1. G.R. No.

74145 June 17, 1987

PEOPLE versus ZOSIMO CRISOLOGO, alias "AMANG",

FACTS:
Zosimo Crisologo alias “Amang”, a deaf -mute, was charged for robbery and homicide
committed on 1 May 1976 in Calamagoy, Poblacion Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. Accused was allegedly
informed of the charged against him through sign language but apparently no sign language expert or
representative was available. The accused through a counsel de oficio waived the reading of the
information and pleaded not guilty. Trial proceeded without any evidence being presented on his part.
Finally, without the services of an expert in sign language ever being utilized at any stage of the
proceedings, the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and
sentenced to die by electrocution. Executive clemency was recommended, however, in view of the
accused's infirmity and his nearly ten-year detention as a suspect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was given due process of law and the insufficiency of the purely
circumstantial evidence presented to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence be in his
favor.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have
conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who
could also have communicated the accused's own version of the circumstances which led to his
implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to
defend himself. Not even the accused's final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust
circumstances. The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in
writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental
right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or
innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have
enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.

2. VILLAFLOR vs SUMMERS GR No. 16444

FACTS:
Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial court,
upon motion of the assistant fiscal, or0dered her to submit to physical
examination to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey
the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of
the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was
found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison
until she should permit the medical examination required by the court.

ISSUE:
 Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined
by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the
Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure
providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.

HELD:
No. The constitutional guaranty that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is
that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. 

Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back
once more to elements and ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal
trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal laws is to purge the community
of persons who violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men.
Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are
then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is
intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its
endeavor to ascertain the truth. No accused person should be afraid of the use
of any method which will tend to establish the truth. For instance, under the
facts before us, to use torture to make the defendant admit her guilt might only
result in including her to tell a falsehood. But no evidence of physical facts can
for any substantial reason be held to be detrimental to the accused except in so
far as the truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty person.

3. PEOPLE vs CANELA GR No. 97086, May 8, 1972

FACTS:
Acting on an information, a team formed to conduct a “buy-bust” operation. A dragnet was set up
where a team was deployed at different strategic places near the Supreme Transit Terminal where the
intended sale was to take place. Across the Supreme Transmit terminal is a billiard hall where a civilian
informer contacted the accused and for a while the two conversed after which accused-appellant
approached the poseur-buyer. The latter asked accused-appellant if he could buy two (2) tea bags of
marijuana. Accused-appellant left for a while and after about three (3) minutes, he (accused-appellant)
returned with the marijuana, gave the same to Sgt. Cruz and the latter gave him two (2) marked ten peso
bills. Then a certain Sgt. Elpidio Anasta approached the two, searched the accused and recovered from
him the marked money paid by the poseur-buyer, a tea bag containing marijuana, one stick of marijuana
cigarette and rolling papers.
Accused-appellant however, disputes the foregoing facts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the accused constitutional rights to be informed of his
rights.

HELD:
 Yes, the Court finds that the arresting officers had violated accused-appellant’s rights when they
failed to inform of his rights as mandated by the Constitution.
The case of People v. Galit laid down the guidelines to be observed by police officers in making an
arrest, as follows:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for
the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.
The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or anyone he chooses
by the most expedient means by telephone if possible, or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall
be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.
The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The Constitution gave more teeth to the foregoing principle and further provided:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right, to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must beprovided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

4. PEOPLE vs NICANDRO G.R. No. L-59378 February 11, 1986

FACTS:
After the complaints and reports were verified to be true, an entrapment with the confidential
informant acting as the buyer of marijuana was organized. The police team formed to carry out the
entrapment plan was alerted of the presence of the drug pusher, the appellant Nelia Nicandro y Velarma,
alias ‘Nel’. The informant asked to buy some marijuana cigarette and gave appellant the two (2) marked P
5.00 bills Thereupon, the appellant delivered to informant four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarette.
Immediately the police team closed in and nabbed the appellant, was frisked and got from the right front
pocket of her pants the two (2), marked P5.00 bills, and from the left pocket of her pants the marijuana
flowering tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper. Upon being investigated and after having been duly
apprised of her constitutional rights, appellant orally admitted having sold the four (4) sticks of marijuana
cigarettes and the ownership of the marijuana flowering tops taken from her pocket, but refused to reduce
her confession to writing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the accused constitutional rights to be informed of his
rights and to warnings.

HELD:
Yes.
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation “to be informed” of his right to
remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle. As a rule, therefor, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person
under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound
to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical
terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly
understands. (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312: People VS. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other words,
the right of a person under interrogation “to be informed” implies a correlative obligation on the part of
the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that
the person has been “informed” of his rights. Now, since the right “to be informed” implies
comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the education,
intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice it to say
that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered.

