Cases Legeth

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant

vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a

member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law
imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R.
CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces
of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the
condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items
to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent,
instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately
P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of
P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a
check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for
payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by
the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of
the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the
honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms.
Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three
(3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-
38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25
August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and
sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the
amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of

insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in
Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in
Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The
pertinent portion of the decision read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the
conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the
Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and
shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court,
in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A
copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by
Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal
and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the
proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's
Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had
become final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review
on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had
lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal
instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful
penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that
accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the
lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is
innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the
herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her
oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks
which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals
upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which
she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a
serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order.
In Lozano v. Martinez, 2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of
penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property but an offense against public order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private

interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest. 3 (Italics supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been
convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what

grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First

Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend
an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding
section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics
supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and
violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of
which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good
moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court
stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a
person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this
Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., in the result.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina
Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape
allegedly committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of
this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and
praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the
recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and
his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as
follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her
foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the
pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second
floor of the house the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back.
Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand dragged her
to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did
not shout for help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next
undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he
removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her
resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster
parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed
ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her
foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she
became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27,
t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the
neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made
by the respondent; that she still frequented the respondent's house after August 5,
1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and
received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick
of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles
left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3,
t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he
went to the Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical
assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the
administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant
from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered
by the complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction,
according to him, he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her
tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual
intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one
week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in
December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her
house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended
to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents'
intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to
marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.'
After the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he
confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something
she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
xxx xxx xxx
FINDINGS AND COMMENT
There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the

complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of
violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual
intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her
behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a
sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in

conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia
Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted, and it is
not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence
shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with
her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child,
he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy
and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave
abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he knew he could
not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so that he,
respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over
her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata'
(uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother.
Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why
she could not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn
petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character"
(Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations
to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may
fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to
be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with
Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married
woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him
from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the Supreme Court in
1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year or
thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently
disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations
with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient
ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of
morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from
the office of a lawyer.
xxx xxx xxx
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing,

respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer
and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not
commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor
General formulated another complaint which he appended to his report, charging the
respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that
he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the
same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia,
thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal
business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent
removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name
from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the
complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are
different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks
the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent
prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the
additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly
notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which
was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the
charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the
respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the
respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is
not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia
Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on
December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia
Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was
already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from
Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them
(t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she
was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at
respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she
was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told
respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already
living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to
marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia
left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because
she and respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27].
Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because
respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her
to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband
(Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-
29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with
respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n.
35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court
Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which

request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent
averring, among others, the following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant,
because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse
with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age;
that he had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20
years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her
love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted
Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on
February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister,
Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date
(February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-
law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him,
but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was
still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a
stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had
left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to
Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia
returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him
again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed;
that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest
them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 'no
choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the
bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this
Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that
he did not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the
petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he
thought and believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the
Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit
perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used
his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant,
knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal
liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a
married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That
respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar
examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent
be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his
counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962.
Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted
and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the
complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and
that he likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from
1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong
the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds
to cause the respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit
relations with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married
woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true
that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and
that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among those
enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be
disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the
power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is
a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any
special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and
the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial
and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re
Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme
Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall
require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the
power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the
general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be
removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from
our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair private and
professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful
continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of
disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of
misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The
tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds.
Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of
a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the
respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her
eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur
criminal liability, as he himself declared and that he limited himself merely to kissing and
embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his
knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece
of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to
him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral
influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and
called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother.
Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral
ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the
blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a
person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done
without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the
moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient
grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez,
44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of
the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client,
as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the
qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good
moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege
to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an
attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession,
but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which
shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his
profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be as the Solicitor General
puts it recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine
Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that
respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did
not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in
effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only
to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of
the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly
committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as
to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in
protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the
respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she
helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian
charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years
of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as
he stated, in order to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting
the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting.
An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he could have
employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue
maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining
promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned.
Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal
profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7
C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing
the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an
offense or offenses different from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14,
1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court,
which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence adduced at the
hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the
respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of
fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court
orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If the

Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall
file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his
investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the
clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the
same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the
Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint
originally filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the
Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the
corresponding complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The
Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be
justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations
in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a
person of good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own
approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a
subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a
person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran
observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character,
or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and professional integrity which
should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as
merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes
at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626,
citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re
Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did
not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived
an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to
have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of
no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to
remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston
J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
A.C. No. 4148 July 30, 1998
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant,

vs.
Atty. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar

sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous
circumstances. 1
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. In Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on
April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of
six months suspension without pay, 2 while in Administrative Matters Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-
CFI, which were consolidated, 3 this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from the
service of respondent. 4
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that
complainant and respondent married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman
Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where
eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to
Dadiangas, Cotabato (now Gen. Santos City), where his last three children were born and
where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on
January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting
with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On December 28, 1977,
Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Pea.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint
against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office
for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent. 5
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another
charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an officer
of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after
investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. 6
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living
with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named
Laella Pea Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by
her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing
along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage
with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal.
This was done while the respondent's marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on
record shows the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her
retirement from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in
Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their father's acts,
including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a
similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for
disbarment under the compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect her children
from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the assistance of
her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his
name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that,
notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court,
respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena. 7
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges
against him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the
Court, as when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without
pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now
my wife. Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute
double jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea will constitute
triple jeopardy. If that's the law so be it. 8
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioner's recommendation, as
follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs.
Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of the
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation therein
to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his
name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and

adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the
foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 (b), of the Rules of Court. * We are in agreement that
respondent's actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's
good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. 9 There is perhaps no profession after
that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of
law. 10 The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and
norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all
times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless
to state, those whose conduct both public and private fails this scrutiny would have to
be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a
fact that aggravates his professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in
the Bench, he knew a judge's actuations ought to be free from any appearance of
impropriety. 11 For a judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice.
Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the
law. 12 Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his actuations, lest it
be a demoralizing example to others. 13Surely, respondent could not have forgotten the Code of
Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives. 14
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct, 15 an attorney-at-
law is also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice.
Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of the public that
justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree of moral integrity is expected of a
lawyer in the community where he resides. He must maintain due regard for public decency in an
orderly society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. 16 Exacted
from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in
the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility
that have been compendiously described as "moral character." To achieve such end, every lawyer
needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve
not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court. 17
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear
case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and member of the bar. 18For disbarment proceedings are intended to afford
the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to
assure the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of administering justice are
competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the clients may
repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., 19 a complaint for disbarment was filed against a
member of the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their
son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated woman. Respondent was
not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral
conduct. In another case, 20 a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. The Court held that respondent failed
to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon him by
this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his lawfully-
wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the
complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude,
even arrogance, in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to
determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal
profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral
conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering
into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or
mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality
and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of
time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his moral indifference to scandal
in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put
the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in
peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Martinez and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo and Purisima, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. 156643 June 27, 2006
FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x--------------------------------x
G.R. No. 156891 June 27, 2006
VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
This Court defers to the Sandiganbayans evaluation of the factual issues. Not having heard
any cogent reasons to justify an exception to this rule, the Court adopts the anti-graft courts
findings. In any event, after meticulously reviewing the records, we find no ground to reverse
the Sandiganbayan.
The Case
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review1 assailing the March 8, 2002 Decision,2 and
the January 33 and 14, 20034 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 20194.
Francisco SB. Acejas III and Vladimir S. Hernandez were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, SPO3 Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas
III and Jose P. Victoriano were charged on February 8, 1994, in an Information that reads
thus:
"That on or about January 12, 1994, or sometime prior thereto in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ and VICTOR CONANAN, being then employed both as
Immigration officers of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, Intramuros, Manila, hence
are public officers, taking advantage of their official positions and committing the offense in
relation to office, conspiring and confederating with Senior Police Officer 3 EXPEDITO S.
PERLAS of the Western Police District Command, Manila, together with co-accused Atty.
FRANCISCO SB. ACEJAS III, of the LUCENARIO, MARGATE, MOGPO, TIONGCO &
ACEJAS LAW OFFICES, and co-accused JOSE P. VICTORIANO, a private individual, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand, ask, and/or extort One Million
(P1,000,000.00) PESOS from the spouses BETHEL GRACE PELINGON and Japanese
TAKAO AOYAGI and FILOMENO PELINGON, JR., in exchange for the return of the passport
of said Japanese Takao Aoyagi confiscated earlier by co-accused Vladimir S. Hernandez and
out of said demand, the complainants Bethel Grace Pelingon, Takao Aoyagi and Filomeno
Pelingon, Jr. produced, gave and delivered the sum of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00)
Pesos in marked money to the above-named accused at a designated place at the Coffee
Shop, Ground Floor, Diamond Hotel, Ermita, Manila, causing damage to the said
complainants in the aforesaid amount of P25,000.00, and to the prejudice of government
service."5
After trial, all the accused -- except Victoriano -- were convicted. The challenged Decision
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan,

Expedito S. Perlas and Francisco SB. Acejas III are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Bribery, and are sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of three million pesos (P3,000,000.00). Accused Vladimir S.
Hernandez and Victor D. Conanan shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary
disqualification. Costs against the accused.
"On ground of reasonable doubt, accused Jose P. Victoriano is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged. The surety bond he posted for his provisional liberty is cancelled. The Hold
Departure Order against him embodied in this Courts Order dated July 24, 2000 is
recalled."6
The first Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied reconsideration of the other accused.
The second Resolution denied Petitioner Acejas Motion for New Trial.
Hence, petitioners now seek recourse in this Court.7
The Facts
The facts8 are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
"At around 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. of December 17, 1993, accused Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) Intelligence Agent Vladimir Hernandez, together with a reporter, went to
the house of Takao Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi at 27 Pacific Drive, Grand
Villa, Sto. Nio, Paraaque, Metro Manila. His purpose was to serve Mission Order No. 93-
04-12 dated December 13, 1993, issued by BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio against
Takao Aoyagi, a Japanese national. Hernandez told Takao Aoyagi, through his wife, Bethel
Grace, that there were complaints against him in Japan and that he was suspected to be a
Yakuza big boss, a drug dependent and an overstaying alien.
"To prove that he had done nothing wrong, Takao Aoyagi showed his passport to Hernandez
who issued an undertaking (Exh. B) which Aoyagi signed. The undertaking stated that
Takao Aoyagi promised to appear in an investigation at the BID on December 20, 1993, and
that as a guarantee for his appearance, he was entrusting his passport to Hernandez.
Hernandez acknowledged receipt of the passport.
"On December 18, 1993, Bethel Grace Aoyagi called accused Expedito Dick Perlas 9 and
informed him about the taking of her husbands passport by Hernandez. Perlas told her he
would refer their problem to his brother-in-law, Atty. Danton Lucenario of the Lucenario,
Margate, Mogpo, Tiongco and Acejas III Law Firm. It was at the Sheraton Hotel that Perlas
introduced the Aoyagis to Atty. Lucenario. They discussed the problem and Atty. Lucenario
told the Aoyagis not to appear before the BID on December 20, 1993.
"As advised by Atty. Lucenario, Takao Aoyagi did not appear before the BID. Instead, Atty.
Rufino M. Margate of the Lucenario Law Firm filed with the BID an Entry of Appearance
(Exh. 6 Acejas). Atty. Margate requested for copies of any complaint-affidavit against
Takao Aoyagi and asked what the ground was for the confiscation of x x x Aoyagis passport.
"Hernandez prepared a Progress Report (Exh. 5 Hernandez) which was submitted to

Ponciano M. Ortiz, the Chief of Operations and Intelligence Division of the BID. Ortiz
recommended that Takao Aoyagi, who was reportedly a Yakuza and a drug dependent, be
placed under custodial investigation.
"In the evening of December 22, 1993 at the Diamond Hotel, the Aoyagis met accused Atty.
Francisco Acejas III who was then accompanied by Perlas. Atty. Acejas informed them that it
would be he who would handle their case. A Contract for Legal Services (Exh. D) dated
December 22, 1993 was entered into by Takao Aoyagi and Atty. Acejas, who represented the
Lucenario Law Firm.
"In the morning of December 23, 1993, Perlas and Atty. Acejas accompanied the Aoyagis to
the Domestic Airport as the latter were going to Davao. It was here that Takao Aoyagi paid
Atty. Acejas P40,000.00, P25,000 of which is 50% of the acceptance fee, and the
P15,000.00 is for filing/docket fee (Exh. O). The Aoyagis were able to leave only in the
afternoon as the morning flight was postponed.
"On December 24, 1993, while attending a family reunion, Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi
informed her brother, Filomeno Jun Pelingon, Jr., about her husbands passport.
"On January 2, 1994, Jun Pelingon talked to BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio in Davao
and told the latter of Takao Aoyagis problem with the BID. Respicio gave Pelingon his calling
card and told Pelingon to call him up in his office. That same day, Jun Pelingon and Mr. and
Mrs. Aoyagi flew back to Manila.
"On January 5, 1994, Jun Pelingon, Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas, Vladimir Hernandez, Vic
Conanan and Akira Nemoto met at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Roxas Boulevard.
"Another meeting was arranged at the Manila Nikko Hotel in Makati on January 8, 1994 with
Jun Pelingon, Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Hernandez attending.
"On January 11, 1994, on account of the alleged demand of P1 million for the return of Takao
Aoyagis passport, Jun Pelingon called up Commissioner Respicio. The latter referred him to
Atty. Angelica Somera, an NBI Agent detailed at the BID. It was Atty. Carlos Saunar, also of
the NBI, and Atty. Somera who arranged the entrapment operation.
"On January 12, 1994, Vladimir Hernandez returned the passport to Takao Aoyagi at the
Coffee Shop of the Diamond Hotel. The NBI Team headed by Attorneys Saunar and Somera
arrested Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Jose Victoriano after the latter picked up the brown
envelope containing marked money representing the amount being allegedly demanded.
Only Perlas, Acejas and Victoriano were brought to the NBI Headquarters." 10
Version of the Prosecution
Testifying for the prosecution were Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi, Filomeno "Jun" Basaca
Pelingon, Jr., and Carlos Romero Saunar.11
The prosecution evidence showed that it was during a meeting on January 5, 1994, when P1
million as consideration for the passport was demanded. Conanan averred that Aoyagi was a
drug trafficker and Yakuza member. The money was to be used to settle the alleged
"problem" and to facilitate the processing of a permanent visa. When Pelingon negotiated to
lower the amount demanded, Conanan stated that there were many of them in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID).12
During the second meeting held at Hotel Nikko, Pelingon was informed that the press and
government enforcers were after Aoyagi. Hernandez asked for a partial payment of
P300,000, but Pelingon said that the whole amount would be given at just one time to avoid
another meeting.13
After talking to Commissioner Respicio on January 11, 1994,14 Pelingon called up Dick Perlas
to schedule the exchange.
Regarding the involvement of Petitioner Acejas, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
adds the following facts:
"1.2. On 5 January 1994, [Acejas] and Perlas met Pelingon at the Aristocrat
Restaurant. [Acejas] informed Pelingon that he would file a P1 million lawsuit against
the BID agents who confiscated the passport of Takao Aoyagi. [Acejas] showed
Pelingon several papers, which allegedly were in connection with the intended
lawsuit. However, when Hernandez and Conanan arrived at the Aristocrat
Restaurant, [Acejas] never mentioned to the BID agents the P1 million lawsuit.
[Acejas] just hid the papers he earlier showed to Pelingon inside his [Acejas] bag.
"1.3. [Acejas] was present when Hernandez proposed that Takao Aoyagi pay the
amount of P1 million in exchange for the help he would extend to him (Takao) in
securing a permanent visa in the Philippines. [Acejas], who was Aoyagis lawyer, did
nothing.
"1.4. On 10 January 1994, [Acejas], Pelingon, Perlas and Hernandez met at the
Hotel Nikko. Thereat, Hernandez informed the group that certain government officials
and even the press were after Takao Aoyagi. Hernandez said that Takao Aoyagi can
make a partial payment of P300,000.00. Pelingon however, assured the group that
Takao Aoyagi would pay in full the amount of P1 million so as not to set another
meeting date. [Acejas] kept quiet throughout the negotiations.
xxx xxx xxx
"1.5.a. [Acejas] was present during the entrapment that took place at the Diamond
Hotel. Hernandez handed the passport to [Acejas], who handed it then to Perlas and
thereafter to Takao Aoyagi. After Takao Aoyagi went over his confiscated passport,
Bethel Grace handed to Hernandez the envelope15 containing the supposed P1
million. Hernandez refused and motioned that [Acejas] be the one to receive it.
[Acejas] willingly got the envelope and placed it beside him and Perlas.
x x x before Hernandez handed out Aoyagis passport, he reminded the group of their
earlier agreement of kaliwaan, i.e., that after the passport is released, the Aoyagis should
give the P1 million."16
Version of the Defense
Vladimir S. Hernandez, Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas III, Victor D. Conanan and
Ponciano M. Ortiz testified for the defense.17
To the Sandiganbayans narration, Hernandez adds:
"6. x x x [Hernandez], an intelligence agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation

