Public Relations Review, 20( 1):5-18 Copyright 0 1994 by JAI

Press Inc.
ISSN: 0363.8111 All rights of reproduction in any form
rcscrvcd.
David E.
Williams and
Bolanle A.
Olaniran
Exxons DecisionMaking Flaws: The
Hypervigilant Response
to the Valdez Grounding
ABSTRACT: The March 24, 1989 Exxon Valdez grounding
caused one of the worst oil spills ever witnessed in the
United
States. While clean up crews were battling the spill, Exxons
crisis
management personnel were fighting an uphill battle against
the
unyielding press coverage and negative reactions from
people
across the country. At the heart of Exxons crisis
management
shortcomings were the flaws in decision making which were
made
at the beginning of the crisis.
This article explores the difficulties of crisis decision making
and
reveals how Exxon employed the maladaptive crisis
response pattern
of hypervigilant decision making during its initial response to
the
spill. The article also offers procedural changes which would
benefit
crisis management personnel who might face a similar
catastrophe
in the future.
David Williams and Bolanle Olaniran are both assistant
professors

in the Department of Communication Studies, Texas Tech

University, Lubbock.
On March 24, 1989, an oil tanker, the Exxon Valdez, hit a
reef in Alaskas Prince William sound causing a rupture that
spilled 240,000 barrels of
oil into the water and onto the shore (Shabecoff, 1989a). The
incident immediately
garnered the attention of the media, environmentalists
groups, and others who were
angered over the damage that would be caused by the oil
and the circumstances
spring 1994 5
Pwblic Relations Review
surrounding the incident.
While the spill was terrible, the events following it only
served to make matters
worse. Exxon was immediately placed in a public relations
nightmare not unlike
those previously experienced by Johnson and Johnson after
episodes of Tylenol
tamperings in 1982 and 1986. Exxons situation was
somewhat more complicated in
that several reasons arose for the public to become angry
with and lose trust in the
company. While many were upset about the environmental
damage, others were
angered over the economic loss (Holusha, 1989b). Still
more complications arose
when it was alleged that the Exxon captain was not at the
helm during the wreck and
that he might have been intoxicated. Exxon angered many
with the spill and they
have yet to fully recover public trust. Two years after the
accident, William Small
(1991) commented that despite spending over two billion
dollars on the cleanup
Exxon has lost the battle of a favorable public image and is
still struggling to regain
its reputation (p. 9).

As with any other major corporate crisis, the Exxon

grounding called for effective
decision making in responding to the general public and the
various specific audiences
who were anxiously awaiting a response. Exxon, however,
failed in its attempt
to select the most appropriate strategy for responding to the
crisis. This article will
initially address the role of decision making in the
management of a corporate crisis.
The essay will then examine Exxons decision making during
the initial stage of the
corporate response to the Valdez grounding. Finally,
suggestions for improved crisis
management and decision making will be offered.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CRISIS
DECISION MAKING
Kreps (1986) defines crisis management as the use of
public relations to minimize harm to the organization in
emergency situations that
could cause the organization irreparable damage (p. 247).
Weick (1988) adds that
Crises are characterized by low probability high
consequence events that threaten
the most fundamental goal of an organization (p. 305). As
Tabris (1984) warns
Crises vary in nature, magnitude, and intensity, but they all
have in common results
that may seriously hamper an organizations ability to
function. They can seriously
undermine its most valued assets-credibility and reputation
(p. 57).
Crisis Management
Effective management of a crisis can depend on several
factors. Preparation is a key as there are a few steps
organizations should take to be
ready for the possibility of a crisis. An ongoing process of
fostering healthy relations

