of imprisonment to one of internment for the same period.
The penal provisions promulgated by the Occupying Power in accordance with Articles 64 and 65 may impose the
death penalty against a protected person only in cases where the person is guilty of espionage, of serious acts of
sabotage against the military installations of the Occupying Power or of intentional offences which have caused the

death of one or more persons, provided that such offences were punishable by death under the law of the occupied
territory in force before the occupation began.
The death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected person unless the attention of the court has been
particularly called to the fact that since the accused is not a national of the Occupying Power, he is not bound to it by any duty
of allegiance.
In any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced on a protected person who was under eighteen years
of age at the time of the offence.
Art. 70. Protected persons shall not be arrested, prosecuted or convicted by the Occupying Power for acts committed or for
opinions expressed before the occupation, or during a temporary interruption thereof, with the exception of breaches of the
laws and customs of war.
Nationals of the occupying Power who, before the outbreak of hostilities, have sought refuge in the territory of the
occupied State, shall not be arrested, prosecuted, convicted or deported from the occupied territory, except for offences
committed after the outbreak of hostilities, or for offences under common law committed before the outbreak of hostilities
which, according to the law of the occupied State, would have justified extradition in time of peace.
Art. 75. In no case shall persons condemned to death be deprived of the right of petition for pardon or reprieve.
No death sentence shall be carried out before the expiration of a period of a least six months from the date of receipt
by the Protecting Power of the notification of the final judgment confirming such death sentence, or of an order denying pardon
or reprieve.
The six months period of suspension of the death sentence herein prescribed may be reduced in individual cases in
circumstances of grave emergency involving an organized threat to the security of the Occupying Power or its forces, provided
always that the Protecting Power is notified of such reduction and is given reasonable time and opportunity to make
representations to the competent occupying authorities in respect of such death sentences.
Art. 76. Protected persons accused of offences shall be detained in the occupied country, and if convicted they shall
serve their sentences therein. They shall, if possible, be separated from other detainees and shall enjoy conditions of food
and hygiene which will be sufficient to keep them in good health, and which will be at least equal to those obtaining in prisons
in the occupied country.
They shall receive the medical attention required by their state of health.
They shall also have the right to receive any spiritual assistance which they may require.
Women shall be confined in separate quarters and shall be under the direct supervision of women.
Proper regard shall be paid to the special treatment due to minors.
Protected persons who are detained shall have the right to be visited by delegates of the Protecting Power and of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, in accordance with the provisions of Article 143.
Such persons shall have the right to receive at least one relief parcel monthly.
Section IV. Regulations for the treatment of internees

Chapter I. General provisions
Art. 80. Internees shall retain their full civil capacity and shall exercise such attendant rights as may be compatible with their
status.
Art. 81. Parties to the conflict who intern protected persons shall be bound to provide free of charge for their maintenance,
and to grant them also the medical attention required by their state of health.
No deduction from the allowances, salaries or credits due to the internees shall be made for the repayment of these
costs.
The Detaining Power shall provide for the support of those dependent on the internees, if such dependents are
without adequate means of support or are unable to earn a living.
Chapter II. Places of Internment

Art. 83. The Detaining Power shall not set up places of internment in areas particularly exposed to the dangers of war.
The Detaining Power shall give the enemy Powers, through the intermediary of the Protecting Powers, all useful
information regarding the geographical location of places of internment.
Whenever military considerations permit, internment camps shall be indicated by the letters IC, placed so as to be
clearly visible in the daytime from the air. The Powers concerned may, however, agree upon any other system of marking. No
place other than an internment camp shall be marked as such.
Art.84. Internees shall be accommodated and administered separately from prisoners of war and from persons
deprived of liberty for any other reason.
Chapter III. Food and Clothing

Art. 89. Daily food rations for internees shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep internees in a good state of
health and prevent the development of nutritional deficiencies. Account shall also be taken of the customary diet of the
internees.

Internees shall also be given the means by which they can prepare for themselves any additional food in their
possession.
Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to internees. The use of tobacco shall be permitted.
Internees who work shall receive additional rations in proportion to the kind of labour which they perform.
Expectant and nursing mothers and children under fifteen years of age, shall be given additional food, in proportion to
their physiological needs.
Art. 90. When taken into custody, internees shall be given all facilities to provide themselves with the necessary clothing,
footwear and change of underwear, and later on, to procure further supplies if required. Should any internees not have
sufficient clothing, account being taken of the climate, and be unable to procure any, it shall be provided free of charge to them
by the Detaining Power.
The clothing supplied by the Detaining Power to internees and the outward markings placed on their own clothes
shall not be ignominious nor expose them to ridicule.
Workers shall receive suitable working outfits, including protective clothing, whenever the nature of their work so
requires.
Chapter IV. Hygiene and Medical Attention

Art. 91. Every place of internment shall have an adequate infirmary, under the direction of a qualified doctor, where internees
may have the attention they require, as well as an appropriate diet. Isolation wards shall be set aside for cases of contagious
or mental diseases.
Maternity cases and internees suffering from serious diseases, or whose condition requires special treatment, a
surgical operation or hospital care, must be admitted to any institution where adequate treatment can be given and shall
receive care not inferior to that provided for the general population.
Internees shall, for preference, have the attention of medical personnel of their own nationality.
Internees may not be prevented from presenting themselves to the medical authorities for examination. The medical
authorities of the Detaining Power shall, upon request, issue to every internee who has undergone treatment an official
certificate showing the nature of his illness or injury, and the duration and nature of the treatment given. A duplicate of this
certificate shall be forwarded to the Central Agency provided for in Article 140.
Treatment, including the provision of any apparatus necessary for the maintenance of internees in good health,
particularly dentures and other artificial appliances and spectacles, shall be free of charge to the internee.
Chapter VII. Administration and Discipline

Art. 99. Every place of internment shall be put under the authority of a responsible officer, chosen from the regular military
forces or the regular civil administration of the Detaining Power. The officer in charge of the place of internment must have in
his possession a copy of the present Convention in the official language, or one of the official languages, of his country and
shall be responsible for its application. The staff in control of internees shall be instructed in the provisions of the present
Convention and of the administrative measures adopted to ensure its application.
The text of the present Convention and the texts of special agreements concluded under the said Convention shall be
posted inside the place of internment, in a language which the internees understand, or shall be in the possession of the
Internee Committee.
Regulations, orders, notices and publications of every kind shall be communicated to the internees and posted inside
the places of internment, in a language which they understand.
Every order and command addressed to internees individually must, likewise, be given in a language which they
understand.
Art. 100. The disciplinary regime in places of internment shall be consistent with humanitarian principles, and shall in
no circumstances include regulations imposing on internees any physical exertion dangerous to their health or involving
physical or moral victimization. Identification by tattooing or imprinting signs or markings on the body, is prohibited.
In particular, prolonged standing and roll-calls, punishment drill, military drill and manoeuvres, or the reduction of food
rations, are prohibited.
Art. 102. In every place of internment, the internees shall freely elect by secret ballot every six months, the members of
a Committee empowered to represent them before the Detaining and the Protecting Powers, the International
Committee of the Red Cross and any other organization which may assist them. The members of the Committee shall be
eligible for re-election.
Internees so elected shall enter upon their duties after their election has been approved by the detaining authorities.
The reasons for any refusals or dismissals shall be communicated to the Protecting Powers concerned.
Chaper VIII. Relations with the Exterior

Art. 106. As soon as he is interned, or at the latest not more than one week after his arrival in a place of internment, and
likewise in cases of sickness or transfer to another place of internment or to a hospital, every internee shall be enabled to send
direct to his family, on the one hand, and to the Central Agency provided for by Article 140, on the other, an internment card
similar, if possible, to the model annexed to the present Convention, informing his relatives of his detention, address and
state of health. The said cards shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not be delayed in any way.

Art. 107. Internees shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards. If the Detaining Power deems it necessary to
limit the number of letters and cards sent by each internee, the said number shall not be less than two letters and four cards
monthly; these shall be drawn up so as to conform as closely as possible to the models annexed to the present Convention. If
limitations must be placed on the correspondence addressed to internees, they may be ordered only by the Power to which
such internees owe allegiance, possibly at the request of the Detaining Power. Such letters and cards must be conveyed with
reasonable despatch; they may not be delayed or retained for disciplinary reasons.
Internees who have been a long time without news, or who find it impossible to receive news from their relatives, or to
give them news by the ordinary postal route, as well as those who are at a considerable distance from their homes, shall be
allowed to send telegrams, the charges being paid by them in the currency at their disposal. They shall likewise benefit by this
provision in cases which are recognized to be urgent.
As a rule, internees' mail shall be written in their own language. The Parties to the conflict may authorize
correspondence in other languages.
Art. 113. The Detaining Powers shall provide all reasonable execution facilities for the transmission, through the Protecting
Power or the Central Agency provided for in Article 140, or as otherwise required, of wills, powers of attorney, letters of
authority, or any other documents intended for internees or despatched by them.
In all cases the Detaining Powers shall facilitate the execution and authentication in due legal form of such
documents on behalf of internees, in particular by allowing them to consult a lawyer.
Art. 114. The Detaining Power shall afford internees all facilities to enable them to manage their property, provided this is
not incompatible with the conditions of internment and the law which is applicable. For this purpose, the said Power may give
them permission to leave the place of internment in urgent cases and if circumstances allow.
Art.116. Every internee shall be allowed to receive visitors, especially near relatives, at regular intervals and as
frequently as possible.
As far as is possible, internees shall be permitted to visit their homes in urgent cases, particularly in cases of death or
serious illness of relatives.
Chapter IX. Penal and Disciplinary Sanctions
Art. 117. Subject to the provisions of the present Chapter, the laws in force in the territory in which they are detained will
continue to apply to internees who commit offences during internment.
If general laws, regulations or orders declare acts committed by internees to be punishable, whereas the same acts
are not punishable when committed by persons who are not internees, such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments only.
No internee may be punished more than once for the same act, or on the same count.
Art. 119. The disciplinary punishments applicable to internees shall be the following:
(1) a fine which shall not exceed 50 per cent of the wages which the internee would otherwise receive under the provisions of
Article 95 during a period of not more than thirty days.
(2) discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the present Convention
(3) fatigue duties, not exceeding two hours daily, in connection with the maintenance of the place of internment.
(4) confinement.
In no case shall disciplinary penalties be inhuman, brutal or dangerous for the health of internees. Account
shall be taken of the internee's age, sex and state of health.
The duration of any single punishment shall in no case exceed a maximum of thirty consecutive days, even if the internee is
answerable for several breaches of discipline when his case is dealt with, whether such breaches are connected or not.
Art. 120. Internees who are recaptured after having escaped or when attempting to escape, shall be liable only to
disciplinary punishment in respect of this act, even if it is a repeated offence.
Article 118, paragraph 3, notwithstanding, internees punished as a result of escape or attempt to escape, may be
subjected to special surveillance, on condition that such surveillance does not affect the state of their health, that it is
exercised in a place of internment and that it does not entail the abolition of any of the safeguards granted by the present
Convention.
Internees who aid and abet an escape or attempt to escape, shall be liable on this count to disciplinary punishment
only.
Art. 121. Escape, or attempt to escape, even if it is a repeated offence, shall not be deemed an aggravating circumstance
in cases where an internee is prosecuted for offences committed during his escape.
The Parties to the conflict shall ensure that the competent authorities exercise leniency in deciding whether
punishment inflicted for an offence shall be of a disciplinary or judicial nature, especially in respect of acts committed in
connection with an escape, whether successful or not.
Chapter XI. Deaths

