Good Practice Guidlines

TO BE UPDATED TO
REFLECT LATEST
LEGISLATIVE
CHANGES
GOOD PRACTICE
GUIDELINES
Health and Safety at

Opencast Mines, Alluvial
Mines and Quarries
November 2015
GOOD PRACTICE GUIDELINES // HEALTH AND SAFETY AT OPENCAST MINES, ALLUVIAL MINES AND QUARRIES
These good practice guidelines give

practical advice on health and safety
controls measures at opencast
mines, alluvial mines and quarries.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
WorkSafe NewZealand would like to thank the Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety
(CCOHS), Confederation of UK Coal Producers (Coalpro), UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), USA Mine
Safety and Health Association (MSHA), NSW Trade and Investment, Queensland Department of Mines and
Energy, Western Australia Department of Mines and Petroleum and WorkSafe Victoria for letting us use
content and images from their publications.
WorkSafe would like to thank the following companies for allowing WorkSafe representatives to visit their
sites and let us use photographs to illustrate good practice:
Glencoal Energy, Fulton Hogan Ltd Miners Road Quarry, Isaac Construction Company Ltd, Hinuera Natural
Stone, Whitehall Quarry
WorkSafe would like to thank the Aggregate and Quarry Association of NewZealand (AQA), the
Amalgamated Engineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union Inc. (EPMU), the Institute of Quarrying
NewZealand (IoQNZ), the MinEx Health and Safety Council Inc. (MinEx) and the Northern Amalgamated
Workers Union (AWUNZ) for their support with industry and stakeholder consultation.
HEALTH AND SAFETY AT

OPENCAST MINES, ALLUVIAL
MINES AND QUARRIES
KEY POINTS:
Have a well-planned, designed and maintained
work site, with a suitable hazard management
system
All workers must be trained and competent
for the work they do, including the required
certification
Notify the site location and nature as well
as the managers details to WorkSafe
Use in guard nip guarding for conveyors,
as well as idler nip guards
Where end tipping, ensure there is a safe
tipping procedure and the tip has been
designed with a Factor of Safety of at least 1.2
Provide separate roads for light and heavy
vehicles, where practicable. Otherwise, ensure
they are segregated
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART A
01
02
10
INTRODUCTION 11
1.1
How to use this guidance
1.2
Background 12
1.3
Purpose 12
1.4
Scope and application
1.5
Interpretation 15
1.6
Safety-critical roles
HAZARD MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
13
16
17
2.1

Applicable legislation: hazard management in the

HSE Act and the Regulations
18
2.2
The health and safety management system (HSMS)
19
2.3
Identifying hazards and analysing risk
19
2.4
Risk assessment
2.5
Principal hazard management plans and principal control plans
21
2.6
Hazard control
22
2.7
Hazard monitoring
23
2.8
Responding to hazard reports
24
2.9
Accident recording, notification and investigation
24
2.10 Hazardous substances
PART B
03
12
20
26
28
PLANNING FOR EXCAVATION
29
3.1
Terminology 30
3.2
Appraisal of ground or strata instability principal hazard
3.3
Ground or strata instability principal hazard management plan (PHMP)
34
3.4
Geotechnical assessment
35
3.5
Slope design
36
3.6
Ground support and reinforcement systems
40
31
04
05
PLANNING FOR TIPS, PONDS, VOIDS AND DAMS

4.1
Appraisal of tips, ponds and voids principal hazard
43
4.2
Tips, ponds and voids principal hazard management plan (PHMP)
45
4.3
Planning and design criteria for tips
46
4.4
Planning and design criteria for ponds or dams
47
4.5
Construction of a tip or pond
47
4.6
Rehabilitation of tips
50
PLANNING FOR ROADS AND VEHICLE OPERATING AREAS 51

5.1
Appraisal of roads and other vehicle operating areas
52
5.2

Roads and other vehicle operating areas principal hazard

management plan
53
5.3
Design and layout of roads
54
PART C
06
07
42
70
USING EXPLOSIVES
71
6.1
Hazard management and emergency planning for explosives
72
6.2
Maintaining, transporting and storing explosives
73
6.3
Shot firing safe systems of work
75
6.4
Explosives selection criteria
76
6.5
Drilling, charging and blasting
77
6.6
Post-firing 84
6.7
Minimising blast damage
CONTROLLING GROUND INSTABILITY IN EXCAVATIONS
89
90
7.1
Planning and design
91
7.2
Excavation rules
91
7.3
Excavation control and scaling
92
7.4
Slope movement monitoring programs
95
7.5
Remedial measures
96
7.6
Historic underground workings
99
7.7
Working near slopes
100
08
09
TIPPING (OR DUMPING)

8.1
Dumping methods
103
8.2
Controlling end-tipping risks
104
8.3
General risk controls
108
8.4
Procedures for examining tip heads
112
8.5
Tip maintenance and inspection
113
8.6
Other considerations for stockpiles
115
8.7
Reworking or reshaping tips
116
WATER-BASED MINING
Planning and design
118
9.2
Excavation rules
118
9.3
Extracting beneath water
118
WATER OR TAILINGS STORAGE

10.1
11
Inspections and tell-tale signs of distress
120
125
126
10.2 Technical operational review
127
10.3 Cleaning out ponds
128
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
130
11.1
Site access: contractors, visitors and public
131
11.2
Power lines and other overhead structures
132
11.3
Reversing, manoeuvring and parking
134
11.4
Loading vehicles
137
11.5
Loading floating plant
139
11.6
Loading and storage of large stone slabs or blocks
139
11.7
Feeding crushers
140
11.8
Railway sidings
140
11.9
Safe drivers and vehicles
140
11.10 Maintenance and repair of roads
146
PART D
12
117
9.1
9.4 Floating plant and boats

10
102
147
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT

12.1
148
Scope 149
12.2 Appraisal of machinery and equipment principal hazards
150
12.3 Mechanical engineering or electrical engineering control plan
150
12.4 Choosing and buying machinery and equipment
151
12.5 Existing machinery or equipment
152
12.6 Siting of Machinery
152
12.7 Access routes
153
12.8 Guarding 153

12.9 Conveyors 163
12.10 Emergency stops
164
12.11 Pre-start warning systems
165
12.12 Electricity 166

12.13 Cranes and lifting equipment
13
WORKER FACILITIES
13.1
Washing facilities
168
170
171
13.2 Toilets 171
14
13.3 Drinking water
171
13.4 Facilities for employees who become ill at work
171
13.5 Facilities for changing and storing clothes
172
13.6 Facilities for meals
172
SITE SECURITY AND PUBLIC SAFETY

14.1
Access to sites
173
174
14.2 Barriers 174

14.3 Signage 174
15
WORKER HEALTH
15.1
Worker health principal hazards and control plan
15.2 Worker health monitoring
176
177
178
15.3 Noise 179

15.4 Vibration 180
15.5 Breathable hazards
180
15.6 Working in extremes of temperature
183
15.7 Manual handling and lifting
183
15.8 Hours of work and fatigue
183
15.9 Psychosocial hazards
184
15.10 Ultraviolet radiation
184
15.11 Contaminated land
185
16
185
15.13 Drugs and alcohol
185
15.14 Personal protective equipment (PPE)
186
PREVENTING FALLS FROM HEIGHT

16.1
17
18
Climbing on or off vehicles
188
189
16.2 Access and egress to heavy vehicle working areas
190
16.3 Covering loads
190
16.4 Access to fixed plant and machinery
192
16.5 Portable ladders
192
16.6 Working near highwalls or faces
192
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS

17.1
Common hazards when undertaking maintenance
17.2
Isolation and lockout of energy
17.3
Permit to work systems
195
197
200
201
17.4 Inspecting and servicing vehicles
202
17.5
208
Blocked crushers or hoppers
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
18.1
What is an emergency, and what are my duties?
210
211
18.2 Keep it simple, and proportionate to the size of the operation
212
18.3 All emergency management plans should be based on the

coordinated incident management system
213
18.4 Assess potential emergencies
214
18.5 Identify needs, and confirm capability requirements
215
18.6 Make the plan
216
18.7 Test, practise and review the plan
222
19
WORKER PARTICIPATION
224
20
TRAINING AND SUPERVISION
226
20.1 Identify skills, knowledge or competencies
227
20.2 Induction training
228
20.3 Training workers
228
20.4 Supervision 228

20.5 Use of contractors
228
20.6 Training Records
228
21
GLOSSARY 229
22
REFERENCES 238
23
APPENDICES 243
23.1 Appendix A: Ratio to percentage grade conversion
244
23.2 Appendix B: Issuing permit to work certificates
245
23.3 Appendix C: Field data collection
247
23.4 Appendix D: Geological models
247
23.5 Appendix E: Types of analysis
248
23.6 Appendix F: Batters and final bench design
249
23.7 Appendix G: Rock bolting systems
250
23.8 Appendix H: Retaining type structures
251
23.9 Appendix I: Culverts
251
23.10 Appendix J: Traction
251
23.11 Appendix K: Windrows
252
23.12 Appendix L: Monitoring methods
254
23.13 Appendix M: Instrument data
257
23.14 Appendix N: Isolation and lockout of energy
258
23.15 Appendix O: Permit to work system process
261
TABLES
1
Definition of very weak rock or soils and weak rock or stronger rock
33
Key questions for risk assessment
34
Example of FOS and POF design criteria approach
37
Recommended super-elevation
58
Recommended transition lengths
58
Engulfment hazard controls at draw down points
116
Maritime rules
121
Control measures for reversing options
135
Developing an emergency plan
212
10 Typical values for the coefficient of friction between rubber tyres

and various road surfaces
252
FIGURES
1
Hierarchy of controls
22
Slope design terminology
30
lope design inter-ramp and

S
overall slope details
31
32 E
xample of sign helping arriving
drivers know what to expect
68
33 E
xample of weight restriction sign
and narrow bridge sign
68
34 F
ace height should not exceed the
reach of the loader used on them
93
Soils and very weak rock guidance 32
Stronger rock guidance
32
Planar failure
38
Wedge failure
38
35 F
ace height should not exceed
the reach of the excavator used on
them, with safe operating distances 93
Step-path failure
38
36 Rock trap design
101
Ravelling failure
38
10 Toppling failure
38
37 Example of tip slope stability

design (limit equilibrium)
105
11
39
Circular failure
12 Guidance for tips (solid)
44
13 Guidance for tips (liquid) and ponds 44
38 E
xample dump construction method
for mixed material (mattressing)
106
39 E
xample dump construction
method for competent material
106
40 Dumping sequence
107
41 Approaching tip point windrow
107
42 V
ehicles should be parked on
level ground (side to side)
109
109
14 Example road layout
55
15 Turning arrangements
56
16 Segregation of light vehicles
56
17 Road gradient
57
18 Superelevated bends
58
19 Sight distance
59
43 D
ump on level ground with a
slight uphill gradient
20 Road alignment
59
44 Vehicle separation at tip point
111
21 Intersection with restricted view
60
45 Articulated vehicles
111
22 Intersection with improved visibility 60
46 Cross section of stockpile
112
23 Give way control selection
47 Dragline working beneath water
119
48 L
ong reach excavator working
beneath water
119
24 Stop control selection

25 S
uitable windrow example
firm material
60
61
62
49 E
xcavator working beneath
water, loading floating plant
120
26 S
uitable windrow example
windrow width
63
50 Example of gangway
121
27 S
uitable edge protection example
rock with supporting material
63
51 E
xample of guardrails around
water pick-up station
122
52 Digger and floating screen
122
28 U
nsuitable edge protection
blocks of stone can be pushed
out of the way
63
53 E
xample of cleaning out a
settling pond with an excavator
129
29 Runaway-vehicle centre berm
65
54 Example of pedestrian route
132
30 Plan view haul road escape lane
65
55 Example of signage for small sites
132
31 P
rofile view haul road
escape Lane
66
56 W
orking under overhead
power lines
133
57 E
xample clearance signage
and placement
134
58 Loading and restricted zones
137
59 L
oads should be spread evenly
across the vehicle
139
84 S
tone saw with gate at access
points 162
85 S
tone saw with light curtains
at access points
162
86 R
emote operation controls on
stone saw
163
60 C
over loose bulk loads when
travelling on a public road
139
87 Example of remote greasing points 163
61 Side-mounted mirrors
142
88 Emergency stop with signage
165
62 Side-mounted mirrors
143
89 Flexible cords with tags
167
63 CCTV monitor in vehicle cab
143
90 E
xamples of signage warning
of hazards
175
91 Example of sign at gate
175
92 R
etrofitted stairway and platform
for safe driver access
190
64 E
xample of fixed close-fitted
guard enclosure on direct drive
electric motors
154
65 E
xample of totally enclosing
sheet metal guard
154
93 Example of excavator access system 190
66 E
xample of panel mesh guards
on fines dewaterer
154
67 E
xample of panel type guards
on dryer
94 R
etrofitted guardrails to protect
workers accessing top of the
machine 190
154
95 Automated covering system
191
68 E
xample of close fitted guards
on batch feeder belts
154
96 Manual covering system
192
69 E
xample of close fitted guards
on vee-belt drive
97 Platform covering system
192
154
98 Overhead gantry harness system
192
70 E
xample of totally enclosing guard
on primary jaw crusher drive
99 Example of a pedestrian windrow
193
155
71 E
xample of hinged access panel
guard bolted shut
100 Example of non-weight

supportive barriers
193
155
101 Example of fall restraint system
194
72 E
xample of steel man-grid on
elevated feed hopper
102 Example emergency station
213
155
103 Vehicle overturn emergency
222
73 E
xample of steel man-grid on
ground feed hopper
155
104 Suitable windrow example

firm material
253
74 Plate type guard
157
75 Bottom idler nip guard
157
105 Suitable windrow example

windrow width
253
76 Example of head drum guards
158
77 Example of tail drum guard
158
106 Unsuitable windrow

curved slopes
253
78 E
xample of perimeter guarding
on gravity take-up points
158
107 Study on windrow size to offer

definite restraint
253
79 Example of skirting guards
159
80 Tail drum return nip guard
161
108 Windrow constructed on

firm foundation
254
81 Head drum nip guard
161
109 Suitable windrow gaps in

windrow for drainage
254
82 Stone guillotine with fixed guards
161
83 E
xample of two-handed starting
device and drop side extraction
110 E
xample of an energy-isolating
disconnect switch
261
161
PART
Introduction
This part of the document gives an introduction, background,
and definitions to help you use it. It includes a discussion
of what quarries and mines this document applies to, and
a guide to the overall practice of hazard management.
PART A
01/
INTRODUCTION
IN THIS SECTION:
1.1 How to use this guidance
1.2 Background
1.3 Purpose
1.4 Scope and application
1.5 Interpretation
1.6 Safety-critical roles
11
This guideline is about helping you implement hazard

controls for risks commonly associated with opencast
mines, alluvial mines and quarry operations.
1.1
HOW TO USE THIS GUIDANCE
This document has four parts:

PART A: INTRODUCTION
metalliferous and coal mines. The Regulations

only address competency requirements for
quarrying and alluvial mining operations.
The Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 is due
This part gives an introduction, background,
to come into effect on 4 April 2016, along with
and definitions to help you use this document.
new regulations (including updated mining
Part A includes a discussion of what quarries
regulations to align with the new Act and fix
and mines this document applies to, and
some drafting errors). While the law change
guidance on the overall practice of hazard

management.
PART B: PLANNING AND DESIGN
This part provides guidance on planning safety
into mine and quarry operations. It describes
in detail how to plan excavations, tips, ponds,
dams, roads, and vehicle operating areas.
will involve some quite significant differences

(eg, how duties are framed, what injuries and
incidents are notifiable, worker engagement
and participation, and clearer regulations) and
changes in terminology, this document will still
provide sound practice guidance for ensuring
health and safety in opencast mines, alluvial
mines and quarries.
PART C: OPERATIONAL SAFETY FOR MINING
WorkSafe is, in consultation with the industry,
AND QUARRYING
updating codes of practice and guidance and
This part sets out site safety practices for
producing new ones. The intent is to provide
working with explosives, managing ground
a series of documents the industry can use to
instability, tipping and dumping material,
comply with the new regime.
storing water and tailings, and managing traffic.

PART D: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND
OPERATIONAL SAFETY FOR EQUIPMENT
AND PEOPLE
This part provides guidance on managing
It was recognised in the Ministry of Business,

Innovation and Employments Safe mines:
Safe Workers A quick guide for mine
operators publication that quarries would
need specific health and safety guidelines.
machinery, worker health and training,
Guidance for alluvial mines is included in
and emergencies.
this document. This is because the hazards

in opencast mines are similar to those in
1.2
BACKGROUND
The Health and Safety in Employment (Mining

Operations and Quarrying Operations)
Regulations 2013 (the Regulations) have
12
alluvial mines, and guidance on opencast

mines is provided.
1.3
PURPOSE
specific provisions for safety in mining
This document has been developed to assist
operations, including opencast (or surface)
opencast mines, quarries and alluvial mines
SECTION 1.0 // INTRODUCTION
in developing, implementing and maintaining
(c) Includes any place in which any
hazard controls for common risks and to meet
material extracted or processed in
their obligations under the Health and Safety
a quarry is crushed or screened.
in Employment Act 1992 (the HSE Act) and its

associated regulations.
1.4
SCOPE AND APPLICATION
This document applies to opencast mines,

alluvial mines and quarries. This document
is mainly for operators, mine and quarry
managers, employers and site health and
safety representatives. However, employees,
(2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the

material is to be extracted or processed
for commercial gain and whether or not
the material is extracted or processed by
the use of explosives.
Quarry operators must notify WorkSafe of
the manager or acting manager of a quarry
(the Regulations, Regulation 24).
contractors, health and safety advisers,
If you are unsure whether your operation is
consultants and engineers may also find
a quarrying operation, as defined by section
it helpful.
19N of the HSE Act, you should get legal
This document does not apply to underground
advice. For the purposes of this document,
mines or tunnels.
The precautions required in a situation will
depend on the extent and nature of the
risks involved. High-risk situations require
higher standards of precautions than low-risk
situations. Examples given do not cover every
a quarry includes:
>> all the surface extraction workings including
preparatory and abandonment works
>> tips (or dumps) associated with and in
the vicinity of the site where the material
is extracted, crushed or screened
possible situation and may not be relevant
>> working stockpiles associated with and in
to all sites. You should complete your own
the vicinity of the site where the material
risk assessments and take competent advice
is extracted, crushed or screened
when implementing health and safety

management systems.
1.4.1WHAT IS A QUARRY?
>> settling ponds associated with and in the

vicinity of the site where the material is
extracted, crushed or screened
>> areas used for processing extracted
The HSE Act defines a quarrying operation as:
materials (including washing, drying
(1) In this Act, quarrying operation
and bagging), where the processing is
(a) Means an activity carried out above

ground for the purpose of
(i) extracting any material, other
than coal or any mineral, from
the earth; or
(ii) processing any material, other than
coal or any mineral, at the place
where the material is extracted; and
(b) includes the place where an activity
described in paragraph (a) is carried
out; and
carried out on site where the extraction

is undertaken
>> areas used for crushing or screening
extracted or processed materials,
regardless of whether it is at the place
the material was extracted
>> the buildings and structures at the quarry
used for the working of the quarry
>> common areas (eg quarry roadways and
railways, but not public roads or railways
under the control of a rail company)
13
>> quarries in a forest, on a farm or on

Crown or public land (eg council reserves
or river beds) regardless of whether
the extraction is of an intermittent nature
or not.
1.4.2WHAT IS NOT A QUARRY
Alluvial mine operators must notify WorkSafe

of the manager or acting manager of an
alluvial mine (the Regulations, Regulations 24).
If you are unsure whether your operation is
an alluvial mining operation as defined by
section 19L of the HSE Act you should get
For the purposes of this document, the
legal advice. For the purpose of this document,
following are not considered to be quarries:
an alluvial mine includes the following:
>> civil or building construction sites (both
>> all the surface extraction workings including
residential and commercial) where cut to

fill is undertaken unless the construction
is associated with the development of
the quarry
>> manufacturing that involves processing
extracted material (eg hot mix or
concrete) although, a quarrys crushing
or screening facility is covered, even if at
a different location
>> recycling aggregate plants
>> stockpiles at dormant quarries and
dormant river gravel extraction sites
>> small scale, non-complex extraction carried
out on farmland solely in support of
farming (ie no tips, highwalls, explosives
or processing)
>> small scale, non-complex extraction carried
out in forests solely in support of forestry
preparatory and abandoned works

>> tips (or dumps) associated with and close
to the site where the material is extracted
>> working stockpiles associated with and
close to the site where the material
is extracted
>> settling ponds or tailing dams associated
with and close to the site where the
material is extracted
>> areas used for the preparation of extracted
materials (including crushing, screening,
washing, drying, bagging and ore
processing)
>> the buildings and structures at the mine
that are used for the working of the mine
>> common areas (eg roadways and railways,
but not public roads or railways under the
control of a rail company).
operations (ie no tips, highwalls, explosives

or processing)
>> non-complex extraction of gravel from
river beds where there is no mechanical
processing.
1.4.3WHAT IS AN ALLUVIAL MINE?
The HSE Act defines an alluvial mining
operation as:
a mining operation carried out above ground
and associated with
(a) The extraction of gold from river deposits
of sand or gravel:
(b) The extraction of iron sand from sand
or gravel.
14
1.4.4WHAT IS AN OPENCAST MINE?

The HSE Act defines a mining operation
as follows:
In this Act, mining operation(a) Means the extraction of coal and minerals
and the place at which the extraction is
carried out; and
(b) Includes any of the following activities and
the place at which they are carried out:
(i) Exploring for coal:
(ii) Mining for coal or minerals:
(iii) Processing coal or minerals associated
with a mine:
SECTION 1.0 // INTRODUCTION
(iv) Producing or maintaining tailings,

spoil heaps and waste dumps:
(v) The excavation, removal, handling,
or a particular type of mining operation as

defined by section 19M of the HSE Act or
the Regulations. For the purpose of this
transport and storage of coal,
document, an opencast mine includes:
minerals, substances, contaminants,
>> all the workings when exploring for coal
and wastes at the place where the
>> all the surface extraction workings,
activities described in subparagraphs

(i) to (iv) are carried out:
(vi) The construction, operation,
maintenance, and removal of plant
and buildings at the place where the
activities described in subparagraphs
(i) to (iv) are carried out:
(vii) Preparatory, maintenance, and
repair activities associated with
the activities described in
subparagraphs (i) to (iv); and
(c) Includes(i) A tourist mining operation:
(ii) A tunnelling operation; but
(d) Does not include-
including preparatory and abandonment

works, associated with the opencast mine
>> tips (or dumps), including stockpiles,
associated with the opencast mine
>> settling ponds or tailing dams associated
with the opencast mine
>> areas used for the processing of extracted
materials (including crushing, screening,
washing, drying, bagging and ore
processing)
>> the buildings and structures at the mine
that are used for the working of the mine
>> common areas (eg roadways and railways,
but not public roads or railways under the
control of a rail company)
(i) Exploring for minerals:
>> an opencast tourist mining operation.
(ii) An alluvial mining operation:
For the purpose of this document, tunnelling
(iii) A mining operation wholly on or under
operations and underground mines are not
the seabed on the seaward side of the
considered opencast mines.
mean high-water mark:

(iv) A quarrying operation.
1.5
INTERPRETATION
The Regulations have definitions for two types
The HSE Act requires duty holders to have
of opencast mining operations:
effective ways of managing health and safety.
>> Opencast coal mining operation means
Duty holders are not legally required to use this
any mining operation associated with the
guidance, but it will help them to comply with
extraction of coal and where no person
the intention of the law. Alternative methods
works underground.
may be used, but these should be at least as
>> Opencast metalliferous mining operation
safe, or better, than those set out within.
means any mining operation associated
This document brings together legal obligations
with the extraction of minerals and where
with other recommendations that are not legal
no person works underground.
requirements but are good practice. For the
In this document, these types are collectively

called opencast mines.
You should get legal advice if you are unsure
purposes of this document must means the

instruction is a mandatory legal obligation.
Should means it is recommended to be
adopted where practicable.
whether your operation is a mining operation
15
The requirements for PHMPs and PCPs within
OTHER SAFETY CRITICAL ROLES
the Regulations do not apply to alluvial mines
The SSE must appoint staff to carry out
and quarries.
1.6
SAFETY CRITICAL ROLES
OPENCAST MINES
MINE OPERATOR
The mine operator must appoint a site senior
>> ventilation officer

>> electrical superintendent
>> mechanical superintendent.
QUARRYING AND ALLUVIAL MINES
executive (SSE) who has responsibility for
Quarrying and alluvial mining operators must
managing health and safety at the operation.
appoint a quarrying or alluvial mine manager,
The SSE may be appointed to more than one
as appropriate. Their duties include:
mine if the mine operator is responsible for
>> managing the mining operation
more than one operation or site. The SSEs
>> supervising the health and safety aspects
responsibilities include appointing other

safety critical roles.
SITE SENIOR EXECUTIVE
The SSE must hold a certificate of
competence as a site senior executive.
The SSEs duties include:
>> developing, implementing and maintaining
the HSMS at the mining operation
>> making sure a risk appraisal and risk
assessment process are developed and
used in the HSMS
>> appointing other safety critical roles.
The mine operator must provide the resources
so the SSE can carry out his or her duties.
MINE MANAGER
A mine manager for an opencast coal
mine or a mine where more than 4 workers
ordinarily work at any one time must hold an
A-grade certificate of competence as a mine
manager. Otherwise, they must hold a B-grade
certificate of competence as a mine manager.
The mine managers duties include:
>> managing the mining operation
>> supervising the health and safety aspects
of a mining operation.
16
other safety critical roles including:
of a mining operation.
A quarrying manager at a site where more
than four workers ordinarily work at any one
time must hold an A-grade certificate of
competence as a quarry manager. Otherwise,
they must hold a minimum of a B-grade
certificate of competence as a quarry manager.
An alluvial mine manager at a site where
more than four workers ordinarily work at any
one time must hold an A-grade certificate
of competence as an alluvial mine manager.
Otherwise, they must hold a minimum of
a B-grade certificate of competence as an
alluvial mine manager.
More information on what is required for a
certificate of competence is available on the
WorkSafe website.
PART A
02/
HAZARD
MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM
IN THIS SECTION:
2.1 Applicable legislation: hazard
management in the HSE Act
and the Regulations
2.2 The health and safety
management system (HSMS)
2.3 Identifying hazards and
analysing risk
2.4 Risk assessment
2.5 Principal hazard management
plans and principal control
plans
2.6 Hazard control
2.7 Hazard monitoring
2.8 Responding to hazard reports
2.9 Accident recording,
notification and investigation
17
Ensuring hazards do not cause harm is the basis

of health and safety in any workplace. A hazard
management system is how you identify and control
hazards in your workplace.
This section describes:
(a) Serious harm.
>> the legislative requirement to have a health
(b) Harm (being harm that is more than trivial)
and safety management system (HSMS)

>> the components your HSMS needs to have
>> the legislative requirement to identify
hazards and manage certain hazards
using a principal hazard management
plan (PHMP)
>> the basic concepts of hazard identification,
risk assessment, and hazard management
>> the legislative requirement to record and
investigate accidents.
the severity of whose effects on any

person depend (entirely or among other
things) on the extent or frequency of the
persons exposure to the hazard.
(c) Harm that does not usually occur, or usually
is not easily detectable, until a significant
time after exposure to the hazard.
A principal hazard is defined in Reg 65 of the
Regulations. In summary, a principal hazard is
any hazard that could create a risk of multiple
fatalities at a mining operation, either in a
APPLICABLE LEGISLATION:
HAZARD MANAGEMENT IN THE
HSE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS
2.1
The HSE Act covers all workplaces and

requires employers to take all practicable
steps to ensure the health and safety of
employees and others while at work. It also
places health and safety duties on others,
such as mine operators, principals, selfemployed persons, and employees.
single accident or in a series of recurring

accidents.
All principal hazards will be significant hazards
under the HSE Act. However, there are likely
to be many more significant hazards than
there are principal hazards.
A mining operation must have a principal
hazard management plan (PHMP) for each
principal hazard, and a principal control plan
(PCP) where specified in the Regulations.
The Regulations have specific provisions for

health and safety in mining operations. This
While alluvial mines and quarries are not
includes opencast coal and mineral operations.
legally required to determine principal
For quarrying and alluvial mining operations,

the Regulations only address competency
requirements. They should, however, be
considered good practice.
you follow the guidance given for principal

hazards, where risks at your operation could
result in multiple fatalities. For the purposes
of this guidance we will describe hazards that
The HSE Act refers to significant hazards
could create a risk of multiple fatalities as
and the Regulations refer to principal hazards.
principal hazards.
A significant hazard is a hazard that is an

actual or potential cause or source of any
of the following:
18
hazards, WorkSafe highly recommends
SECTION 2.0 // HAZARD MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
THE HEALTH AND SAFETY

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (HSMS)
2.2
Mining operations must have a HSMS,

including opencast mines. WorkSafe
>> The PHMPs and PCPs required.

>> How monitoring, assessment and
inspections of working places will
be undertaken.
recommends alluvial mines and quarries
>> Any other requirements of the Regulations.
have a HSMS.
For more detailed information on the
The HSMS is to set out a level of detail
content of the HSMS see regulation 56 of the
appropriate for the nature, size, complexity
Regulations. For more detailed information
and hazards of the mining operation, and any
on developing HSMS, see the WorkSafe:
other relevant matters.
>> Guidance for a Hazard Management
Different approaches and formats may be used

to develop a HSMS. Regardless of the structure
adopted for the HSMS, it must include a
systematic approach to hazard management
and should be part of, and integrated with,
System for Mines.

>> Fact Sheet: A Hazard Management
System for Mining Operations.
>> Guide to Developing Safety Management
Systems for the Extractives Industry.
the overall management system.
Further information can also be obtained
Where the Regulations require an HSMS
from Standards NewZealand (AS/NZS 4804
to be developed, it must include:
Occupational Health and Safety Management
>> A health and safety policy.
Systems General Guidelines on principles,
>> The process used to identify hazards, assess

the risk of harm, and to identify controls to
manage these. This could include a standard
operating procedure (SOP).
>> How reporting and recording health
systems and supporting techniques and

AS/NZS 4801 Occupational Health and Safety
Management Systems Specification with
guidance for use).
The HSMS must be developed in consultation
and safety information will be achieved,
with workers at the site. It must be easily
including setting of key performance
understood and made available to all workers.
indicators and investigation of accidents.

>> A description of the systems, procedures
and other risk control measures in place
to manage hazards and to respond to
increased levels of risks. This could include
a trigger action response plan (TARP).
>> How material changes that may create
hazards will be identified.
>> The health and safety management
structure, including competency
The HSMS must be in place for:

(a) Coal mines from the start of exploration
activities until the abandonment of
the mine.
(b) Metalliferous mines from the start
of physical development, including
construction of mining infrastructure
and earthworks, until the abandonment
of the mine.
requirements and how temporary and

permanent vacancies will be filled, and
competency requirements for acting
positions in the structure.
>> Monitoring and audit matters as required
by regulation 57 of the Regulations.
>> How monitoring of health and safety
2.3 IDENTIFYING HAZARDS

AND ANALYSING RISK
You must ensure an effective method is in
place to systematically identify and regularly
assess hazards to workers at your site.
of mine workers will be performed.
19
Section 7 of the HSE Act outlines the process

for employers to identify and assess hazards.
Regulation 54 of the Regulations outlines
the process of risk appraisal for mining
operations, which are additional to section 7
of the HSE Act.
Regulations 6566 of the Regulations
outlines the process for identifying principal
hazards in a mining operation.
under the HSE Act. The mine operator must

ensure risk assessments are carried out, and
the Site Senior Executive is responsible for
carrying out the risk assessment.
A risk assessment can help you determine:
>> how severe a risk is
>> whether existing control measures
are effective
>> what action you should take to control it
>> how urgently action needs to be taken.
There are a number of ways to identify

hazards. Some of these include:
>> Physical inspections: inspect the workplace
and assess where someone could get hurt.
>> Task and process analysis: identify the
likelihood of a negative effect on the safety of

people, equipment and infrastructure, or the
environment. The likelihood of occurrence and
consequences is generally used to estimate
hazards involved in each task. This should
risk. Risk assessment can be either qualitative
include what happens when intervention is
(ie rankings or descriptive indicators) or
required (eg breakdowns). Identify hazards
quantitative (ie numerical estimates).
at each stage of the production process.
Some hazards that have exposure standards,
>> Best practice guidelines and standards
such as noise and airborne contaminants,
>> Hazard and operability study (HAZOP)
may need scientific testing or measurement
>> Accident investigation analysis: identify
by a competent person. This is to accurately
hazards and causes of harm from

investigations involving similar types
of work.
>> Near miss, audit or inspection analysis:
assess the risk and to check the relevant

exposure standard is not being exceeded (eg
noise meters to measure noise levels and dust
deposition meters to measure airborne dust).
trends or common problems can be
Similarly geotechnical or ground failure
identified from near miss reports, audits
risk may be a complex issue and require
or inspections. Analysis of these reports
a competent person for assessment.
may show locations that are more

dangerous and indicate problems with
the design and layout of that work area
or the way work is carried out there.
>> Work environment monitoring: For example,
noise assessment, air quality assessment.
>> Analytical techniques for calculating the
hazard: For example, geotechnical data
for ground stability.
2.4
RISK ASSESSMENT
A risk assessment involves considering what

could happen if someone is exposed to a
hazard and the likelihood of it happening.
It is part of the requirements for all workplaces
20
Risk is a measure of the consequence and
1. Regulation 55 of the Regulations outlines

the requirements for risk assessment for
mining operations.
2. Regulation 82 of the Regulations
outlines additional requirements for risk
assessment for tips, ponds and voids.
outlines additional requirements for
risk assessment for work in the inrush
control zone.
risk assessment for roads and other
vehicle operating areas.
>> the review and audit processes for the PHMP.
See the Regulations for the full requirements,
risk assessment for emergency
including requirements specific to each PHMP.
management planning.
More detailed information on risk assessment
is available in:
>> AS/NZ 4804 Occupational Health and
Safety Management System General
A PHMP is required for each principal hazard

regardless of the likelihood of an accident.
A PHMP should show the risk, after controls
and monitoring, is reduced by all practicable
steps as per the HSE Act.
guidelines on principles, systems and
If a particular principal hazard is not present,
supporting techniques Section 4.3.4.
a PHMP will not be required for it. A PHMP is
>> AS/NZS ISO 31000 Risk Management

Principles and Guidelines.
>> MDG 1010 Minerals Industry Safety
and Health Risk Management Guideline.
still required for mining operations where:

>> explosives are used
>> a tip is located on a slope, and is greater
than 15 meters in height and 100,000 m3
in volume.
2.5 PRINCIPAL HAZARD

MANAGEMENT PLANS AND
PRINCIPAL CONTROL PLANS
A principal hazard is one that could
cause multiple fatalities, either in a single
accident or in a series of recurring accidents.
The Regulations list some things to that may
cause principal hazards, but is not exhaustive.
2.5.1PRINCIPAL HAZARD MANAGEMENT
PLANS (PHMP)
A PHMP sets out the measures that will be
used to manage a particular principal hazard.
A PHMP must be in writing and include:
>> the nature of the principal hazard
>> the roles, responsibilities and competencies
required to implement the PHMP
>> any other matter required by the Regulations
in relation to particular principal hazards.
It must also include a description of:
>> how risk assessments will be conducted
and the result of any completed
>> the control measures to be implemented
to manage it and the risk of harm it presents
>> how any specific requirements in the
regulations (if any) will be complied with
>> emergency preparedness for the
principal hazard
2.5.2PRINCIPAL CONTROL PLANS (PCP)

