A.M. No.

SB-14-21-J - RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH

AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD
ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN

Promulgated:

SEPTEMBER 23, 2014 /

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
REYES, J.:
I concur with the ponencia 's declaration that the evidence presented
against Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong) are
insufficient to sustain the charge of bribery against him. That there is no
direct evidence that would sufficiently establish that Justice Ong actually
received money from Janet Lim-Napoles (Napoles) in exchange for her
acquittal in the Kevlar case. Likewise, I agree with the ponencia 's finding
that the association between Justice Ong and Napoles had been sufficiently
proved; that Justice Ong's act of meeting with Napoles at the latter's office
on two occasions, notwithstanding that the decision in the Kevlar case had
long been promulgated, violates the rule of propriety under Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.
I am unable to agree, however, with the ponencia 's conclusion that
Justice Ong's association with Napoles "constitutes gross misconduct
notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery."
Although Justice Ong's dealing with Napoles gives the appearance of
impropriety, there is a paucity of evidence, however, to conclude that he has
a "corrupt inclination" which would merit a finding of gross misconduct on
his part and be meted the penalty of dismissal from the service. Further, I do
not agree with the ponencia that Justice Ong is guilty of dishonesty when he
failed to disclose in his letter to the Chief Justice that he visited Napoles in
her office after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case.

The charge of bribery and/or

corruption against Justice Ong was
not sufficiently proved.
The charge of gross misconduct against Justice Ong stems from the
allegation of bribery against him by "pork barrel scam" whistleblowers
Benhur Luy (Luy) and Marina Sula (Sula} Essentially, Luy and Sula

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

alleged that Napoles solicited the help of Justice Ong in connection with the
Kevlar case, which was then pending before the Sandiganbayan. They
claimed that Napoles was acquitted of the charge against her in the said case
through the intercession of Justice Ong; that Justice Ong obtained monetary
consideration in exchange for Napoles' acquittal.
The accusation of bribery is a very serious charge that would entail
not only the dismissal of a judge, in this case an Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, but also criminal prosecution. 1 An accusation of bribery is
easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Thus, the complainant must
present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as
what is imputed against the respondent connotes a misconduct so grave that,
if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof
required should be more than substantial. 2 In such cases, there must be a
direct and convincing evidence to prove the charge of corruption; mere
accusations will not suffice. 3
The claims of Luy and Sula that Justice Ong is the "contact" of
Napoles in the Sandiganbayan and that he caused the acquittal of the latter in
the Kevlar case in exchange for monetary consideration are hearsay.
During the investigation conducted by retired Supreme Court Justice
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez (Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez) on February 12,
2014, Luy categorically stated in his direct examination that Justice Ong is
the "contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan. However, when asked how
he knew that Justice Ong is the "contact" of Napoles, Luy replied that
Napoles told him so. Thus:
Atty. Garen

And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue
Ribbon Committee that Ms. Napoles has a certain connect sa
Sandiganbayan, who was this connect you were talking about, if
you remember?

Witness Luy
A

Si Justice Gregory Ong po.

How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of
Ms. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan?
Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles po, pinsan ko po kasi si Ms.
Napoles. We are second cousins. So, kinwento talaga sa akin ni
madam kung ano ang mga development sa mga cases, kung
ano ang mga nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo
na nakakausap niya si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala

See Sy v. Judge Fineza, 459 Phil. 780 (2003).

See Castanos v. Judge Escano, Jr., 321 Phil. 527 (1995); Cea v. Judge Paguio, 445 Phil. 535
(2003); Vda. de Nepomuceno v. Judge Bartolome, 448 Phil. 663 (2003).
3
See Atty. Valdez, Jr. v. Judge Gaba/es, 507 Phil. 227 (2005).

;l

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

raw sa kanya po ay si Senator [J]inggoy Estrada. 4 (Emphasis

mine)

Likewise, Luy's allegation that Justice Ong was the one who
orchestrated the acquittal of Napoles in the Kevlar case in exchange for
monetary considerations is based only on what Napoles told him, viz:
Q

You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a

while ago: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may
You stated that the
connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan."
"connect" is Justice Ong. Can you explain before us what you
mean "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What do you mean
by that? "inayos"?