with the media is essential (Dilenschneider, 1985; Benson,

1988; Barton, 1990). In
times of crisis it is helpful to have established trust with
those who will be asking
questions and seeking information. Katz (1988) suggests
that if this can help to
garner favorable press coverage there will be a better
chance of minimizing damage
to the organizations image and credibility.
6 Vol. 20, No.
Emons Decision-Making Flaws: 7he Hypewigilmat
Response to the Vakiez Grounding
Large organizations should also develop and maintain crisis
management team
(Myers Holusha, 1986; PASE, 1981; Nude11 Antokol, 1988;
Shrivastava Mitroff,
1987). Members of the team should represent all divisions of
the organization and
possess individual crisis mangement skills. These individuals
will be taught specific
duties to fulfill in the event of a crisis.
Members of the crisis team will periodically conduct an
organizational crisis audit.
Littlejohn (1983) describes the crisis audit as a systematic
approach to identifying a
crisis issues by gathering information on the internal and
external environments and
establishing priorities on these issues (p. 41). The crisis
audit will involve an attempt
to identify possible crisis issues with a subsequent
determination on the probability
of the crisis occurring and the extent of the impact. Tabris
(1984) indicates that the
ability to discover crisis potential is primarily dependent on
good vertical communication
within the organization.
Results of a crisis communication audit will lead, if
necessary, the development of

a crisis contingency plan which allows the team to consider

how a crisis might occur
and how it would be handled (Wisenblit, 1989). Although
different organizations
will have different procedures in the contingency plan, there
will always be a need to
select a specific official spokesperson (Lau, 1987). The
choice of a spokesperson
would be one who is a high ranking official who can convey
trustworthiness and
communicative skill. Shalowitz (1987) notes that use of an
official spokesperson will
benefit the organization by limiting the possibility of
conflicting stories and views
being attributed to the company.
Crisis management procedures should provide for a means
of training the team
members and other employees about their specific duties in
a crisis. Furthermore,
training scenarios should be used to simulate the stress and
pressure of a crisis while
the members are practicing their planned crisis response
procedures. Finally, noncrisis
team employees should be of concern during crisis situations
(Fisher Briggs,
1989; Quarantelli, 1988; Saunders, 1988). Employees can be
an essential element in
the crisis management mix. Their daily mnctioning and
interactions with internal
and external publics can give insight to the media and
general public as to how the
company is handling the crisis. Quarantelli (1988) explains
the problems of interorganizational
communication during a crisis.
The communication system is designed to process and
exchange relatively
predetermined types and quantities of information. However,
during a disaster,

the number of staff using the communication system will

often increase greatly.
This is created in part by internal staff changes undertaken
by the organization to
meet the demands of the crisis situation (p. 376).
Special effort should be devoted to the employees need to
know what is happening
during a crisis. The lack of trustworthy information will cause
employees to
question their worth to the organization and possibly the
stability of their jobs.
Saunders (1988) study of Eastern Airline pilots during that
companys financial
crisis revealed that they felt their input was unwanted and
their careers were at risk.
Her suggestions for improving communication with
employees during a crisis
Spring 1994 7
Public Relations Review
included: (1) messages from top level management, (2)
assurances of job security (if
possible), and (3) more forums for effective feedback (p. 39).
Crisis Decision Making
Research and professional practice is fairly consistent in
explaining
the general processes and procedures organizations should
follow in crisis
management. However, the correct procedures can be
implemented only when the
appropriate decisions are made. Although general crisis
management guidelines are
available, coping with a crisis the magnitude of the
Challenger disaster, the Tylenol
tamperings, or the Valdez spill calls for effective decision
making on how damage to
the corporate image can be minimized. As Fink (1986) has
suggested Remember
that managing a crisis is managing your decisions (p. 133).