(BID), went to the house of Private Respondents Takao and Bethel Grace Aoyagi to enforce
and serve a Mission Order issued and assigned to him by BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio
on December 13, 1993, for the arrest of Takao Aoyagi.
"7. When Bethel Grace showed [Hernandez] her husbands passport, [Hernandez] found out
that the latters [authority] to stay had already been duly extended. He invited private
respondents to go with him to the BID office. They declined, but made a written undertaking
to appear at the BID office for investigation on December 20, 1993. As security for said
undertaking, Bethel Grace Aoyagi entrusted to [Hernandez] her husbands passport, receipt
of which [Hernandez], in return, acknowledge[d] in the same instrument.
"8. On January 19, 1994, [Hernandez] signified that the record of Aoyagi has been cleared
and that he can pick up his passport at the BID office. In connection therewith, [Hernandez]
was invited by Perlas to make the return at a lunchtime meeting to be held at the Diamond
Hotel Coffee Shop. Upon arrival thereat, [Hernandez] gave the passport to Atty. Acejas,
Aoyagis counsel, and within less than ten minutes, he left the coffee shop." 18
In his Petition, Acejas narrates some more occurrences as follows:
"1. 18th December 1993 The law firm of Lucenario Margate Mogpo Tiongco &
Acejas was engaged by the spouses Takao Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon
Aoyagi. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"3. 22nd December 1993
"a) The managing partner of the law firm, Atty. Lucenario, briefed [Acejas]
about the facts regarding the confiscation by agents of the BID of the
passport belonging to a Japanese client. x x x.
"b) Thereafter, [Acejas] was tasked by Atty. Lucenario to meet his brother-in-
law Mr. Expedito Perlas, who happened to be a policeman and a friend of Mr.
Takao Aoyagi. Thus, [Acejas] met Mr. Perlas for the first time in the
afternoon of this date.
"c) Also, for the first time, [Acejas] met the clients, spouses Aoyagis, at the
Diamond Hotel, where they were staying. x x x [Acejas] advised them that the
law firm decided that the clients can file an action for Replevin plus Damages
for the recovery of the Japanese passport.
"d) The CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES was signed between the client
and the law firm, thru [Acejas] as partner thereof. x x x The amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php.50,000.00) was agreed to be paid by way of Case
Retainers/Acceptance Fees, which was supposed to be payable upon (the)
signing (t)hereof, and the sum of Php.2,000.00 by way of appearance fee.
However, the client proposed to pay half only of the acceptance fee
(Php.25,000.00), plus the estimated judicial expenses for the filing or docket
fees (Php.15,000.00). x x x It was then further agreed that the balance of
Php.25,000.00 was supposed to be given upon the successful recovery of
the Japanese passport.
"e) The clients informed [Acejas] that they are supposed to leave for Davao
the following day on the 23rd because they will spend their Christmas in
Davao City; but they promised that they will be back on the 26th, which is a
Sunday, so that on the 27th, which is a Monday, the complaint against the
BID officers will have to be filed in Court.
xxx xxx xxx
"6. 27th December 1993 (T)he law office received word from Mr. Perlas that the
Japanese did not come back on the 26th (December), x x x so that the case cannot
be filed on the 27th instead (it has) to wait for clients instruction.
"7. 4th January 1994 In the late afternoon, the law firm received a telephone call
from Mr. Perlas informing (it) that the Japanese is already in Manila and he was
requesting for an appointment with any of the lawyer of the law firm on January 5,
1994.
"8. 5th January 1994 [Acejas] met for the first time Mr. Filomeno Pelingon Jr.
including a certain Nimoto Akira.
x x x.
"b) [Acejas] told Mr. Pelingon Jr. that all the pleadings are ready for filing but,
of course, the Japanese client and the wife should first read the complaint
and sign if they want to pursue the filing of the complaint against the BID
agents.
"c) For the first time, Mr. Pelingon advised against the intended filing of the
case. x x x He instead suggested that he wants to directly negotiate with the
BID agents.
"d) Thereafter, Mr. Pelingon instructed Mr. Dick Perlas to contact the BID
agent who confiscated the Japanese passport. Mr. Perlas and Mr. Pelingon
were able to contact the BID agent.
"e) For the first time [Acejas] saw Mr. Hernandez, when the latter arrived
and also accused Victor Conanan. In the course of the meeting, a
confrontation ensued between [Acejas] and [Hernandez] concerning the legal
basis for the confiscation of the passport. [Acejas] demanded for the return of
the Japanese passport x x x. Mr. Hernandez said that if there are no further
derogatory report concerning the Japanese client, then in a matter of week
(from January 5 to 12), he will return the passport.
"f) [Acejas] gave an ultimatum to Mr. Hernandez that if the Japanese

passport will not be returned in one (1) weeks time, then (the law firm) will
pursue the filing of the replevin case plus the damage suit against him
including the other BID agents.
"g) x x x Mr. Pelingon Jr. for the second time advised against the filing
thereof saying that his Japanese brother-in-law would like to negotiate or in
his own words magbibigay naman [i.e. will give money anyway].
"9. 8th January 1994
"a) Again, Mr. Perlas called the law office and informed x x x that the
Japanese client is now in Manila. Petitioner attended the meeting they
arranged in (Makati) and meet Dick Perlas, Vladimir Hernandez and
Pelingon Jr. x x x.
"b) x x x according to Pelingon Jr., the Japanese does not want to meet with
anybody because anyway they are willing to pay or negotiate.
"c) [Hernandez was also] present at the meeting and [Acejas] met him for the
second time. x x x [Acejas] said that if [Hernandez] will not be able to return
the passport on or before January 12, 1994, then the law firm will have no
choice but to file the case against him x x x. Again, for the third time Mr.
Pelingon warned against the filing of the case because he said that he would
directly negotiate with the BID agents.
"d) The Makati meeting ended up with the understanding that Mr. Hernandez
will have to undertake the return [of] the Japanese passport on or before
January 12, 1994.
"10. 12th January 1994
"a) Mr. Perlas called up the law office informing that the Japanese client was
already in Manila and was requesting for an appointment with the lawyers at
lunchtime of January 12 at the Diamond Hotel where he was billeted.
xxx xxx xxx
"c) x x x x x x x x x
"At this meeting, the Japanese was inquiring on the status of the case and
he was wondering why the Japanese passport is not yet recovered when
according to him he has already paid for the attorney fees. And so, [Acejas]
explained to him that the case has to be filed and they still have to sign the
complaint, the Special Power of Attorney and the affidavit relative to the filing
of replevin case. But the Japanese would not fully understand. So, Pelingon
Jr. again advised against the filing of the case saying that since there is no
derogatory record of Mr. Aoyagi at the BID office, then the BID agents should
return the Japanese passport.
xxx xxx xxx
"e) Thereafter, Pelingon, Jr. and Dick Perlas x x x tried to contact Mr.
Hernandez. Since, they were able to contact the latter, we waited until
around 2:00 p.m.. When Mr. Hernandez came, he said that the Japanese
client is cleared at the BID office and so, he can return the Japanese
passport and he gave it to [Acejas]. x x x When [Acejas] received the
Japanese passport, (he) checked the authenticity of the documents and
finding that it was in good order, (he) attempted to give it to the Japanese
client.
"Very strangely when [Acejas] tried to hand-over the Japanese passport to the Japanese
across the table, the Japanese was motioning and wanted to get the passport under the
table. x x x [Acejas] found it strange. (He) x x x thought that it was a Japanese custom to
receive things like that under the table. But nonetheless, [Acejas] did not give it under the
table and instead passed it on to Mr. Dick Perlas who was seated at (his) right. And so, it was
Mr. Dick Perlas who took the passport from [Acejas] and finally handed it over to Mr. Aoyagi.
x x x. After that, there was a little chat between Mr. Hernandez and the client, and Mr.
Hernandez did not stay for so long and left.
"Still, thereafter, (w)hen the Japanese passport was received, Bethel Grace Aoyagi and
[Acejas] were talking and she said since the Japanese passport had been recovered, they
are now willing to pay the Php.25,000.00 balance of the acceptance fee.
"Mrs. Aoyagi was giving [Acejas] a brown envelope but she want[ed] Mr. Hernandez to
receive it while Mr. Hernandez was still around standing. But Mr. Hernandez did not receive
it.
"Since, the payment is due to the law firm, [Acejas] received the brown envelope.
xxx xxx xxx
"Not long after, [Acejas] saw his companion, accused Mr. Victoriano, who was signaling
something as if there was a sense of urgency. [Acejas] immediately stood up and left
hurriedly. When [Acejas] approached Mr. Victoriano, he said that the car which [Acejas]
parked in front of the Diamond Hotel gate, somebody took the car. [Acejas] went out and
checked and realized that it was valet parking so it was the parking attendant who took the
car and transferred the car to the parking area. [Acejas] requested Mr. Victoriano to get
(the) envelope and the coat, at the table.
"g) When [Acejas] went out, [Acejas] already looked for the parking attendant to get the car.
When the car arrived, [Acejas] just saw from the doors of the Diamond Hotel Mr. Jose
Victoriano and Mr. Dick Perlas coming out already in handcuffs and collared by the NBI
agents." They then were taken to the NBI, except the accused Vladimir Hernandez." 19
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the elements of direct bribery,20 as well as conspiracy in the
commission of the crime,21 had been proven. Hernandez and Conanan demanded
money;22 Perlas negotiated and dealt with the complainants;23 and Acejas accepted the
payoff and gave it to Perlas.24
Victoriano was acquitted on reasonable doubt.25 Although he had picked up the envelope
containing the payoff, this act did not sufficiently show that he had conspired with the other
accused.26
The Sandiganbayan did not give credence to the alleged belief of Acejas that the money was
the balance of the law firms legal fees.27 If he had indeed believed that the money was
payable to him, he should have kept and retained it. The court then inferred that he had
merely been pretending to protect his clients rights when he threatened to file a suit against
Hernandez.28
The January 3, 2003 Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied the Motions for
Reconsideration of Hernandez, Acejas and Perlas. According to the Sandiganbayan,
Conanan was not shown to be present during the meetings on January 8 and 12, 1994. 29 His
presence during one of those meetings, on January 5, 1994, did not conclusively show his
participation as a co-conspirator.
The January 14, 2003 Resolution denied Acejas Supplemental Motion, which prayed for a
new trial.
The Issues
Petitioner Hernandez raises the following issues:
"I. Whether or not respondent court erred in ruling that [Hernandez] was part of the
conspiracy to extort money from private respondents, despite lack of clear and
convincing evidence.
"II. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when
it overlooked the fact that the legal requisites of the crime are not completely present
as to warrant [Hernandez] complicity in the crime charged.
"III. Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan, 5th Division, ruled erroneously when
it relied solely on the naked and uncorroborated testimonies of the late Filomeno
Jun Pelingon, Jr. in order to declare the existence of a conspiracy to commit bribery,
as well as the guilt of the accused.
"IV. Whether or not [respondent] courts acquittal of co-accused Victor Conanan and
its conviction of [Hernandez] for the offense as charged effectively belies the
existence of a conspiracy.
"V. Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction when it found [Hernandez]
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery." 30
On the other hand, Petitioner Acejas simply enumerates the following points:
"1. The Conspiracy Theory
2. The presence of lawyer-client relationship; duty to clients cause; lawful

performance of duties
3. Instigation not entrapment
4. Credibility of witness and testimony
5. Affidavit of desistance; effect: creates serious doubts as to the liability of the

accused
6. Elements of bad faith
7. Elements of the crime (direct bribery)
8. Non-presentation of complaining victim tantamount to suppression of evidence" 31
In the main, petitioners are challenging the finding of guilt against them. The points they
raised are therefore intertwined and will be discussed jointly.
The Courts Ruling
The Petitions have no merit.
Main Issue:
Finding of Guilt
The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1)
agrees to perform an act that constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present; 2) accepts the gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute
a crime; or 3) abstains from the performance of official duties.32
Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of direct bribery, which contained the
following elements: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2) who received the gifts or presents
personally or through another, 3) in consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime,
and 4) that act related to the exercise of official duties.33
Hernandez claims that the prosecution failed to show his involvement in the crime. Allegedly,
he was merely implementing Mission Order No. 93-04-12, which required him to investigate
Takao Aoyagi.34 The passport was supposed to have been voluntarily given to him as a
guarantee to appear at the BID office, but he returned it upon the instruction of his superior.35
The chain of circumstances, however, contradicts the contention of Hernandez. It was he

who had taken the passport of Takao Aoyagi.36 On various dates,37 he met with Takao and
Bethel Grace Aoyagi, and also Pelingon, regarding the return of the passport. Hernandez
then asked for a down payment on the payoff,38 during which he directed Bethel Grace to
deliver the money to Acejas.39
Bethel Grace Aoyagis testimony, which was confirmed by the other witnesses, proceeded as
follows:
"PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:
"Q: When Vlademir Hernandez arrived, what happened?
"A: He got the passport from his pocket and passed it on to Atty. Acejas, sir.
"Q: What happened after he gave the passport to Atty. Acejas?
"A: [Acejas] gave the passport to Mr. Expedito Perlas, sir.
"Q: After that, what happened?
"A: Then, [Perlas] gave it to Mr. Aoyagi, sir.
"Q: The passport?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And when Mr. Aoyagi received the passport, what did you do or what did Mr. Aoyagi do?
"A: He checked all the pages and he kept it, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
"Q: What did you do with that money after Mr. Aoyagi received the passport?
"A: Because our agreement is that after giving the passport we would give the money so
when Mr. Perlas handed to my husband the passport, I gave the money placed on my lap to
my husband and he passed it to Mr. Hernandez who refused the same.
"ATTY. ACEJAS:
"Your Honor, please, may I just make a clarification that when the witness referred to the
money it pertains to the brown envelope which allegedly contains the money x x x .
"AJ ESCAREAL:
"Noted.
"Q: Did Mr. Hernandez got hold or touched the envelope?
"A: No, sir.

"Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your husband do?
"A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he pointed to Atty. Acejas
so my husband handed it to Atty. Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr.
Perlas.
"Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say anything?
"A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.
"INTERPRETER:
"Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right.
"Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom?
"A: Expedito Perlas, sir.
"Q: Did Expedito Perlas [receive] that envelope?
"A: Yes, sir.
"A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty. Acejas, sir.
"Q: And then, what happened?
"A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I think, it happened in just
seconds[.] Mr. Vlademir Hernandez immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody
came and picked up the envelope, sir."40
Significantly, Hernandez does not address the lingering questions about why Takao Aoyagi
or his representatives had to negotiate for the retrieval of the passport during the meetings
held outside the BID. Ponciano Ortiz, chief of the Operation and Intelligence Division of the
BID, testified that it was not a standard operating procedure to officially return withheld
passports in such locations.41 It can readily be inferred that Hernandez had an ulterior motive
for withholding the passport for some time despite the absence of any legal purpose.
Also, Hernandez cannot claim innocence based on Conanans acquittal. 42 While the
testimony of Pelingon was the only evidence linking Conanan to the conspiracy,43 there was
an abundance of evidence showing Hernandezs involvement.
Acejas, on the other hand, belies his involvement in the conspiracy. He attacks the
prosecutions version that he was silent during the negotiations for the return of the
passport.44 According to him, he kept giving Hernandez an ultimatum to return the passport,
with threats to file a court case.
Acejas testified that he had wanted to file a case against Hernandez, but was prevented by
Spouses Aoyagi. His supposed preparedness to file a case against Hernandez might have
just been a charade and was in fact belied by Pelingons testimony regarding the January 5,
1994 meeting:
"ATTY. VALMONTE:
"Q: Who arrived first at Aristocrat Restaurant, you or Acejas?
"A: Acejas arrived together with Dick Perlas[. T]hey arrived ahead of me, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
"Q: When the three (3) of you were talking that was the time that Atty. Acejas was showing
you documents that he was going to file [a] P1 million damage suit against Hernandez?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: Now, is it not that when Hernandez and Cunanan arrived and you were talking with each
other, Atty. Acejas also threatened, reiterated his threat to Hernandez that he would file [a]
P1 million damage suit should Hernandez [fails] to return the passport?
"A: When the group [was] already there, the P1 million [damage suit] was not [anymore]
mentioned, sir."45
Even assuming that Acejas negotiated for the return of the passport on his clients behalf, he
still failed to justify his actions during the entrapment operation. The witnesses all testified
that he had received the purported payoff. On this point, we recount the testimony of Bethel
Grace Aoyagi:
"Prosecutor Montemayor:
xxxxxxxxx
"Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your husband do?
"A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he pointed to Atty. Acejas
so my husband handed it to Atty. Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr.
Perlas.
"Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say anything?
"A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.
"Interpreter:
"Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right.
"Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom?
"A: Expedito Perlas, sir.
"x x x x x x x x x
"A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty. Acejas, sir.
"Q: And then, what happened?
"WITNESS:
"A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I think, it happened in just
seconds[.] Mr. Vladimir Hernandez immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came
and picked up the envelope, sir.
"Q: Do you know the identity of that somebody who picked up the envelope?
xxxxxxxxx
"A: Victoriano, sir."46
Acejas failed to justify why he received the payoff money. It would be illogical to sustain his
contention that the envelope represented the balance of his firms legal fees. That it was
given to Hernandez immediately after the return of the passport leads to the inescapable
conclusion that the money was a consideration for the return. Moreover, Acejas should have
kept the amount if he believed it to be his. The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayans
pronouncement on this point:
"x x x. If he believed that the brown envelope contained the balance of the acceptance fee,
how come he passed it to Perlas? His passing the brown envelope to Perlas only proves that
the same did not contain the balance of the acceptance fee; otherwise, he should have kept
and retained it. Moreover, the three prosecution witnesses testified that the brown envelope
was being given to Hernandez who refused to accept the same. This further shows that the
brown envelope was not for the balance of the acceptance fee because, if it were, why was it
given to Hernandez.
xxxxxxxxx
"Acejas defense was further weakened by the fact that his testimony as to why he left
immediately after the brown envelope was given to him was uncorroborated. He should have
presented accused Victoriano to corroborate his testimony since it was the latter who
allegedly called him and caused him to leave their table. This, he did not do. The ineluctable
conclusion is that he was, indeed, in cahoots with his co-accused." 47
Lawyers Duty
Acejas alleges that the Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate his lawyer-client relationship with
the complainants. He was supposedly only acting in their best interest 48 and had the right to
be present when the passport was to be returned.49
True, as a lawyer, it was his duty to represent his clients in dealing with other people. His
presence at Diamond Hotel for the scheduled return of the passport was justified. This fact,
however, does not support his innocence
Acejas, however, failed to act for or represent the interests of his clients. He knew of the
payoff, but did nothing to assist or protect their rights, a fact that strongly indicated that he
was to get a share. Thus, he received the money purporting to be the payoff,
even if he was not involved in the entrapment operation. The facts revealed that he was a
conspirator.
The Court reminds lawyers to follow legal ethics50 when confronted by public officers who
extort money. Lawyers must decline and report the matter to the authorities. 51 If the extortion
is directed at the client, they must advise the client not to perform any illegal act. Moreover,
they must report it to the authorities, without having to violate the attorney-client
privilege.52 Naturally, they must not participate in the illegal act.53
Acejas did not follow these guidelines. Worse, he conspired with the extortionists.
Instigation
Also futile is the contention of petitioners that Pelingon instigated the situation to frame them
into accepting the payoff.54 Instigation is the employment of ways and means to lure persons
into the commission of an offense in order to prosecute them.55 As opposed to entrapment,
criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator.56
There was no instigation in the present case, because the chain of circumstances showed
an extortion attempt. In other words, the criminal intent originated from petitioners, who had
arranged for the payoff.
During the cross-examination of Bethel Grace Aoyagi, pertinent was Associate Justice
Escareal clarifying question as follows:
"AJ ESCAREAL:
"[Q:] Did Mr. Hernandez say anything when he returned the passport to your husband?
"A: He did not say anything except that he instructed [the] group to abide with the agreement
that upon handing of the passport, the money would also be given immediately
(magkaliwaan)."57
Alleged Discrepancies
According to Acejas, Pelingons testimonies given in his Complaint-Affidavit, Supplemental-

Affidavit, inquest testimony, testimony in court, and two Affidavits of Desistance were
contradictory.58 He cites these particular portions of Pelingons Affidavit:
"5. That having been enlightened of the case, and conscious that I might be prosecuting
innocent men, I have decided on my own disposition, not to further testify against any of the
accused in the Sandiganbayan or in any court or tribunal, regarding the same cause of
action.
"6. That this affidavit of desistance to further prosecute is voluntarily executed, and that no
reward, promise, consideration, influence, force or threat was executed to secure this
affidavit."59
Pelingon testified that he had executed the Affidavit of Desistance because of a threat to his
life.60 He did not prepare the Affidavit; neither was it explained to him. Allegedly, his true
testimony was in the first Complaint-Affidavit that he had executed.61
By appearing and testifying during the trial, he effectively repudiated his Affidavit of
Desistance. An affidavit of desistance must be ignored when pitted against positive evidence
given on the witness stand.62
Acejas has failed to identify the other material points that were allegedly inconsistent. The
Court therefore adopts the Sandiganbayans finding that these were minor details that were
not indicative of the lack of credibility of the prosecution witnesses.63 People v. Eligino64 is in
point:
"x x x. While witnesses may differ in their recollections of an incident, it does not necessarily
follow from their disagreement that all of them should be disbelieved as liars and their
testimony completely discarded as worthless. As long as the mass of testimony jibes on
material points, the slight clashing statements neither dilute the witnesses credibility nor the
veracity of their testimony. Thus, inconsistencies and contradictions referring to minor details
do not, in any way, destroy the credibility of witnesses, for indeed, such inconsistencies are
but natural and even enhance credibility as these discrepancies indicate that the responses
are honest and unrehearsed."65
Suppression of Evidence
Acejas further raises the issue of suppression of evidence. Aoyagi, from whom the money
was supposedly demanded, should have been presented by the prosecution as a witness. 66
The discretion on whom to present as prosecution witnesses falls on the People. 67 The
freedom to devise a strategy to convict the accused belongs to the
prosecution.68 Necessarily, its decision on which evidence, including which witnesses, to
present cannot be dictated by the accused or even by the trial court. 69 If petitioners believed
that Takao Aoyagis testimony was important to their case, they should have presented him
as their witness.70
Finally, Acejas claims that his Comment/Objection to the prosecutions Formal Offer of
Evidence was not resolved by the Sandiganbayan.71 In that Comment/Objection, he had
noted the lateness in the filing of the Formal Offer of Evidence.
It may readily be assumed that the Sandiganbayan admitted the prosecutions Formal Offer
of Evidence upon the promulgation of its Decision. In effect, Acejas Comment/Objection was
deemed immaterial. It could not overrule the finding of guilt. Further, it showed no prayer that
the Sandiganbayan needed to act upon.72
Finally we reiterate that, as a rule, factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive
upon this Court.73 We are convinced that these were clearly based on the evidence adduced
in this case.
In sum, we find that the prosecution proved the elements of direct bribery. First, there is no
question that the offense was committed by a public officer. BID Agent Hernandez extorted
money from the Aoyagi spouses for the return of the passport and the promise of assistance
in procuring a visa. Petitioner Acejas was his co-conspirator. Second, the offenders received
the money as payoff, which Acejas received for the group and then gave to Perlas. Third, the
money was given in consideration of the return of the passport, an act that did not constitute
a crime. Fourth, both the confiscation and the return of the passport were made in the
exercise of official duties.
For taking direct part in the execution of the crime, Hernandez and Acejas are liable as
principals.74 The evidence shows that the
parties conspired to extort money from Spouses Aoyagi. A conspiracy exists even if all the
parties did not commit the same act, if the participants performed specific acts that indicated
unity of purpose in accomplishing a criminal design. 75The act of one is the act of all.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolutions
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, respondent.
x-------------------------x
Bar Matter No. 1227 July 25, 2006
RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
x-------------------------x
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC July 25, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP
BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR.
IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA

DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP RESOLUTION
UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM FROM THE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR
FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains
to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Vera's moral fitness to remain as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to schedule his oath taking
as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as
Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine
the national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
A.C. No. 6697
The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and
recommendation on subject case,1 summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:
In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the
suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the
following grounds:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension

order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in

Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989
IBP Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds
due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the
Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department San Francisco, State Bar of
California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the
respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the
said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension.
Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to
lead the country's most noble profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called "rotation
rule" provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP
Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the
requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter
Membership. He surmised that the respondent's transfer was intended only for the
purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the
respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues
raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier
administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to
him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon
by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No.
6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that
the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res
judicata.
On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for
presentation of evidence in support of their respective allegations.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that

there is substantial evidence showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness and
depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed
that the respondent never denied that he used his client's money. Complainant
argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of
California accepted the latter's resignation and even if such was accepted,
complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the
case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the
respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.
Bar Matter No. 1227
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC
As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to this
Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the
other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBP's Resolution, dated 13 May
2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing
acts inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general. 2
The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular
meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3
vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition
filed before this Court docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz,
et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-
R165108." The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to
increase filing fees.3
The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the
above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor
Carlos L. Valdez.4
On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the
IBP Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the
IBP Board's 14 January 2005 Resolution.5
On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Vera's request for oathtaking as
National President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697,
the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.6
On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the
CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de
Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection
with the IBP Board's Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic
Act No. 9227.7
On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de
Vera from assuming office as IBP National President.8
On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter
wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having
committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.9
On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel,
Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the
IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President. 10 Quoted hereunder is the
dispositive portion of said Resolution:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that
Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of
Governors and Executive Vice President for committing acts inimical to the IBP
Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:
1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public

about the Supreme Court and members of the IBP Board of Governors,
during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers,
held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making it
appear that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the
PETITION docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining
Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108", was due to influence
and pressure from the Supreme Court of the Philippines;
2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that
brought the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP as a whole in public
contempt and disrepute;
3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for

Lawyers which mandates that "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others", by making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant
lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of
Lawyers in Baguio City;
4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and

humiliate the IBP Board of Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter
to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;
5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz,
during the Plenary Session of the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of
withholding from him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January
2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong
impression that the IBP National President deliberately prevented him from
taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus compromising the
reputation and integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP as a
whole.11
On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon.
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as "Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring
Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly
Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due
Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary
Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than
Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal Investigation." 12
In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts
inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-
complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without
just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process.
Pertinent portions of his letter read:
It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice
against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I
am scheduled to assume my position as National President of the IBP on July 1,
2005. x x x
I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court
even in administrative cases:
1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The
complaint against me was in writing.
2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period
of time after receipt of the complaint.
3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.
4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against
me. I challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could question him. He
refused. I offered to testify under oath so I could be questioned. My request
was denied.
5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.
6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my

accuser, prosecutor, and judge all at the same time.
7. Gov. Rivera's prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident

because when his motion to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his
inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he can
vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel me.13 (Emphasis and
underscoring in original.)
On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera. 14 In
their Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera
was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member.
Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:
(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited
resolutions from IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its
decision to withdraw the Petition, all with the end in view of compelling or coercing
the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the decision to withdraw the Petition.
(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors
and the IBP National President in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th
National Convention of Lawyers.
(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated 'solicited' speakers (at the plenary
session), Atty. de Vera "fanned the fire", so to speak, and went to the extent of
making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court
and some members of the IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally
did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an
acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.
(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that
some of the members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal
of the petition (without mentioning names) because "nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme
Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court."
He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the resolution,
withdrawing the petition, due to "influence" or "pressure" from the Supreme Court. 15
The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Vera's actuation during the Plenary Session was "the
last straw that broke the camel's back." He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP
Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him.
On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position
paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board
and as IBP EVP.16
On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special
meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP
Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de
Vera's removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected
and declared as IBP EVP.17
On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago. 18 On 20 June
2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to
the IBP Board.19 Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board
elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty.
Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice
Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazar's election. 20 IBP National President Cadiz also
requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazar's election be approved and that he be
allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of
Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court. 21 Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera
protested the election of Atty. Salazar.22
In his Extended Comment23 dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was
absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board
because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on
the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise
executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum standards of
due process of law.
Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed
against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although
undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations,
not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in
particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during
the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected
member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that the
right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP
Board.
Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this
Court's Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic
Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As regards the election
of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it was
contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:
Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall
hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of
their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen
and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be
performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or
removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting
President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the event of death, resignation,
removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the
Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired
portion of the term or during the period of disability.
Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees
appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the
pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix. 24
To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die,
resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an
Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such
election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement
should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation Rule
embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.
In response to Atty. de Vera's averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel,
submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to
protect itself from an intractable member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP
By-Laws;
(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not
because of his disagreement with the IBP Board's position but because of the
various acts that he committed which the IBP Board determined to be inimical to the
IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;
(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional
right to Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to
insist on similar conduct by others;
(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the
fundamental principles of due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was
duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was
furnished a copy of Governor Rivera's Letter-Complaint the day before the said
meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meeting's Agenda; and was allowed to
personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;
(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under
Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP
Board and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;
(vi) Atty. de Vera's replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao
Region because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP
By-Laws had already been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern
Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the
same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that
(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to
take his oath as IBP National President.25
The Court's Ruling
AC No. 6697
In his Memorandum26 dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the
consideration of the Court:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic)

COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE
OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE

PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO
AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE

MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN.
CASE NO. [6052]27
The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue.
Consequently, we will start with the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent
Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension

order rendered against him by the State Bar in California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in

Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989
IBP Elections).
It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier
administrative case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued
upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by
this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052
(In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:
"As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients
when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to
surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot
serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for
the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final
judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied
upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee
which are recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar
Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final decision of the
Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California
administrative case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the
complainant's money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by
the investigating officer. xxx"
"On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera
while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final
judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of
the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he
suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue
the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence
of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has
the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown
how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness
to run for governor.
On the other hand, as regards the second issue:
"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post

because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in
Paraaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He
only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate
goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency.
Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera
violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article
II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can
register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not

automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his
place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the
particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does
not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of
the place where he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in
registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more
than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this
Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer
complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:
xxx
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must
be made not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the
chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP
membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP
National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador
Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero,
Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de
Vera's transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their
respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the
certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's
transfer was made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3
September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter
Officers were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by
Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter
Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every
other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen
months had elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it
was done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27
February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case
No. 2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared that:
"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial

proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Court's] administrative powers."
In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for
grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the
bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter
a complaint for disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same
incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be
charged on the basis of the same incident. This Court held that while the respondent
is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to
double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This
Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an
erring court personnel under the Court's supervisory power over courts while, in the
second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Court's plenary authority over
membersof the legal profession.
In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still
applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs.
Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled
that:
"While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be

contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a
second time for an act which he had already answered for.";
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L.
Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No.
MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that:
"Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present
administrative case becomes dismissible.
xxx
Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of
competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively
settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and
for the same cause. It provides that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction

is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes
an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be
affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same
matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should
not be permitted to litigate it again.
This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of
unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the
clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and
promotes the rule of law."
In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant
had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The
complainant's contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case
at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the instant
administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given
least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is
denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the
suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin
the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President.28
Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, "In Re: Petition
to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election" and promulgated on 11
December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the
parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their
capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring
the application of res judicata.
In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions
must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4)
there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject
matter, and identity of causes of action.29 In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty.
de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.
It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and
causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de
Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the
present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first
administrative case, complainants' cause of action was Atty. de Vera's alleged violation or
circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of
action is Atty. de Vera's alleged violation of lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the
complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum,
what is being principally sought is Atty. de Vera's suspension or disbarment.
The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved
on the basis of the parties' rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that
Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in
the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors.
Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we
held that the complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-
laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file with the IBP
President a written protest against the candidate. The Court's statement, therefore, that Atty.
de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter
dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings;
hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a
hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three
years. We held in that case that
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit
before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the
determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the
members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of
morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter
possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the
disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final
judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.30
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper
case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director
is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive
audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary
disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is
sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm.
Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be
suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by
complainant.
The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing
alone, is not proof of malpractice.
In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty.
Leon G. Maquera,31 we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the
Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was
suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member
of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.
We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was
admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and
against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However,
unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted
against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he
surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme
Court of California.
In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a

foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and
suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the
foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima
facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or
final order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,32 we explained that "[a] foreign
judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a
contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving
of due notice in the foreign forum."
In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not
constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must
prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing
officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise
unethical under Philippine law.
There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent

of the recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of
California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds

therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent
court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of
such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension. 33
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable
men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 34 The statutory enunciation of the
grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power
of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers
cannot be restricted.35
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer.

Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "Malpractice." 36 That meaning
is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a
business.37
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his
profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession. 38
Now, the undisputed facts:
1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California,
docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera
handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de
Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son
to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the
release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of
the case which he then deposited to his personal account; 39
2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for three years;40 and
3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the
Supreme Court of California.41
Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he
misappropriated his client's funds as the latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to
use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation
notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he "expected de Vera
might use the money for a few days."
By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds,
Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.
In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum that
he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said
amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent
the amount for personal purposes.42
At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.43 It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in
issue can be reasonably inferred.44
Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is highly unethical.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES
OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
In Espiritu v. Ulep45 we held that
The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it
requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the
attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all
money and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly,
he shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Even more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or
gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming
into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted
for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with
his own or be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by
him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)
In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his client's money for
personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more
than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of
rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.
In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the
funds intended for the latter's son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full
amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the
State Bar of California.46
Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records
of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client.
In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera47 we declared that
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis
had indeed testified that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." As Atty.
de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this
statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis "expected
de Vera might use the money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of
consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client's funds as it was an acceptance of the
probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds, which by itself did not
speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.
In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without the
latter's acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that
Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own
benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused
dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot
be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a
member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence. 48 Respondent violated his oath
to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. 49 Where any lesser
penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,50 we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from
his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account
without the latter's knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;51 Castillo v. Taguines;52 Espiritu v. Atty.
Cabredo IV,53 the respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to
their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively,
received by them for their clients without the latter's permission. In Dumadag v. Atty.
Lumaya,54 we indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount of
the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of
execution. Considering the amount involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that the
penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.
Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not
a ground for his suspension or disbarment
Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paraaque,
Las Pias and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a
circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP
National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del
Sur nor does he hold office therein.
In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of transferring to another IBP
Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is
allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be
made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter election.
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said
that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a
legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in
transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule will produce the next IBP
EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code
of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyer's Oath do not prohibit nor punish
lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in
accomplishing such goal.
Bar Matter No. 1227

Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC
To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following
issues must be addressed:
I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in
removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.
i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due

process in removing Atty. de Vera.
ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.
II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June
2005, and can consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-
2007.
The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor
We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to
remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which
states:
Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should determine after
proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason
become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the
remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause,
including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable
excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the
Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates
from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of
the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the
unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause
by resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to
the approval of this Court.
In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural
and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied "very basic rights of due process
recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases" like the right to answer
formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf,
the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-
examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera
voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same
time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting
on his own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the
necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so
he could vote to support his own motion.
The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session,
and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal
hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was
enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed
against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that
he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against
him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in
fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.
We are in agreement with the IBP Board.
First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life,
liberty and property.55 It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within
the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said
position as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board of governors for
cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.
Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. 56 At
the outset, it is here emphasized that the term "due process of law" as used in the
Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due "to the very nature of the doctrine
which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not
susceptible of more than one general statement."57 The phrase is so elusive of exact
apprehension,58 because it depends on circumstances and varies with the subject matter and
the necessities of the situation.59
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in
court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon
different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and
its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character,
the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional
requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established
administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making
of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections
and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One
adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is required for "hearing" may differ
as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.60
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. 61 Nor is an actual
hearing always essential62 especially under the factual milieu of this case where the
members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for
removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court all
witnessed Atty. de Vera's actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.
It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he
was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of
the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera
was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.
Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the
complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and
judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially
inhibited himself from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the
necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in
favor of his motion.
For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera's
expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).
Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause,
including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable
excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board,
subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution
adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase "remaining members" refers to the
members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason
therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable to
resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera
should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are
to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two voted
against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.
The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause
All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an
IBP Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board
argues that it is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable
member whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to
various acts committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board
in particular and the IBP in general.
Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of
the Board during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a
duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only
shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the IBP
Board.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of
the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de
Vera's removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.
Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are
inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said
to disagree before they agree.
However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts
are brought outside its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP,
which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members
in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBP's prestige and repute with
the lawyers as well as with the general public.
As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the

governing board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal
cleavages are made public.
The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and
resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have been given
an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision
on a contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound
thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing board
are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the
authority of the board.63
The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter's
actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP
Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the
public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court
enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the
administration of justice.
In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a
member of the board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a
policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The
effectiveness of the board as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements are
resisted in public by a board member.
Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he
should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his
heart's content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant
his removal as EVP as well
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his
removal as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:
SEC. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors
from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis.
xxx
Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors.
Atty. de Vera's removal from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from
acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de
Vera since it was rendered without grave abuse of discretion
While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision
over the IBP,64 it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising
its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by the
provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to
define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational
structure, and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these
By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on
its day-to-day affairs, without the Court's interference.
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been
vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and representative
of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws. 65 The Board acts as a
collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules
serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or
malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board
deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption66 of validity, which shall continue, until
and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the
Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board
has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not
be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Board's action or resolution.
There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided
in Article VI, Section 4467 of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board
abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an
IBP Governor and EVP. As has been previously established herein, Atty. de Vera's removal
from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted well within
the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the Board's
resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De
Vera was conducted in accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP
By-Laws
In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP
Board of Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the
removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done
without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-Laws
of the IBP.
With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated
13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant
vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.
Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill
vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the
Integration Rule,68 and Section 11 (Vacancies),69 Section 44 (Removal of members),70 Section
47 (National officers),71 Section 48 (other officers),72and Section 49 (Terms of Office)73 of the
By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on
how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence
in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining members of the
2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-
Laws.
The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the
Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to
the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that "[t]he
EVP shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term." The phrase "for the
next succeeding term" necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as
IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members
of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained
now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we
have yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP
Board of Governors.
Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and
thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment
of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.
Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his
removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from
Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of
the IBP By-Laws.
According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the
Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a
rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:
"ORDER
xxxx
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President
elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP
regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-
Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-
President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was
abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should
be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall
automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors
shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position
of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP
regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive
Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency
among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall
begin anew.
xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)"
In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among
the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result
of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule
pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains
to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the
automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De
Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the
rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Vera's
removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP
Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the
non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and
purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter.
The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables
the new IBP National President to attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to
expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time
that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in
fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It should also be
pointed out that this wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected
from among the members of the IBP Board of Governors, who are serving in a national
capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is
to assume the highest position in the IBP must have been exposed to the demands and
responsibilities of national leadership.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule
for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP
from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the
experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 in this case, Governor Salazar who would have
served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.
It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the
EVP for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of
Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De
Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month before the expiration of the term of office of the
2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been able
to serve in a national capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.
In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as much as practicable" to clearly
indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in
compelling and exceptional circumstances.
It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP
national presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from
where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for
such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only
one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.
We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-
Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of
the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been no one qualified to
assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-
Laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:
1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for
TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this
Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May
2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing
him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of
discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar
as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder
of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws
and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and
assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-
2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of
the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
ADM. CASE No. 3319 June 8, 2000
LESLIE UI, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for
allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant,
Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City1and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children,
namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December
1987, however, complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit
relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in
1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang
Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the
University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then
visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the
legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with
Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui.
Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out
well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would
come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband,
Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in
March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui
but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on
that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11,
1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the
ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the
complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2 respondent averred that she met Carlos
Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge,
however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he
had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui
formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985 3.
Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to
live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted
to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they
would live together.4
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only
return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During
one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who
insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of
the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July
1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few
days after she reported to work with the law firm5 she was connected with, the woman who
represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know
if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they
were married abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true
civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived
with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother,
Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents'
funds.6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten
Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly
malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew
perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at
the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was
to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged
her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution
dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit
relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in
December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was
still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents
started and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and
respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their
conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos
left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship,
illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant's
evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of
respondent's cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos
St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least
create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant,
worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not
make the complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and
Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their

respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be

dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary
of Justice, but the same was dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove
her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San
Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion
to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with
making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was
altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the
Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on
October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment.
However, the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of
the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage
between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not
October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the
reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said
IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. 12 It is the contention
of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised
Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making
false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are
indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that
she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the
possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith
on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of
whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to
be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be
dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of

good moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an
immoral manner.
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in
this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married,
and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui.
She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos
Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in
his courtship. 18
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly
incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had
she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling
reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or
1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before
complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos
Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted
that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from
1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui
on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with
a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a
light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house
and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of
the house and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have
no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a
private security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the
respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-
5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the
Department of Justice21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or
illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she
entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be
considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in
love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true
civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by
having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children.
Complainant testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew
complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank
where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that
respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by
her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that
respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a
document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24, respondent stated that complainant miserably
failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to
the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the
fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui
to be a married man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its
Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui,
the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim
too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to
be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason
therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status
of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts
with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her
brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each
other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live
together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part
of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic)
anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without
cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family
life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of
Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly
and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.
We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that
can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and
the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or
pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has
been held
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in
the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer
ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his

conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is

"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that
what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959). 26
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui,
she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got
married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are
not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our
legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry
from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of
public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle
their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that
perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she
exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal
background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion
that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing
questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with
a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find
out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987,
Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply
incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in
courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent
in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos
Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be
"grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's
act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status
belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting
the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to
the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and
the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer,
we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the
photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as
significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of
her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar,
can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience
and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to
her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated
date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called
1avvphi1
upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest
degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of

her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN
WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same
or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40136 March 25, 1975
COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G. ALVAREZ, petitioners,

