Concrete Vs Teodoro

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29766 November 29, 1968
PERMANENT CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DONATO TEODORO, defendant-appellant,
CLEMENTINA VDA. DE GUISON, defendant-appellee.
Dizon Law Office for plaintiff-appellee.
Andres T. Velarde for defendant-appellant.
V. E. del Rosario and Associates for defendant-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
This appeal from the decision in civil case 64002 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila was certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court because it
involves only questions of law.
There is no dispute as to the material and relevant facts.
The defendant Clementina Vda. de Guison hired the defendant contractor,
Teodoro & Associates, to construct a building for her for a lump sum of
P44,000, the contractor explicitly agreeing in the written contract with Guison
that "all of said labor and materials shall be supplied by me."
During the construction, the contractor ordered and received from the plaintiff
Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. hollow blocks, of an aggregate value of
P759.88, which were used in the construction of the building. The contractor
refused to pay the said amount, despite demands made upon it, on the
ground that payment thereof is properly the obligation of Guison.
On May 18, 1964 the plaintiff filed suit in the city court of Manila against
Donato Teodoro and Guison for the collection of the sum of P759.88, with
interest thereon, plus attorney's fees and costs of suit. It amended its
complaint on July 6, 1964 to include Teodoro & Associates as co-defendant
and/or alternative defendant.
On December 16, 1964 the city court rendered judgment.
... in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant C. Vda. de Guison,
ordering said defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P759.88 with interest
thereon at the stipulated rate of 12% per annum from March 9, 1963, the date
of first extra-judicial demand (Exh. G), until the whole amount shall have been
fully paid, plus the sum of P75.00 as and for attorney's fees, and the costs of
suit.
Guison appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, in which tribunal all
the parties adopted and reproduced the respective pleadings they filed with
the city court.
On June 7, 1966 at the pre-trial conference held before the Court of First
Instance, only three issues were agreed upon by the parties, which were
incorporated in an order of the said court of the same date, to wit, (1) whether
the defendant Guison, the owner of the building, can be held liable for
materials ordered by the contractor without her signing for them; (2) whether
the contractor can collect from Guison for an additional construction, the
contract for which was entered into verbally between the contractor and the
tenant of Guison with her consent; and (3) whether the contractor can be
made responsible for the purchase of electrical goods which were substituted
with imported ones, although the contract does not so specify.
No evidence was presented. The parties filed their respective memoranda,
after which the case was considered submitted for decision.
On September 12, 1966 the CFI rendered judgment ordering Donato Teodoro
to pay to the plaintiff the cost of the hollow blocks (P759.88) with interest, plus
attorney's fees and costs.
The latter's appeal to the Court of Appeals (which certified the case to us, as
earlier mentioned) imputes two errors to the CFI. More specifically,
The court a quo erred in sentencing the defendant-appellant to pay the sum
of P759.88 with interest, costs and attorney's fees there being no evidence
whatsoever to show his connection or participation in the transactions subject
thereof; and
Even assuming arguendo that the appellant had something to do with said
construction, defendant Clementina Vda. de Guison should be made liable for
the plaintiff's claim and not appellant.
1. The thrust of the appellant's assignment of error is that he cannot be held
liable for the cost of the hollow blocks plus interest, attorney's fees and costs
of suit, because no evidence was presented to show or even remotely
suggest that he had any participation in or connection with any of the
transactions involved in this case. This argument, however, ignores the
admitted fact that at the pre-trial conference held in the court below, all the
parties agreed to limit the issues to only three questions of law affecting all
the parties alike. At the said pre-trial conference, the appellant failed to put in
issue his alleged non-participation, in spite of the clear allegation in the
amended complaint that "defendant Donato Teodoro and/or Teodoro and
Associates was the contractor." Clearly, the question now sought to be
argued and discussed by the appellant was waived by him. For indeed, the
delimitation of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other
questions on appeal.1
And this is as it should be. "One of the objectives of pre-trial procedure is to
take trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering."2 Pre-trial is
primarily intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition
of a cause are properly raised.3 Thus, to obviate the element of surprise,
parties are expected to disclose at a pre-trial conference all issues of law and
fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may involve
privilege or impeaching matter.4
The appellant waited until the case was decided against him in the court a
quo before he raised on appeal the issue of his non-participation in the
transactions which gave rise to this case. His failure to disclose this defense
is contrary to the purpose and spirit of pre-trial procedure as established and
conducted in our courts. It effectively prevented the plaintiff and the defendant
Guison from being accorded an opportunity to meet this defense. Both as a
weapon of attack and defense, surprise should not be tolerated under our
Rules of Court. The appellant is bound by the delimitation of the issues
contained in the trial court's order issued on the very day the pre-trial
conference was held. Such an order controls the subsequent course of the
action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. In the case at
bar, modification of the pre-trial order was never sought at the instance of any
party.
The city court's pronouncement regarding the absence of evidence linking the
appellant to the transactions, is of no moment. When a civil case is appealed
from a city or municipal court to the court of first instance, all the proceedings
had are deemed vacated. Thus provides sec. 9 of Rule 40 of the Revised
Rules of Court:
A perfected appeal shall operate to vacate the judgment of the municipal or
city court, and the action when duly docketed in the Court of First Instance
shall stand for trial de novo upon its merits in accordance with the regular
procedure in that court, as though the same had never been tried before and
had been originally there commenced....
At all events, the record discloses circumstances which negative the
appellant's contention that he is in no way connected with the transactions
that gave rise to this controversy. First. His identical address with Teodoro
& Associates at 76 Makiling, Cubao, Quezon City, identifies him to be the
contractor or one of several contractors doing business under the name and
style of "Teodoro & Associates." Second. He was served with summons at
the same address with the Teodoro and Associates, and in fact both were
represented in the court below by one and the same counsel in the person of
Atty. Ismael M. Estella. Third. The second paragraph of the appellant's
crossclaim for reimbursement against Guison contained in his amended
answer with counterclaim and cross-claim dated January 20, 1965, impliedly
admits that he was involved in the said transactions had with the plaintiff.
2. The appellant argues, upon his other assignment of error, that assuming
that he participated in the transactions involving the construction of the
building, it is Guison, because she is the owner of the building, who is liable
for the cost of the hollow blocks used therein.
This argument is unavailing. By virtue of the contract between Guison and the
contractor, the latter expressly assumed the cost of the materials by
undertaking that "All of said labor and materials shall be supplied by me," and
this logically because the contract was for the construction of a building for
which Guison agreed to pay a total lump sum.
It is true that the installation of the hollow blocks in the house of Guison
redounded to her benefit. It does not thereby follow, however, that she was
enriched at the expense of the plaintiff. The contract between her and the
contractor, we reiterate, was for a lump sum of P44,000, with the latter
assuming the obligation to furnish all labor and materials. In the absence of
proof that she failed to comply with her covenant to pay P44,000 to the
contractor, the latter is legally obliged to make good its own undertaking to
furnish all materials and labor.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, at appellant's costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

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