Research and professional practice is much less specific in

explaining the complexities
of crisis decision making. Crisis decision making refers to the
strategic selection of
public announcements and policy decisions made by the
organization to alleviate a
crisis and restore public confidence. Stubbart (1987)
suggests that crisis decisions
differ from routine decisions in their uncertainty, their
complexity, their potential to
invoke conflicting interests and the likelihood of decision
maker ego involvement
(p. 89). When confronted with a corporate crisis, crisis
management personnel will
also have their decision making abilities challenged by the
need to react quickly, the
scrutiny of the press and public interest groups, and the
threat of negative consequences
resulting from poor decision making. These pressures can
erode the abilities
of one who is a competent decision maker under normal
conditions.
Janis and Mann (1977) have addressed decisional conflict
and emergency decision
making in an effort to identify the patterns of stress induced
decision making.
This research is essential in explaining the difficulties and
problems which crisis
management personnel face when coping with an
organizational crisis.
Janis and Mann (1977) identified four maladaptive and one
adaptive strategy
decision makers employ during crisis induced stress. The
four maladaptive strategies
are: (1) unconflicted inertia, (2) unconflicted change, (3)
defense avoidance and, (4)
hypervigilance. These strategies are labeled maladaptive
because they fail to discover

the best means for escaping danger (p. 64). The adaptive
strategy is the vigilant
approach to decision making which is likely to lead to
effective emergency action
with a much better chance of a successful outcome than
hypervigilance or any of the
other patterns (p. 65).
Unconflicted inertia develops when a decision maker or
group determines that
signs of danger do not warrant an action. The decision maker
may believe the threat
of danger is minimal or that the damage would be
intolerable. Having deemphasized
the threat of danger, the decision maker will continue to do
whatever he
or she has been doing without any change in response to the
crisis threat. When the
actual crisis occurs, or the danger intensifies, the
organization is caught off-guard and
unprepared.
Unconflicted change occurs when the decision maker selects
one solution to a
crisis and then refuses to consider any other alternatives.
With this strategy the
8 Vol. 20, No. 1
E&ons Decision-Making Fluws: ne F&per-vigilant
Response to the Valdez Grounding
decision maker will frequently follow the first possible
solution or the solution which
is most easily adopted. When following this strategy there
will usually not be any
thought given to contingency or backup plans in case the
initial plan fails. Uncontlicted
change provides two means for faulty decision making. First
the most easily adopted
solution to a crisis is rarely the best choice. Second, when
the initial solution fails the
decision maker falters by not selecting a better alternative.

The third maladaptive strategy, defense avoidance, occurs

when the dominant
mode of coping with the emergency will be to avoid cues
that stimulate anxiety or
other painful feelings (Janis Mann, 1977, p. 58). Defense
avoidance may take two
different forms. Evasive defense avoidance refers to ones
lack of interest in the threat
or crisis, The decision maker will allow him herself to be
distracted by less critical
matters. The buck passing defense avoidance occurs when
the decision maker
identifies the least objectionable solution to a crisis and
ignores its possible problems
while developing a rationale to prove that they have
selected the best solution. Each
of the defense avoidance forms is maladaptive because they
prohibit a thorough
evaluation of the crisis situation.
Hypervigilance, the final maladaptive strategy, was
considered by Fink (1986) to
be probably the worst coping strategy (p. 140). He added
that this form of
decision making can create the largest and most costly
decisional mistakes.
Hypervigilance involves an overreaction to the crisis in which
the decision maker
seeks an immediately available solution and is then willing to
quickly abandon it for
another seemingly plausible solution.
One factor leading to hypervigilant decision making is a high
level of stress which
might include fear, shame, or guilt (Janis Mann, 1977; Janis,
Defares, Grossman,
1983). Although these conditions do not automatically result
in defective decisions,
their presence in crisis situations do greatly increase the
possibility of hypervigilant

