Indonesia Packet Population PDF
Indonesia Packet Population PDF
Indonesia Packet Population PDF
Development
Agenda
Indonesian Perspectives
Jere. R. Behrman
Jere Behrman (Ph.D. Economics, MIT, 1966) is the WR Kenan, Jr. Professor of Economics and Sociology and
Population Studies Center Research Associate at the University of Pennsylvania. His research is in empirical
micro economics, economic development, early childhood development, labor economics, human resources
(education, training, health, nutrition), economic demography, household behaviors, life-cycle and
intergenerational relations and policy evaluation. He has published over 370 professional articles (primarily
in leading general and field economic journals, also in leading demographic, sociology, nutritional and
biomedical journals) and 34 books
Dwini Arianto
Dwini Arianto, is Vice Director of the Indonesia Demographic Institute. The Demographic Institute deals with
issues of demography, population and development. It is a semi-autonomous organization with two main
objectives: (i) to promote awareness among planners, policy makers, program implementers, researchers,
business people, scholars, practitioners and people at large of demographic change and variables that impact
upon national development; (ii) to promote cooperation with other population studies centers in order to
develop a stronger and more qualified research culture in the demographic field. Its major activities
include: (1) Research and consultancy on population dynamics, (2) Training in demography and populationrelated matters and (3) Dissemination of information on population-related issues.
Table of Contents
Summary: White Paper Report by Hans-Peter Kohler & Jere R. Behrman .................................. 1
White Paper Report by Hans-Peter Kohler & Jere R. Behrman ................................................... 3
Presentation: Indonesia Demographic Institute ..................................................................... 14
thinly and there are local workers who may lose out, so it is important that migration is well managed to
allow adjustment. The overall benefits are still clear, however, and reducing barriers to migration is a target
which would be highly relevant for Indonesia; the benefit for every thousand rupiah spent is likely to be
around 45,000 IDR.
There are other inescapable trends which have to be recognised and made the most of. Towns and cities will
continue to grow rapidly in low- and middle-income countries. This can create problems, but there are also
opportunities for higher productivity and better healthcare and schooling, so it is important for urbanisation
to be properly managed to maximise the gains. Similarly, the inevitable aging of the population calls for
policies which improve both health and lengthen working lives.
Indonesias population will continue to grow for the next few decades but, properly managed, this can create
both economic growth and better welfare.
Make family planning available to everyone, including achieving universal access to sexual and
reproductive health (SRH) services by 2030, and eliminating unmet need for modern contraception by
2040.
Reducing of barriers to migration, within low- and middle-income countries, as well as between lowand middle-income countries and high-income countries.
Benefit-cost ratios for expanding family planning are likely to be very high, between 20-30 for Indonesia and
possibly larger than 90 in high-fertility countries. The benefit-cost ratios for reducing barriers to migration are
also high though difficult to calculate specifically for Indonesia, broader studies suggest the benefit for every
dollar (or rupiah) spent is around 45. Both of these policy priorities and their relevance for contemporary
Indonesia are discussed below. In addition, our analyses for the Copenhagen Consensus project indicate several
priorities with probably high, but difficult to quantify, benefit-cost ratios. These include the elimination of agebased eligibility criteria for retirement, and interventions facilitating more efficient and more equitable
inevitable urbanization.
Our analyses of Population and Demography also emphasize that population quality (or human capital),
including aspects such as health and education, is an important further aspect of population dynamics that is
essential for addressing the challenges of future population changes, for promoting gender equality and human
rights, and for realizing the benefits of population dynamics for social, economic and environmental
development. Population quality therefore needs to be seen as an inherent component of population
dynamics, and in some areasfor instance policies addressing population agingpopulation quality-related
policies to increase life-long learning and adaptability and to mitigate impacts of chronic diseases are primary
3
policies. Because aspects of population quality are discussed in other Copenhagen Consensus papers, the
discussion here focuses primarily on population quantity, including aspects such population growth, population
age structure, migration and urbanization.
Population trends in Indonesia
Indonesia, with a current population of 241 million persons, is an important example for illustrating the
Copenhagen Consensus Centers assessment of high-priority policy areas in the area of demography and
population dynamics.3 Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world. It is the eighth country in
terms of adding most people to the global population by 2050, the fourth outside of Africa (after India,
Pakistan, USA), adding a total of more than 66 million. Much of this future growth will be concentrated in urban
areas, the infrastructure and social services of which are already struggling due to rapid urbanization in recent
decades. A substantial upsurge in the population, especially among the urban poor, would compound these
problems.