Art. 129. The wills of internees shall be received for safe-keeping by the responsible authorities; and if the event of the death
of an internee his will shall be transmitted without delay to a person whom he has previously designated.
Deaths of internees shall be certified in every case by a doctor, and a death certificate shall be made out, showing the
causes of death and the conditions under which it occurred.
An official record of the death, duly registered, shall be drawn up in accordance with the procedure relating thereto in
force in the territory where the place of internment is situated, and a duly certified copy of such record shall be transmitted
without delay to the Protecting Power as well as to the Central Agency referred to in Article 140.
Art. 130. The detaining authorities shall ensure that internees who die while interned are honourably buried, if possible
according to the rites of the religion to which they belonged and that their graves are respected, properly maintained, and
marked in such a way that they can always be recognized.
Deceased internees shall be buried in individual graves unless unavoidable circumstances require the use of
collective graves. Bodies may be cremated only for imperative reasons of hygiene, on account of the religion of the deceased
or in accordance with his expressed wish to this effect. In case of cremation, the fact shall be stated and the reasons given in
the death certificate of the deceased. The ashes shall be retained for safe-keeping by the detaining authorities and shall be
transferred as soon as possible to the next of kin on their request.
As soon as circumstances permit, and not later than the close of hostilities, the Detaining Power shall forward lists of
graves of deceased internees to the Powers on whom deceased internees depended, through the Information Bureaux
provided for in Article 136. Such lists shall include all particulars necessary for the identification of the deceased internees, as
well as the exact location of their graves.
Art. 131. Every death or serious injury of an internee, caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, another internee
or any other person, as well as any death the cause of which is unknown, shall be immediately followed by an official enquiry
by the Detaining Power.
A communication on this subject shall be sent immediately to the Protecting Power. The evidence of any witnesses
shall be taken, and a report including such evidence shall be prepared and forwarded to the said Protecting Power.
If the enquiry indicates the guilt of one or more persons, the Detaining Power shall take all necessary steps to ensure
the prosecution of the person or persons responsible.
Chapter XIII. Release, Repatriation and Accommodation in Neutral Countries
Art. 132. Each interned person shall be released by the Detaining Power as soon as the reasons which necessitated
his internment no longer exist.
The Parties to the conflict shall, moreover, endeavour during the course of hostilities, to conclude agreements for the
release, the repatriation, the return to places of residence or the accommodation in a neutral country of certain classes of
internees, in particular children, pregnant women and mothers with infants and young children, wounded and sick, and
internees who have been detained for a long time.
Art. 133. Internment shall cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities.
Internees in the territory of a Party to the conflict against whom penal proceedings are pending for offences not
exclusively subject to disciplinary penalties, may be detained until the close of such proceedings and, if circumstances require,
until the completion of the penalty. The same shall apply to internees who have been previously sentenced to a punishment
depriving them of liberty.
By agreement between the Detaining Power and the Powers concerned, committees may be set up after the close of
hostilities, or of the occupation of territories, to search for dispersed internees.
Art. 134. The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour, upon the close of hostilities or occupation, to ensure the return of all
internees to their last place of residence, or to facilitate their repatriation.
Section V. Information Bureaux and Central Agency

Art. 136. Upon the outbreak of a conflict and in all cases of occupation, each of the Parties to the conflict shall establish an
official Information Bureau responsible for receiving and transmitting information in respect of the protected persons
who are in its power.
Each of the Parties to the conflict shall, within the shortest possible period, give its Bureau information of any measure taken
by it concerning any protected persons who are kept in custody for more than two weeks, who are subjected to assigned
residence or who are interned. It shall, furthermore, require its various departments concerned with such matters to provide
the aforesaid Bureau promptly with information concerning all changes pertaining to these protected persons, as, for example,
transfers, releases, repatriations, escapes, admittances to hospitals, births and deaths.
Art. 137. Each national Bureau shall immediately forward information concerning protected persons by the most rapid means
to the Powers in whose territory they resided, through the intermediary of the Protecting Powers and likewise through the
Central Agency provided for in Article 140. The Bureaux shall also reply to all enquiries which may be received regarding
protected persons.

Information Bureaux shall transmit information concerning a protected person unless its transmission might be detrimental to
the person concerned or to his or her relatives. Even in such a case, the information may not be withheld from the Central
Agency which, upon being notified of the circumstances, will take the necessary precautions indicated in Article 140.
All communications in writing made by any Bureau shall be authenticated by a signature or a seal.
Art. 138. The information received by the national Bureau and transmitted by it shall be of such a character as to make it
possible to identify the protected person exactly and to advise his next of kin quickly. The information in respect of each person
shall include at least his surname, first names, place and date of birth, nationality last residence and distinguishing
characteristics, the first name of the father and the maiden name of the mother, the date, place and nature of the action taken
with regard to the individual, the address at which correspondence may be sent to him and the name and address of the
person to be informed.
Likewise, information regarding the state of health of internees who are seriously ill or seriously wounded shall be supplied
regularly and if possible every week.
Art. 139. Each national Information Bureau shall, furthermore, be responsible for collecting all personal valuables left by
protected persons mentioned in Article 136, in particular those who have been repatriated or released, or who have escaped
or died; it shall forward the said valuables to those concerned, either direct, or, if necessary, through the Central Agency. Such
articles shall be sent by the Bureau in sealed packets which shall be accompanied by statements giving clear and full identity
particulars of the person to whom the articles belonged, and by a complete list of the contents of the parcel. Detailed records
shall be maintained of the receipt and despatch of all such valuables.
Art. 140. A Central Information Agency for protected persons, in particular for internees, shall be created in a neutral country.
The International Committee of the Red Cross shall, if it deems necessary, propose to the Powers concerned the organization
of such an Agency, which may be the same as that provided for in Article 123 of the Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949.
The function of the Agency shall be to collect all information of the type set forth in Article 136 which it may obtain through
official or private channels and to transmit it as rapidly as possible to the countries of origin or of residence of the persons
concerned, except in cases where such transmissions might be detrimental to the persons whom the said information
concerns, or to their relatives. It shall receive from the Parties to the conflict all reasonable facilities for effecting such
transmissions.
The High Contracting Parties, and in particular those whose nationals benefit by the services of the Central Agency, are
requested to give the said Agency the financial aid it may require.
The foregoing provisions shall in no way be interpreted as restricting the humanitarian activities of the International Committee
of the Red Cross and of the relief Societies described in Article 142.
Art. 141. The national Information Bureaux and the Central Information Agency shall enjoy free postage for all mail, likewise
the exemptions provided for in Article 110, and further, so far as possible, exemption from telegraphic charges or, at least,
greatly reduced rates.
The First Protocol32
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
PART 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Preamble:
earnest wish to see peace prevail among peoples
every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of any State
Scope (Article 1)
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of
humanity and from dictates of public conscience.
apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
32
For the three Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, thanks to dave romero.
apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation
meets with no armed resistance.
thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to
the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.
armed conflicts which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination
Definitions (Article 2)
Rules of international law applicable in armed conflict" means the rules applicable in armed conflict set forth in
international agreements to which the Parties to the conflict are Parties and the generally recognized principles and rules of
international law which are applicable to armed conflict
Protecting Power" means a neutral or other State not a Party to the conflict which has been designated by a Party to
the conflict and accepted by the adverse Party and has agreed to carry out the functions assigned to a Protecting Power
under the Conventions and this Protocol
"Substitute" means an organization acting in place of a Protecting Power
Protecting Power (Article 5)

duty of the Parties to a conflict from the beginning of that conflict to secure the supervision and implementation of the
Conventions and of this Protocol by the application of the system of Protecting Powers
Protecting Powers shall have the duty of safeguarding the interests of the Parties to the conflict
each Party to the conflict shall without delay designate a Protecting Power
If a Protecting Power has not been designated, the International Committee of the Red Cross, without prejudice to the
right of any other impartial humanitarian organization to do likewise, shall offer its good offices to the Parties to the conflict
with a view to the designation without delay of a Protecting Power to which the Parties to the conflict consent
PART 2: WOUNDED, SICK, SHIPWRECKED