5. PEOPLE vs PIDO G.R. No. 92427, August 2, 1991

FACTS:          
This is an appeal from the decision of the lower court convicting, ROBERTO R. PIDO of the
crime of rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of April 1980, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by
holding the neck of the complainant simultaneously poking a deadly bladed instrument against her,
threatening to kill her should she shout for help and ordering her to remove her entire clothings, have
sexual intercourse with the undersigned complainant, against her will.

The complaint was filed with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Manila. It was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 61752 and was assigned to Branch 35 thereof. The
accused entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on 13 July 1981.

On January 3, 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting the accused of the crime
of rape and sentencing him to a penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In summary the testimonial evidence as presented by the prosecution as part of or as res gestae
points to the accused as having committed rape based on the testimony of the alleged victim Teresita Gam
and her cousin Lydia Sulit who allegedly saw the accused leave the house after committing the heinous
act. (She did not see the actual rape). On the other hand, the accused denies the accusation and on his part
alleged that it was Teresita Gam who invited her into the house and had consensual sexual intercourse
with him. He further narrates that they were former sweethearts and they broke up previously because
Teresita worked in a club and became a prostitute. The alleged rape took place on April 15, 1980, Teresita
reported the alleged crime the following month – May 1980.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused-appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
We have carefully and meticulously reviewed and analyzed the evidence for the prosecution in
this case and, guided by the jurisprudential principles and considerations adverted to in the exordium of
this decision, We find that the prosecution failed to discharge its duty to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Reversal of the decision appealed from is inevitable.
 It is the teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must
not be accepted with precipitate credulity. Common sense and logic, and above all the duty to render
impartial justice, which is expected from judges, demand that the testimonies of witnesses must be
viewed in their totality. This of course means that due attention must be given to the cross-examination. It
is the province of the latter to test the credibility of the witnesses, expose falsehood or half-truth, uncover
the truth which rehearsed direct-examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate
inconsistencies on substantial matters which create reasonable doubt. In short, cross-examination is an
indispensable instrument of criminal justice to give substance and meaning to the Constitutional right of
the accused to confront the witnesses against him and to show that the presumption of innocence has
remained steadfast and firm.
This case then provides one more occasion for this Court to take exception to the rule that
appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court considering that it is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying. 33 Two special considerations in this case justify such departure.
Firstly, it was another judge (Judge Alfredo Lazaro) who heard and received the whole testimony on
direct examination of the complainant and the major portion of her testimony on cross-examination.
Judge Makasiar, who decided the case, did not then have sufficient basis to form an opinion as to the
complainant's deportment and manner of testifying. Secondly, the trial court had ignored or overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances, as hereafter shown, which would affect the result of the case.

6. PEOPLE vs COSEP GR NO. 11353, May 21, 1998

FACTS:         
Petitioner, Tomas Cosep, was the Municipal Planning and Development Coordination Officer of
Olutanga, Zamboanga del Sur.  In 1987, the Municipality decided to construct an artesian well for one of
its localities.  Hence, it secured the services of private complainant Angelino E. Alegre to undertake the
said project, under a “pakyaw” arrangement for the contract price of P5,000.00 payable after completion
of the project.

After the project was finished, petitioner secured the amount of P5,000.00 from the Municipal
Treasurer. However, only P4,500 was given to the private complainant, the balance being allegedly
withheld by petitioner as reimbursement for his expenses in processing the papers in the Municipal
Treasurer’s Office.

On April 10, 1992, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.   Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued. The Sandiganbayan found him guilty of the charge.
Petitioner has filed the instant petition contending that:  (a) he was not accorded an impartial trial by the
Sandiganbayan and (b) his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt to justify his conviction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was accorded impartial trial by the Sandiganbayan and that his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
Regarding the first assignment of error, petitioner bewails the fact that during his testimony the
Justices of the  Sandiganbayan actively participated in the proceeding by propounding no less than sixty-
eight questions[4] which, in his opinion, were indications of partiality or prejudgment of guilt. 
We do not agree.

While we do not see any merit in petitioner’s first assigned error, we, however, agree with him
that his guilt was not adequately proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.

It is well settled that whether the accused is guilty or not of the offense charged is a question
which involves a determination of facts as presented by the prosecution and the defense.   The duty to
ascertain which is more credible is lodged with the trial court which had the opportunity to observe the
witness directly and to test his credibility by his demeanor on the stand.   Thus, the Sandiganbayan’s
factual findings are generally accorded respect, even finality, unless: (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts or
premised on the absence of evidence on the record.A re-examination of the entire proceedings of the
instant case compels us to take exception to the aforementioned general rule.
Where the state fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional
presumption, the accused is entitled to acquittal, regardless of the weakness or even the absence of his
defense[14] for any conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s case and not on the
weakness of the defense. Therefore, Tomas Cosep is Acquitted, on the grounds of reasonable doubt.
7. PEOPLE vs JUDGE AYSON G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989

FACTS:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City
station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in
accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed
by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter
was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76, 000. The findings of the Audit
team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was
prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two
months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the
prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the
confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit
those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondentJudge iscorrect in making inadmissible as evidence the admission
and statement of accused.