reactions. The combination of stress and guilt, fear, or

shame leads decision makers
to feel responsible for making a decision which will quickly
alleviate the troubles
caused by the crisis and the inner turmoil they are
experiencing.
Time pressure is a second factor leading to hypervigilant
decision making. Janis,
Defares, and Grossman (1983) explain that the
hypervigilance pattern is initiated
when a deadline pressure threatens the decision maker(s)
safety, career, financial
status or anything else of value (p. 15). The time constraints
will cause the decision
maker to focus on the possible losses or damage which could
result from the crisis.
Hypervigilant decision makers who feel time constraints will
also pay too much
attention to negative rumors and exaggerated claims of
damage and desperately seek
the least dangerous solution.
The scenario most likely to cause hypervigilant decision
making is the combination
of an unexpected threat which suddenly emerges and the
added pressure of a short
time limit in which to respond to the crisis. This scenario is
most likely to occur when
the decision maker has disregarded earlier warnings about
the threat. The use of
defense avoidance will cause decision makers to miss or
ignore relevant information
and misjudge the extent of risk about the crisis. They will be
likely to avoid decisional
conflict by allowing someone else to make a decision or not
making any decision.
spring 1994 9
Public Relations Review
The adaptive style is referred to as vigilant decision making.
This style of crisis

decision making will generally allow for more optimum

outcome. The possibility of
vigilant decision making is enhanced by a recognition and
understanding of the
seriousness of an impending crisis, confidence that research
and analysis will indicate
the best means for coping with the crisis, and belief that
sufficient time is available to
discover the best response. The vigilant decision maker will
also be capable of
resisting the tendency to adopt the first or most conceivable
solution without
sufficient thought given to its feasibility.
These conditions optimize but do not guarantee a positive
decision outcome.
Given the opportunity for a vigilant approach to decision
making, the agent now
must follow through with a thorough analysis of the situation
and various alternatives.
Hirokawa and Rost (1992) have helped to formulate an
insight into group
interaction known as vigilant interaction theory. They
explain that this theory
maintains that group interaction affects decision-making
performance by directly
shaping the quality of vigilance (or critical thinking) that
leads to a final group
choice (p. 269). This theory maintains that decision quality
will depend on how
well the group moves through three stages: the analysis of
the problematic situation,
establishment of goals and objectives, and evaluation of
positive and negative
qualities of available choices. (Hirokawa Rost, 1992, p. 270).
EXXONS CRISIS DECISION MAKING
Exxons handling of the Valdez grounding is characteristic
of hypervigilant decision making in response to a crisis.
Previous research on the

Valdez grounding (Williams Treadaway, 1992) has indicated

that Exxon faltered by
attempting three different ineffective strategies (burden
sharing, scapegoating, and
acceptance) for dealing with the crisis. The remainder of this
section will explain why
these strategies were attempted. It will first demonstrate
that Exxon was caught in a
situation highly conducive to hypervigilant decision making
and, second, show how
the company then enacted hypervigilant decisions.
The Hypewigilant Situation
Exxon was caught in a situation highly conducive to
hypervigilant decision making
because they were hit with an unexpected threat and then
felt the pressure to take
quick action without adequate time to critically weigh the
options.
Exxon obviously did not expect an accident of this
magnitude. The Valdez
grounding was not even preceded by warnings of bad
weather and there was no
reason to suspect the Valdez would run aground. The
unexpected nature of the
grounding was made worse by the lack of an emergency
team at Prince William
Sound. The immediate response to the spill was handled by
Exxon personnel at the
terminal in Valdez. However, they had equipment adequate
for only a small spill.
The Alyeska Service Company, which operates the transAlaska oil pipeline, then
moved to bring in floating oil booms to help contain the spill.
In 1981 Alyeska had
10 Vol. 20, No. 1
Exxons Decision-Makin/r Flaws: The Hypervtj&nt
Response to the Valdn Grounding
disbanded a 20 member emergency team which monitored
the Prince William