Definitions (Article 8)
Wounded" and "sick" mean persons, whether military or civilian, who, because of trauma, disease or other physical
or mental disorder or disability, are in need of medical assistance or care and who refrain from any act of hostility. These
terms also cover maternity cases, new-born babies and other persons who may be in need of immediate medical assistance
or care, such as the infirm or expectant mothers, and who refrain from any act of hostility
"Shipwrecked" means persons, whether military or civilian, who are in peril at sea or in other waters as a result of
misfortune affecting them or the vessel or aircraft carrying them and who refrain from any act of hostility.
"Medical personnel" means those persons assigned, by a Party to the conflict, exclusively to the medical purposes
enumerated under e) or to the administration of medical units or to the operation or administration of medical transports.
"Religious personnel" means military or civilian persons, such as chaplains, who are exclusively engaged in the work
of their ministry and attached to the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, to medical units or medical transports of a Party
to the conflict, to medical units or medical transports or to civil defense organizations of a Party to the conflict.
"Medical units" means establishments and other units, whether military or civilian, organized for medical purposes,
namely the search for, collection, transportation, diagnosis or treatment - including first-aid treatment - of the wounded, sick
and shipwrecked, or for the prevention of disease.
"Medical transportation" means the conveyance by land, water or air of the wounded, sick, shipwrecked, medical
personnel, religious personnel, medical equipment or medical supplies
"Medical transports" means any means of transportation, whether military or civilian, permanent or temporary,
assigned exclusively to medical transportation and under the control of a competent authority of a Party to the conflict
"Medical vehicles" means any medical transports by land
"Medical ships and craft" means any medical transports by water
"Medical aircraft" means any medical transports by air
"Distinctive emblem" means the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun on a white
ground when used for the protection of medical units and transports, or medical and religious personnel, equipment or
supplies
Scope (Article 9)
shall apply to all those affected by a situation referred to in Article 1, without any adverse distinction founded on race,
colour, sex, language, religion or belief political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on
any other similar criteria.
Protection of Persons (Article 11)

All the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to whichever Party they belong, shall be respected and protected
The physical or mental health and integrity of persons who are in the power of the adverse Party or who are interned,
detained or otherwise deprived of liberty shall not be endangered by any unjustified act or omission
prohibited to carry out on such persons, even with their consent: physical mutilations, medical or scientific
experiments, removal of tissue or organs for transplantation

Exceptions to the prohibition: only in the case of donations of blood for transfusion or of skin for grafting, provided that
they are given voluntarily and without any coercion or inducement, and then only for therapeutic purposes
Protection of Medical Units

Medical units shall be respected and protected at all times and shall not be the object of attack (Article 12)
Under no circumstances shall medical units be used in an attempt to shield military objectives from attack (Article 12)
protection to which civilian medical units are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their
humanitarian function, acts harmful to the enemy (Article 13)
not be considered as acts harmful to the enemy: that the personnel of the unit are equipped with light individual
weapons for their own defence or for that of the wounded and sick in their charge, that the unit is guarded by a picket or by
sentries or by an escort, that small arms and ammunition taken from the wounded and sick, and not yet handed to the
proper service, are found in the units, that members of the armed forces or other combatants are in the unit for medical
reasons (Article 13)
Protection of civilian medical and religious personnel (Article 15)

Civilian medical personnel shall be respected and protected
The Occupying Power shall afford civilian medical personnel in occupied territories every assistance to enable them
to perform, to the best of their ability, their humanitarian functions
Civilian religious personnel shall be respected and protected
Role of the civilian population and of aid societies (Article 17)

The civilian population shall respect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, even if they belong to the adverse Party,
and shall commit no act of violence against them
Identification (Article 18)

civilian medical personnel and civilian religious personnel should be recognizable by the distinctive emblem and an
identity card certifying their status
a Party to the conflict may authorize the use of distinctive signals to identify medical units and transports
Medical Transportation
Medical vehicles shall be respected and protected in the same way as mobile medical units (Article 21)
Medical ships and craft, whether at sea or in other waters, be respected and protected in the same way as mobile
medical units (Article 23)
Any warship on the surface able immediately to enforce its command may order them to stop, order them off, or
make them take a certain course, and they shall obey every such command. Such ships and craft may not in any other way
be diverted from their medical mission so long as they are needed for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked on board (Article
23)
A clear refusal to obey a command given in accordance with paragraph 2 shall be an act harmful to the enemy
(Article 23)
Medical aircraft shall be respected and protected (Article 24)
In and over land areas physically controlled by friendly forces, or in and over sea areas not physically controlled by an
adverse Party, the respect and protection of medical aircraft of a Party to the conflict is not dependent on any agreement
with an adverse Party (Article 25)
A medical aircraft which flies over an area physically controlled by an adverse Party without, or in deviation from the
terms of, an agreement, either through navigational error or because of an emergency affecting the safety of the flight, shall
make every effort to identify itself and to inform the adverse Party of the circumstances. As soon as such medical aircraft
has been recognized by the adverse Party, that Party shall make all reasonable efforts to give the order to land or to alight
on water, or to take other measures to safeguard its own interests, and, in either case, to allow the aircraft time for
compliance, before resorting to an attack against the aircraft. (Article 27)
Medical aircraft shall not be used to collect or transmit intelligence data and shall not carry any equipment intended
for such purpose (Article 28)
Medical aircraft shall not carry any armament except small arms and ammunition taken from the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked on board and not yet handed to the proper service, and such light individual weapons as may be necessary to
enable the medical personnel on board to defend themselves and the wounded, sick and shipwrecked in their charge.
(Article 28)
Medical aircraft flying over areas which are physically controlled by an adverse Party, or over areas the physical
control of which is not clearly established, may be ordered to land or to alight on water, as appropriate, to permit inspection
in accordance with the following paragraphs. Medical aircraft shall obey any such order. (Article 30)
Should a medical aircraft, in the absence of an agreement or in deviation from the terms of an agreement, fly over the
territory of a neutral or other State not a Party to the conflict, either through navigational error or because of an emergency
affecting the safety of the flight, it shall make every effort to give notice of the flight and to identify itself. That State shall
make all reasonable efforts to give the order to land or to alight on water to allow the aircraft time for compliance, before
resorting to an attack against the aircraft. (Article 31)

Missing Persons (Article 33)
As soon as circumstances permit, and at the latest from the end of active hostilities, each Party to the conflict shall
search for the persons who have been reported missing by an adverse Party
Dead Persons (Article 34)

The remains of persons who have died for reasons related to occupation or in detention resulting from occupation or
hostilities and those or persons not nationals of the country in which they have died as a result of hostilities shall be
respected, and the gravesites of all such persons shall be respected, maintained and marked.
In the absence of any agreement and if the home country of such deceased is not willing to arrange at its expense for
the maintenance of such gravesites, the High Contracting Party in whose territory the gravesites are situated may offer to
facilitate the return of the remains of the deceased to the home country. Where such an offer has not been accepted the
High Contracting Party may, after the expiry of five years from the date of the offer and upon due notice to the home country,
adopt the arrangements laid down in its own laws relating to cemeteries and graves.
Part 3: Methods and Means of Warfare, Combatants and POW
Methods and Means of Warfare

prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering (Article 35)
prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment (Article 35)
prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to
lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy (Article 37)
Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to
act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious
because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law. The following are
examples of such ruses: the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation. (Article 37)
prohibited to make improper use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of
other emblems, signs or signals (Article 38)
prohibited to make use of the distinctive emblem of the United Nations, except as authorized by that Organization
(Article 38)
prohibited to make use in an armed conflict of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of neutral or other
States not Parties to the conflict (Article 39)
prohibited to make use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of adverse Parties while engaging in
attacks or in order to shield, favour, protect or impede military operations (Article 39)
No person parachuting from an aircraft in distress shall be made the object of attack during his descent (Article 42)
person who has parachuted from an aircraft in distress shall be given an opportunity to surrender before being made
the object of attack, unless it is apparent that he is engaging in a hostile act (Article 42)
Armed Forces (Article 43)

armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a
command responsible to that Party for the conduct or its subordinates
Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains) are combatants,
that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.
Combatants and POW

Any combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war. (Article 44)
combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or
in a military operation preparatory to an attack (Article 44)
A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while failing to distinguish himself from noncombatants shall
forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all respects to those
accorded to prisoners of war (Article 44)
A person who takes part in hostilities and falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be presumed to be a prisoner
of war and should any doubt arise as to whether any such person is entitled to the status of prisoner of war, he shall
continue to have such status until such time as his status has been determined by a competent tribunal. (Article 45)
any member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who falls into the power of an adverse Party while engaging
in espionage shall not have the right to the status of prisoner of war and may be treated as a spy (Article 46)
member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who, on behalf of that Party and in territory controlled by an
adverse Party, gathers or attempts to gather information shall not be considered as engaging in espionage if, while so
acting, he is in the uniform of his armed forces (Article 46)
A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war (Article 47)
Part 4: Civilian Population

the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives (Article 48)
In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian (Article 50)
Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. (Article 52)
Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited (Article 54)
In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian
objects. (Article 57)
Persons who, before the beginning of hostilities, were considered as stateless persons or refugees under the relevant
international instruments accepted by the Parties concerned or under the national legislation of the State of refuge or State
of residence shall be protected persons (Article 73)
The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall facilitate in every possible way the reunion of
families dispersed as a result of armed conflicts and shall encourage in particular the work of the humanitarian organizations
engaged in this task in accordance with the provisions of the Conventions and of this Protocol and in conformity with their
respective security regulations. (Article 74)
Protection of Civilian Population (Article 51)

The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military
operations.
The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of
violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited.
The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to
attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.
Protection of Civilian Objects

Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited
to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage. (Article 52)
it is prohibited:to commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic monuments, works of art or places of
worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; to use such objects in support of the military effort; to
make such objects the object of reprisals. (Article 53)
prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,
such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and
supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or
to the adverse Party (Article 54)
prohibitions above shall not apply to such of the objects covered by it as are used by an adverse Party: as
sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action
(Article 54)
Protection of the Natural Environment (Article 55)

Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage
Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.
Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces (Article 56)

Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations,
shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the
release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
In order to facilitate the identification of the objects protected by this article, the Parties to the conflict may mark them
with a special sign consisting of a group of three bright orange circles placed on the same axis
Zones under Special Protection