HELD:
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to
witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in
case at bar).      
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a
witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a
prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness
the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse
to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be
waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in Miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:
1)      He shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2)      Nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him.
3)      Any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

8. MANUEL CABAL vs HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN JR.

FACTS:
Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint charging
petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained
wealth, and other equally reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines created a committee to
investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the witness
stand in the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his
aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee, invoking
his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness
stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory.
This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness
stand.                                                                                                                                            
The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem
proper. The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" of contempt for failing
to obey the order of the Committee to take the witness stand. The "charge" was assigned to the sala of
respondent judge Kapunan. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash, which was denied.
Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand violates his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.

HELD:
Yes. Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of
unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of
the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or
employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. However, such forfeiture has
been held to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property
are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemptions of defendants in criminal case from the
obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.            No person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take
the stand as a witness against himself applies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings,
including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense,
but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature.The privilege of a
witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the witness a question which he
refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A
question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where a witness
exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for
refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is
improper.                                                                                                                                       The
possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-incrimination
will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the witness is virtually
that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal
to answer any and all questions. It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only
to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.
9. PEOPLE vs CITY COURT OF MANILA 154 SCRA 175 (1987)

FACTS:
Agapito Gonzales and Roberto Pangilinan was accused of violating Section 7 of RA 3060(An Act
Creating the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures) in relation to Article 201(Immoral doctrines , obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent shows) of the RPC.

On April 07, 1972, two information were filed against the accused. The first one, filed for

violation of RA 3060, alleged that the accused, without having previously submitted to the Board of
censors for Motion Pictures for preview and examination, exhibited a motion film in a public place.

The second one, filed for violation of Article 201, alleged that the accused exhibited motion
pictures “depicting and showing scenes of totally naked female and male persons with exposed private
parts doing the sex act in various lewd and obvious positions, among other similarly and equally obscene
and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public view, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building,
Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue.”
 
Accused Gonzales moved to quash the information in the criminal case for ground
of double jeopardy as the case pending against him for violation of RA 3060, allegedly contains the same
allegations in the criminal case.

Respondent City Court (City Court of Manila, Branch 6) dismissed the criminal case on the basis

that the allegations in the two information are identical and the plea entered in one case by the accused
herein can be reasonably seen as exposing him to double jeopardy in the other case.

  Petitioner contends that the accused could not invoke the constitutional guarantee against double

jeopardy, when there had been no conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of criminal proceedings
in another case for the same offense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was double jeopardy in the case at hand.

HELD:

It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1)
a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or
a frustration thereof.

  All these requisites do not exist in this case. The two (2) informations with which the

accused was charged, do not make out only one offense, contrary to private respondent's allegations. In
other words, the offense defined in section 7 of Rep. Act No. 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion
pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included
in the offense defined in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent
and immoral motion pictures.

The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of the two(2)
laws involved would show that the two (2) offenses are different and distinct from each other.
 
 It is evident that the elements of the two (2) offenses are different. The gravamen of the offense defined
in Rep. Act No. 3060 is the public exhibition of any motion picture which has not been previously
passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. The motion picture may not be indecent or
immoral but if it has not been previously approved by the Board, its public showing constitutes a
criminal offense.

10. PEOPLE vs RELOVA GR No. L-45129

FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of
Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the
ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975,
Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with
a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of the Opulencia
Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have been
installed without authority from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the
building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric
current consumption in the plant’s electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription
for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery
that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case
was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas
Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of
Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the
ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first
offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the
approval and necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by an ordinance,
where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is
punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint
against Mr.Opulencia. 

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second
offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity
punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:
Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as
tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double
jeopardy. The first would be that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense and the second sentence states that “If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the
conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act”. In the case at bar, it was very
evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double
jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that
even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an
ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two
charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance
shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that
Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from
the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia
11. TATAD vs SANDIGANBAYAN GR No. L-72335

FACTS: 
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal
Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges
of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S.
Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it
became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos
and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in  the
form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on
April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres.
Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and
report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing
of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L.  Cantero. By
October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by
the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the
Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all
against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private
corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a  check of
P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as
consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services
rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three
(3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for thecalendar years 1973,
1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived
accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It
was denied hence the appeal.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

HELD:
  YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the
complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos.
Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which
require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and
their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding
investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve
a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent
court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded
or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

12. ALONTE vs SAVELLANO JR. 287 SCRA 245

 
FACTS:
Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura
Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonte’s house
who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Biňan. The counsel and the
prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was
pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the
change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila
RTC under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and
Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her
desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere.
Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua.
Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie
when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her
desistance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD:
The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to
animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of
waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder
of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous
petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier
promulgated is nullified.