The purpose of a PCP is to link the duties and
functions of the people, the equipment and
the environment in which they operate. Some
control measures may be used to control the
risks associated with more than one hazard.
This may include principal hazards and
significant hazards. These can be put together
as a PCP which will set controls for the whole
mine. The PCP must explain the control
measures to be taken.
A PCP will not necessarily provide all the
controls for a particular hazard. For example,
the controls needed for a principal hazard
may be provided by one or more PCPs, plus
specific controls in a PHMP.
A PCP should show the risk, after controls
and monitoring, is reduced by all practicable
steps as per the HSE Act.
Not all PCPs are required for all mining
operations and you will need to refer to
the Regulations for specific details.
The following is a list of PCPs that may
be required for opencast mines:
>> mechanical engineering
>> electrical engineering
>> emergency management
>> worker health.
21
Although not required by the Regulations, WorkSafe recommends that surveying requirements
should be covered by a PCP.
2.6
HAZARD CONTROL
The ways of controlling hazards are ranked from the highest level of protection and reliability
to the lowest as shown in Figure 1. This is known as the hierarchy of control. Sections 810 of the
HSE Act require employers to work through this hierarchy when managing significant hazards
(which includes principal hazards).
LI
M
IN
AT
E
Eliminate
the hazard
Substitute the hazard

with something safer
Isolate the hazard from people

Reduce the risks through engineering controls
IN
IM
IS
E
IS
O
LA
TE E
Administration Controls
Personal Protective Equipment
Figure 1: Hierarchy of controls
LEVEL 1 CONTROL METHODS ELIMINATION

The most effective control measure is to eliminate the hazard and associated risk. You must
always aim to eliminate a hazard, where reasonably practicable. The best way to do this is by
not introducing the hazard into the workplace. For example, you can eliminate the risk of a fall
by doing the work at ground level.
Eliminating hazards is often cheaper and more practical to achieve at the design or planning
stage. In these early stages, there is greater scope to design out hazards or incorporate risk
control measures that are compatible with the original design and functional requirements.
For example, a noisy machine could be designed and built to produce as little noise as possible,
which is more effective than providing workers with personal hearing protectors.
You can eliminate risks by removing the hazard completely; for example, by removing trip
hazards on the floor or disposing of unwanted chemicals.
22
It may not be possible to eliminate a hazard
>> Using Personal Protective Equipment
if doing so means that you cannot make the
(PPE): for example, ear muffs, respirators,
end product or deliver the service. If you
face masks, hard hats, gloves, and safety
cannot eliminate the hazard, then eliminate as
glasses. PPE limits exposure to the harmful
many of the risks associated with the hazard
effects of a hazard, but only if workers
as practicable. This may include substituting
wear and use the PPE correctly.
the hazard with something safer; for example

replacing solvent-based paints with waterbased ones.
LEVEL 2 CONTROL MEASURES ISOLATION
If it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate
a hazard and associated risk, you must
reduce the risk by isolating people from the
hazard. This involves physically separating
the source of harm from people by distance
or using barriers. For example, you could
install guard rails around exposed edges and
holes in floors, use remote control systems
to operate machinery, or store chemicals
in a fume cabinet.
Only use administrative controls and PPE:

>> where no other practicable controls
are available (as a last resort)
>> as an interim measure until a more
effective control can be used
>> to supplement higher level controls
(as a back-up).
When a significant hazard can only be
minimised, section 10 of the HSE Act requires
employers to monitor employees exposure to
the hazard and monitor their health. Employers
must take all practicable steps to get their
employees informed consent to conduct this
health monitoring. They can only perform
Isolation controls can include engineering
monitoring with this informed consent.
controls. Engineering controls are physical
With changes in technology and cost of
in nature, including a mechanical device

or process. For example, you could use
mechanical devices such as trolleys or hoists
to move heavy loads, place guards around
moving parts of machinery, install residual
current devices (electrical safety switches)
and so on.
LEVEL 3 CONTROL MEASURES MINIMISATION
Minimisation control measures do not control
the hazard at the source. They rely on human
behaviour and supervision, and used on their
own, tend to be least effective in minimising
risks. Two approaches to reduce risk in this
way are:
>> Administrative controls: work methods
controls over time, methods to eliminate and

isolate a hazard may become practicable. You
must continue to assess significant hazards
that are being minimised to determine whether
other methods are available to control them.
For example, replace or upgrade older vehicles
with ones with better safety devices such as
anti-lock brakes, traction control and retarders.
2.7
HAZARD MONITORING
You must regularly review your operations to

identify any new hazards that may have arisen.
You must also review the controls you have in
place to ensure the controls are still effective.
In addition to your duties under the HSE
or procedures that are designed to
Act, mine operators, mining operations
minimise exposure to a hazard; for example,
and SSEs have other responsibilities
developing procedures on how to operate
under the Regulations to audit and review
machinery safely, limiting exposure time
hazard controls.
to a hazardous task, using signs to warn

people of a hazard.
Regulations 5759, 69, 70, 75, 82, 89, 94, 95

of the Regulations outline the process of
review and auditing for mining operations.
23
RESPONDING TO HAZARD
REPORTS
2.8
Mine operators must ensure hazards reported

by mine workers are investigated. This must be
>> give WorkSafe written notice of the accident

and the circumstances it occurred in.
The register of accidents must include accidents
that might have harmed (eg near miss incidents).
completed as soon as practicable, with regard
Mine operators have additional duties
to the seriousness of the hazard (see the
described in the box below.
box below).
Regulation 226Register of accidents
Regulation 115Mine operator must
and serious harm
investigate reported hazard
(1) The mine operator must record the
(1) If a mine worker reports the existence
particulars of the following in relation
of a hazard in the mining operation,
to any mine worker:
including (without limitation) any action
(a) every accident that harmed (or,
done or not done in contravention of

any system, procedure, or other riskcontrol measure in place at the mining
operation to control a hazard, the mine
operator must ensure that the report
is investigated.
(2) The investigation must be completed
as soon as practicable, having regard
to the seriousness of the hazard.
Regulation 116Mine operator must advise
mine worker of result of investigation
When the investigation required by
regulation 115 is completed, the mine
operator must ensure that the mine worker
as the case may be, might have

harmed) the mine worker at the
mining operation; and
(b) every occurrence of serious harm
to the mine worker at work, or as
a result of any hazard to which the
mine workers was exposed while
at the mining operation.
(2) For each accident or occurrence of
serious harm, the particulars prescribed
in Schedule 7 must be recorded in a
register of accident and serious harm
maintained by the mine operator.
(3) The mine operator must ensure that
who reported the hazard is promptly
a copy of the register is provided to
advised of the result of the investigation.
WorkSafe at intervals of not more than

6 months.
Hazard notices may be issued by trained

site health and safety representatives in
accordance with section 19ZF of the HSE Act.
ACCIDENT RECORDING,
NOTIFICATION AND
INVESTIGATION
2.9
Section 25 of the HSE Act outlines your duties

regarding accident recording and notification.
In summary you must:
>> maintain a register of accidents and
serious harm
>> notify WorkSafe as soon as possible if
serious harm or any of the accidents
described in regulations occur
24
(4) For the avoidance of doubt, a mine

operator is not required, in relation to
any mine worker, to maintain a separate
register of accidents and serious harm
under section 25(1) or (1B) of the Act.
Regulation 227Notification of accidents
and serious harm
(1) For the purpose of section 25(2)(b)
of the Act, every accident specified in
Schedule 8 is required to be notified
to WorkSafe if the accident occurs at
a mining operation.
(2) For the purpose of section 25(3)(b) of

the Act, the mine operator must notify
the following to WorkSafe:
(a) Every accident specified in
Schedule 8 if the accident occurs
at the mining operation; and
(b) Every occurrence of serious harm
at the mining operation.
(3) The mine operator must notify the
accident or serious harm to WorkSafe
by providing the particulars prescribed
in Schedule 7 to WorkSafe.
(4) The mine operator must also provide
Employers must investigate any accidents

or harm to determine whether a significant
hazard was involved1.
Regulation 228Accident Investigation
(1) The mine operator must ensure that(a) any accident at the mining
operation is investigated; and
(b) the investigation findings are made
available to the mine workers at the
mining operation.
(2) If the accident is a notifiable accident,
the mine operator must ensure that a
report of the investigation findings is
the particulars of the accident or serious
provided to WorkSafe within 30 days
harm, except for personal information
of the date on which the accident
about any mine worker, to every site
occurred.
health and safety representative at the

mining operation.
(5) WorkSafe must make the particulars of
the accident or serious harm, except for
personal information about any mine
worker, available to industry health and
safety representatives.
(6) For the avoidance of doubt, a mine
operator is not required, in relation
(3) A procedure for making findings

available to workers must be included
in the health and safety management
system.
(4) Nothing in this regulation affects
section 7(2) of the Act.
2.9.1OTHER NOTIFICATIONS
to any mine worker, to separately
Mining operations must notify WorkSafe
notify the accident or serious harm
of a number of matters, including:
to WorkSafe on the basis that the
>> the commencement, recommencement,
mine worker is an employee of a selfemployed person contracted to the

mine operator.
The HSE Act requires employers to investigate
accidents or harm that have been recorded in
the accident register (as per section 25 of the
HSE Act) whether or not it was caused by or
arose from a significant hazard. The Regulations
place additional duties on mine operators
to investigate accidents.
Accident investigations should identify
controls to prevent the same or similar
incidents reoccurring.
installation or cessation of the operation

>> the proposed date of installation of:
a shaft
a winding system
>> the appointment of
an SSE
an acting SSE
a mine manager
acting mine manager
>> any of the notifiable accidents set out
in Schedule 8 of the Regulations
>> any of the high-risk activities set out
in Schedule 9 of the Regulations.
The HSE Act, section 7
25
Mine operators also have obligations to submit
All hazardous substances must be approved by
draft PHMPs and PCPs to WorkSafe.
the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA)
Quarries and alluvial mines must notify

WorkSafe about the nature of the operation, its
location, and the name of the relevant manager
for the operation. The zone of operation for
under HSNO. An approval lists the controls, or

rules, that apply to the substance so that
the risks to people and the environment
are safely managed.
mobile crushing plant operating over an area
Controls cover:
should be notified to Worksafe, along with the
>> packaging and labelling
details for the relevant manager.

More details of what must be notified, as well
as the contact details, and notification form,
are available under the Extractives section
of the WorkSafe website.
2.10
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
Many chemicals and fuels used in extractive

operations are hazardous and are controlled
under the Hazardous Substances and New
Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO).
Hazardous substances used in the extractive
industry include:
>> explosives and detonators
>> compressed gases
>> petrol, diesel and liquefied petroleum
gas (LPG).
2.10.1HAZARD CLASSIFICATIONS,
APPROVALS AND CONTROLS
Hazardous substances are classified according
to their hazardous properties. Hazardous
substances may have one or more the
following properties:
>> explosive hazard class 1
>> flammable hazard classes 2, 3 and 4
>> information about hazardous substances

safety data sheets
>> protective clothing and equipment
>> safe storage of hazardous substances
including:
warning signs
container types
storage location and construction
certification of storage locations
and containers
>> training and certification for people who
use hazardous substances, including
approved handler certification and
controlled substance licenses
>> tracking the most hazardous substances,
including explosives
>> emergencies including:
fire extinguishing
spill and leak control
planning for emergencies.
2.10.2PERSON IN CHARGE
HSNO requires a person in charge at all
workplaces to manage hazardous substances.
They must make sure that the HSNO controls
are complied with.
>> oxidising hazard class 5

>> toxic hazard class 6
>> corrosive hazard class 8
>> toxic to the environment (ecotoxic)
hazard class 9.
2.10.3STAYING SAFE WITH HAZARDOUS

SUBSTANCES WHERE TO START
You need to know what hazardous substances
you have and how to manage them. Product
labels and safety data sheets (SDSs) provide
26
information about the products hazards and

how to manage them. Manufacturers and
suppliers must only sell correctly labelled
substances and must provide compliant and
up to date SDSs for hazardous substances.
SDSs contain important information about:
>> first aid
>> storage
>> cleaning up spills
>> the right protective equipment.
Make sure you have SDSs for all your
hazardous substances. Contact your supplier
who must provide them.
Which controls you have to follow depends
on the type and amounts of hazardous
substances you have. Make a list, or inventory,
of all the hazardous substances you have, the
amounts you have, their hazards and approval
numbers. The approval number should be
on the SDS. You can use the information
in your inventory on the HSNO Calculator
(www.hazardoussubstances.govt.nz) and
the Approved Hazardous Substances
with Controls Database with on the
Environmental Protection Authority website
(www.epa.govt.nz).
2.10.4WHERE TO GET MORE INFORMATION
The Hazardous Substances website
(www.hazardoussubstances.govt.nz) provides
information on hazardous substances and
controls. It also has the HSNO calculator.
The Environmental Protection Authoritys
website (www.epa.govt.nz) contains
information about hazardous substance
approvals.
27
PART
Planning and design

This part of the guide provides guidance for designing
safety into mine and quarry operations. It describes in
detail how to plan excavations, tips, ponds, dams, roads,
and vehicle operating areas.
28
PART B
03/
PLANNING FOR
EXCAVATION
IN THIS SECTION:
3.1 Terminology
3.2 Appraisal of ground or strata
instability principal hazard
3.3 Ground or strata instability
principal hazard management
plan (PHMP)
3.4 Geotechnical assessment
3.5 Slope design
3.6 Ground support and
reinforcement systems
29
Planning for excavations requires a good understanding

of ground conditions, and determining ways in which
potential ground failure could be avoided. A systematic
approach to managing ground instability is very important.
design and implementation of ground support
>> how to identify and manage hazards
or reinforcement. The ongoing maintenance
from unstable ground

>> the role of geotechnical assessments
>> how to design safe slopes
>> how to stabilise and support slopes.
The potential impacts of unplanned and
of supports and continuous monitoring for

any indication of movement or potential for
failure are also important components of
a systematic approach.
Refer to Section 7 for more information
on controlling ground stability.
uncontrolled ground movement are:

>> Safety Loss of life or injury to those
working at or visiting the site.
>> Social Loss of income and workforce
confidence, minimised corporate credibility,
and increased liability.
3.1
TERMINOLOGY
Slopes are generally designed as a series

of batters separated by benches, which are
provided at predefined vertical height intervals
(see Figure 2).
>> Financial and economic Disruptions to

operations, product or equipment losses,
Crest
increased stripping and clean-up costs, and

reduced access to markets.
>> Environmental Collapse of or damage
Bench
Batter
Face
to nearby infrastructure, interference

with natural drainage and damage to
surrounding land, natural habitats,
Road or working
Bench
Batter
angle
wildlife or conservation initiatives

and programmes.
Figure 2: Slope design terminology
Safely developing a mine or quarry requires

assessment of the deposit and the factors
Access to an excavation can be by a road or
that will affect ground stability including:
ramp that may spiral around, or be located on
>> the dip and strike
one side of the excavation with switchbacks
>> bedding planes

>> faulting
two access ramp sections (or between a ramp

section and the floor or crest) is defined as
>> folding
the inter-ramp slope. The inter-ramp slope
>> other geological characteristics.
angle is always flatter than the batter angle in
A systematic approach to ground stability

requires a good understanding of ground
conditions before operations start. Slope
designs should be suitable for the ground
conditions and, where necessary, include the
30
at each end. A succession of batters between
that slope. The full height of a slope, from the

toe to the crest, comprising several batters
separated by benches (and access road
sections if the road is on that slope) is the
overall slope (see Figure 3).
SECTION 3.0 // PLANNING FOR EXCAVATION
Crest
Inter-ramp
Slope
Road (or ramp)
of any such failure. The probability of such a

failure actually happening is not relevant in
this context. The consequences depend on
the likely scale of the failure (that is, the size
of the failure and the area affected by it) and
whether people are likely to be fatally injured.
For other surface operations (ie quarries
Road (or ramp)
and alluvials) an appraisal of the operation
Inter-ramp slope angle
must also be done by a competent person to

determine whether a geotechnical assessment
Overall slope
is required.
Overall slope angle

Floor
As a guide:
Figure 3: Slope design inter-ramp and overall
slope details
>> Simple operations (eg shallow depth,

soft material with faces less than 3.5 m,
or competent rock with faces less than
APPRAISAL OF GROUND
OR STRATA INSTABILITY
PRINCIPAL HAZARD
15m) require a geotechnical appraisal by
Excavation faces and ponds should be
that a geotechnical assessment is not
3.2
properly designed, with:
a competent person to determine that the

face design is safe, adequate benching
is in place, and confirm to the operator
required. Assessments should be in writing,
>> stable slope angles
dated and signed with a review period
>> adequate benches
established.
>> bench widths at least half the face height,

and not less than 3.5 m
>> face heights suitable for the site conditions
and excavation method
>> faces that do not exceed the reach
of the excavator
>> faces scaled to control the risk of rock falls
>> faces, at quarries, and working benches
in alluvial mines, that have not been
>> Complex operations (eg individual faces

exceeding 15 m, overall excavation depth
exceeding 30 m, fractured rock, disturbed
geological structure) require a geotechnical
assessment by a competent person.
A geotechnical assessment should be
completed where:
>> The height of any individual face is more
than 15 m.
>> In the case of soils and very weak
undermined.
rock where the height of any part of

The SSE must carry out an appraisal of
an excavation is more than 3.5 metres
the mining operation to identify principal
and the overall slope angle is steeper
hazards at the mining operation .
than 2 horizontal to 1 vertical (27 to the
horizontal) (see Figure 4).

Use competent people for technical input and
advice during the appraisal process, as required.
>> The bottom of the excavation is more

than 30 metres below any surrounding
To determine if ground or strata instability is a
land within 30 metres of the edge of the
principal hazard, consider how an excavation
excavation (that is, the excavation is more
might feasibly fail, and the likely consequences
than 30 metres deep, allowing for any

nearby higher ground) (see Figure 5).
Health and Safety in Employment (Mining and Quarrying) Regulations 2013, regulation 66 (1) (a)
31
>> Irrespective of the excavation face height, depth or angle there are factors that mean
there could be a principal hazard. An example could be fractured rock mass or geological
discontinuities (poor rock mass quality) or the location or proximity of a tip.
>> In the case of stronger rock, and well-cemented gravels, a geotechnical assessment should
be carried out where the overall:
height of any adequately benched slope, from toe to crest, is between 15 m30 m
slope angle is steeper than one horizontal to one vertical (45 to the horizontal)
(see Figure 5).
h>3.5 m and steeper

than 27 (ie 1v:2h)
height
>15 m
height
>3.5 m
degrees
Figure 4: Soils and very weak rock guidance
Following the identification of ground or strata instability as a principal hazard, the SSE must
ensure a geotechnical assessment is completed by a competent person. This must determine
the level of ground or strata support required to safely conduct the mining operation3.
A risk assessment must be completed for the ground or strata instability principal hazard.
A description of how the risk assessment will be conducted and the results of the risk
assessment must be included in the PHMP4.
30 m
height >15 m but <30 m
and steeper than 45
(ie 1v:1h)
height
height
>15 m
degrees
Figure 5: Stronger rock guidance

3
4
32
The Regulations, regulation 71 (1)

The Regulations, regulations 68 (b) and (c)
height
>30 m
The definition of soils and very weak rock and stronger rock is provided in Table 1 below.
TERM
DEFINITION
Soils and very

weak rock
As defined by the NZ Geotechnical Society Incorporated Field Description

of Soil Analysis Guideline (Dec 2005) Table 3.5 Rock Strength Terms being:
Term
Field identification of
specimen
Unconfined
uniaxial
compressive
strength qu
(MPa)
Point load
strength Is(50)
(MPa)
Very weak
Crumbles under firm

blows with point of
geological hammer.
Can be peeled by
a pocket knife
15
<1
Extremely
weak (also
needs
additional
description
in soil
terminology)
Indented by thumb
nail or other lesser
strength terms used
for soils
<1
Note: No correlation is implied between qu and Is(50)

Stronger rock

Term
specimen
Unconfined
uniaxial
compressive
strength qu
(MPa)
Point load
strength Is(50)
(MPa)
Extremely
strong
Can only be chipped with

geological hammer
>250
>10
Very strong
Requires many blows of

geological hammer to break it
100 250
5 10
Strong
Requires more than one blow

of geological hammer to
fracture it
50 100
25
Moderately
strong
Cannot be scraped or peeled

with a pocket knife. Can be
fractured with single firm blow
of geological hammer
20 50
12
Weak
Can be peeled by a pocket

knife with difficulty. Shallow
indentations made by firm
blow with point of geological
hammer
5 20
<1
Table 1: Definition of very weak rock or soils and weak rock or stronger rock
33
Table 2 shows questions that could be considered during a risk assessment completed in respect
of ground instability.
PARAMETER
CONSIDERATIONS
Slope type
Active or inactive
Slope geometry
Overall slope height, slope angle, bench height, bench slope angle,
bench width
Slope material characteristics

(including alteration grade)
Rock or soil, structurally controlled, variable alteration or materials

present, material or discontinuity shear strength parameters
Proximity of existing structures
Property or services adjacent to both crest and toe of slope, both

external and located on site
Proximity of workers
Vulnerability, location relative to potential failure
Proximity of general public
Proximity of public access, roads, footpaths, walkways and so on
Failure mechanism
Rockfall, planar, wedge, toppling, rotational, flow, travel distance
Speed of failure
Rapid (flows, rockfall), slow (rotational), very slow (rotational)
Water (surface water and

groundwater)
Visible signs of seepage or discharge, prevention of detrimental

effects by effective surface water management
Past history of failure
History of instability (type, location and so on), visible signs of

active or previous failure (bulging of slope surfaces and so on)
Existing remedial measures
Bolting, regrading, pumping (de-watering)
Monitoring
Extensometers, piezometers, closure meters, EDM targets, radar
Seismic history
Whether the region is seismically active
Operating parameters
Exposure time of workers (shift), excavation method, associated

equipment (vehicle) exposure, effects of poor blasting
Table 2: Key questions for risk assessment
GROUND OR STRATA INSTABILITY PRINCIPAL HAZARD

MANAGEMENT PLAN (PHMP)
3.3
Where an appraisal has identified a principal hazard, the SSE must ensure there is a PHMP for the
principal hazard5.
The ground or strata instability PHMP must contain information detailed in regulations 68 and 71
of the Regulations. In summary, regulation 71 requires the PHMP to include:
>> when and how ground failure may occur and how it can be avoided
>> suitable ground control methods, including continuous modelling, testing and updating
>> appropriate equipment and procedures for monitoring, recording, interpreting and analysing
data about seismic activity
>> collection, analysis and interpretation of relevant geotechnical data
34
The Regulations, regulation 66 (1) (b)
>> how to maintain ground support integrity

including replacement of defective
supports
>> allowance for higher standards of support
to be installed than that required by
the PHMP.
The ground or strata instability PHMP should
be developed in the context of the whole
HSMS and not in isolation. This will ensure
gaps and overlaps are identified and used
in the implementing of suitable controls for
ground or strata instability.
For more detailed information on the content
of the PHMP, and its relationship with other
management and controls plans, processes
>> formulation of a geotechnical model

>> slope design
>> design, control and monitoring of blasting
>> design, installation and quality control
of rock support
>> design of suitable monitoring systems.
Factors that may be considered during the
geotechnical assessment include:
>> possible seismic (either natural or induced)
or geothermal activity
>> previously excavated or abandoned
workings
>> subsidence or settlement (either controlled
or through strain)
and procedures see WorkSafes Guidance for
>> drainage patterns, groundwater regimes,
a Hazard Management System for Mines and
water inflow and dewatering procedures
Developing a Ground or Strata Instability

Principal Hazard Management Plan.
3.4
GEOTECHNICAL ASSESSMENT
Geotechnical assessments must be carried out

by a competent person.
Geotechnical assessment of ground conditions
is critical to developing a comprehensive
PHMP, where applicable. The data collected
>> equipment and procedures used for scaling

>> effect of time and oxidation on rock
support and stability.
3.4.1FIELD DATA COLLECTION
Field data collection is the process of
obtaining relevant information which
might affect the design, construction and
performance of excavations.
during the geotechnical assessment underpins:
The information collected could include:
>> slope design and its stability
>> site history
>> the implementation of a suitable support
>> topography and geomorphology
system (where required)

>> the ongoing monitoring requirements
suitable to the size and scale of the design.
The geotechnical assessment will provide
an indication of the risk of failure of a
particular slope. This normally involves
application of a factor of safety calculation
but may include more extensive probabilistic
analysis. For more detailed information on
factor of safety (FOS) and probability of
failure (POF), see section 3.5.1.
The geotechnical assessment may include:
>> field data collection
>> local climate

>> hydrogeology and drainage
>> physical geology and geologic structure
>> lithology and rock mass properties.
Data collection should always be carried
out by a competent person (ie a geologist,
engineering geologist or geotechnical
engineer) or a properly trained geotechnician
under the supervision of an engineering
geologist or geotechnical engineer.
More information on field data collection can
be found in Appendix C: Field Data Collection.
35
3.4.2FORMULATION OF A
This could lead to safety implications and
GEOTECHNICAL MODEL
higher operating costs due to slope failures.
The geotechnical assessment should
By applying sound geotechnical engineering
address or include:
practices, safe slopes can be designed
>> An assessment of the geological features
and maintained in almost any geological
of the deposit, including
environment.
the strength of the rock mass,
Varying parameters of bench height, bench
hydrogeology,
the orientation of geological structure,
external influences.
width, batter face angle, and inter-ramp

slope height and slope angle all contribute
to improve overall slope stability. Examples
of each are provided below.
>> The design of bench heights and bench

widths, taking into account excavation
3.5.1SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS AND
method and equipment.
FACTOR OF SAFETY (FOS)
>> How to orient the quarry faces to stability
anticipated modes of failure, the scale of the
consideration of failure modes and how
slope, available data and the perceived risk
they will be managed.
relevant to the particular stage of the slope.
>> An assessment of the suitability of the

design for short and long-term stability
and maintenance of the faces.
>> An indication of the probability of failure
Whether a particular failure is acceptable

will depend on its consequence and risk.
If the failure of a particular slope has no
bearing on its surroundings or safety and
or the factor of safety of the overall
production, it is likely to be of minimal
excavation.
concern. However, this is generally not the
>> The inspection and monitoring

requirements.
>> The design must also allow adequate space
case. As such, slopes need to be designed

to an acceptable standard taking into account
the consequence of failure and the inherent
for haul roads with provision for safety
uncertainty in the geotechnical model.
features as necessary, ie
Slope design is essentially governed by
suitable road widths, with
two factors, the consequence of failure
inner rock trap and berm,
and the degree of inherent uncertainty.
outer edge protection (ie windrow) and

face edge stand-off.
3.5
SLOPE DESIGN
At mines or quarries there is a tendency to

increase the slope angle to decrease waste
rock stripping and possibly generate higher
return on investment. However, increasing the
slope angle decreases the stability of the slope.
36
Fundamental to slope stability analysis are the
for blasting and excavation, including
It is usual practice to apply a FOS or POF to

the design geometry. When the consequence
of failure or the level of uncertainty is high, the
design criteria should be altered accordingly
(resulting in a more conservative design).
An example of the FOS and POF design
criteria approach is shown in Table 3.
WALL
CLASS
CONSEQUENCE
OF FAILURE
DESIGN
FOS
DESIGN
POF
Moderately
serious
1.2
10%
Serious
1.5
1%
Serious*
2.0
0.3%
EXAMPLES
Highwalls not carrying major infrastructure
Highwalls carrying major infrastructure

(eg treatment plant, ROM pad, tailings
structures, crushing structures)
Permanent highwalls near public infrastructure
and adjoining leases
Source: Safe Work Australia Ground Control in Open Pit Mines (July 2011)
Table 3: Example of FOS and POF design criteria approach
TYPES OF ANALYSIS
When developing stability analysis criteria it is critical to have an understanding of the origins
and limitations of the various geotechnical engineering design procedures when applying them.
Further information on the following types of analysis can be found in Appendix E: Types of Analysis:
>> rock mass rating (RMR) and mining rock mass rating (MRMR) Classification Systems
>> kinematic analysis of structurally controlled failures
>> limit equilibrium analysis
>> numerical analysis.
MODES OF FAILURE
Collecting and interpreting information on major structures and other geological features is
important in determining failure potential.
Steeper and higher slopes or batters will generate greater driving forces. This increases the
potential for rock mass failure, presenting a higher risk. Slopes or batters excavated within rock
masses that contain persistent geological structures have greater potential to develop large
wall-scale failures.
Control of large failures is generally more difficult and important than small failures.
This section contains information on dams as well as the tips, ponds and voids principal
hazard. This is because dams are often covered by this PHMP, particularly with tailings dams.
Potential large scale failures are usually controlled by:
>> excavating slopes or batters to a shallower angle
>> depressurisation of groundwater in the rock mass
>> installing ground support and reinforcement.
Using ground support and reinforcement to control large scale failures is generally more costly
than when used for discontinuities with shorter trace lengths.
* Where a mutually acceptable agreement to allow excavation cannot be made between the quarry or mine owner and the
owner of the adjoining structure or plot of land. Note a higher standard of geotechnical data is required for the design
of category 3 slopes compared to category 1 and 2 slopes
37
Basic modes of failure are listed below
Step-path failure is similar to planar failure, but
(Girard J.M. 2012).
the sliding is due to the combined mechanisms

of multiple discontinuities or the tensile failure
of the intact rock connecting members of the
master joint set.
Figure 6: Planar failure
Planar failures occur when a geological

discontinuity, such as a bedding plane, strikes
parallel to the slope face and dips into the
excavation at an angle steeper than the angle
of friction.
Figure 9: Ravelling failure
Ravelling: Weathering of material and

expansion and contraction associated with
freeze-thaw cycles are the main causes
of ravelling. This type of failure generally
produces small rock falls, not massive failures.
Figure 7: Wedge failure
Wedge failures occur when two discontinuities

intersect and their line of intersection
daylights in the face.
Figure 10: Toppling failure
Toppling can occur when vertical or

near-vertical structures dip toward the pit.
In this case, the bench face height should
be limited to a distance roughly equal to the
bench width. This will help catch any toppling
material and decreases the chances of
impacting work on the pit floor.
Figure 8: Step-path failure
38
3.5.3OVERALL SLOPE DESIGN

The methods of analysis required for overall
slope design are the same as those used for
the batter design, except the scale is different.
In stronger rocks, overall slopes may fail by
planar and wedge sliding. In soils and weak
rocks, they may fail by toppling and rotational
shearing. More complex collapses involving
failure through the rock mass will require
Figure 11: Circular failure
analysis by numerical methods.

Batter stability immediately below and above
Circular failures (or slumps) generally occur
the access ramp should also be considered
in weak rock or soil slopes. They do not
when designing inter-ramp slopes. Batter
necessarily occur along a purely circular arc,
instability immediately below could undermine
but some form of curved failure surface is
the ramp and instability immediately above
normally apparent. Failures can occur at the
could spill onto the ramp.
surface (slope failure), at the toe (toe failure),

or at depth in a weak zone.
3.5.2BATTER AND FINAL BENCH DESIGN
3.5.4WORKING BENCH WIDTHS

To determine working bench widths, consider
the type of equipment and the method of
Slopes are generally designed as a series of
mining or quarrying. You should ensure there
batters separated by benches, at predefined
is enough room to allow the:
height intervals.
>> cordoning off of unsafe ground conditions
Benches should be wide enough to stop
that may occur
potentially hazardous rock falls and contain
>> roadway to be located away from the face
any spills from the batters above.
>> excavating mobile plant to work
The final decision on the maximum batter
>> correct positioning of trucks being loaded
height should be based on:
>> safe queuing of trucks while waiting to
>> reliability of the batter slope (ie stability

under potential failure modes)
>> availability of equipment for adequate
scaling to remove loose pieces of rock.
For reliability of the batter design, all possible
failure modes should be identified and their
stability assessed by kinematic and limit
be loaded.
People should not be allowed to work near
or under hazardous faces or banks. Unsafe
ground conditions should be corrected
promptly, or the area cordoned off.
3.5.5GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE
equilibrium analyses, as appropriate.
WATER CONTROL
Further information about batter and bench
Mines or quarries excavated below the
design can be found in Appendix F: Batters and

final bench design, including information on:
>> batter height and reach
ground water table may need some form of

dewatering and depressurisation. The most
significant related problem is the effect
that water pressure has on the stability of
>> final bench spacing
the slopes. Water pressure in structural
>> final bench widths.
defects in the rock mass, and pore spaces
39
in rock material reduces effective stress,
shape. Safety is paramount, but economic
and consequently shear strength.
viability and the various requirements based on
At some sites, with minor ground water inflow

from slopes or floor, evaporation alone can
Ground support and reinforcement systems
account for all dewatering requirements.
(artificial support) may include retaining walls,
At other sites, major pumping operations
placement of rock or cable bolts. It also may
may be necessary. The approach to ground
include structures such as drilled or cast in-
water control can be by means of water
place piles, earth and rock anchors, reinforced
abstraction methods such as:
earth including the use of geotextile and
>> using production bores
protection against erosion.
>> through sumps or trenches

>> through sub-horizontal drainage holes
drilled into the slopes.
3.6.1DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
When providing artificial support you should
match the design of the support system to
Each method can be used individually or
the ground conditions. Design methods for
in combination to produce the required
artificial support should consider:
result. Selection of the most appropriate

method will depend largely on the local and
regional hydrogeological conditions, the
relative importance of depressurisation to
>> the function of the support (eg to prevent

rock fall, slope failure or rock slide)
>> geological structure in and around the slope
the specified design and the required rate of
>> in situ rock mass strength and behaviour
production. At large extractive sites, all three
of the rock support or reinforcement
methods may be required for groundwater
system under load
control. The production bores can be used

in advance of and during extraction.
Control of surface drainage is also an
important aspect of the implementation of
the slope design. Surface water drainage
paths through and around the site should
be designed, constructed and maintained so
that water does not pond at the crest or toe
of critical slopes. To stop scouring on a face,
water should not be discharged over a face
except in a single controlled point. If possible,
the water should be directed along the bench
to the roadway, and along an open drain to
a collection point, sump or settling pond.
GROUND SUPPORT AND

REINFORCEMENT SYSTEMS
3.6
>> groundwater regime and chemistry, rock

stress levels and the changes in rock stress
during the life of the excavation
>> the potential for seismic events
(earthquake or blasting)
>> retaining the overall factor of safety.
Effect of timing of installation: Generally,
the earlier artificial support is installed the
more effective it is. In areas requiring support,
installation should be undertaken as soon as
practicable to limit potential loosening and
unravelling of the rock mass. Extended delays
in the installation may jeopardise effectiveness
of the artificial support. Ideally, identified
wedges or blocks that are potentially unstable
should be secured as excavation continues,
with artificial support being installed
A number of factors influence whether ground
progressively.
support is required. The basic principle of
Corrosion: The influence of corrosion means
ground support and reinforcement is to allow

the operator to maintain the same overall
slope angle while retaining the overall factor of
safety. This is important when addressing zones
of weakness to maintain a consistent design
40
operating type also influences design decisions.
no conventional forms of artificial support will

last indefinitely they all have a finite design
life. The use of galvanised components is one
way in which the life of the support will be
prolonged.
Quality control: Each element or layer of
and can lock key blocks into place. It also
artificial support should be combined so that
protects the rock against erosion by water and
the overall system is well-matched to the
weathering. To protect water-sensitive ground,
ground conditions for the design life of the
the shotcrete should be continuous and crack-
excavation.
free and reinforced with a wire mesh or fibres.
You should develop a quality control
Fibrecrete (steel fibre reinforced shotcrete)
procedure to ensure the standard of
was introduced in the 1970s and has gained
installation of artificial support meets the
worldwide acceptance as a replacement
design expectations for all ground conditions
for traditional wire mesh reinforced plain
at the site.
shotcrete. Steel fibres are incorporated in
3.6.2ARTIFICIAL SUPPORT MEASURES

Artificial support measures can be categorised
into four main groups (Read and Stacey 2009):
>> rock bolting systems
>> retaining type structures
>> surface treatments
>> buttressing.
ROCK BOLTING SYSTEMS
Rock bolting systems typically fall into
the shotcrete to improve its crack resistance,

ductility, energy absorption and impact
resistance characteristics. Properly designed,
fibrecrete can reduce or eliminate cracking,
a common problem in plain shotcrete.
Slope erosion protective measures slopes
which are highly susceptible to erosion
should be protected from rain and wind.
A rock or cobble cover of 300 mm thickness
is usually sufficient to protect against wind
and rain. Alternatively grasses can be used.
three categories: rock bolts, dowels (shear
Rock netting linked steel wire and rings
pins) and cable bolts. Rock bolting systems
connected into sheets. Draped over a face,
can be improved by connecting individual
they limit rock movement and the energy in
components by welded mesh or strapping.
any movement. Useful in poor ground where
More information on rock bolting systems
fretting needs to be controlled.
can be found in Appendix G: Rock Bolting
Hydro-seeding is a popular method of
Systems.
quickly establishing grasses on steep batters.
RETAINING TYPE STRUCTURES
BUTTRESSING
Retaining walls are typically formed from
A simple method of increasing slope stability
precast concrete or in situ poured concrete,
is to increase the weight of material at the toe,
steel sheet piling or bored piles. Walls can be
creating a counterforce that resists failure.
reinforced or un-reinforced and can be tied
A berm or buttress of earth or rock fall can
back with tendons into the rock.
simply be dumped onto the toe of the slope.
Proper drainage behind the wall is critical
Brocken rock or riprap is preferred to
to their performance. Drainage material will
overburden because it has a greater
reduce or eliminate the hydraulic pressure and
frictional resistance to shear and is free
increase the stability of the fill material behind
draining, reducing problems with plugging
the wall.
groundwater flow.
More information on retaining type structures
Shear trenches or shear keys provide
can be found in Appendix H: Retaining type
increased shearing resistance to failure and
structures.
also serve as a subsurface drain. A shear

trench is frequently a good supplement to
SURFACE TREATMENTS
flattened slopes and berms. Shear trenches
Shotcrete lining provides ground support
should extend the full length of the slope.
41
PART B
04/
PLANNING
FOR TIPS,
PONDS, VOIDS
AND DAMS
IN THIS SECTION:
4.1 Appraisal of tips, ponds and
voids principal hazard
4.2 Tips, ponds or voids principal
hazard management plan
(PHMP)
4.3 Planning and design criteria
for tips
4.4 Planning and design criteria
for ponds or dams
4.5 Construction of a tip or pond
4.6 Rehabilitation of tips
42
SECTION 4.0 // PLANNING FOR TIPS, PONDS, VOIDS AND DAMS
A well designed and constructed tip, pond or dam

will have the lowest long-term and operational risk
(eg structural failure).
The consequences depend on:
>> how to identify and manage hazards
>> the likely scale of the failure (ie the size
from tips, ponds, voids, and dams
of the failure and the area affected by it)
>> the role of geotechnical assessments
>> whether people are likely to be fatally injured.
>> criteria for planning and designing tips,
Use a competent person for technical input and
ponds, and dams

>> processes for constructing and maintaining
safe tips, ponds, and dams.
advice during the appraisal process, as required.