It is prohibited for the Parties to the conflict to attack, by any means whatsoever, non-defended localities (Article 59)
The appropriate authorities of a Party to the conflict may declare as a non-defended locality any inhabited place near
or in a zone where armed forces are in contact which is open for occupation by an adverse Party. Such a locality shall fulfill
the following conditions: all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment must have been
evacuated; no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments; no acts of hostility shall be
committed by the authorities or by the population; and no activities in support of military operations shall be undertaken.
(Article 59)
It is prohibited for the Parties to the conflict to extend their military operations to zones on which they have conferred
by agreement the status of demilitarized zone, if such extension is contrary to the terms of this agreement. A demilitarized
zone is a zone which fulfils the following conditions: all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military
equipment, must have been evacuated; no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments; no acts
of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the population; and any activity linked to the military effort must have

ceased.
(Article 60)
Civil Defense
"Civil defence" means the performance of humanitarian tasks intended to protect the civilian population against the
dangers, and to help it to recover from the immediate effects, of hostilities or disasters and also to provide the conditions
necessary for its survival (Article 61)
Civilian civil defence organizations and their personnel shall be respected and protected (Article 62)
Occupying Power may disarm civil defence personnel for reasons of security. (Article 62)
. The protection to which civilian civil defence organizations, their personnel, buildings, shelters and matriel are
entitled shall not cease unless they commit or are used to commit, outside their proper tasks, acts harmful to the enemy.
Protection may, however, cease only after a warning has been given setting, whenever appropriate, a reasonable time-limit,
and after such warning has remained unheeded. (Article 65)
It shall also not be considered as an act harmful to the enemy that civilian civil defence personnel bear light individual
weapons for the purpose of maintaining order or for self-defence (Article 65)
Each Party to the conflict shall endeavour to ensure that its civil defence organizations, their personnel, buildings and
matriel are identifiable while they are exclusively devoted to the performance of civil defence tasks. (Article 66)
The international distinctive sign of civil defence is an equilateral blue triangle on an orange ground when used for the
protection of civil defence organizations, their personnel, buildings and matriel and for civilian shelters. (Article 66)
Relief Actions
If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the conflict, other than occupied territory, is not
adequately provided with supplies, relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without
any adverse distinction shall be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions. Offers
of such relief shall not be regarded as interference in the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts. In the distribution of relief
consignments, priority shall be given to those persons, such as children, expectant mothers, maternity cases and nursing
mothers, who, under the Fourth Convention or under this Protocol, are to be accorded privileged treatment or special
protection. (Article 70)
Each Party in receipt of relief consignments shall, to the fullest extent practicable, assist the relief personnel in
carrying out their relief mission. Only in case of imperative military necessity may the activities of the relief personnel be
limited or their movements temporarily restricted. (Article 71)
Penal Prosecutions (Article 75)

No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person found guilty of a penal offence related to
the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the
generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure, which include the following:
(a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence alleged against
him and shall afford the accused before and during his trial all necessary rights and means of defence;
(b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal responsibility;
(c) no one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account or any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offence under the national or international law to which he was subject at the time when it was committed; nor shall
a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after
the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit
thereby;
(d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law;
(e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence;
(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt;
(g) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(h) no one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an offence in respect of which a final judgement acquitting
or convicting that person has been previously pronounced under the same law and judicial procedure;
(i) anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to have the judgement pronounced publicly; and
(j) a convicted person shall be advised on conviction or his judicial and other remedies and of the time-limits within which
they may be exercised.
Protection of Women
Women whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be held in quarters separated
from men's quarters. They shall be under the immediate supervision of women. Nevertheless, in cases where families are
detained or interned, they shall, whenever possible, be held in the same place and accommodated as family units. (Article
75)
Women shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and
any other form of indecent assault. (Article 76)
Pregnant women and mothers having dependent infants who are arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to
the armed conflict, shall have their cases considered with the utmost priority. (Article 76)

To the maximum extent feasible, the Parties to the conflict shall endeavor to avoid the pronouncement of the death
penalty on pregnant women or mothers having dependent infants, for an offence related to the armed conflict. The death
penalty for such offences shall not be executed on such women. (Article 76)
Protection of Children
Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen
years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In
recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen
years the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest. (Article 77)
If arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict, children shall be held in quarters separate
from the quarters of adults, except where families are accommodated as family units (Article 77)
The death penalty for an offence related to the armed conflict shall not be executed on persons who had not attained
the age of eighteen years at the time the offence was committed (Article 77)
No Party to the conflict shall arrange for the evacuation of children, other than its own nationals, to a foreign country
except for a temporary evacuation where compelling reasons of the health or medical treatment of the children or, except in
occupied territory, their safety, so require. Where the parents or legal guardians can be found, their written consent to such
evacuation is required. If these persons cannot be found, the written consent to such evacuation of the persons who by law
or custom are primarily responsible for the care of the children is required. Any such evacuation shall be supervised by the
Protecting Power in agreement with the Parties concerned, namely, the Party arranging for the evacuation, the Party
receiving the children and any Parties whose nationals are being evacuated. In each case, all Parties to the conflict shall
take all feasible precautions to avoid endangering the evacuation. (Article 78)
Protection of Journalists (Article 79)

Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be considered as civilians
They may obtain an identity card similar to the model in Annex II of this Protocol. This card, which shall be issued by
the government of the State of which the Journalist is a national or in whose territory he resides or in which the news
medium employing him is located, shall attest to his status as a journalist.
Grave Breaches (Article 85)

the following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when committed willfully, in violation of the
relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death or serious injury to body or health:
(a) making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack;
(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack
will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a)(iii);
(c) launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will
cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a)(iii);
(d) making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of attack;
(e) making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he is hors de combat;
(f) the perfidious use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other protective signs
recognized by the Conventions or this Protocol
the following shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when committed willfully and in violation of the
Conventions or the Protocol:
(a) the transfer by the occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation
or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory,
(b) unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians;
(c) practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on
racial discrimination;
(d) making the clearly-recognized historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or
spiritual heritage of peoples and to which special protection has been given by special arrangement, for example, within the
framework of a competent international organization, the object of attack, causing as a result extensive destruction thereof,
where there is no evidence of the violation by the adverse Party of Article 53, subparagraph (b), and when such historic
monuments, works of art and places of worship are not located in the immediate proximity of military objectives;
(e) depriving a person protected by the Conventions or referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article of the rights of fair and
regular trial.
grave breaches of these instruments shall be regarded as war crimes
International Fact-Finding Commission (Article 90)

a) An International Fact-Finding Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission") consisting of 15 members
of high moral standing and acknowledged impartiality shall be established;
(b) When not less than 20 High Contracting Parties have agreed to accept the competence of the Commission pursuant to
paragraph 2, the depositary shall then, and at intervals of five years thereafter, convene a meeting of representatives of
those High Contracting Parties for the purpose of electing the members of the Commission. At the meeting, the
representatives shall elect the members of the Commission by secret ballot from a list of persons to which each of those
High Contracting Parties may nominate one person;
(c) The members of the Commission shall serve in their personal capacity and shall hold office until the election of new
members at the ensuing meeting;
(d) At the election, the High Contracting Parties shall ensure that the persons to be elected to the Commission individually
possess the qualifications required and that, in the Commission as a whole, equitable geographical representation is
assured;
(e) In the case of a casual vacancy, the Commission itself shall fill the vacancy, having due regard to the provisions of the
preceding subparagraphs;
(f) The depositary shall make available to the Commission the necessary administrative facilities for the performance of its
functions.
The Commission shall be competent to:
(i) inquire into any facts alleged to be a grave breach as defined in the Conventions and this Protocol or other serious
violation of the Conventions or of this Protocol;
(ii) facilitate, through its good offices, the restoration of an attitude of respect for the Conventions and this Protocol;
(d) In other situations, the Commission shall institute an inquiry at the request of a Party to the conflict only with the consent
of the other Party or Parties concerned;
(e) Subject to the foregoing provisions or this paragraph, the provisions of Article 52 of the First Convention, Article 53 of the
Second Convention, Article 132 or the Third Convention and Article 149 of the Fourth Convention shall continue to apply to
any alleged violation of the Conventions and shall extend to any alleged violation of this Protocol.
Responsibility (Article 91)

A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands,
be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.
Denunciation (Article 99)

In case a High Contracting Party should denounce this Protocol, the denunciation shall only take effect one year after
receipt of the instrument of denunciation. If, however, on the expiry of that year the denouncing Party is engaged in one of
the situations referred to in Article I, the denunciation shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict or occupation
and not, in any case, before operations connected with the final release, repatriation or re-establishment of the persons
protected by the Convention or this Protocol have been terminated.
The denunciation shall be notified in writing to the depositary, which shall transmit it to all the High Contracting
Parties.
The Second Protocol
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.
The rules observed in international armed conflicts are also applicable in non-international armed conflicts.
The Third Protocol
Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional
Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), 8 December 2005
Distinctive Emblems (Article 2)

This Protocol recognizes an additional distinctive emblem in addition to, and for the same purposes as, the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Conventions. The distinctive emblems shall enjoy equal status.
This additional distinctive emblem, composed of a red frame in the shape of a square on edge on a white ground,
shall conform to the illustration in the Annex to this Protocol. This distinctive emblem is referred to in this Protocol as the
"third Protocol emblem".
Indicative use of the third Protocol emblem (Article 3)

National Societies of those High Contracting Parties which decide to use the third Protocol emblem may, in using the
emblem in conformity with relevant national legislation, choose to incorporate within it, for indicative purposes:
a) a distinctive emblem recognized by the Geneva Conventions or a combination of these emblems; or
b) another emblem which has been in effective use by a High Contracting Party and was the subject of a communication to
the other High Contracting Parties and the International Committee of the Red Cross through the depositary prior to the
adoption of this Protocol.
Who may use the 3rd protocol emblem

National societies of high contracting parties (Article 3)
International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,
and their duly authorized personnel (Article 4)

medical services and religious personnel participating in operations under the auspices of the United Nations (Article
5)
Prevention and Repression of Misuse (Article 6)