Part of the population growth until 2050 might be attributed to Indonesias stalled fertility decline, that is, the
fact that the number of children born per woman stopped declining in the late-1990s. Fertility has remained
above replacement level, at levels possibly as high as 2.6 children per woman.4 Interestingly, however, even
under the assumption that fertility levels would instantly drop to replacement fertility (and remain at
replacement until 2050), Indonesia would add about 70 millionjust about the same as under the current UN
medium fertility projectionto the global population. How is this possible?
Figure 1 shows Indonesias current and projected 2050 population pyramids, and Figure 2 shows the total
population growth compared to both global and South-Eastern Asias population growth,5 and the trend in
Indonesias total fertility rate (TFR, a measure of the total number of children born to a woman during her lifetime). Indonesias total, young and old-age dependency ratios are plotted in Figure 3. As many other countries
in the region, the next decades will bring about a transformation of Indonesias population with important
implications for human and economic development. Life expectancy is likely to continue its fairly rapid
increase: from 58.6 in 1980, to currently 71.2, and a predicted 77.4 by 2050. The population age structure will
shift from a still relatively young population pyramid to one that is characterized by significant population
aging, with the share of the population above age 65 increasing from currently 5.4% to 16%, while the share of
the population below age 15 will decrease from 28% to 19%. But clearly, even by 2050, Indonesia will not yet
have an old population age structure such as those that are expected by 2050 for many developed countries
or even Asian neighbors such China.
Population growth will slow; having peaked near 2.6% per year when Indonesias population was around 110
million in the late 1960s, it is currently estimated to be around 1.1% and it is projected to decline to 0.2% by
2050 when the population is expected to reach 321 million. By then, it will have added an extra 26% to its
current population, which, in relative terms, is less than the world population growth between now and 2050
but slightly more than South-Eastern Asias population growth in the same time period. An important factor
contributing to this slowing of population growth is the decline in the TFR, which dropped from 5.5 in 1970 to
about 2.32.6 in 201015, a drop of about 3 children per woman.6 At the same time, investments in children
increased, as is illustrated by an increase in the secondary school enrollment rate from less than 20% to 76%
during this time period. But TFR has remained relatively constant since the late-1990s, and there is even
somewhat of a controversy about how low (or not) the current TFR in Indonesia actually is. The United Nations
estimates it to be around 2.3, while recent surveys suggest a level near 2.6 (Figure 2). The latter level is about
1/2 child per woman above the replacement level, and if correct, it would mean that the TFR has been
unchanged since 2002. Nevertheless, the fact that Indonesias population growth by 2050 would be
approximately equal if fertility instantly dropped to replacement level indicates that this growth is driven by
population momentum, that is, the tendency for a population to continue to grow even with replacement-level
fertility because of a relatively large number of individuals at childbearing years.
These broad trends in population dynamics place in the center cell of the taxonomy of population quantity and
quality in Figure 4: while Indonesia has almost completed the fertility transition, and rapid population growth
has thus disappeared, it still has only moderately-high levels of human capital and lacks behind some other
countries in Latin America and some South-East Asian countries with regard to both fertility declines and
human capital increases.
The current and future challenge for Indonesia is to reap the benefits of the demographic dividend,7 that is, the
process by which a favorable age structure with a large fraction of the population in working ages can facilitate
rapid economic development. Whether Indonesia can do so effectively will depend on both population
dynamics and changes in population quality during the next decades.