Witness Luy
A

Kasi po ma'am meron kasi kaming ledger ng Sandigan case so

lahat ng nagastos ni Ms. Janet Napoles, nilista ko po yon lahat.
Kasi naririnig ko po kay Janet Napoles, parang pinsan ko si Ms.
Janet Napoles "Paano nagkaroon ng kaso ang ate ko? So
nadiscover ko na lang po na yun pala yung Kevlar. So, mahigit
one hundred na nagastos po ni Ms. Napoles, kasi di lang naman po
si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...

Justice Gutierrez
Just answer the question directly. Paano inayos ... Anong ibig
mong sabihin na inayos. Paano inayos?
Witness Luy
A

Ano po ma'am nagbigay po siya ng pera pero hindi siya

nagbanggit ng amount. Basta nagpalabas po siya ng pera.

Justice Gutierrez
Q
A

Did you come to know to whom she gave the money?

Wala po siyang... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ...
binanggit po niya si ... kasi si madam hindi kasi siya nagki-keep
kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako, nabanggit niya po si Justice
Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya ng pera kay
Justice Ong pero she never mentioned kung magkano yung
amount.

Q
A

Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?

Opo, yun ang sabi niya.

Q
A

That was her statement?

Yes, madam.

TSN, February 12, 2014, p.15.

t.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

Q
A

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

To you?
Yes, madam.

xx xx
Witness Luy
Kasi nakwento pa po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO
million na ang nagastos niya. Tapos ang sabi ko nga po sa kanya:
"Madam, PIOO million na sa halagang P3.8 lang na PO sa Kevlar helmet,
tapos Pl 00 million na ang nagastos mo."
Justice Gutierrez
Q

Q
A

Did she tell you to whom or explain to you where this amount of
PlOO million was paid? How was it spent?
Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates
kasi parang staggered. May PS million sa ibang tao ang kausap
niya. Tapos ito naman tutulong ng ganito. Iba-iba kasi madam eh.
But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?
Wala po pcro nabanggit lang po niya sa akin na nagbigay po
siya kay .Justice Ong, but she never mentioned the amount. 5
(Emphasis mine)

Even Luy's testimony on the circumstances surrounding Napoles'

issuance of eleven (11) checks, each amounting to P282,000.00, to Justice
Ong, supposedly interest payments for the P25 .5 million which the latter
wanted to deposit with the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Police
Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI), are merely based on what
Napoles told him. Luy never saw that the said checks, which he insinuated
were part of the consideration for Napoles' acquittal in the Kevlar case, were
indeed given to Justice Ong.
Q
A

Now, when ...... I am interested in this check which as you said

P25milion or so?
Opo, P25.5 million po.

Q
A

Whose check was that?

BDO Check from Gregory Ong po.

How do you know that it was from Gregory Ong?

Sinabi po ni Ms. Napoles sa akin.

Q
A

Q
A

Ah, it was she who told you?

Yes po.
That this is the check of Gregory Ong?
Yes po. As I testified earlier na hindi ko nakita ang checke kung
nakapangalan kay Ms. Janet Napoles, ang sinabi ni Ms. Napoles sa
akin, ang checke ay BDO na P25.5. Kaya nag-compute kami ng
26.

Id. at 26-29.

;l

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

xx xx

Q
A

You never asked or confronted or talked to Justice Ong regarding

that matter? You only relied on the "say-so" of Janet Napoles?
Sinabi niya, kasi siya ang boss ko, ang instructions niya noon,
and at that time po, Justice Gregory Ong was in the other. .. nasa
kabilang office siya and before na nag-issue kami, na sa 2501 siya.
Yes, yes, but I am interested of your personal knowledge in the
issuance of check, if the check came from Justice Ong or not, and
you said that it was only told to you by Janet Napoles?
Yes po.

Justice Gutierrez

By the way Mr. Luy, were you the one who delivered the check
to Mr. Justice Gregory Ong?
Witness Luy

Hindi na po.

Q
A

Who delivered the check to him?

Si Ms. Napoles na po.

Q
A

How did you come to know that it was Ms. Napoles? Did you see?
Opo, kasi dalawa po kami na nag-prepare. Bago kasi .... Tinanong
ko kasi madam siya kung sino ang payee. Ilalagay ko po ba dito
madam Gregory Ong? Sabi niya, Hindi. Teka lang. Umalis siya.
Purnunta sa kabila, sa 2501. Tapos, tumuloy siya at sabi "Pay to
cash na lang." So, inilagay namin madam na cash. Tapos,
pinirrnahan niya yung checke na prenepare ko. So, bitbit na niya
yung check. Dinala na niya.