The provisions of the Geneva Conventions and, where applicable, the 1977 Additional Protocols, governing
prevention and repression of misuse of the distinctive emblems shall apply equally to the third Protocol emblem. In
particular, the High Contracting Parties shall take measures necessary for the prevention and repression, at all times, of any
misuse of the distinctive emblems mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 and their designations, including the perfidious use and the
use of any sign or designation constituting an imitation thereof.
Notwithstanding the paragraph above, High Contracting Parties may permit prior users of the third Protocol emblem, or of any
sign constituting an imitation thereof, to continue such use, provided that the said use shall not be such as would appear, in
time of armed conflict, to confer the protection of the Geneva Conventions and, where applicable, the 1977 Additional
Protocols, and provided that the rights to such use were acquired before the adoption of this Protocol.
4. FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Crash Course In Basic Foreign Investment Law33
A. EXPROPRIATION LAW
As one of the most dynamic fields of international commercial law today, foreign investment law has undergone a
rapid evolution in state practice within the recent past. There are many centers of controversy within the larger field of foreign
investment law, but arguably the most contentious issue remains that of expropriation. The context of international
expropriation rules is: the home state (where the investment is located) expropriates the rights of ownership of the investor
state (who introduced the investment and to whom such investment belongs) who, as an alien, may rely on international law
for the standard of treatment that should be accorded to it. We must remember that expropriation, although recognized as one
of the inherent attributes of sovereignty, assumes an international and therefore more complex dimension when exercised
against foreign property because (1) the investor state, being a subject of a foreign state, cannot be deemed to have been
completely subsumed under the authority and sovereignty of the home state by virtue merely of their contractual relations (2)
the relationship of home and investor states are clearly defined under an investment contract which, according to its verbiage,
may or may not make reference to international law in cases of conflict, in the former case the ideally absolute exercise of the
home states sovereignty becomes limited to a certain extent by the standards of international law. In navigating through the
turbulent waters of expropriation rules, one may be guided by the following principles which, to date, may be said to govern
foreign investment law:
1. The norm remains to be the harmonization of all sources of legal obligations. One party to an investment contract
cannot therefore renege on the duties it voluntarily assumed on the pretext of complying with a duty or exercising a
right if the source of such duty or right comes into conflict with the obligations laid down in the investment contract
and/ or customary law. The home state is therefore not allowed to unilaterally revoke investment agreements on the
basis of its absolute sovereignty over its natural resources, because such exercise of sovereignty must as much as
possible be consonant with the duty to comply with obligations validly entered into.
2. If harmonization is not possible, the norm remains to be the expropriability of every property. Although investment
contracts must be complied with in good faith, all states recognize the validity of the exercise of a home state of its
prerogative to expropriate. The home state can therefore take foreign property, and there are no established absolute
exceptions to this rule (meaning there are no cases wherein the home state can be said to be absolutely barred or
precluded from expropriating). The only difference lies in the legal consequence of every act of taking, which would
depend on whether the taking was lawful or not, or whether the parties expressly provided in the investment contract
for the processes to be complied with during such expropriatory acts.
3. For every act of expropriation, the norm remains to be the compensability of every act of taking. If the home state
takes, it is bound to pay. This is the prevailing rule in current state practice and opinion juris. The home state may
exercise its prerogative to expropriate, but it cannot do so without compensating the investor state or at least
reinstating the status quo ante (meaning the considerations paid for and benefits received under the contract would
be restored to the respective parties). The duty to pay compensation may take various forms. It may be (1) a
necessary legal consequence of the expropriatory act, as provided expressly in the investment contract (2) a
necessary legal consequence of the expropriatory act, in accordance with customary law (3) an alternative form of
extinguishment of a legal obligation (instead of performing the obligations under the contract, the home state chooses
to reinstate the status quo ante by giving back, as compensation, the consideration for the contract plus other
incidental adjustments), or (4) in the form of punitive damages, where the taking was adjudged to be unlawful, in
which case the contract may be enforced or, if performance is already impossible, the home state may be required to
pay compensation in an amount that would approximate the value of the property taken and the damage caused by
33
Thanks to ceejay balisacan for this portion
the unlawful taking. The fact that compensation must be paid is generally accepted as a norm; the only point of
contention is the QUANTUM of such compensation. How much should be paid is often a subject of debate and there
is as yet no fixed rule in determining the value of compensation that must be paid. In practice, however, what the
home state pays the investor would usually be a matter of negotiation and conditioned upon the financial
circumstances of the home state. There are some cases where the norm of compensability is believed to be
inapplicable, although such exemptions are found in the writings of publicists and no authoritative decision has yet
been rendered recognizing these exemptions as such. The examples are the taxing power of the state 34, regulatory
takings35, and police powers36.
4. In any case, the norm remains to be enforceability of every international legal obligation, regardless of the source .
The investment contract may be primarily the law between the parties. However, by virtue of the fact that investment
agreements are often concluded between states or between private entities pursuant to a trade agreement concluded
by their respective states, international legal obligations would inevitably come into play. As such, from the time the
investor state introduces the foreign property into the home states territory, both would have to be guided by the
obligations which both are bound to under international law. As a consequence, the home state cannot be permitted
to undertake an expropriation in such manner as to be violative of other international legal obligations like (1) the duty
to observe pacta sunt servanda under customary law 37 (2) the duty to accord foreign investors with the international
minimum standard of treatment under customary law38 (3) the duty to expropriate for a public purpose, on a non-
discriminatory basis, and with payment of just compensation under customary law39, or (4) the duty to observe
elementary rules of contractual relations as embodied in general principles of law relating to contracts40.
In dealing with the issue of expropriation, one must be guided by basic UN texts touching on expropriation:
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the
national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In
such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking
such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law. (ARTICLE 4)
Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by or between sovereign States shall be observed in good faith; States
and international organizations shall strictly and conscientiously respect the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their
natural wealth and resources in accordance with the Charter and the principles set forth in the present resolution.
(ARTICLE 8)
---United Nations Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources

Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, 14 December 1962
34
In the process of taxation, the investor state may constructively be deprived of a portion of its property through profits; but since the
power of taxation is recognized as plenary in nature, any incidental taking that would result cannot be compensable.
35
In enacting legislations designed to protect the interests of its citizens, the home state may impose certain regulatory measures which,
when applied, would have the effect of depriving the investor of a portion of its property. An example of such regulatory measures is the
imposition of technical requirements upon a particular industry to comply with environmental standards. Even if such a measure would
effect a deprivation of ownership rights, it is not compensable because regulatory measures are not supposed to take property; they merely
impose standards by which such property may be utilized.
36
Police power measures are distinguished form expropriatory acts in that the former assumes a more immediate dimension; in such cases,
the taking of property is done to avert or stop a clear and present danger to the public, something which the home state has a duty to
prevent. There is therefore a difference between expropriating a factory because the government wants to nationalize the manufacturing
industry and abating the operations of the factory because of its harmful emissions. In the latter case, since the taking was done to stop an
existing danger and to punish the offending factory owner, no compensation is due. Notice that in both police power and expropriation, a
public purpose is being served, but the exercise of police power was done not to pursue a public policy but to exercise a governmental duty
to abate nuisances.
37
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the Vienna Convention is recognized as
a codification of international customary norms regarding treaty compliance.
38
Such minimum standard is nothing more than the reasonable treatment recognized by all nations viewed from the perspective of an
objective third party observer. The minimum standard is embodied in most investment treaties in force today, and was enunciated by the
General Claims Commission constituted by the US and Mexico in the Neer Claim.
39
These three requirements can be found in almost all investment treaties in force and can therefore be argued as constituting
internationally recognized norms relating to the validity of expropriatory acts.
40
These general principles of law recognized by all civilized nations pertain to such commonly-held notions as good faith, non-unilateral
abrogation without reinstatement of the status quo ante, and unjust enrichment. These principles are found in all established legal systems
and are, in some instances, codified categorically as articulating general principles of law, like in the case of the Principles of International
Commercial Contracts codified by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law.
To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be
paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that
the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be
settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all
States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance
with the principle of free choice of means. (ARTICLE 2, Par. 2, Subpar. C)
---Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States

GA Res. 3281(xxix), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974) 50
As Harris notes, the Charter has not attained the status of custom because developed states have effectively mounted a
resistance to the clause which does not require a public purpose precondition to expropriation. The same is true with the
Declaration on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order, another UN GA Resolution backed by developing
countries, which was overridden, according to Walde, by the historical inclination towards market liberalism. The formula of
developing states, according to him, was simply incompatible with the tendency towards promotion of foreign investment, the
latter requiring adequate and stable protections as an inducement to risk-averse foreign investors. The following survey of
case law on expropriation represents the views taken by international tribunals in interpreting the different operative terms of
the aforequoted texts:
Texaco v. Libya
An internationalized contract with a stabilization clause precludes the exercise of the expropriatory prerogatives of the home
state
In 1973 and 1974, Libya decided to nationalize the properties and assets of two American companies which were granted
concession contracts to exploit and extract oil. The contention centers on two clauses in the concession contract: (1) the
stabilization clause which provides that the contractual rights expressly created by this concession shall not be altered
except by mutual consent of the parties and (2) the governing law clause which provides that the concession shall be
governed by and interpreted in accordance with the principles of the law of Libya common to the principles of international law
and in the absence of such common principles then by and in accordance with the general principles of law, including such of
those principles as may have been applied by international tribunals. Further, under the concession contract, any disputes
arising from the interpretation of the terms of the agreement (including alleged breaches of the stabilization clause) shall be
submitted to international arbitration.
According to sole arbitrator Dupuy, the stabilization, governing law, and arbitration clauses of the concession contract are
sufficient evidence that the contract has been internationalized, meaning subjected to the standards of international law and
taken out of the ambit of domestic law. The validity of the actuations of both parties, therefore, has to be measured against
international standards, and not based on its compatibility with Libyan law. Internationalization of contracts results in the
protection of investors against the risks of contractual modification or abrogation resulting from changes in municipal laws or
other governmental measures. Specifically, Dupuy states that the recognition by international law of the right to nationalize is
not sufficient ground to empower the state to disregard its commitments, because the same law also recognizes the power of
a state to commit itself internationally, especially by accepting the inclusion of stabilization clauses in a contract entered into
with a foreign private partyThus, in respect of the international law of contracts, a nationalization cannot prevail over an
internationalized contract, containing stabilization clauses Therefore, if a state bound itself to a contract which is
international in character and burdened with stabilization clauses, such state is deemed to have waived its prerogative to
expropriate contrary to the terms of such contract. Since, in this case, the expropriation was deemed to have been contrary to
the stabilization clause of an internationalized contract, the expropriatory act is set aside and Dupuy awarded a remedy of
restitutio in integrum meaning Libya was compelled to perform its obligations under the concession contract, i.e., to allow
Texaco to extract oil.
BP v. Libya
The home state may expropriate if it wants to; when it does, even under wrongful circumstances, the investor state cannot
compel the home state to continue performing the latters obligations, but may only claim compensation by way of damages
BP Exploration Company (BP) had a contractual agreement with the Government of Libya (Libya), which allowed BP to
operate in Libya for the extraction, processing and export of petroleum. The area in which BP was allowed to operate was
called Concession 65; it has an area of over 8,000 sq. kms. in the heart of the Sarir desert. On November 29 and 30 of 1971,
the Government of Iran occupied 3 Islands in the Gulf (Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tumb). These Islands were still
under British protection, though the treaty which provided such protection would last only until Nov. 30 1971. The British,
however, did not react to the occupation, and were blamed to be the cause of the loss of the Islands. In December 7 of 1971
Libya passed the BP Nationalization Law, which nationalized the operations of BP in Concession 65, restoring to the State
ownership of all properties, rights, assets and shares in the operations conducted in the said area, and then transferring these
to a new company, the Arabian Gulf Exploration Company. The law was passed in reaction to Britains failure to act on the