directly attributed to this program remains controversial, but its key role in facilitating Indonesias path towards
lower fertility is uncontested.8 The practice of contraception during this program became so well-ingrained
that even the fall of family incomes and rising costs of contraception during the 1998 financial crisis only had a
minimal effect on contraceptive use. It seems, contraceptive users in Indonesia valued family planning so much
that these two challenges did not deter them from practicing contraception.9
And yet, progress in reducing fertility has stalled. By 2014, the country had aimed to reach a total fertility rate
of 2.1; however, based on recent DHS survey estimates, the TFR had essentially remained where it was early
in this decade: at 2.6. The above-cited UN population forecasts until 2050 assume that the TFR drops below
2.1 by 202530, and remains below-replacement fertility thereafter. But why should a decline in TFR resume
now, after 10 years or stalling? There is clearly some reason to be skeptical, and some observers have
characterized Indonesias fertility as being stubbornly high. If TFR levels would for instance remain until 2050
constant at 2.5 children per woman, Indonesias population would grow significantly faster and the total and
young-age dependency ratiosthe declines of which are critical for reaping the benefits of the demographic
dividendwould remain substantially higher (dotted lines in Figures 1 and 3). Others, however, think these
concerns about high fertility in Indonesia are exaggerated, in part due to uncertainty about the accuracy of
recent fertility estimates and in part due to concerns that a rapid decline of fertility in the next decades may
exacerbate population aging.10 Nevertheless, in April last year, Health Minister Nafsiah Mboi labelled
Indonesias family planning programs a failure, citing their inability to control the countrys fertility rate. And
progress in other SRH indicators has been slow as well. Infant mortality is around 25 per 1,000 live births, as
compared to 2 for Singapore and 7 in Malaysia. Indonesia also has one of the highest maternal mortality ratios
in Southeast Asia, with an estimated 190 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, as compared to 6 deaths for
every 100,000 live births in Singapore and 29 in Malaysia.11 The total unmet need for family planning services
in Indonesia is 11%, and about 84% of contraceptive demands are satisfied (80% for modern methods).12
Unmet need is substantially higher, around 1315% for less educated and poor individuals, and for women at
the end of their childbearing.13
In response to these trends, Indonesia is reviving its family planning program. A recent Lancet article for
instance stated:14 In the 1970s, dua anak cukup (two children are enough) became more than a fertility
campaignit was a rallying cry for the country. [...] When other low-income countries [now] look to improve
their family planning schemes, the Indonesian model often tops the list. And so, to lower fertility rates, Indonesia
need look no further than within its borders. Today, after a two-decade hiatus, dua anak cukup commercials
have returned to the air. Jakarta is thus hoping to build on its past success, both in terms of reducing fertility
but also in terms of creating the individual, social and economic benefits that would arguable stem from such
reduced fertility. The focus of this renewed effort towards promoting family planning will be in rural areas,
where the rate of 1519 year olds having children is more than double that in urban areas, and it will
particularly encourage the use of long-term contraceptive methods.
Is this effort likely to be effective, and what are the likely benefit-cost ratios one could possibly hope to attain
with such investments in family planning programs in Indonesia?
It would be wrong to evaluate family planning programs primarily with respect to population growth. Broader
human-rights-based and gender-responsive perspectives are required. The UN Secretary General, for example,
highlighted that protecting and fulfilling the human rights of young people and investing in their quality
education, effective livelihood skills, access to sexual and reproductive health services and information,
including comprehensive sexuality education, as well as employment opportunities, are necessary for the
development of their resilience and create the conditions under which they can achieve their full potential.15
Expanding access to family planning is an important component of such a broad human-rights-based and
gender-responsive policy agenda. Specifically, a recent literature emphasized that family planning programs
besides reducing fertility and, related, maternal and child mortalityare likely to result in higher levels of
female education, improvements in womens general health, increases in female labor force participation and
earnings, increased child health (up and beyond the effect on reducing child mortality) and increased child
human capital.16 And in context like Indonesia, where fertility has already declined substantially from its peak,
these benefits in terms of childrens and womens well-being are likely to be the dominant ones. Much less
important is the effect on population growth, which in countries like Indonesia is to a substantial extent driven
by population momentum.
Our analyses for the Copenhagen Consensus project suggest benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) in excess of 90 for family
planning programs in high fertility countries, about one third of which can be attributed to reduced infant and
maternal mortality and two thirds to increased income growth resulting from the demographic dividend.
Most of these high-fertility countries to which this estimate applies are located in sub-Saharan Africa, have
higher levels of unmet need for family planning, have higher levels of maternal and infant mortality, and
experience much more rapid population growth than Indonesia. In high fertility countries, these high BCRs
occur because reduced population growth as a result of expanded family planning programs can help countries
to benefit from the demographic dividend. But in terms of age structure, Indonesiaalong with other countries
in the regionis already relatively well-positioned (Figure 3), and is poised to benefit further from a declining
total dependency ratio (and thus increasing the share of the population in working ages) if its fertility trends
follow the trajectory assumed under the UN median forecast (Figure 2). If fertility levels were to remain
constant at around 2.5 children per women, these potential benefits from a demographic dividend would be
substantially reduced (dotted lines in Figure 3).
