G.R. No. L-5955 September 19, 1952 JOSE L. LAXAMANA, Petitioner, JOSE T. BALTAZAR, Respondent

G.R. No.
L-5955
September 19, 1952
JOSE L. LAXAMANA, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE T. BALTAZAR, respondent.
Gerardo S. Limlingan and Jose L. Baltazar for petitioner.
Macapagal, Punzalan and Yabut for respondent.
Ramon Duterte and Pedro Lopez as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
When in July 1952 the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended, the vice-mayor Jose T.
Salazar, assumed office as mayor by virtue of section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code.
However, the provincial governor, acting under section 21 (a) of the Revised Election Code (R.A.
180), with the consent of the provincial board appointed Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of Sexmoan,
who immediately took the corresponding official oath.
Result: this quo warranto proceeding, based solely on the petitioner's proposition that the section
first mentioned has been repealed by the subsequent provision of the Revised Election Code.
If there was such repeal, this petition should be granted, and Laxamana declared the lawful mayor of
Sexmoan. Otherwise it must be denied.1
The two statutory provisions read as follows:
SEC. 2195. Temporary disability of the mayor. Upon the occasion of the absence,
suspension, or other temporary disability of the Mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the
Vice-Mayor, or if there be no Vice-Mayor, by the councilor who at the last general election
received the highest number of votes.
SEC. 21 (a). Vacancy in elective provincial, city or municipal office. Whenever a
temporary vacancy in any elective local office occurs, the same shall be filled by appointment
by the President if it is a provincial or city office, and by the provincial governor, with the
consent of the Provincial Board, if it is a municipal office. (R.A. 180, the Revised Election
Code.
SEC. 21 (a) The portion relating to municipal offices was taken from section 2180 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which partly provided:
SEC. 2180. Vacancies in municipal office. (a) In case of a temporary vacancy in any
municipal office, the same shall be filled by appointment by the provincial governor, with the
consent of the provincial board.
(b) In case of a permanent vacancy in any municipal office, the same shall be filled by
appointment by the provincial board, except in case of a municipal president, in which the
permanent vacancy shall be filled by the municipal vice-president. . . .
It will be seen that under this section, when the office of municipal president (now mayor)
become permanently vacant the vice-president stepped into the office. The section omitted reference
to temporary vacancy of such office because section 2195 governed that contingency. In this regard
sections 2180 and 2195 supplemented each other. Paragraph (a) of section 2180 applied to
municipal offices in general, other than that of the municipal president.
Under the Revised Administrative Code, specially the two sections indicated there was no
doubt in Government circles that when the municipal president was suspended from office, the vicepresident took his place.
Temporary vacancy in office of municipal president. Paragraph (a) of this section (2180)
should be construed to cover only municipal offices other than the office of president. Section
2195 of the Administrative Code should be applied in case of the absence, suspension, or
other temporary disability of the municipal president. (Op. Atty. Gen. Sept. 21, 1917; Ins.
Aud. Oct. 23, 1927.) (Araneta, Administrative Code Vol. IV p. 2838)
Municipal president cannot designate acting president. There is no provision of law
expressly or implied authorizing the municipal president to designate any person to act in his
stead during his temporary absence or disability. From the provision of section 2195 of the
code, it is clear that the vice-president or, if there be no vice-president, the councilor who at
the last general election received the highest number of votes, should automatically (without
any formal designation) discharge the duties of the president. (Op. Ins. Aud. March 2, 1926)
(Araneta Administrative Code Vol. IV, p. 2839)
Now it is reasonable to assume that the incorporation of the above section 2180 into the Revised
Election Law as section 21 (a) did not have the effect of enlarging its scope, 2 to supersede or repeal
section 2195, what with the presumption against implied repeals.3 "Where a statute has received a
contemporaneous and practical interpretation and the statute as interpreted is re-enacted, the
practical interpretation is accorded greater weight than it ordinarily receives, and is regarded as
presumptively the correct interpretation of the law. The rule here is based upon the theory that the
legislature is acquainted with the contemporaneous interpretation of a statute, especially when made
by an administrative body or executive officers charged with the duty of administering or enforcing
the law, and therefore impliedly adopts the interpretation upon re-enactment." (Sutherland Statutory
Construction, sec. 5109.)
Indeed, even disregarding their origin, the allegedly conflicting sections, could be interpreted in the
light of the principle of statutory construction that when a general and a particular provision are
inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former (sec. 288, Act 190). In other words, section 2195
referring particularly to vacancy in the office of mayor, must prevail over the general terms of section
21 (a) as to vacancies of municipal (local) offices. Otherwise stated, section 2195 may be deemed
an exception to or qualification of the latter.4 "Where one statute deals with a subject in general
terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be
harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of whether it was
passed prior to the general statute." (Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 5204)
In a recent decision,5 we had occasion to pass on a similar situation repeal by subsequent
general provision of a prior special provision and we said,:
It is well-settled that a special and local statute, providing for a particular case or class of
cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and
application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general
act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. . . . It is a canon of
statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing
a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions, of such earlier statute.
(Steamboat Company vs. Collector, 18 Wall. (U.S.), 478; Cass County vs. Gillett, 100 U.S.
585; Minnesota vs. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 396.)
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general the terms of the
general brood enough to include the matter provided for in the special the fact that one is
special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as
remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law
of a particular case. (State vs. Stoll, 17 Wall. (U.S.) 425)
In fact even after the Revised Election Code was enacted, the Department of the Interior and the
office of executive Secretary who are charged with the supervision of provincial and municipal
governments have "consistently held that in case of the suspension or other temporary disability of
the mayor, the vice-mayor shall, by operation of law, assume the office of the mayor, and if the vicemayor is not available, the said office shall be discharged by the first councilor." (Annex 5 of the
answer.)
Needless to say, the contemporaneous construction placed upon the statute by the executive
officers charged with its execution deserves great weight in the courts. 6
Consequently it is our ruling that when the mayor of a municipality is suspended, absent or
temporarily unable, his duties should be discharged by the vice-mayor in accordance with sec. 2195
of the Revised Administrative Code.
This quo warranto petition is dismissed with costs. So ordered.
1wphl.nt
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-5955 September 19, 1952 JOSE L. LAXAMANA, Petitioner, JOSE T. BALTAZAR, Respondent

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No. L-5955 September 19, 1952 JOSE L. LAXAMANA, Petitioner, JOSE T. BALTAZAR, Respondent

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No. L-5955 September 19, 1952 JOSE L. LAXAMANA, Petitioner, JOSE T. BALTAZAR, Respondent

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No.

September 19, 1952

JOSE L. LAXAMANA, petitioner,

You might also like