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    Flixborough Disaster

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    Eddylyn Marie
    The chemical plant in Flixborough, UK produced caprolactam using cyclohexane. A crack was found in one of the reactors, so a temporary bypass pipe was installed. On June 1, 1974 the bypass pipe ruptured, releasing cyclohexane vapor that ignited, causing a massive explosion. Twenty-eight workers were killed and thirty-six injured. The explosion destroyed the plant and damaged over 1,800 nearby buildings. An investigation found that the plant modifications were made without fully assessing safety risks, no pressure testing was done on the bypass pipe, and the potential for disaster was not considered. Recommendations included regularly maintaining equipment, reporting failures early, considering building locations, and training engineers more broadly.

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    Flixborough Disaster

    Uploaded by

    Eddylyn Marie
    335 views4 pages
    The chemical plant in Flixborough, UK produced caprolactam using cyclohexane. A crack was found in one of the reactors, so a temporary bypass pipe was installed. On June 1, 1974 the bypass pipe ruptured, releasing cyclohexane vapor that ignited, causing a massive explosion. Twenty-eight workers were killed and thirty-six injured. The explosion destroyed the plant and damaged over 1,800 nearby buildings. An investigation found that the plant modifications were made without fully assessing safety risks, no pressure testing was done on the bypass pipe, and the potential for disaster was not considered. Recommendations included regularly maintaining equipment, reporting failures early, considering building locations, and training engineers more broadly.

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    The chemical plant in Flixborough, UK produced caprolactam using cyclohexane. A crack was found in one of the reactors, so a temporary bypass pipe was installed. On June 1, 1974 the bypass pipe ruptured, releasing cyclohexane vapor that ignited, causing a massive explosion. Twenty-eight workers were killed and thirty-six injured. The explosion destroyed the plant and damaged over 1,800 nearby buildings. An investigation found that the plant modifications were made without fully assessing safety risks, no pressure testing was done on the bypass pipe, and the potential for disaster was not considered. Recommendations included regularly maintaining equipment, reporting failures early, considering building locations, and training engineers more broadly.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    335 views4 pages

    Flixborough Disaster

    Uploaded by

    Eddylyn Marie
    The chemical plant in Flixborough, UK produced caprolactam using cyclohexane. A crack was found in one of the reactors, so a temporary bypass pipe was installed. On June 1, 1974 the bypass pipe ruptured, releasing cyclohexane vapor that ignited, causing a massive explosion. Twenty-eight workers were killed and thirty-six injured. The explosion destroyed the plant and damaged over 1,800 nearby buildings. An investigation found that the plant modifications were made without fully assessing safety risks, no pressure testing was done on the bypass pipe, and the potential for disaster was not considered. Recommendations included regularly maintaining equipment, reporting failures early, considering building locations, and training engineers more broadly.

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    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
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    The explosion was caused by the rupture of a temporary bypass pipe containing cyclohexane, which formed a flammable vapor cloud that ignited. It destroyed the plant and damaged surrounding buildings.

    A crack was discovered in one of the reactors, so a temporary bypass pipe was installed while repairs were made. This bypass pipe ruptured, likely due to a nearby pipe fire, releasing cyclohexane that vaporized and ignited.

    Twenty-eight workers were killed and thirty-six injured. Nearby property was also damaged. If it occurred on a weekday, casualties would have been higher.

    Flixborough Disaster, Nypro (UK)

    I.