vs.
LO BU and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Filemon G. Alvarez for petitioners.
Yolando F Busmente for respondent Lo Bu.
FERNANDO, J.: +.wph!1
The jurisdiction of respondent Court of Appeals is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding. It is taken to task for entertaining an appeal from the Court of First Instance on a
replevin suit which was correctly dismissed as it had all the earmarks of a subterfuge that
was resorted to for the purpose of frustrating the execution of a judgment in an unfair labor
practice controversy, one moreover already passed upon and sustained by this Court.
Petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union is the prevailing party in that labor dispute
which unfortunately had dragged on since 1961, all its efforts to obtain what was due it being
rendered illusory through the machinations of a certain Ong Ting, now deceased, and the
private respondent Lo Bu. The lack of competence of respondent Court of Appeals to
proceed further is thus rather obvious. It is about time that there be an effective vindication of
the rights of petitioner labor union, so long set at naught and disregarded, by the
employment of techniques, which certainly deserve no encouragement, much less approval.
There was a grave infirmity then in the Court of Appeals having dismissed the appeal,
reinstating it in its resolution of December 19, 1974. Certiorari and prohibition lie.
The facts show that on January 16, 1973, petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union
was able to obtain from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for
the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor. 1 Thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Mario
Abiog of Manila, who was especially deputized to serve the writ, did so on January 17 and 18,
1973 levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century
Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public auction sale. 2 It was then that respondent
Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations, a point stressed in another motion dated February 2, 1973, on the further
ground that petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union failed to put up an indemnity bond.
The Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated February 23, 1973 denied his motions. So
likewise was the motion for reconsideration, as shown in its order dated March 23, 1973. Private
respondent appealed by certiorari such order to this Court. It was docketed as G.R. No. L-
36636. 3 This Court, in its resolution dated July 17, 1973, denied the petition for certiorari of
private respondent. 4 In the meanwhile, there was a replevin suit by private respondent in the
Court of First Instance of Manila covering the same properties. Upon receipt of the order from this
Court denying certiorari, petitioner labor union filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint. It
was therein alleged that private respondent has no cause of action, he being a fictitious buyer
based on the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated June 22, 1970 and
affirmed by the Supreme Court in its resolution dated July 17, 1973. The lower court dismissed
the complaint. 5 That is the decision elevated to the Court of Appeals, and it is precisely because
of its obvious character as a further delaying tactic that this petition is filed.
Petitioner labor union has made out a case for certiorari and prohibition.
1. The order of the Court of Industrial Relations in the unfair labor practice case dated June
27, 1970 6 for the satisfaction and enforcement of which the third alias writ of execution was
issued in favor of petitioner labor union starts with the following: "This concerns complainant's
motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, dated March 12, 1970, "allowing the Sheriff
to serve the Writ and returnable within 60 days and the said writ should be directed to Cosmos
Foundry Shop or New Foundry Shop which is the firm name use(d) by the respondent in lieu of
the Cosmos Foundry Shop ... The original writ of execution had been returned wholly unsatisfied
as respondents had no visible properties found in their names, and the foundry shop where Mrs.
Ong Ting and her family reside at Maisan, Valenzuela, Bulacan, is the "New Century Foundry
Shop" (return of the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, dated March 11, 1970). Consequently,
in its Order of March 19, 1970, the Court directed the examination of Mrs. Ong Ting and the
Cosmos Foundry Shop concerning the latter's and Ong Ting's property and income. Extensive
hearings were conducted." 7
Then comes this relevant portion: "From the evidence and the records, the Court finds that
after the Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned, Ong Ting established the New Century
Foundry Shop. He and his family resided in the premises of the shop at 118 Maisan Road,
Valenzuela, Bulacan. After his proposals to settle the present case for P5,000.00 in
September 1968, for P25,000.00 in October 1968, and for P40,000.00 on December 22,
1968, were successively rejected by complainant's counsel, Ong Ting, after hinting of taking
measures to avoid liability, soon executed a deed of absolute sale on December 31, 1968,
selling all his business, including equipment, machineries, improvements, materials, supplies
and rights, in the New Century Foundry Shop, to his compadre Lo Bu, for P20,000.00, which
he acknowledged so fully paid ... The deed does not bear the conformity of Mrs. Ong Ting.
On January 7, 1969, when Lo Bu applied for the original registration of the firm name, he
gave his name as the manager and the capital of the business as P30,000.00 ...
Notwithstanding such sale to Lo Bu, Ong Ting filed a verified urgent motion to reopen the
case on January 25, 1969, and a verified motion for reconsideration of the Decision on May
12, 1969. In the latter motion, it was alleged that as a result of the fire, "Ong Ting lost
everything; we cannot squeeze blood out of nothing ... " This allegation was made despite
the recent alleged sale to Lo Bu, from which he realized P20,000.00." 8 The absence of good
faith on the part of respondent Lo Bu as the alleged vendee was made clear thus: "There was no
actual turn over of the business to Lo Bu, the alleged manager in absentia. At the time Ong Ting
died, he was still residing in the premises of the shop ... His family continued to reside therein
without paying any rental to Lo Bu. His young 19-year-old son Delfin Ong became in-charge of
the shop and the workers. His daughter Gloria Ong became the cashier. Mrs. Ong Ting became
the manager and she supervised the work. .. The alleged sale was no doubt intended to
circumvent any judgment this Court might render unfavorable to respondents. It is clearly
fictitious. And such a declaration by this Court is well within its jurisdiction because what is being
sought is the enforcement or implementation of its order. Having acquired jurisdiction, the Court
may employ means to carry it into effect (Sec. 6, Rule 135, Rules of Court)." 9
That was why in the dispositive portion of the aforesaid order, an alias writ of execution was
issued against the properties held in the name of the New Century Foundry Shop at 118
Maisan Road, Valenzuela, Bulacan for the satisfaction of the judgment in this unfair labor
practice proceeding. As noted, there was a replevin suit by the same vendee in bad faith, Lo
Bu, which was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila precisely because in the
meanwhile the finality of the writ of execution became definitely settled when this Court
issued its resolution of July 17, 1973. 10 It denied the petition for certiorari filed by the private
respondent, Lo Bu, for the purpose of annulling the third writ of execution issued in accordance
with the dispositive portion of the order of the Court of June 22, 1970.
2. To all intents and purposes then, that is the law of the case. What is worse, private
respondent Lo Bu certainly cannot plead ignorance, as he himself was the petitioner in the
certiorari proceeding before this Court. He failed, and ii was not surprising, for on the facts as
found, he was a principal in the nefarious scheme to frustrate the award in favor of petitioner
labor union. There was thus a ruling as to the bad faith that characterized his pretension of
being the alleged vendee. In Cruz v. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions 11 it was
shown that to avoid the legal consequences of an unfair labor practice, there was a fictitious sale
resorted to, as in this case. Under the circumstances, the bad faith being evident, the ostensible
vendee was precluded from taking advantage of the situation. So it must be here. Moreover, that
is merely, as stated earlier, to accord deference to the fundamental principle of the law of the
case, his petition for certiorari having been dismissed by this Court. There is this excerpt from the
recent decision of Mangayao v. De Guzman: 12 "The latest case in point as of the time the order
complained of was issued is Kabigting v. Acting Director of Prisons, a 1962 decision. As
emphasized by the ponente, the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Makalintal: 'It need not be stated
that the Supreme Court, being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions
properly brought before it and that its decision in any give case constitutes the law of that
particular case. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts, and hence
beyond their power and authority to alter or modify. If petitioner had any ground to believe that the
decision of this Court in Special Proceeding No. 12276 should further be reviewed his remedy
was to ask for a reconsideration thereof. In fact he did file two motions for that purpose, both of
which were denied. A new petition before an inferior court on the same grounds was unjustified.
As much, indeed, was clearly indicated by this Court in its resolution of April 3, 1959, herein
above reproduced in its entirety. The import of the resolution is too plain to be misunderstood.' So
it has been from 1919, when in Compagnie Franco-Indochinoise v. Deutsche-Australische
Dampschiffs Gesellschaft, this Court, through Justice Street, categorically declared that a
decision that has become the law of the case "is not subject to review or reversal in any court."
What is more, in 1967, there is a reaffirmation of the doctrine by this Tribunal in People v.
Olarte where it was stressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes that a ruling constituting the law of the case,
"even if erroneous, ... may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final ... " Then,
in Sanchez v. Court of Industrial Relations, promulgated in 1969, there is the pronouncement that
the law of the case 'does not apply solely to what is embodied in [this Court's] decision but
likewise to its implementation carried out in fealty to what has been ... decreed.'" 13
3. Private respondent, in his special and affirmative defenses, alleged that petitioners have a
plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law being the appellees in the pending
case in the Court of Appeals sought to be dismissed in this suit for certiorari. As a general
rule, such a plea could be looked upon with sympathy. That is the ordinary course of judicial
procedure. There would be no basis for legitimate grievance on the part of petitioners. It is
not so however in this case. The sad plight of petitioner labor union had been previously
noted. It is about time that a halt be called to the schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his
far-from-commendable efforts to defeat labor's just claim. It would be repugnant to the
principle of social justice 14 and the mandate of protection to labor 15 if there be further delay in
the satisfaction of a judgment that ought to have been enforced years ago.
4. One last point. It was set forth in the Petition 16 that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion
with the Court of Industrial Relations to recall the writ of execution alleging as one of his grounds
lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the sale of the New Century Foundry Shop,
followed by another motion praying for the return of the levied properties this time asserting that
petitioner labor union failed to put up an indemnity bond and then a third, this time to allow the
sheriff to keep the levied properties at his factory, all of which were denied by the Court en
banc in its order of March 23, 1973, assailed in the certiorari proceeding, dismissed by this Court
for lack of merit. 17 Counsel Yolando F. Busmente in his Answer to this petition, filed on February
20, 1975, had the temerity to deny such allegations. He simply ignored the fact that as counsel for
respondent Lo Bu, petitioner in L-36636, he did specifically maintain: "On January 26, 1973, in
order to vindicate his rights over the levied properties, in an expeditious or less expensive
manner, herein appellant voluntarily submitted himself, as a forced intervenor, to the jurisdiction of
respondent CIR, by filing an urgent 'Motion to Recall Writ of Execution,' precisely questioning the
jurisdiction of said Court to pass upon the validity and legality of the sale of the 'New Century
Foundry Shop' to him, without the latter being made a party to the case, as well as the jurisdiction
of said Court to enforce the Decision rendered against the respondents in Case No. 3021-ULP, by
means of an alias writ of execution against his properties found at the 'New Century Foundry
Shop;' ... ; Petitioner appellant's urgent motion aforesaid was set for hearing on February 5, 1973,
and inasmuch as the auction sale of his properties was set for January 31, 1973, the CIR issued
an order on January 30, 1973, one day before the schedule sale, ordering the Sheriff of Manila
not to proceed with the auction sale; ... ; On February 3, 1973, herein petitioner-appellant [Lo Bu]
filed another urgent motion dated February 2, 1973, praying for the return of his properties on the
ground that the judgment creditor (respondent-appellee) failed to put up an indemnity bond,
pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; ... On February 10, 1973
respondent-appellee Cosmos Foundry Workers Union interposed its opposition to herein
petitioner-appellant's urgent motions dated January 26, 1973 and February 2, 1973, ... ; On
February 27, 1973, herein petitioner-appellant received an order from respondent CIR, dated
February 25, 1973, denying his urgent motions and ordering the Sheriff of Manila to proceed with
the auction sale of his properties "in accordance with law;" ... " 18 Such conduct on the part of
counsel is far from commendable. He could, of course, be casuistic and take refuge in the fact
that the paragraph of the petition, which he denied, was, in addition to being rather poorly and
awkwardly worded, also prolix, with unnecessary matter being included therein without due
regard to logic or coherence or even rules of grammar. He could add that his denial was to be
correlated with his special defenses, where he concentrated on points not previously admitted.
That is the most that can be said of his performance, and it is not enough. For even if such be the
case, Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself. He was of course expected to defend his
client's cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose
of labor statutes. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less than
the dignity of the profession, requires that he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and
call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in
mind, then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of December 19, 1974 of
respondent Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal is nullified and set aside. The writ of
prohibition is likewise granted, respondent Court of Appeals being perpetually restrained
from taking any further action on such appeal, except that of dismissing it. Triple costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Antonio and Fernandez, JJ., concur. 1wph1.t

Aquino, J., is on leave.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur in the judgment enjoining the Court of Appeal from entertaining the appeal of private
respondent in CA-G.R. No. 56485-R entitled Lo Bu, etc. vs. Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers
Union & F. Alvarez.
After petitioners had secured a judgment in the Court of Industrial Relations against Cosmos
Foundry Shop and by virtue thereof obtained a writ of execution against said Shop and the
Sheriff had levied on properties found therein, herein private respondent appeared and
asserting his rights over the levied properties by virtue of a sale made to him by the Shop,
impugned the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to carry out the purported execution. The
Industrial Court sustained its authority and on certiorari to the Supreme Court by respondent
the petition was dismissed (G.R. No. L-36636). In the meanwhile, respondent sued for
replevin of the same properties in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Case No. 89994. In
its answer to the replevin action, petitioners invoked the resolution of this Court in G.R. No.
L-36636 and moved to dismiss the complaint, which motion was granted. When respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition.
No doubt, as things stand now, the remedy pursued by petitioners is not the appropriate one.
The ground of dismissal upheld by the trial court was in essence res adjudicata. Ordinarily,
against such dismissal, the remedy is appeal and, of course, such an appeal cannot be
stopped by prohibition. And if only because the Court of Appeals has not been given any
opportunity at all to pass on its own alleged lack of jurisdiction, the present action would
seem to be premature.
From another point of view, however, it is quite obvious that to allow the respondent Court of
Appeals to entertain respondent's appeal would be sanctioning, as the main opinion finds,
the apparently endless ingenious schemes, if judicial, of respondent to further delay the
execution of the subject judgment which became final and executory almost two years ago
after a protracted litigation that started way back in 1961, since thirteen yesteryears from
now. Law and justice demand that petitioners should not be further denied the fruit of their
legal efforts, to secure redress, particularly because in the order of the Industrial Court
denying respondent's motion to recall the writ of execution against Cosmos Foundry Shop,
the court found said Shop and respondent to have indulged in a simulated transaction
covering the properties in question purposely to avoid satisfaction of the judgment in favor of
petitioners.
To reiterate, the ground of dismissal of respondent's replevin suit is a legal one, res
adjudicata, termed in the main opinion as "law of the case". Indeed, the Court of Industrial
Relations had already found the sale to respondent of the Cosmos Foundry Shop to be
fraudulent, and that decision was sustained by this Court. In that proceeding, even the
jurisdiction of the Industrial Court was questioned. Thus, both the merits of the respective
claims of the parties as well as the validity of the action of the Industrial Court is now beyond
question. And that was the basis of petitioners' motion to dismiss the replevin action. Under
these circumstances, any appeal from the order of dismissal should have come directly to
this Court, the issue passed upon by the trial court being purely legal, premised as it is on
conclusions of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations no longer assailable as a matter of law
by respondent.
In other words, the Court of Appeals would have no alternative anyway than to certify that
appeal to Us, and, accordingly, We can already decide the present action as if certification
had in fact been made. The pleadings and the issues before Us now could not be
substantially different, if We took the roundabout way of directing such certification to be
made before We render Our decision. It is, but proper, therefore, that in the interest of a
faster, more effective and less technically cumbersome administration of justice, We should
here and now put an end to the controversy between the parties herein.
Contrary to the claim of respondent regarding the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to pass
on the question of the alleged fictiousness of the sale to respondent, there is at least the
decision of this Court in Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa La Campana vs. De los Angeles,
36 SCRA 142, holding that the power of control over the Sheriff in relation to the
implementation of writ of execution issued by the Industrial Court belongs to that court and
not to any Court of First Instance. (at pp. 155-6.) But even assuming there could be in truth
some doubt on the matter, the fact is that issue was actually included in the previous
proceeding in that court sustained by this Court in G.R. No. L-36636. If that ruling is in
anyway erroneous, We cannot change it anymore. As far as the parties are concerned that is
the law of the case. Even a ruling on jurisdiction has the effect of res adjudicata. Much less
then could any other court disregard it. And inasmuch as the trial court simply adhered to this
view, its order of dismissal can hardly be assailed as erroneous.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is my considered view that for want of appellate

jurisdiction, the impugned appeal in the Court of Appeals may be considered as non-existing
and that court should be enjoined from taking any further action thereon, even as We decide
the case now as if it had been duly appealed to us without the need of any further
proceeding, since, as already observed, the necessary pleadings are in effect already before
Us.
A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial
assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4To induce them to hire his services, he
persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.
Complainant also attached "respondents" calling card: 6
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
Tel: 362-7820
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm.
Fax: (632)
M-01
362-7821
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Cel.: (0926)
Grace Park, Caloocan City
2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
1avvphi1
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of
complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 12 of the Rules
of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern
warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by
respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of
ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by
which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. 13 To
allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade
the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high
character of service to which every member of the bar is called. 14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any mans cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a
measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very
same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it
during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could
produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and
Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 1avvphi1
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer
should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of
better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. 20 Again the Court notes that
respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from
Labianos "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his
office.21Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice.
He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent

violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer
lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees,
stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided
attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer
in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its
outcome.23Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery
rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in
the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the
clients cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the
exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants
serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on

lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a
wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based
on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their
services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labianos calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was
clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a
promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from
their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional
vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his
culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly
responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02
and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of one
year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006
ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant,

vs.
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto
Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral
turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; 2 and constitutes sufficient ground for
his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.3
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a
Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte
hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004. 4After that hearing, complainant manifested
that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its
attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did on
July 27, 2004.6Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and

Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in
its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated
homicide,7 which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:
"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after
gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao
Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the
car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the
Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the
taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The
accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the
aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground.
The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor.
Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him
get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the
taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down
a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist
and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified
and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure
that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his
vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up
intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he
was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on
the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The
incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi
driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano."8
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought
the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side
of his neck,9 complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely
medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr.
Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and
disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002,
respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several
conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of
the offended party, Roberto Soriano."10
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply
with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals. 11
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent

be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that
the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following
facts:
"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the
latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent
went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot
Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied

that he had shot Complainant;
"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the
one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet
satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant."12
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved

and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed
to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed
of good moral character.13 In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he
stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already
been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be
determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral
turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty,
or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals."14
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed
in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, 15 a labor case concerning an
employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the
particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the
employers contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If
it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRIs Employment Policy Regulations and
indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant
circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it
was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude.
That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:
"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known
and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. x x x."16 (Emphasis supplied)
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court
appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime
are quoted as follows:
"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had
his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly
rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack
but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife
from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold
on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that
Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation
in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the
total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and
intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust." 17
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly
evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter
least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact
that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those
were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.
We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed
morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend
himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed
complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly
shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a
handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to
escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct,
respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he
acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted.
Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be
a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was
definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which
he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously
wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact
revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm 18 and his
unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and
disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorneys
oath20 and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws of
the land."
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense
of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence
and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years21 since he was ordered to settle
his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill
that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction
to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and
youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that
could never even fully restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the
profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.22 Where their misconduct
outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office
and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court
may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.23
We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral
character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law.
Good moral character includes at least common honesty.24
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As
found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-
court settlement with complainants family.25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted
a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainants family that had sought a
conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon. 26
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story
of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons. 27 The trial court had this to
say:
"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty.
Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped
each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is
improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on
beating him to death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the
complainants version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on
the chest. x x x."28
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness.29The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on
honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or
allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good
faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal
profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble
profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are
vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity
in a manner beyond reproach."31
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic
moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and
reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 32 Thus, whenever a
clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall
not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end
desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to
respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his
profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with
our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth
and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of
good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of
the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances
not the mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal
profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen
dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is

ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in
his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8010 June 16, 2009
KELD STEMMERIK, represented by ATTYS. HERMINIO A. LIWANAG and WINSTON P.L.