13. PEOPLE vs MINGOA GR No. L-5371

FACTS:
Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of
Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the
provincial auditor, the defendant Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public
funds in the Court of First Instance of Romblon, and having been found guilty as charged and sentenced
to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case here
on the ground that it involved a constitutional question.

The evidence shows that it is not disputed that upon examination of his books and accounts on
September 1, 1949, defendants, as accountable officer, was found short in the sum above-named and that,
required to produce the missing fund, he was not able to do so. He explained to the examining officer that
some days before he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with him to show
and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in
court and presented no evidence in his favor.

We agree with the trial judge that defendant's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot
overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his inability to produce the fund which was found
missing. As His Honor observes, if the money was really lost without defendant's fault, the most natural
thing for him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release from liability. But this he did
not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that he preferred to do
his own sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to the police. Considering further as the prosecution
points out in its brief, that defendant had at first tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to examine
his accounts, and that for some time before the alleged loss many teachers and other employees of the
town had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe that defendant had really malversed
the fund in question and that this story about its loss was pure invention.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent

HELD:
NO. The fact is that the trial court did not believe defendant’s explanation that the money was
lost, considering it mere cloak to cover actual misappropriation. That is why the court said that “whether
or not the defendant is guilty of malversation for negligence is of no moment…” the presumption of
misappropriation is found on Art. 217 of the RPC which provides that failure of a public officer to have
duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by and duly
authorized officer, shall prima facie evidence that he has put the missing funds or property to personal
use. The legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proven they shall be prima facie
evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be
rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed so that the interference of
the one from the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two
in common experience.

14. PEOPLE vs NOQUE GR No. 175319

FACTS:
 Accused Joselito Noque was caught in a buy-bust operation conducted by SPO4 Norberto
Murillo on January 30, 2001. Two Informations were filed before the RTC of Manila docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 01-189458 and 01-189459 charging of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of a regulated drug. The trial court convicted the accused on both charges. The trial court held
that while the Informations alleged methamphetamine hydrochloride as the drug seized from the
appellant, the drug actually confiscated which was ephedrine, which by means of chemical reaction could
change into methamphetamine. Thus, the trial court ruled that the appellant can be convicted of the
offenses charged, which are included in the crimes proved. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The CA held that the designations and allegations in the informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and
illegal possession of regulated drugs. Hence, the accused appealed the case before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not appellant’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was not
violated.

HELD:
The appeal is bereft of merit. As correctly observed by CA, the offenses designated in the
Informations are for violations of Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, which define and penalize the crimes
of illegal sale and possession of regulated drugs. The allegations in the Informations for the unauthorized
sale and possession of “shabu” or methamphetamine hydrochloride are immediately followed by the
qualifying phrase “which is a regulated drug”. Thus, it is clear that the designations and allegations in the
Informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs. Ephedrine has
been classified as a regulated drug by the Dangerous Drugs Board in Board Resolution No. 2, Series of
1988. 

The CA correctly ruled that Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, can be applied by
analogy in convicting the appellant of the offenses charged, which are included in the crimes proved.
Under these provisions, an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. At any rate, a
minor variance between the information and the evidence does not alter the nature of the offense, nor
does it determine or qualify the crime or penalty, so that even if a discrepancy exists, this cannot be
pleaded as a ground for acquittal. In other words, his right to be informed of the charges against him has
not been violated because where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only
of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein.

 
1688
Prepared by: Katrina S. Diploma 1
 
15. BELTRAN vs SAMSON G.R. No. 32025 September 23, 1929

FACTS:
The petitioner complains that Judge Samson ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to
take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for
the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified. The respondent contend that the petitioner is not entitled to
the remedy applied for. The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge,
upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses
to be present at the investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without
prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear.

The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional
provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58 which reads: "Nor shall
he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." As to its scope, this  privilege is not
limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right against self-incrimination was violated when he was
compelled to write for the purpose of comparing the petitioner’s handwriting and determining whether he
wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified

HELD:
Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that ascertain
writing or signature is in his own hand, he may or may not, on cross-examination, write in open court in
order that the jury may be able to compare his handwriting with the one in question. Here the witness is
compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which
may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a
specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the
circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to
obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means complained, that is not reason for trampling upon
a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of in
nocent persons.

16. GANDICELA vs LUTERO GR No. L-4069

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the petitioner against the respondent
judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Iloilo.
The petitioner was charged with the crime of serious physical injuries in an information filed by
the City Fiscal of Iloilo on May 12, 1950. When the trial of the case was finally set on July 17, 1950, "the
City Fiscal appeared for the prosecution and informed the court that there was a private prosecutor
authorized to present the case in court, and that he is not ready to enter into trial for Fiscal Daguay is the
one handing this case, who is at present appearing in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo." The court,
"taking into consideration that Attorney Mapa has not entered had appearance in this case and that this
case has been dragging along for so many weeks, today being the last day set for trial, hereby orders that
this case be dismissed without prejudice on the part of the City Fiscal, City of Iloilo, to file another
information, with costs de oficio."