Ah, she brought the check to the other room but you did not see the
person to whom it was delivered, right?
Kasi madam, alam ko po na ...

Atty. Geronilla
No. You just answer the question.
Justice Gutierrez
Just answer the question.
Winess Luy

Ah, you mean si Ms. Napoles na binigay niya mismo yung

checke kay Gregory Ong? Hindi po.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

Justice Gutierrez
Q
A

You did not see?

Hindi po. Hindi ko po nakita. 6 (Emphases mine)

Similarly, Sula's claim that Justice Ong is the "contact" of Napoles in

the Sandiganbayan is merely based on what Napoles told her. Thus:
Atty. Benipayo
Q

So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet
Lim Napoles regarding her involvement in the Kevlar case, or how
she was trying to address the problem with the Kevlar case
pending before the Sandiganbayan?

Witness Sula
A

Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga

lawyers na binabayaran niya para tulungan siya kay Gregory Ong
sa Kevlar case. Tapos, sa kalaunan po, nasabi na niya sa amin
na meron na po siyang nakilala sa Sandiganbayan na
nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya, siya po
7
ang tutulong sa amin para ma-clear kami. x x x. (Emphasis
mine)

Basic is the rule that a witness may only testify to those facts, which
he knows of his personal knowledge. 8 Hearsay evidence is inadmissible,
generally, since it is not subject to the tests that can ordinarily be applied for
the ascertainment of the truth of the testimony, since the declarant is not
present and available for cross-examination. 9 By itself, and as repeatedly
conveyed by jurisprudential policy, hearsay evidence is devoid of intrinsic
merit, irrespective of any objection from the adverse party. 10
The veracity of the foregoing allegations against Justice Ong cannot
be ascertained since the declarant thereof, i.e. Napoles, was not presented
during the investigation conducted by Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez.
Notwithstanding that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were admitted in
evidence, the same are, insofar as the claims that Justice Ong is the "contact"
of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan and that he caused the acquittal of the latter
in the Kevlar case in exchange for monetary consideration, devoid of any
probative value.

9
10

Id. at 50-52.
Id. at 7 I.
RULES OF COUin, Rule 130, Section 36.
See R.J. Francisco, EVIDENCE, 1996 ed., p. 246.
Peralta, Jr., PERSPECTJVES OF EVIDENCE, 2005 ed., p. 275.

;f_.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

While it is true that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
applied strictly in administrative proceedings, 11 still, hearsay evidence,
without more, would not suffice to establish an allegation therein. 12 In this
case, other than the hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula, no other evidence
was presented to establish that it was indeed Justice Ong who is the
"contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan who helped her secure an
acquittal in the Kevlar case. Thus, the testimonies of Luy and Sula with
regard to the foregoing should not be given any weight in the determination
of Justice Ong's administrative liability.

Justice Ong's act of visiting Napoles'

office twice after the promulgation of
the decision in the Kevlar case gives
the appearance of impropriety.
Although the circumstances surrounding the charge of bribery against
Justice Ong were not established, it does not mean, however, that he cannot
be held administratively liable. Luy testified that he personally saw Justice
Ong visit Napoles' office in Discovery Suites Center on two occasions
sometime in 2012, after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case.
Luy's testimony was corroborated by Sula.
Justice Ong admitted that he indeed visited Napoles in her office
twice sometime in 2012. However, he clarified that, on his first visit, he just
wanted to thank Napoles personally since the latter made it po~sible for him
to wear the robe of the Black Nazarene, of which he is a devotee. He
explained that he wanted to wear the robe of the Black Nazarene, which is
known for its healing powers, since he is suffering from prostate cancer. On
his second visit to Napoles, he claimed that they just talked for about 30
minutes and had coffee.
Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates
judges to avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety
as well in all of their activities. As a subject of constant public scrutiny,
judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome
by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. 13 In this
regard, judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. 14 Public
confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of
judges. Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. 15

JI
12

Office of the Court Administrator v. Jndar, A.M. No. RT J-10-2232, April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA 24.
See Gonzales v. NLRC, 372 Phil. 39 (1999); Skippers United Pac(fic, Inc. v. NLRC, 527 Phil. 248

(2006).
13
14

15

NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4, Section 2.