ESGUERRA,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:
Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips to the
Philippines, he was introduced to respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. That was his misfortune.
In one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled at the beauty of the country and
expressed his interest in acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted respondent
who advised him that he could legally acquire and own real property in the Philippines.
Respondent even suggested an 86,998 sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin, Cawag, Subic,
Zambales with the assurance that the property was alienable.
Trusting respondent, complainant agreed to purchase the property through respondent as

his representative or attorney-in-fact. Complainant also engaged the services of respondent
for the preparation of the necessary documents. For this purpose, respondent demanded
and received a P400,000 fee.
Confident that respondent would faithfully carry out his task, complainant returned to
Denmark, entrusting the processing of the necessary paperwork to respondent.
Thereafter, respondent prepared a contract to sell the property between complainant,

represented by respondent, and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, the purported owner of the
property.1 Subsequently, respondent prepared and notarized a deed of sale in which de
Mesa sold and conveyed the property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for P3.8
million.2 Respondent also drafted and notarized an agreement between complainant and
Gonzales stating that it was complainant who provided the funds for the purchase of the
property.3 Complainant then gave respondent the full amount of the purchase price (P3.8
million) for which respondent issued an acknowledgment receipt. 4
After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant tried to get in touch
with respondent to inquire about when the property could be registered in his name.
However, respondent suddenly became scarce and refused to answer complainants calls
and e-mail messages.
When complainant visited the Philippines again in January 2005, he engaged the services of
the Jimenez Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez Caluya & Fernandez Law Office to ascertain
the status of the property he supposedly bought. He was devastated to learn that aliens
could not own land under Philippine laws. Moreover, verification at the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the property was inalienable as it was
situated within the former US Military Reservation.5 The CENRO also stated that the property
was not subject to disposition or acquisition under Republic Act No. 141. 6
Thereafter, complainant, through his attorneys-in-fact,7 exerted diligent efforts to locate

respondent for purposes of holding him accountable for his fraudulent acts. Inquiry with the
Olongapo Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) disclosed that respondent
was in arrears in his annual dues and that he had already abandoned his law office in
Olongapo City.8 Search of court records of cases handled by respondent only yielded his
abandoned office address in Olongapo City. 1avvphi1
Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent in the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.9 He deplored respondents acts of serious misconduct. In
particular, he sought the expulsion of respondent from the legal profession for gravely
misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally acquire land in the Philippines and for
maliciously absconding with complainants P3.8 million.10
Respondent failed to file his answer and position paper despite service of notice at his last
known address. Neither did he appear in the scheduled mandatory conference. In this
connection, the CBD found that respondent abandoned his law practice in Olongapo City
after his transaction with complainant and that he did not see it fit to contest the charges
against him.11
The CBD ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer to mislead complainant on the
matter of land ownership by a foreigner.12 He even went through the motion of preparing
falsified and fictitious contracts, deeds and agreements. And for all these shameless acts, he
collected P400,000 from complainant. Worse, he pocketed the P3.8 million and absconded
with it.13
The CBD found respondent to be "nothing more than an embezzler" who misused his
professional status as an attorney as a tool for deceiving complainant and absconding with
complainants money.14 Respondent was dishonest and deceitful. He abused the trust and
confidence reposed by complainant in him. The CBD recommended the disbarment of
respondent.15
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of the CBD
with the modification that respondent was further required to return the amount of P4.2
million to respondent.16
We agree with the IBP.
Sufficiency Of Notice Of
The Disbarment Proceedings
We shall first address a threshold issue: was respondent properly given notice of the
disbarment proceedings against him? Yes.
The respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor did he appear during the
scheduled mandatory conference. Respondent in fact abandoned his last known address,
his law office in Olongapo City, after he committed the embezzlement.
Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He can neither
defeat this Courts jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative
liability by the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts. Thus, service of the complaint and
other orders and processes on respondents office was sufficient notice to him.
Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the notice
requirement cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to have waived it. The law does
not require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.17 The law obliges no
one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in
accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality.18
In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP
National Office or their respective chapters19 of any change in office or residential address
and other contact details.20 In case such change is not duly updated, service of notice on the
office or residential address appearing in the records of the IBP National Office shall
constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings against
him.
Respondents Administrative Infractions

And His Liability Therefor
Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote respect for the law
and uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted with the law, they must
ensure that the law functions to protect liberty and not as an instrument of oppression or
deception.
Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the legal profession and has
been found wanting.
Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession.
All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood.21 That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is a sacred trust
that should be upheld and kept inviolable at all times.22
Lawyers are servants of the law23 and the law is their master. They should not simply obey
the laws, they should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto by serving as exemplars
worthy of emulation. Indeed, that is the first precept of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or

conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.
This Court has interpreted this provision, as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds,24 to mean that "under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or agricultural
lands, including residential lands." The provision is a declaration of imperative constitutional
policy.25
Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy,

showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared
spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal.
By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and that de
Mesa thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of
complainant, he falsified public documents and knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law.26
Respondents misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could
legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the
property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not
give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he
deceived complainant and misled him into parting with P400,000 for services that were both
illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million
given by complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent
act that was criminal in nature.1avvphi1
Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed unethical act after
unethical act, wantonly violating laws and professional standards.
For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyers oath and Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He also transgressed the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL

HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF

HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND

HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
(emphasis supplied)
A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal
knowledge to further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear and
present danger to the rule of law and to the legal system. He does not only tarnish the image
of the bar and degrade the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays
everything that the legal profession stands for.
It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen support Dick
the Butchers call, "Kill all lawyers!"27 A disgrace to their professional brethren, they must be
purged from the bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court
is directed to immediately strike out the name of respondent from the Roll of Attorneys.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Keld Stemmerik the total amount
of P4.2 million with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this
resolution until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of
payment of the amount within ten days from payment.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is ORDERED to locate Atty. Mas and file the
appropriate criminal charges against him. The NBI is further DIRECTED to regularly report
the progress of its action in this case to this Court through the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant who shall forthwith record it in the
personal file of respondent, the Court Administrator who shall inform all courts of the
Philippines, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall disseminate copies to all its
chapters and members and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of
the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and
JON DE YSASI, respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would indeed
have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had
reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace
of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the
inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the Court cannot proceed
elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded any
judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager of
Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of Top Form
Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with
other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and
dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and
operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing,
harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending to
such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he
lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and
commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate
occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the
surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted
over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined
for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to
January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical
expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without
due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and
written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty.
Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for the
remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for
brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed
therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages,
thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, 1 holding
that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid
cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for
his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and
Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling
in Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. 2 On appeal to the Fourth
Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto. 3
His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit, 5 petitioner
filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner
was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages,
thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these
issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as
the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the character of the
pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the same are
in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of
his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a
modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and
conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which reason the
NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with the Court's
resolution of November 16, 1992, 7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992 largely
reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter. 8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is
worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that
because of the special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action
involved, this case could very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission
as perhaps the first of its kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son,
his father's namesake, the only child and therefore the only heir against his
own father. 9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were

noted that may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations.
First, most of the complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with
each other, were personal matters affecting father and son relationship. And
secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work, they allow their
personal relationship to come in the way. 10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just
cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also charges the
NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive labor
arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his
functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to
terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for
petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only
questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in seeking the
dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer
to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing
Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page
references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that
technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and
that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each
case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of
due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered
by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing.
The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision does
not impair the validity of the judgment, 11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution
with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final
dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case. 12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio,
who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later
transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case,
presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions, 13 which petitioner has not
successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application
of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of
the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure,
not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to
nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of one's position cannot
be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker
shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due
process. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer may
validly terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by
his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the
employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of
labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation
of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the
workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates
provided by law. 15Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of the
employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a
ground for termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay. 16 On
the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the
employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment. 17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely erred
in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his
employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. For want of substantial
bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the
factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC, 18 as
even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from
judicial review when so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve
acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982
to December 1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work because
he has a justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess
in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr.
Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr.
Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills

sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City
upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to
handle only administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. As a manager,
petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda
Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances
involved and basic human experience, petitioner's illness and strained family
relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable
reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period
of October 1982 to December 1982. In any event, such absence does not
warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are

as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or

justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the
employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in
Labor and Social Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute

abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the
Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of
the intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred
that the employee has no more interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to
constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . .
Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts
unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work
anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment.

First, petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside
Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness and strained family relations.
Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once
able to work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private
respondent of his intention to assume again his employment. Last, but not
the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he
realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner
had no intention to abandon his employment. 20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in
the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it be
denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former
admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to
stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not
petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding
periods for recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said
illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending physician, 21 and as
the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was
justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and
unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute
abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment. 22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may
be classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the
discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want to
go," 24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority. His
duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office
premises at all times, or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of
his work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible
and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he proved to
be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of increased production during the time that
petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to
1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and
on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were irregular
and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as
employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the control contemplated refers
only to matters relating to his functions as farm administrator and could not extend to
petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no
explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with)
requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of
residence would justify the termination of his employment. That petitioner changed his
residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably among his basic rights, nor
can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-
employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's
intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the
payroll, reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social security purposes, and paid
his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December,
1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner would no
longer return to work that he considered the latter to have abandoned his work and, for this
reason, no longer listed him as an employee. According to private respondent, whatever
amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a
father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made
therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving said
pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying
about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral
deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de
Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention
to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in
working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his
objectives, private respondent takes the novel position that the agreement to support his son
after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts the initial
abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about
petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion
regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued
performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last
quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser about
the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since April, 1984, and his
indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the
farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984. 26 With these, petitioner contends that
it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or
allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service
as farm administrator. 27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be
made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of
returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it
may have been, was not without valid causes of which private respondent had full
knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer returning
to work, private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how
he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even

after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner
would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform services directly required by
his position as farm administrator. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such
acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc., 28 claiming
and paying for additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to
Bacolod through Zip Forwarders, 29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances for
molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities, Inc., 30 and remitting to private
respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the normal
activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even
command his child to run errands for him. In the present case, however, considering the
nature of these transactions, as well as the property values and monetary sums involved, it
is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates
that these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at least be held
accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the terms, specifications and other details
relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was
considered to have done so by private respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of
place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected
of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to
imagine what further authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to
compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed

by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda.
Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane
planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited planter-member of the
BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA

representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic)
as such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents

I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my

name, place and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT being herein given the power and authority to sign for me and in my
name, place and stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said
check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the same over to me for my
proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my

Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts
therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED

CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated
by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation
regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance of withholding tax
reports, 34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to
work, 35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one
who has abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private
respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention
to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the
presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably
advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant
Celestina G. Ovejera of said office. 36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of the
proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded equal
opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary,

pension, allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement
thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator.
The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts
prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's
employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out. Besides, if such
amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his
child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be necessary and required as
if they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged

abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's
agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have determined
that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by petitioner,
regardless of designation, were in consideration for services rendered emanating from an
employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that can qualify them as mere
civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how
abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act
on the part of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very
concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his employment 38 does
not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private

respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and
hearing. 39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer seeks to
terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the
Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this case where private respondent did not
dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his
employment. 40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in
Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker

shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s)
constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work,
notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations as
stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from
receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a

worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons
therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. Any decision taken by the employer

shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. The employer shall submit a monthly report
to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all
dismissals effected by him during the month, specifying therein the names of
the dismissed workers, the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of
commencement and termination of employment, the positions last held by
them and such other information as may be required by the Ministry for policy
guidance and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner
was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his
impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as
private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of
procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits that no notice was served
by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on September 5,
1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of
termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. 41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be
denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the
second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service
thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is
conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee, especially when
there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. The law
does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the
effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the
employee. 42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor
General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his

defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment, records
somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic)
aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this failure,
the other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was
not complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate
the otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal.
The validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all
times provided however that sanctions must be imposed on
the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due
process requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No.
80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition),
...
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170
SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is
dismissed for just cause, he must not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe
procedural due process. The public policy behind this is that, it may
encourage the employee to do even worse and render a mockery of the rules
of discipline required to be observed. However, the employer must be
penalized for his infraction of due process. In the present case, however, not
only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is
without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he
has a justifiable excuse. 43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to
reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of
P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. Private
respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in imposing the fine because that
penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed employees to
the DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the
implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be
dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every
worker to security of tenure. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates, the
Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer

shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or
when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his
other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the
absence of just cause for dismissal. 45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has
tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in some cases
certain events may have transpired as would militate against the practicability of granting the
relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there are strained relations between the
employer and the employee, payment of back wages and severance pay may be awarded
instead of reinstatement, 46 and more particularly when managerial employees are
concerned. 47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that the
dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what the law accords him. 48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be

entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages
computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his
reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement
Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that
when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be made between
managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a
company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a
competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the difference
between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the
reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank
and file workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not
be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism between the
parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as

farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of
petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and
peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible. 49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal from
employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a
deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one
for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and
social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the
defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. 50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229,
are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to
the court to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. 51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery
of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud,
or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy, 52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do not feel, however, that an award of the damages
prayed for in this petition would be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their
allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages
were awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly
victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be
faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy,
instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The records
reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity
between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent
that each one has a cause for damages against the other. For this reason, we hold that no
moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation
of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified.
There was no voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a
justifiable excuse for his absence, or such absence does not warrant outright
dismissal without notice and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty
of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not
exceeding three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement,
petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary
for every year of service, a fraction of six months being considered as one (1)
year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA
651). But all claims for damages should be dismissed, for both parties are
equally at fault. 54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely
disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their
ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal 55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much
their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal
conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate
consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a
lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or
withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel
in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise,
rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation. 56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement."
On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them,
despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took
pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the
contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the
situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective
clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has
been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter
"shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his
jurisdiction." 57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the
proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to
make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a
bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring
resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that we have
adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have failed
to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute,
and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking,
instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually
emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition
and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision, the parties may
eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial
terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby

SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not
exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in lieu of reinstatement,
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months
being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 2797 October 4, 2002
ROSAURA P. CORDON, complainant,

vs.
JESUS BALICANTA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On August 21, 1985, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon filed with this Court a complaint for
disbarment, docketed as Administrative Case No. 2797, against Atty. Jesus Balicanta. After
respondents comment to the complaint and complainants reply thereto, this Court, on
March 29, 1995 referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP, for brevity)
for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice. Commissioner
George Briones of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was initially tasked to investigate
the case. Commissioner Briones was later on replaced by Commissioner Renato Cunanan.
Complainant filed a supplemental complaint which was duly admitted and, as agreed upon,
the parties filed their respective position papers.
Based on her complaint, supplemental complaint, reply and position paper, the complainant
alleged the following facts:
When her husband Felixberto C. Jaldon died, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon and her
daughter Rosemarie inherited the properties left by the said decedent. All in all, complainant
and her daughter inherited 21 parcels of land located in Zamboanga City. The lawyer who
helped her settle the estate of her late husband was respondent Jesus Balicanta.
Sometime in the early part of 1981, respondent enticed complainant and her daughter to
organize a corporation that would develop the said real properties into a high-scale
commercial complex with a beautiful penthouse for complainant. Relying on these apparently
sincere proposals, complainant and her daughter assigned 19 parcels of land to Rosaura
Enterprises, Incorporated, a newly-formed and duly registered corporation in which they
assumed majority ownership. The subject parcels of land were then registered in the name
of the corporation.
Thereafter, respondent single-handedly ran the affairs of the corporation in his capacity as
Chairman of the Board, President, General Manager and Treasurer. The respondent also
made complainant sign a document which turned out to be a voting trust agreement.
Respondent likewise succeeded in making complainant sign a special power of attorney to
sell and mortgage some of the parcels of land she inherited from her deceased husband.
She later discovered that respondent transferred the titles of the properties to a certain Tion
Suy Ong who became the new registered owner thereof. Respondent never accounted for
the proceeds of said transfers.
In 1981, respondent, using a spurious board resolution, contracted a loan from the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for brevity) in the amount of Two Million Two Hundred Twenty
Pesos (P2,220,000) using as collateral 9 of the real properties that the complainant and her
daughter contributed to the corporation. The respondent ostensibly intended to use the
money to construct the Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC, for brevity). Complainant later
on found out that the structure was made of poor materials such as sawali, coco lumber and
bamboo which could not have cost the corporation anything close to the amount of the loan
secured.
For four years from the time the debt was contracted, respondent failed to pay even a single
installment. As a result, the LBP, in a letter dated May 22, 1985, informed respondent that the
past due amortizations and interest had already accumulated to Seven Hundred Twenty-nine
Thousand Five Hundred Three Pesos and Twenty-five Centavos (P729,503.25). The LBP
made a demand on respondent for payment for the tenth time. Meanwhile, when the BCC
commenced its operations, respondent started to earn revenues from the rentals of BCCs
tenants. On October 28, 1987, the LBP foreclosed on the 9 mortgaged properties due to
non-payment of the loan.
Respondent did not exert any effort to redeem the foreclosed properties. Worse, he sold the
corporations right to redeem the mortgaged properties to a certain Hadji Mahmud Jammang
through a fake board resolution dated January 14, 1989 which clothed himself with the
authority to do so. Complainant and her daughter, the majority stockholders, were never
informed of the alleged meeting held on that date. Again, respondent never accounted for
the proceeds of the sale of the right to redeem. Respondent also sold to Jammang a parcel
of land belonging to complainant and her daughter which was contiguous to the foreclosed
properties and evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 62807. He never accounted for
the proceeds of the sale.
Sometime in 1983, complainants daughter, Rosemarie, discovered that their ancestral home
had been demolished and that her mother, herein complainant, was being detained in a
small nipa shack in a place called Culianan. Through the help of Atty. Linda Lim, Rosemarie
was able to locate her mother. Rosemarie later learned that respondent took complainant
away from her house on the pretext that said ancestral home was going to be remodeled
and painted. But respondent demolished the ancestral home and sold the lot to Tion Suy
Ong, using another spurious board resolution designated as Board Resolution No. 1, series
of 1992. The resolution contained the minutes of an alleged organizational meeting of the
directors of the corporation and was signed by Alexander Wee, Angel Fernando, Erwin
Fernando and Gabriel Solivar. Complainant and her daughter did not know how these
persons became stockholders and directors of the corporation. Respondent again did not
account for the proceeds of the sale.
Complainant and her daughter made several demands on respondent for the delivery of the
real properties they allegedly assigned to the corporation, for an accounting of the proceeds
of the LBP loan and as well as the properties sold, and for the rentals earned by BCC. But
the demands remained unheeded. Hence, complainant and her daughter, in a letter dated
June 4, 1985, terminated the services of respondent as their lawyer and repeated their
demands for accounting and turn-over of the corporate funds, and the return of the 19 titles
that respondent transferred to the corporation. They also threatened him with legal action in
a letter dated August 3, 1985.
Soon after, complainant found out from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, for
brevity) that Rosaura Enterprises, Inc., due to respondents refusal and neglect, failed to
submit the corporations annual financial statements for 1981, 1982 and 1983; SEC General
Information Sheets for 1982, 1983 and 1984; Minutes of Annual Meetings for 1982, 1983 and
1984; and Minutes of Annual Meetings of Directors for 1982, 1983 and 1984.
Complainant also discovered that respondent collected rental payments from the tenants of
BCC and issued handwritten receipts which he signed, not as an officer of the corporation
but as the attorney-at-law of complainant. Respondent also used the tennis court of BCC to
dry his palay and did not keep the buildings in a satisfactory state, so much so that the
divisions were losing plywood and other materials to thieves.
Complainant likewise accused respondent of circulating rumors among her friends and
relatives that she had become insane to prevent them from believing whatever complainant
said. According to complainant, respondent proposed that she legally separate from her
present husband so that the latter would not inherit from her and that respondent be adopted
as her son.
For his defense, respondent, in his comment and position paper, denied employing deceit
and machination in convincing complainant and her daughter to assign their real properties
to the corporation; that they freely and voluntary executed the deeds of assignment and the
voting trust agreement that they signed; that he did not single-handedly manage the
corporation as evidenced by certifications of the officers and directors of the corporation; that
he did not use spurious board resolutions authorizing him to contract a loan or sell the
properties assigned by the complainant and her daughter; that complainant and her daughter
should be the ones who should render an accounting of the records and revenues inasmuch
as, since 1984 up to the present, the part-time corporate book-keeper, with the connivance
of the complainant and her daughter, had custody of the corporate records; that complainant
and her daughter sabotaged the operation of BCC when they illegally took control of it in
1986; that he never pocketed any of the proceeds of the properties contributed by the
complainant and her daughter; that the demolition of the ancestral home followed legal
procedures; that complainant was never detained in Culianan but she freely and voluntarily
lived with the family of P03 Joel Constantino as evidenced by complainants own letter
denying she was kidnapped; and that the instant disbarment case should be dismissed for
being premature, considering the pendency of cases before the SEC and the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga involving him and complainant.
Based on the pleadings and position papers submitted by the parties, Commissioner Renato
Cunanan, in his report1dated July 1, 1999, recommended respondents disbarment based on
the following findings:
"A. The complainant, Rosaura Jaldon-Cordon and her daughter, Rosemarie were
stockholders of a corporation, together with respondent, named Rosaura Enterprises,
Inc.
"Per the Articles of Incorporation marked as Annex A of Complainants Position
Paper, complainants subscription consists of 55% of the outstanding capital stock
while her daughters consists of 18%, giving them a total of 73%. Respondents
holdings consist of 24% while three other incorporators, Rosauro L. Alvarez, Vicente
T. Maalac and Darhan S. Graciano each held 1% of the capital stock of the
corporation.
"B. On April 5, 1981, complainant and her daughter Rosemarie Jaldon executed two
Deeds of Transfer and Assignment conveying and transferring to the corporation 19
parcels of land in exchange for shares of stock in the corporation.
"x x x xxx xxx
"C. Both Deeds of Assignment particularly page 3 thereof indicate that respondent
accepted said assignment of properties and titles in behalf of the corporation as
Treasurer. The deeds were signed on April 5, 1981.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Together, therefore, complainant and her daughter owned 1,711 shares of the 1,750
shares comprising the authorized capital stock of the corporation of 97% thereof.
"No increase in capitalization was applied for by the corporation.
"F. Respondent claims in his Comment, his Answer and his Position Paper that on
April 4, 1981 he was elected as Chairman and Director and on April 5, 1981 he was
elected President of the corporation. Respondents own Annexes marked as G and
G-1 of his Comment show that on April 4, 1981 he was not only elected as
Chairman and Director as he claims but as Director, Board Chairman and President.
The purported minutes was only signed by respondent and an acting Secretary by
the name of Vicente Maalac.
"Said Annex does not show who was elected Treasurer.
"Respondents Annex H and H-1 shows that in the alleged organizational meeting
of the directors on April 5, 1981 a certain Farnacio Bucoy was elected Treasurer.
Bucoys name does not appear as an incorporator nor a stockholder anywhere in the
documents submitted.
"The purported minutes of the organizational meeting of the directors was signed
only by respondent Balicanta and a Secretary named Verisimo Martin.
"G. Since respondent was elected as Director, Chairman and President on April 4,
1981 as respondents own Annexes G to G-1 would show, then complainants claim
that respondent was likewise acting as Treasurer of two corporations bear truth and
credence as respondent signed and accepted the titles to 19 parcels of land ceded
by the complainant and her daughter, as Treasurer on April 5, 1981 after he was
already purportedly elected as Chairman, President and Director.
"H. Respondent misleads the Commission into believing that all the directors signed
the minutes marked as Exhibit H to H-1 by stating that the same was duly signed
by all the Board of Directors when the document itself shows that only he and one
Verisimo Martin signed the same.
"He also claims that all the stockholders signed the minutes of organizational
meeting marked as Annexes G and G-1 of his Comment yet the same shows that
only the acting Chairman and acting Secretary signed.
"I. Respondent claims that the Board or its representative was authorized by the
stockholders comprising 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock, as required by law, to
mortgage the parcels of land belonging to the corporation, which were all assigned to
the corporation by complainant and her daughter, by virtue of Annex I and I-1:
attached to his Comment.
"The subject attachment however reveals that only the following persons signed their
conformity to the said resolution: respondent Balicanta who owned 109 shares,
Vicente Maalac (1 share), Daihan Graciano (1 share).
"Complainants who collectively held a total of 1,711 shares out of

the 1,750 outstanding capital stock of the corporation were not represented in the
purported stockholders meeting authorizing the mortgage of the subject properties.
"The 2/3 vote required by law was therefore not complied with yet respondent
proceeded to mortgage the subject 9 parcels of land by the corporation.
"J. Respondent further relies on Annex J of his Comment, purportedly the minutes of
a special meeting of the Board of Directors authorizing him to obtain a loan and
mortgage the properties of the corporation dated August 29, 1981. This claim is
baseless. The required ratification of 2/3 by the stockholders of records was not met.
Again, respondent attempts to mislead the Commission and Court.
"K. Further, the constitution of the Board is dubious. The alleged minutes of the
organizational meeting of the stockholders electing the members of the Board, have
not been duly signed by the stockholders as shown in respondents annex G which
was purportedly the organizational meeting of the stockholders.
"L. Also, Annex J of respondents Comment which purportedly authorized him to

obtain a loan and to mortgage the 9 parcels of land was only signed by himself and a
secretary.
"M. In said Annex 'J' of respondents Comment he stated that complainant Rosaura
Cordon was on leave by virtue of a voting trust agreement allegedly executed by
complainant in his favor covering all her shares of stock. The claim is baseless. The
voting trust referred to by respondent (annex D of his Comment), even if it were
assumed to be valid, covered only 266 shares of complainants yet she owned a total
of 1,039 shares after she and her daughter ceded in favor of the corporation 19
parcels of land.
"Being a former lawyer to complainant, respondent should have ensured that her
interest was safeguarded. Yet, complainant was apparently and deliberately left our
(sic) on the pretext that, she had executed a voting trust agreement in favor of
respondent.
"It is suspicious that complainant was made to sign a voting trust agreement on 21
August 1981 and immediately thereafter, the resolutions authorizing respondent to
obtain a loan and to mortgage the 9 parcels of land were passed and approved.
"N. It is also highly irregular for respondent who is a lawyer, to allow a situation to
happen where, with the exclusion of complainant as director the result was that there
remained only 4 members of the Board,.
"O. Respondents own pleadings submitted to the Commission contradict each other.
"1. For instance, while in his Comment respondent DENIES that he employed
deceit and machination in convincing the complainant and her daughter to
sign the articles of incorporation of Rosaura Enterprises and in ceding to the
corporation 19 parcels of land in Zamboanga City, because they freely,
intelligently and voluntarily signed the same, yet, in his Position Paper,
respondent took another stance.
"In paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 of his Position Paper which was submitted 12
years later, respondent claimed that it was actually the idea of Atty. Rosaura
L. Alvarez that a corporation be put up to incorporate the estate of the late
Felixberto D. Jaldon.
"2. Likewise, respondent claimed that complainant and her daughter were not
directors, hence they were not notified of meetings, in paragraph 2-6 (c) of
his Comment he blamed the other stockholders and directors for the
corporations inability to comply with the Land Banks demands saying that
they have consistently failed since 1982 to convene (1.) for the annual
stockholders meetings and (i.i) for the monthly board meeting.
"His own pleadings claim that he had been the Chairman/President since
1981 to the present. If (sic) so, it was his duty to convene the stockholders
and the directors for meetings.
"Respondent appeared able to convene the stockholders and directors when

he needed to make a loan of p2.2 million; when he sold the corporations
right of redemption over the foreclosed properties of the corporation to
Jammang, when he sold one parcel of land covered by TCT 62,807 to
Jammang in addition to the 9 parcels of land which were foreclosed, and
when he sold the complainants ancestral home covered by TCT No. 72,004.
"It is thus strange why respondent claims that the corporation could not do
anything to save the corporations properties from being foreclosed because
the stockholders and directors did not convene.
"This assertion of respondent is clearly evident of dishonest, deceitful and

immoral conduct especially because, in all his acts constituting conveyances
of corporate property, respondent used minutes of stockholders and
directors meetings signed only by him and a secretary or signed by him and
persons who were not incorporators much less stockholders.
"It is worthy of note that in respondents Exhibits 15, 16, 17 and 18 of his
position paper, there were 7 new stockholders and complainant appeared to
have only 266 shares to her name while her daughter Rosemarie had no
shares at all. Respondent did not present any proof of conveyance of shares
by complainant and her daughter.
"It is further worth noting that complainants voting trust (annex D of

respondents Comment) where she allegedly entrusted 266 shares to
respondent on August 21, 1981 had only a validity of 5 years. Thus, she
should have had her entire holdings of 1,283 shares back in her name in
August 1986.
"Respondents purported minutes of stockholders meeting (Exhs. 15 and

