Subject: Persons and Family Relations

Topic: Parental Authority

Sub-Topic: Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority - Arts. 225-233 FC, R.A. 7610 (Anti-Child-Abuse Act)
Digester: Dean B. Condevillamar

G. R. No. L-3236 March 27, 1907

SEBASTIAN ABIERA, administrator of the estate of JUAN ABIERA, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MIGUEL ORIN, Defendant-Appellant.

W.A. Kincaid, for Appellant.
Sebastian Abiera, in his own behalf

FACTS:

1. Vicenta Cacao, Mariano Cacao, and Petra Cacao were brothers and sisters.

2. Vicenta Cacao married Miguel Orin and after her said marriage left no descendants or ascendants.

3. 1898 - Miguel Orin, Mariano Cacao, and Juan Abiera in 1898 entered into an agreement in writing covering the
disposition of the properties and animals had and acquired during the marriage of Miguel Orin and Vicenta Cacao.

Brothers & Sisters

Vicenta Cacao Mariano Cacao Petra Cacao
Miguel Orin (Husband of Vicenta) Juan Abiera (Husband of Petra)
Agreement on the Disposition of Properties & Animals of Vicenta and Miguel
Miguel Orin Mariano Cacao Juan Abiera
Sebastian Abiera (Son of Juan)

4. Now, the plaintiff," continues the judgment, "has filed this complaint as special administrator of his deceased father,
Juan Abiera, alleging that the defendant has not complied with the said contract and agreement and prays the court to
compel the compliance of the defendant therewith.

ISSUE:

Whether or not plaintiff can compel defendant to comply with the obligations in the contract?

RULING:

No, the plaintiff cannot compel the defendant to comply with the obligations in the contract.

The law provides that as an “administrator he had only the right to institute such actions as pertain to the estate he is
administering, and no action, dealing with obligations contracted in favor of third persons, or others from whom he
does not derive such right, can be brought by him as such administrator.” Moreover, the right attached to parental
authority or guardianship is extinguished with the death of the parents. “ This was an exclusively personal right that
could not survive the person who had such right.”

In the instant case, Sebastian Abiera, as administrator of the estate of Juan Abiera, had only the right to institute such
actions as pertain to the estate he is administering because the contract agreed to by his father involved in favor of
third persons. In addition, Juan Abiera’s right to parental authority or guardianship was extinguished by his death.
Hence, the plaintiff cannot compel the defendant.
XXX

RULING

Wherefore the judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed, without special mention as to the
costs in both instances. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be
entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came
for proper action. So ordered.
XXX

Ancillary Provisions

Article 225 - 233 of FC:

Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Property of the Children

Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the
unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement,
the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent
concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less
than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the
performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.

A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child
resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property
or any part thereof is situated.

The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues
regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be
heard and resolved.

The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute
parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary
rules on guardianship shall apply. (320a)

Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by
onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the
latter's support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.

The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to
the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. (321a, 323a)

Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an
unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be
given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would have paid
if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any
case, the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime. (322a)

Chapter 5. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority

Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:
(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)

Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates:

(1) Upon adoption of the child;

(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority; or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority. (327a)

Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the
same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically
reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. (330a)

Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental
authority if the parent or the person exercising the same:

(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;

(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
(3) Compels the child to beg; or
(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness.

The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable
negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority.

If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive
the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the
circumstances.

The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the
purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be
repeated. (33a)

Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be
subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority. (n)

Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the
person of the child as the parents.

In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)

FULL TEXT AHEAD

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-3236. March 27, 1907. ]

SEBASTIAN ABIERA, administrator of the estate of JUAN ABIERA, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MIGUEL
ORIN, Defendant-Appellant.

W.A. Kincaid, for Appellant.

Sebastian Abiera, in his own behalf.

SYLLABUS

1. ESTATES; ADMINISTRATORS; CONTRACTS. — The true parties interested, in the case at bar, in the obligation
contracted by the defendant, are the children of A, and not the latter, for the reason that the obligation was executed in
their favor and not in favor of A. The plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of the deceased A, has, therefore, no right
to ask for the compliance with the said obligation. As such administrator he had only the right to institute such actions
as pertain to the estate he is administering, and no action, dealing with obligations contracted in favor of third persons,
or others from whom he does not derive such right, can be brought by him as such administrator.

2. ID.; PARENT AND CHILD. — The right attached to parental authority was extinguished with the death of A, and he
could not transfer, as administrator, such right to the administrator of his estate. This was an exclusively personal right
that could not survive the person who had such right.

3. CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTION; EXCEPTION. — Because of the foregoing considerations the plaintiff had no right of
action, and the complaint should have been dismissed. An exception based on the lack of a right of action can be
submitted during any stage of the case, as provided in section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

DECISION

MAPA, J. :

There was no new trial asked for in this case and therefore this court can not review the proofs presented in the same.
The judgment of the lower court was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, as special administrator of the estate of Juan
Abiera, deceased, who died intestate, which judgment is in accord with the prayer of the complaint herein and orders
the defendant to pay the sum of 1,000 pesos, as claimed in said complaint.

The court below states, among other things, in its judgment rendered herein, the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Vicenta Cacao, Mariano Cacao, and Petra Cacao were brothers and sisters. Vicenta Cacao married Miguel Orin and
after her said marriage left no descendants or ascendants, and Miguel Orin, Mariano Cacao, and Juan Abiera in 1898
entered into an agreement in writing covering the disposition of the properties and animals had and acquired during
the marriage of Miguel Orin and Vicenta Cacao; Mariano Cacao and Juan Abiera as representatives of their children,
who are the only heirs as well as the natural nephews of the deceased woman Cacao.
"Now, the plaintiff," continues the judgment, "has filed this complaint as special administrator of his deceased father,
Juan Abiera, alleging that the defendant has not complied with the said contract and agreement and prays the court to
compel the compliance of the defendant therewith."cralaw virtua1aw library

The tenor of this contract, according to the judgment referred to, is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We, having knowledge and information of the inventory of the properties acquired during the married state and life of
Miguel Orin and the said Vicenta Cacao, by our contract have agreed, that Miguel Orin, The widower, obligates himself
to deliver to his brothers-in-law, as guardians and fathers of the heirs of Petra Cacao, the value of one thousand pesos
to each of them. The period within which to comply with this contract is until August 15, next; this is the just amount of
our inheritance."cralaw virtua1aw library

From these statements of the judgment it is clearly seen that the deceased, Juan Abiera, entered into a contract, the
compliance of which is prayed for in the complaint herein, not as a personal right, but in the name and representation
of his children. There can be no doubts as to this. The contract deals with the matter of the extrajudicial partition of the
estate left by Vicenta Cacao whose heirs were according to the judgment, not Juan Abiera but his children. Abiera,
therefore, had to act by force of law in the representation of these children in treating in such contract as to the
manner in which the said estate was to be divided. It was for this reason, says the court below in emphatic terms, that
Juan Abiera became a party to the said contract as the representative of his children. It was for this reason also that
there is expressed in the same contract the fact that Miguel Orin obligated himself to pay over 1,000 pesos to Juan
Abiera as guardian and farther of the heirs of Petra Cacao. This Petra Cacao was the deceased wife of Juan Abiera and
the sister of Vicenta Cacao, whose estate is dealt with herein and which estate came to be inherited and participated in,
through legitimate succession by the children of Juan Abiera in representation of their mother, the said Petra Cacao.

Therefore, the true interested parties in the obligation contracted by the defendant herein, Miguel Orin, are the
children of Juan Abiera, and not the latter, for the simple reason that the obligation was executed in their favor and not
in favor of said Abiera. This being the fact, it is evident that the plaintiff in his office as administrator of the deceased
Juan Abiera has no right to ask for the compliance with the said obligation. As such administrator he has only the right
to institute such actions as correspond and pertain to the estate which he is administering, and no other action dealing
with contracts and obligations contracted in favor of third persons, or others from whom he does not derive such right,
can be brought as such administrator.

On the other hand it is not necessary, it being too trivial, to refer to the right of Juan Abiera to represent his children as
father or guardian of the same, and that he has not transferred nor could he transfer to the administrator of his estate
such right from the mere fact that he was such administrator. As has been stated, the said right attached to parental
authority or guardianship was extinguished with the death of Abiera, together with the parental right or the said
guardianship — this in fact and law. This was an exclusively personal right that could not survive the person who had
such right.

Consequently by reason of the considerations expressed above the court below incurred error in taking into
consideration the propriety of the complaint herein. This could not have been done legally, the plaintiff not having the
right of action and was without such right of action in the suit brought by him, and this is the basis of the exception
taken by the appellant and now before this court. It is true that this exception on this point was not brought forward in
the Court of First Instance, but it is also true that the exception based on the lack of right of action can be submitted
during any stage or state of the case, as provided in section 93 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Wherefore the judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed, without special mention as to the
costs in both instances. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be
entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came
for proper action. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.