02-11. Tajan V Cusi, JR

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-28899. May 30, 1974.]

ALFREDO C. TAJAN, petitioner, vs. HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR.,
Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao, respondent.
Jose P. Arro for petitioner.

Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. in his own behalf.
DECISION
ANTONIO, J :
p
In this original action of prohibition petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan challenges the

authority of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao to hear
Administrative Case No. 59 of said court involving a disciplinary action initiated
against petitioner as a member of the Philippine Bar.
In a letter dated December 5, 1967 addressed to petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan, he was
required by respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours why he should not be
removed or suspended from the practice of law for preparing, or causing to be
prepared, a petition in court containing factual averments which petitioner knew
were false, to wit:
"The records and the transcript of stenographic notes of Misc. Case No.
2968 of this Court show that you prepared and/or caused to be prepared a
veried petition for issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of Transfer
Certicate of Title No. T-7312 in favor of Vicente Calongo, alleging therein as
grounds therefor, 'That the aforesaid Transfer Certicate was lost by the
herein petitioner in his house in Mati, Davao; That in spite of the diligent
search of the aforesaid title, the same could not be found and is therefore
now presumed to be lose,' and had the petition signed by Atty. Justo Cinco,
when you know very well that the owner's duplicate copy has always been in
the custody of Municipal Judge Bernardo P. Saludares of the Municipality of
Kapalong to whom the same was entrusted by Vicente Calongo, and that as
a result of the petition, this Court, through the Hon. Vicente P. Bullecer,
Presiding Judge of Branch IV, issued an Order on June 28, 1967, directing
the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao to issue a new owner's duplicate
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7312.
"In view thereof, you are hereby given seventy-two (72) hours from the
receipt hereof to explain why you shall not be removed or suspended from
the practice of law."
Petitioner, in answer thereto, wrote a letter to respondent Judge on December 7,

1967 denying the material averments of respondent Judge's letter and explaining
the circumstances under which he prepared the aforementioned petition.
Apparently not satised with petitioner's answer, respondent Judge had his letter
led and docketed as Adm. Case No. 59 against petitioner, and, together with Adm.
Case No. 58 against Atty. Justo Cinco, gave due course thereto and set the same for
hearing on January 24 and 25, 1968. At the hearing on January 24, 1968, petitioner
questioned, among others, the propriety of the proceedings, contending that since
the case was one for disbarment, respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner as well as the subject matter thereof. Petitioner orally moved
that respondent Judge inhibit himself from hearing the administrative case in view
of the latter's conicting positions as prosecutor and judge at the same time. The
oral motion was denied.
On February 1, 1968, respondent Judge proceeded to hear the evidence against
petitioner. At the said hearing Municipal Judge Saludares testied by more or less
reiterating the testimony he previously gave at the hearing of the petition for relief
from the order in Misc. Case No. 2968 allowing the issuance of an owner's duplicate
of title. The continuation of the hearing was set for April 26, 1968.
On April 15, 1968, petitioner led the present petition, and on April 17, 1968, this
Court gave due course thereto and ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction upon petitioner's posting of a bond.
Petitioner's thesis is that respondent Judge has no authority on his own motion to
hear and determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension of attorneys because
jurisdiction thereon is vested exclusively and originally in the Supreme Court and
not in courts of rst instance. Petitioner also contends that assuming arguendo that
courts of rst instance have such authority, the procedure outlined in Rule 139 of
the Revised Rules of Court should govern the ling and investigation of the
complaint.
We find petitioner's contentions without merit.
1.
The power to exclude unt and unworthy members of the legal profession
stems from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law
and the admission of persons to engage in that practice. It is a necessary incident to
the proper administration of justice. An attorney-at-law is an ocer of the court in
the administration of justice and as such he is continually accountable to the Court
for the manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been granted to him.
His admission to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued
enjoyment of the right conferred, is dependent upon his remaining a t and safe
person to exercise it. When it appears by acts of misconduct that he has become
unt to continue with the trust reposed upon him, his right to continue in the
enjoyment of that trust and for the enjoyment of the professional privilege accorded
to him may and ought to be forfeited. The law accords to the Court of Appeals and
the Court of First Instance the power to investigate and suspend members of the
bar.
The following provisions of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court are applicable:
"SEC. 28.
Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of
First Instance. Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend
an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding
section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
"SEC. 29.
Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Court of First
Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such suspension,
the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall forthwith transmit
to the Supreme Court a certied copy of the order of suspension and a full
statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of
such certied copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full
investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or
extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his oce as such,
as the facts warrant.
"SEC. 30.
Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No
attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession,
until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the
charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be
heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear
and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter
ex parte."
These provisions were taken from Sections 22, 23 and 25, respectively, of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which read:
"SEC. 22.
Suspension of lawyers . Courts of First Instance may
suspend a lawyer from the further practice of his profession for any of the
causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such
lawyer will not be privileged to practice his profession in any of the courts of
the Islands until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
"SEC. 23.
Proceedings upon suspension. Upon such suspension the
judge of the Court of First Instance ordering the suspension shall forthwith
transmit to the Supreme Court a certied copy of the order of suspension
and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the
receipt of such certied copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make
full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or
extending the suspension, or removing the lawyer permanently from the roll
as it shall find the facts to warrant.
"SEC. 25.
Hearing of charges . No lawyer shall be removed from the
roll or be suspended from the performance of his profession until he has
had full opportunity to answer the charges against him, and to produce
witnesses in his own behalf and to be heard by himself and counsel, if he so
desires, upon reasonable notice. But if upon reasonable notice the accused
fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to
determine the matter ex parte."
2.
It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of members of the
bar are not in any sense a civil action where there is a plainti and the respondent
is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and aord no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the ocial ministration of persons unt to practice in them. The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his conduct as an ocer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice. The court may therefore act upon its own motion and thus be the initiator of
the proceedings, because, obviously the court may investigate into the conduct of its
own ocers. 1 Indeed it is not only the right but the duty of the Court to institute
upon its own motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or the disbarment of an
attorney, when from information submitted to it or of its own knowledge it appears
that any attorney has so conducted himself in a case pending before said court as to
show that he is wanting in the proper measure of respect for the court of which he
is an ocer, or is lacking in the good character essential to his continuance as an
attorney. This is for the protection of the general public and to promote the purity of
the administration of justice.
3.
Procedural due process requires that no attorney may be "removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon
reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his
own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel" (Sec. 30, Rule 138, Revised
Rules of Court). 2
While the aforecited Sec. 30 of Rule 138 does not state what is a reasonable notice,
Sec. 9 of Rule 139, of the Revised Rules, provides that as far as applicable, the
procedure outlined by the preceding sections of Rule 139 "shall govern the filing and
investigation of complaints against attorneys in the Court of Appeals or in Courts of
First Instance." Section 2 of Rule 139, provides that the respondent lawyer in
disciplinary proceedings is granted 10 days from service of a copy of the complaint
within which to le his answer. It is desirable, therefore, that a similar period should
be granted by the Court of First Instance to attorneys charged before it, for the
purpose of uniformity in procedure. We nd, however, that in the case at bar,
petitioner not only failed to question as unreasonable, the period granted to him by
the court within which to answer the complaint, but actually was not substantially
prejudiced thereby as he led his answer to the complaint within the period of 72
hours from receipt thereof.
Petitioner claims that pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 139, which provides that as far
as may be applicable, the procedure for the investigation by the Solicitor General of
complaints against lawyers referred to said ocial by the Supreme Court shall
govern the ling and investigation of complaints against lawyers in the Court of
Appeals and in Courts of First Instance, the Solicitor General, and not respondent
Judge, should be the one to conduct the present investigation. Sections 3 to 6 of