As a guide, complete an appraisal to
determine whether a tips, ponds or voids
The design of tips, ponds or dams should
principal hazard exists where:
allow for:
>> The tip is, or will be, in a wholly or
>> slope of the foundation
mainly solid state and not in solution or
>> geotechnical properties of the base
suspension (ie not likely to flow if not

contained) and
and material
>> earthquake risk
the area of the tip exceeds 10,000 m2 or
>> surrounding area drainage, surface
the height of the tip exceeds 15 m or

the average gradient of the land
drainage and under-drainage

>> size and lifespan
>> adjacent infrastructure and land ownership
>> final landscape and stability requirements
covered by the tip exceeds 1 in 12.

Or
>> The tip or pond contains, or will contain,
any liquid or material wholly or mainly in
>> equipment and operational methods
solution or suspension (ie likely to flow if
to be used.
not contained) and

the contents of the tip or pond is more
APPRAISAL OF TIPS, PONDS

AND VOIDS PRINCIPAL HAZARD
4.1
than 4 m above the level of any land

which is within 50 m of its perimeter or
the contents of the pond exceeds
20,000 m3.

hazards at the mining operation6.
Or
>> Irrespective of the size of the tip, pond
To determine if tips, ponds or voids are a
or void, other factors (eg the geology,
principal hazard, you should consider how
location or proximity to an excavation)
a tip, pond or void might feasibly fail, and
means there is a principal hazard.
the likely consequences of any such failure.
Or
The probability of such a failure actually
>> Vehicles operate near the edge of a tip,
happening is not relevant in this context.
pond or void.
The Regulations, regulation 66 (1) (a)
43
Area covered by tip or stockpile >10,000 m2
height
>15 m
>5 (average gradient >1v:12h)
Figure 12: Guidance for tips (solid)
50 m
Content of tip >20000 m3

(excluding containment bund)
Height
>4 m
Figure 13: Guidance for tips (liquid) and ponds
A risk assessment must be completed for the tips, ponds, and voids principal hazard.
A description of how the risk assessment will be conducted and the results of the risk
assessment must be included in the tips, ponds, and voids PHMP7.
In addition to the above, the SSE must ensure a risk reassessment of the stability of the tip,
pond, or void is carried out by a competent person at least once every 2 years after the date
the SSE has approved the PHMP, and, where construction of a tip, pond or void deviates from
the geotechnical design, and, if a new tip, pond or void is created8.
7
8
44

The Regulations, regulation 82
TIPS, PONDS AND VOIDS

PRINCIPAL HAZARD MANAGEMENT
PLAN (PHMP)
Where an appraisal has recognised a principal
a hazard management system for mines.
4.2
hazard, the SSE must ensure there is a principal

hazard management plan (PHMP) for it9.
4.2.1GEOTECHNICAL ASSESSMENT
Regardless of the result of the risk appraisal,
Where a tip, pond or void has been appraised
a mining operation must have a PHMP if a tip
as a principal hazard, the PHMP must include
is or will be:
a geotechnical assessment. This must be
>> located on a slope
proportionate with the type and scale of
>> greater than 15 metres high

>> greater than 100,000 m3 in volume10.
The tips, ponds or voids PHMP must contain
information detailed in regulations 68 and 81
of the Regulations. In summary, regulation 81
tipping operations and consider:

>> the underlying geotechnical structure
at the tip site
>> the properties of the material being tipped
>> the creation of any ponds or voids12.
requires information on:
A geotechnical assessment will dictate any
>> procedures and processes for the safe
foundation and surface treatment required
design, construction and maintenance
and may include any or all of:
of tips, ponds or voids
>> removal of unsuitable, weak material

in the foundation
>> a geotechnical assessment

>> road design and traffic movement
>> benching of the foundation
>> the dumping rules
>> installation of under-drains and final

slope toe drains
>> records of material tipped

>> an inspection and monitoring regime.
Where regular inspections are required by the
PHMP, the PHMP must specify the nature and
interval of inspections. It must also specify
the appointment of a competent person to
supervise the conduct of dumping operations,
including a requirement this person supervises
every inspection of a tip on the site11.
The tips, ponds and voids PHMP should be
developed in the context of the whole health
and safety management system, not in
isolation. This will ensure gaps and overlaps
are identified and used in the implementing
of suitable controls for tips, ponds, and voids.
>> installation of surface cut-off drains.

Using data collected from the geotechnical
assessment, develop a geotechnical design
which establishes appropriate foundations.
A geotechnical recommendation for the
maximum lift height, depths, volumes and
maximum overall tip height should be
provided as part of the geotechnical design.
4.2.2RECORDS TO BE KEPT
Where a tip or pond has been appraised as a
principal hazard, the PHMP must provide for
record keeping of the materials being tipped13.
Quarry and alluvial mines are recommended
to keep records where the tip or pond has
been appraised as a principal hazard.
9
10
11

The Regulations, regulation 66 (c)
12
13
The Regulations, regulation 81 (b)

The Regulations, regulation 81 (e)
45
PLANNING AND DESIGN

CRITERIA FOR TIPS
4.3
You should proactively design and plan

dumping activities not rely solely on
reactionary design. You should be aware
of the properties of the overburden, and
the influence of the local environment on
tip stability.
To make sure health and safety hazards
are controlled, consider:
>> the geological nature of the area (in
particular the foundation of the tip)
>> the quantity, type, and rehabilitation
of overburden
>> the type and size of the mobile plant
to be used and access roads for vehicles
and pedestrians
>> preparation of the receiving area
>> settling requirements, drainage and
runoff controls
>> stabilising methods, including inspections
>> spontaneous combustion susceptibility
work. You must notify WorkSafe in writing at

least 24 hours before you intend to undertake
tree-felling14.
Subsoil drainage should be considered, to
ensure there can be no liquefaction of the
material placed there. Subsoil drainage can
be as simple as placing large rocks to allow
moisture to wick through. However, this
could be a more sophisticated system using
drain coil and piping to capture and transport
moisture through the material, to a controlled
discharge below the tip. Design water
diversion and drainage structures according
to acceptable engineering standards and
perform to these for the full life of the tip.
Where rehabilitation is required, undertake
this as soon as possible to prevent scouring
and water damage through erosion.
Design access roads and other vehicle
operating areas to acceptable engineering
standards for the number and type of vehicles
requiring access. Design criteria should include
road width, road gradient, edge protection,
signage, speed limits, lighting, overhead
>> controlling public access
hazards and passing rules. Refer to section 5
>> any other hazards which may affect safety
for further information on roads.
(eg overhead power lines).
Adjacent stockpiles can have an effect on
Tips should be designed to take into
each other; for example, stability may be
account the full range of foundation
altered where they overlap. The adequacy
materials, tip materials and ground and
of vehicle routes should also be considered
surface water conditions.
when planning the position and size of
Prepare all tip sites to safely receive the

material. This includes removal of vegetation
and topsoil, and keying into the substrata
stockpiles. In particular, the risk of collision

can be minimised by ensuring a clear field
of view for drivers (refer section 11.9.4).
to ensure the stability of the material
As part of planning you should include
placed above.
appropriate edge protection (refer sections
Where tree felling is required, competent
5.3.9 and 8.2.3).
workers with appropriate tree felling

qualifications must be used to undertake the
14
46
Health and Safety in Employment Regulations 1995, regulation 26
PLANNING AND DESIGN

CRITERIA FOR PONDS OR DAMS
>> characteristics of embankment or other
The site for a pond (or tailings dam) must
static liquefaction and integrated waste
4.4
be selected to eliminate hazards or minimise

the potential impact on people. This includes
during operations, decommissioning and after
retaining structures (stability, erosion

resistance, resistance to dynamic or
landform)
>> operating strategy
abandonment, particularly in the event of
>> requirement for access
the following:
>> characteristics and availability of cover
>> seepage
>> dust generation
>> exposure to chemicals or hazardous
particulates
>> erosion
>> overtopping
>> abrupt failure of retaining structure
and rehabilitation methods

>> whether there are any populated areas
downstream which may be adversely
affected in the event of a failure.
Site abandonment should be considered
during the design stage to ensure postabandonment performance will meet
stakeholder expectations and regulatory
>> impediment of surface water flows
requirements. Abandonment and rehabilitation
>> pollution.
planning should ensure the pond disposal area
Physical factors that should be considered

during site selection and design include:
>> hydrology (potential for flooding and
catchment area characteristics)
>> topography (influence of watershed,
streams, and creek systems)
>> foundation material (water tightness,
strength, and liquefaction potential)
>> foundation conditions (physical,
geochemical, and geotechnical properties)
>> characteristics of construction (suitability,
availability, and proximity)
>> characteristics of tailings material (physical,
geochemical and geotechnical properties)
>> climate (rainfall patterns, evaporation rates
and prevailing winds)
>> geology (faults, fractures, shear zones
and areas of instability)
>> hydrogeology (potential impact
on ground water resources)
>> seismicity
>> minimum freeboard
is left such that it is able to:

>> maintain an acceptable level of hazard
controls (eg for dust control, access,
and so on)
>> remain structurally stable
>> resist deterioration through erosion
and decay
>> prevent loss of containment.
4.5 CONSTRUCTION OF A TIP
OR POND
You should develop and implement a
construction plan to ensure the tip or pond
construction meets design specifications
and tolerances. This should include quality
assurance procedures. The plan should also
contain systems of work and procedures to
ensure the proposed construction can be
carried out safely.
Use a competent person to ensure
construction of tips or ponds meet design
specifications and tolerances, and that the
following are documented:
>> seepage control methods
47
>> the conditions encountered during
to accumulate against or on any part of the
testing). This should be verified against
tip, unless it is specifically designed as a dam
those assumed in the design
or pond.
>> corrective measures taken where
Where tips are constructed above an existing
conditions did not meet the original design
water course, the water course should be
or specifications
diverted or culverts of sufficient size provided
>> all changes required that deviated from

the original design
>> the testing and measurement regime
to validate the design parameters
>> survey data and drawings of the tip
or pond construction.
The true locations of the following features
should be shown in your design:
>> borrow pits and embankments
>> drains and seeping trenches
>> topsoil stockpiles and capping
material sources
>> process water and return water ponds
to channel the water through the tip area.

The tip should have internal drainage to deal
with expected rainfall. This is usually provided
by under-tip drains or coarse, permeable
layers positioned at appropriate levels. Internal
drainage systems should be designed by a
suitably competent engineer or hydrologist.
Drainage systems must be maintained.
4.5.2DAM SAFETY SCHEME
For storing water or another fluid under
constant pressure you must comply with
the requirements of a dam, as set out in the
Building Act 2004. Structures at extractives
>> monitoring instrumentation
sites that may fit the definition of a dam include
>> decant towers
settling ponds, tailing dams and reservoirs.
>> buried pipework and cables.
For more detailed information on dam
The construction records and monitoring data
notifications, dam classification, dam safety
form the basis of the design of subsequent

stages. Where construction is staged, a
separate construction report should be
prepared for each stage.
Your tip or pond may also be considered a dam
under the Building Act 2004. You can view the
Building Act 2004 at www.legislation.govt.nz.
assurance programmes or dam compliance

certificates see www.dbh.govt.nz.
4.5.3SMALL DAMS
Dams are to be designed, built and maintained
to an appropriate standard. Substandard dams
can fail, causing injury to workers, as well as,
damage to equipment and financial loss.
4.5.1DRAINAGE OF A TIP
The following information was supplied
If sufficient water is present, either from heavy
by the Ministry of Business, Innovation
rainfall or other sources, some or all of a tip

can become saturated. In this case the water
in the saturated portion has a buoyant effect
and reduces the strength of the material,
making the tip more prone to sliding. As such,
measures should be taken to ensure water
48
drains away. Water should never be allowed
construction (including field and laboratory
and Employment. The information does

not prescribe how small dams should be
constructed or maintained. It is a guide
on ensuring a dam complies with statutory
requirements, including those in the
Building Act 2004.
For further general information on inspecting
CONSTRUCTION OF A SMALL DAM
small dams, constructing small dams or the
The construction of a small dam, although not
Building Code see the following documents

available at www.dbh.govt.nz/small-damsguidance:
>> The NewZealand Society of Large
requiring building consent, requires careful

consideration of design and construction
methodology. In the first instance, you should
employ a technical expert to provide advice
Dams (NZSOLD) Guidelines on
on designing and constructing a small dam to
inspecting small dams.
make sure it is fit for purpose and it complies
>> The Auckland Regional Council

Dam Safety Guidelines.
>> The Building Regulations 1992
(Building Code).
with the Building Code.

A small dam is expected to have the following
features:
Foundations and structural support
As provided by guidance issued by MBIE, a
The areas of ground on which the dam is
small dam can be considered any dam that:
located (including the areas of adjacent
(a) has a height of less than 4 metres; or
ground) form part of the total water barrier.
(b) holds less than 20,000 cubic metres volume.
If the foundations do not adequately support

the basic small dam structure, or are weak
However, the Act states that all building work
or prone to high seepage flows, they can
carried out must comply with the Building
cause the dam to become useless or to fail.
Regulations 1992 (also known as the Building
The foundation of a small dam is often the
Code). Building work includes the construction
natural materials on which it stands. A clean,
and alteration of small dams even though they
stable foundation of adequate strength and
are exempt from requiring a building consent
low permeability is vital for a small dams
for this work.
durability and performance. An adequate seal
The Building Code sets out performance
at the dam foundation and abutments must be
standards that building work must meet, and

covers aspects such as structural stability
formed to reduce leakage from the reservoir.

Otherwise, it may not fill or excessive seepage
and durability. The Building Code does not
may cause dam failure.
prescribe how building work should be done
Spillway and high stream flow prevention
(it has no detailed requirements for design

and construction), but states how completed
building work, and its components, must
perform. This is important when considering
the construction of a small dam, as each dam
is unique to its location and environment.
All dams require at least one working spillway.

A flood spillway prevents high stream flows
caused by heavy or prolonged downpours
from overtopping the dam crest. This causes
erosion of the dam materials, and may lead
to a breach of the dam. The flood spillway is
Design, construct and maintain all dams in
normally formed around the end of the small
a way that:
dam and extends downstream, clear of the
>> safeguards people and property from
dam toe. The flood spillway must be of a size
structural failure
>> complies with the Building Code
throughout its life
>> has a low failure probability.
adequate for flood flows expected for the

rainfall and catchment size or topography.
A smaller service spillway for a small dam
may also exist and will normally be a culvert
or pipe which takes normal flows.
49
Storage capacity
Assess the volume of storage to ensure it
prevent or minimise environmental impacts
is large enough for the intended purpose.
>> to rehabilitate disturbed areas for a land
Sufficient freeboard must be provided to
use (eg return of disturbed areas to a
prevent overtopping of the dam.
natural state or other acceptable land use).
Embankment and slope angles
Rehabilitation should address management
The embankment must have a crest of
of water runoff, air quality, stability of
sufficient width, and may require protection
material, erosion control, and treatment
if vehicles or heavy stock will have access.
and containment of any possible hazardous
The upstream and downstream slope angles
substances.
need to be chosen carefully, to ensure the
Stability of material and control of water runoff
embankment slopes are stable. To ensure a

high standard of compaction, the fill material
needs to be carefully selected, sufficiently
impervious, and placed at the correct moisture
level and thickness of each layer. Riprap may
be required on the upstream face to protect
the dam against wave lap erosion.
Pipes and conduits
Pipes are often placed through the bottom
are the most important as they will be the first

indicators of any problems in the rehabilitated
area. Stability should be monitored by study
of the toe area of any overburden tip.
Ensure it is well compacted and not bulging
or moving out from its original placement.
Another indicator of movement would be
cracks appearing around the crest or top
of the rehabilitated tip.
of the dam for drawing of water. However, it
Rehabilitation is a requirement for all new
is important to note these can also be weak
resource consents and most current resource
points for seepage, causing erosion of the
consents.
dam fill. Technical advice is recommended
Rehabilitation should be considered and
for correct design details where pipes pass

through a dam.
4.6
REHABILITATION OF TIPS
When the site is temporarily (suspended) or

permanently closed (abandoned), it should
be left in a safe condition.
Typically rehabilitation is carried out
progressively, meaning parts of the site can
be abandoned, while other parts are still
operational; for example, rehabilitation of
overburden tips that have reached capacity.
The objectives of abandonment of all or part
of a site are:
>> to ensure the public is safe by preventing
inadvertent access to site infrastructure
>> to provide for the stable, long-term storage
of overburden and tailings
50
>> to make sure the site is self-sustaining and
incorporated into all aspects of site planning,

construction and operation. This allows key
aspects of the abandonment to be planned
for throughout the sites life cycle. Plans
should identify measures to be undertaken
during the operations phase that are aimed
at progressive rehabilitation of disturbed or
developed areas of the site.
Review and revise rehabilitation plans as
necessary throughout the sites life cycle.
The plans may become more detailed,
incorporating more activities related
to the site and consideration of more
site conditions and monitoring results.
PART B
05/
PLANNINGFOR
ROADS AND
VEHICLE
OPERATING
AREAS
IN THIS SECTION:
5.1 Appraisal of roads and other
vehicle operating areas
5.2 Roads and other vehicle
operating areas principal
hazard management plan
5.3 Design and layout of roads
51
Roads and other vehicle operating areas can introduce

significant hazards at an extractives site. However, a
well-designed and maintained site will make workplace
vehicle accidents less likely.
This section describes how to:
To determine if roads and other vehicle
>> identify and manage hazards from roads
operating areas are a principal hazard,
and other vehicle operating areas

>> plan and design safe vehicle routes, road
structures, gradients, corners, drainage,
surfacing, visibility, and areas for working,
turning, and stopping
>> manage traffic and provide clear
information and guidance for drivers.
The overall message is safety by design.
Considering what vehicle activities will
be conducted on a road or other vehicle
operating areas will help determine the kind
of hazards that may be present. The unwanted
events associated with roads and other vehicle
operating areas include:
>> vehicles rolling over or going over edges
>> ground failure on to or below vehicles
>> collisions between vehicles and unwanted
interaction between vehicles and people
>> uncontrolled movement of vehicles
>> vehicles contacting overhead power lines
or other structures.
Assessing the risks will help you take the correct
action to eliminate, isolate or minimise hazards.
consider the following factors. The probability

of such a failure actually happening is not
relevant in this context.
>> How a road or other vehicle operating
area might feasibly fail and the likely
consequences of a failure (eg collapse, slips).
>> The type of vehicles using the road or other
vehicle operating area.
>> The activities that are undertaken and the
consequence of any interactions between
vehicles and pedestrians, structures or
other vehicles. For example vehicles
carrying passengers, light and heavy
vehicle interactions, travelling under
overhead power lines, loading over a cab
where a driver may be present and so on.
>> How a vehicle may lose control and the
likely consequences (eg driver falling
asleep, mechanical failure, tip over).
>> The hazards on the road or other vehicle
operating area (eg sharp corners, steep
gradients, large drop-offs and so on).
>> Any other hazard involving vehicles.
Use competent people for technical input and
advice during the appraisal process as required.
APPRAISAL OF ROADS AND

OTHER VEHICLE OPERATING AREAS
5.1

hazards at the mining operation20.
20
21
52

A risk assessment must be completed for

the roads and other vehicle operating areas
principal hazard. A description of how the risk
assessment will be conducted and the results
must be included in the Roads and Other
Vehicle Operating Areas PHMP21.
SECTION 5.0 // PLANNING FOR ROADS AND VEHICLE OPERATING AREAS
Regularly renew whether intersections

and roads are necessary.
ROADS AND OTHER VEHICLE

OPERATING AREAS PRINCIPAL
HAZARD MANAGEMENT PLAN
5.2
Where an appraisal has recognised a principal

hazard, the SSE must ensure there is a PHMP22.
The roads and other vehicle operating areas
PHMP must contain information detailed in
regulations 68 and 80 of the Regulations.
Regulation 80 requires the PHMP to provide
for the following areas including:
General road design:
>> controls for the safe design, layout,
operation, construction and maintenance
of roads and other vehicle operating areas
>> road maximum grade, minimum widths and
radius for curves, camber, surface material
specifications and drainage needs.
Measures to control risks associated with:
>> any banks, steep drops or any other hazard
adjacent to the road or other vehicle
operating area
>> interactions between vehicles, considering
speed, volume and other relevant matters
>> interaction between site vehicles and
public vehicles
>> interactions between vehicles and
pedestrians
>> interaction between vehicles and fixed
>> measures to manage the risks of trucks

overturning
>> safe tip areas and routes
>> recommended methods of safe working.
Procedures for the operation and movement
of loads:
>> shifting equipment and discharging loads
>> the maximum loads that can be carried
or towed.
Worker safety:
>> how workers will safely access and exit
their place of work
>> how workers will safely work or travel on or
near roads or other vehicle operating areas
>> areas to be considered prohibited zones.
Vehicle safety and maintenance:
>> park-up, refuelling and recharging safety
requirements
>> the safe storage of fuel
>> the periodic inspection and testing
of the braking system
>> the safe operation and requirements
of vehicles carrying passengers or
transporting equipment including
separation of loads, the use of seat
belts or other restraint devices and
the provision of seating
>> how defects identified when inspecting
vehicles will be addressed.
The roads and other vehicle operating areas
structures (eg gas pipes and processing
PHMP should be developed in the context
machinery) including overhead and
of the whole health and safety management
underground power lines
system, and not in isolation. This will ensure
>> the use of remote control vehicles
gaps and overlaps are identified and used in

the implementing of suitable controls roads
>> adverse climatic conditions (eg rain, ice, fog).
and other vehicle operating areas.
In relation to dump trucks:
For roads and other vehicle operating areas
>> the design, construction, and
recognised as a principal hazard, it is likely
22
maintenance of safety benches,
a mechanical engineering PCP will also
windrows and collision bunds
be required.
53

a Hazard Management System for Mines.
DESIGN AND LAYOUT

OF ROADS
5.3
Every site is different and likely to present

different hazards and risks. However, a welldesigned and maintained site with suitable
separation of vehicles and people will make
vehicle accidents less likely.
Safe workplaces are achieved by separating
pedestrians and vehicles, light and heavy
vehicles, and providing hazard-free
vehicle routes.
5.3.3VEHICLE ROUTES
Where practicable you must eliminate the
hazard of pedestrians and vehicles interacting.
The most effective way of achieving this is
to provide separate pedestrian and vehicle
routes, and where practicable, separating
light and heavy vehicles.
Design roads that are:
>> adequate for the number, type and size
of the largest vehicles that may use them
>> suitable for the varying driver positions
which includes height and cab position
(eg right, left or centre drivers position).
Roads should:
>> have firm surfaces, adequate drainage
and safe profiles to allow safe vehicle
movements
5.3.1TERRAIN AND GEOTECHNICAL

CONSIDERATIONS
>> where appropriate, have edge protection
Take into account the terrain and geotechnical
and road markings (eg sealed roads) or
issues when designing and establishing roads.
delineators showing the right of way
They will impact on the type of operation
>> have speed limits and speed control
that will be carried out, the mobile equipment
measures specific to site conditions and
to be used, and where infrastructure can
the types of vehicles using the route
be located.
5.3.2OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS
Consider how operating parameters will
impact on the design, layout, and materials
used to construct the road and maintenance
requirements prior to constructing and
establishing roads. This includes:
>> the nature, type and, load of vehicles
to use the road
>> have adequate rock fall protection

measures (eg a catch ditch, catch bench
or suitable barrier)
>> be clearly delineated in the hours of
darkness by using reflective marker pegs
or similar devices or have suitable access
restrictions to hazards (eg ponds or other
water filled hazards or steep drop-offs)
>> allow for break back of the bench crest
during the life of the road. The amount of
>> expected volume of traffic
break back will depend on geotechnical
>> operating hours
characteristics of the bench
>> vehicle operating speeds

>> gradients (including superelevation)
>> materials available for road construction
and maintenance.
54
>> be clearly signed
>> minimise the need for reversing with

one-way systems and turning points
>> accommodate the turning circles
of vehicles.
Also consider:
>> access to the site including weight restrictions on bridges, narrow roads and so on
>> where distribution points will be (eg processing areas, weighbridge location, load covering
areas, loading areas, points of sale to the public)
>> impacts of land adjacent to the road.
Where practicable, road design should avoid:
>> unstable areas
>> hazards such as excavations, ponds, structures, fuel or chemical storage areas, underground
workings or voids and overhead power lines
>> steep gradients and tight bends
>> one-lane two-way routes.
You may need to engage a specialist traffic engineer for complex traffic flows, especially at sites
with large processing operations.
5.3.4ROAD WIDTHS
The width of a road should be based on the size of the largest vehicle in use. The larger the vehicle,
the more clearance is required.
Each lane of travel should be at least 1.5 times the width of the widest vehicle that would normally
use the road. For a two-lane road, the width should be at least 3 times the width of the largest
vehicle. Provide extra room for drains, windrows or centre windrows (refer Figure 14).
Formation Width
Carriageway
Windrow
Table
Drain
Drain
A = Width of widest truck using road
Catch
Drain
B= Half width of widest truck
Figure 14: Example road layout with clearance between lanes
Where it is not practicable to have two lane roads, adequate passing bays and turning points
should be provided. One-lane roads and turning points are not recommended on haul roads.
It may be appropriate to use turning bays to allow vehicles to turn and drive forwards for most of
the time. Turning bays would ideally be a roundabout or a banjo type. Although, hammerhead
and stub arrangements may be acceptable.
55
Banjo
2
3
3
Hammerhead
Banjo
Banjo
Hammerhead
Hammerhead
1
4
Stub
4
Figure 15: Turning arrangements

3
Where reasonably practicable
provide segregation of light vehicle on roads also used by off road
dump trucks. This is to eliminate interactions between light and heavy vehicles (refer Figure 16).
2
The hierarchy of controls for controlling light and heavy vehicle interactions is:
1
1. Separation
2 (different haul road).
Stub
2. Segregation (bund separation on same haul road).

3. Administrative controls.
Stub
Consider the interactions of light and heavy vehicles when entering and leaving haul roads.
Figure 16: Segregation of light vehicles
Bends on haul roads should be designed wider than the straight stretch to allow for overhang
of vehicles using it. Switchbacks or other areas on haul roads requiring sharp curves should
be designed to take into account the minimum turning radius of the haul trucks.
56
5.3.5ROAD GRADIENT
GRADE AND VEHICLE COMPATIBILITY
Five important aspects of the steepness
The grade of a road must be compatible with
or grade of a roadway are:
road conditions, the type of road surface and
>> the grade needs to be compatible with

the braking capabilities of the vehicles
(with a factor of safety)
>> the grade needs to be compatible with the
performance capabilities of the vehicles
>> the grade will affect a vehicles stopping
distance
>> the grade selected will have to take into
account a vehicles ability to operate safely
in wet conditions
the vehicle capability. Vehicle brakes must

be able to stop in the worst case scenario
without losing control of the vehicle. Particular
attention should be paid when loads are
moved downhill.
Different vehicles, with different performance
characteristics, will use the roads. Design the
roads to allow all vehicles to operate within
their safety parameters. Road grades should
never be designed to the maximum climbing
or descending capacity of the vehicles that
>> superelevation affects the speed
use them. Generally, a gradient of 1:8 or
around bends.
less should be applied when planning haul
DETERMINING THE GRADE OF A ROAD

The steepness of a road is normally expressed
as a ratio. The ratio is determined by
measuring the distance travelled along the
road in relation to the vertical height change
(see Figure 17). For example, a road with
a 1-metre vertical change over a travelling
distance of 10 metres is a 1:10 ratio.
road layouts.
It is important vehicles are not overloaded
as brake or retarder performances depend
on the grade and on the vehicles total weight
(refer 11.4.3).
GRADE SITUATIONS TO AVOID
Avoid road alignments that result in a sharp
bend near the top of a grade. These are hard
to see at night, when headlights tend to shine
up into the darkness. If this cannot be avoided,
the bend should be defined, for example, using
lling
Trave
nce
dista
Vertical height
Figure 17: Road gradient
Information in vehicle manuals about braking

and performance abilities on slopes may
be provided as a grade percentage (see
Appendix A for conversion chart).
The steepness of a road should be measured
using surveying equipment. The grade
should be determined over a portion of the
extended reflective markers.

Also avoid sharp bends near the bottom
of a grade. Here, vehicles tend to pick up
momentum, making it more difficult to
maintain control around the bend. If you
cannot avoid a sharp bend, a safe speed for
descending the grade should be posted as
well as adequate restraining measures, such
as large windrows or runaway provisions
should be used (refer 5.3.9 and 5.3.10).
SUPERELEVATION
road where the grade is constant. Where
Superelevation is a technique used to assist
the steepness varies, the grades should be
vehicles in manoeuvring safely around corners.
determined for different segments.
Superelevation is the banking of the road

pavement at bends. It allows the vehicle taking
57
the corner to counteract forces towards the outside of the bend, by directing the vehicles weight
towards the centre or radius of the bend. The amount of superelevation on a bend is directly
related to the radius of the corner and the desired vehicle speed through the corner.
The following table is a guide for providing the superelevation necessary to reduce lateral forces.
The maximum superelevation should be regarded as 1:20.
SPEED (KM/HR)
TURN RADIUS
(M)
16
45
1:25
60
1:37.5
90
1:50
1:20
150
1:100
1:37.5
1:20
215
1:100
1:50
1:25
300
1:100
1:50
1:37.5
24
32
40
1:25
Table 4: Recommended super-elevation
Superelevation is a particularly important

design consideration for switchbacks on haul
roads, as they typically have a small turn
radius. On switchbacks, which have the centre
of the bend located on the up-side of the road,
Full superelevated section
a well-chosen superelevation rate prevents
Outside land is flat

superelevation
transition
material being spilled from laden trucks and

improves vehicle control.
Normal
crown
As with changes in grade, transition into

and out of superelevated bends needs to be
smooth, so vehicles can be eased into corners.
Superelevated Curve
Superelevation transition lengths depend on

the cross fall change and the design speeds.
The larger the change in road alignment, the
Figure 18: Superelevated bends
longer the transition needs to be. Transition

lengths should be applied so one-third
is on the bend and two-thirds are on the
tangent (refer Figure 18). Table 5 outlines the
recommended lengths.
VEHICLE SPEED (KM/HR)
Cross slope change per 100 m pavement
Table 5: Recommended transition lengths
58
16
24
32
40
48
56
0.08 m
0.08 m
0.08 m
0.07 m
0.06 m
0.05 m
To illustrate the use of this table, assume

a vehicle is travelling at 32 km/hr on
normal pavement with a cross-fall of 2%.
Required stopping distance

Sight distance
The vehicle is approaching a switchback

Vertical curve
with superelevation of 4% the opposite way.

The total cross slope change here is 6% (2%
plus 4%). For a vehicle travelling at 32 km/
Required stopping distance

Sight distance
hr the recommended change is 0.08 m per

100m. Therefore the total transition length
is 75 metres ((6%/0.08m) x 100 = 75 m).
5.3.6SIGHT DISTANCE
Vertical curve
Figure 20: Road alignment
Sight distance is simply how far along the

road a driver can see ahead of their vehicle
(see Figure 19). Roads should be designed
to give drivers a sufficient distance of clear
vision ahead so they can avoid unexpected
obstacles. A basic rule of safe driving is that,
at all times, a driver must be able to stop the
vehicle within their sight distance. If a driver
sees a problem, such as a boulder on the road
or a stalled vehicle, they must be able to stop
in time to avoid it.
Design roads with viewing distances and
alignments so that a vehicle rounding a
bend, cresting a hill, descending a grade, or
approaching a junction can stop in time to
avoid an object in the road or a vehicle pulling
onto the road (refer Figure 20). Consideration
should be given to the height of a driver in
different vehicles.
SIGHT DISTANCE IN BAD WEATHER

OR AFTER DARK
The sight distance can be reduced during
inclement weather, such as rain, snow or
fog. Under these conditions, drivers must
slow down to the point where they can stop
within the available sight distance. Effective
headlights and spotlights improve the ability
to see and be seen.
When driving after dark, sight distance can
be defined by the distance illuminated by the
vehicles headlights. Drivers should reduce
their speed so they can bring the vehicle to
a stop within the illuminated distance. This
distance will vary with the type of headlight.
To be most effective, you should keep
headlights properly aimed and clean. Speeds
should be reduced at night because drivers
typically have reduced depth perception,
The available stopping

distance or the
Sight Distance, is measured
along the path
of the Vehicle
peripheral vision and reaction time.

There is often little contrast in brightness
between the background and other objects
at an extractive site especially in snow.
Roadside reflectors should be installed to help
define the roadway and intersections. Vehicles
used at night should have lights that can be
seen from the side of the vehicle, as well as
the front and rear.
Figure 19: Sight distance
59
SIGHT DISTANCE AT INTERSECTIONS
clearance a Stop control should be used that
Sight distance is important at intersections,
requires vehicles to come to a complete stop
where a driver must be able to see oncoming
(refer examples shown in Figures 23 and 24).
vehicles far enough away to safely turn on to

or cross the road. Ideally, drivers should be
able to pull on to the road, or cross the road,
Drivers side
without requiring approaching vehicles to

slow down. The main factors in the safe sight
distance at intersections are the acceleration
ability of the vehicles pulling on to the road
Restricted view
and the speed of the oncoming traffic.

