Politics of Saudi Arabia

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Saudi Arabia

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 The politics of Saudi Arabia takes place in the context of an absolute
monarchy, where the King of Saudi Arabia is bothhead of state and
the head of government, but decisions are, to a large extent, made on the
basis of consultation among the senior princes of the royal family and the
religious establishment. The Qur'an is declared to be the constitution of
the country, which is governed on the basis of Islamic law (Shari'a).
Government is dominated by the vast royal family, the Al Saud, which
has often been divided by internal disputes and into factions. The
members of the family are the principal political actors. Political
participation outside of the royal family is limited, but there has been
pressure for some time to broaden participation. In recent years[when?],
there has been a rise inIslamist activism, which has also resulted in
Islamist terrorism. According to at least some observers, "traditionally"
issues such as foreign policy, national defense, and international affairs
have been "the purview of the state" in Saudi Arabia, while "justice,
education, and family matters", being related to religion, had been
handled by "the religious establishment". However, in recent years, "the
Saudi state has been working to reclaim control of these areas."[1]

Contents
[hide]

1 Constitution

2 National government

o 2.1 The King

o 2.2 Royal family

o 2.3 The Ulema and the Al ash-Sheikh

o 2.4 Corruption

o 2.5 Reform

3 Politics outside of the royal family

o 3.1 Political participation

o 3.2 Opposition to the royal family

o 3.3 Islamist terrorism

 o 3.4 Arab Spring protests

4 Regional government

o 4.1 Municipal elections

5 Political reform

6 See also

7 References

8 External links

Constitution[edit]

Verses from the Quran, the official constitution of the country

Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy,[2] although, according to the Basic
Law of Saudi Arabia adopted by royal decree in 1992, the king must
comply with Sharia (that is, Islamic law) and the Quran. The Quran and
the Sunnah are declared to be the country's constitution.[3] There is no
legally binding written constitution and the Quran and the Sunna remain
subject to interpretation. This is carried out by the ulema, the Saudi
religious establishment.[4]

National government[edit]
The government of Saudi Arabia is led by the monarch, King Salman,
who acceded to the throne in 23 January 2015. No political parties or
national elections are permitted[2] and according to The
Economist's 2010 Democracy Index, the Saudi government was the
seventh most authoritarian regime from among the 167 countries rated.
[5]
Government is dominated by the royal family.[6]
The King[edit]
The Basic Law specifies that the king must be chosen from among the
sons of the first king, Abdul Aziz Al Saud, and their male
descendants[7] subject to the subsequent approval of religious leaders
(the ulema).[2] In 2007, an "Allegiance Council" was created, comprising
King Abdulaziz's surviving sons plus a son of each his deceased sons, to
determine which member of the royal family will be the heir apparent
(the Crown Prince) after Prince Muhammad, who is the current Crown
Prince, either dies or accedes to the throne.[8]