Rule 139 are not applicable to the investigation of complaints against attorneys in
the Court of Appeals and in Courts of First Instance. The investigation by the
Solicitor General in Section 8 of Rule 139 refers to complaints referred to said oce
by this Court and not to investigations in suspension proceedings before the Court
of Appeals or Courts of First Instance, because Sections 28 to 30 of Rule 138
authorize said courts and confer upon them the power to conduct the investigation
themselves, subject to another and nal investigation by the Supreme Court in the
event of suspension of the lawyer. On the basis of the certied copy of the order of
suspension and the statement of the facts upon which the same is based, required
by Section 29 of Rule 138, the Supreme Court "shall make full investigation of the
facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension or
removing the attorney from his oce as such, as the facts warrant." In other words,
under such circumstances the intervention of the Solicitor General would, therefore,
be unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court is ordered dissolved, with costs against petitioner.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.
"The practice regulating disbarment Proceedings is not as we have noted

regulated by statute, but all courts of general jurisdiction have at all times in the
history of the law possessed the inherent power to suspend and disbar attorneys
for professional misconduct of such a character as showed them to be unworthy
to hold the place of ocers of the court; and the books are full of cases in which
the court, on its own motion, has instituted proceedings like this. Indeed, we think
that it is not only the right, but the duty, of a judge of a circuit court to institute,
upon his own motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or disbarment of an
attorney, when from information laid before him, or from his personal knowledge,
it appears to his satisfaction that the attorney is so demeaning himself as to be
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
xxx xxx xxx
"In Rice v. Com., 18 B. Mon. 472, which was a disbarment proceeding, this
court, in answering an objection that the judge of the circuit court did not have
authority to institute, on his own motion, the proceeding, said:
'This objection is founded on a misconception as well of the power as of the
duty of the court. The defendant in the rule was an attorney at law and an ocer
of the court. All courts have the power to control and regulate to a certain extent,
the conduct of their ocers, and to inict on them for their ocial misconduct
such punishment as the law prescribes. If a court have knowledge of the
existence of such ocial misconduct on the part of any of its ocers, it not only
has the power, but it is its duty, to institute an appropriate proceeding against the
oender, and to bring him, if guilty, to consign punishment. And it is much to be
regretted that this duty, which the law devolves upon the court of the country, is
so little regarded, and that the obligations which it imposes are so frequently
overlooked or neglected.'
"In Walker v. Com., 8 Bush, 86, it was again said:
'It is a well-established rule of common law that courts may inquire into the
conduct of their ocers, such as attorneys and counselors who practice in their
courts, and punish for offenses.'
xxx xxx xxx
"In Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 Sup. Ct. 569, 27 L. Ed. 552, the Supreme
Court, quoting with approval from an opinion by Chief Justice Sharswood, said:
'We entertain no doubt that a court has jurisdiction without any formal
complaint or petition, upon its own motion, to strike the name of an attorney from
the roll in a proper case, provided he has had reasonable notice, and been
aorded an opportunity to be heard in his defense.'" (Lenihan v. Commonwealth,
176 S.W. 948, 953.)
2.
In re MacDougall, 3 Phil., 70 (1903); In re Calderon, 5 Phil., 658 (1906); In re

Cuenco, 41 Phil., 32 (1920).

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-28899. May 30, 1974.]

Jose P. Arro for petitioner.

In this original action of prohibition petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan challenges the

Petitioner, in answer thereto, wrote a letter to respondent Judge on December 7,

Judge, should be the one to conduct the present investigation. Sections 3 to 6 of

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

"The practice regulating disbarment Proceedings is not as we have noted

In re MacDougall, 3 Phil., 70 (1903); In re Calderon, 5 Phil., 658 (1906); In re

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