Because of the limited acceleration ability
of trucks, especially when laden, ample sight
distance should be provided. The higher
the speed on the road, the longer the sight
distance should be.
Figure 21: Intersection with restricted view
Avoid locating intersections near hill crests

or sharp curves. In these situations, the sight
Drivers side
distance will be limited. Intersections should
Section of
road designed
and constructed
to improve
Visibility
be kept as flat as possible and sight distance

should be considered in all directions.
In laying out intersections, the effect of the
Restricted view
large blind spot to the right or left side of

haulage trucks (depending on the position
of the drivers seat), should be considered.
Intersections where trucks need to stop or
give way to other vehicles should be angled
to optimise the drivers ability to see vehicles
Figure 22: Intersection with improved visibility
coming from both the right and left sides

(refer Figures 21 and 22). For roads used by
haulage trucks, avoid roads that intersect at an
angle of less than 90 degrees on the opposite
30M
25
Clear
visibility
9M
30M
Clear
visibility
side of the driver. Alternatively compensating

measures should be taken (eg convex mirrors,
reduced speed zones, communication systems
or on-board cameras).
When using Give Way controls at an
intersection you should have visibility
clearance of 1.2 times the priority road speed
limit, nine metres back from the intersection.
Where you cannot achieve the visibility
60
Clear visibility 1.2 times (meters) priority

road speed limit 9m from intersection
e.g. 25km/hr speed limit x 1.2 = 30 metres.
Therefore you should have 30m visibility 9m back
from the intersection if using a Give Way control.
Figure 23: Give way control selection
Roadside ditches collect drainage from the

30M
25
30M
9M
road surface and intercept runoff from adjacent

hillsides, keeping it off the road surface.
Culverts carry runoff under the road surface
to a drainage course. They vary in size from
300 mm concrete or corrugated metal pipes
to large shapes 3 m or more in diameter.
Obstructed view at any point along

the 9m distance Stop control should be used
The inlets and outlets for the larger sections

usually have concrete headwalls and wing
walls to reduce erosion problems. The smaller
Figure 24: Stop control selection
pipes usually have bevelled end sections for

the same reason.
5.3.7DRAINAGE
Having good drainage systems will:
>> prolong the life of the road
>> reduce maintenance costs on roads
and vehicles
>> minimise downtime
When using culverts they should be buried

deep enough to prevent them being crushed
by vehicles passing over them. Manufacturers
can provide information about suitable depth.
More information on culverts can be found in
Appendix I: Culverts.
>> minimise health effects on drivers
5.3.8ROAD PAVEMENT
>> improve tyre life.
Surface and drain all roads adequately to make
Drainage is normally provided using:
sure vehicles can be driven safely.
Cross fall (or cross slope): Surface drainage is
The materials that make up the road pavement
designed to cause the water to leave the road
and road base need to serve two functions:
as shallow, non-erosive sheet flow in a way
>> provide adequate traction
suited to the road material, slope and terrain.
>> provide support for the vehicles without
To promote drainage either; the road surface
excessive sinking in or rutting.
should be sloped from one side to the other,

or the road should be crowned, or raised,
TRACTION
in the centre.
A road pavement of gravel or crushed stone
Typical cross falls for unpaved roads in
is preferred for roads. While some other
NewZealand are 3.5 to 4% and 2 to 4%

for paved roads. On haul roads a cross fall
between 2% and 4% is preferred. Steeper
crowns can increase tyre wear and metal
fatigue in trucks. Cross falls should not be
carried around a bend; instead there should
be a transition zone between the normal cross
fall road and the start of the superelevation
of the bend. For more information about
materials provide better traction when dry,

a gravel road pavement offers good traction
values in both wet and dry conditions. You
may have to import gravel or crushed stone
when not available on site. Alternatively, if all
weather pavements are not practicable and
roads become un-trafficable due to weather
or under-foot conditions, have procedures
in place that outline when operations should
superelevation see section 5.3.5.4.
stop and when they can re-start. Base any
Free-draining road materials allow water
assessments.
on the road surface to drain down and out.
such procedures on technically sound risk
61
More information on traction can be found
Windrows mainly:
in Appendix J: Traction.
>> give the driver a visual indication of the
SUPPORT
Rutting of a soft pavement can create a
hazard by affecting a drivers ability to control
the vehicle and by subjecting the driver to
rough or jarring conditions. Rutting occurs
when tyres sink into the pavement because
the road material doesnt offer adequate
location of the roadway edge

>> provide a sense of contact to the driver
if they accidentally contact the windrow
>> provide restraint to the vehicle and give the
operator the opportunity to regain control
and keep the vehicle from leaving the road
>> keep a vehicle back from the edge by a
support. Fine-grained soils, even when well-
distance equal to at least the width of
compacted, may not support the tyre loads
the windrow.
imposed by large haul trucks, especially during

wet conditions.
To prevent or minimise rutting of the road, a
road base material with sufficient strength to
support the tyre loadings should be provided.
A layer of gravel or crushed stone, for
example, has higher bearing strength and will
EARTHEN WINDROWS
Windrows used on roads where heavy vehicles
operate need to be of sufficient height and
width, constructed with suitable material and
be steeper on the road side to serve the four
functions indicated above.
distribute the tyre loadings over a larger area.
Windrow suitability is normally judged based
The use of a layer of geotextile can assist in
on its height, although the effectiveness of
providing a road base that will better support
a windrow also depends on its width (or
the tyre loadings. A great deal of maintenance
thickness) and its firmness.
work will be necessary to keep the road in
Earthen windrows should be a minimum of
good condition where road base material has

inadequate support strength.
5.3.9ROADSIDE EDGE PROTECTION
half the wheel height of the largest vehicle

that uses the roadway. Windrows less than this
= halfcurved
the wheel
height make an ideal ramp for
orawith
slopes,
vehicles to run over and are totally ineffective.
The failure to provide adequate edge
Support installation and construction of
protection is the cause of many vehicle
windrows by robust design calculations
accidents. Provide adequate windrows or
determined by a competent person.
guardrails where there is a change of level,

drop, pond, or other hazards which would put
the driver, or others, at risk if the vehicle left
the road.
Risk assessments will determine the type of
edge protection or runaway provisions require.
PURPOSE OF WINDROWS
Roadside windrows are a common safety
feature along elevated roadways. However, the
capability of windrows may be misunderstood,
and its dangerous if they give drivers a false
sense of security.
62
a = half the wheel height
Figure 25: Suitable windrow firm material big

enough to absorb the vehicle's momentum with
a steepened inside slope
a = half the w
a = half the whe
Angle of
repose
Figure 26: Suitable windrow the width of the

windrow is as wide as the normal angle of repose
Figure 27: Suitable edge protection a rock with

material in between which can safely absorb
the impact
For more information on windrows, see

Appendix K: Windrows.
Windrows can deteriorate due to weathering,
Water channel
and should be regularly inspected and

maintained to ensure their continued
effectiveness. Mine operators must ensure
a
a competent person inspects windrows at
a
least weekly23.
BOULDER WINDROWS
Direction of Travel
Sometimes a continuous row of boulders

is used to form a windrow. When a vehicle
Figure 28: Unsuitable edge protection blocks of

stone can be pushed out of the way
contacts a boulder windrow, the restraint

comes from the frictional forces involved
in sliding the boulder ahead of the vehicle.
Boulders cannot be placed right at the edge of
the drop off because there has to be a distance
available for the vehicle to push the boulders.
GUARDRAILS
You should engage a qualified engineer
Angle of
with suitable experience

to determine
repose
adequate design and construction of
This distance will depend on the size of the
guardrails, where used.
boulders and the size and speed of the

a vehicle.
If guardrails are used instead of windrows,a
For that reason blocks of stone or tyres
make sure they are capable of:
placed individually along the edge of a road
>> providing a visual indicator of the location
a =which
half thecan
wheel
beheight
easily
pushed out of the way
by a vehicle, or increase the risk of injury

to the driver, are not suitable for windrows
(refer Figure 28). Blocks of stone or tyres may
be used provided you heap materials (like
scalpings) between the blocks or tyres so they
can safely absorb the impact and not be easily
pushed (refer Figure 27).
aof
= half
wheel
thethe
edge
ofheight
the road
>> giving a sensation of contact to the driver

if the guardrail is accidentally contacted
>> restraining or impeding the vehicles
passage over the edge.
Considering the large size and mass of
haulage trucks, guardrails generally need
Water channel
23
The Regulations, regulation 222 (1) (a) (ii)
a
Direction of Travel
63
to be higher and stronger than the guardrails
Escape lanes can be used where space
typically used on public roads.
is available (refer Figures 30 and 31).
Embed guardrail posts deep enough to

provide adequate resistance and make the
posts and horizontal guide members strong
escape lanes:
>> The size and expected speed of a runaway
enough to restrain or impede the passage
vehicle that might be required to enter
of the vehicle.
the lane.
Installation and use should not exceed the

manufacturers recommended limits in respect
to vehicle type, size and weight.
5.3.10RUNAWAY PROVISIONS
Safety features should be incorporated into
road design to guard against the consequences
of runaway vehicles. As previously discussed,
typical edge-of-road windrows should not be
relied on, by themselves, to stop a large haul
truck. However, other methods such as the use
of escape lanes can bring a runaway vehicle
to a safe stop and prevent an accident.
Two types of runaway provision are centre
berms and escape lanes.
Centre berms are piles of loose granular
material placed strategically along the
centreline of the road (refer Figure 29). In the
case of brake or retarder failure, the driver
manoeuvres the vehicle in line with the berm
so the vehicle straddles the berm and is
brought to a halt. Consider the following
when installing centre berms:
>> the nature and size of the equipment that
might need to drive on to or straddle the
centre bench
>> using material to provide sufficient drag
on the vehicle
>> positioning of the centre berms so vehicles
have limited time to pick up momentum
>> adequate space between berms to allow
the driver time to position the vehicle.
64
Consider the following when installing
>> Alignment of the lane and the road.

An operator of a runaway vehicle should
be able to steer the runaway vehicle into
the lane.
>> Size and length of the lane. The lane needs
to be wide enough and of sufficient length
to allow vehicle access and time for it to
slow and stop.
>> Construction material for the lane should
offer a high rolling resistance and not tend
to compact.
Downhill haulage traffic lane
4t
o1
B
A/2
slo
p
4t
o1
e B
A/2
45 m
1.5
45 m
to C
1.0
1.5
slo
p
GROSS VEHICLE WEIGHT
to 1
Less than < 45,000
skilograms
lop
45,000
to 91,000 kilograms
A/2
C
45 m
91,000 to 181,000 kilograms

1.5
1.0
More than 181,000tokilograms
s
lop
3.5 m
to
1.0
slo
p
45 m
slo
p
1 1.2 m
4.5 5 m
3.5 4.5 m
1.2 1.5 m
56m
4.5 5.5 m
1.5 1.8 m
67m
5.5 to 10 m
1.8 3.5 m
7 13 m
A
Figure 29: Runaway-vehicle
centre berm
rea
ion A
erat
ecel
ne
e La
p
Esca
ea
Entrance ar
Haul Road
Downgrade
Upgrade
Figure 30: Plan view haul road escape lane
65
ea
n ar
ratio
cele
De
Entrance Area
-10%
+20
Grade transition
Haul
Road
-10%
Figure 31: Profile view haul road escape lane
5.3.11PARKING AREAS
Consider the following when establishing parking areas:
>> separating light and heavy vehicles (including private vehicles eg workers cars)
>> locating on as flat, level ground as possible
>> being consistent in design and layout
>> where possible, have one way systems (limit need for reversing)
>> using stop blocks or spoon drains to prevent unintended movement of vehicles
>> managing or limiting pedestrian and light vehicle interaction with heavy vehicles
>> having clear signage.
For more detailed information on parking areas, see section 11.3.4.
5.3.12TIPS OR STOCKPILES
When establishing tips or stockpiles think about the vehicle activities that will occur in these
areas and set up controls to manage the risks including:
>> ensuring there is sufficient room for vehicles to operate
>> where possible, have one way systems
>> managing stockpiles so they do not encroach on vehicle operating areas
>> managing the size of the stockpile so that it does not restrict lateral vision of operators
>> restricting light vehicles and pedestrian access
>> providing additional lighting if operating at night.
For more detailed information on tips, see sections 4 and 8.
5.3.13WORKSHOPS AND FIXED PLANT AREAS
A vehicle collision with a pedestrian, machinery or other vehicle is much more likely in workshops
and process plant areas due to the restricted vision around fixed plant and doorways. To reduce
the risk of this occurring:
66
>> provide specific parking areas
passing vehicles from being exposed to the
>> restrict vehicle access as much
hazard by absorbing and dissipating the
as practicable
>> establish clearly identified pedestrian
crossings and walkways
>> provide bollards or barriers to protect
infrastructure close to roads
>> establish and sign appropriate speed limits.
5.3.14SLOPE HAZARDS ABOVE AND
BELOW ROADS
Road hazards can be created due to instability
of material either above or below the road.
The hazard from above is for rock falls or
slides of material onto the road which could
endanger passing vehicles. The hazard from
below is that ground will not be stable or have
sufficient strength to support the vehicles
using the road, especially when roads are
constructed on fill areas. You should establish
exclusion zones to avoid these hazards.
Pay special attention to the stability of any
area where water is seeping out of a slope
the presence of water tends to make slopes
less stable. For more detailed information on
drainage and depressurisation see section
3.5.5 and 5.3.7.
For more detailed information on slope
hazards, see section 3.
ROCK FALLS
Where roads are adjacent to any highwalls,
slopes or tips containing large rocks, you
should make sure vehicles are protected
from potential rock falls. Rock slopes tend
to become less stable over time due to
factors such as weathering and the effects of
water. They should be regularly checked for
overhangs, open joints or other evidence of
unstable rock. Unstable material should be
either removed, supported, or the area isolated
so drivers are not exposed to a potential
rock fall (eg catch berms or rock fall fences).
Consider how high and how far out from
the wall the structure must be if using catch
berms or rock fall fences. This is to prevent
energy of the falling rock. How far a piece of

falling rock will come out from a wall depends
mainly on the steepness of the wall and the
presence and condition of any structures. With
a vertical wall, a rock fall would tend to end
up near the base of the wall. However, with a
sloping wall, or a wall with benches that have
accumulations of material on them, the falling
material will tend to bounce and be propelled
farther out from the base of the wall.
Maintenance regimes should include clearing
of slips or rock falls that will reduce the
catchment area if left to accumulate.
For more detailed information on ground
support, see section 3.
CUT AND FILL ROADS
Filled roads should be constructed in
compacted, horizontal layers. When fill is
placed on an existing slope, the layers should
be tied-in by first removing vegetation and
cutting horizontal benches into the existing
slope material. Any springs or seepage areas
should be collected in a drain to prevent the
fill from become saturated. Erosion of fill
slopes should be repaired before the condition
threatens the safety of the road.
Watch for signs the ground below the road
may be unstable, such as tension cracks or
settling. Slopes may become unstable as they
absorb rainfall, become eroded or are loaded
by the weight of heavy vehicles.
5.3.15TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PLAN (TMP)
Regardless of the size of the site, you should
produce a site specific TMP to determine
where and what risks are present. TMPs are
usually documented procedures which are
visual in nature and identify vehicle routes,
flow, access points, parking areas and other
vehicle control areas.
TMPs should be updated to reflect any changes
within the operation and communicate these
changes to all workers and visitors as required.
67
This can be effectively achieved by induction,

signage or tool box meetings. These will be
effective if change management processes are
in place.
Roads and other key features of the traffic
ALL
TRAFFIC
management system within mining operations

must be included in plans24.
5.3.16TRAFFIC SIGNAGE AND MARKINGS
25
WorkSafe considers it best practice to

use signage (including delineators) and
line markings for drivers and pedestrians
consistent with those used on public roads
(where a suitable sign or marking exists).
This is to ensure instructions are easily
recognisable to drivers and pedestrians
(a learned habit).
For more detailed information on traffic signs
and markings see the NewZealand Transport
Figure 32: Example of sign helping arriving drivers

know what to expect
Agency manuals Ministry of Transport Signs

and Markings (MOTSAM), Traffic Control
Devices (TCDM) and Code of Practice for
Temporary Traffic Management (COPTTM).
Keep signs clean to make sure they are
continually effective. Maintaining signs should
HEAVY VEHICLE
BRIDGE LIMITS
AXLES 4 300kg
GROSS 50% OF CLASS 1
SPEED 15km/h
form part of the road maintenance programme.
CAUTION
WIDE
VEHICLES
Use illuminated or reflective signs, markings or

delineators where driving is likely to be carried
out in the dark.
Use delineators suitable for the size of the
Figure 33: Example of weight restriction sign and

narrow bridge sign
largest vehicle using the road.

Consider taller delineators (road markers) in
5.3.17SPEED LIMITS
snow fall areas to make sure they are always
Speed limits should be established based on
visible where snow can drift or graders may

bury them.
capabilities of the vehicles using the roads.
Signs could be used to inform drivers or
For a given section of a road the speed limit
pedestrians about the routes to use and
should be the speed at which, under normal
also to instruct people how to behave safely
conditions, sight distances are adequate,
(eg whether they should use protective
the curves can be safely negotiated and
equipment, and how) (refer Figure 32).
any downgrades can be travelled without
Warning signs to show hazards along the way
exceeding the braking capabilities of the
could also be appropriate (refer Figure 33).
vehicles. Additionally, the speed should be
24
68
the layout and condition of the roads and the
The Regulations, regulation 217 (p)
consistent with the width and smoothness of
SPEED AROUND A BEND
the road so the driver can operate the vehicle
Speed limits around bends can only remain
safely and with a reasonable level of comfort

and control.
the same as the straight sections of road

where the superelevation and radius has been
Any such speed limits should be regularly
designed to allow this to happen. Where this is
monitored and reviewed to make sure they
not possible, reduce speed limits. Speed limits
are still appropriate. Install adequate signage
will need to be sign posted accordingly.
where speed limits are set.

Driving conditions can vary considerably due to:
>> changing weather conditions reducing
visibility
>> general road deterioration (reducing
traction or becoming more slippery)
>> volume of vehicles which accelerates wear
and tear on bends and other areas where
braking takes place.
Emphasise to drivers the speed limit only
applies under ideal driving conditions, and
they are responsible for reducing their speed
to a safe level when road, weather, or other
5.3.18LIGHTING
Lighting an extractives site is much more
difficult than lighting a public road because
of the uneven surfaces and the consequential
deceptive effects of shadows.
You must provide adequate lighting to enable
workers to move safely around places of
work25. In addition to vehicle mounted lights,
lighting should be provided:
>> around plant and buildings
>> on pedestrian routes
>> where loading and unloading takes place
conditions are less than ideal. Sites may
>> at tip points
implement rules for temporary speed limits;
>> at water bodies where access is required
for example, under fog conditions speeds

are reduced.
to pontoons, pumps, and so on.

Lights provided on vehicles must be
For more detailed information on setting
sufficient to enable them to be driven safely,
speed limits for on-road heavy vehicles,
but additional lighting may be required for
see the NewZealand Transport Agency
manoeuvring operations such as reversing,
publication Heavy Vehicle Stability Guide.
dumping, or at intersections.
SPEED ON DOWNHILL SECTIONS

The speed limit posted on downhill sections
should take into account the braking
capabilities of the vehicles using the road.
On haul roads speed limits need to be reduced
in advance of a downhill section to account
for the lag time involved before retarders are
engaged (if fitted). Vehicle operator manuals
should be consulted to determine braking
Lights should be positioned so they do not

dazzle the driver when they come around a
corner or drive over a crest. When using diesel
or petrol powered lighting systems you should
make sure they:
>> are positioned safely (eg off road lanes)
>> have sufficient duration to last the shift
without refuelling
>> form part of the maintenance schedule.
capability and retarder lag time requirements.

It is common to have different speed limits for
uphill or downhill travel. Signage recommending
gear selection may also be required.
25
Health and Safety in Employment Regulations 1995, regulation (4) (2) (e)
69
PART
Operational safety for

mining and quarrying
This part of the document sets out site safety practices
for working with explosives, managing ground instability,
tipping and dumping material, storing water and tailings,
and managing traffic.
70
PART C
06/
USING
EXPLOSIVES
IN THIS SECTION:
6.1 Hazard management and
emergency planning for
explosives
6.2 Maintaining, transporting
and storing explosives
6.3 Shot firing safe systems
of work
6.4 Explosives selection criteria
6.5 Drilling, charging and blasting
6.6 Post-firing
6.7 Minimising blast damage
71
The use of explosives to break rock at a mine or quarry

is a hazardous process. The blasting procedure must
be managed to protect workers and the general public
from the adverse consequences of a blast.
must cover specific aspects of work
HAZARD MANAGEMENT
AND EMERGENCY PLANNING
FOR EXPLOSIVES
with explosives
6.1.1EXPLOSIVES PRINCIPAL HAZARD

>> how to develop the PHMP, which
>> risk assessment
MANAGEMENT PLAN
>> blast design and charging
Any use of explosives (or associated activities)
>> how to select explosives
is considered a principal hazard26. Therefore
>> how to carry out the blast
any operation where explosives are used must
>> safety processes to follow after a blast.

Controls for transport, storage, packaging,
manufacture, and disposal of explosives are
set under by the Hazardous Substances and
New Organisms Act 1996
have an explosives PHMP and an Emergency

PCP in relation to explosive emergencies.
Sites where explosives are used must have an
appointed manager qualified in accordance
with the Regulations27.
and regulations made under that Act (HSNO).
The Explosive PHMP must contain information
The regulations also specify controls to ensure
detailed in regulations 68 and 86 of the
heat, shock, pressure, spark energy and
Regulations. In summary, regulation 86
electromagnetic radiation and static energy
includes requirements for information
are safely managed.
on the following to be included:
There is more information on hazardous
>> transporting explosives
substances in section 2.10.
>> explosive precursors
Safe and efficient blasting requires all quarry
>> inspecting, reporting and undertaking
and mine operators and supervisors to

understand and follow correct procedures for
actions to ensure safety of explosives

and equipment
handling and using explosives. Practices that
>> accounting for explosives
lower the risk of premature or inadvertent
>> checking for deterioration of explosives
explosion and prevent the mishandling of

explosives are important in maintaining safety.
Any workers handling or using explosives
must be competent or strictly supervised by
a competent person at all times. Competence
should include current relevant qualifications
and approved handler certification.
26
27
72
6.1

The Regulations, Part 1, subpart 2
>> securing and storing of explosives

>> identifying and controlling hazards from
charging and firing explosives
>> declaring danger zones
>> finding, recovering and detonating
misfired explosives safely
SECTION 6.0 // USING EXPLOSIVES
>> keeping records of misfires
6.2.1TRANSPORTING EXPLOSIVES
>> keeping a register of approved handlers
The person in charge of any transportation of
>> co-operating with explosives contractors or
explosives must ensure all requirements listed
any other person authorised under HSNO
in regulations 51 and 52 of the Hazardous
regarding storage, handling, transportation
Substances (Class 1-5) Regulations are met
and use of explosives.
as required. These include:
6.1.2EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
CONTROL PLAN
>> Notifying the Commercial Vehicles

Investigation Unit of the NewZealand Police
at least 24 hours before departure on the
The Emergency Management Control Plan
first occasion of transport by a new route
must contain information detailed in regulation
and at intervals no greater than 12 months.
105 of the Regulations. For information on the
>> Making sure there is an approved handler
Emergency Management Control Plan, see
controlling the transportation or the
section 17.
explosives are secured as required by
Depending on the amount of explosives
regulation 22 of the Hazardous Substances
stored, HSNO requires an emergency response

plan. The emergency response plan can be
(Class 1-5) Regulations.

>> Making sure vehicles meet the
included in your Emergency PCP provided
requirements of regulations 15, 16, 17
all requirements outlined in the Hazardous
and 21 of the Hazardous Substances
Substances (Emergency Management)
Regulations 2001 and regulation 47 of the

Hazardous Substances (Classes 1 to 5 Controls)
Regulations 2001 have been addressed.
MAINTAINING, TRANSPORTING
AND STORING EXPLOSIVES
6.2
All equipment used for shot firing should

be checked prior to use and kept and
maintained in a safe operating condition.
The equipment should be serviced on a
>> Making sure there are sufficient of fire

extinguishers of the right type.
>> Only persons necessary for the
transportation or emergency procedures
are in the vehicle, but that a minimum of
two people are present where quantities
are greater than 250 kg.
>> Making sure that the amount of explosives
transported is within safe load limits.
>> Making sure separation distances are
regular basis, dependant on the amount of
maintained and drivers are informed verbally
usage and original equipment manufacturers
and in writing on the separation distances.
(OEM) recommendations.
Mining operations must address the
inspection and reporting on the safety
of shot firing equipment, including how
appropriate action will be taken to make the
equipment safe, in their explosives PHMP.
>> Making sure vehicles do not stop except

where there has been an accident, incident,
emergency or need for urgent refuelling or
as required by the Land Transport Act 1998.
Where a vehicle does stop the duration
must be minimised. The explosives must be
managed according to the requirements for
Level 3 emergency management planning
as detailed in the Hazardous Substances
(Emergency Management) Regulations 2001.
73
Mining operations must address
6.2.3TRACKING EXPLOSIVES
transportation of explosives in their
Tracking is recording what happens to
explosives at the mining operation PHMP
hazardous substances during their lifecycle
including inspection and reporting on the
from manufacture or import, through
safety of equipment and how the equipment
distribution, to use and disposal30.
used for transportation will be made safe.
Explosives must be tracked.
6.2.2STORAGE OF EXPLOSIVES
Mining operations must address how
Explosives must be stored in accordance
mining operation will be accounted for
with HSNO and associated regulations28.

The regulations are supported by the
Approved Code of Practice for Storage of
Explosives (HSNOCOP 55), which approves
aspects of AS 2187.1-1998 Explosives Storage,
Transport and use Part 1: Storage for use in
New Zealand.
This standard covers:
explosives brought into and used at the

in their explosives PHMP31.
6.2.4SECURITY OF EXPLOSIVES
The Hazardous Substances (Class 1-5)
Regulations specify the requirements for
securing explosives. Explosives must be
secured at a hazardous substance location
or designated use zone. They must be stored
>> requirements for magazines
in a container that meets the requirements
>> segregation and separation distances
of either regulation 23 and 24, or regulation
>> emergencies.
25 of the Hazardous Substances (Class 1-5)
For more detailed information on storage of
of an approved handler32.
explosives see the Approved Code of Practice
Regulations unless under the personal control
for Storage of Explosives (HSNOCOP 55) and
AS 2187.1-1998 Explosives Storage, transport
establishment of secure storage for
and use Part 1: Storage.
explosives including the system used for
Mining operations must address

transportation of explosives at the mining
operation in their explosives PHMP. Include
the inspection and reporting on the
safety of equipment for transporting and
delivering explosives and the appropriate
action to be taken to make safe the
signing explosives in and out of storage, in

their explosives PHMP33. Mining operations
must also address inspection of and
reporting on the safety of equipment used
for storing explosives and how appropriate
action will be taken to make safe the
equipment being inspected or reported on34.
equipment used for transporting explosives

in the PHMP29.
Hazardous Substances (Class 1-5) Regulations, regulations 15 to 31

The Regulations, regulations 86 (a), (c) and (d)
30
Hazardous Substances (Tracking) Regulations 2001, Schedule 2
31
The Regulations, regulation 86 (e)
32
Hazardous Substances (Class 1-5) Regulations, regulation 22
33
The Regulations, regulation 86 (g)
34
The Regulations, regulations 86 (c) and (d)
28
29
74
SHOT FIRING SAFE SYSTEMS

OF WORK
6.3
You must have safe systems of work in place

that take into account your obligations
under the HSE Act, HSNO and associated
Regulations. Shot firing rules should include:
>> hazard identification and checklist for
clearing the blast zone prior to final
connect up
>> clearance distances and suitable shelter
for all workers and people in the vicinity
>> face checks, edge protection or marking
>> storage, transport and security
of explosives
>> suitable blast warning signals (visible
and audible), isolation barriers and
signsworkers allowed at the blast site
>> protection against unintended initiation
and how to deal with misfires.
When controlling and mitigating blast
effects (noise, vibration and fumes) mining
operations must address the identification
and control of hazards that may arise during
the charging and firing of explosives and in
particular places (eg in a storage bin feeder
in which an explosive is to be used to clear
a blockage) in their explosives PHMP.
The roles of the blast charger and approved

handler in charge of the blast should be
appointed by the mine operator.
6.3.1INDIVIDUAL BLAST RISK ASSESSMENT
A formal risk assessment should be completed
for each blast, identifying the hazards and
controls at each stage, including the extent
of the blast exclusion zone during the firing
sequence.
Any risk assessment and subsequent hazard
controls should be agreed to and approved by
all the relevant parties involved in the blasting
process before blasting.
Factors to consider during the risk
assessment may include (but are not
limited to) the following:
Shot considerations:
>> the type of shot (cast, stand-up, interburden, coal parting, rip rap, protection
rock and so on)
>> aim of the shot (maximum fragmentation,
maximum heave and so on).
Geology of the area:
>> the ground type (hardness or
bedding planes)
>> known geological abnormalities
within the blast design area.
Persons in charge of a hazardous substance

location must control adverse effects of
unintended initiation in accordance with
Persons in charge of a detonation of
Blast design:
>> burden and spacing (including blast design)
>> average bench height
>> vertical location of the bench
>> average blast hole load
explosives must ensure the requirements of
>> the designed blast powder factor
>> timing and effects
(Class 1-5) Regulations are met.
>> equipment and personnel safety
Ensure there is clarity around the roles and

responsibilities for each blast undertaken.
>> access to and from the proposed blast

declared danger zone
>> location of equipment and workers
during the blast
75
>> location of protected works or

associated works
>> location of external infrastructure
For example, blasting for rip rap and large

rock is different from a production blast
for aggregate
potentially affected by the blasting
>> minimise the risk of misfires
activities (buildings, roads, rail).
>> enable the location of any misfired shots
Environmental considerations
to be determined accurately
>> historical records of fly rock events
>> keep back-break to a minimum
>> presence of water
>> ensure the shape of the muck pile so it
>> historical or current underground workings

>> the formation and management of any
blast fume
>> radio communication black spots
>> the expected weather conditions.
can be safely loaded using the equipment

at the site.
EXPLOSIVES SELECTION
CRITERIA
6.4
6.4.1GROUND CONDITIONS
6.3.2BLAST DESIGN
When selecting explosives the objective is to
Blast designs will vary from site to site as
ensure reliability and safety for the ground
different types of rock require different types
conditions present.
of explosives to be effective. The blast design
Modern Ammonium Nitrate based explosives
should be tailored for each blast, in view of
are very safe when handled correctly, they
the conditions on the site. To achieve success,
can however explode if subjected to
several site-specific conditions should be
prolonged heating under confinement.
evaluated, including:
Hazardous situations include: dry running
>> the intended slope design
or dead heading a pumps, fire encroaching
>> geology, especially structure and hardness
on process equipment or storage areas and
>> water conditions

>> vibration characteristics
>> pattern shape
>> available free faces.
contamination by incompatible chemicals.

All blast-holes containing water should be
recorded. To avoid the risk of a misfire, wet
blast-holes should be charged with an
explosive that has appropriate water resistant
Once these conditions have been defined,
properties. If damp blast-holes are required to
a controlled blast design can be developed
sleep, an explosive with some water resistant
that takes site factors into account.
properties should be used. Explosives
The design should:

>> make sure any possible fly-rock is
contained within the declared blast
exclusion zone and include any special
precautions required to achieve this
(eg blast curtains or blast mats)
containing sufficiently high levels of emulsion

are water resistant and the preferred option
for managing damp or wet holes. Use a clear
identification system that ensures priming and
charging of wet blast-holes is appropriate,
for example spray painting the depth of
water next to the hole.
>> control vibration and air overpressure.

This can include limiting the amount of
6.4.2BLASTING IN OXIDISING OR
explosive per delay, altering delay timing
REACTIVE GROUND
to suit characteristics and adjusting

fragmentation to suit the type of rock
and the purpose for which it is intended.
76
Both sulphide minerals and coal may oxidise

rapidly when broken and exposed to air.
In operations where such minerals are present,
The following standards and procedures
carry out tests to determine if the ground
should be in place:
is reactive.
>> The drilling site should be prepared and
The explosives to be used and the charging

practices to be adopted should be developed
in consultation with explosive manufacturers
and consider the following general precautions:
>> Sheath ANFO explosives to inhibit
exothermic reaction between the
explosives and the material to be blasted.
>> Wash down all exposed surfaces within the
blast vicinity to make sure there is no fuel
available for a secondary explosion.
>> Use adequate stemming in all blast-holes
to inhibit the development of a flame front
at the collar of a blast-hole.
>> Use low explosive strength detonating
drill holes marked before drilling.

>> Drilling should not be carried out on any
face or bench until it has been examined
for misfires and suitably treated (refer to
section 6.6.3.2 for the treatment of misfires).
>> The driller should record every drill hole
including date, time, length, inclination,
and position relative to a fixed point
or benchmark.
>> The driller should record any unusual events
during the drilling (eg cavities, soft rock,
or an inability to drill designated holes).
>> When positioning the drill rig or while
drilling near the edge of the bench, the drill
cord that isnt in contact with rocks or
rig should be positioned so the operator
dust (to avoid detonating cord raising
has a clear view of the edge at all times
and igniting dust).
and far enough away to prevent the drill
>> Select the correct stemming for the

conditions; usually a clay-cock stemming
is preferred.
More information is available in the AEISG
Code of Practice for Elevated Temperatures
and Reactive Ground.
rig toppling.
>> Drilling should not be carried out in a
hole where any part is considered within
an unacceptable distance from a hole
containing explosives.
If it is necessary to drill in or relatively close
to an old hole or butt which is suspected of
DRILLING, CHARGING
AND BLASTING
6.5
6.5.1DRILLING BLAST-HOLES
containing explosives, it should only be carried

out after the hole has been flushed and a relief
hole drilled at a safe distance.
The main risks associated with the drilling
6.5.2CHARGING OPERATIONS
of blast-holes are residual explosives from
CLEANING AND MEASURING BLAST-HOLES
previous blasts being initiated and poorly

drilled holes creating an unsafe situation
during firing.
Blast-holes should be checked before loading

to make sure they are clear and drilled to
the correct depth. Any blocked holes should
Blast geometry and design is imperative
be cleared with a charging pole. Blast-holes
to create safe discharges and blast results.
should have their depth measured and
Blast-hole diameter, inclination and length
recorded immediately before charging. Short
should be adequately designed and recorded
holes can lead to overcharging and digging
for the selected drill pattern. Correct drilling
problems, while overcharged blast-holes can
of blast designs will ensure safety hazards
cause fly rock and air blast hazards.
such as over break, fly rock or air blast

overpressure are significantly reduced.
77
DISTRIBUTION OF MARKERS AND PRIMERS
BULK EXPLOSIVES
Markers should be positioned in a
When loading free flowing granular explosives
standardised pattern in relation to each hole
and emulsions, avoid damaging down lines
so when the hole is stemmed, the loader can
or pulling the down line into the hole. The
work in a uniform manner. The marker needs
following general precautions should be taken:
to be securely placed in the drill cuttings so
>> load the shot so the holes furthest from the
the down lines are not drawn into the hole.