King Salman of Saudi Arabia

The king combines legislative, executive, and judicial functions[9] and
royal decrees form the basis of the country's legislation.[10]The king is also
the prime minister, and presides over the Council of Ministers (Majlis al-
Wuzar), which comprises the first and second deputy prime ministers
(usually the first and second in line to the throne respectively) and 23
ministers with portfolio and five ministers of state.[11] The king makes
appointments to and dismissals from the Council, which is responsible for
such executive and administrative matters as foreign and domestic policy,
defense, finance, health, and education, administered through numerous
separate agencies.[9] There is also a 150-member Consultative Assembly,
appointed by the King,[12] which can propose legislation to the King but
has no legislative powers itself,[13] including no role in budget formation.
The government budget itself is not fully disclosed to the public. "Fully
40%" ... is labeled `Other sectors` (including defense, security,
intelligence, direct investment of the kingdom's revenues outside the
country, and how much goes to directly to the royal family).[14][15]
Although, in theory, the country is an absolute monarchy, in practice
major policy decisions are made outside these formal governmental
structures and not solely by the king. Decisions are made by establishing
a consensus within the royal family (comprising the numerous
descendants of the kingdom's founder, King Abdulaziz). In addition, the
views of important members of Saudi society, including
the ulema (religious scholars), leading tribal sheikhs, and heads of
prominent commercial families are considered.[9]
As an absolute monarchy, the personality and capabilities of the reigning
monarch have an impact on the politics and national policies of the
country. King Saud (19531964) was considered incompetent and
extravagant and his rule led to an economic and political crisis that
resulted in his forced abdication.[16] King Faisal (19641975) was a
"modernist" who favored economic, technological and governmental
progress but was also politically and religiously conservative. He directed
the country's rapid economic and bureaucratic development of the early
1970s, but also made concessions to the religious establishment, and
abandoned plans to broaden political participation.[17] King Khalid (1975
1982) left government largely to his Crown Prince, Fahd,[18] who
succeeded him as King (19822005). Prince Fahd was a talented
administrator who initiated significant industrial development in the
Kingdom. He was regarded by many as the "father of the country's
modernization".[19] However, during the last 10 years of his reign, ill-
health prevented him from fully functioning. In the absence of a king who
could provide strong central leadership, the state structure began to
fragment[20] and the country stagnated.[21] King Abdullah, who came to the
throne in 2005, was seen as a reformer[22] and has introduced economic
reforms (limited deregulation, encouragement of foreign investment, and
privatization) and made modernizing changes to the judiciary and
government ministries.[23]
Royal family[edit]
The royal family dominates the political system. The family's vast
numbers allow it to hold most of the kingdom's important posts and to
have an involvement and presence at all levels of government.[6] The
number of princes is estimated to be anything from 7,000 upwards, with
the most power and influence being wielded by the 200 or so male
descendants of King Abdulaziz.[24] The key ministries have historically
been reserved for the royal family,[2] as are the thirteen regional
governorships.[25]With the large number of family members seeking well
paying jobs, critics complain that even "middle management" jobs in the
Kingdom out of reach for non-royal Saudis, limiting upward mobility and
incentive for commoners to excel.[26]
The one exception to this rule was Khaled al-Tuwaijri, Secretary General
of the Court and King Adbullah's minence grise. He was a commoner
and immensely powerful, which meant he was despised by most royals,
especially the Suderis, who sacked him as soon as the old king died.
Long term political and government appointments result in the creation of
"power fiefdoms" for senior princes.[27] Examples include: King
Abdullah, who was the Commander of the National Guard from 1963
until 2010, when he then appointed his son to replace him;
[28]
Crown Prince Sultan, was Minister of Defense and Aviation from 1962
to 2011; Prince Nayef was the Minister of Interior from 1975 until his
death in 2012; Prince Saud had been Minister of Foreign Affairs from
1975 to just before his death in 2015;[29] and King Salman, was the
Governor of the Riyadh Region from 1962 to 2011.[30]
In the absence of national elections and political parties,[2] politics in
Saudi Arabia takes place in two distinct arenas: within the royal family,
the Al Saud, and between the royal family and the rest of Saudi society.
[31]
The royal family is politically divided by factions based on clan
loyalties, personal ambitions and ideological differences.[31]The most
powerful clan faction is known as the 'Sudairi Seven', comprising the late
King Fahd and his full brothers and their descendants.[8] Ideological
divisions include issues over the speed and direction of reform,[32] and
whether the role of the ulema should be increased or reduced. There were
also divisions within the family over who should succeed Crown Prince
Sultan.[8][33]
Leading figures in the royal family with differing ideological orientations
included Prince Nayef, the late Interior Minister, and Prince Saud Al-
Faisal, the Foreign Minister. Prince Nayef was personally committed to
maintaining Saudi Arabia's conservative Wahhabi values. Of the senior
princes, he was probably the least comfortable with King Abdullah's
desire for reform. Following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United
States, perpetrated mostly by Saudi nationals, Prince Nayef was strongly
criticized by the U.S. for his reaction. It also took pressure from within
the royal family for him to launch a hunt for Islamist militants who had
attacked Western targets in Saudi Arabia. By contrast, Prince Saud Al
Faisal is one of the strongest supporters of political and social reform.
[34]
For example, he (as well as King Abdullah) has spoken in favor of
women having the right to vote, to follow the career path they wish and to
be able to drive a car. Women would be able to vote in municipal
elections beginning in 2012.BBC[35]
The Ulema and the Al ash-Sheikh[edit]
The significance of the ulema (the body of Islamic religious leaders and
jurists) is derived from the central role of religion in Saudi society. It has
been said that Islam is more than a religion, it is a way of life in Saudi
Arabia, and, as a result, the influence of the ulema is pervasive.[36] Saudi
Arabia is almost unique in giving the ulema a direct role in government,
[37]
the only other example being Iran.[38] Prior to 1971, a council of senior
ulema advising the king was headed by the Grand Mufti and met
informally. In that year, the council was formalized in a Council of Senior
Scholars, appointed by the king and with salaries paid by the government.
[39]