Id., Canon 2, Section I.
Dela Cruz v. Judge Bersamira, 391 Phil. 232, 242 (2000).

,
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

Regardless of the reason therefor, it cannot be gainsaid that Justice

Ong's act of visiting Napoles in her office on two occasions gave rise to an
appearance of impropriety on his part. He should have been more
circumspect in dealing with Napoles considering that the latter is a former
litigant in a case decided by a division of the Sandiganbayan, of which he is
the chairman. Undoubtedly, from the view of a reasonable observer, such
conduct is highly imprudent and unbefitting of a magistrate of the
Sandiganbayan.
The appearance of impropriety on the part of Justice Ong is not
negated by the fact that his visit to the office of Napoles occurred long after
the decision in the Kevlar case had been promulgated. The termination of
the Kevlar case will not dissipate public scrutiny on his conduct as an
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, especially considering that he
received a favor from Napoles who was acquitted of the charge against her
in the said case.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with
propriety and must be above suspicion. His must be free of even a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties,
but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private individual. 16

Justice Ong's act of visiting Napoles

only amounts to simple misconduct.
Notwithstanding the finding that there is no direct evidence to prove
the charge of bribery against Justice Ong, the ponencia nevertheless found
him guilty of gross misconduct, imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal
from service. The ponencia stressed the "association" of Justice Ong with
Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case and
pointed out that "[t]he totality of the circumstances of such association
strongly indicates [Justice Ong's] corrupt inclinations."
I do not agree.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a
rule of law or standard of behavior in connection with one's performance of
official functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to exist, there
must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were
corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or were in persistent
disregard of well-known rules. 17

16

Derogatory News Items Charging J. Demetria Demetria, 407 Phil. 671 (2001 ).
See Gacadv. Clapis, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 534; Judge Francisco
v. Justice Cosico, 469 Phil. 549 (2004).
17

11

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

Contrary to the ponencia 's finding, there is no reliable evidence in this

case to conclude that Justice Ong's conduct was corrupt or inspired by the
intention to violate the law. The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula,
without more, are insufficient to prove the charge of bribery against Justice
Ong. There were no other evidence presented as regards the alleged bribery
of Justice Ong which, when taken together with the hearsay testimonies of
Luy and Sula, would support a finding of gross misconduct on the part of
Justice Ong.
The allegation that Justice Ong is the "contact" of Napoles in the
Sandiganbayan who helped her secure an acquittal in the Kevlar case
remains to be a mere allegation unsupported by any reliable evidence. It is
derived from the testimonies of Luy and Sula who testified thereon based
not on their personal knowledge but on what Napoles had told them. To
stress, the said testimonies of Luy and Sula have no probative value and
should not have been considered by the ponencia in the determination of the
administrative liability of Justice Ong.
The "totality of circumstances" adverted to by the ponencia,
apparently, only refers to the visit of Justice Ong to the office of Napoles on
two occasions after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case,
which fact was admitted by Justice Ong. Indeed, from the various evidence
presented against Justice Ong, only the fact of his visit to Napoles was
sufficiently established. However, as already stated, the fact of Justice
Ong's visit to Napoles only supports a finding of impropriety or giving the
appearance of impropriety on the part of Justice Ong.
Impropriety or giving the appearance of impropriety, by fraternizing
with a litigant, in this case a former litigant, only amounts to simple
misconduct. On this point, the Court's ruling in Atty. Molina v. Judge Paz 18
is instructive, viz:
In the present administrative case, respondent Judge Paz admitted
to facilitating a meeting between Atty. Molina and Mayor Antiporda with
the aim of forging a settlement between the warring political factions.
Respondent Judge Paz saw himself as a mediator between the contending
political factions in the Municipality of Buguey. However, Atty. Molina
was at that time facing a multiple murder case in the sala of respondent
Judge Paz and the victims of the multiple murder case were the political
followers of Mayor Antiporda. In short, respondent Judge Paz held a
private meeting with Atty. Molina, who was then accused of multiple
murder before respondent Judge. Respondent Judge Paz knew that Atty.
Molina was a private prosecutor in the criminal cases against the mayor's
son pending with another court. The disputes between the political
factions involved grave felonies, which respondent Judge Paz should have
known could not be the subject of compromise.