Sound area for oil spills. Exxon was not responsible for the
disbandment ofthis team.
However, the lack of an emergency team on site helped to
make an unexpected
accident appear to be an accident for which Exxon was also
unprepared.
The hypervigilant situation took greater shape with the
pressure that was placed
on Exxon to react quickly to the spill. Exxon had very little
time to fully consider the
alternative strategies for dealing with the spill because of
the immediate attention of
the press. It was just one day after the grounding that
environmentalists and marine
biologists were placing animals on an in danger list. Four
days after the incident
biologists predicted that the damage to the Valdez shore and
wildlife may last for
years. On that same day the New Tarb Times reported that
the accident was
responsible for increased oil prices. As Small (1991) noted:
Television, of course, ran endless pictures of the damage to
the shoreline and the
wildlife. It ran interviews with local natives, with
environmental critics, with
government officials in Washington. It seemed that very little
was said by Exxon
and very little reported of the companys efforts, (p. 10).
Dyer, Miller, and Boone (1991) revealed that Associated
Press wire stories about
Exxon increased from approximately 20 in February 1989 to
130 in March and 325
in April. Likewise the print media reacted quickly in
questioning and condemning
Exxon for the spill. Not surprisingly, Exxon was not receiving
sympathetic or even
neutral press coverage concerning the spill.
Exxon officials had to deal with more than the pressure
provided from media. The

attention was causing a strong backlash from those who

were upset about the
environmental damage. One day after the grounding, a
commercial fisherman stated
that the herring beds of Prince William Sound were already
destroyed and that
salmon was the next concern (Mauer, 1989, p. 22). Otters,
whales, porpoises and sea
birds were then added to the list of casualties as photos and
video of dying and dead
animals were shown to the public by the media throughout
the country. Concerns
over the loss of Alaskan shores and wildlife led to public
boycotts of Exxon
Corporation and its products. The boycotters became even
more irate when the spill
caused an increase in oil prices (Wald, 1989, p. B7). There
was a continual call from
environmentalists for Exxon to do more and to do it quickly.
The immediate negative response toward Exxon made the
environment inconducive
to vigilant evaluation of the alternatives because Exxon was
both burdened with the
guilt of the spill and pressured to act immediately. There was
virtually no time to
thoroughly evaluate the options for responding to the angry
public. Exxon was
trapped in the type of situation most likely to produce
hypervigilant decision making
because they encountered an unexpected threat and had
pressure to respond quickly.
The Hypervigilant Responses
Exxon employed hypervigilant decision making in response
to the spa1 as they sought
the first reasonable strategy for alleviating their guilt and
then quickly abandoned it for
spring 1994 11
Public Relations Review

a different strategy. Previous research (Williams Treadaway,

1992) has indicated that
Exxon decided to employ a burden sharing strategy and then
quickly switched to a
scapegoating attempt which was followed by acceptance of
the guilt.
The first decision Exxon made in response to the spill was to
employ a burden
sharing strategy in which the company claimed that both the
Coast Guard and
Alaskan environmental officials and even the weather were
partially responsible for
the extent of damage caused by the spill.
Exxon quickly came under fire for their slow response to the
accident. The March
25th Los Angeles Times quoted University of Alaska
professor Richard Steiner, who
queried Where was the crackerjack response team that was
supposed to be out
there? They are moving way too slowly (Dolan Taylor, 1989,
p. 15). Steiner had
flown over the oil slick and after witnessing the devastation
was lamenting the fact
that it had been 14 hours since the grounding and Exxon had
not yet begun any
visible clean up efforts. The following day Alaska Governor
Steve Cowper also
referred to Exxons Efforts as slow and inadequate (Jones
Parrish, 1989, p. 1). The
Department of Environmental Conservation also labeled
Exxons efforts as inadequate
(Jones Parrish, 1989, p. 12).
Exxon first decided to employ the burden sharing strategy by
suggesting that the
spill was made worse by the weather. Frank Iarossi, president
of Exxon Shipping
Company stated theres no way I can keep oil from
impacting more beach area.

