Privatisation and Take-Overs
Privatisation and Take-Overs
Privatisation and Take-Overs
These regulations are put in place to protect the The conduct of the take-over schemes must
interests of shareholders and to ensure that all comply with the requirements as stipulated by the
take-overs and mergers take place in a Securities Commission, and embodied under the
competitive, informed and efficient market. Also, Rules of the Malaysian Code on Take-Overs and
the laws and regulations are to ensure all Mergers 2010.
shareholders of a company involved in a take-
over and merger situation receive fair and equal The take-over offers could be made by any party,
treatment. i.e. by the existing controlling shareholders or any
other party. If the offer is made by existing
The methods of privatisation are mainly controlling shareholders or by a party that is
categorized into:- aligned to the controlling shareholders, then the
offer is commonly regarded as a friendly take-
(i) Take-over offer; and over. If the offer is made by a party that is not
aligned to the existing controlling shareholders or
(ii) Selective capital repayment; and not by the invitation of the board of directors, then
this is generally regarded as a hostile take-over.
(iii) Disposal of Assets and its business
undertakings. In Malaysia, the take-over offer can be voluntary
or mandatory. A mandatory offer is required to be
Based on recent trends, the most common type of made when the shareholding ownership in the
privatisation is via the take-over offer route, with a listed company is above the trigger level due to
total of 11 and 9 transactions or representing 65% acquisition of shares by the owner. The trigger
and 75% of the total privatisation transactions in levels are namely:-
2012 and 2011, respectively.
(i) an acquisition of 33% of voting shares by a
person together with persons acting in concert
with them (acquirer), or when
Methods of privatisation
Take-over offer
This is also the preferred approach by Tan Sri Under this route, the major shareholder offers to
Ananda Krishnan (TAK) where all companies take the listed company private, by proposing the
that were taken private by him or parties listed company to buy back the shares of the
connected to him including Maxis, Bumi Armada minority shareholders at an offer price. The
and Astro All Asia Networks Plc were done via shares bought back would then be cancelled
take-over offers. pursuant to the Section 64 of the Companies Act
1965. Upon cancellation of the shares bought
The offeror succeeded in getting not less than back from the minority shareholders, the major
90% of the shares not held by the offeror or shareholder would then own 100% of the reduced
persons acting in concert prior to privatisation via capital of the company, and the company would
the take-over offers. As allowed by the Capital then be delisted upon completion of the exercise.
Market & Services Act 2007 (CMSA) and
Companies Act, 1965, the offerors can then The SCR route would require approval from the
invoke the compulsory acquisition of the shareholders of the company via a special
remaining shares not held by them if the resolution in which the promoter would have to
remaining dissenting shareholders decide not to abstain from voting. In addition to regulatory
take up the offer under the privatisation. It can be approvals, the listed company would require an
seen that a majority of the successful offerors approval from the creditors for the capital
eventually invoked this provision and compulsorily reduction and thereafter a sanction by the Court.
acquired the remaining shares of the dissenting
shareholders. The drawback for the SCR method as compared
to the take-over route is that this may be more
The compulsory acquisition provision is a very tedious as approvals from creditors and court
useful tool in any privatisation exercise. This is to would be required for the successful
ensure that the offerors would be able to buy out implementation of the privatisation. The privatised
the entire company in a privatisation, so long as company may also need to recapitalise if the
they are able to successfully obtain acceptances reduced capital from the privatisation is not
for not less than 90% of the shares not held by optimum for the operations of the company.
them upon the launch of the privatisation scheme.
Effectively, if there are some small dissenting Generally, privatisation schemes that involved
shareholders (representing less than 10% of the SCR are those companies which are
buy-out shares) who do not agree to the undervalued, and have substantial cash or ability
privatisation, the law is crafted so that this small to raise cash so that the major shareholders can
dissenting group would not have a green mail use the cash in the company to make payment to
leverage against the offerors. This is a fair the other shareholders via the SCR. In this way,
provision, and adequate protection has been the major shareholders need not raise the
included in the laws to ensure that the interests of necessary financing in order to take the company
the minority shareholders are not jeopardized in private.
any privatisation scheme.
Some of the listed companies that have used this
Without this provision, an offeror in a privatisation route as a method for privatisation of the listed
take-over offer scheme would then be subjected company in 2012 included Mamee-Double Decker
to uncertainties of not being able to buy-out the (M) Berhad and Lipo Corporation Berhad. The
entire company even if the offer to the minority privatisation of these 2 companies alone has
shareholders is fair and reasonable as any wiped out market capitalisation of approximately
shareholder can refuse to accept the offer. RM716 million from Bursa Malaysia.
John Master Industries Berhad (John This does not preclude the major shareholder as
Master Industries) A Case of Indirect well from partaking in the bid.
Privatisation via the disposal of assets
and business undertakings The major shareholder of John Master Industries,
via Yoon Foong Garments Sdn Bhd (YFG),
John Master Industries sale of the entire business made a bid for RM77.4 million, and was the
and undertakings and returning the proceeds to successful bidder in the tender exercise as no
shareholders was not a privatisation exercise, well other higher bid was received when the tender
not anyway in a technical sense. The exercise, closed on 23 July 2009. After negotiation with the
when announced on 23 June 2009, was independent directors, YFG was given the green
effectively a proposal to dispose of the entire light to buy the entire business and undertakings
business and undertakings via a tender exercise. of John Master Industries after they agreed to
The rationale for the proposed disposal as stated increase their offer price by RM1.1 million from
by the board of directors was due to uncertain the original bid. John Master Industries then
outlook of the companys future financial embarked on a capital repayment exercise to
performance whereby its revenue growth for the repay all the proceeds from the disposal of the
past 3 financial years ended up to 31 March 2009 entire business and undertakings. The indirect
had been rather stagnant and that the company privatisation of John Master Industries was
had been incurring losses for the 2 of the past 3 successful when the minority shareholders voted
financial years as well as the challenging outlook for the disposal and repayment of the proceeds.
and prospects of the industry in which the The shareholders received a RM0.63 per share
company operates in. Given the unfavourable capital repayment which is equivalent to the net
circumstances above, it is unlikely for the asset per share of the company after taking into
company to declare dividends in the near future. consideration of the loss arising from the disposal
For the benefit of the shareholders, a tender was and estimated expenses for the exercise. The
undertaken to enable the company to realize the repayment amount was at a premium of 28.6%
highest value for the disposal. As a tender was over its last traded market price of RM0.49 per
called, anyone can bid for the business and share prior to the disposal announcement on 19
undertakings and assets, in whole or in part. June 2009.
Part 3
The success or failure of the privatisation can be affected by the offer price and the corresponding premium
of the offer price over the market traded price. Needless to say, the privatisation would have a higher chance
of succeeding if the price offered contains a higher premium when compared to the market traded price. The
average premiums paid for recent successful privatisation transactions are about between 18% to 22% over
the 5-day volume weighted average price, as can be seen in the table below :-