    Background Information

    The chemical plant, owned by Nypro UK (a joint venture between Dutch State Mines and the British National Coal Board) and in operation since 1967,

    produced caprolactam, a precursor chemical used in the manufacture of nylon. Residents of the village of Flixborough were not happy to have such a large industrial development so close to their homes and had expressed concern when the plant was first proposed. The process involved oxidation of cyclohexane with air in a series of

    six reactors to produce a mixture of cyclohexanol and cyclohexanone. Two months prior to the explosion, a crack was discovered in the number 5 reactor. It was decided to install a temporary 50 cm (20 inch) diameter pipe to bypass the leaking reactor to allow continued operation of the plant while repairs were made. At 16:53 on Saturday 1 June 1974, the temporary bypass pipe (containing cyclohexane at 150C (302F) and 1 MPa (10 bar)) ruptured, possibly as a result of a fire on a nearby 8 inch (20 cm) pipe which had been burning for nearly an hour. Within a minute, about 40 tonnes of the plant's 400 tonne store of cyclohexane leaked from the pipe and formed a vapour cloud 100200 metres (320650 feet) in diameter. The cloud, on coming in contact with an ignition source (probably a furnace at a

    nearby hydrogen production plant) exploded, completely destroying the plant. Around 1,800 buildings within a mile radius of the site were damaged.

    II.

    Problem Statement

    The explosion killed twenty eight workers and thirty six suffered were injured. The number of casualties would have been more if the incident happened on a weekday, as the main office block was not occupied. Offsite consequences resulted in fifty three reported injuries. Property in the surrounding area was damaged to a varying degree.

    Prior to the explosion, on 27 March 1974, it was discovered that a vertical crack in reactor No.5 was leaking cyclohexane. The plant was subsequently shutdown for an investigation. The investigation that followed identified a serious problem with the reactor and the decision was taken to remove it and install a bypass assembly to connect reactors No.4 and No.6 so that the plant could continue production. During the late afternoon on 1 June 1974 a 20 inch bypass system ruptured, which may have been caused by a fire on a nearby 8 inch pipe. This resulted in the escape of a large quantity of cyclohexane. The cyclohexane formed a flammable mixture and subsequently found a source of ignition. At about 16:53 hours there was a massive vapour cloud explosion which caused extensive damage and started numerous fires on the site. Eighteen fatalities occurred in the control room as a result of the windows shattering and the collapse of the roof. No one escaped from the control room. The fires burned for several days and after ten days those that still raged were hampering the rescue work. The following must be determined for this study: 1. The factors that caused the explosion 2. The persons responsible for the explosion 3. The actions done the UK government III. Analysis of the Study The Flixborough works of Nypro (UK) Ltd were virtually demolished by an explosion of warlike dimensions on the afternoon of Saturday 1 June 1974. The explosion was estimated to be equivalent to the force arising from 15 45 tons TNT. This was due to ignition of a vapor cloud which is formed when pressurized cyclohexane escaped from a reactor, vaporized and ignited. Twenty eight died and thirty six were injured. If the explosion happened during weekdays there would have been more casualties.

    The plant modifications occurred without a full assessment of the potential consequences. Only limited calculations were undertaken on the integrity of the bypass line. No calculations were undertaken for the dog legged shape line or for the bellows. No drawing of the proposed modification was produced. No pressure testing was carried out on the installed pipe work modification. Those concerned with the design, construction and layout of the plant did not consider the potential for the major disaster happening instantaneously. The incident happened during start up when critical decisions were made under operational stress. In particular the storage of the nitrogen for inerting would tend to inhibit the venting of off gas as a method of pressure control/reduction. The cost of the disaster is estimated to have been in the order of 27 million for damage to the factory and 1.6 million for the repair of shops and houses, at 1975 prices. IV. Discussions of the Solutions The following alternative solutions were drawn: The failed reactor must be replaced with the best and suitable reactor that can withstand the pressure given by the reactors. V. Tests must be done to ensure the efficiency of the replaced reactor. Maintenance reactors and in the plant as whole must be done always

    Recommendations The following recommendations were made: Maintenance of the plant and reactors should be done regularly Any failure in the plant or reactors must be reported as early as possible to prevent any accidents accompanied by this failures The positioning of the occupied buildings must taken into consideration

    The engineers should be more broadly based academically and practically so that they had more knowledge of other branches of engineering

    The Process Hazards Analysis should be carried out on any modified system

    References: http://www.hse.gov.uk http://suite101.com http://en.wikipedia.org

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