Not only is royal succession subject to the approval of the ulema,[2] so are
all new laws (royal decrees).[37] The ulema have also influenced major
executive decisions, for example the imposition of the oil embargo in
1973 and the invitation of foreign troops to Saudi Arabia in 1990.[40] It
plays a major role in the judicial and education systems[41] and has a
monopoly of authority in the sphere of religious and social morals.[42]
By the 1970s, as a result of oil wealth and the modernization of the
country initiated by King Faisal, important changes to Saudi society were
under way and the power of the ulema was in decline.[43] However, this
changed following the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in
1979 by Islamist radicals.[44] The government's response to the crisis
included strengthening the ulema's powers and increasing their financial
support:[45] in particular, they were given greater control over the
education system[44]and allowed to enforce stricter observance
of Wahhabi rules of moral and social behaviour.[45] Since his accession to
the throne in 2005, King Abdullah has taken steps to rein back the powers
of the ulema, for instance transferring their control over girls' education
to the Ministry of Education.[46]
The ulema have historically been led by the Al ash-Sheikh,[47] the
country's leading religious family.[42] The Al ash-Sheikh are the
descendants of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the 18th century founder
of the Wahhabi form of Sunni Islam which is today dominant in Saudi
Arabia.[48] The family is second in prestige only to the Al Saud (the royal
family)[49] with whom they formed a "mutual support pact"[50] and power-
sharing arrangement nearly 300 years ago.[40] The pact, which persists to
this day,[50]is based on the Al Saud maintaining the Al ash-Sheikh's
authority in religious matters and upholding and propagating Wahhabi
doctrine. In return, the Al ash-Sheikh support the Al Saud's political
authority [51] thereby using its religious-moral authority to legitimize the
royal family's rule.[52] Although the Al ash Sheikh's domination of the
ulema has diminished in recent decades,[53] they still hold the most
important religious posts and are closely linked to the Al Saud by a high
degree of intermarriage.[42]
Corruption[edit]
Corruption is widespread in Saudi Arabia, most prevalent in the form of
nepotism, the use of middlemen, wasta, to do business as well as
patronage systems.[54] The Saudi government and the royal family have
often, and over many years, been accused of corruption.[55] In a country
that is said to "belong" to the royal family and isnamed after it,[56] the
lines between state assets and the personal wealth of senior princes are
blurred.[24] The corruption has been described as systemic[57] and endemic,
[58]
and its existence was acknowledged[59] and defended[60] by Prince
Bandar bin Sultan (a senior member of the royal family)[61] in an
interview in 2001.[62]
Although corruption allegations have often been limited to broad
undocumented accusations,[63] specific allegations were made in 2007,
when it was claimed that the British defence contractor BAE Systems had
paid Prince Bandar US$2 billion in bribes relating to the Al-Yamamah
arms deal.[64] Prince Bandar denied the allegations.[65]Investigations by
both US and UK authorities resulted, in 2010, in plea bargain agreements
with the company, by which it paid $447 million in fines but did not
admit to bribery.[66] Transparency International in its annual Corruption
Perceptions Index for 2012 gave Saudi Arabia a score of 4.4 (on a scale
from 0 to 10 where 0 is "highly corrupt" and 10 is "highly clean").[67]
Reform[edit]
Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, there has been mounting pressure to
reform and modernize the royal family's rule, an agenda championed by
King Abdullah both before and after his accession in 2005. The creation
of the Consultative Council in the early 1990s did not satisfy demands for
political participation, and, in 2003, an annualNational Dialogue
Forum was announced that would allow selected professionals and
intellectuals to publicly debate current national issues, within certain
prescribed parameters. In 2005, the first municipal elections were held. In
2007, the Allegiance Council was created to regulate the succession.[68] In
2009, the king made significant personnel changes to the government by
appointing reformers to key positions and the first woman to a ministerial
post.[69] However, the changes have been criticized as being too slow or
merely cosmetic,[70] and the royal family is reportedly divided on the
speed and direction of reform.[32]
In 2011, Abdullah announced that women will be able to be nominated to
the Shura Council.[71]