Focusing on the benefits in terms of reduced maternal and infant mortality alone, earlier Copenhagen
Consensus analyses suggested benefits-cost ratios of 30 or higher. Yet, the information base on which these
estimates were derived had higher levels of infant and maternal mortality, and presumably lower costs of
operating a family planning programs. USAID estimated the costs of expanding family planning to gradually
eliminating unmet need over a 5-year horizon to be around US$67 million.17 As a result of reduced population
growth, USAID estimates that Indonesia would benefit through reduced required spending on education, water
and sanitation, and maternal/child health by about US$554 million, outweighing the costs by a factor of 8:1
(although these analyses assume that investments in child quality do not increase as a result of reduced
fertility, which is contrary to the usually observed pattern). Subject to caveats about causality, the analyses
also claim that this expansion of family planning could be expected to avert around 5,400 maternal deaths and
more than 336,000 child deaths over a 5-year period. Taken at face value, and evaluating lives according to the
Copenhagen Consensus Center guidelines, this investment of $67 million would result in an exceptionally high
benefit-cost ratio. But it seems likely that these analyses substantially overestimate the benefits and/or
underestimate the costs of the expansion of the family planning program to eliminate unmet need.
A more cautious back-of-the-envelope calculation of the benefit-cost ratio is based on the costs of
eliminating unmet need provided by the Guttmacher Institute.18 These calculations suggest that the benefitcost ratios of expanding family planning are around 2030, attributable to reduced infant and maternal
mortality. This estimate is consistent with earlier analyses conducted as part of the Copenhagen Consensus
project on this topic (see above). This does not yet account for potential additional benefits resulting from the
demographic dividend, which would be reinforced by declining fertility.
In summary, the Copenhagen Consensus analyses related to Population and Demography suggest that, even in
countries such as Indonesia that have experienced large fertility declines and are in the center of the population
quality-quantity taxonomy in Figure 4, the BCRs associated with the expansion (or revival, as in the case of
Indonesia) of family planning programs can be substantial and far above the break-even point of one.
Urbanization
The global population will continue to rapidly urbanize during the next decades, with most rapid urbanization
occurring in low- and middle-income countries.19 Indonesia will be no exception to this trend. The proportion
of the population that is urban has more than doubled in the last three decades, standing now at 54%, and is
expected to increase further to 72% by 2050. Existing and possibly new megacitiesthat is, cities like Jakarta
with more than 10 million peoplewill absorb a substantial fraction of this urban population growth.
While clearly associated with many problemsfor instance overcrowding, local pollution, concentrated
povertyurbanization has potentially important positive implications for development, including through
higher wages due to higher productivity in urban industries/services, better schooling and health services,
greater opportunities for political participation, reduced environmental impact of population, and freedom
from traditional norms, all of which are pull factors for urbanization.
The challenge for the Post-2015 Development Agenda will be to implement policies that mitigate the
downsides of urbanization while enhancing its benefits for individuals and the society. The Copenhagen
Consensus Center paper on Population and Demography did not succeed in estimating global benefit-cost
ratios for changes to promote better urbanization, as conditions among countries for what are basically
national and subnational policies and regulations vary enormously. But even for a specific context such as
Indonesia, such calculations are not easily possible. Nevertheless, even in the absence of such detailed benefitcost calculations, it is likely that interventions to facilitate successful urbanization have high benefit-cost
ratios.
10
Population Aging
The consequences of population aging will increasingly become a policy concern for Indonesia. By 2050, the
proportion of the population aged 65 and over will have increased from currently 5.4% to 16%, and the median
age will rise from 28 to 38 years (Figure 1). There are no viable policy options that can change the basic
tendency of countries, including Indonesia, to grow considerably older during the next decades. In light of rapid
growth of elderly populations, the Copenhagen Consensus Center paper on Population and Demography
therefore emphasized the need to accommodate populations aging in social, economic and environmental
development, and creating institutional environments where possible negative consequences of population
aging are lessened. This, however, poses challenges as some countries may get old before they get rich.