That wind is working against us (Jones, 1989b, p. 1). The

weather was also used to
explain the delay in getting equipment to the spill site. At
this point, Exxon initiated
the hypervigilant response by focusing on the weather. This
gave Exxon a quick
means for explaining away part of the damage thus relieving
some of their guilt.
The burden sharing strategy was then broadened as public
anger continued to
rise. On March 29, Don Conratt, the Alaska coordinator for
Exxon explained that
the best opportunity to clean up the spill was lost because
the oil had now already
begun to spread out. Conratt admitted that the spill would
harm the shoreline but
he blamed the Department of Environmental Conservation
for their delay in
approving a permit to use dispersants which could have
minimized damage (Jones,
1989a). The Alaskan government and U.S. Coast Guard were
also indicted by
Exxon for causing a delay in the clean up efforts when they
did not provide
authorization for the use of chemicals. This issue became
confused because the state
ofAlaska had pre-approved the use of dispersants for some
areas and other areas were
determined on a case-by case basis. Those areas designated
as zone one were far away
from sensitive shorelines and therefore pre-approved for
dispersant use. Areas
designated as zones two or three were more ecologically
sensitive and dispersant use,
was decided on a case-by-case basis. The confusion arose
when the Valdez oil spill
quickly spread to include areas in all three zones and the
issue of pre-approval became
difficult to determine.

The burden sharing attempt was quickly proven to be

ineffective. The trouble
presented by adverse weather conditions was viewed as a
weak excuse and the
complaints of a lack of authorization were rejected by the
press and public (Shabecoff,
1989). The most pointed criticism of Exxons burden sharing
strategy was delivered
12 Vol. 20, No. 1
Exxons Decision-Making Flaws: 7he HypenQifant
Response to the Valdez Grounding
by Stephen M&pine, the Lieutenant Governor of Alaska. He
stated I would
suggest its Exxons tanker that ran up on the rocks. Trying
to shift the burden of the
blame in this situation is something that just cannot and
should not be done
(Reuters, 1989 p. A12).
Exxon was now further entangled in a situation conducive to
hypervigilant
decision making. The first decision was made under the
constraints of guilt, an angry
public, and time pressure. With the burden sharing strategy
no longer viable, and
even worsening their position, Exxon now felt the need to
devise a new strategy as
quickly as possible. They were still burdened by guilt and did
not realistically have
time to fully consider all possible options. These constraints
led to a second illadvised
decision in which Exxon employed a scapegoating strategy.
Exxon immediately seized the opportunity to blame the
incident on the third
mate, Gregory Cousins and pilot of the Valdez Joseph
Hazelwood. On March 27 it
was revealed that Cousins was piloting the tanker as it ran
aground (Mauer, 1989).
Since this was clearly against federal regulations and
company policy, Exxon decided

to shift blame for the incident to Cousins and Hazelwood

thus employing a
scapegoating strategy. Hazelwood then became the focus of
this strategy when on
March 28 Exxon confirmed reports that he had a history of
drinking problems
(Jones, 1989b). The company became fully committed to the
scapegoating strategy
after the National Transportation Safety Roard reported on
March 30 that Hazelwood
was legally drunk when tested 10 hours after the grounding.
Following this announcement,
Exxon announced that Hazelwood had been fired. Exxon
reiterated
its position that Hazelwood had blatantly broken company
policy and that infraction
led to the grounding.
Although there was a public outcry against Hazelwood,
Exxon did not improve its
standing in the publics eye. There were witnesses who
claimed that Hazelwood did
not appear drunk and others who suggested that he might
have begun drinking after
the accident. There was even more backlash against Exxon
from those who wondered
why the company would have allowed Hazelwood to
continue as a pilot when they
had previously discovered his drinking problems (Williams
Treadaway, 1992). Exxon
was unable to separate itselffrom Hazelwood by employing
the scapegoating strategy.
Once again, Exxon had followed a hypervigilant pattern by
selecting the alterative
which became available and offered some hope of alleviating
guilt. The decision to
scapegoat Hazelwood was made so quickly that it had not
yet been a full week since
the accident occurred and Exxon was still being criticized for
employing the burden