Explosive accessories should be distributed
and placed alongside the marker near the
hole. They should not be placed in the drill
cuttings or in a position where a vehicle
could possibly run over a primer causing
an unplanned explosion.
PRIMERS
access point are loaded first

>> charge the shot in a way that prevents
damage to the down line and excessive
spillage around the hole
>> regularly sample the product for quality
and density to avoid possible desensitisation
by compression (dead pressing)
>> where the truck empties during the
Primer cartridges and the down line used
charging of a particular hole, identify the
to form the primer should be of suitable
hole and make sure loading is completed
explosive strength. The primer should be
before firing.
located in the hole without using undue force

and care taken to avoid unnecessary matter
between cartridges. The following general
precautions should be taken:
>> check explosives for damage
>> report any damaged explosive to
the approved handler to dispose of
appropriately
>> secure lines to avoid primer being drawn
into the hole (slumping)
>> place the tails of the down line neatly
at the base of the marker so they are
secure and away from any vehicle
movements
>> if a down line or primer is lost down the
Mobile manufacturing unit (MMU)

The following general precautions should
be taken while using MMUs:
>> A pre-start check should be conducted to
make sure the vehicle is in sound condition
and repair.
>> All workers operating the MMU must
be competent to monitor any support
equipment associated with the delivery of
the explosives; for example, pump pressure
gauges, emergency shut off and so on.
>> MMUs must be earthed during mixing
and transfer operations to dissipate static
charges35. This may include electrical
continuity through the piping system on
hole, notify the shot-firer, record the loss
the vehicle and fitting of tyres that can
and re-prime the hole
conduct static charges.
>> never remove a jammed primer by
>> The operator should have full view of
applying excessive force. Multiple priming
explosive delivery points or adequate
should be used if the original primer
communication with another operator
cannot be removed.
who has a full view.

>> Vehicle access to the shot should be by
a clearly defined access route designated
by the shot-firer.
35
78
>> In areas of restricted visibility, a spotter
>> Poor delay sequences lead to an excessive
should be used to control vehicle
delay period between adjacent holes
movements.
resulting in reduced burdens being created
>> When working near the edge of the bench

hazards must be identified and appropriate
fall protection determined.
>> Before access to public roads, any
explosive residue should be washed with
water from pump hoses, explosive mixing
receptacles etc.
Pneumatic charging
Where pneumatic charging devices are
used, they must be effectively earthed.
Good practice for operation of a pneumatic
charging is for antistatic footwear to be used
and for the operators to remove their gloves
and earth themselves before touching any
electric detonator.
PREVENTION OF FLY ROCK
Preventing fly rock is vitally important.
during the blasting operation leading to

fly rock.
>> The amount of explosives placed in the
shot-hole is not suitable for the rock type
leading to overcharging.
>> A geological anomaly in the rock
formation, such as a dyke, creates a band
of weathered weaker rock in front of a
charged shot-hole which can lead to
overcharging. Geological anomalies can
be difficult to identify as the surface rock
exposed on the face will look the same
as expected. The drilling could be into
competent rock with the dyke located
between the shot-hole and the free face.
>> Rock around the collar may be
fragmented by the blasting of the
previous working bench.
The main causes of fly rock are:
Surveying the face, and obtaining as much
>> The explosives column is brought too
information as possible on the geology is
high up the shot-hole. The top stemming
important when developing blast design. It is
is less than the burden.
also important to verify this information prior
>> The rise of explosives has not been

checked. Bulk explosive has filled into a
cavity, fissure, joint voids or cracks, all of
which may have reduced burden and will
be over charged.
>> Shot holes have deviated when being drilled
to charging the shot holes. Careful adherence

to the charging details contained in the blast
design should lead to successful, incident
free blasting. If some parameters change then
the distribution of explosives may need to
be altered.
and have come closer together resulting in
Approved handlers must ensure no one
a portion of the shot being over charged.
is subject to any hazardous fragment by
>> The drill angle on an inclined shot hole
limiting the quantity of explosives used36.
is such that the bottom of the hole has a

reduced burden leading to overcharging.
>> A section of rock has fallen out of the face
after the profiling has been carried out
Shot firers should:

>> Frequently check (every 2 to 3 metres)
the rise of explosives in the shot hole.
causing a reduced burden which has not

been identified and lead to overcharging.
36
79
>> Visually check the alignment (azimuth)

and inclination of every shot hole and
compare them with the design.
When charging is being done during shift

changes, a written procedure should be in
>> Carefully consider any deviations.
place for communication between the shifts.
>> Consider re-profiling where a rock or
Information about charging and blasted
slip has occurred after the initial profile
locations, holes loaded and any unique
was done.
hazards or unusual circumstances associated
>> Include a written delay sequence schedule

in the blast specification so excessive delay
periods can be easily identified.
>> Check the powder factor for the rock
type to calculate the quantity of explosives
(may wish to compare with previous
successful blasts).
>> Examine other site faces for evidence
of dykes.
>> Consult with the driller and check the
with the shot should be shared.

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)
When handling or using explosives, the
potential hazards must be identified and
suitable PPE provided and worn. Safety
Data Sheets for the products being used will
outline PPE requirements. These may include
retarding clothing, gloves, goggles and in
some instances, anti-static clothing.
drillers log for evidence of geological
ACTIVITIES IN PROXIMITY
anomalies (eg voids, dykes, clay seams,
There must not be any activity undertaken
cavities, fissures, joint voids or cracks).
within the proximity of the shot that could
Also check for changes in the rate
generate heat, sparks, an impact or pressure
of penetration of the drill string (if it
shock that could result in an explosion or
increases it can be due to weaker rock).
fire37. This includes smoking, naked flames
>> Consider increasing the top stem

where rock around the collar has been
fragmented by blasting of the previous
working bench.
or operation of machinery. Unauthorised

workers and machinery not involved in the
blasting operation should be removed a
safe distance from the area.
SLEEP TIME IN BLAST-HOLES
VEHICLES ON NON-ELECTRIC BLAST
The sleep time of an explosive is important
Where vehicles are used at non-electric blasts
because explosives can often deteriorate

under unfavourable conditions such as heat,
cold, humidity and water and could cause
failure of the explosives. Product deterioration
may result in a charge, or part of a charge,
failing to explode or misfiring. Explosives
should be charged and fired at the earliest
practicable time.
At any time when a blast is being slept, guards
should be posted and remain in place until the
blast is fired.
37
80
CHARGING DURING SHIFT CHANGES
there is a risk of a premature explosion or

misfire if the vehicles run over detonators or
damage the signal tube. Vehicle access to the
shot should be by a clearly defined access
route. Where there is restricted visibility a
spotter should be used to control vehicle
movements.
SIGNAGE
Charging areas should be clearly marked by
appropriate warning signs. Where charged
holes will be left to sleep over night suitable
Hazardous Substances (Class 1-5) Regulations, regulations 15, 16 and 17
barricades, warning signs and lighting
TAMPING RODS
should be used. Approaching vehicles and
Only wooden or other non-metallic rods
people need to be able to clearly identify the

charge area. If further warning is required
an overnight guard can be utilised to direct
people and vehicles around the shot area.
COMMUNICATION DEVICES
When using electric initiation it is possible
for the blasting circuit to be energised by the
electric field produced by radio transmitters,
should be used when tamping to prevent

the possibility of an explosion from shock,
friction or impact. Make sure the safety fuse,
lead wires, detonating cord or signal tube
connected to the primer are not damaged
during the tamping process. A primer should
never be tamped due to the risk of explosion
caused by impact.
mobile telephones, two way radios and so on.
STEMMING HOPPERS
Safe distances for electric detonators subject
Where mobile equipment is used to carry
to radio frequency should be determined.

Such devices should never be carried while
holding or connecting electric explosives.
6.5.3STEMMING
Avoid damaging the down line connected
to the primer during the placing of stemming
a hopper for the loading of stemming into

charged holes the mobile equipment should
have good visibility. Care should be taken
not to damage down lines on charged holes.
Stemming should be completed as soon as
possible.
material. The following precautions should
6.5.4INITIATION
be taken:
Consider the following procedures when
>> Make sure the hole has been loaded with
connecting shots using non-electric,
explosives and the collar length is correct.

>> Check the tension on the down lines to
determine whether the primers are in the
product.
>> Check the stemming material is of a
>> Workers carrying out the hook-up should

have a connection plan.
>> After connecting the shot it should be
checked to confirm it is correct. The
suitable quality and does not contain large
approved handler is ultimately responsible
fragments of rock that may cause damage
for the hook-up and should personally
to down lines.
check the connections before firing.
>> Approach the hole from the side opposite
>> The system for firing the explosive must
to the marker securing the initiating line
not be readied to the point that only the
if loading with mobile equipment (refer
one final action needs to be taken to fire
section 6.5.3.2).
the charge until all safety requirements;
>> Leave blast-holes charged with gassed

bulk explosives un-stemmed for the
recommended time to allow for gas
bubble expansion.
>> Stem all loaded holes prior to the end of
the shift. In cases where this is not possible
consider blocking the hole with a gasbag
or covering it with drill cuttings.
38
detonating cord or electric initiated systems:
including clearing the blast area, has

been done38.
>> In the event of a possible thunderstorm
developing, the person in charge must
assess the proximity of the storm
and decide whether to fire or not. If a
thunderstorm approaches any handling
or preparation of the explosives must
Hazardous Substances (Class 1-5) Regulations, regulation 33 (1) (e)
81
stop and all people evacuated in

accordance with section 33 of the
Hazardous Substances (Class 1-5)
Regulations. Where a shot is not
going to be fired, the shot-firer
should disconnect the control row
before evacuating, if safe to do so.
NON-ELECTRIC FIRING
A procedure should be in place that provides
a safe system of hook-up on non-electric
explosives. Connections and detonating cord

Regulations, regulation 19: Protection from
stray electrical currents:
Where any class 1 substance is to be fired
using an electrical system other than those
firing systems initiated only by electrical
currents modulated to specific waveforms
or pulse sequences, the area within 2 metres
of the uninsulated portion of the electrical
firing system must not be subject to stray
electrical currents of more than 60 mA.
charge weight (grams of explosives per metre)
should be in accordance with manufacturers
Regulations, regulation 20: Protection from
instructions.
electromagnetic radiation:
ELECTRIC FIRING
>> Electric detonators are susceptible to
accidental initiation by sources of stray
electricity. To reduce the risk of accidental
ignition the following controls should be
applied. Keep wire ends, connectors and
fittings, shorted (twisted) until immediately
prior to use.
>> Do not use electric detonators near power
lines or other potential sources of electric
current.
>> Stop all surface charging operations if
an electrical storm is imminent. Lightning
detector devices can be used to track
storms and lightning strikes, giving greater
determination of whether surface charging
operations should be stopped. Select
an appropriate detector for the type of
charging operation, and use in accordance
with site and manufacturers instructions.
>> Keep detonators clear of the ground until
charging starts.
>> Never hold an electronic delay detonator
while it is being tested or programmed.
>> Do not use plastic liners in blast-holes
unless they are permanently conductive.
When undertaking any electric firing in

close proximity to radio masts or antennae,
cell towers, communications towers
or satellite dishes, the requirements of
regulation 20 must be considered before
the blast is designed. Alternatives would
be to use non-electronic blasting methods.
CIRCUIT TESTERS
Before connecting the firing circuit, the
detonating circuit and firing circuit should be
checked to ensure continuity. It is possible an
explosion might occur when testing. Therefore
appropriate hazard controls, including clearing
the blasting area and choosing a safe location
for testing, must be in place. The shot-firer
should make sure the circuit tester is
maintained in correct working order.
SHOT FIRING CABLE
Where a shot firing cable is used to initiate
a blast, the shot-firer should make sure the
cable is adequately protected and insulated
for the conditions under which the blasting is
to be carried out. Adequate precautions are
essential to prevent the cable from coming
into contact with electrical installations, metal
objects and areas where possible damage can
be caused to the insulating cover.
82
Keep the cable short-circuited at each end

during the charging operation and at the
power end while the leads from the detonators
are being connected. The short circuit at
the power end should not be opened for
connection to the source power until the
blasting area is clear of people. As soon as
the blast has been fired the short circuit
should be re-established by physical
disconnection from the exploder.
The approved handler must ensure no

person is subject to blast overpressure,
heat radiation, ground vibration or
hazardous fragments as described in
WARNING PROCEDURES
The person in charge of the detonation
must ensure everyone not specifically
EXPLODERS
authorised by the approved handler to be
Only exploders capable of storing or
in the designated use zone are excluded,
generating the electrical energy required to
using the following methods:
reliably initiate electric detonators should be

used. They should be carefully handled and
regularly tested to ensure reliable performance.
Regulations, regulations 15 to 18:
(a) Information must be displayed that

(i) Warns that a substance is being
detonated and that entry is
prohibited; and
(ii) is visible from all points that are
Explosives must not be:
5 m from the outer side of the
>> Subject to any impact or pressure
perimeter of the designated use
shock that could result in an unintended

explosion or fire.
>> Exposed to any ignition source that may
zone; and
(iii) meets the level of comprehensibility
and clarity required for signage in
release spark energy in a way that could
Part 3 of the Hazardous Substances
result in an unintended explosion or fire.
(Identification) Regulations 2001; and
>> Exposed to any ignition source capable
(b) 1 minute before firing, a distinctive
of generating heat or fire where that
warning sound must be generated
could result in an unintended explosion
that is of sufficient volume to be heard
or fire.
throughout the zone, and at all points
>> Exposed to the build-up of static

electrical charges where that could
result in an unintended explosion or fire.
that are 5 m from the outer side of the

perimeter of the zone, by a person with
normal hearing; and
(c) a visual check must be made of the zone
6.5.5FIRING
BLAST EXCLUSION ZONE
The shot-firer should determine the blast
immediately before firing to ensure that

all people not directly involved with the
firing have been excluded39.
exclusion zone and the location of guards by
External parties
undertaking a risk assessment which considers
Pre-notify external parties if necessary
any technical concerns or known hazards in
before conducting blasts. External parties
the shot.
may include adjoining properties, residences

or the general public.
39
83
Withdrawal of people
BLAST MONITORING
People in the vicinity of the blasting area
Where blasting is conducted in close
must be warned and withdrawn to a safe area
proximity to buildings or structures, ground
outside the blast exclusion zone before firing
vibration and air-blast overpressure should be
the shot. They should not return until the all
monitored to record the blast characteristics.
clear signal is given. Everyone involved in the

blast must be able to reach a predetermined
safe position before firing.
A visual check of the blast exclusion zone
must be undertaken prior to firing.
Signage
Information must be displayed that warns
people there will be a blast and that entry is
prohibited. Any signs must be clearly visible
and written in such a way that people can
clearly understand them.
is monitored40.
6.6
POST-FIRING
6.6.1POST-FIRING INSPECTION
A post-firing inspection should be undertaken.
Before entering the blast area, sufficient
time must be allowed for dust and fumes to
clear. Early re-entry may result in illness from
inhalation of toxic gases and post-blast fumes.
Dust and fumes can also reduce visibility and
Audible warning device
result in collisions, falling, tripping or inability
An audible warning device must be used to
to detect unstable rock.
indicate a blast is going to take place. The
Where a blast has been initiated by electric
device must produce a sound that is clearly

identifiable from any other sound which
might be used for warning or operational
signals on the site. It must be loud enough
to be heard throughout the blast zone and
at least 5 metres from the blast exclusion
zone perimeter.
Radio Signal
detonators, the firing cable should be

disconnected from the exploder immediately
after firing and before the post-firing inspection.
The ends of the firing cable should be shortcircuited together, and the key removed from
the exploder.
The purpose of a post-firing inspection is to
confirm conditions in the area of the blast are
Where radios are also used to give an
safe for work to restart. In particular, the shot-
audible warning signal, everyone on site
firer should look for evidence of:
should clearly understand the implication
>> Unstable ground: The vibration, concussion
of the warning signal.
and ground stress redistribution resulting
Where there is more than one radio channel
from blasts can loosen rock around walls
used on a site, select a radio channel that is
located some distance from the blast site.
always used for blasting. The warning signal
Areas that were stable before a blast can
should be broadcast simultaneously on all
become unsafe or collapse after a blast,
channels where there are users of other
particularly large blasts. Falls of ground can
channels in the blast locality.
pose a serious threat to the safety of any
Preventing access to the blast exclusion zone
workers in the area. People undertaking

the post-blast inspection should approach
Adequate roadblocks and guards should be
the blast area with caution, avoiding the
placed at any road or access point in to the
toe and crest of the face. If possible inspect
blast exclusion zone during the firing and
the blast muck-pile from the bench below
until the all clear is given by the shot-firer.
or to the side.
40
84
The approved handler must ensure the firing
Hazardous Substances (Class 1-5) Regulations, regulation 33 (1) (f)
>> Misfires or burning explosives: If explosives

have misfired or are burning there is a clear
danger of additional detonations with the
associated risks of blast damage and fly
rock. Misfired explosives are often difficult
to detect and accidental initiation in a
confined location can cause fatal or serious
>> prevention: how to prevent or minimise

blast fumes
>> management of fumes: where blast fumes
extend beyond the blast exclusion zone
>> management of an exposure: for when
people are exposed to blast fumes.
injury. It is essential to thoroughly look for
Mining operations should include control
any signs of misfired detonators, detonating
measures in their Explosives PHMP and
cords and burning explosives during the
Emergency PCP.
post-firing inspection and all subsequent

mucking operations. People in the area
should immediately return to a designated
safe zone if misfires or burning explosives
are discovered. The all clear should not
PREVENTION
There is a strong correlation between wet
ground and the production of excessive blast
fumes. As well as water, known causes for the
be given and all guards, barricades and
generation of blast fumes are:
signage should stay in-place. The approved
>> incorrect fuel to oxygen ratio
handler should inform the quarry or mine
>> product pre-compression
manager of the situation immediately.

Only after the post-firing inspection has
been completed and the area has been
confirmed as safe, should the all clear can
be given and barricades, cautionary signs
and guards removed.
The approved handler must ensure any
misfired charge is identified41.
6.6.2PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT
OF POST-FIRING FUMES
Blasting operations can sometimes cause toxic
gases, including oxides of nitrogen, ammonia,
nitric acid, carbon monoxide and carbon
dioxide, to be released into the atmosphere in
significant quantities. These gases are often
referred to as blast fumes and exposure to
even quite low concentrations can pose a
serious health risk. Nitrogen dioxide is visible
as a reddish brown colour; the others are
not visible.
>> insufficient priming

>> acidic soils
>> presence of pyrite
>> product formulation.
Blast fumes can be reduced if:
>> the explosive product selected is correct
for the conditions
>> holes are dewatered before loading
>> sleep times are kept to the minimum time
recommended by the manufacturer.
An understanding and application of
meteorology (ie weather conditions,
wind speed and direction and stability classes)
and gas cloud distributions will enable
calculation of how long a blast gas plume
will take to reach a point of interest such as
a smoko hut, workshop, office or house42.
Such understanding and application also
helps in determining the dispersion of the
gas plume, how far it will spread sideways,
and how the gas concentration will change
Safety management systems should include
with distance. Anyone developing prevention
the different control phases for blast fumes
and emergency management plans should
which include:
understand the gas toxicology and the
41
42
Hazardous Substances (Class 1-5) Regulations, regulation 33 (1) (f)

Buildings should not be used as shelters unless they have been assessed by competent persons as safe havens
85
exposure standards of a gas (ie nitrogen

dioxide) particularly high concentration
exposures over relatively short periods.
The approved handler must ensure any

misfired charge is identified44.
MANAGEMENT OF FUMES
DETERMINATION OF MISFIRES
Before a gas plume occurs, it is important
Methods used to determine if a misfire has
to have a system for managing a potential
occurred are based on many factors, including
incident including evacuations. The system
appropriate training, standard operating
should include information on wind speed and
procedures and guidance from standards
direction and on whether there is a gas-tight
(eg AS 2187.2-2006 Explosives Storage and
shelter nearby. Communication systems and
Use). There are certain events that indicate
monitors to record concentrations of toxic
a misfire has occurred including:
fumes should also be in place.
>> If using safety fuse, the number of shots
MANAGEMENT OF AN EXPOSURE
Exposure to nitrogen dioxide can result
in delayed health effects that may be lifethreatening even though the exposed person
may initially appear relatively unaffected. For
this reason, people who have been exposed to
nitrogen dioxide should undergo an immediate
medical assessment and a continued period
of observation on the advice of the treating
doctor. It is recommended that as a precaution
the patient be observed for up to 12 hours.
Safety data sheets relative to the types of
products being used should be readily available
to everyone involved in the blasting process.
Source: Queensland Department of Employment,
Economic Development and Innovation, Explosives
Inspectorate, Safety Alert No. 44 V2, 15 March 2011
Prevention and management of blast fumes.
6.6.3MISFIRES
The site should have a written procedure that
provides a safe system of entry and inspection
for misfires and their treatment including the
methods used for detecting a misfire.
procedure to find, recover, and detonate
misfired explosives and records to be kept of
misfired explosives in their explosives PHMP43.
counted is less than the number of holes

fired or a disagreement on the count of
shots fired.
>> If damaged safety fuse, detonating cord,
lead wires or unfired signal tube is exposed
in a hole that has been fired.
>> Evidence of cut-offs, butts or remaining
portions of holes (eg boulders with drill
holes) that are suspected of containing
explosives.
>> Holes that have slumped between charging
and firing due to dispersion of the explosive
from water ingress or through joints and
fissures.
>> If during the normal excavation of the
blasted ground, uninitiated or residual
explosives are found or the load out mobile
plant encounters poor diggability of the
blasted ground.
A careful examination of the debris for
explosives must be undertaken which,
if present should be safely disposed of
(refer section 6.6.6).
MISFIRE TREATMENT
Having located a misfire, do not attempt
to drill into the charged hole. A hazard
identification and risk assessment should be
undertaken to determine the safe treatment
method. A misfire among a number of charges
may cause excessive rock scatter when fired
43
44
86
The Regulations, regulations 86 (k) and (l)

Hazardous Substances (Class 1-5 Controls) Regulations 2001, regulation 33 (1) (f)
because the successful shots have relieved the
>> When the misfired hole is larger or longer
overburden. Adequate extra cover should be
than 50 mm and 3 m respectively, increase
used in such cases.
the distance between the misfired hole and
Removal of stemming and re-priming

Where a hole has completely misfired, the
stemming may be removed by either applying
water under pressure or by compressed air
and water through a length of antistatic hose
(ie FRAS). No metal fitting should be within
the hole. Where water under pressure (or
the relieving hole so the misfired charge

will not be drilled into.
>> When an electric detonator is involved, first
short-circuit the detonator wires and then
tie to some permanent object to recover
the detonator after a relieving hole has
been fired.
water and air pressure) is not available the
All explosives recovered from misfired holes
stemming may be sludged out using water
should be collected and disposed of as
and a wooden or other approved implement.
detailed in section 6.6.6.
Compressed air alone should not be used.

When the stemming has been removed a fresh
priming cartridge may be inserted and the
hole again stemmed and fired. An artificial
burden or cover should be placed around
and over the hole to prevent fly rock.
Shattered ground
If the ground around the misfire has been
shattered the relieving hole method should
not be used. In this case the ground around
the misfire should be carefully cleared until the
explosives are uncovered. Do this cautiously
If a misfire contains ANFO or slurry or any
by following the wires or fuses down to the
other explosive rapidly destroyed by water,
charge, removing the last few inches of cover
such explosive may be sludged out down
by hand.
to the primer using the procedure described
Pre-drilling precautions
for removal of stemming above. The slurry

explosive washed out should be treated as
deteriorated explosives and dealt with as
detailed in section 8.21. The hole should then
be re-primed and fired to explode the original
primer. Do not remove a primed charge from
the blast hole.
No hole should be drilled in any face or bench

until it has been thoroughly cleaned and
washed down within a radius of 1 m from the
intended hole. Any cut-offs or sub-drill holes
should be examined to make sure they do
not contain explosives. Sub-drill holes should
then be plugged with a wooden plug. If
Relieving hole misfire treatment
examination reveals explosives the cut-offs or
Where it is not possible to explode a misfire
sub-drill holes should be primed and fired and
by re-firing a relieving hole should be drilled
the pre-drilling precautions above taken again.
parallel to the original hole then charged and
Misfire workers
exploded as follows:
>> Mark the misfired hole clearly or block it
by inserting a wooden plug.
>> When the misfired hole is 50 mm or less
Where a misfired charge is identified the

approved handler must ensure no-one
approaches for 10 minutes in the case of an
electrically fired charge. For a charge fired
in diameter and less than 3 m in length,
by a fuse45 this is 60 minutes. The approved
do not drill the relieving hole closer than
handler must then safely depose of the
600 mm to the nearest point of the
malfunctioning charge in accordance with
misfired hole.

(Disposal) Regulations 2001.
45
Hazardous Substances (Class 1-5 Controls) Regulations 2001, regulation 33(1A)
87
The approved handler may have an experienced

person to assist. All other people must be kept
well clear of the area.
The person in charge must ensure the
requirements of regulation 32(3) of the
Hazardous Substances (Class 1-5) Regulations
are maintained until safe disposal by the
approved handler is completed. This includes
display of information, warning sounds and
visual checks.
LOADING OUT A KNOWN MISFIRE
Before retrieving misfired material, a written
hazard identification and risk assessment
should be completed by competent people.
The hazard identification and risk assessment
should take into account the site shot firing
procedures. The hazard identification and
risk assessment should identify key areas,
for example:
>> The excavator involved may need to be
provided with additional protection for
the operator. This depends on the
properties of the material involved.
>> Use CCTV or other suitable means of
>> the mobile plant running over the explosive

material
>> movement of rock in the bucket while
transportation is taking place
>> tipping the rock out of the bucket at the
search site.
All explosive materials have a sensitivity, some
greater than others. Heat, pressure and friction
can initiate the explosives or detonators
especially if they are damaged. When misfired
charges are found the approved handler must
safely dispose of them. For more information
on disposal of defective explosives see 6.6.6.
6.6.4RECORDS
Blasting records including all key parameters
such as hole specification, burden and spacing,
quantities of explosive used, tie-in pattern and
number of delays should be documented.
6.6.5REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
The approved handler must report all misfires
to the person in charge46.
Misfires and other explosive incidents47 must
isolation, to observe the muck pile during
be reported to WorkSafe in accordance with
the loading operation so the mobile plant
Schedule 7 of the Regulations.
operator can be alerted to the presence

of suspect material.
>> How shot holes involved in the misfire
6.6.6DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS AND

DEFECTIVE EXPLOSIVES AND PACKAGING
can be located in the muck pile. Survey
The disposal of explosives is considered to
equipment may be used which can more
be an inherently hazardous task. There have
accurately define the hazardous area.
been a number of fatalities and serious injuries
Flags, bunting or warning notices may be
where people have attempted to dispose of
needed to mark the areas identified.
explosives themselves. Disposal of explosives
Accidental initiation can occur while the

mobile plant operator recovers explosive
must only be done by fully trained, competent

people with specialist experience in this field.
material by:
>> the bucket of the mobile plant striking the
explosive material during excavating
>> rock falling and striking the explosive
material
46
47
88
Hazardous Substances (Class 1-5 Controls) Regulations 2001, regulation 33(1A)(b)

As defined by Schedule 8 of the Regulations
EXPLOSIVES NO LONGER REQUIRED
DISPOSAL OF EMPTY EXPLOSIVE CASES
Explosives no longer required should be
Disposal of empty explosives cases must
returned to the supplier. Where they cannot
comply with regulation 10 of the Hazardous
be returned to the supplier, disposal methods
Substances (Disposal) Regulations 2001.
must be in accordance with regulation 5 of the

Hazardous Substances (Disposal) Regulations
2001. Explosives must not be thrown away,
buried or flushed.
EXPLOSIVES FOUND WHILE LOADING
Treat any suspected explosives found while
excavating as live. Shut the area down, set up
a prohibited zone and put control systems in
place, including informing the site manager
(Quarry Manager or Mine Manager).
DETERIORATED AND DEFECTIVE
Where burning empty cases following a blast,

they should be taken away from the blast site
to a secure place. After checking no explosive
remains hidden or lodged in the case and
any residual content is removed, burn them
under controlled conditions. The site should
be cleared and secured while the burning
takes place. The area should be checked after
burning to make sure there is nothing left of
the cases.
6.7
MINIMISING BLAST DAMAGE
EXPLOSIVES
Inappropriate blasting practices can result in
The Government funds a free collection
substantial damage to the rock mass in the
service for the disposal of deteriorated and
interim and final slopes. The consequences
defective explosives which is conducted
of poor blasting practices include:
by Civilian Ammunition Inspectors and the
>> Loose rock on slope faces and batter crests.
NewZealand Defence Force. To arrange for

the collection and disposal of deteriorated or
defective explosives contact your local Police
station in the first instance (do not dial 111).
Deteriorated and defective explosives include:
>> Over-break in the face leading to oversteepening of the slope, which in turn could
lead to further instability depending on the
level of stability allowed in the original design.
>> Sub-grade damage that can destroy safety
>> explosives with an expired shelf life
benches leading to a reduction in their
>> any explosives recovered through
effectiveness as a means of retention of
a misfire procedure
>> any explosives that are found to
be in damaged condition.
loose rock pieces falling from above.

>> A cumulative reduction in the strength of
rock mass in which the slope is developed.
In particular, the shear strength of the
EXPLOSIVES PACKAGING
Empty explosive packaging should be checked
to ensure no explosive remains hidden or
lodged within any packaging before disposal.
Labels should be clearly marked so there is
no uncertainty of the packaging contents.
structural defects will be reduced.

Consequently, put in place standardised
drilling and blasting practices based on
well-founded and recognised blast design
procedures, which are appropriate to the
ground conditions at the site.
89
PART C
07/
CONTROLLING
GROUND
INSTABILITY IN
EXCAVATIONS
IN THIS SECTION:
7.1 Planning and design
7.2 Excavation rules
7.3 Excavation control and scaling
7.4 Slope movement monitoring
programs
7.5 Remedial measures
7.6 Historic underground workings
7.7 Working near slopes
90
SECTION 7.0 // CONTROLLING GROUND INSTABILITY IN EXCAVATIONS
To manage the risk of ground instability during excavation,

have suitable procedures in place for excavation and
monitoring of slopes.
essential geotechnical information obtained
>> scale and control excavations to prevent
during operations is consolidated with
rockfall or slope instability

>> monitor slopes to detect any instability
>> prevent or put right ground instability
>> excavate safely under water.
7.1
PLANNING AND DESIGN
information in the geotechnical model and

continually used to assess the suitability of
the slope design in relation to ground stability.
Implementing the design typically involves
considering suitable ground control strategies,
such as minimising unnecessary damage to
slopes during blasting, excavation control
Before any excavation begins, an appraisal
and scaling, and installation of ground support
of the site ground conditions should be
and reinforcement.
undertaken by a competent person to

determine all factors likely to affect the
stability of the ground and the limitations
that should be imposed on the excavation
site design.
This should be documented. The assessment
should be reviewed and revised where necessary
Refer to Section 3 for more information

on excavation design.
7.2
EXCAVATION RULES
Excavation rules should be drawn up setting out:

>> the manner in which excavation activities
when a material change has occurred in the
should be carried out, specifying the type
ground conditions or the excavation methods.
and reach of excavators
Effective ground control relies on geotechnical
>> the physical dimensions of the excavation
information obtained at different stages of the
including slope, height of faces, width of
life of the site during planning and design,
benches, position of catch-berms and
at implementation of the design and through
gradient, position and protection of
day-to-day operations such as surveying,
access ramps
installation, maintenance and inspections.