The petitioner contends that "The dismissal of the case without prejudice by the respondent judge
upon the failure of the prosecution to enter into trial violates the constitutional right of your petitioner to a
speedy trial; the respondent judge ought to have dismissed the case definitely;" and alleges "That there is
no appeal nor any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law from the
aforementioned order of the respondent judge, except the petition for certiorari and mandamus."

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of the right to speedy trial against respondent Lutero

HELD:
 According to Section 9 of Rule 13, if a criminal case is dismissed otherwise than upon the merits
at any stage before judgment, without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after defendant has pleaded to the charge, the
dismissal of the case shall be definite a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; but if it is
dismissed upon the petition or with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will be without
prejudice or not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, because, in the last case, the
defendant's action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right not be
prosecuted again for the same offense.

If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to speedy trial, he should ask, not for the
dismissal but for the trial of the case. If the prosecution asks for the postponement of the hearing and the
court believes that the hearing cannot be postponed anymore without violating the right of the accused to
a speedy trial, the court shall deny the postponement and proceed with the trial and require the fiscal to
present the witnesses for the prosecution; and if the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and
consequently fails to proved the defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court, upon the motion of
the defendant, shall dismiss the case.

Besides, the respondent judge, in dismissing the case without prejudice on the part of the fiscal to
the file another information, has acted, not only within the court's jurisdiction, but correctly, because the
case was dismissed with the express consent of the accused or petitioner, who move for the case. If the
defendant or petitioner did not move for the dismissal and the respondent dismissed the case, the
dismissal would be definite or a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, even if the court or judge
erroneously states in the order of dismissal that it be without prejudice on the part of the city fiscal; to file
another information, because the court can not change the nature and legal effects of such dismissal, and
the petitioner can not be prosecuted again for the same offense. But where a defendant expressly consents
to, by moving for, the dismissal of the case against him, as in the present case, even if the court or judge
states in the order that the dismissal is definite or does not say that the dismissal is without prejudice on
the part of the fiscal to file another information, the dismissal will not be a bar to a subsequent
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.

17. PEOPLE vs MARIO SERZO GR No. 118435

FACTS:

The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our Constitution, our laws and our Rules of
Court. During custodial investigation, arraignment, trial and even on appeal, the accused is given
the option to be represented by a counsel of his choice. But when he neglects or refuses to exercise this
option during arraignment and trial, the court shall appoint one for him.While the right to be represented
by counsel is absolute, the accuseds option to hire one of his own choice is limited. Such option cannot be
used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, to trifle with the Rules or to prejudice the equally
important rights of the state and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.

Alfredo Alcantara Y Casabal never knew that death was just around the corner inevitably meeting
his way. That fateful night of August 22, 1990, Alfredo together with his wife Adelaida Alcantara were
staying inside their house comfortably watching television when at around 11:30 in the evening, Susana
Serzo, mother of the accused, and one Epifania Bentilacion came knocking at their doorsteps and
pleading for help to bring out her grandchildren who were being held inside their house by her son, the
accused in this case. Unhesitatingly, the couple heeded their call and went with them at their house,
located just across the private complainant’s residence. The spouses were able to rescue the grandchildren
and to bring them to a safer place. When returning to their house, Alfredo Alcantara who was walking
just armslength ahead of his wife, was attacked by accused Mario Serzo from behind. Accused stabbed
Alfredo at his back forcing the latter to scamper for his dear life. However, accused was able to
overpower him thereby causing his fall in the canal where he was repeatedly stabbed by the
accused. Adelaida Alcantara shouted for help but was likewise attacked by the accused as she was only
half-meter away from her husband. However, Adelaida fortunately was able to hold the hand of the
knifewielder and persistently fought the accused. At that moment, the commotion had already caught the
attention of the residents within the vicinity who responded to help her thereby causing the accused to
flee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was denied of his right to counsel

HELD:

NO. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him in all stages of
the proceedings.The option to hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics,
trifle with the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the State and the offended party to speedy
and adequate justice.

The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where an accused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also a
recognition of the accused not having the skill to protect himself before a tribunal which has the power to
take his life or liberty.

The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal. RA
7438 provides that any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.
The right is however not absolute and is waivable; a) the state must balance the private against the state's
and offended party's equally important rightto speedy and adequate justice, and b) the right is waivable as
long as the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently made.