Politics outside of the royal family[edit]

Politics in Saudi Arabia, outside of the royal family, can be examined in
three contexts: the extent to which the royal family allows political
participation by the wider Saudi society, opposition to the regime, and
Islamist terrorism.
Political participation[edit]
Outside of the House of Al Saud, participation in the political process is
limited to a relatively small segment of the population and takes the form
of the royal family consulting with the ulema, tribal sheikhs and members
of important commercial families on major decisions.[9] This process is
not reported by the Saudi media.[72] In theory, all males of the age of
majority have a right to petition the king directly through the traditional
tribal meeting known as the majlis.[73] In many ways, the approach to
government differs little from the traditional system of tribal rule. Tribal
identity remains strong and, outside of the royal family, political
influence is frequently determined by tribal affiliation, with tribal sheikhs
maintaining a considerable degree of influence over local and national
events.[9] In recent years there have been limited steps to widen political
participation, such as the establishment of the Consultative Council in the
early 1990s and the National Dialogue Forum in 2003.[68]
Opposition to the royal family[edit]
The rule of the Al Saud faces political opposition from four
sources: Sunni Islamist activism, liberal critics, including an underground
green party, the Shia minority particularly in the Eastern Province; and
long-standing tribal and regional particularistic opponents (for example in
the Hejaz).[74] Of these, the Islamic activists have been the most
prominent threat to the regime and have in recent years perpetrated a
number of violent or terrorist acts in the country.[75] However, open
protest against the government, even if peaceful, is not tolerated. On 29
January 2011, hundreds of protesters gathered in the city of Jeddah in a
rare display of protest against the city's poor infrastructure after deadly
floods swept through the city, killing eleven people.[76] Police stopped the
demonstration after about 15 minutes and arrested 30 to 50 people.[77]
Islamist terrorism[edit]
Osama bin Laden and 15 out of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudi
nationals[78] and former CIA director James Woolsey described Saudi
Arabian Wahhabism as "the soil in which Al-Qaeda and its sister terrorist
organizations are flourishing."[79]
According to a 2009 U.S. State Department communication by Hillary
Clinton, United States Secretary of State, (disclosed as part of
the Wikileaks U.S. 'cables leaks' controversy in 2010) "donors in Saudi
Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist
groups worldwide".[80] Part of this funding arises through the zakat (or
religious tax) required to be paid by all Saudis to charities, and amounting
to at least 2.5 percent of their income. Although many charities are
genuine, others, it is alleged, serve as fronts for money laundering
and terrorist financing operations. While many Saudis contribute to those
charities in good faith believing their money goes toward good causes, it
has been alleged that others know full well the terrorist purposes for
which their money will be used.[79][81]
Arab Spring protests[edit]
Main article: 201113 Saudi Arabian protests
Since 2011, Saudi Arabia has been affected by its own Arab
Spring protests.[82] In response, King Abdullah announced on 22 February
2011 a series of benefits for citizens amounting to $36 billion, of which
$10.7 billion was earmarked for housing.[83][84][85] No political reforms
were announced as part of the package, though some prisoners indicted
for financial crimes were pardoned.[86] On 18 March the same year, King
Abdullah announced a package of $93 billion, which included 500,000
new homes to a cost of $67 billion, in addition to creating 60,000 new
security jobs.[87][87][88]
The lack of critical thought in the education system has been cited by
some as the reason why fewer protests occurred in the Kingdom.[89]