Population aging in middle-income countries such as Indonesia potentially brings two important national goals
into conflict: (1) developing economic systems that will provide economic security to the growing number of
old people, and (2) sustaining strong economic growth.20 Achieving these two goals will require new policies,
most importantly policies that encourage saving, and investment in health and education to improve
productivity. In contrast to European and many Latin American countries, however, policymakers in many Asian
countriesincluding Indonesiahave one important advantage. Social-security systems in the region tend to
be relatively modest. The specific high-priority policy emphasized in our analyses for the Copenhagen
Consensus, namely eliminating age-based eligibility criteria for retirements in public pension systems, is less
important in Indonesia as compared to European or Latin American countries. Instead, other policies are likely
to be more promising. For example: (1) untying social safety nets and health and pension systems from formal
labor market participation, to reduce distortions and benefit the poorer members of society, who tend to work
in informal employment or home production that is not covered by formal sector benefits; (2) renewing efforts
to assess formal and informal means of making education over the life cycle more effective as social returns to
more general education (learning how to learn) and to education over the life cycle are likely to increase in an
aging world; and (3) promoting investments in adult health and human capital, especially in contexts where
healthy aging can facilitate higher labor force participation and productivity at older ages.
11
Notes
1UNFPA,
UNDESA, UN-HABITAT, IOM (2013). Population Dynamics in the Post-2015 Development Agenda:
Report of the Global Thematic Consultation on Population Dynamics. United Nations. URL
http://www.worldwewant2015.org/file/313464/download/340868.
2
Kohler, H. P. and Behrman, J. R. (2014). Population and demography: Benefits and costs of the population
and demography targets for the post-2015 development agenda. Copenhagen Consensus Project: Post-2015
Consensus, URL http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/populationanddemography.
3
Population trends and indicators reported here are obtained from UN Population Division (2012a). World
Population Prospects, the 2012 revision: Standard (median) forecasts. United Nations, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, URL http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/. In addition, because of
the likely higher accuracy for recent years, estimates of the total fertility rate are obtained from Indonesia
DHS (2013). Indonesia Demographic and Health Survey 2012: Preliminary Report. Jakarta, Indonesia and
Calverton, Maryland: Statistics Indonesia, National Population and Family Planning Board, Ministry of Health
and Measure DHS.
4There
is some concern that this DHS-based fertility estimate is biased upward; see McDonald, P. (2014). The
demography of Indonesia in comparative perspective. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 50(1): 2952.
doi: 10.1080/00074918.2014.896236
5South-Eastern
Asian countries include, besides Indonesia, also Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao Peoples
Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam.
6Note
that the recent Indonesia DHS estimates the TFR for 2012 as 2.6, 11% higher than the UN estimate of
2.35 for the period 2010-15; moreover, the DHS estimates suggest that there has been no change in TFR
across three surveys during since 200203 to 2012.
7Bloom,
D. E., Canning, D. and Sevilla, J. (2002). The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the
Economic Consequences of Population Change. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
8Ezeh,
A. C., Bongaarts, J. and Mberu, B. (2012). Global population trends and policy options. Lancet
380(9837): 142148. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(12)60696-5.
9McKelvey,
C., Thomas, D. and Frankenberg, E. (2012). Fertility regulation in an economic crisis. Economic
Developmemt and Cultural Change 61(1): 738. doi: 10.1086/666950.
10McDonald,
12Unmet
need is a concept used by demographers to measure the number or proportion of women who are
fecund and sexually active, but are not using any method of contraception despite the fact that they report
not wanting any more children or wanting to delay the next child.
13Indonesia
DHS (2013). Indonesia Demographic and Health Survey 2012: Preliminary Report. Jakarta,
Indonesia and Calverton, Maryland: Statistics Indonesia, National Population and Family Planning Board,
Ministry of Health and Measure DHS.
14Seiff,
A. (2014). Indonesia to revive national family planning programme. The Lancet 383(9918): 683. doi:
10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60244-0. URL http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS01406736(14)60244-0/abstract.
15UNFPA
(2014). ICPD Beyond 2014 Global Report. New York, NY: United Nations. URL
http://www.unfpa.org/public/home/sitemap/ICPDReport.