18. PEOPLE vs MORIAL GR No. 129295

FACTS:

On January 6, 1996, Paula and Albert Bandibas were killed and robbed. As a part of the

investigation and as a result of a witness’ testimony, Edwin and Leandro Morial were asked several
questions by the policemen and were invited to the police station for continuing investigation. They were
turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez and later interrogated again after they woke up at past 6 in the
morning. That investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez resulted into the admission by Leandro that he
was one of those who participated in the robbery with homicide. With the latter’s consent, his statements
were reduced into writing. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of his right to remain silent and to have a
counsel, whatever will be his answer will be used as evidence in court. SPO4 Fernandez volunteered
to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to which Leandro consented. Atty. Aguilar was contacted by the former
and he first met the latter at January 9, 1996 at about 8:00 in the morning. After Leandro agreed to answer
voluntarily knowing that the same can be used against him as evidence in court, the investigation was
conducted by SPO4 Fernandez with the presence of the counsel. After “all the material points” were
asked, Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator if he can leave due to very important engagement. The latter
agreed to the lawyer’s request. But before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to
answer questions in his absence, the latter agreed. During and despite Atty. Aguilar’s absence, SPO4
Fernandez continued with the investigation and propounded several more questions to Leonardo, which
the latter answered.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Leondro Morial’s right to counsel was waived during the investigation.
HELD

Leonardo was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation;
therefore his quasi-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him and his other co-accused.
The Court stressed out that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify that Atty. Aguilar only left
after Leonardo had admitted that he and his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar
rationalize that he only left after Leonardo had admitted the “material points”, referring to the
participation of the three accused to the crime. Both are invalid since Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 requires
that “any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel.” Furthermore, the last paragraph of Section 3 states that “in the absence of any lawyer, no
custodial investigation shall be conducted.”
Even granted that Leonardo consented Atty. Aguilar’s departure during the investigation and to
answer questions during the lawyer’s absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his right to counsel
and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, these rights cannot be
waived unless the same is made in writing and in the presence of the counsel. In the case at bar, no such
written and counseled waiver of these rights was presented as evidence.
19. PEOPLE vs REY SUNGA, et al.
    
FACTS:
Upon the discovery of the mutilated body of a high-school girl at a coffee plantation, an
Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Rape with Homicide against several
suspects including Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and
Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice.
        Rey Sunga et al. filed with the RTC a petition for bail underscoring the weakness of the
prosecution‘s evidence, there being no direct evidence against them. In the same proceeding, a motion
was granted to discharge Locil to become a state witness while deferring the resolution of the bail
petition.
        Through the testimony of Locil, the RTC reached to a decision convicting Sunga and Lansang as
principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of death, and
Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape.

ISSUE:
Whether the guilt of Sunga et al. has been proven beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged

HELD:
 The testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or
implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral
certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime. The testimony must be
substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances
and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest.
As an exception to the general rule on the requirement of corroboration of the testimony of an
accomplice or co-conspirator-turned state witness, her testimony may, even if uncorroborated, be
sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in a
straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could not have been the result of
deliberate afterthought.
The Court is not in fact prepared to accord Locil credibly as a witness. Who can trust one who, in
her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays in a boarding house albeit she has no visible means
of income to pay therefor, and carries an alias name to evade being traced by her mother and aunt?
Evidence to be believed should not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but should also be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances.
The observations pertaining to both the weak, incomprehensible voice with which Locil gave her
testimony, the improbability with which she was precisely made by appellants to be a witness to their
crime, and the failure of her description of Pascua‘s eyes to match the latter‘s actual physical feature
cannot but engender serious doubts as to the reliability of her testimony against all appellants. The Court
thus finds her uncorroborated account to have failed the jurisprudentially established touchstone for its
credibility and sufficienacy, that of straightforwardness and deliberateness, as evidence to warrant
appellants‘ conviction.
20. PEOPLE vs. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO 398 SCRA 567

FACTS:

Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto (Rullepa), a houseboy, was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City for allegedly having carnal knowledge with “AAA”, three (3) years of age,
a minor and against her will and without her consent.
“AAA” described her abuse under the hands of Rullepa in a plain and matter-of-fact manner in her
testimony. The victim and her mother testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape.
However, the prosecution did not offer the victim‘s certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents
in evidence.
Finding for the prosecution, the RTC rendered judgment finding Rullepa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape and accordingly sentenced him to death. The case was placed for automatic
review of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon Rullepa

HELD:

A person‘s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being

addressed to the senses of the court. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape cases,
the Court in People v. Pruna laid down the guideline.
 Under the guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient
to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a) and (b) above. In such cases, the disparity
between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily determine from
the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relative‘s
testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person‘s appearance, as object
evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and, following
United States v. Agadas, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved
(below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victim‘s age from
her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists.
A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old.
The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and the testimony of
the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that “AAA” was below seven years old at the
time of the commission of the offense, Rullepa cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only
the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
21. PEOPLE vs ARDEL CANUTO 528 SCRA 366 (2007)