18

462 Phil. 620 (2003).

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

10

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge

should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his
activities. A judge must not only be impartial, he must also appear to be
impartial. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of judges. Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this
appearance.
Respondent Judge Paz's actuation constitutes simple
misconduct, which for a first offense is punishable with suspension of one
month and one day to six months. However, respondent Judge Paz had
retired compulsorily on 21 September 1998. In lieu of suspension,
respondent Judge Paz should be fined, not Pl,000 as recommended by the
Investigating Justice, but P20,000 considering that simple misconduct is a
less serious charge. 19 (Emphasis mine)

Thus, finding that his conduct violates the rule on propriety under
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, Justice Ong should be held
liable for simple misconduct. The charge of simple misconduct is classified
under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as a less serious charge. A
finding of guilt for a less serious charge carries with it the penalty of either:
(a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than
P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00. 20
This is already the second offense of Justice Ong; he had previously
been fined and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense
in the future will be dealt with more severely. 21 Accordingly, the maximum
penalty for less serious charge should be imposed upon Justice Ong, i.e.
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for three (3)
months.
The charge of dishonesty against
Justice Ong is unsubstantiated.

I further disagree with the ponencia 's conclusion that Justice Ong is
guilty of dishonesty. The ponencia opined that, in Justice Ong's letter to the
Chief Justice prior to the commencement of the administrative investigation,
he vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted by
Napoles; that he deliberately failed to disclose his "social calls" to Napoles.
That it was only after Luy and Sula testified that he mentioned the fact of his
visit to Napoles.
Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray. 22 Contrary to the ponencia 's assessment, the
19

20
21

22

Id. at 630-631.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, Section 11.
See Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24, 2010, 628 SCRA 626.
Canada v. Judge Suerte, 570 Phil. 25, 35 (2008).

;[

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

11

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

failure of Justice Ong to disclose in his letter to the Chief Justice the fact of
his visit to Napoles cannot be considered dishonesty as would merit
disciplinary action.
The ponencia failed to take into consideration the context of the letter
sent by Justice Ong to the Chief Justice. During the administrative
investigation conducted by Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez, Justice Ong
explained that:
Q
A

Q
A

Why did you write a letter to the Chief Justice?

I wrote that letter motu proprio although I was not required by the
Supreme Court to write that letter in order to defend a reputation as
a magistrate or as a judge, and also to protect the good name and
integrity of the Sandiganbayan as an institution because I believe
that I did not commit any wrongdoing, sir.
What in particular was Mr. Rufo trying to say in this article?
Mr. Rufo, in his article, he was trying to insinuate that during the
pendency of the Kevlar helmet case against this Janet Napoles, that
there is irregularity in the manner by which the decision was
arrived at, and also, at that time of the pendency of the case, I was
[close] to Napoles and he was also insinuating that I was the ... I
am the legal adviser. I was the one advising her of the legal
strategies as to how to go about the Kevlar helmet case, and also
that I was partying with the Napoleses.

xx xx
Q

Now in your letter to the Chief Justice, you did not speak about
this circumstance of meeting with Ms. Janet Napoles. So, why did
you not include in your letter your explanation regarding the role
of Ms. Napoles in helping you gain access to the Black Nazarene?
Because at that time when I wrote the Chief Justice, I was only
addressing the picture wherein myself, Senator Jinggoy and
Napoles were depicted and the article of Mr. Rufo and
nowhere in the article that says that I was seen ... that I was
there in the office of Ms. Napoles at that time, sir. 23 (Emphases
mine)

Verily, Justice Ong wrote the said letter to the Chief Justice to address
the insinuations in the article of Aries Rufo published in the social
news-network Rappler, particularly, that he attended parties and social
events hosted by Napoles. This he did by categorically denying in the said
letter that he attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles. He failed
to disclose that he twice visited Napoles in her office since he was
addressing the insinuation against him in the said article. It may have been a
lapse of judgment on his part but it certainly is not dishonesty. In any case,
when allegations came out that he visited the office of Napoles in Discovery
Suites Center on two occasions, Justice Ong readily admitted to such fact.
Such admission, indubitably, is incongruent with the idea of being dishonest.
23

TSN, March 21, 2014, pp. 12-13; 27.

r,

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

12

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to hold Sandiganbayan Associate Justice

Gregory S. Ong guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT. Accordingly, he
should suffer the penalty of SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE for a period of
THREE (3) MONTHS, without salary or other benefits. Further, he is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.

Associate Justice