sharing strategy. The scapegoating strategy also failed

leaving Exxon with the same
problem of trying to cope with the spill in order to satisfy an
ever-growing animosity
toward Exxon from the public.
With two crisis response failures, Exxon quickly adopted its
final strategy of
acceptance. In retrospect, it appears that the strategy of
acceptance might have been
the best choice for Exxons crisis efforts had it been the first
choice and implemented
correctly. Unfortunately for Exxons crisis personnel, the
hypervigilant response kept
them from discovering this option until it was too late and
thus it was not wellreceived
by the public.
spring 1994 13
Public Relations Review
This strategy involved an acceptance of the consequences of
the spill and an
emphasis on the steps being taken to correct the problem.
Exxon financed the
building of animal emergency care units to help rescue and
save as many of the
animals as possible. The company also strongly
acknowledged that it would reimburse
members of the local fishing industry for their loss of
equipment and income.
The strongest effort toward acceptance was the April 3rd
advertisement which
appeared in 165 publications across the nation. This
advertisement offered a statement
by Exxon Chairperson Lawrence J. Raw1 in which he said that
the company
was acting swiftly and competently to clean up the spill.
The statement then
mentioned how sorry he was that the accident occurred
and that Exxon will leave

Prince William Sound close to what it was before the tragedy.

Again, this strategy was
not completely successful. The biggest problem with the
advertisement, and the
whole acceptance strategy, was that it came too late. Had
the advertisement appeared
much sooner, within two days of the accident, it might have
been received more
favorably. Secondly, the advertisement never actually stated
that Exxon accepted
responsibility for the tragedy, only that the company would
clean up the spill. Finally,
Rawls claim that Exxon was moving competently and
swiftly to clean up the spill
was just too easy to refute with all the previous evidence
that suggested the company
moved slowly and incompetently.
Lessons from the Exxon Valdez Crisis
It can only be concluded that Exxon failed to make correct
decisions in determining how to deal with the Valdez crisis.
The pattern of flawed
decisions suggests that the corporate decision makers were
operating in a hypervigilant
mode. The Exxon Valdez case provides clear evidence for the
need of crisis audits
and contingency plans. However, the Exxon Valdez incident
also demonstrates that
crisis audits and contingency plans are not always sufficient
when managing a large
scale crisis. Thus, crisis managers need to develop additional
procedures which
facilitate vigilant decision making. The remainder of this
article will address changes
Exxon might have employed in its response and which will
be useful to other
companies that become involved in large scale public
relations crises.
Managing the Initial Response Dilemma

Exxon was at a severe disadvantage in its attempt to save

the corporate image because
the hypervigilant situation developed quickly and out of the
control of crisis management
personnel. It was impossible for anyone outside of the Valdez
captain and
others on board to have predicted the grounding might take
place. The unexpected
nature of the incident combined with its nearly unparalleled
severity garnered the
immediate mass attention of the press and public thus,
defining the hypervigilant
situation. This necessitated an immediate decision on how to
manage the crisis yet
the time to consider the alternatives was insufficient.
14 Vol. 20, No. 1
Emons Decision-Making Flaws: 7he Hypervigikznt
Response to the Valdez Grounding
This dilemma provides a serious problem for crisis
management personnel-how
can alternatives be properly evaluated and a good decision
made when the decisions
need to be immediate? Exxon might have limited damage to
its corporate image if
the contingency plan included a procedure which would have
the predetermined
spokesperson go to the location, report what is known, and
assure the public and
press that the company is working to take proactive
measures.
A critical element of this initial stage of the contingency plan
would have the
spokesperson and or other representatives meet with local
opinion leaders and
effected groups. Crisis management personnel can utilize
insights from risk communication
experts (Covello & Allen, 1988; Renz, 1992) who emphasize
involving the