Iranian occupation of its three protectorate islands in the Gulf. The nationalization law provided that the State should pay
compensation to BP, which was to be determined by a committee established by the Minister of Petroleum. The decision of
such a committee was to be final, to admit no appeal, and to be communicated to the Petroleum Minister, who will then inform
BP about it within 30 days of issuance. However, no action on compensation was taken until February 13, 1972. A three man
committee was formed but it was only in September of that year that BP received communication from the committee, asking
its remarks and viewpoints on the matter of compensation. As a result of the Nationalization Law (which was rapidly
implemented) BPs operations in Concession 65 were brought to a complete halt and its staff were immediately excluded from
the premises and facilities. The Arabian Gulf Exploration Company had taken over Concession 65.
The Concession contract in this case contains the same governing law clause as that in the case of Texaco above that
Libyan law would be applicable only to the extent that it coincides with international law. The arbitrator first disposed of the
issue of (1) whether or not the alleged injured party to a concession agreement has the right to deem the contract as valid and
enforceable even after the alleged wrongful expropriation and (2) whether or not the injured party may claim reparations in the
form of specific performance/ restitutio in integrum. The arbitrator stated that under international law, the wrongful breach of a
contract would entitle the injured party to terminate the contract at its option. Until and unless such injured party elects to do
so, the contract should be deemed as valid and binding and it can compel the other party to continue performing its obligations
under it. However, such situation, according to the arbitrator, does not find application in a case where the other (expropriating)
party is a sovereign state. The right to deem the contract as continuing to be binding and the consequent right to demand
restitutio in integrum is therefore not available to BP under international law. This pronouncement is important because it
recognizes the almost plenary power of the home state to expropriate that the home state cannot be precluded under
international law to expropriate when it wishes to.
Finding no concurrence between Libyan and international law regarding the declarations sought to be obtained by BP, the
arbitrator then turns to international law. Under international law, the arbitrator declared, the same conclusions as above were
inevitable no support for the claim that the injured party may deem the contract as continuing to be valid and that restitutio in
integrum is proper. The all-important portion of the decision which applies to all expropriation cases involving a sovereign state
is: when by exercise of sovereign power a State committed a fundamental breach of a concession agreement by repudiating it
through a nationalization of the enterprise and its assets in a manner which implies finality, the concessionaire is not entitled to
call for specific performance by the Government of the agreement and reinstatement of his contractual rights, but his sole
remedy is an action for damages. The conclusion is therefore unequivocal the home state may expropriate when it desires
to, and even if such expropriation is done in breach of the contract, the home state can still not be entitled to reinstate the
operability of the contract; at the most, it can only be compelled to pay damages.
In this case, damages were awarded by the arbitrator. However, it is important to note that the circumstances under which the
expropriation took place in this case constitutes one of the first instances where an arbitral court classified state actions as (1)
in breach of obligations (2) discriminatory and (3) confiscatory. The wrongfulness of the expropriatory act is important to
establish because this would determine the quantum of compensation that would be awarded to the injured party. The oft-
quoted portion of the decision is: The BP Nationalization Law, and actions taken thereunder, by Libya, constitute a
fundamental breach of the BP Concession as they amount to a total repudiation of the agreement and obligations of Libya
under such agreement. The bases for this ruling are rules of applicable systems of law too elementary and voluminous to
require or permit citation. Further, Libyas taking of BPs property, rights and interests clearly violate Public International Law as
it was made for purely extraneous political reasons and was arbitrary and discriminatory (as other concessions have not been
touched). It was also confiscatory as no offer of compensation was made in two years.
Chorzow Factory Case
The home state may expropriate, but when it does unlawfully, it would have to pay a large price either to continue being
bound to the obligations under the contract, or be liable for damages, or both
For facts of the case, please refer to earlier reference under Sources of International Law. However, for purposes of this
section, it is important to recall that the expropriation undertaken by Poland against German interests in this case was made in
violation of a treaty, and therefore classified as wrongful under international law. This case is often quoted in expropriation
cases because it provides for the quantum of compensation required to be paid in cases of wrongful takings by the home
state. The oft-quoted portion of the decision is now known as the Chorzow Standard in international law. It is often invoked by
investor states to justify their claims of compensation, because it is sufficiently vague as to evade exact quantification but
sufficiently liberal and inclined towards investors interests as to be adequately justificatory of claims of full compensation (full
meaning nearly everything the value of the property, forgone profits, future profits, incidental expenses, committed profits,
and damages). Note, however, that the Chorzow Standard does contemplate restitutio in integrum as a remedy for unlawful
expropriations, contrary to subsequent arbitral decisions precluding the propriety of any such remedial award, as in the BP
case. The continuing validity of this assertion is still a matter of debate, and of course, although investor states do settle in time
to mere payment of compensation, it never hurts to have the Chorzow Standard as the starting point of every negotiation as
far as the investor state is concerned. The Chorzow Standard provides:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - a principle which seems to be established by
international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals - is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe-
out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act
had not been committed. (1) Restitution in kind, or if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a
restitution in kind would bear; (2) Award of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or
payment in place of it such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act
contrary to international law.
Liamco v. Libya
(1) Sovereign immunity is waived if the home state consents to litigate arbitral claims anywhere in the world
(2) Acts of state cannot be passed upon in judgment by any foreign tribunal.
(3) Contractual rights are not property, and repudiation of contractual obligations is not a taking, within the meaning of
expropriation law
(4) Compensability, once satisfied, renders a taking lawful under international law; the unsatisfactory quantum of such
compensation on the part of the investor would not render the taking unlawful
In 1973 and 1974 Libya nationalized both LIAMCO's rights under the concessions and certain of its oil drilling equipment.
Following unsuccessful negotiations regarding compensation, LIAMCO rejected the terms of the nationalization and initiated
proceedings under the arbitration clause. Libya, maintaining that the nationalization superseded the concessions altogether,
refused to participate in the Geneva proceedings. LIAMCO, after obtaining a favorable ruling, brings action to the District Court
of the District of Columbia to confirm and enforce such ruling. In bringing the suit, LIAMCO invokes the jurisdiction of the Court
pursuant to American Law on Actions Against Foreign States, arguing that Libya is not immune under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA). LIAMCO further contends that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (Convention) requires the confirmation of the award. Libya does not challenge the validity of the underlying award.
Instead it mounts a two pronged defense arguing first that the Court is without jurisdiction, and second, that even should the
Court find jurisdiction, it should refrain from enforcing the award under the Convention because of the act of state doctrine.
This case was brought before an American Court not because that is where it will be litigated but because LIAMCO wanted the
arbitral decision rendered in Geneva to be confirmed in the United States.
The District Court of the District of Columbia made several pronouncements relevant under international law. First, it held that
the arbitration clause of the concession contract between LIAMCO and Libya is sufficient to bring disputes arising under it
within the ambit of international law. As such, as far as American law is concerned, it has acquired jurisdiction over Libya
notwithstanding its supposedly immune status as a state because of the arbitration clause (which provides that arbitration
should take place either where the parties agreed, or where the arbitrators might agree) that contemplates arbitration
anywhere in the world, including the United States.
Second, this case is relevant in expropriation law because it recognizes that measures falling within the act of state doctrine 41
cannot be questioned by another foreign state. It does not mean that the court before which a case is brought can be deprived
of jurisdiction properly acquired, as in this case. It only means that in litigating a claim, all the parties to the dispute, including
the court, would take it as a given that an act of state is valid and legitimate. In short, all other points of issue may be litigated
except whether or not the home state is justified in expropriating.
Under American law, particularly the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act 42, acts of state may be passed
upon if such would amount to a confiscatory taking violative of international law and the President of the United States does
not exercise his prerogative, by reason of foreign policy, to preclude American courts from doing so. Under this consideration,
the District Court dismissed LIAMCOs claim as being not justiciable, and made two pronouncements relevant to expropriation
law: the taking requirement of the Hickenlooper amendment was not satisfied because (1) contractual rights are not
property, and the repudiation of contractual obligations not a taking, within the meaning of the law; and the violative of
international law requisite was also not satisfied because (2) a taking is not rendered violative of international law simply
because the investor is not satisfied with the amount of compensation the home state is prepared to pay; as long as there
exists a mechanism for compensation within the law of the home state, the taking is lawful.
Starett Housing Case
(1) Expropriation does not need a law to be deemed as such; any act that would result in the deprivation of ownership rights
and therefore effect an indirect or virtual taking would be classified as expropriation nonetheless
(2) Expropriation does not need the physical taking of property to be deemed as such; any deprivation of ownership rights
closely related to the physical property would be classified as expropriation nonetheless
In 1974, Starett, operating through Shah Goli, an Iranian subsidiary company, entered into an agreement with an Iranian
development bank to buy land in Iran and build houses upon it. The project was proceeding on schedule when their
harassment during the 1979 revolution caused the withdrawal of the American and other foreign personnel working on it. This,
41
The doctrine provides that Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.
42
The Hickenlooper Amendment provides that unless the President, for foreign policy reasons, suggests otherwise, courts must not decline
on the ground of the act of state doctrine to decide the merits of a claim of title or other right to property . . .based upon (or traced though) a
confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law.
coupled with general revolutionary disruption and government intervention (making Shah Goli forgo contractual payments and
freezing Shah Golis bank accounts), caused the project to fall behind schedule and Shah Goli to be in financial difficulties. In
January 1980, Iran placed Shah Goli under control of a temporary manager. Starett files a suit for compensation, alleging that
the acts of the Iranian government is an expropriation of its property rights under the contract.
The Starett Housing case is a landmark case in foreign investment law because it recognized the concept of an indirect
expropriation. In current usage, the concept has been used interchangeably with terms such as virtual expropriation,
effective expropriation, or act tantamount or equivalent to expropriation. In this case, the tribunal recognized that,
technically speaking, no expropriation took place because, unlike in the Texaco, BP, or LIAMCO cases, no law was passed by
Iran expropriating the assets of Starett. However the tribunal made a pronouncement that it is recognized in international law
that measures taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so useless
that they must be deemed to have been expropriated, even though the State does not purport to have expropriated them and
the legal title to the property formally remains with the original owner. In this case such manner of interference was committed
by the Iranian government when it undertook acts leading to the bankruptcy and placement under receivership of Shah Goli,
Staretts co-venturer. Upon doing so, Iran effectively has taken the property rights of Starett in the housing project and
deprived it of its reasonable expectations as an investor.
Secondly, the Starett case is also significant because, in departure from the LIAMCO view, contractual rights are deemed to be
property for purposes of expropriation law. The doctrine of the case is that measures of expropriation or taking, primarily
aimed at physical property, have been deemed to comprise also rights of a contractual nature closely related to the physical
property. The contractual rights referred to by the Tribunal includes such intangible assets as management rights, legitimate
investment-backed expectations in the completion of the venture, and right to proceeds. The Tribunal, in sum, laid down the
doctrine that expropriation may be direct or indirect, and that it may be undertaken through a literal taking of a physical asset,
or through a deprivation of ownership rights closely related to a physical property.
Kuwait v. Aminoil
A home state may not be precluded from expropriating; if any, the limitations to the exercise of expropriatory prerogative must
be confined only to a limited period covering serious undertakings, and such limitations must be expressly provided for in the
contract
Aminoil is an American company which was granted an oil concession by Kuwait. However, Kuwait, by Decree, terminated the
agreement before its expiry and transferred the concession assets to itself. Aminoil question the legality of the termination
under the stabilization clauses of the contract, particularly Art 17 and Art 11(B). The provisions prohibit a nationalization of the
oil venture. Art 17 states that no alteration shall be made in the terms of this Agreementexcept in the event of the Shaikh
and the Company jointly agreeing that it is desirable in the interest of both parties to make certain alterations, deletions or
additions. Art 11(B) states that save as aforesaid this Agreement shall not be terminated before the expiration of the period
specifiedexcept by surrender as provided in Article 12 or if the Company shall be in default under the arbitration provisions
of Article 18. Kuwait, in defense of its actions, invokes the principle of sovereignty over natural resources which, according to
it, is an imperative rule of jus cogens. This principle prohibits States from giving guarantees against the exercise of the public
authority over natural resources.
In contrast with Dupuys arbitral decision in the Texaco case, the arbitral court in Aminoil expressly reiterates that there is no
rule in international law absolutely precluding a home state from expropriating. The only limitations (and not absolute
exceptions) to this rule are three-fold: States may pledge not to nationalize but only if: [a] it is for a serious undertaking; [b] it is
expressly stipulated for; [c] it covers a limited period. In short, a home state may validly waive its expropriatory prerogative only
for a limited time (the prohibition against taking cannot be perpetual), only upon serious undertakings (other investments of a
smaller scale may be expropriated more expeditiously), and in any case any such limitations must be embodied in the
contract. The expropriatory power of the state is the general rule, and therefore any limitations to its exercise cannot be
implied. In considering the legal consequences of an expropriatory act, consideration must be given to whether the investor
has been adequately protected by express provisions of the contract relating to compensation. The compensability of an
expropriatory act strongly militates against the presumption that the home state can take property without necessary legal
consequences in the exercise of its sovereignty. The Tribunal also interpreted Arts 17 and 11(B) as not absolutely forbidding
nationalization because it impliedly requires that nationalization shall not have a confiscatory character. Lastly, the Tribunal
gave due credit to the fact that the act of Kuwait was in pursuance of a legitimate state policy. It considered that the
undertaking (the extraction of oil) was at first, directed to narrow patrimonial ends, that is, as a financial venture entered into by
the Kuwaiti government for its governmental purposes. Later, it became an essential instrument in the economic and social
progress of the State, as evidenced by the progressive development of Kuwaiti law with a view to taking an active role in the
development of its own resources within its territory. As such, the expropriation in this case was not found to be unlawful, and
the Tribunal merely awarded compensation to Aminoil.
Amoco International Finance v. Iran
(1) Expropriation may be done for a public purpose, and not merely for public utility