Following appraisal of ground conditions,
a design should be prepared setting out the
measures to control ground instability. Where
an existing design has already been proved,
it may be used as the basis for the design
of a new excavation, if the ground conditions
at both sites are not significantly different.
>> the way in which material should be

removed from the excavation
>> the sequence in which material should
be removed
>> maintenance of faces including scaling
>> the nature and frequency of supervision
>> response to defects.
During planning and design, there is usually

a relative lack of data available when the
slope design is first developed. It is therefore
91
These rules are essential for the proper
Scaling from the bench above is normally
management of excavations. They are practical
done by chaining the face using a large
measures required to keep excavations and
chain (ships anchor chain) with or without
the people working in and around them safe.
attached dozer track plates. The chain can be

dragged along the face by a dozer or backhoe.
EXCAVATION CONTROL
AND SCALING
7.3
Adequate excavation control and scaling of

faces (and selection of the equipment to be
used to achieve the desired standards) are
critical elements in achieving and maintaining
safe slopes.
In soils and weak and weathered rock, batters
can be excavated by free digging using
hydraulic excavators. It is critical slopes are
not under-cut so the as-built slope is steeper
than the as-designed slope as it could result
in instability. Provide adequate surface runoff
control measures to the benches separating
the batters to minimise water infiltration and
the bench above, as large rocks may pull the

plant off balance.
Scaling from the bench below is generally
performed by an excavator configured as a
backhoe. Most manufacturers offer specialised
units equipped with long booms holding small
buckets or rock picks.
The debris accumulated at the toe of the
batter after scaling should be removed before
access to the toe is lost. This will ensure
adequate catchment volume on the safety
bench is maintained. Supplementary bench
cleaning will depend on access and the service
life of a slope. Periodic bench inspections
slope erosion.
should identity sections that require cleaning.
In strong rocks, drilling and blasting is needed
7.3.1MOBILE PLANT WORKING ON FACES
to fragment the rock mass prior to the final

preparation of the slope. Care should be
taken to prevent over digging of the face,
particularly where there is blast damage or
fractured rock.
Faces that have potential for instability should

be worked within the reach height of the
equipment used, whether they are working
in sand or hard rock. Typically, wheel loaders
can reach 6-8 m and excavators 9-12 m.
Scaling of the batter crest and face following
Larger mining shovels (120 tonne or more)
excavation is an important component of
are capable of reaching 18-20 m depending
the implementation of the design. Scaling is
on how they are used.
intended to remove loose blocks and slabs

that may form rock falls or small failures.
Scaling also helps preserve the catch capacity
of benches needed to retain loose rock
material rilling from above. In soils and weak
and weathered rock, experienced mobile plant
operators can construct slopes with smooth
surfaces so scaling is not generally required.
92
Do not use a backhoe to scale the face from
If mobile plant is at risk of being engulfed in

a face collapse, a trench or rock trap should
be used to maintain a safe operating distance.
Height
Reach
Height
Reach
Figure 34: Face height should not exceed the reach of the loader used on the face
Reach
Height
Height
Height
Reach
Reach
Safe Distance
Figure 35: Face height should not exceed the reach of the excavator used on the face, with safe
operating distances
7.3.2POST EXCAVATION INSPECTION OF BLASTED SECTIONS48

When the excavator reaches the batter face following a blast, the designed toe and crest should
be achieved and no blast-induced damage should be visible of the face. After excavation is
completed the face should be inspected and analysed for excessive over break. The damage
should be classified into the following categories to help guide design refinement.
>> No visible damage: joints tight, teeth marks in face, no loose material present, half-barrels
visible when pre-splitting and a well-defined toe and crest.
>> Sight damage: joints opened up, crest loss <1 metre, few half-barrels visible when
pre-splitting, excavation possible for 1metre beyond designed batter location.
48
Source: Beale G. (2009) Guidelines for Open Pit Slope Design, Eds. John Read and Peter Stacey, CSIRO Publishing
93
>> Moderate damage: blocks dislodged, crest

loss 1-3 metres, excavation possible for 1-3
metres beyond designed limit.
>> Severe damage: face shattered, blocks
ABNORMAL WATER FLOWS

Sudden changes in rainfall or water flow
may also precede slope failures. Spring run-off
from snow melt or after periods of heavy rain is
dislodged and rotated, excavation possible
one of the most obvious examples of increased
for more than 2 metres from designed limit.
water flow which may have adverse effects
A detailed record should be made of the post

excavation performance of the batter face.
7.3.3INDICATIONS OF FAILURE49
Even the most carefully designed slopes may
be subject to instability. Some of the more
common indications of failure are listed below.
on slopes. However, changes in steady flow

from dewatering wells or unexplained changes
in piezometer readings may also indicate
subsurface movement that has cut through
a perched water table or intersected a water
bearing structure. Changes in water pressure
resulting from the blockage of drain channels
can also trigger slope failures.
TENSION CRACKS
Water can also penetrate fractures and
Cracks forming at the top of a slope are an
accelerate weathering processes. Freeze-thaw
obvious sign of instability. Cracks form when
cycles cause expansion of water filled joints
slope material has moved toward the floor.
and loosen slope material. Increased scaling
Since this displacement cannot be detected
may be necessary during cold weather.
from the floor, it is extremely important

to frequently inspect the crests of slopes
above active work sites. Safe access should
be maintained at all times to the regions
immediately above the active excavation.
Frequent inspections may be necessary during
periods of heavy rain or spring run-off and
after large blasts.
The simplest method for monitoring tension
cracks is to spray paint or flag the ends so
that new cracks or propagation along existing
cracks can be easily identified on subsequent
inspections. Measurement of tension cracks
may also be as simple as driving two stakes
on either side of the crack and using a survey
tape to measure the separations.
SCARPS
Scarps occur where material has moved
down in a vertical or nearly vertical fashion.
The material that has moved vertically and the
face of the scarp may be unstable and should
be monitored accordingly.
CREEP OR SLOW SUBSURFACE MOVEMENT

Bulging material or cattle tracks appearing
on a slope indicate creep or slow subsurface
movement of the slope. Other creep indicators
can be determined by looking at vegetation in
the area. While most quarries or mines do not
have vegetation on slope faces, the movement
of trees at the crest of a slope can indicate
instability.
RUBBLE AT THE TOE
Fresh rubble at the toe of a slope or on the
floor of the excavation is a very obvious
indicator that instability has occurred. It must
be determined which portion of the slope
failed, and whether more material may fail.
One of the most dangerous situations to occur
is an overhang. If workers are not aware that
a portion of the material below them has
failed, they may unwittingly venture out onto
an unsupported ledge. Remedial measures
such as scaling, supporting, or blasting the
overhang or other hazardous rock may
be necessary.
49
94
Girard. J. M. (September 2012). Assessing and monitoring open pit mine highwalls. WA, Australia. Sourced from
www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining
SLOPE MOVEMENT
MONITORING PROGRAMS
7.4
Sufficient, suitable slope movement

monitoring should be provided as required
by a geotechnical assessment or risk
assessment to detect instability at an early,
non-critical stage to allow for the initiation of
safety measures. Monitoring after the fact
>> assignment of tasks for design,

construction and operation of systems
>> planning of regular calibration and
maintenance
>> establishment of trigger action
response plans (TARPs) and associated
accountabilities for action to minimise
impacts of slope movement.
does little to undo the damage caused by
Monitoring methods for slopes can be
unexpected failures.
surface and subsurface and qualitative and
Mining operations must, and quarry and

alluvial mine operators should, address the
collection, analysis and interpretation of
relevant geotechnical data. This must include
monitoring of openings and excavation and
quantitative. All have their place in specific

environments and are often related to the
potential failure size. The selection of the
most appropriate technique depends on
site-specific conditions.
seismic activity in their ground or strata
Regardless of the technique used, if there is
instability PHMP .
an adequate level of monitoring and a good
50
The purpose of a slope movement monitoring

program is to:
>> maintain safe operational practices for
the protection of workers, equipment and
facilities
>> provide warning of instability so action can
be taken to minimise the impact of slope
movement
>> provide crucial geotechnical information
to analyse the slope failure mechanism and
design the appropriate corrective measures.
understanding of the ground conditions, the

onset of major slope failure can be detected
in advance. The safety risks can then be
managed to an acceptable standard.
7.4.1MONITORING METHODS
The type of instruments selected for a slope
monitoring program depends on the particular
problems to be monitored. A comprehensive
monitoring system may include instruments
capable of measuring rock mass displacement,
ground water parameters, and blast vibration
Planning a slope movement monitoring
levels.
program should involve the following steps:
When selecting monitoring instruments,
>> definition of site conditions
incorporate some level of redundancy in the
>> prediction of all potential mechanisms that
system to cross-check instrument performance
could control instability

>> determination of parameters to be
monitored and potential magnitude
>> establishment of suitable monitoring systems,
including instrumentation and location
>> formulation of measurement procedures,
including frequency, data collection,
processing, interpretation and reporting
50
and eliminate errors. Redundant or overlapping measurements will also provide a

back-up in the case of instrument failure.
Automated equipment is generally more
accurate than manual equipment since
some human error is removed. Automated
systems also provide added flexibility in the
sampling rate and can therefore monitor more
The Regulations, regulations 71 (2) (e) and 71 (2) (f)
95
frequently than manual readings. Another
COLLECTION OF INSTRUMENTATION DATA
distinct advantage of automated systems
A competent geotechnical engineer or
is their ability to trigger alarms if certain

threshold limits are reached.
is responsible for collection of instrumentation
Instruments should be placed where they
data determined during the planning phase.
will be the most effective. Estimating the
For more information on instrumentation data,
movement expected in a particular area

should help ensure the limits of the instrument
are not exceeded. There may also be
environmental limitations (ie extreme heat
or cold) that determine whether a particular
instrument will work at a specific site. All of
see Appendix M: Instrument Data. Included is

information on the following:
>> processing and presentation of
instrument data
>> interpretation of instrumentation data
these factors need to be evaluated against the
>> responding to data variations
primary objectives of the monitoring program.
>> reporting conclusions.
For more information on typical surface

and subsurface monitoring methods see
Appendix L: Monitoring Methods. Included
is information on:
7.5
REMEDIAL MEASURES
The selection of remedial measures taken

following slope movement depends on the
>> visual inspection
nature of the instability and the operational
>> surface extensometers and crack
impact. Each case should be evaluated
monitoring
>> terrestrial geodetic surveys
>> GPS Stations
>> radar
>> subsurface techniques
>> micro-seismic monitoring
>> monitoring of groundwater pressure.
7.4.2INSTRUMENTATION DATA
individually with respect to safety, site plans

and cost-benefit analyses.
Generally speaking, stabilisation and repair
methods are used when ground movement
has already occurred where artificial support
methods are used to prevent instability.
Let the material fail: If the failure is in a noncritical area of the excavation, the easiest
response may be to leave the material in place.
Work can continue at a controlled rate if the
A detailed draft of monitoring and reporting
velocity of the failure is low and predictable
procedures should be prepared during
and the mechanism of the failure is well
the planning phase and finalised after the
understood. However, if there is any question
instruments have been installed. At that time
about the subsequent stability, you should
responsible workers will be familiar with
make an effort to remove the material.
operation of instruments and specific site

considerations. These procedures should
include:
>> a list of data collection
>> equipment specifications, including
servicing requirements
>> processing and presentation procedures
>> interpretation procedures, including
alarm levels.
96
instrumentation specialist, selected by the site,
To prevent small-scale failures from reaching

the floor of the excavation, both the number
and width of benches can be increased.
Catch fences can also be installed to contain
falling material.
Support the material: If allowing the instability
to fail is not an option, artificially supporting
the failure may be a solution. Some operations
have successfully used reinforcement such as
bolts, cables, mesh, and shotcrete to support
should also be used to keep surface runoff
rock mass. The use of such supports can be
away from tension cracks and open rock
very expensive. However if the overall angle
mass discontinuities near the slope face.
of a batter can be steepened and clean-up

costs are reduced, the added expense of
7.5.1INSTALLATION OF ARTIFICIAL
reinforcement may be justified.
GROUND SUPPORT AND REINFORCEMENT
A careful study of the geological structures
If artificial ground support and reinforcement
should be performed to select the proper
are included in the slope design, it is
reinforcement (ie length of bolts or cables,
essential they are installed correctly and
thickness of shotcrete and so on). Bolts that
the timing of their installation is an integral
are too short will do little to prevent slope
part of the design implementation. For more
stability problems from continuing. In some
detailed information on ground support and
cases, reinforcement has only served to tie
reinforcement systems see section 3.6.
several small failures together, creating a
Although some of the work involved in the
larger failure.
installation of artificial ground support and
Another potential solution to stop or slow
reinforcement can be carried out from a safe
down ground movement is to build a buttress
distance (ie shotcreting, drilling, and so on.)
at the toe of the slope. The buttress offsets
the installation of mesh and bolts, including
or counters the driving forces by increasing
the plating and tensioning of them, may
the resisting force. Short hauls of waste-rock
expose workers to much greater rockfall
often make this an attractive and economical
hazards than usual.
alternative for stabilizing slope failures.
The increased risks to safety during installation
Remove the hazard: If a slope continues to
must be clearly recognised and managed. In
fail, and supporting the slope is not a feasible
addition, no worker should enter an area of the
alternative, you should remove the hazard.
operation that has unsupported ground unless
Flattening the slope to a more favourable angle
they are installing or supervising the installation
with respect to the local geology will often
of ground support. Where any worker installing
solve the problem. When catchment systems
or supervising the installation of ground
are not available, appropriate scaling methods
support will be exposed to a hazard associated
should be employed regularly to remove
with unsupported ground, temporary support
hazards associated with small rockfalls.
must be provided to protect them51.
Removing (or unweighting) the top portion
Managers must ensure suitable ground support
of a slide may decrease the driving forces
methods are designed and implemented for all
and stabilize the area. However, this option is
working areas and plans showing the ground
generally unsuccessful and in some situations
support put in place are displayed in locations
involving high water pressure, unloading
readily accessible to all workers52.
actually decreased the stability of the
Consider the following when installing artificial
remaining material.
Since water pressure creates slope stability
problems, dewatering using horizontal or
vertical wells can be a significant way of
controlling slope behaviour and minimizing
hazards. Surface drainage and diversions
51
52
ground support and reinforcement:

Storage and handling:
>> Artificial ground support and reinforcement
products should be stored and handled to
minimise damage or deterioration.

97
>> Steel components designed to be
known zones of weakness, or proximity
should be clean of oil, grease, fill, loose
to other workings or boreholes
or flaking rust and any other materials

which may damage the grout.
>> the area to which the procedures apply

and the date they became effective53.
Grout and other additives:
Correct tensioning procedures (when
>> Grout is mixed according to the
required) should be used for the various types
manufacturers or suppliers instructions
of artificial ground support and reinforcement.
including cement to water ratio, correct
The purpose of tensioning of cables should
mixing time and speed and water quality.
be determined to establish whether post-
>> Any additives (eg retarders, accelerators,

fluidisers) to the grout mix should be
added in the recommended amounts and
at the specified time in the mixing and
pumping process.
>> Where full grout encapsulation of steel
elements is required, the method of
grouting should show a grout return at
the collar of the hole. Other methods that
can demonstrate complete hole filling may
also be appropriate. All grout mixing and
pumping equipment should be cleaned
and maintained regularly.
Procedures during installation:
tensioning or pre-tensioning is required.

Also consider:
>> Orientation of the hole should be
appropriate for the geometry and
expected mode of failure.
>> Plates or straps against the rock surface
should have adequate thickness to prevent
nuts being pulled through the plate or strap
when loaded against the rock surrounding
the hole.
>> Shotcrete thickness should be tested
regularly during placement to make sure
the specified thickness has been applied.
A means of permanently marking the
Procedures for artificial ground support and
shotcrete surface with a depth gauge
reinforcement installation should include:
probe may be appropriate.
>> the method of work
Samples of the shotcrete mix should be
>> the support materials and equipment
collected at specified intervals, under normal
to be used
>> the layout and dimensions of the artificial
ground support and reinforcement system
>> any method of temporary support
necessary to secure safety
>> the procedures for dealing with abnormal
conditions
>> the method and equipment for withdrawal
of support
>> manufacturers instructions relevant
to the safe use of support
53
98
>> information on other hazards such as
encapsulated in resin or cement grout
operating conditions. They should be tested

in a suitably recognised concrete testing
laboratory for compliance with the shotcrete
design specifications. These should state the
slump of the mix, the uniaxial compressive
strength and a measure of the toughness
of the product.
Procedures following installation:
>> Have monitoring arrangements to
ensure the artificial ground support or
reinforcement system continues to be
effective including monitoring for corrosion.
Sourced from HSE: Approved Code of Practice and Guidelines The control of ground movement in mines
HISTORIC UNDERGROUND
WORKINGS
Whilst this is important to assess the likelihood
Sites may mine or extract materials that
not be relied upon.
7.6
have previously been mined by underground

methods. There are high-risk hazards that
can arise where opencast mines or quarries
approach and then progressively mine or
extract through underground workings.
These hazards include:
>> sudden and unexpected collapse of
the ground or walls
>> the loss of people or equipment into
unfilled or partially filled underground
workings
>> loss of explosives from charged blast
holes that have broken through into the
underground workings
>> overcharging of blast holes where
explosives have filled cavities connected
to the blast hole
>> risk of ejecta (fly rock and so on) from
of abandoned underground workings

around an open pit, its accuracy may
A review of underground workings should

be part of the design and planning of the
site to make sure, as far as practicable:
>> All known underground workings are
marked clearly on all working plans and
the plans rechecked.
>> There is recognition that the rock mass
surrounding the underground workings
may be highly variable in strength and
potentially unstable.
>> A three-dimensional model of underground
workings is developed and used in all
design, planning and scheduling.
It is essential all plans are updated following
all phases of exploration to ensure the revised
outlines of the actual extent and shape of
underground workings are recorded.
cavities close to the floor and adjacent
Where it is unlikely underground workings
blast holes, particularly when explosives
could be of large dimensions and extended in
have entered the cavity from the blast
length and depth, or where no previous plans
hole during charging and the loss is
are available, it may be necessary to confirm
not detected.
the location of the underground workings.
In general, the above hazards are significantly
A number of detection methods are available
increased when the underground workings
which may be used to confirm the lateral
were not backfilled at the time of mining.
extent and shape of underground workings
As these hazards are not generally evident
including:
during normal operations you should take
>> probe drilling
additional measures to better define their
>> geophysical techniques (including seismic,
nature and extent.

7.6.1HAZARD IDENTIFICATION OF
UNDERGROUND WORKINGS
A thorough review of previous mine plans
is essential before development.
The validity of old underground mine plans
should be thoroughly checked, particularly if
they are abstracted or copied from originals.
resistivity, conductivity and gravity

methods)
>> ground probing radar
>> laser based electronic distance
measurement (EDM) surveying methods
>> closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras
lowered through probe holes
>> where practicable, actual physical
inspection and survey.
99
Once the relevant hazards have been
>> plant and equipment specifications
adequately defined, you must put in place
>> regular communication of information
controls to mine or extract safely through

the underground workings.
7.6.2RISK CONTROL
Consider the following control measures to
eliminate or minimise the risk of unexpected
floor or wall collapse:
>> placing fill materials into the
>> leaving a pillar of adequate dimension
between the current working bench
and the underground workings by
stowing or collapsing
>> restricting work to areas clear of the
suspect location, with an adequate
margin of safety
>> blasting waste rock into voids, followed
by further back filling to stabilise the area.
If there is a risk of intersecting underground
workings, a geotechnical assessment should
be carried out to determine the minimum
stable floor pillar or rib pillar dimensions.
All areas of a working bench likely to be
underlain by underground workings should
be clearly marked and access to the area
controlled by a specific set of procedures.
all those involved

>> review of the procedures as the depth
of the pit increases.
Allowance should be made for the uncertainty
in the precise position of underground
workings and any potentially unstable
ground surrounding the underground
workings. An extra margin of safety should
be allowed in the separation of permissible
works areas from suspect zones.
When extraction approaches operating
underground mines, the potential hazards
may include:
>> flooding of the underground workings
>> instability of the slopes and surrounding
surface areas
>> adverse effects on the underground mine
ventilation system
>> spontaneous combustion
>> collapse of unfilled stope voids
>> deficiencies in co-ordination,
communication and control of mining
activities between the surface and
underground mines.
These procedures should address a range
Each of these hazards must be adequately
of issues including:
investigated and controlled by appropriate
>> minimising pedestrian movement
means according to the identified risk.
>> the workers responsible for monitoring

and marking out the hazardous areas
7.7
WORKING NEAR SLOPES
>> probe drilling procedures
Managing hazards from individual rocks falling
>> marking out the extent of the
from a slope (highwall or face) is done through
>> drilling and blasting
>> plant and equipment movement
>> placement of fill materials in unfilled
workings
>> rock stability monitoring
>> daylight and night operations
100
and discussion of issues of concern with
a combination of four techniques. These are:

>> supporting or controlling the fall path of
potentially loose rock
>> scaling the loose rock
>> providing rock catching berms or benches
or both
>> limiting workers exposure to areas where
loose rock is on the slope.
Before allowing people to work near a slope, the slope should be thoroughly inspected for
hazards including loose rock. Where loose rock is identified it should be scaled off the slope or
the area beneath the loose rock should be cordoned off. Benching effectively reduces workers
exposure as does moving roadways and work areas farther out from the base. In addition, mobile
plant should be worked perpendicular to the base of the slope as it provides the operator with
a better view of the face.
When working near slopes the following safety precautions should be followed:
>> A bench is located in the slope above the work area. Space the bench so you can clean
the face of the immediate wall (the section of wall from the floor up to the first bench)
with mobile plant or equipment available at the site.
>> The workers must not be positioned between the slope and any part of any mobile
plant or equipment that would hinder their escape from falls or slides.
>> Safe access to the top of the slope must be provided to allow for examinations of
ground conditions.
>> Clear the top of the slope of loose, hazardous material before the shot material exposing
the face is brought down. Use mobile plant (eg an excavator) that can reach the edge of
the wall from safe staging and use the outward force of the bucket to remove loose material
from the top edge of the wall.
>> A buffer must be provided that locates workers a safe distance out from the toe of the wall.
This may be achieved by placing the loading excavator on a rock platform with a rock trap
(or trench) between the excavator and the face (see Figure 36).
Face height
>> Mobile plant should work perpendicular to the face or toe while in the impact zone.
Rock Trap width

1/4 face height
Rock trap depth

1/8 face height
Rock Platform height
Rock Platform width
Machine Track width
Figure 36: Rock trap design
101
PART C
08/
TIPPING
(OR DUMPING)
IN THIS SECTION:
8.1 Dumping methods
8.2 Controlling end-tipping risks
8.3 General risk controls
8.4 Procedures for examining
tip heads
8.5 Tip maintenance and
inspection
8.6 Other considerations for
stockpiles
8.7 Reworking or reshaping tips
102
SECTION 8.0 // TIPPING (OR DUMPING)
Instability or movement in tips and stockpiles can cause

serious harm. To minimise this risk, actively manage tips
and stockpile, and have robust procedures in place.
>> common risks from tips and tipping
and ways to control them
>> procedures for inspecting tip heads
and tip condition.
Incidents can occur for various reasons when
dumping. Mainly these reasons are unsafe tip
head conditions, unsafe dumping practices,
or some combination of the two.
Some unsafe dump point conditions include:
>> No windrow or restraint, or an inadequate
windrow or restraint. Makes the edge
location difficult to judge; offers inadequate
>> A tip that runs downgrade to the windrow.

Gives drivers less control while backing,
and can soften the dump area from poor
drainage.
>> A tip thats placed on a soft or weak
foundation. As the tip gets larger, the
slope may become unstable due to the
foundation giving way underneath the tip.
>> Inadequate lighting for night operations,
or poor visibility during inclement weather.
Makes driver judgements, and detection
of unsafe conditions, more difficult.
>> Inadequate clearance between equipment
and overhead power lines. Two particular
restraint to keep a vehicle from going over
concerns are that truck trays are raised
the edge.
at dump points, and as tips get larger the
>> A windrow that is too narrow at the base.

Allows the heavy loading of the truck to
get so close to the edge of the tip that
clearance may be gradually reduced.

>> Congestion around the tip head where
dump trucks or other mobile machinery
the edge material may not be strong
congregate and crowd the tip head due
enough to support the weight.
to operational delays or unplanned events.
>> An edge of a tip that has been weakened

because the tip has been loaded out at the
toe and over steepened. Edge material may
not be able to support the truck weight, and
its own weight. A portion of the windrow
8.1
DUMPING METHODS
There are three methods of dumping:

1. Paddock dumping where loads are
may have fallen away reducing the windrows
dumped close to each other and, if another
capability to provide restraint.
layer is to be built on top, the surface is
>> An edge of a tip that has been undercut.

Overhanging conditions can be created
especially when the tip material is frozen,
or has sat for an extended period of time.
>> Cracks, settlement, or a slide near the edge
levelled and prepared for the next lift using

mobile plant.
2. Dump short and push off where loads are
dumped and pushed off a tip edge.
3. End-tipping where loads are dumped
of the tip. The edge may be unstable and
down a free face and the load slides
may not support the additional truck weight.
down requiring regular maintenance
>> A soft area near the edge of the tip.
and re-building of windrows.
May cause tyres to sink in and the truck

to tip over as it attempts to dump.
103
Paddock dumping or dumping short and
may become unstable because of a zone of
pushing off are the preferred options for all
weak material in the tip. Sliding may occur
tips. This is because these methods generally
on a layer of the material.
eliminate the hazard of trucks driving off an

edge or the edge collapsing due to increased
weight from trucks. Under carefully managed
circumstances end-tipping can be done safely.
CONTROLLING END-TIPPING
RISKS
8.2
Whenever heavy vehicles are operated near

the edge of a slope, there is a risk the edge
supporting the weight of the vehicles being

used, normally a truck, and withstand the
other dynamic forces imposed in stopping and
dumping near the edge, engineering processes
and checks that tips are being maintained to
meet design specifications and tolerances are
essential. This is to make sure tip edges remain
stable and capable of withstanding the weight
material will not support the vehicles. This is
of vehicles dumping over an edge.
especially relevant on tips or stockpiles where
End-tipping should therefore only be done
the material is normally in a relatively loose
where the following risk mitigation measures
condition.
are in place and maintained:
In a tip or stockpile the material is typically
>> A geotechnical assessment54 of every tip
at its angle of repose. The angle of repose
with a minimum Factor of Safety of 1.2
is the angle at which the material rests when
(refer section 4 for more information).
simply dumped in a pile. This angle will vary
>> Tips and tip heads (including windrows)
depending on the size and shape of the
should be designed (with drawings, see
constituent particles, how the material is
figure 37 for an example); formed from
dumped and the amount of moisture in the
consolidated layers; and terraced or
material when it is dumped.
stepped back to minimise fall risks.
For a pile of material at its angle of repose,

the edge of the pile is by definition marginally
stable. When dumped or pushed over the
>> The edge and windrows should be

systematically maintained while end-tipping.
>> The windrow should be used as a visual
edge, the material tends to slide until it
guide only. The windrow should not be
comes to rest at an angle where it can just
used to help stop the truck but only as
barely support its own weight. This is why it
a visual guide to judge where to stop.
is hazardous to bring the heavy weight of a

truck close to the edge of an angle of repose
slope. When this occurs, the slope material
must support not only its own weight, but
also the additional weight of the loaded truck.
If the additional weight of the truck causes
the materials shear strength to be exceeded,
the edge of the slope will give way under the
>> There is adequate supervision of dumping

operations to make sure unsafe conditions
are being corrected and safe practices are
being followed.
>> There are specified intervals for reviewing the
end-tipping and auditing of the processes.
>> Unusual material (eg weaker or wetter)
weight of the truck. This is the reason there
should always be treated differently than
is an ongoing history of serious incidents at
standard overburden. Unusual material
uncontrolled tip heads.
should always be paddock dumped in
The edge of a pile can also become unstable

if the foundation cannot support the weight
an area where it will not compromise

tip stability.
of the material and begins to give way.
Track-dozers are preferred for maintaining
Especially in a tip of overburden, the edge
tip heads because they distribute the weight
54
104
Because the tip head must be capable of
The Regulations, regulation 81 (b)
of the mobile plant over a greater area than a rubber-tyred dozer, subsequently decreasing
ground pressure. This practice should be encouraged.
When dumping short, a good rule of thumb is to dump one truck-length back from the edge.
The benefit of using this method is that the truck drivers are not exposed to the potential
hazards at the edge of the tip. They can complete the haul quicker since they don't need to
be as precise in backing and positioning the truck when they are dumping.
To eliminate the hazard of trucks reversing into water, only backfill water filled areas by the
dump short and push off method.
Example of tip slope stability design (limit equilibrium)
200kPa surcharge
100% load on rear wheels
70
of vehicle load
} Influence
on crest of dump slope
70
65
65
60
60
Factor of safety
1.21
55
55
50
50
Elevation (m)
45
45
15m high
batter
40
40
Tip Material
35
35
30
30
6.5m
from crest
25
20
25
10m
step back
Phreatic su
rface
20
15
15
10
10
Floor of tip
5
0
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
* not to Scale
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
Distance (m)
Figure 37: Example of tip slope stability design (limit equilibrium)
8.2.1TIP CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURE

All tips should have a construction procedure to follow when dumping. This procedure should:
>> Describe how the tip design, from the geotechnical assessment, will be implemented by
the workers.
>> Specify the overall slope angle, maximum heights of batter slopes and minimum bench widths.
>> Consider the type of material being dumped and the dumping method.
>> Consider the size and type of vehicles being used.
>> Include windrow specifications (refer 8.2.3 for more information).
>> Be easily understandable by the workers dumping.
Workers should be trained in the procedure and dumping should be monitored, to ensure the
procedure is being followed.
Using diagrams is a good way to communicate the procedure to workers. Figures 38 and 39 are
examples of easily understood tip construction procedures that describe how the tip design from
the geotechnical assessment will be implemented.
105
ope
ll sl
era
x ov
Ma
More competent
material
Min bench
width
Min bench
width
Soft material
More competent
material
Soft material
Min bench
width
Max
height
Figure 38: Example dump construction method for mixed material (mattressing)
l
ral
ve
o
x
pe
slo
Ma
Min bench
width
pe
lo
Max batter
height
ax
rs
tte
ba
Figure 39: Example dump construction method for competent material
These are only two potential dump construction methods. The procedure that the mine follows
should be based on the geotechnical assessment.
Using diagrams is a good way to communicate the procedure to workers.
8.2.2DUMPING METHODOLOGY
Loads should be dumped in phases according to the design to ensure stability and to allow the
tip face to be built out uniformly. A phase is a series of dumps whereby progressive loads are
dumped adjacent to the previous one (refer Figure 40).
106
At the end of each phase the tip surface, edge
The windrow or backstop should be used as
and windrow should be reformed (taking into
a visual guide only. The windrow or backstop
consideration any compaction or movement
should not be used to help stop the truck.
of the windrow that is required) before the
On no account should a vehicle be allowed
next phase starts.
to mount windrows or backstops.
Tip edge and windrow
Tip Edge
Windrow
3rd tip
2nd tip
1st tip
Best
Figure 40: Dumping sequence
There should be communication between the

mobile plant operators and the truck drivers
Prepared windrow
to advise when the next phase can start.

When reversing close to the edge of a tip,
Tipped material
drivers should reverse slowly and come to

a gradual stop at the tip head. As a truck
reverses up and the brakes are applied,
Consolidated
tip material
dynamic forces are produced which push

down and out on the tip. The more abruptly
a vehicle stops, the higher these forces are.
These forces can make a stable edge give way.
Drivers should reverse perpendicular to the
edge, or with the driver's side tyres leading
just slightly (refer Figure 41). In many tip head
windrow
accidents, the tyre tracks havePrepared
revealed
the
truck was reversing at an angle, with the rear

material
tyres opposite the driver leading. InTipped
these
cases, the drivers side mirror would have

indicated the driver still had a distance to
Consolidated
back up, while
the opposite side rear tyres
tip material
were already contacting the windrow or

going over the edge.
Figure 41: Approaching tip point windrow
107
8.2.3CONSTRUCTION OF WINDROWS
8.2.4CONSTRUCTION OF STOP-BLOCKS
AT TIP HEADS
(OR WHEEL BACK-STOPS) AT PERMANENT
A critical function of a windrow at a tip head
TIP HEADS
is to keep the heavy load on the rear tyres of
When a truck (or loader) dumps off a
the truck from getting too close to the edge.
permanent tip head (eg into a hopper)
In this respect the height of the windrow is
adequate stop-blocks should be in place.
important because the higher the windrow, the
The stop-block should be designed,
wider the base of the windrow. It is this wide
constructed, installed and of sufficient height
base that is critical in keeping the load back
to offer definite restraint. The stop-block
from the edge.
should be adequate for the largest vehicles
Windrows should be seen as a safety extra

and should not be used as a brake or even
an indicator that the edge has been reached.
They must be designed, constructed, installed
and of sufficient height to offer definite
restraint in the event a vehicle accidentally
contacts them. While traditional rules of
thumb for windrow heights (ie half the height
of the wheel) may be useful, they are often
not supported by design calculations and
could be inadequate as a safety barrier.
Design parameters for windrow construction
should be followed. Design parameters
include:
>> Using material to construct the windrows
that will use the tip head. Remove spills

(including gradual build up) that accumulate
in front of the stop-block as these will reduce
the height of the block.
8.3
GENERAL RISK CONTROLS
8.3.1OVERHEAD HAZARDS
Carry out dumping operations clear of
overhead hazards such as power lines,
pipework and so on. Continuously check
for overhead hazards. If a tip or stockpile
increases in size, vehicles may gradually
begin working closer and closer to overhead
hazards that were too far away to be a
concern when the tip or stockpile was started.
that is non-uniform in size, to allow

interlocking of particles for greater
8.3.2VISIBILITY OF A DUMP SITE
cohesion and strength.
Adequate lighting must be provided. The area
>> Sloping the outer face of the windrow
should be illuminated well enough to allow
to its natural angle of repose. The slope
signs of tip head instability, such as cracks,
should be pushed up steeper on the inner
to be detected. If visibility is poor (eg due to
face (but must maintain adequate width).
bad weather conditions), dumping should be
>> The width and distance must be enough to
stopped or other controls implemented to
keep the heavy loading on the rear tyres of
maintain safety (eg trucks should dump back
trucks from getting too close to the edge
from the edge).
where the material could give way.
During adverse weather a trigger point should

be established that will determine when
operations will need to be modified or stopped
due to reduced operating parameters. This
can include visibility, temperature (freezing),
traction on pavements (rain) and wind.
108
8.3.3VEHICLE MANOEUVRING
It will usually not be possible to completely
avoid reversing of trucks where dumping has
to happen. However, reduce the amount of
reversing to as little as possible. For more
information on reversing, refer section 10.1.
Tip heads should be of sufficient size to permit
manoeuvring by the largest equipment that
is intended to be used.
8.3.4DUMP-POINT SURFACES
The horizontal surface at the tip head should
Best
be kept level from side to side so trucks wont

tip on their sides when the tray is raised (refer
Figure 42).
The surface of the tip head should be kept
sloped a small amount so, when reversing
to the tip head, the trucks will be going up a
slight grade (refer Figure 43). This gives the
driver better control. It also provides a better
opportunity to get the truck out if any shifting
of the ground occurs, and keeps the tip head
better drained.
Best
Figure 42: Vehicles should be parked on level

ground (side to side) when dumping their load
Best
Figure 43: Dump on level ground with a slight
uphill gradient
109
8.3.5COMMUNICATION
There should be a clear and effective system
that allows communication between anyone
entering the stockpile or dump area, such as
two-way radio.
A protocol should be established to define
who is coordinating the tip head. If a dozer
is present at the tip head it is good practice
to assign this to the dozer driver. If a dozer
driver is not constantly present then other
arrangements should be made where multiple
trucks may be present at the same time.
8.3.6USING SPOTTERS
A spotter is someone who guides a truck
into the dumping position, either from a safe
viewing platform protected from the elements,
or in a stationary vehicle.
A spotter should always spot the truck from
the drivers side. Where spotters are used
radios should be provided.
a minimum of one truck length on their

approach and in making their turn.
8.3.9TOE EXCLUSION ZONE
(PROHIBITED ZONE)
A toe exclusion zone should be established
at a safe distance from the toe of all working
tip and stockpile slopes. Barricade fencing,
windrows or traffic cones and warning signs
should be erected where there is a risk of harm.
8.3.10RESTRICTED ACCESS FOR LIGHT
VEHICLES AND WORKERS ON FOOT
To make sure no additional traffic hazards are
introduced there should be restricted access
to operational areas of a tip for light vehicles
and workers on foot. Signs should be erected
indicating restricted access areas.
Where light vehicles are required to access
the tip head you should establish dedicated
light vehicle parking areas and have protocols
Spotting platforms should be highly visible
in place to eliminate pedestrian and heavy
to all vehicles.
vehicle interaction, stopping operations until
8.3.7USING TECHNOLOGY
Make use of new technologies such as
proximity sensors and vehicle mounted
pedestrians have left the tip head.

8.3.11SEGREGATION OF VEHICLES
AT THE TIP HEAD
cameras that can improve both tip head
Demarcated routes, for use during night or
safety and efficiency.
day, should be provided. This should ideally
A rearward facing camera can assist a truck

driver in backing up square to the tip head
and in knowing how close to the windrow the
vehicle is positioned. They should be provided
at all times where end-tipping is undertaken.
8.3.8TRAFFIC FLOW
Consider the types of vehicles entering the tip
head when determining a direction of travel
(eg driver cabs may be on the left or the right
hand side). Approaching with the tip head to
the drivers cab side gives the driver the best
opportunity to check the condition of the
tip head just prior to dumping.
110
Drivers should stay back from the edge
separate access to and exit from the dumping

areas. One-way routes are preferable. By
restricting movement to defined routes grading
and watering requirements are reduced.
Vehicles in the dumping area should remain
in the view of the driver of a reversing vehicle
at all times; that is, on the cab side. Vehicles
should remain at least one truck width apart
from other vehicles while dumping (refer
Figure 44). This leaves room in case a truck
tips over on its side while attempting to dump.
Truck drivers should never drive within the
reversing path of another vehicle.
Do not reverse a vehicle blindly in a dumping
out (ie using a backhoe). When material sticks
area. Drivers should make full use of visibility
in the tray, on no account should drivers try to
aids and should not reverse until they are
jar it loose by jamming on the brakes as they
certain the path is clear and only if protection
reverse. The truck could tip over, the tray hoist
is in place adjacent to any edge of a hazard.
could fall causing sudden extreme movement,
Safe operating procedures should outline
or if this is done near the edge of a tip, the
the protocols and rules when working at a
added force could cause the edge to collapse.
tip head.
A safe system of work should be established

for dumping loads. When the truck is
positioned the driver should apply the park
brake before putting the transmission into
neutral. When the hoist or tray is rising, the
truck driver should use the mirrors to watch
the material flowing from the tray to ensure
there are no side spills or uneven flow (which
may indicate a hang-up). Check for cracking
or slumping of the tip head.
8.3.13RAISED TRAYS AND ALIGNMENT
At least 1 truck width
OF ARTICULATED VEHICLES
The vehicle should stay level if it is moved
forward during dumping. Driving with the tray
raised should be restricted to short distances,
and only where it is required to fully discharge
Figure 44: Vehicle separation at tip point
Light vehicles should go to the designated

area if there is one. If not, they should stay
a nominated distance away from the trucks
dumping or queued to dump, similar to having
a loading clearance zone. Trucks should queue
in a location that ensures they will be safely
a load. Raised tray alarms and built in speed

controls can reduce the risk of vehicles being
driven with the tray raised.
Always align the tractive unit and trailer of
an articulated vehicle when dumping (refer
Figure 45). Provide enough space for a vehicle
to manoeuvre the trailer and cab so they are
lined up.
separated from the dumping truck and in clear

view of that trucks operator.
8.3.12DUMPING THE LOAD
Drivers should be trained on how to safely
handle sticking material (hang-ups). Sticking
material can make the truck tip over as the
tray is raised or cause a more critical loading
condition on the edge of the tip. If the tray gets
to about two-thirds of the way up and material
is still sticking, the driver should lower the tray
and find another means of getting the material
Articulated vehicles should be parked straight when tipping
Figure 45: Articulated vehicles
111
8.3.14REMOVING MATERIAL FROM
PROCEDURES FOR EXAMINING

TIP HEADS
8.4
A STOCKPILE
The removal of material from the toe of a
stockpile can have a significant effect on
the stability of the edge. In the case of loose,
free-flowing material, loading out at the toe
may have little impact because the material
tends to slide back to its angle of repose.
Once material has become tightly packed from
vehicles on the stockpile, or from sitting for a
period of time and settling in, the area where
material is loaded out will generally stand at
a steeper angle. Material standing at about
35 degrees when dumped over the edge can
typically stand at 45 degrees once loaded
out. In some cases, such as when material has
been sitting for a long time, the material may
It is critically important to examine a tip head

for unsafe conditions on a regular and ongoing basis. Tip head conditions can change
due to new material being dumped, the effects
of equipment near the tip head, weather
conditions, or even just the settling-in of material
with the passage of time. In stockpiles, a big
factor affecting the tip head condition is the
loading-out of material from the toe of the pile.
At a minimum, tip heads should be visually
inspected by a competent person prior to
work commencing, at least once during each
working shift, and more often if necessary
for safety. A written record should be made
stand even steeper or may even stand in an
of each inspection.
overhanging condition. With these steepened
Operators and supervisors should be trained
conditions, there is less slope material to
in unsafe conditions and practices at tip heads.
support loadings on the stockpile, and a
Operators and supervisors should routinely
sudden failure could occur.
check the area for unsafe conditions, such
Mobile plant operators should be trained
as cracks, inadequate windrows, unstable
to continuously trim the face so it does not

overhang and collapse (refer Figure 46). Faces
should be worked in a straight line so that wings
do not develop and create a crescent face
material on the slope below the tip head,

or a loaded-out slope below the tip head.
Such conditions should be immediately
reported and acted on including the
which can be self-supporting in the short term.
suspension of operations as required.
Barriers should be installed to restrict access
For more detailed information on what
to the top of the tip above the area which is

being loaded out. The purpose of the barriers
is to isolate the potentially dangerous edge
(which could be undercut) from drivers and
to eliminate material being dumped on to
the loader.
to look for at a tip head see section 8.5.