12
16
Kohler, H.-P. (2013). Population growth. In: Lomborg, B. (ed.), Global Problems, Smart Solutions: Costs and
Benefits, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 510580. Working paper version available at
http://repository.upenn.edu/pscworkingpapers/34. Miller, G. and Singer Babiarz, K. (2014). Family planning:
Program effects. NBER Working Paper #20586. doi: 10.3386/w20586.
17
USAID Health Policy Initiative (2009). Achieving the MDGs in Indonesia: The contribution of family planning.
USAID Health Policy Initiative, URL
http://www.healthpolicyinitiative.com/Publications/Documents/2461MDGIndonesiafinal.pdf
18
Singh, S., Darroch, J., Ashford, L. and Vlassoff, M. (2010). Adding it up: The costs and benefits of investing in
family planning and maternal and newborn health. Guttmacher Institute Report, URL
http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/28189
19UN
Population Division (2012b). World urbanization prospects: The 2011 revision. Population Division,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York.
20Mason,
A. and Lee, S. H. (2011). Population aging and economic progress in asia: A bumpy road ahead?
AsiaPacific Issues 99.
13
Demographic Issues
Post-2015 Five Demographic Issues in
Indonesia:
continuing large number of population with a bulk
of productive age people
emerging ageing population
urbanization
complex population mobility
High number of maternal deaths
A Democratizing Era
Indonesian Population Dynamics
since 1998 has been occurring in the
context of Democratization and
Decentralization
AN EVER
LARGER
GIANT
POPULATION
50
Expecting about
million new comers, they are
the upcoming young people, leading to greater
concerns related to sexual and reproductive health
and rights
Indonesia in 2010
64M
Note:
* CPR: Contraceptive Prevalence Rate
* TFR: Total Fertility Rate
Continuation of an aggressive
promotion of fertility reduction is
unjustified.
Half of currently married women want
no more children.
Pay attention to regional variation.
Among those who intend to have more
children, half want to delay the next
birth for at least 2 years.
This means that the demand for
contraceptive is relatively high.
Unfortunately, they often face
obstacles in gaining access to methods
of birth control appropriate to their
personal preferences and needs. As a
result, the need is significantly unmet
as the supply cannot meet the
demand.
6
Pembangunan Kebersamaan
Keadilan Pemerataan
Kesejahteraan
Number
Structure
Distribution
Quality Aspects
Social
Economy
Culture
Environment
Politic
Security
Others
Growth
Component
Fertility
Mortality
Migration
11
TFR <2.1
TFR 2.1-2.5
TFR 2.6-2.9
TFR above 3
Yogyakarta, Lowest
TFR of 2.1
East Java
Intermediate 30-100
Papua, 112
Surplus of Women
Surplus of Men
Sex ratio above 110
14
100%
50-99%
25-49%
< 25%
16
West Papua
6500
WORLD
6000
1.16
5500
5000
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
WORLD
(Thousand)
1950
2.532.229
1960
3.038.413
1970
3.696.186
AFRICA
ASIA
EUROPE
2.30
1.08
0.20
1.15
NORTHERN AMERICA
OCEANIA
0.91
1.75
1980
4.453.007
1990
5.306.425
2000
6.122.770
2010
6.895.889
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011). World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, CD-ROM Edition.
1950
1960
1970
More developed
1980
1990
2000
0.41
1.18
2.21
2010
Least developed
Less developed
(Thousand)
More developed
Less developed
Least developed
1950
811.187
1.524.954
196.088
1960
913.330
1.881.432
243.650
1970
1.006.421
2.377.735
312.030
1980
1.081.094
2.978.145
393.768
1990
1.144.404
3.651.914
510.107
2000
1.188.809
4.271.965
661.996
2010
1.235.900
4.827.660
832.330
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011). World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, CD-ROM Edition.
3500
3000
AFRICA
ASIA
EUROPE
2500
2000
2.30
1.08
0.20
1500
1000
NORTHERN AMERICA
OCEANIA
500
0
1950
AFRICA
(Thousand)
AMERICA
EUROPE
ASIA
AFRICA
OCEANIA
1960
1970
ASIA
1950
338.983
547.287
1.403.389
229.895
12.675
1980
EUROPE
1990
2000
OCEANIA
1960
424.376
603.854
1.707.682
286.729
15.773
0.91
1.75
2010
AMERIKA
1970
517.662
655.879
2.134.993
368.148
19.506
1980
616.780
692.869
2.637.586
482.803
22.970
1990
724.193
720.497
3.199.481
635.287
26.967
2000
834.718
726.777
3.719.044
811.101
31.130
2010
934.611
738.199
4.164.252
1.022.234
36.593
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011). World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, CD-ROM Edition.