(2) Compensability is the norm; the process or quantum of compensation is not. An expropriation is therefore deemed lawful
as long as provision for compensation exists, although it may be unsatisfactory to the investor, subject to the submission of
any dispute to arbitration
(3) Takings may be done in successive stages; the fact that the entire economic branch to which an enterprise belongs was
not expropriated is not necessarily a badge of discriminatory intent
(4) A home state is not bound by obligations contracted by private entities within its territories. For any such obligation to
arise, a clear duty on the part of the home state must be embodied in the contract
Amoco is a Swiss company and a wholly owned subsidiary of Standard Oil, and American company. Amoco entered into a
joint venture with NPC, an Iranian company controlled by the Iranian government, to form Khemco, an Iranian company jointly
owned and managed by Amoco and NPC. The venture sought to process and sell Iranian natural gas, each contracting party
having 50% shares in the profits to be realized. In 1980, the Khemco Agreement, which was by its terms valid for 35 years,
was declared null and void by the Iranian government following the 1979 Iranian revolution and the implementation of Iranian
legislation (the Single Article Act of 1980) that was intended to complete the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. Amoco
filed a suit for compensation for the taking of its interests in Khemco.
The first doctrine of foreign investment law that was pronounced in Amoco is that the ground for expropriation which was
formerly limited to public utility (as expressed in the Chorzow case) has been expanded to the more general term public
purpose. It is therefore not needed for the expropriating home state to prove that it wanted to exercise ownership over the
property taken for the use of the public. It is enough that the taking be done in pursuance of some public purpose43.
Secondly, the case reiterated the doctrine in LIAMCO that a taking satisfies international standards of lawfulness when it
provides for a mechanism for the payment of compensation. Under the Single Article Act, a special commission will be
constituted to determine the amount of compensation due to the foreign investor, any disagreement over the quantum of which
may be submitted for arbitration. Amoco did not avail of this remedy, and so it cannot be said that the expropriation was
unlawful per se because it did not grant compensation in such manner and within such time as to satisfy the investor. What
would make an act of taking unlawful under international law would be the absence of any provision for compensation.
Thirdly, the Amoco case is also instructive with regard to the issue of discriminatory takings. In the BP case, the Tribunal
actually found that there was a discriminatory expropriation because it was undertaken only against BP and not against other
similar ventures of other nationalities. The Tribunal in the Amoco case did not rule that an expropriation is per se unlawful
because it is directed only against a particular entity within a larger industry. The Tribunal in this case recognized that the act
of expropriation which is the prerogative of the home state may be undertaken in such manner as to be determined by the
home state in pursuance of its policies. The non-expropriation of an entire branch of economic activity is not in itself
discrimination, absent any evidence of patent bad faith or discriminatory designs. Said the Tribunal: Reasons specific to the
non-expropriated enterprise, or to the expropriated one, or to both, may justify such a difference of treatment. Furthermore, as
observed by the arbitral tribunal in AMINOIL, a coherent policy of nationalization can reasonably be operated gradually in
successive stages.
Lastly, the important doctrine laid down in this case is that stabilization clauses must be clear in demanding from the home
state obligations which the investor state can enforce against it. Absent such unequivocal stipulation in the contract, the home
state cannot be deemed to have been a party to the contract and cannot therefore be held liable under its terms. In this case,
no clear obligation was imposed by the concession contract on the Iran government. There was no showing that the contract
contained a stabilization clause that would have obligated the Iranian government to insulate the contract from any change in
domestic law that would affect the contracts operation. As such, the Iranian government cannot be said to have expropriated
Amocos property in breach of its obligations because no obligation exists on its part. In conclusion, the Tribunal ordered Irans
compensation of Amoco as a necessary legal consequence of the taking, and such expropriation was classified as a lawful
one under international law, thereby negating the propriety of any award of damages.
Phillips v. Iran
(1) Expropriation is any act which would deprive the investor of his ownership rights permanently
(2) Focus should be on the effect of the expropriatory act on the investor, and not on the intention of the home state
(3) The reckoning point of expropriation is that point at which the deprivation of ownership rights becomes irreversible
Phillips entered into a Joint Structure Agreement with Iranian Government to exploit oil. Imam Khomeini sparks a revolution in
Autumn of 1978 and it succeeds in toppling over the past regime in February 1979. The revolutionary government decides to
withdraw all oil contracts with foreign companies under the guise of Nationalization/Anti-western sentiment. The company then
sued for recovery of compensation form the Iranian government.
The Phillips case is significant in that it reiterated the doctrine on indirect expropriation established in the Starett case. This
case, however, further qualified the concept of indirect expropriation by pronouncing that (1) expropriation need not be of
contractual rights closely related to a physical property; it is merely required that the taking amount to a deprivation of
43
By this standard, the home state may transfer ownership of the property for the use of a private entity, or even let the property lie idle or
destroy it in any case there would be an expropriation.
ownership rights (2) expropriation must be done with finality and not merely ephemeral (3) the focus must be on the effect and
impact of the expropriatory act on the investor and not on the intention of the home state or the manner in which the
expropriation is undertaken this heavy focus on the effect of expropriatory acts on the investor more than the government
interest pursued will later be known as the sole effect doctrine in foreign investment law. Said the tribunal: While assumption
of control over property by a government does not automatically and immediately justify a conclusion that the property has
been taken by the government, thus requiring compensation under international law, such a conclusion is warranted whenever
events demonstrate that the owner was deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not
merely ephemeral. The intent of the government is less important than the effects of the measures on the owner, and the form
of the measures of control or interference is less important than the reality of their impact.
Also, the Phillips case is significant when it comes to determining the reckoning point at which the operative act of
expropriation is deemed to have taken place. This is essential in the computation of compensation, especially with regard to
forgone profits and damages. According to the tribunal: where the taking is through a chain of events, the taking will not
necessarily be found to have occurred at the time of either the first or the last such event, but rather when the interference has
deprived the Claimant of fundamental rights of ownership and such deprivation is "not merely ephemeral," or when it becomes
an "irreversible deprivation. The irreversibility point refers to that point where the exercise of ownership rights of the investor
has already been rendered absolutely impossible by the acts of the home state.
B. FREE TRADE44
The study of foreign investment law would not be complete without delving into one of the most progressive fields of
international commerce free trade. The underlying basis for the widespread promotion of liberal market paradigms in the
international economy is the proposition that trade, as a rule, is always beneficial, and the more unhampered and equal the
trade is, the greater the economic benefits to be reaped and, ultimately, the greater the level of development that all states can
achieve. Rising from the ashes of World War II, the nations of the world came to the agreement that accelerating the recovery
of devastated states would entail the promotion of an international mechanism that would facilitate the flow of international
capital from those who have it to those who need it most. The Bretton Woods regime established from such agreement
became the precursor of modern-day international free trade, again with the underlying assumption that trade is essentially
beneficial, and that international trade would be more facilitative of development if it were to be undertaken under a regime of
progressively decreasing tariffs and strictly enforced mechanisms to safeguard against unfair trade practices. From the Bretton
Woods agreement arose discussion groups the members of which agree to conduct international trade under mutually
favourable terms using a most favored nation framework. From this discussion groups came the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Ultimately, the World Trade Organization was born, as the manifestation of the states desire to conduct
multilateral trade with a view to establishing an economic order where tariffs are progressively decreased and unfair trade
practices are offset by economic enforcement measures.
The Philippines is arguably the only jurisdiction among all the states signatories to the WTO treaty wherein the
legality of the treaty itself has been pronounced by the highest court of the land. In the case of Tanada v. Angara, the
Supreme Court has had occasion to declare that (1) the Filipino-First policy purportedly enshrined in the Constitution is just a
hortatory provision which cannot be legally enforced as a matter of right without any supporting legislation (2) the Philippines
does not adhere to an isolationist economic policy and is in fact accommodative of international trade arrangements that are
anchored on the policy of equality and reciprocity (3) the WTO Agreeement constitutes a treaty obligation which the Philippines
is bound to perform under the principle of pacta sunt servanda; as such, since the pacta sunt servanda doctrine is part of
international law, it is binding on the Philippines by virtue of the Constitutions Incorporation Clause (4) the international free
trade regime embodied in the WTO Agreement represents the best possible economic option for the Philippines, considering
the prevailing international economic context. This last pronouncement of the Court was uncalled for at the very least, it being
a statement of policy which the Court has no competence to make. In deciding the case the way it did, therefore, the Supreme
Court not only solidified the argument that the WTO Agreement is a valid treaty obligation, but also made the unsolicited
pronouncement of the trade regimes wisdom and propriety.
The implementation of the WTO Agreement in the country, however, is not without issue. As expected, many
contentious controversies have confronted the country primarily in the field of protecting against unfair trade measures of other
states. We must remember that the WTO established not only a policy of progressive lowering of tariffs, it also put in place
certain measures of economic enforcement to ensure that trade between nations are as equal as possible. These economic
enforcement measures are anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures, and safeguard measures:
(1) anti-dumping measures there is dumping when the export price of a commodity is less than its normal value in
the exporting state. Anti-dumping measures seek to equalize trade in such manner as for the commodity to actually
reflect its value from the standards of the exporting state. Such measures must be undertaken only after it was
proven that (1) a dumping exists (2) there was an actual injury to a domestic industry (3) there is a causal link
between the dumping and the injury. In addition, the measures must be initiated by 25% of an industry affected.
44
This portion is based on notes from Sir Harrys discussion in class and the article The Philippines and the WTO: Survey of Current
Practices with Emphasis on Anti-Dumping, Countervailing Duties, and Safeguard Measures by Sir Harry published in the Asian Journal
of WTO and Health Law and Policy (Vol. 1, 2006).
(2) countervailing measures a subsidy is a financial contribution by a government where there is either a direct fund
transfer, a revenue which otherwise due is forgone, or when a government provides goods and services. In such
cases, countervailing measures may be employed by the importing state to make the product reflect its actual value
taking into consideration the subsidy that its manufacturers have received. Such measures may be undertaken only if
it was proven that (1) a dumping exists (2) there was an actual injury to a domestic industry (3) there is a causal link
between the dumping and the injury.
(3) safeguard measures safeguard measures are employed when there is a showing of a dramatic increase in the
imports of a particular commodity. Dumping or unfair subsidy need not be proved to justify resort to these measures,
it being enough that surge in imports is proven alongside a serious injury or threat of injury that the former has
caused or will cause, and that the product in question is a like product, in absolute or relative terms, to the product
domestically manufactured.
How exactly the arbitration panels and the Appellate Body of the WTO (which were established to rule on disputes
between states arising from the interpretation of the Agreements provisions) dealt with cases and disputes arising from the
adoption of such economic enforcement measures is also a fertile topic. Here, relevant decisions and the essential portions of
their rulings interpretative of the Agreements provisions will be considered:
1. Cold Rolled Coil Sheets from Taiwan the injury proven was not causally linked to the dumping measure but a
result of such extraneous factors as the Asian Financial Crisis, debt servicing, and inefficient and uncompetitive
technology.
2. Portland Cement Case the Tariff Commission of the Philippines is independent and its factual findings are given
great weight by the Court.
3. Desiccated Coconut Case (Philippines v. Brazil) the application for remedies must follow the process set out in
the treaty; in this case, the case should have been brought before the GATT and not the WTO because the measures
were imposed under GATT.
4. Shrimps Case (US); Tuna Case (US); Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Case (US) the US must
impose trade restrictions that are in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption and must
impose them against not only imported but locally harvested products.
It is also relevant that one of the recognized valid grounds for the imposition of trade restrictions are the so-called
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) which allows an importing state to impose trade measures to protect human,
animal or plant life or health in the territory of member states either from (1) entry , establishment, or spread of pests or
diseases (2) risks arising from additives, contaminant toxin, or disease-causing organism, (3) from a risk arising from a
disease or pest carried by an animal or plant, (4) to prevent or limit other damages in the territory of member states arising
from the introduction, establishment or spread of pests. The imposition of these measures, however, are subject to the
showing of sufficient scientific basis and the undertaking of risk assessment measures. Any challenge to the validity of
SPS measures must be anchored on the proposition of an available alternative to the measure being challenged that
would (1) provide the same or a higher protection than that given by the challenged measure and (2) be less restrictive of
trade.
5. Beef Hormones Case (US v. EU) risk assessment is a prerequisite in the imposition of SPS measures
6. Bananas Case (US v. EU) quantitative trade preferences are violations of the most favored nation provision of the
WTO Agreement. The same tariff dues must be imposed on similar products, regardless of the origin.