At a minimum, before and during each work
shift the tip surface, edges and faces should
be inspected by a competent person for
any evidence of instability. Refer Regulation
222 of the regulations for specific
examinations required.
Redress
potentially
unstable
section
Regulation 83 Inspection of tips

If the PHMP for tips, ponds, and voids
required regular inspections to be carried
natural angle
of repose
Cross section of stockpile
Figure 46: Cross section of stockpile
112
out, it also must specify:

(a) the nature and interval of inspections; and
(b) the appointment of a competent person

to supervise the conduct of tipping
operations, including a requirement that
this person supervise every inspections
of a tip at the mining operation.
Regulation 122 Defects discovered during
inspection of tips
(1) The mine operator must ensure that any
These can include:

8.5.1TENSION CRACKS OR SETTLEMENT
A tension crack or settled area near the
edge of a tip or stockpile is a warning sign
of an unstable, or marginally stable, slope.
Cracking is an indicator that some movement
has already taken place. If movement has
occurred, then the slope material is unable
person who carries out an inspection of
to support its own weight, and it should not
a tip at the mining operation-
be relied on to support additional weight,
(a) makes a written record of all
such as a truck.
defects discovered during the
If there is a tension crack in the dump area,
inspection; and
vehicles should not travel over or near the
(b) informs the mine manager of the
crack. The additional weight of the vehicles
defects that require immediate
may trigger the slope to fail. Loads should be
rectification.
dumped a minimum of one truck-length away
(2) The mine operator must ensure that a
from the crack or in an alternative area.
written record is made of the action taken
Cracked areas should be clearly marked
to remedy any defect in a tip discovered
and isolated so the area is not used, or the
during an inspection of the tip.
condition should be immediately corrected
(3) The mine operator must ensure that the
by flattening that area of the tip. This can be
records required by subclauses (1) (a)
done by dumping material at the bottom as a
and (2) are kept as part of the health
buttress, and carefully pushing material down
and safety management system.
from the top using a track-dozer.

Tension cracks will tend to run parallel to the
TIP MAINTENANCE AND

INSPECTION
edge of the slope. In some materials, other
Regular maintenance of tip surfaces should
to be randomly oriented.
8.5
types of surface cracking may occur as a result

of the material drying out. Drying cracks tend
be undertaken, as well as the access and exit

routes. This helps to make sure vehicle hazards
due to spillage, wheel ruts, potholes and
water ponding are minimised. Windrows or
backstops should be maintained in height
and profile.
8.5.2MOVEMENT OF SLOPE MATERIAL

A crack or a scarp (a steepened area where
the material has slid) on the slope is an
indication of instability. Bulging of the slope
material is not always as apparent as cracks,
Control dust generation using water trucks
but it is another sign the slope material is
or spray systems to reduce dust nuisance
moving.
and poor visibility hazards. Dust control in

dumping areas should be at least equal to
that in loading areas.
Bulging can be detected by looking along

the slope of the tip, especially the area near
the toe, and paying particular attention to
When completing inspections look for
any material that is not at the normal angle
indications of inherent failure mechanisms
of repose. Bulging of the ground next to the
or defects due to poor operational practices.
tip is an indication the foundation underneath
113
the tip is too weak to support the weight of
For more information on construction of
the tip. A failure through the foundation could
windrows, refer section 8.2.2.
cause a portion of the tip to slide.

Where any signs or movement of bulging
8.5.5UNDERMINED SLOPES
material is recognised, dumping operations
When material is loaded out from the toe of a
should be immediately stopped. Dumping
slope, it makes the slope less stable and more
operations may resume after a risk assessment
prone to sliding. In this weakened condition
and consequent hazard controls (including
the material at the edge of the slope may not
reforming the tip) have been completed
be able to support its own weight and the
and actioned.
additional weight of a truck. An undermined

slope is especially hazardous at a tip head
8.5.3SOFT AREAS
Ruts and accumulations of water may indicate
soft areas. The hazard in this situation is that
the edge to suddenly give way.
as a truck starts to dump, the tyres may sink
Because of this hazard, even without cracks
into the soft area. In the worst case this could
or other signs of instability, dumping at or near
result in the truck tipping over, especially if
the edge, where the tip has been loaded-out
combined with material hanging up in the tray.
and undermined, should be strictly prohibited.
Soft areas should either be clearly marked so

the area is not used, or the condition should
be immediately corrected by re-grading and
sloping the area to promote better drainage.
Drivers should stop dumping and move to a
firmer area if they feel the tyres sinking into
the ground and immediately report such
occurrences to their supervisor.
If your examination identifies an undermined

area, it should be cordoned off and rectified.
Regulation 222 Examination of mining
operations
(1) The mine operator must ensure that
a competent person
(a) Examines
(i) Before the start of each working
8.5.4INADEQUATE WINDROWS
shift and at suitable times during
Inspections should include checking windrows
of the mining operation where
are adequate to prevent vehicles getting

too close to the edge. Windrows must be
designed, constructed, installed and of
sufficient height to offer definite restraint in
the event a vehicle accidentally contacts them.
each working shift, every area

a mine worker is or will be
present; and
(ii) At least weekly, every accessible
area of the mining operation,
including every area containing
It is important vehicles do not back forcibly
barriers, machinery, seals,
into a windrow. As the tyres sink into the
underground or surface
windrow, the heavy loading on the rear tyres
infrastructure, and ventilation
gets closer to the edge, which can cause the
stoppings; and
edge to give way. Inspections should include

checking for tyre marks on the windrow
material. If you notice tyre marks, the potential
hazard of this practice should be discussed
with drivers immediately and appropriate
action taken.
114
because the additional weight of the truck,

if positioned too close to the edge, can cause
(iii) At least weekly, every vehicle in

the mining operations; and
(iv) Before it is started, any fixed
8.6.1ENGULFMENT
or mobile plant in the mining
Engulfment can occur where loaders (or other
operation that has been stopped
mobile equipment) are removing material from
for the preceding 24 hours or
a stockpile that is substantially higher than
longer, and
the loading equipment. Hazard controls (ie
(b) Takes all practicable steps to
benching, height restrictions, and continuously
eliminate, isolate or minimise any
collapsing the face so it does not overhang)
significant hazard identified during
and emergency procedures (in the case
the examination; and
of an engulfment) must be established.
(c) Ensures that all plant examined

either is safe or is made safe.
(2) The mine operator must ensure that a
Where using draw down points (ie reclaims)

there is a risk mobile plant will fall or
inadvertently drive into a draw down hole.
written procedure for the conduct of
Major contributing factors include:
examinations required by subclause
>> The suitability of mobile plant for the
(1) is included in the health and safety
stockpile design and operating environment
management system for the mining
(eg mobile plant operating alongside
operation and sets out
relatively steep stockpiles with heights
(a) The matters to be covered by
above the safe limits of mobile plant).
the examination; and

(b) A timetable (subject to the
minimum requirements of
subclause (1)) for carrying out
the examinations; and
(c) The process for recording
findings; and
(d) The process for taking action
as a result of findings.
>> The operator not being aware of the

location of draw down points and either
driving into the hole, or sliding into the hole.
>> The operator driving over the top of a
bridged hole that suddenly collapses.
>> Insufficient surface structures or other
navigational aids that could be used by
the operator to identify the location of
draw down points.
Where there is a risk of engulfment, mobile
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
FOR STOCKPILES
8.6
plant should be designed to protect the

operator and provide for prompt recovery
of the operator. Consideration must be given
Walls or other supports provided to contain
to the rescue of people in the event of an
stockpiles should be designed by a competent
emergency. Recovery systems and methods
engineer to ensure their stability.
should be developed and tested. The controls
If stockpiles grow to an extent that was not
outlined in Table 6 could be used.
anticipated, they should be subject to a design

review to ensure safety.
In windy conditions, spray water on the
stockpiles to minimise the dust hazard
(refer section 11.10).
115
CONTROLS
COMMENT
The stockpile mobile plant should be designed

to withstand engulfment forces of at least
40psi (280kpa)
Assumes a safety factor of 2:1 and is based on

USA stockpile dozer incidents and investigations
Devices to assist the mobile plant operator in

determining whether draw points are operating
Devices include:
>> Flags
>> Lights
Pedestrians should be prohibited from the

hazardous area at all times
For example, draw down points
Provide communication devices so mobile plant

operators can communicate with the control room
in the event of an emergency
Devices include:
Safety equipment to:
Devices include:
>> Ensure the operator is in a safe atmospheric

environment if the mobile plant cab is
engulfed; and
>> Breathing apparatus
>> Facilitate rescue
>> Mats or portable bridges (to bridge the gap

between stable ground and the engulfed
mobile plant)
Position indicating devices to assist mobile plant

operators in determining the location of draw
down points in high risk zones should be used.
Audible or visual alarms should be provided to
alert the mobile plant operator
>> Radio telephones (RTs)

>> Cell phones (where reception allows)
>> Rescue harness

>> Emergency lighting
Devices include:
>> GPS
>> Cameras over draw down points
>> Proximity detection
>> Fixed structures to provide a reference point
Table 6: Engulfment hazard controls at draw down points
8.7
REWORKING OR RESHAPING TIPS
Tips may be reworked or reshaped for landscaping or for operational requirements

(eg forming roads over dumped material). A geotechnical specialist should be consulted
when planning rehabilitation to ensure the stability of the tip at all times. For more information
on rehabilitating tips, see section 4.6.
116
PART C
09/
WATER-BASED
MINING
IN THIS SECTION:
9.1 Planning and design
9.2 Excavation rules
9.3 Extracting beneath water
9.4 Floating plant and boats
117

>> excavate safely under water
>> safely access floating plant.
9.1
PLANNING AND DESIGN
Before any excavation, an appraisal of the

ground conditions should be undertaken by
9.2
EXCAVATION RULES
Excavation rules should be drawn up

setting out:
>> the manner in which excavation activities
should be carried out, specifying the type
and reach of excavators
>> the physical dimensions of the excavation
a competent person to determine all factors
including slope, depth, height of free faces,
likely to affect the stability of the ground and
width of benches, position of catch-berms
the limitations that should be imposed on the

excavation design.
>> the way in which material should be

removed from the excavation
This should be documented. The assessment
>> the nature and frequency of supervision
should be reviewed and revised where
>> response to defects.
necessary when a material change has

occurred in the ground conditions or the
excavation methods. Effective ground control
9.3
EXTRACTING BENEATH WATER
relies on geotechnical information obtained at
Excavations should be kept stable even if you
different stages of the life of the site during
cannot see them. When extracting beneath
planning and design, at implementation of the
water, slopes will be saturated.
design and through day-to-day operations.
Draglines, clam shells and long reach hydraulic
Following appraisal of ground conditions, a
excavators may over steepen the slope on
design should be prepared setting out the
which they stand and cause failure. These
measures to control ground instability. Where
slopes should be treated as a significant
an existing design has already been proved, it
hazard. Working methods should be based
may be used as the basis for the design of a
on the geotechnical assessment of the
new excavation, where the ground conditions
material being excavated allowing for any
at both sites are not significantly different.
variation of submerged materials.
During planning and design, there is usually
The working bench should be kept flat and
a relative lack of data available when the
clear of equipment or material to enable a
design is first developed. It is essential that
rapid exit in the event of instability of the face.
information obtained during operations
The front edge of the bench should remain
is consolidated with information in the
visible to the operator at all times. Tracks
geotechnical model and continually used to
should face the excavation, or be no more
assess the suitability of the design in relation
than a 45 angle, with track motors facing
to ground stability.
away from the face (see Figure 47, Figure 48

and Figure 49).
118
SECTION 9.0 // WATER-BASED MINING
Escape route
Area
at risk
of
under
cutting
Tracks facing
the excavation
(no more than 45)
to allow rapid exit
Potentially unstable ground

(distance from toe to rear of
mobile plant): Determine
working methods based on
geotechnical assessment
Figure 47: Dragline working beneath water
Escape route
Area at risk
of under
cutting
Tracks facing
the excavation
(no more than 45)
to allow rapid exit
Figure 48: Long reach excavator working beneath water
119
Floating Plant
Escape route
Tracks facing
the excavation
(no more than 45)
to allow rapid exit
Area
at risk
of
under
cutting

Figure 49: Excavator working beneath water, loading floating plant
Edge protection, barriers, warning signs and other suitable controls should be placed around any
water filled excavation to keep people away from any hazardous zones. Edge protection, barriers
or signs should be moved as the excavation progresses and the hazardous area changes. Rescue
facilities must be provided (refer section 17).
If there is any doubt about the safety of excavations, operations must be stopped and remedial
controls undertaken.
Where loading floating plant there should be clear signals or communication between the
excavator operator and the floating plant operator so feeding can stop if required. Where
trommel screens are used, a visual or audible warning device should be used to alert the
excavator operator if the trommel has stalled. Such an occurrence can cause the screen to
become overloaded and could compromise the stability of the floating plant if loading continues.
Emergency procedures must be in place. This may include equipping mobile plant with features
or tools for use in an emergency; for example, push-out windows or window breaking tools.
9.4
FLOATING PLANT AND BOATS
Floating plant or boats (including those used on settling ponds) may be governed by the
requirements set out in the New Zealand Maritime Transport Act 1994 and Maritime Rules made
under it. Nothing in this section precludes you from complying with the requirements of the
Maritime Transport Act 1994 or Maritime Rules where it applies to your vessel.
As a general guide the following documents will be needed for you to legally operate your
floating plant or boat (hereafter referred to as vessel):
120
VESSEL TYPE
SAFETY SYSTEM
MARITIME RULES RELATING TO DESIGN,

CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT
Floating structures that are

not navigable, that is they are
permanently attached to the shore
(eg floating jetties, gangways)
No maritime
documentation
Not covered by the Maritime Transport Act

or Maritime Rules. Covered by the
Building Act
Barges over 24 metres in length
Barge Safety
Certificate
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
40C
41 may apply
42A
42B
43
46 Section 3
47 Section 3
49 (where there are lifting appliances)
Barges less than 24 metres in length
Maritime Operator
Safety System
(MOSS)
Barges less than 24 metres in length

that do not:
No maritime
documentation
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
40C
41 may apply
42A
42B
43
47 Section 2
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
40C
41 may apply
42A
42B
43
45 (partially apply)
47
>> Have a lifting device with a WLL

of 1 or more tonnes or
>> Carry passengers (does not
include crew)
>> Carry cargo
All powered vessels
Maritime Operator
Safety System
(MOSS)
Table 7: Maritime rules
For more detailed information on the Maritime Transport Act 1994, Maritime Rules and maritime
safety systems contact Maritime New Zealand or visit www.maritime.govt.nz.
Ensure floating plant will:
>> not become unstable due to shifting loads or being overloaded
>> remain stable while being towed
>> remain water worthy in operating conditions.
Floating plant is to be designed, manufactured and maintained to the required standard.
9.4.1SAFE MEANS OF ACCESS AND EGRESS
Safe means of access (eg gangway) should
be provided to vessels, floating processing
platforms, draw off points or submersible
pumps where people have to access them
for work purposes (refer Figure 50).
Figure 50: Example of gangway
121
Where using jetties, gangways, platforms,

bridges or walkways they must be fitted with
suitable handrails or other means to stop
people falling in the water (refer Figure 51).
>> No tracking of the excavator takes place

during the transfer.
>> No articulation of the arm or bucket takes
place during the transfer.
>> The excavator bucket is fitted with grab
rails positioned clear of any hinge points.
>> The person in the bucket is wearing a
self-inflating life preserver.
>> A clear line of sight is maintained between
the passenger and the excavator driver.
>> The excavator boom hydraulics are fitted
with hose burst protection valves.
Do not have personnel on board floating plant
while it is fed by an excavator.
Consider providing remotely operated rope
winch systems and power wash systems
during the design stage (safety by design).
Figure 51: Example of guardrails around a water

pick-up station
This eliminates hazards associated with

workers making frequent visits to floating
processing platforms.
Cables and pipes should be separated or

stored away from walkways to avoid tripping
(eg in cable trays). Surfaces of walkways
should be slip resistant.
Where traversing of jetties, gangways,
platforms, bridges, walkways, stairs or ladders
is required in the hours of darkness sufficient
lighting must be provided.
Where ponds and floating processing plants
are being used in alluvial mining, precautions
should be taken at the edge of the excavation
(refer section 7.5). Whilst emphasis should
be given to the stability of large excavators
and unstable ground conditions, this should
also include pedestrians accessing floating
platforms from the excavation edge.
For more detailed information on construction

and installation of platforms, walkways,
In alluvial mining the use of excavator buckets
stairways and ladders see the Department of
to transfer persons over a short distance to a
Building and Housing Compliance Document
floating processing platform should only be
for New Zealand Building Code Clause D1
permitted where:
Access Routes.
>> Pedestrians enter the bucket from a

position well clear of the excavation edge.
122
Figure 52: Digger and floating screen
9.4.2DESIGN AND MODIFICATIONS
9.4.3REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE
TO VESSELS
TO VESSELS
Do not submerge dredge or floating plant
To ensure the integrity of vessels, you should
decks under any circumstances. If the
establish maintenance and repair programs.
freeboard of a dredge or floating plant
These may include:
appears to be insufficient, a competent person
>> Regularly checking decks and hulls for
should be engaged to evaluate and rectify the

buoyancy. Dredge or floating plant operators
should make sure dredge or floating plant
decks do not become submerged under
any operating conditions. This is particularly
important when sludge builds up on the cutter
head and when the cutter is driven into the
bottom of the pond or into a working face
during mining operations.
Equipment installed on the dredge or floating
plant should be secure so that it wont shift
and destabilise the dredge or floating plant.
cracks and holes

>> Sealing all covers over hatches in the deck
with continuous excess marine sealant to
ensure water tightness
>> Regularly checking all hull compartment
bulkheads are watertight, to isolate water
flow should water ingress occur in any
individual compartment
>> Providing a sounding tube for each
hull compartment that extends to near
the bottom of the compartment so the
compartments can be sounded daily for
Where trommel screens are used an automatic
water ingress. Dredges should also have
tripping device or warning should be installed
an adequate capacity pump with a non-
to stop the trommel screen if the tailings
collapsible suction pipe long enough to
discharge belt stalls. Such an occurrence can
reach the bottom of any hull compartment.
cause the screen to get overloaded if the
When water ingress is detected the water
operator is not alerted, and the whole plant
can be quickly and efficiently removed
can tip over.
from the hull before buoyancy of the
Modifications can cause vessels to capsize

due to additional weight or the effects
dredge is seriously affected.

>> Procedures to make sure repairs are
modifications have on the balance of the
undertaken in pontoon cells when
vessel. Establish procedures to ensure
leaks develop.
modifications to the original design do

not exceed the design capacity set by the
manufacturer.
>> Regularly checking ropes and rigging for

signs of wear.
The use of polyurethane or polystyrene in hull
Procedures should also consider examination
compartments does not ensure buoyancy of
and maintenance of safety controls provided by
dredges. It is recommended these materials
the manufacturer to make sure modifications to
are not used because the materials deteriorate
the original design do not reduce the in process
over time, becoming porous and water
weight safety margin. For example, ensure
absorptive, and they do not allow for regular
dredge overload and full hopper alarm switches
inspection of the hull compartment surfaces.
are functioning within the specifications of the

manufacturer to maintain freeboard levels.
For more detailed information on barge
stability see Maritime New Zealand Barge
Stability Guidelines.
Hull compartments are confined spaces and a

confined space working procedure is to be used.
Refer to AS 2865 for more information on
confined space entry.
For more information on Repairs and
Maintenance see section 16.
123
9.4.4BOATS
Boats, like any other equipment, should
be of adequate size and power to properly
perform the anticipated task. Remember,
weight capacity includes people, motor,
Take into account the PPE and equipment

a worker will have on their person when
considering PFDs. Lifejackets are to keep a
workers face out of the water, in case they are
rendered unconscious.
equipment and any other haul load.
9.4.6ROPES, PULLEYS, WINCHES
Consider the weight of a retrieved item
AND RIGGING
if a retrieval operation is undertaken.

Boats must be operated by workers who
have adequate experience or training or
who are supervised by a competent person.
All floating plant will require mooring. This is

often accomplished using winches and ropes.
On smaller plants with manual winches and
rope, the main hazard is that of tripping.
You must have a Maritime Operator Safety
Larger plants may have substantial winches
System (MOSS) for all powered vessels.
and large diameter wire ropes. These present
For more detailed information on MOSS
additional hazards from gear failure (ropes
contact Maritime New Zealand or visit
or pulleys breaking) and whiplash as strain
their website at www.maritimenz.govt.nz.
is exerted on rigging. Exclusion zones should
9.4.5PERSONAL FLOTATION DEVICES

(PFDs)
be defined.
Ropes, pulleys and other rigging should be
covered or otherwise protected. Workers
Establish and enforce policies for wearing
should stand well clear of any hazardous
Personal Flotation Devices (PFDs). Like seat
zones when the ropes are taking strain.
belts on vehicles, PFDs are effective only
For more detailed information on load lines
when they are worn.
see Part 47 of the Maritime Rules.
Provide sufficient quality PFDs of the proper
Anchoring should be firmly positioned and
type appropriate for each workers weight.
not prone to undermining.
Maintain the PFDs in serviceable condition

and replace them if they become worn
or damaged.
The use of galvanised ropes is advisable to

prevent the unseen, internal corrosion that can
occur in steel wire ropes operating constantly in
Generally, Type 401 open waters lifejackets are
and around water. Regardless of the rope used,
the most appropriate lifejackets for a working
all associated equipment such as pulleys, rope
environment. Type 401 lifejackets are designed
clamps and sheaves should be specified based
to keep an unconscious person face up in the
on the rope diameter and safe working load.
water. PFDs may include life buoys and life

lines (ropes) stationed at suitable locations.
9.4.7EMERGENCY EXITS
When using lifejackets they must meet NZS
Cabins should have an emergency exit in the
5823:1999, NZS 5823:2001, or NZS 5823:2005
event of a sinking or capsize, such as a push-
Specification for buoyancy aids and marine
out window or a trap-door.
safety harnesses and lines or another

national standard substantially complying with
the New Zealand standards. These include US,
Australian, European and ISO standards.
124
PART C
10/
WATER OR
TAILINGS
STORAGE
IN THIS SECTION:
10.1 Inspections and tell-tale
signs of distress
10.2 Technical operational review
10.3 Cleaning out ponds
125
Instability or failure of ponds and tailing dams can cause

harm. Design, construct, operate and maintain ponds
and tailing dams appropriately to prevent this harm.
>> inspect ponds and dams, and identify
potential causes of failure
INSPECTIONS AND TELL-TALE

SIGNS OF DISTRESS
10.1
Once a dam has been constructed, regular
>> review ponds and dams periodically
monitoring (including routine visual
>> maintain ponds and dams.
inspections) and maintenance should be
SSEs must take all practicable steps to

eliminate, isolate or minimise any significant
hazard associated with ponds and dams.
carried out to minimise the risk of the dam

failing and to ensure it maintains compliance
with the Building Code.
Safe systems of work should identify and
The most common failure mechanisms for
control any risks to workers and anyone else
a typical small earth dam are surface erosion
who may be affected by activities associated
from overtopping, internal erosion (ie piping
with ponds and dams (including adjacent
or seepage) and embankment slumping. These
landowners). This includes workers who need
failures can arise from defects such as spillway
access to potentially hazardous areas for
inadequacy, uncontrolled seepage, design
purposes such as carrying out inspections
and construction deficiencies, and a lack of
and cleaning out ponds or dams.
maintenance.
Mine operators must make sure a competent54
If any of the following signs of distress or other
person examines ponds or dams where
unusual characteristics develop, immediate
workers are, or will be, before the start of each
action should be taken to ensure safety and a
working shift and at suitable times during the
technical expert contacted to investigate the
shift. At least weekly, every accessible area of
dam to make sure it is safe and compliant with
the tip or pond, including areas with barriers,
the Building Code.
must be inspected by a competent person.

Quarry and alluvial mine operators should
10.1.1UPSTREAM SLOPE
undertake the same inspections where a tip or
The upstream slope of an earth dam or pond
pond has been appraised as a principal hazard.
should be examined for any sign of erosion,
For more detailed information on principal

hazard plans, planning and design criteria,
geotechnical assessments and construction
of ponds and dams see section 4.
beaching or slumping. These may be caused

by wave action, flooding, or a rapid drop in
the water level.
A damaged upstream face reduces the
stability of the dam by limiting its ability
to resist wave action and high water levels.
54
126
SECTION 10.0 // WATER OR TAILINGS STORAGE
Failure of the upstream slope can result from

undercutting, erosion, depressions, and other
evidence of the initiation of a possible slip
or landslide.
10.1.2CREST
The crest of a dam should be examined for
shape and cracks. A variation in levels across
the top of the dam may indicate abnormal
settlement (vertical downward movement)
or possibly an underlying void. Undetected,
this may lead to the eventual failure of
the dam as a result of the progressive
development of internal erosion.
10.1.3DEWATERING OR OVERFLOW
CHANNELS
Dewatering channels should be checked
for weed growth and side collapses. Safety
issues include edge collapse while inspecting,
silt build-up in the channel, and vegetation
disguising undermined edges.
Overflows can be decanting pipes, angled
pipes, spillways and armoured channels. These
should be inspected regularly, particularly
when there are periods of high rainfall.
10.1.4DOWNSTREAM SLOPE
Ideally, an inspection for seepage should
be made when the water is at or near its
highest level. Examine the downstream slope,
downstream toe, abutments, areas near
spillways, and around and adjacent to outlets.
Seepage areas can be identified by wet spots
or muddy areas, usually accompanied by the
lush growth of tussock and other grasses.
The use of piezometers will greatly increase
the ability to detect seepage at early stages
and should be considered as a control. You
will normally need technical advice for the
type and placement of each piezometer.
Small amounts of steady seepage (not
concentrated flows) do not represent a
serious condition, as long as controlled
drainage is provided and ponding is not
allowed to occur. An area of known seepage
that suddenly stops or significantly decreases
may indicate an area of distress and should
be investigated.
10.2 TECHNICAL OPERATIONAL
REVIEW
Inspections should include checking for
Periodic technical reviews should be
blocked intakes of decant, or angled pipes
undertaken by a competent person to assure
with vegetation or other debris. A significant
the tip or pond is operating in accordance
hazard when clearing blocked intakes is the
with the design intent. This can also ensure
sudden release of water into the pipe which
that regulatory requirements are being met
can suck a person onto the intake causing
(including those required by the Building Act
injury or drowning. Blockages should only be
2004). Inspections and audits form part of this
cleared with machinery or tools that keep a
review using input parameters derived from
person away from the intake.
site measurements, observations and testing.
Partially blocked overflow channels should be
Technical reviews:
cleared quickly and safely. Remedial measures
>> check that previous review
to limit the amount of floating vegetation

in ponds should be established. Make sure
armoured channels are not scoured when
there is a high water flow. This can erode
the dam crest and affect the integrity of
the embankment.
recommendations have been actioned

>> confirm appropriate responses have been
made to any incidents or issues arising
>> verify compliance with specifications
(eg inspection, monitoring, quality control)
>> verify compliance with legislative
requirements
127
>> validate the continued use of the tip

or pond design
>> recommend any necessary operational
or design modifications.
The type and level of information provided
in the review should be in-line with the tip
and pond risk appraisal.
A record of review outcomes should be
maintained. This should indicate any
recommended actions and details of how
they were addressed or implemented.
When using mobile plant, plant operators

should constantly monitor the crest of
the pond for signs of slumping, cracking
or instability. If any signs of instability are
observed, all work should stop; workers and
plant removed, and access prohibited. Seek
geotechnical advice if required.
The mobile plant operator should only remove
silt as planned, and not excavate the pond
retaining structure. The edge of the silt pond
should be clearly demarcated at all times,
ideally by barriers such as a bund. The mobile
If the tip or pond is a dam under the Building
plant should be as far from the lagoon edge as
Act 2004 and requires a dam safety assurance
operationally possible, and should be capable
programme (DSAP) under the dam safety
of obtaining the necessary depth of dig while
scheme, the DSAP will also include requirements
maintaining the required stand-off. The mobile
for inspection and review of the dam55.
plants tracks should be perpendicular to the

pond edge so a safe, rapid exit from the area
10.3
CLEANING OUT PONDS
The main risks when cleaning out ponds are

created by undercutting and making the
embankment unstable (particularly below
water) or by mobile plant driving on to soft
ground that cannot support the plants weight.
Settling ponds can be deceptive, as they can
form a crust which appears stable but the
silt remains soft beneath. Access onto the silt
should not be permitted unless capped and
stabilised. Mobile plant should be kept back
from the edge by at least a distance of 1.5
times the height of the face (refer Figure 53).
A risk assessment should be carried out
to identify the appropriate methodology
and plant to undertake silt extraction. The
most common method is silt removal by
an excavator. Alternative methods include
dredges, suction pumps or vacuum pumps.
55
128
Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2008, regulation 8
can be made if slope instability develops.