17) do not reflect this.
"There was no explanation whatsoever from respondent on how complainant

and her daughter lost their 97% control holding in the corporation.
"3. As a further contradiction in respondents pleadings, we note that in

paragraph 2.7.C of his Comment he said that only recently, this year, 1985,
the complainant and her aforenamed daughter examined said voluminous
supporting receipts/documents which had previously been examined by the
Land Bank for loan releases, during which occasion respondent suggested to
them that the corporation will have to hire a full-time book-keeper to put in
order said voluminous supporting receipts/documents, to which they
adversely reacted due to lack of corporate money to pay for said book-
keeper. But in respondents Position Paper par. 6.3 he stated that:
Anyway, it is not the respondent but rather the complainant who should
render a detailed accounting to the corporation of the corporate records as
well as corporate revenues/income precisely because since 1994 to the
present:
(a). The corporate part-time book-keeper Edilberto Benedicto, with the

indispensable connivance and instigation of the complainant and her
daughter, among others, has custody of the corporate records, xxx
"4. In other contradictory stance, respondent claims in par. 7.3 of his position
paper that complainant and her daughter sabotaged the BCC operations of
the corporation by illegally taking over actual control and supervision thereof
sometime in 1986, xxx
"Yet respondents own exhibits in his position paper particularly Exhibit 15

and 16 where the subject of the foreclosed properties of the corporation
comprising the Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC) was taken up,
complainant and her daughter were not even present nor were they the
subject of the discussion, belying respondents claim that the complainant
and her daughter illegally took actual control of BCC.
"5. On the matter of the receipts issued by respondent evidencing payment to

him of rentals by lessees of the corporation, attached to the complaint as
Annexes H to H-17, respondent claims that the receipts are temporary in
nature and that subsequently regular corporate receipts were issued. On
their face however the receipts clearly appear to be official receipts, printed
and numbered duly signed by the respondent bearing his printed name.
"It is difficult to believe that a lawyer of respondent stature would issue

official receipts to lessees if he only meant to issue temporary ones.
"6. With regard to respondents claim that the complainant consented to the
sale of her ancestral home, covered by TCT No. T-72,004 to one Tion Suy
Ong for which he attached as Exhibit 22 to his Position Paper the minutes of
an annual meeting of the stockholders, it behooves this Commission why
complainants signature had to be accompanied by her thumb mark.
Furthermore, complainants signature appears unstable and shaky. This
Office is thus persuaded to believe complainants allegation in paragraph 3b
of her position paper that since September 1992 up to March 1993 she was
being detained by one PO# (sic) Joel Constantino and his wife under
instructions from respondent Balicanta.
"This conclusion is supported by a letter from respondent dated March 1993,

Annex H of complainants position paper, where respondent ordered Police
Officer Constantino to allow Atty. Linda Lim and Rosemarie Jaldon to talk to
Tita Rosing.
"The complainants thumb mark together with her visibly unstable shaky
signature lends credence to her claim that she was detained in the far flung
barrio of Culianan under instructions of respondent while her ancestral home
was demolished and the lot sold to one Tion Suy Ong.
"It appears that respondent felt compelled to over-ensure complainants

consent by getting her to affix her thumb mark in addition to her signature.
"7. Respondent likewise denies that he also acted as Corporate Secretary in

addition to being the Chairman, President and Treasurer of the corporation.
Yet, respondent submitted to this commission documents which are
supported to be in the possession of the Corporate Secretary such as the
stock and transfer book and minutes of meetings.
"The foregoing findings of this Commission are virtual smoking guns that
prove on no uncertain terms that respondent, who was the legal counsel of
complainant in the latter part of the settlement of the estate of her deceased
husband, committed unlawful, immoral and deceitful conduct proscribed by
Rule 1.01 of the code of professional responsibility.
"Likewise, respondent clearly committed a violation of Canon 15 of the same

code which provides that A lawyer should observe candor fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.
"Respondents acts gravely diminish the publics respect for the integrity of
the profession of law for which this Commission recommends that he be
meted the penalty of disbarment.
"The pendency of the cases at the SEC and the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga filed by complainant against respondent does not preclude a
determination of respondents culpability as a lawyer.
"This Commission cannot further delay the resolution of this complaint filed in
1985 by complainant, and old widow who deserves to find hope and recover
her confidence in the judicial system.
"The findings of this office, predominantly based on documents adduced by

both parties lead to only one rather unpalatable conclusion. That respondent
Atty. Jesus F. Balicanta, in his professional relations with herein complainant
did in fact employ unlawful, dishonest, and immoral conduct proscribed in no
uncertain terms by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In
addition, respondents actions clearly violated Canon 15 to 16 of the same
Code.
"It is therefore our unpleasant duty to recommend that respondent, having

committed acts in violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility,
thereby causing a great disservice to the profession, be meted the ultimate
sanction of disbarment."2
On September 30, 1999, while Commissioner Cunanans recommendation for respondents

disbarment was pending review before Executive Vice-President and Northern Luzon
Governor Teofilo Pilando, respondent filed a motion requesting "for a full-blown investigation
and for invalidation of the entire proceedings and/or remedial action under Section 11, Rule
139-B, Revised Rules of Court," alleging that he had evidence that Commissioner Cunanans
report was drafted by the lawyers of complainant, Attys. Antonio Cope and Rita Linda
Jimeno. He presented two unsigned anonymous letters allegedly coming from a disgruntled
employee of Attys. Cope and Jimeno. He claimed to have received these letters in his
mailbox.3
Respondents motion alleging that Attys. Antonio Cope and Rita Linda Jimeno drafted
Commissioner Cunanans report was accompanied by a complaint praying for the
disbarment of said lawyers including Commissioner Cunanan. The complaint was docketed
as CBD Case No. 99-658. After Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan filed
their answers, a hearing was conducted by the Investigating Committee of the IBP Board of
Governors.
On May 26, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution4 dismissing for lack of
merit the complaint for disbarment against Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner
Cunanan. And in Adm. Case No. 2797, the Board adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan, and meted against herein respondent Balicanta
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 5 years "for commission of acts of
misconduct and disloyalty by taking undue and unfair advantage of his legal knowledge as a
lawyer to gain material benefit for himself at the expense of complainant Rosaura P. Jaldon-
Cordon and caused serious damage to the complainant." 5
To support its decision, the Board uncovered respondents fraudulent acts in the very same
documents he presented to exonerate himself. It also took note of respondents contradictory
and irreconcilable statements in the pleadings and position papers he submitted. However, it
regarded the penalty of disbarment as too severe for respondents misdeeds, considering
that the same were his first offense.6
Pursuant to Section 12 (b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, 7 the said resolution in
Administrative Case No. 2797 imposing the penalty of suspension for 5 years on respondent
was automatically elevated to this Court for final action. On the other hand, the dismissal of
the complaint for disbarment against Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan,
docketed as CBD Case No. 99-658, became final in the absence of any petition for review.
This Court confirms the duly supported findings of the IBP Board that respondent committed
condemnable acts of deceit against his client. The fraudulent acts he carried out against his
client followed a well thought of plan to misappropriate the corporate properties and funds
entrusted to him. At the very outset, he embarked on his devious scheme by making himself
the President, Chairman of the Board, Director and Treasurer of the corporation, although he
knew he was prohibited from assuming the position of President and Treasurer at the same
time.8 As Treasurer, he accepted in behalf of the corporation the 19 titles that complainant
and her daughter co-owned. The other treasurer appointed, Farnacio Bucoy, did not appear
to be a stockholder or director in the corporate records. The minutes of the meetings
supposedly electing him and Bucoy as officers of the corporation actually bore the signatures
of respondent and the secretary only, contrary to his claim that they were signed by the
directors and stockholders.
He likewise misled the IBP investigating commission in claiming that the mortgage of 9 of the
properties of the corporation previously belonging to complainant and her daughter was
ratified by the stockholders owning two-thirds or 67% of the outstanding capital stock when in
fact only three stockholders owning 111 out of 1,750 outstanding shares or 6.3% assented
thereto. The alleged authorization granting him the power to contract the LBP loan for Two
Million Two Hundred Twenty Pesos (P2,220,000) was also not approved by the required
minimum of two-thirds of the outstanding capital stock despite respondents claim to the
contrary. In all these transactions, complainant and her daughter who both owned 1,711 out
of the 1,750 outstanding shares of the corporation or 97.7% never had any participation.
Neither were they informed thereof.
Clearly, there was no quorum for a valid meeting for the discussion and approval of these
transactions.
Respondent cannot take refuge in the contested voting trust agreement supposedly
executed by complainant and her daughter for the reason that it authorized respondent to
represent complainant for only 266 shares.
Aside from the dishonest transactions he entered into under the cloak of sham resolutions,
he failed to explain several discrepancies in his version of the facts. We hereby reiterate
some of these statements noted by Commissioner Cunanan in his findings.
First, respondent blamed the directors and the stockholders who failed to convene for the
required annual meetings since 1982. However, respondent appeared able to convene the
stockholders and directors when he contracted the LBP debt, when he sold to Jammang the
corporations right of redemption over the foreclosed properties of the corporation, when he
sold one parcel of land covered by TCT No. 62807 to Jammang, when he mortgaged the 9
parcels of land to LBP which later foreclosed on said mortgage, and when he sold the
complainants ancestral home covered by TCT No. 72004.
Second, the factual findings of the investigating commission, affirmed by the IBP Board,
disclosed that complainant and her daughter own 1,711 out of 1,750 shares of the
outstanding capital stock of the corporation, based on the Articles of Incorporation and deeds
of transfer of the properties. But respondents evidence showed that complainant had only
266 shares of stock in the corporation while her daughter had none, notwithstanding the fact
that there was nothing to indicate that complainant and her daughter ever conveyed their
shares to others.
Respondent likewise did not explain why he did not return the certificates representing the
266 shares after the lapse of 5 years from the time the voting trust certificate was executed
in 1981.9
The records show that up to now, the complainant and her daughter own 97% of the
outstanding shares but respondent never bothered to explain why they were never asked to
participate in or why they were never informed of important corporate decisions.
Third, respondent, in his comment, alleged that due to the objection of complainant and her
daughter to his proposal to hire an accountant, the corporation had no formal accounting of
its revenues and income. However, respondents position paper maintained that there was
no accounting because the part-time bookkeeper of the corporation connived with
complainant and her daughter in keeping the corporate records.
Fourth, respondents claim that complainant and her daughter took control of the operations
of the corporation in 1986 is belied by the fact that complainant and her daughter were not
even present in the alleged meeting of the board (which took place after 1986) to discuss the
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. The truth is that he never informed them of such
meeting and he never gave control of the corporation to them.
Fifth, Commissioner Cunanan found that:
"5. on the matter of the receipts issued by respondent evidencing payment to him of rentals
by lessees of the corporation, attached to the complaint as Annexes H to H-17, respondent
claims that the receipts are temporary in nature and that subsequently regular corporate
receipts were issued. On their face however the receipts clearly appear to be official receipts,
printed and numbered duly signed by the respondent bearing his printed name.
"It is difficult to believe that a lawyer of respondents stature would issue official receipts to
lessees if he only meant to issue temporary ones."10
Sixth, respondent denies that he acted as Corporate Secretary aside from being the
Chairman, President and Treasurer of the corporation. Yet respondent submitted to the
investigating commission documents which were supposed to be in the official possession of
the Corporate Secretary alone such as the stock and transfer book and minutes of meetings.
Seventh, he alleged in his comment that he was the one who proposed the establishment of
the corporation that would invest the properties of the complainant but, in his position paper,
he said that it was a certain Atty. Rosauro Alvarez who made the proposal to put up the
corporation.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondent committed grave and serious
misconduct that casts dishonor on the legal profession. His misdemeanors reveal a deceitful
scheme to use the corporation as a means to convert for his own personal benefit properties
left to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.
Not even his deviousness could cover up the wrongdoings he committed. The documents he
thought could exculpate him were the very same documents that revealed his immoral and
shameless ways. These documents were extremely revealing in that they unmasked a man
who knew the law and abused it for his personal gain without any qualms of conscience.
They painted an intricate web of lies, deceit and opportunism beneath a carefully crafted
smokescreen of corporate maneuvers.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society,
the obligation to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Specifically, he is forbidden to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.11 If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic
ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should
also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them.12 Thus, the requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.13 Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not
only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain
ones good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.14 Good moral character is more
than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. 15 This
must be so because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of
unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his
all."16
Indeed, the words of former Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Pompeyo Diaz cannot
find a more relevant application than in this case:
"There are men in any society who are so self-serving that they try to make law serve their
selfish ends. In this group of men, the most dangerous is the man of the law who has no
conscience. He has, in the arsenal of his knowledge, the very tools by which he can poison
and disrupt society and bring it to an ignoble end."17
Good moral standing is manifested in the duty of the lawyer "to hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession." 18 He is bound "to account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client." 19 The relation between an
attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature. Thus, lawyers are bound to promptly
account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct.20
This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate personality of the corporation to
absolve him from exercising these duties over the properties turned over to him by
complainant. He blatantly used the corporate veil to defeat his fiduciary obligation to his
client, the complainant. Toleration of such fraudulent conduct was never the reason for the
creation of said corporate fiction.
The massive fraud perpetrated by respondent on the complainant leaves us no choice but to
set aside the veil of corporate entity. For purposes of this action therefore, the properties
registered in the name of the corporation should still be considered as properties of
complainant and her daughter. The respondent merely held them in trust for complainant
(now an ailing 83-year-old) and her daughter. The properties conveyed fraudulently and/or
without the requisite authority should be deemed as never to have been transferred, sold or
mortgaged at all. Respondent shall be liable, in his personal capacity, to third parties who
may have contracted with him in good faith.
Based on the aforementioned findings, this Court believes that the gravity of respondents
offenses cannot be adequately matched by mere suspension as recommended by the IBP.
Instead, his wrongdoings deserve the severe penalty of disbarment, without prejudice to his
criminal and civil liabilities for his dishonest acts.
WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Jesus T. Balicanta is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of

Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on leave.

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Republic of the Philippines

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a

(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of

In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First

Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., in the result.

A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,

xxx xxx xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the

But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in

xxx xxx xxx

Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing,

Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which

SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If the

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant,

In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar

Now he faces disbarment.

The records reveal the following facts:

RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97

Adm. Case No. 4148

Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs.

Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

Bellosillo and Purisima, JJ., took no part.

FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 156891 June 27, 2006

VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner,

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan,

Hence, petitioners now seek recourse in this Court.7

The facts8 are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:

"Hernandez prepared a Progress Report (Exh. 5 Hernandez) which was submitted to

Version of the Prosecution

xxx xxx xxx

Version of the Defense

To the Sandiganbayans narration, Hernandez adds:

"6. x x x [Hernandez], an intelligence agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation

In his Petition, Acejas narrates some more occurrences as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"3. 22nd December 1993

xxx xxx xxx

"f) [Acejas] gave an ultimatum to Mr. Hernandez that if the Japanese

"9. 8th January 1994

"10. 12th January 1994

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner Hernandez raises the following issues:

"V. Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of