Regional government[edit]
The kingdom is divided into 13 regions (mantiq), which in turn are
divided into numerous districts. Regional governors are appointed,
usually from the royal family, and preside over one or more municipal
councils, half of whose members are appointed and half elected. The
governors are responsible for such functions as finance, health, education,
agriculture, and municipalities. The consultative principle operates at all
levels of government, including the government of villages and tribes.
[9]
The governors act as regional "mini-kings", sitting in majlises, hearing
grievances and settling disputes.[90]
Municipal elections[edit]
In February 2005, the first elections in Saudi Arabian history were held.
The elections for "virtually powerless" municipal councils were for half
the seats (the half of each council's seats were appointed). Women were
not allowed to stand for office or to vote.[91]
In Riyadh, the number of registered voters did not exceed 18% of those
eligible to vote, representing only 2% of the city's population. There was
evidence of much greater interest in the Shia community of the Eastern
Province.[92] Women will be allowed to vote beginning in 2012, as King
Abdullah announced in the opening speech of the new term of the Shura
Council.[93]
In 2005, candidates tended to be local businessmen, activists and
professionals. Although political parties were not permitted, it was
possible to identify candidates as having an Islamist orientation, a liberal
agenda or reliant on tribal status. The Islamist candidates tended to be
backed by public figures and the religious establishment and won most of
the seats in the Saudi cities such as
Riyadh, Jeddah, Medina, Tabuk and Taif. Candidates with "Western
sympathies or any suspicion of secularism" lost out heavily to "hardline
conservatives who were endorsed by the local religious establishment."
This demonstrated to some that rather than being a conservative force
holding back the country, the royal family was more progressive than the
Saudi population as a whole.[94]
In 2007, a Saudi commentator noted that the municipal councils were
proving to be powerless. Nevertheless, the elections represented an
important step in modernizing the regime.[92]
Although male-only municipal elections were held again on 29
September 2011,[95][96] Abdullah announced that women will be able to
vote and be elected in the 2015 municipal elections.[71]

Political reform[edit]
In March 1992, King Fahd issued several decrees outlining the basic
statutes of government and codifying royal succession for the first time.
The King's political reform program also provided for the establishment
of a national Consultative Council, with appointed members having
advisory powers to review and give advice on issues of public interest. It
also outlined a framework for councils at the provincial or emirate level.
In September 1993, King Fahd issued additional reform decrees,
appointing the members of the national Consultative Council and spelling
out procedures for the new council's operations. He announced reforms to
the Council of Ministers, including term limitations of 4 years and
regulations to prohibit conflict of interest for ministers and other high-
level officials. The members of 13 provincial councils and the councils'
operating regulations were also announced.
The membership of the Consultative Council was expanded from 60 to 90
members in July 1997, to 120 in May 2001, and to 150 members in 2005.
Membership has changed significantly during each expansion of the
council, as many members have not been reappointed. The role of the
council is gradually expanding as it gains experience.
Saudi Municipal elections took place in 2005 and some journalists saw
this as a first tentative step towards the introduction of democratic
processes in the Kingdom, including the legalization of political parties.
Other analysts of the Saudi political scene were more skeptical.
[97]
Islamist candidates, often businessmen, did well, but in practice had
little real power.[98] In 2009, promised new elections and hopes for female
suffrage in them were postponed for at least two years.[99]
On 15 February 2009, in a reshuffle King Abdullah removed Sheikh
Ibrahim Bin Abdullah Al-Ghaith from his position as President of
the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice.
He also removed Sheikh Saleh al-Luhaidan as head of the Supreme
Judicial Council and appointed the first female minister.[100][101][102]
In his first act as King, Salman removed Khaled al-Tuwaijri,
Abdullah's de facto Prime Minister and minence grise, replacing him
with a Prince of the Blood.

See also[edit]

Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice

(Saudi Arabia)

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councils -- and then for only half the seats on those; women were
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religiously approved candidates, sent out to voters on their cell
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