Growth Rate
2,32 persen
20
19
18
17
16
No
Some Complete Some
education primary primary secondary
Juta
400
Replacement
300
Sedang
200
Rendah
100
0
1950
2000
2050
Sonny Harry B Harmadi
2100
2150
Permasalahan Kuantitas
Lingkungan:
Kesehatan:
Pemerintah:
Politik:
Umur
0 - 14
15 - 64
> 64
DR
2014
27.6
67.2
5.3
48.9
2015
27.3
67.3
5.4
48.6
2016
27.1
67.4
5.5
48.4
2017
26.8
67.5
5.6
48.1
2018
26.6
67.6
5.8
47.9
2019
26.3
67.7
6.0
47.8
2020
26.1
67.7
6.2
47.7
Umur
0 - 14
15 - 64
> 64
DR
2021
25.8
67.8
6.4
47.6
2022
25.5
67.8
6.7
47.5
2023
25.2
67.8
6.9
47.4
2024
24.9
67.9
7.2
47.3
2025
24.6
67.9
7.5
47.2
2026
24.2
68.0
8.1
47.0
2027
23.9
68.0
8.1
47.0
Umur
0 - 14
15 - 64
> 64
DR
2028
23.5
68.1
8.4
46.9
2029
2030
2031
23.2
22.9
22.6
68.1
68.1
68.1
8.7
9.0
9.3
Sonny Harry B Harmadi
46.9
46.9
46.9
2032
22.3
68.0
9.6
47.0
2033
22.0
68.0
10.0
47.0
2034
21.8
68.0
10.3
47.2
Prasyarat:
Kualitas penduduk
Ketersediaan
lapangan kerja
berkualitas
Akses terhadap
tabungan
Tidak ada
diskriminasi pekerja
perempuan
Program KB
mencapai targetnya
PERSEBARAN PENDUDUK
7%
7%
7%
4%
69%
7%
14%
8%
7%
4%
65%
7%
7%
4%
64%
7%
5%
60%
7%
7%
5%
60%
7%
5%
62%
16%
18%
19%
8%
6%
58%
20%
20%
21%
7%
1930
1961
1971
1980
1990
2000
2010
Sumatera
Jawa & Madura
Kalimantan
Sulawesi
Lainnya
Sonny Harry B Harmadi
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
Kepri
Kaltim
Banten
Sulut
Sumbar
Malut
Sumsel
Maluku
Sumut
Papua barat
Kalsel
Jabar
Riau
Bali
Sulsel
Jambi
Sultra
Bengkulu
Gorontalo
Kalbar
Babel
NAD
Lampung
Jatim
Sulteng
NTB
DIY
Kalteng
Papua
Jateng
NTT
Penduduk
Wilayah
Sumber:
Data
Diolah
dari BPS, 2011
Sonny
Harry
B Harmadi
60
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
2003
2009
2010
2011
2012
2003
2009
2010
2011
2012
< SD
54.3
50.1
48.8
48.3
47.2
< SD
55.06
50.4
48.64
47.77
47.36
SLTP
23.1
21.9
22.3
22.3
22.2
SLTP
20.47
18.59
19.13
19.29
18.57
13.89
14.98
15.50
15.59
16.17
SMA
13.9
14.8
15.3
14.9
15.9
SMA
SMK
5.2
7.3
7.4
7.9
7.8
SMK
6.06
8.48
8.64
9.05
8.93
D1-D3
1.6
2.3
2.4
2.6
2.2
D1-D3
1.90
2.84
2.98
3.14
2.69
Univ
2.0
3.6
3.9
4.0
4.7
Univ
2.62
4.71
5.11
5.16
6.28
11.5
11.2
11.0
11.7
9.8
9.6
9.0
8.9
8.3
8.6
8.2
7.5
7.3
0%
11.9
20%
Tertiary School
14.9
15.0
Not/Yet School
32.1
31.9
33.2
29.3
29.1
30.4
31.0
29.7
33.0
32.3
32.6
19.5
20.1
19.9
20.2