FACTS:
The testimony of the victim that she felt nothing when the rape was committed does not negate
the commission thereof. AAA, a 15-year old girl, was allegedly raped by Ardel Canuto. Six (6) months
later, AAA related the incident to her aunt DDD who accompanied her to a hospital where she was
medically examined by a doctor. The examination showed that AAA‘s genitalia had an old
hymenal laceration. AAA then filed a case against Canuto and the Regional Trial Court convicted Canuto
of rape, sentencing him to a penalty of death. After a review of the case by the Court of  Appeals,
the appellate court affirmed the trial court‘s decision with modification consisting of an increase in the
amount of civil indemnity and moral and exemplary damages awarded to AAA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding Canuto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged

HELD:
In his Brief filed with this Court, Canuto maintains that the lower courts erred in convicting him,
the prosecution having failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court said that the
fact that AAA felt nothing while she was being raped by Canuto does not negate the commission of the
crime. A 15-year-old naive barrio lass, threatened with death or serious injury if she repulses the
sexual advances of the accused, can only cower in fear and yield into submission. As for AAA‘s delay of
almost six months in reporting the incident to the authorities, People v. Francisco, People v. Marcelo and
People v. Bayani enlighten. In these cases, this Court declared that a six- month delay in reporting the
rape to the authorities does not impair the credibility of the private complainant or indicate a fabricated
charge if satisfactorily explained. In AAA‘s case, the fear instilled in her by Canuto that he would kill her
and her kin if she reported the questioned act could explain the delay, especially given her awareness
that appellant had been previously convicted and detained for killing someone. Besides, many victims of
rape never complain or file criminal chargesagainst the rapist, they preferring to silently bear the
ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offender‘s making good his
threats.
22. MENDOZA vs. BORJA GR Ono. L-45667

FACTS:
 Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not arraigned.
That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a
decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to the Court o First
Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the failure to arraign him is a
violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without
requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor
General commented that the decision should be annulled because there was noarraignment.

ISSUE:
 Whether or Not petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned.

HELD:
Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as
to why he was indicted and whatpenal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his
guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is
also not just due process that requires anarraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused, for the
first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he
is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the
crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the
state is mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed
him. Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of
an arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being
thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on
him should be set aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view
of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R.
Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is
nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November
16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is
remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due
respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.
23. PEOPLE vs. MAHINAY 302 SCRA 455
FACTS:
 
Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his tasks was to take care
of Isip’s house which was under construction adjacent to the latter’s residence. The victim was a 12-year
old girl who used to frequent the residence of Isip.
On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was reported missing by her mother. The
following morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney and disappeared.
The victim’s body was found, lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same day. She was found in the
septic tank wearing her blouse and no underwear. The autopsy showed that the victim was raped and was
strangled to death.
 Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown
belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by the victim’s mother to belong to her daughter. Also,
they found a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of the appellant. Also found in the yard,
three armslength away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants
and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellant’s belongings.
The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated
how the crime was committed. The trial ensued and the lower court convicted him of the crime of Rape
and was sentenced to death.
The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

ISSUE:
 
1. WON the appellant’s extra-judicial confession was validly taken and in accordance with his
rights under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights; and
 
2. WON the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt
 
HELD: 
The conviction of the appellant is affirmed.
 
The Court ruled that the appellant’s extrajudicial confession was taken within the ambit of the
law as evinced by the records and testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him his
constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights.
 
As to the second issue, the appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution is insufficient to warrant a conviction of his guilt. However, the Court ruled otherwise.
 
The Court recalled the Rule on Evidence and settled jurisprudence. Absence of direct proof does
not absolve the appellant because conviction may be had with the concurrence of the following requisites
as stated in the Rules of Court:
1.    there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
The Court recalled the ruling in People v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141, all circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt.
And also in People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 citing People v. Abitona, 240 SCRA 335, that facts and
circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight
and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
The Court agreed with the trial court’s decision in giving credence to several circumstantial
evidence, which is more than enough to prove appellant’s guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.
The Court also updated the Miranda rights with the developments in law that provided the rights of
suspects under custodial investigation in detail
24. PEOPLE VS. ANDRE MARTI GR 81561, 18 JANUARY 1991
FACTS:
 On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of
the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying
with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes)
attended to them. Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport
number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ,
Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who
assured the former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his
friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown
corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with
masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the
boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job
Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's packages was opened, yielding dried
marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and
took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the
said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated
address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti for
violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal
Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting Marti of
violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's constitutional
rights, be invoked against the State.

HELD:
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing the accused's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court
sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense
charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes
into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that
which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on
the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution. The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only
be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at
bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

25. PEOPLE vs. EDUARDO AGBAYANI GR No. 122770

FACTS:
Sometime in September of 1993 in Malolos, Bulacan, the accused was charged by his two
daughters, FEDELINA and DODIMA the crime of rape. The case was, however, provisionally dismissed
by said Judge after the complainants desisted from pursuing the same. Eduardo Agbayani was thus
consequently released from jail. Three (3) days thereafter he molested again Eden, one of his siblings.
 