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Public international law finals reviewer 0

Public international law

PROF. HARRY ROQUE

* Bok * Ceejay * Tif * Gem * Tin *

~ Lora ~ PJ ~ Carol ~ Jerome ~ Ben ~ Cathe ~ Easter ~ Mike ~ Marco ~

Uplaw 2009b Always will b

II. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Art. 38, ICJ Statute:

Article 53, 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties

What are the elements of international custom?

How is opinion juris understood?

Are judicial decisions and teaching of publicists sources of international law?

What is a jus cogens norm?

In general, how do norms of international law come into being?

Kuroda v. Jalandoni (1949)

Yamashita v. Styer (1945)

PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

Uplaw 2009b Always will b

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969)

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Southwest Africa Case (2nd Phase, 1966)

Asylum Case Haya Dela Torre (Columbia/Peru, 1950)

Nuclear Test Cases (1974)

Legality Of The Use Of A State Of Nuclear Weapons (1996)

Preah Vihear Temple Case (1962)

Corfu Channel Case (1949)

Chorzow Factory Case (Germany V. Poland) (1928)

Uplaw 2009b Always will b

Texaco V. Libya (1978)

Passage Case (Portugal V. India)

III. ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Uplaw 2009b Always will b

ART. 1, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States:

ART 34, ICJ Statute:

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Mavrommatis Case (1924)

Certain Expenses Of The UN (1962)

How is state sovereignty defined in international law?

Island Of Palmas Case

Uplaw 2009b Always will b

US: Discovery Inchoate title Netherlands: Treaty

Critical date in this case treaty of paris (1898)

SS Lotus Case (France V. Turkey)

Uplaw 2009b Always will b

Eastern Greenland Case

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Minquiers & Ecrehos Case (UK v. France), (1951)

Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway), (1951)

Uplaw 2009b Always will b

Western Sahara Case (1975)

Preah Vihear Temple Case, (Cambodia v. Thailand), (1962)

Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), (1986)

Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), (1999)

Libya v. Chad, (1994)

El Salvador v. Honduras, with Nicaragua intervening, (1992)

Uplaw 2009b Always will b

Clipperton Island Arbitration (France v. Mexico), (1931)

Eritrea v. Yemen, (1998)