36 Liang v. People

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 3

Liang v.

People
GR No. 125865, 26 March 2001

DOCTRINES:

The slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the
purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel, slander cannot be
considered as an act performed in an official capacity.

FACTS:

This case has its origin in two criminal Informations for grave oral defamation filed
against petitioner, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), alleging that on separate occasions on January 28 and
January 31, 1994, petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a
member of the clerical staff of ADB.

On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to
an advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner enjoyed immunity from
legal processes, dismissed the criminal Informations against him. On a petition for
certiorari and mandamus filed by the People, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 160, annulled and set aside the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing
the criminal cases.Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court.

On January 28, 2000, we rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for review.
We ruled, in essence, that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not
absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Furthermore, we held that
the immunity cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation
in the name of official duty.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused is immune from suit.

RATIO:

After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioners and intervenors


Motions for Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of
January 28, 2000. As we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch,
cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB
officers and personnel.
Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging the criminal case for oral
defamation against him. We wish to stress that it did not. What we merely stated therein
is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official
capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioners utterances constituted oral defamation
is still for the trial court to determine.

J. Punos concurring opinion:

Liang contends that a determination of a person's diplomatic immunity by the DFA is a


political question. It is solely within the prerogative of the executive department and is
conclusive upon the courts. Furthermore, the immunity conferred under the ADB Charter
and the Headquarters Agreement is absolute. It is designed to safeguard the autonomy
and independence of international organizations against interference from any authority
external to the organizations. It is necessary to allow such organizations to discharge
their entrusted functions effectively. The only exception to this immunity is when there is
an implied or express waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by statute. The
exception allegedly has no application to the case at bar.

"It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and
where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction.
Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of
the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases
the judicial department of the government follows the action of the political branch and
will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction."

Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to diplomatic immunity and hence his
immunity is not absolute. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a
diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts,
whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished
for any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other
hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional" immunities, that is, only
those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of
its purposes. This is the reason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement
explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank officers and employees only with
respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives
immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the
jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a
waiver of immunity.

Liang cannot also seek relief under the mantle of "immunity from every form of legal
process" accorded to ADB as an international organization. The immunity of ADB is
absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official
acts. He stands charged of grave slander for allegedly uttering defamatory remarks
against his secretary. Considering that the immunity accorded to petitioner is limited only
to acts performed in his official capacity, it becomes necessary to make a factual
determination of whether or not the defamatory utterances were made pursuant and in
relation to his official functions as a senior economist.

You might also like