20.6
17.1
17.5
17.0
16.3
18.2
19.9
15.1
14.2
14.5
16.4
19.0
19.8
60%
14.4
15.0
15.2
15.3
15.7
33.1
32.7
33.2
33.4
40%
16.2
17.5
18.0
18.7
19.5
19.5
20.9
31.7
70%
12.7
10%
13.6
30%
23.0
50%
32.8
80%
14.5
22.3
29.7
28.5
27.5
26.7
25.8
24.4
23.7
22.4
22.4
20.7
21.1
20.5
19.6
19.0
17.7
16.6
16.5
90%
13.8
% Total 15>
100%
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Jawa
Kalimantan Sulawesi
Pertanian
39.3
45.5
38.5
40.0
35.6
41.7
42.1
Pertambangan
34.3
39.5
32.6
34.3
35.8
36.1
35.8
Industri
34.5
34.5
36.0
37.1
37.6
37.5
34.8
LGA
36.1
36.5
35.7
36.2
36.5
36.5
36.4
Konstruksi
35.9
37.9
35.8
35.3
37.4
36.8
37.2
PHR
36.8
38.3
35.9
37.4
37.1
37.1
37.8
Transkom
36.0
37.2
35.8
34.0
33.4
33.7
36.4
Keuangan
34.2
35.0
32.9
33.3
34.1
33.7
34.7
Jasa
36.8
38.3
36.8
36.8
36.6
37.0
37.7
2000
-11,4
-4,4
-6,9
20,6
2,3
0,2
4,8
0,5
-0,1
-6,3
3,7
-7,5
4,8
-3,0
10,6
Tahun
2010
-11,3
-4,4
-7,1
19,0
2,3
0,3
4,7
0,8
0,1
-7,9
3,7
-7,1
3,4
-2,6
10,6
2025
-10,9
-4,0
-6,5
17,9
2,1
0,5
4,5
0,7
0,5
-7,9
3,5
-6,4
2,9
-2,1
10,1
Provinsi
Bali
Nusa Tenggara Barat
Nusa Tenggara Timur
Kalimantan Barat
Kalimantan Tengah
Kalimantan Selatan
Kalimantan Timur
Sulawesi Utara
Sulawesi Tengah
Sulawesi Selatan
Sulawesi Tenggara
Gorontalo
Maluku
Maluku Utara
Papua
2000
2,6
0,3
-1,7
0,2
10,3
2,1
9,1
1,4
4,4
-3,3
7,4
-6,3
-0,2
-0,1
3,9
Tahun
2010
2,3
0,3
-1,8
0,2
10,3
2,0
8,7
1,5
4,4
-3,4
7,6
-6,2
-0,2
-0,1
3,9
2025
2,1
0,4
-1,7
0,1
9,8
1,8
8,0
1,5
4,3
-3,2
7,7
-5,9
-0,2
-0,1
3,5
DKI Jakarta
Banten dan
Jawa Barat
Riau
Kalteng,
Kaltim
Papua
Sulteng, Sultra
Peningkatan
Urbanisasi
PERSEBARAN PENDUDUK
7%
7%
7%
4%
69%
7%
14%
8%
7%
4%
65%
7%
7%
4%
64%
7%
5%
60%
7%
7%
5%
60%
7%
5%
62%
16%
18%
19%
8%
6%
58%
20%
20%
21%
7%
1930
1961
1971
1980
1990
2000
2010
Sumatera
Jawa & Madura
Kalimantan
Sulawesi
Lainnya
UU 23/2006
TERTIB
2
DATABASE
KEPENDUDUKAN
Terbangunnya Database
Kependudukan yang
Akurat ditingkat
Kab/Kota, Prov & Pusat
Database Kependudukan
Kab/Kota tersambung
(online) dengan Prov &
Pusat menggunakan SIAK
Database Kependudukan
Kemendagri & Daerah
Tersambung dengan
Instansi Pengguna
PENERBITAN NIK
DOKUMEN
KEPENDUDUKAN
(KK, KTP, AKTA CAPIL, DLL)
Alternatif Solusi
Solusi masalah kuantitas penduduk
Solusi masalah kualitas penduduk
Solusi masalah mobilitas penduduk
Thank You
49