GR No. 138570

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G.R. No.

138570

Case Title:
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) et.al., petitioners vs. Executive Secretary et. al,
reposdents

Date:
October 10, 2000

I. FACTS

 The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an
agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a
treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada
with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.
 The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S.
and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel
and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
 Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

II. ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. RULING

No, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it
must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so
required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification
by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has
not required it.

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United
States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the
phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in
common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To
be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the
said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the
terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA
as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed
marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave
abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.

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