The next day, they go to Bulacan to report the incident to Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan, who had, the
year before, handled the rape case filed by Fedelina and Dodima. Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan reported
the complaint to Judge Danilo Manalastas who reopened the previous provisionally dismissed case and
issued a warrant of arrest against the herein accused. The trial court convicted the accused. The defense
contended that he was denied of the right to counsel.

ISSUE:
Did the lower court failed to apprise him of his right to have counsel of his own choice?

HELD:
No. It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised
the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the
trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and
trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the
contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved
that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused
was informed by the court of such right.

26. AMION vs. CHIONGSON 301 SCRA 614

FACTS:
 This is an administrative matter filed before the court charging the respondent judge for
ignorance of the law and oppression for vehemently insisting of appointing the accused-appellant counsel
de officio despite the appellant’s opposition because he has his own counsel of choice in the person of
Atty. Depasucat. However, many instances that Atty. Depasucat did not appear in court which prompted
respondent judge to assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to represent the accused stating on record that
his representation is without prejudice to the appearance of the accused own counsel. This was done in
order to avoid delay of the trial since the complainant already expressed frustration on the so many
postponement of the hearing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel of his own choice as asserted by the
accused in the case at bar.

HELD:
  The court finds the administrative complaint against respondent judge devoid of merit. An
examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the
"preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under
investigation  rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution. Accused-complainant was not,
in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all
the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right,
for not appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. It was the strategic
machination of delaying the proceeding by the accused that gave rise to the need of appointing him
counsel de officio by the court as delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to speedy disposition of a
case and causes delay in the administration of justice. 

27. PEOPLE VS AGBULOS

Facts:
Angelita Bangit filed a complaint against Joselito Agbulos, charging him with Forcible abduction
with rape. Agbulos was arraigned on January 23,1981 where he pleaded guilty. On April 25, 1984, the
prosecution rested its case. On August 13,1984, a warrant of arrest was issued against Agbulos, but was
later on recalled because it was issued to the wrong bonding company, thus the hearing was reset on
November 5, 1984,. On the said date, Agbulos failed to appear before the court. The bonding company
was given 30 days to produce the person of the accused and show the cause why judgement should not be
rendered against them. The bonding company fails to surrender the accused and the court issued an order
stating that upon motion of fiscal, judgement will issue against the full amount of the bond. Trial was
further reset to January 30, 1985 and still the accused failed to appear. Pursuant to the order of the court
on the judgement on the bond, accused was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence, thus,
Defense counsel just manifested that they were adopting the testimony of prosecution witness Ernesto
Tamayo, thereafter; the defense rested its case. On July 11 1985, judgement was rendered against the
bonding company, and on June 15 1985, accused was found guilty of forcible abduction with rape,
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and indemnification. On August 16, counsel for
accused appealed.

ISSUE: Was the trial in absentia valid? Whether or not the accused may appeal?

HELD:
Yes, it was perfectly valid in accordance with the constitution. The old case of people vs
Avanceña required the presence of the accused at certain stages of the trial. This only results in the
discontinuance of the trial as long as the defendant would not reappear or remain at large. This rule would
work for the fugitive’s advantage. This rule is now modified by the bill of rights which allows trial in
absentia. The prisoner cannot simply escape and thwart the continuance of prosecution and conviction
against him provided that he has been arraigned, duly notified, and his failure toappear unjustified. By the
same rule, the accused forfeits his right to appeal. Rule 124, section 8 of the 1985  rules on criminal
procedure provide that the court may, upon motion of the appellee, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement, or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

28. PEOPLE VS. GANO

FACTS:
On December 31, 1994 at around 7:00 in the morning Sr.Inspector Ernesto Garcia received a
report of a massacre at a residence in San Mateo Rizal. At the crime scene Garcia saw the body of
Pociano Salen and was thereafter informed the identity of the suspect. The suspect in the name of
Castanito Gano a.k.a. Allan Gano or Jerry Perez or several other known aliases was arrested and detained
in Butuan Cityafter having tried to escape from the authorities. On their way back to Manila Garcia
disclosed that the accused confessed to him his responsibility for the triple killing and robbery .Upon
arraignment, the accused Castanito Gano made a qualified admission by admitting the killing of the three
(3) victims but denying the charge of robbery. Considering that what is charged is a complex crime with a
single penalty, the accused with the assistance of his counsel entered a plea of Not guilty.

ISSUE:
WON the voluntary confession being conditional could be mitigating?
HELD: NO. The Court ruled that if the voluntary confession is conditional or qualified, it is NOT
mitigating. The accused was merely confessing to the crime of homicide but NOT to robbery with
homicide, a considerably graver offence. For voluntary confession to be appreciated as an extenuating
circumstance, the same must not only be made unconditionally but the accused must admit to the offense
charged, i.e.robbery with homicide and not to either robbery or homicide only. Hence, If the voluntary
confession is conditional or qualified, it is not mitigating.