public in environmental risk issues. Crisis management

personnel should likewise
involve the public in information dissemination and some
decision making procedures.
In the Valdez incident, trained Aleyska employees and many
local fishermen
were available and ready to be put to work in cleaning up
the spill. However, Exxon
did not utilize that resource in the early stages of the crisis
(Davidson, 1990).
Exxon representatives might have also sought out
environmentalist groups to help
explain the extent of the damage and what measures would
be taken. Leaders of
environmentalists groups could have been immediately
invited to help Exxon
organize local clean-up efforts. Such an action by Exxon
would have allowed the
company to demonstrate a proactive response to the
emergency. This step would also
have reduced some ofthe tension and anger ofeffected
groups as their time and energy
would have been partially diverted toward positive efforts at
assisting in the clean-up.
Separating the Decision Environmentfiom
the Disaster Environment
Given the immediate development of the hypervigilant
situation, it is not surprising
that inadequate coping strategies were selected. The
frequently changing and shorttermed
use of the burden sharing, scapegoating, and acceptance
strategies clearly
indicate that Exxon was hastily seeking an immediately
available solution with the
hope that it would alleviate the guilt of the spill.
In addition to alleviating the immediate response dilemma,
as suggested above,
Exxon might have also improved its initial decision making if
its crisis management

procedures had been further altered to allow key decision

makers to stay at either a
central location away from the stress and anxiety of the
disaster scene or at a
controlled, isolated location at or near the disaster scene.
Exxons decision-makers were caught up in the confusion of
the situation and
unable to carefully evaluate their alternatives. Coast Guard
Admiral Edward Nelson
was quoted as saying:
The decision-making process, much like the town of Valdez
and the state of
Alaska, was being consumed by strained emotions and
conflicting information
(Davidson, 1990, p. 48).
spring 1994 15
Public Relations Review
Nelson further detailed what he witnessed at the crisis
scene:
On Sunday, Frank larossi had sixty-eight of his people up
there. They knew how
to get oil out of the ground and move it from point A to point
B, but these guys
were not crisis managers. When I walked in and saw Exxons
place, it looked like
a potential caucus room-packed with people, long tables,
phone lines, people
running in and out with doughnuts. This was supposed to be
the operations
setup where they were trying to make decisions (Davidson,
1990, p. 48).
Vigilant decision making requires that the group have time to
move thoroughly
through the stages of analysis, goal setting, and outcome
evaluation. The initial
response, as described above, will allow the key decision
makers time to consider
their options, but removing them from the disaster will
alleviate some of the pressure

and stress which could lead to hasty, faulty decision-making.

If key decision-makers
are it the disaster scene, there is a greater chance that they
will witness the devastation
and initial media and public outcry which might induce the
causes of hypervigilant .
Therefore, if possible, crisis managers should be kept away
from the disaster scene. If
crisis decision makers must be on the scene, they should be
sheltered from the press
and other operations dealing with the crisis. Their
information should come from
reliable reports, not first-hand observation and participation
in cleanup operations or
.press conferences. In times of crisis, decision-making
practitioners in general need to
be exposed to all the facts, but not all of the emotions, of the
situation.
This article has offered an insight into the public relations
handling of the Exxon
Valdez crisis. It has been suggested that Exxons decisionmakers engaged in
hypervigilant decisionmaking. While the Exxon case was
extreme, it serves as a clear
example of what can happen when decision-makers employ
a hypervigilant decisionmaking
mode when coping with large scale disasters. However,
hypervigilant decisionmaking can occur with any level of crisis that involves high
stress and the
pressure to react quickly. Therefore, public relations
practitioners in general and crisis
management personnel in particular need to be aware of the
causes of both adaptive
and maladaptive decision-making.
This article also suggested that crisis management literature
must continue to be
refined. The Exxon case has demonstrated that crisis
management personnel need to

be ready to deal with the immediate response dilemma and

the decision and disaster
environments. While these insights should be useful, there is
a continuing need to
analyze crisis situations to determine the best means for
enhancing decision-making
and the eventual crisis outcomes.
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