The excavated silt should be cast as far away
from the crest of the pond as possible to
prevent loading of the crest which could
cause failure. Silt placement should not block
the safe exit route of the mobile plant. When
not in use, all mobile plant should be parked
at a safe location away from the waters edge.
SECTION 10.0 // WATER OR TAILINGS STORAGE
The excavator machine

should remain on stable
ground at all times
Haul roads located

beyond
working area
Potentialy unstable
ground
Distance from
crest to toe
(minimum distances)
Edge of lagoon
clearly marked
with barrier
Escape route
Tracks facing
the excavation
(no more than 45)
to allow rapid exit
Height Distance
5m
6m
7m
8m
9m
10 m
7.5 m
9.0 m
10.5 m
12.0 m
13.5 m
15.0 m
height
Allowance for
potential break back
Distance from
Crest to toe = 1.5 x height
height = vertical height of face
from toe to crest
Figure 53: Example of cleaning out a settling pond with an excavator
129
PART C
11/
TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT
IN THIS SECTION:
11.1 Site access: contractors,
visitors and public
11.2 Power lines and other
overhead structures
11.3 Reversing, manoeuvring
and parking
11.4 Loading vehicles
11.5 Loading floating plant
11.6 Loading and storage of large
stone slabs or blocks
11.7 Feeding crushers
11.8 Railway sidings
11.9 Safe drivers and vehicles
11.10 Maintenance and repair
of roads
130
SECTION 11.0 // TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
Any vehicle movement can pose significant risks at

extractive sites, because of the size of the vehicles
used and the environment people are working in.
This section describes traffic management
measures for:
>> the interaction between light and

heavy vehicles56.
>> moving around hazards
This is good practice for all quarry and alluvial
>> keeping safe speeds, distances and
mine operators, and a legal requirement for
manoeuvres
>> using safe and appropriately-trained drivers
>> selecting and maintaining suitable vehicles.
There are a number of ways vehicle activities
can present a risk to workers at an extractives
site. These include:
>> the failure of a roadway (ie a collapse
or slip)
>> interactions between vehicles and
pedestrians, vehicles and structures, or
vehicles and vehicles (ie vehicles carrying
other mine operators as defined in section

19M of the HSE Act.
SITE ACCESS: CONTRACTORS,

VISITORS AND PUBLIC
11.1
On entering the site, vehicles and pedestrians

should be directed to a safe area, depending
on the nature of their visit. This is usually
achieved by signage but may include road
marking, footpaths or barriers. Allow sufficient
parking spaces for workers and visitors.
passengers, light and heavy vehicle
Where site vehicles cross a footpath or turn
interactions)
from or onto a public road, consider public
>> the loss of vehicle control (ie the driver

falling asleep, mechanical failure or tip over)
>> the extent of hazards on the roadway
(ie sharp corners, steep inclines, drop-offs
or traffic volume)
>> other hazards involving vehicles (ie fire,
explosion or visitor vehicles).
safety. This may involve discussions with the

local council or NewZealand Transport Agency
(NZTA) as part of the planning process.
11.1.1CONTRACTORS AND VISITING DRIVERS
Carefully consider contractors and visiting
drivers who are required to access operational
areas. Assess their needs and where
Give adequate consideration to the following
applicable, induct them to ensure they are
in the design, layout, operation, construction
aware of the site rules and procedures and
and maintenance of every road within the
what is expected of them.
mining operation:
>> the grade and width
For example, light vehicles (such as

maintenance vans) are invariably required
>> the drainage system
to attend breakdowns in operational areas.
>> the characteristics of light and heavy
Give the visiting driver the traffic management
vehicles to be used
>> movement of light and heavy vehicles
plan, or escort them so their movements and

operations are strictly controlled.
when forming tips or stockpiles
56
131
Regardless of the size of the site you must

establish safe systems of work which could
include vehicle visibility standards (refer
SITE SAFETY
11.9.4), induction systems and signage

as required.
11.1.2PEDESTRIAN SEPARATION
Pedestrian activity in operational areas should,
wherever practicable, be restricted particularly
in the hours of darkness. Workers should not
enter operational areas as a pedestrian unless
authorised to do so.
Pedestrians must use separate routes
WARNING
Machinery & Heavy

Plant in operation
on this site
You must not enter
this area without
the authority
of the Site Supervisor
High visibility
clothing
must be worn
wherever practicable, for example pedestrian

only areas and safe, designated pedestrian
routes (refer Figure 54). Other controls may
include using light vehicles to transport
Figure 55: Example of signage for small sites
workers to their place of work or, only allowing

pedestrians to enter areas when vehicles are
stationary (ie lunch breaks). Where separation
by time is used as a control, check pedestrians
have moved out of the area before operations
recommence.
For smaller sites, or where only a few people
are working, holding areas may be appropriate
(eg signage stating visitors are to remain at
the site hut until authorised to proceed).
11.2 POWER LINES AND OTHER

OVERHEAD STRUCTURES
11.2.1OVERHEAD POWER LINES
Overhead power lines on a site are likely to
pose a significant risk, unless vehicles cannot
approach them. Vehicles do not need to
strike the overhead lines for injury to occur
electricity can arc a significant distance
Install a sign to inform people of prohibited
depending on the voltage and conditions.
zones (refer Figure 55).
The most effective way to prevent contact

with overhead lines is by not carrying out
work where there is a risk of contact with,
or close approach to, the wires. Roads should
be routed to avoid them. If there is a risk,
and the road or working area is permanent
(or long-term), consult its owner to find
out if the line can be permanently diverted
away from the work area or replaced with
underground cables. If this is not practicable
the following guidance applies.
Use precautions such as those illustrated in
Figure 56 if it is possible for a vehicle to reach
the danger zone around the cables. In risk
Figure 54: Example of pedestrian route
132
assessment take into account the possibility

of vehicles travelling with a raised tray.
No vehicle or its load can approach or work within at least four metres of an overhead power
line unless written consent is given by the lines owner. For more detailed information on
approach distances see the NewZealand Electrical Code of Practice for Electrical Safe
Distances (NZECP 34).
Where vehicles are likely to be used at any time in the proximity of overhead power lines, a
permanent sign must be installed in a conspicuous place as near as practicable to the drivers
position. The sign should be maintained in a legible condition and must state Warning: Keep
clear of power lines. For mobile crushers or transportable conveyors the sign should be installed
in a conspicuous place at each towing point and adjacent to driving controls.
If work needs to be carried out below power lines and it is possible that vehicles could reach
into the danger zone, the lines should be isolated and earthed before work begins. If this is not
practicable, physical safeguards such as chains on the booms of excavator may be required to
prevent vehicles reaching into the danger area.
Emergency procedures should outline what to do in the event of contact with an overhead
power line (refer Section 18). Include the operator not exiting the plant and the vehicle being
isolated, to manage the potential risk of electrocution or tyre explosion in the procedures.
Most power line owners have information available on their websites for working around
overhead and underground power lines. One example is available from Vector at vector.co.nz/
safety/near-our-network.
WARNING
r of
keep clea
power lines
WARNING
r of
keep clea
s
power line
Figure 56: Safe working under overhead power lines
11.2.2OTHER OVERHEAD STRUCTURES

Measure and record the vertical clearance under overhead obstructions on routes.
The measurement should take account of any underhanging lighting, ventilation or other
service features, which are often added after the initial design. Routes used by vehicles
should allow for sufficient overhead clearance depending on the nature of the hazard.
133
Vehicle routes should also avoid anything that might catch on or dislodge a load.
Protect any overhead obstructions (such as electric cables, pipes, conveyors, walkways and
so on) using goalposts, height gauge posts or barriers.
Give clear warnings of any limited width or headroom in advance and at the obstruction itself
such as signs or audio warnings. For more information about signs refer section 5.3.16.
6.5m
more
Install height
clearance sign above
the hazard showing
clearance in metres
Clearance
Figure 57: Example clearance signage and placement
11.3
REVERSING, MANOEUVRING AND PARKING
Reversing is hazardous because the driver has reduced visibility and is in an awkward driving
position.
The most effective way of reducing reversing incidents is to use one-way systems and turning
bays. Where this is not practicable, organise sites to keep reversing to a minimum. Where reversing
is necessary, consider the following:
>> ensuring adequate visibility for the driver
>> installing engineering controls (ie collision avoidance equipment)
>> installing reversing cameras, proximity detection equipment and reversing alarms
>> providing safe systems of work
>> providing adequate supervision and training.
Where safe reversing relies on reversing aids (such as reversing cameras) the vehicle should
not be used if they are defective. Temporary controls could be used to ensure safety (eg using
a spotter).
134
When it is dark, site lighting and vehicle lights must provide sufficient light for the driver to see
clearly when reversing57.
No single safeguard is likely to be sufficient on its own during reversing. Consider all the relevant
precautions together (see Table 8).
TYPE OF CONTROL
Eliminate need to reverse
EXAMPLES OF CONTROLS
>> Implement one-way systems around site and in loading and unloading areas
>> Provide designated turning areas
Engineering controls
>> Fit collision avoidance equipment that warns the operator of the presence
of a pedestrian, object or another vehicle and stops the vehicle from
operating
Reduce reversing
operations
>> Reduce the number of vehicle movements as far as possible
Adequate visibility and

proximity devices for
drivers
>> Fit reversing cameras, radar, convex mirrors and so on to overcome

restrictions to visibility from the drivers seat, particularly at the sides
and rear of vehicles
>> Instruct drivers not to reverse, unless absolutely necessary
>> Fit proximity devices to warn the driver of possible collision with an
object or person
Make sure safe systems
of work are followed
>> Design vehicle reversing areas which:

allow adequate space for vehicles to manoeuvre safely
exclude pedestrians
are clearly signed
have suitable physical stops to warn drivers they have reached the
limit of the safe reversing area
>> Make sure everyone on site understands the vehicle rules
>> Fit all vehicles on site with appropriate warning devices such as
reversing alarms
>> Have controlled (or supervised) reversing systems such as the excavator
operator controlling the truck coming in to be loaded
>> Use spotters
>> Check that procedures work in practice and are actually being followed
Table 8: Control measures for reversing options
11.3.1SPOTTERS
A spotters (or signallers) job is to guide drivers and make sure reversing areas are free
of pedestrians or other hazards.
If you are using spotters, make sure:
>> only trained spotters are used
>> they are clearly visible to drivers at all times
>> a clear and recognised system of communication is adopted
>> they stand in a safe position throughout the reversing operation.
57
Health and Safety in Employment Regulations 1995, regulation 4 (2) (e)
135
11.3.2FOLLOWING DISTANCES
Ensure vehicles follow one another at a distance
always be factored into calculations which

are provided in OEM braking data.
that provides adequate clearance. If a vehicle
The load on a vehicle, traction, and how the
follows another vehicle too closely, an accident
brakes have been applied (soft, medium, hard)
can occur if the driver in the trailing vehicle
also affect the stopping distance of a vehicle.
doesnt react as fast as the lead driver to a

stop situation. This can also happen if the
trailing vehicle cannot stop as effectively
as the lead vehicle.
As vehicle speeds increase, the following
In areas where excessive stopping distances

are calculated, speed restrictions may be
required to make sure the final calculated
stopping distance meets acceptable
operational requirements.
distance should be lengthened to provide

the necessary level of safety. Drivers should
11.3.4PARKING
increase their following distance in conditions
Park vehicles on level ground wherever
where the sight distance is reduced (ie foggy

conditions) or when road conditions may
result in a longer stopping distance (eg in
wet weather).
practicable to eliminate the possibility of

them being set in motion. Vehicles parked on
slopes should never be left unattended unless
the wheels are secured, chocked, blocked or
Consider the speeds on both level roads and
angled against a suitable bund so the vehicle
grades, and establish following distance rules
cannot move accidentally.
that provide for safe distances in all situations.
You should develop a safe system of work for
The following distance rules should be kept in

the site Traffic Management Plan or the Roads
and Other Vehicle Operating Areas PHMP.
leaving a vehicle unattended. For example,

requiring drivers to switch off the engine,
remove the ignition key, apply all brakes and
Visual aids can be used to determine following
so on. For mobile plant this may include
distances (eg spacing road marker pegs at the
lowering ground engaging equipment (ie
sites following distance rule).
excavator buckets, dozer blades, ripper teeth

and scraper bowls) to the ground.
11.3.3STOPPING DISTANCES
The distance a vehicle needs to be able
radius of an excavator or the manoeuvring
to stop is made up of three elements:
zone of other operational vehicles, unless
>> the distance travelled during the operators
in accordance with a safe system of work.
reaction time
>> the distance travelled during the brakes
response time
>> the distance the vehicle travels before
coming to a stop.
Quite often the Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) will only specify braking
distance as specified in element 3.
When it is necessary to park light vehicles

close to heavy vehicles (eg for maintenance
purposes) the heavy vehicle should be parked
before the light vehicle enters the area.
The heavy vehicle should remain immobilised
throughout the operation. An isolation
procedure should be followed.
SSEs must ensure vehicles are only operated
by competent people unless adequately
The distance of the sum of all three elements
supervised. Mine operators must authorise
should be allowed for when determining
competent people in writing. This may mean
the overall stopping distance for vehicles.
ensuring keys, or any other devices for starting
Gradients and wet conditions will also have
vehicles, are in a secure place while parked.
a significant effect on element 3, and should
136
Vehicles should never be parked in the swing
You must establish a safe system of work so anyone leaving a vehicle does not enter a hazardous
area. This includes when operators are undertaking daily start-up inspections and shift changes.
11.4
LOADING VEHICLES
Loading, for the purposes of this section, refers to the loading of vehicles with excavated
material by mobile plant. For information on safety when loading mobile plant or equipment
(or other loads) from transporters or trucks, see the NewZealand Transport Agency's The Truck
Loading Code. For information on loading floating plant see section 10.5.
Depending on the nature of the site, loading may be into haul trucks, truck and trailer units,
utility vehicles or car trailers (eg where selling of product is directly to the public).
11.4.1LOADING ZONES
It is recommended that the loading zone (or prohibited zone) be a minimum of six metres
around the truck, trailer or mobile plant. This zone may need to be larger, depending on the
visibility of vehicles or traffic movement associated with loading (refer Figure 58).
In addition to the loading zone, restricted zones should be established based on a site specific
risk assessment which considers the movement of vehicles associated with loading.
Working face
stock
pile
6m
6m
Loading
zone
Restricted Area
to allow for turning
vehicles
Restricted Area
to allow for turning
vehicles
min 6 m
min 6 m
min 6 m
min 6 m
min 6 m
min 6 m
min 6 m
The loading zone

is deemed to be a
minimum of 6 metres
around the truck,
trailer and mobile plant.
This zone may need to
be larger depending on
the visibility of vehicles
or traffic movement
associated with loading
Figure 58: Loading and restricted zones
The entry of any vehicle (other than those being loaded) or pedestrians into a loading zone while
excavation and loading operations are active should be prohibited.
You should determine a safe system of work which specifies communication protocols for
vehicles entering the loading zone (to be loaded). For example, the system could specify contact
is made with the mobile plant operator to request permission to proceed. On larger sites this
may be co-ordinated by a supervisor or other designated person in control of traffic movements.
The safe system of work should also specify steps to be taken, including the immediate
suspension of works, if a vehicle or pedestrian enters the loading zone without prior permission.
137
11.4.2LOADING OPERATIONS
The HSE Act requires duty holders to identify
and control significant hazards. Insecure
loads and overloaded vehicles can present a
significant hazard whether on a public road
or a road within the confines of the site.
>> Select suitable mobile plant or purposebuilt devices (hoppers) that reduce the
risks to other vehicles or pedestrians.
ON-ROAD VEHICLES
>> Spread loads as evenly as possible during
loading, based on advice from the driver,
The Land Transport Act 1998 contains the
and do not load over cabs. Unbalanced
load security legislation for vehicles driven
loads can make the vehicle or trailer
on public roads. It provides strict liability for
unstable, or overload individual axles
offences involving insecure loads and loads
(see Figure 59).
falling from vehicles. The Truck Loading Code

details the general requirements that must be
met to ensure a load cannot fall, and applies to
the operator or any person loading the vehicle.
>> All drivers (and where applicable,

passengers) should remain in the vehicle
during loading.
>> If the load is to be covered, an on-vehicle
Loads must be secured and remain safe while
covering device that can be worked from
loading, while the vehicle is being driven,
ground level or a safe place higher up
and during unloading. When loading or
should be provided. Alternatively, a load
unloading, the vehicle should be level, stable
covering platform or gantry should
and stationary. Apply all vehicle and trailer
be used. For more information on covering
brakes, and follow these principles:
loads refer section 16.3.
LIGHT VEHICLES
loading. Unbalanced loads can make the
vehicle or trailer unstable, or overload
individual axles.
>> Prohibit loading over cabs unless the driver
is out of the vehicle and away from the
loading zone (ie in a safe area).
>> Avoid loading to the back of the trailer as
this can cause the trailer to tip backwards
(especially for single-axle trailers). This can
reduce the grip the vehicle has on the road
surface, as the wheels are lifted away from
the ground.
>> Balance loads across the axle (or axles) of a
>> As loose loads normally rely on the

vehicle body for restraint it is extremely
important to make sure all body-to-chassis
attachment points (ie U bolts, hinge pins,
hinge pin brackets and so on) are secure,
and the attachment points and body are
in sound condition.
>> Doors to bulk bins must be closed to avoid
loose bulk loads from being blown out58.
>> When travelling on a public road, loose
bulk loads should be covered whenever
there is a risk of load shedding due to wind
action or movement. Body work should
be kept in good condition in order to
minimise hazards during transportation.
This applies particularly to badly fitted tail
drawbar so coupling or uncoupling can be
gates that permit gravel and stones to fall
managed easily and safely, and the trailer
to the roadway.58 Loose bulk loads being
is stable when being transported.
transported in a vehicle on a public road
>> Wherever possible couple (or uncouple)
without a tarpaulin fitted, should at no time
drawbar trailers unloaded, as this makes
reach higher than 100 mm below any side
them easier to handle and generally safer
of the vehicle (refer Figure 60)58.
to work with.
58
138
The Truck Loading Code specialised requirements (Loose bulk loads)
>> Body height extensions (hungry boards)
>> If particularly large rocks are being loaded,
should only be used where conditions and
placing a fine material bed will provide
type of load permit. In these circumstances,
some cushioning and stability.
supports should be adequately fixed to

the existing body. It is not adequate to
rely on the load within the parent body of
the vehicle for support. Where necessary,
tie-chains should be used transversely
at the top of body extensions to prevent
sideways spread58.
>> The placement of loads should ensure they

are secure.
>> The excavator or loader should be matched
to the size of the truck being loaded.
11.4.3WEIGHT LIMITS
Maximum vehicle and axle weights must
never be exceeded59. Overloaded vehicles
can become unstable and difficult to steer,
or be less able to brake.
Mining operations must include the maximum
load that may be carried or towed by vehicles
and equipment (whether by reference to
weight, dimensions or other criteria) on their
roads and other vehicle operating areas PHMP60.
Figure 59: Loads should be spread evenly across

the vehicle
11.5
LOADING FLOATING PLANT
For information on loading floating plant see

section 9.3.
LOADING AND STORAGE OF

LARGE STONE SLABS OR BLOCKS
11.6
Transporting and storing large stone slabs or

blocks carries a high risk of serious personal
injury if not done safely. Due to their size and
Figure 60: Cover loose bulk loads when travelling
on a public road
weight, such slabs or blocks are potentially

unstable.
To ensure the safety of workers you must
OFF-ROAD VEHICLES
determine a safe system of work that includes:
>> Prohibition zones: not allowing people
loading. Unbalanced loads can make the

vehicle or trailer unstable, or overload
individual axles.
>> Prohibit loading over the cabs.
>> All drivers (and where applicable, passengers)
should remain in the vehicle during loading.
>> Loads should not be dropped from height
to avoid people in the cab being thrown
around or injured.
59
60
into an area where a slab or block may

fall during transport or lifting.
>> Written work instructions (or standard
operating instructions): workers must be
given appropriate information, instruction
and training on the dangers of large stone
slabs or blocks and the need to follow safe
systems of work.
>> Adequate supervision by a competent
person.
The Truck Loading Code

The Regulations, regulation 80(1)(n)
139
>> Always restraining slabs or blocks during

loading or unloading operations (whether
RAILWAY SIDINGS
from vehicles or from storage). This
Where railing sidings enter a site:
should include attaching and detaching
>> where practicable, have a means of
straps, lifting slings and so on. This is

especially important when poeple may be
in the hazardous area where a slab may
fall during lifting, and when loading or
unloading vehicles (due to the variable and
sometimes unpredictable effects of road
camber or vehicle suspension).
>> Providing, maintaining, using and
inspecting appropriate certified lifting
equipment and PPE.
>> Making sure loads are secured from
movement while being transported.
When using rack type storage systems they
should be designed and certified to prevent
slabs toppling over or slipping out from the
base. Traditional A frame storage is not
suitable in this context unless modifications
have been undertaken that achieve the
above goal.
11.7
FEEDING CRUSHERS
If the crusher is to be fed directly by a loader

or excavator, then:
>> standing pads should be suitable (stable)
locking siding entrances

>> where practicable, have tracks separated
from other operational areas
>> have a safe system of work for
communication about train arrival times
and days (eg having the rail operator advise
of train entrance at least 24 hours prior)
>> make sure tracks are not obstructed and
are kept clear of debris
>> where appropriate, put signage in place
advising of train arrival and other hazards.
11.9
SAFE DRIVERS AND VEHICLES
Drivers must be competent, or adequately

supervised, to operate a vehicle safely and
receive appropriate information, instruction
and training for the make and model of
vehicles they use. It is particularly important
that less experienced drivers are closely
monitored following their training to make
sure they work safely.
Protocols should be established that stipulate
drivers and passengers must wear their
seatbelts. Past accidents have shown that
and high enough for the operator to
staying in the cab with the seatbelt fastened
monitor the feed hopper from the cab
is the best way to avoid a serious injury or
>> keep the ramp wide enough to allow

for adequate edge protection on either
side of the ramp as well as the travel of
death when a vehicle goes out of control.

11.9.1TRAINING AND COMPETENCY
the vehicle when using wheeled loaders
OF DRIVERS
or trucks
Drivers must be licenced to drive on a public
>> the maximum gradient of the ramp should

be within the capability of the loading vehicle
>> the last few metres of the ramp should be
road. You should have internal systems of

licencing for site areas not defined as a
public road.
level so the vehicle is not discharging uphill.
Training requirements will depend on an
This helps operators monitor the feed. The
individuals experience and training they have
vehicle will also be more stable
previously received. Risk assessment should
>> make sure pedestrians and obstructions are

kept out of the excavator swing radius or
loading area.
140
11.8
help decide the level and amount

of training a person receives.
In general, newly recruited drivers have the
much easier and cheaper to start with the
greatest training needs but there should
right vehicle than to modify it later. The
also be a reassessment programme for
following are minimum factors to consider
more experienced drivers.
before purchasing a vehicle:
It is important to assess information provided
>> the effectiveness of the braking system,
by newly appointed drivers, particularly in
bearing in mind the slopes it is expected
relation to training and experience. Monitor
to work on
them on-site to establish both their actual level
>> adequate all-round visibility for the driver
of competence and any further training needs.
>> stability under all foreseeable operating
Keep a record of training and licences for each

driver to help ensure the most appropriate
conditions
>> protection for the driver and any
person is allocated a particular task, and
passengers from falling objects (falling
identify those requiring refresher training.
object protective structure (FOPS)),
Mine operators must authorise vehicle

operators or drivers in writing61. Authorisation
to operate should be for every individual
vehicle and model.
For more information on training and
supervision see section 20.
11.9.2FITNESS TO DRIVE
A persons fitness to drive a vehicle should be
judged on an individual basis, but the aim is to
match the task requirements with the fitness
and abilities of the driver.
Pre-employment health assessments and
on-going health monitoring should include
assessment and monitoring that relates to
an individuals ability to safely drive a vehicle
(and undertake any associated tasks) where
their role requires it.
Detailed advice on medical standards of
fitness to drive is published by the NZTA:
nzta.govt.nz/resources.
overturning (roll-over protective structure

(ROPS)) and seat belts. Further information
is available in the Approved Code of
Practice for Operator Protective Structures
on Self-propelled Mobile Mechanical Plant
>> safe access and egress to and from the cab
and other areas of the vehicle where access
may be required
>> engine firewall and fire suppression
equipment
>> lights, windscreen wipers, horn and other
warning devices
>> guarding for dangerous parts during use
or maintenance work
>> protection for the driver and any
passengers from rain, high and low
temperatures, noise, dust and vibration
>> suitable seating for the driver and any
passengers
>> maximum loads that may be carried
or towed.
Where vehicles are not fitted with safety
11.9.3VEHICLE SUITABILITY
features you must consider retro-fitting where
Vehicles must be suitable for the type of work
your hazard identification and risk assessment
being done and the place they are being used.
process has recognised a significant hazard.
Selecting suitable vehicles can reduce or
For vehicles expected to enter sites in the
eliminate many risks at the site. It is generally
61
hours of darkness (whether or not work
141
is scheduled to take place) additional
mining vehicles. The illustrations in the report
supplementary lighting should be provided
show the area around the operator where they
(ie forward and rearward facing spotlights)
cannot see obstacles. You can download
or additional vehicle-mounted work lights.
the report or view the diagrams on-line at
Any permanently fitted lights must comply
www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/highwaywork
with the Land Transport Rule: Vehicle Lighting
zones/bad/pdfs/BASFinalReport.pdf.
2004 when being driven on public roads.

11.9.4DRIVER VISIBILITY
There should be a procedure to be followed

before a vehicle drives off. This should be a
beep from the horn, with a five second delay
Many vehicles have substantial blind spots,
before driving off, from being parked overnight
not only immediately behind the vehicle, but
or otherwise not in use. In operational areas this
also alongside and immediately in front of it.
should be two beeps from the horn, with a five
Improving visibility requires a combination
second delay before driving forward, and three
of approaches such as reversing cameras,
beeps from the horn with a five second delay
collision avoidance systems, proximity sensors
before reversing.
and mirrors.
Studies suggest that when used appropriately
(ie drivers glance at the system at the
appropriate time) reversing cameras can
successfully mitigate the occurrence of
reversing crashes, particularly when paired
with an appropriate audible warning system.
One study62 found:
>> of those drivers that did not look at the
rear-view camera before reversing, 46%
looked at the camera after being audibly
warned
>> of the drivers who looked at the rear-view
camera display 88% avoided a crash.
A CLEAR VIEW
Drivers should not place items in the
windscreen or in the way of mirrors or
monitors, where they might impede visibility
from the driving position. The area of the
windscreen that is kept clear by the wipers
should not be obscured, nor should the side
windows. Windows and mirrors should be
kept clean and in good repair. Dirt or cracks
can make windows or mirrors less effective.
If necessary, fit additional side-mounted
mirrors to increase the drivers visibility
(refer Figure 61 and Figure 62).
Accidents can occur when vehicles drive off

or turn while a pedestrian or vehicle is passing
or parked in a blind spot. As a guide the driver
should be able to see a one metre high object
one metre away from any danger point of a
vehicle. The driver should be able to detect
the presence of other vehicles and pedestrians
in their intended line of travel when moving
off or when reversing.
Tests carried out for the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
Figure 61: Side-mounted mirrors
demonstrate blind areas in some typical
62
142
Backing collisions: A study of drivers eye and backing behaviours using combined rear-view camera and sensor systems,
Hurwitz DS. et al (2010), Injury Prevention 16(79-84)
Figure 63: CCTV monitor in vehicle cab
REVERSING ALARMS
Figure 62: Side-mounted mirrors
Reversing alarms warn anyone in the vicinity

the vehicle is in reverse gear. They rely on the
driver having a clear view and the pedestrian
COLLISION AVOIDANCE AND PROXIMITY

DETECTION EQUIPMENT
or other vehicles moving out of the way.

Reversing alarms may be drowned out by
Collision avoidance equipment warns the
other noise, or may be so common on a
driver of fixed obstacles or other vehicles
busy site that people do not take any notice
along the route, and stops the vehicle from
of them. Using reversing alarms may be
colliding. Collision avoidance systems usually
appropriate (based on your risk assessment)
use GPS or local area wireless technology
but will likely be most effective when used
(ie WiFi or Bluetooth) to determine vehicle
with other measures.
position, speed and heading. Vehicle locations

and paths are calculated and sent via a radio
link to all other outfitted vehicles in the area.
Where two or more vehicles may collide
audible and visual warnings are sent to
the drivers.
11.9.5VISIBILITY OF LIGHT VEHICLES

Light vehicles are at risk of being crushed
by heavy vehicles. They should be kept away
from areas where heavy vehicles operate.
Where this is not practicable they should be
Proximity detection equipment warns the
fitted with rotating or flashing beacons, high
driver of the presence of people or objects
visibility buggy whips, high visibility and
in the immediate vicinity, but does not stop
reflective markings and other appropriate
the vehicle from colliding (it relies on the
measures. This makes them readily visible to
driver to stop).
drivers of other vehicles. The use of vehicle

hazard lights alone is not deemed adequate
CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION (CCTV)

CCTV cameras can be mounted on the front,
side and rear of a vehicle. Images are relayed
to a screen located inside the cabin (refer
Figure 63). Some cameras are equipped
with infrared illuminators so the driver has
a comprehensive view even when it is dark.
Thermal imaging systems are also available
and may be suited to sites where night
operations are a concern.
and should be discouraged.

For light vehicles expected to enter areas where
heavy vehicles are operating, consider the
following controls during your risk assessment:
>> Establish exclusion zones around
heavy vehicles.
>> Heavy vehicles are to remain
stationary when light vehicles are
within exclusion zones.
143
>> The impact on environmental conditions

on visibility (eg darkness, fog or rain).
>> Fit vehicles with rotating or flashing
falls) the operator also needs the security of

a falling object protective structure (FOPS).
orange warning lights, visible 360 degrees
Mining operations are required to address the
from the vehicle, unless multiple lights
fitting of devices to protect the operators of
are fitted to cover blind spots and fit with
mobile plant, including rollover protection and
reflective strips.
falling object protection (refer regulation 98
>> Fit radios so drivers can communicate

with site supervisors or directly to heavy
vehicle drivers.
>> Fit a warning flag (buggy whip) which
Mechanical Engineering Control Plan).

For more detailed information on design and
types of operator protective structures, see
the Approved Code of Practice for Operator
can be seen by the operator of the tallest
Protective Structures on Self-Propelled Mobile
vehicle.
Mechanical Plant.
>> Fit clearly visible numbering, or an

alternative form of positive identification, as
SEAT BELTS
an aid for 2-way communication between
All drivers and passengers should wear
heavy vehicle and light vehicle drivers.
appropriate seat belts. They should be
Light vehicle visibility controls should apply
checked immediately if:
to all light vehicles (eg contractor or visiting
>> the buckles are not working properly
drivers where they are required to enter
>> the belt is damaged or faded
operational areas).
>> the belt starts to fray.
Any permanently fitted lights, retro-reflectors
Specific legal requirements under the Land
or retro-reflective material must comply with
Transport Act for safety belts have changed
the Land Transport Rule: Vehicle Lighting
over the years, and differ depending on the
2004 where being driven on public roads.
age and type of vehicle. The type of belt has
11.9.6PROTECTION OF DRIVERS,
OPERATORS OR PASSENGERS
also changed from static belts to retractor

belts. For more detailed information on
seat belts for vehicles, see the NewZealand
OPERATOR PROTECTIVE STRUCTURES
Transport Agency website nzta.govt.nz.
Operators of heavy vehicles are at high risk
The information from NZTA is considered
of serious or fatal injury by crushing if their
good practice regardless of whether the
vehicles roll over, tip on to their sides or
vehicle is being driven on a public road or not.
objects enter the cab.
For more detailed information on seat belt
Generally, the risk depends on the terrain.
requirements for vehicles fitted with operator
Theres a low risk on flat, stable ground and

high risk on steep or unstable ground, or on
work adjacent to embankments, excavations
or working on top of old mine workings.
Fitting ROPS and wearing a seat belt can
reduce the risk of serious or fatal injury in the
event of a roll-over or tip-over. Where there
is risk of objects falling onto the operators or
144
entering the driving position (such as rock
protective structures see the Approved Code

of Practice for Operator Protective Structures
on Self-Propelled Mobile Mechanical Plant.
TRANSPORTING PEOPLE
People should only be transported in vehicles
designed to carry passengers with forward or
rear facing seats and seatbelts. These vehicles
should also comply with vehicle visibility
standards (see section 11.9.4). Vehicles not
>> routinely checking hose clamps for security
specifically designed for carrying people
>> routinely checking for wear of hoses or
should not be used.

Wherever practicable, carry loads separately
rigid pipes underneath clamps

>> using fire resistant hoses and high
from passengers. If the cab is not separate
temperature tolerant hoses designed for
from the load area (eg a van), fit a bulkhead or
oil operating temperatures >150C
cargo barrier between the load compartment

and the cab. This should be strong enough
to withstand a load shifting forwards in an
emergency.
Secure small equipment (ie fire extinguishers
>> installing and evaluating insulation around

hot components or insulating hoses near
hot components and upgrading to braided
armour type hoses
>> protecting wiring against fire and making
or tools) which may become missiles in the
sure connections are appropriate to OEMs
event of a collision.
requirements and are suitably located
11.9.7VEHICLE FIRES
Typical causes of fires on or in vehicles include
component failure and poor or inadequate
maintenance. When completing a risk
assessment for prevention of fires consider:
The design for example:
>> Hydraulic components are like for like and
>> the location and rating of protective

devices such as fuses, solenoids and
non-return valves.
Inspection and maintenance for example:
>> completing pre-start checks for locating
and acting on oil leaks, sprays, stains and
bird nests
>> the maintenance work order system
considered suitable for use. Always consult
includes the correct selection, integrity
the original equipment manufacturer(s)
and testing of control measures
(OEM) before making changes.

>> Any maintenance, installations or design
modifications that are undertaken off-site
are verified before use, and are equivalent
to the OEMs standards and design.
>> Implementing quality checks or audits
by OEM authorised service providers
periodically as a cross check for site
maintenance.
>> Using Low Flammability Hydraulic Fluids.
Note: Low flammability and mineral
hydraulic fluids should never be mixed. If
you are replacing one with the other ensure
a flushing product is used and no residual
product remains.
The installation for example:
>> properly fitting any attached or in situ
hoses with approved OEM components
>> using thermal imaging equipment to detect

hot spots and high temperature areas of
plant during maintenance programs
>> routinely washing, cleaning and checking
hoses for any sources of rubbing, oily mist
or leaks
>> carrying out periodic checks on hydraulic
braking systems to ensure sound operation,
including bearings brake drums, rotor
and callipers
>> routinely checking electrical wiring
including insulation
>> routinely checking solenoid connections
for corrosion and replacing or checking
at set engine hours or as per OEM
recommendations
>> protective devices for solenoids such
as fuses.
>> maintaining hydraulic equipment with the

appropriate fit-for-purpose tools
145
Emergency preparedness for example:
The quantity of water needed to control dust
>> Installing suitable and sufficient firefighting
depends on the nature of the road surface,
equipment (ie fire extinguishers). The
traffic intensity, humidity and precipitation.
type of fire extinguisher will depend on
During drier months, a typical road may require
the class of fire you are most likely to
one to two litres per square meter per hour.
experience. For example, powder ABE fire
Liquid stabilisers and polymers can also be
extinguishers are suitable for flammable
used, which can help strengthen the surface
and combustible liquids, flammable gases
layer and provide a degree of water proofing.
and energised electrical equipment.

>> Communication of fire-related events,
maintenance incidents and subsequent
attendance and associated follow-up, is
clear to workers.
>> Fitting appropriate automatic or manually
operated fire suppression, and engine or
fuel pump shutdown systems63.
>> Fitting mobile plant with a battery isolation
switch and where practical, a fuel isolation
system.
11.10
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR

OF ROADS
Roads and other vehicle operating areas
should be regularly maintained so they
do not develop bumps, ruts or potholes.
These may make control of vehicles difficult
or cause health problems due to whole body
vibration. In addition, excess mud and slurry
can seriously affect the manoeuvrability and
braking potential of the vehicles using the
SAFETY WHEN WATERING ROADS

Watering roads to suppress dust has the
potential for vehicle accidents. The water
tanker could turn over or the roads could
become slippery because of wet bends,
downgrades, and any other sections of road
where brakes may be applied (ie intersections).
Water tanker drivers should avoid driving
across gradients due to the potential increase
in instability of trucks carrying fluids. As a
hazard control, consider installing baffles
in tanks carrying fluids to help prevent
movement of water inside the tank.
Patch or spot spray roads, and avoid blanket
spray or excessive amounts of water being
deposited on the roads (especially in braking
areas, gradients and junctions of haul roads).
It is recommended water tankers are fitted
with systems that can be effectively controlled
by the operator to manage water output.
Procedures for watering roads should detail
road and other vehicle operating areas.
actions to take when roads have been
DUST SUPPRESSION
This is particularly important on haul roads.
Dust generated by moving vehicles can reduce
Where possible, water tankers should be filled
visibility to dangerous levels and introduce
at the lowest point, and dust suppression
a health hazard. Dust is typically reduced
applied travelling up hill. This will avoid fully
by applying water to the road surface.
loaded water tankers travelling downhill.
excessively watered, reducing traction.
In dry conditions, watering helps maintain

compaction and surface pavement strength.
It also maintains the pavement shape, reduces
the loss of gravel and helps reduce corrugation
of the road surface.
63
146
The Regulations, regulation 98 (d) Automatic fire suppression and engine or fuel pump shutdown systems for safety
critical equipment must be addressed by mining operations in their Mechanical Engineering PCP
PART
Operational safety for

equipment, people, and
dealing with emergencies
This part provides guidance for managing machinery,
worker health and facilities, site access and security,
providing appropriate training, and emergencies.
147
PART D
12/
MACHINERY AND
EQUIPMENT
IN THIS SECTION:
148
12.1 Scope
12.6 Siting of Machinery
12.2 Appraisal of machinery and

equipment principal hazards
12.7 Access routes
12.3 Mechanical engineering

or electrical engineering
control plan
12.9 Conveyors
12.8 Guarding
12.10 Emergency stops
12.4 Choosing and buying

machinery and equipment
12.11 Pre-start warning systems
12.5 Existing machinery or

equipment
12.13 Cranes and lifting

equipment
12.12 Electricity
SECTION 12.0 // MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT
All sites use machinery and equipment in their day to

day workplace activities. If the hazards associated with
machinery are not safely managed, then serious injury
and death can occur.
The overall message is safety by design.
>> identify and manage equipment hazards
(for new and existing equipment)
This section covers machinery and equipment

commonly used at extractives sites where
the information in the following documents,
or other WorkSafe guidelines, may not
be sufficient to provide industry specific
>> position and guard equipment
guidance. This section does not cover vehicles
>> use prestart warning systems and
including mobile plant (for information on
emergency stop systems effectively

>> prevent, detect and deal with fires
and explosions
vehicles see section 10).

The WorkSafe Best Practice Guidelines for
the Safe Use of Machinery and Ergonomics
>> manage electrical hazards
of Machine Guarding Guide have information
>> manage specific hazards around lifting
for managing hazards associated with
equipment and floating equipment.

12.1
SCOPE
The scope of machinery and plant as defined

in the HSE Act is extremely wide. It covers
machinery which may not be covered in

these guidelines including:
>> undertaking risk assessments
>> choosing, buying, installing, modifying
and decommissioning machinery
almost any equipment used at work including:
>> eliminating hazards in the design process
>> hand tools such as hammers, handsaws
>> specific machinery hazards
>> individual machines such as circular saws,
>> guarding types
photocopiers, trucks
>> apparatus such as laboratory apparatus
(eg Bunsen burners)
>> use, inspection and maintenance

of machinery
>> safe systems of work.
>> lifting equipment such as hoists, forklifts,
The WorkSafe Approved Code of Practice for
elevating work platforms, lifting slings
Managing Hazards to Prevent Major Industrial
>> other equipment such as ladders, pressure

water cleaners
>> an installation (a series of machines
connected together), for example a crushing
plant and associated conveyor systems.
Accidents outlines information for processes

employed after crushing and screening (eg
bitumen production or ore processing) that is
not included in these guidelines. Appendix 2 of
the code lists activities the code may apply to.
149
APPRAISAL OF MACHINERY
AND EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL
HAZARDS
12.2
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING
OR ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
CONTROL PLAN
12.3
66 Site senior executive responsible for
PART 4
identifying principal hazards and having
PRINCIPAL CONTROL PLANS
principal hazard management plans
92 Site senior executive responsible for
(a) The site senior executive must-
having principal control plans
(a) carry out an appraisal of the mining
If a subpart of this Part applies to a mining
operation to identify principal
operation, the site senior executive must
hazards at the mining operation; and
ensure that there is a principal control plan
(b) ensure there is a principal hazard
for the mining operation that complies with
management plan for each
that subpart.
principal hazard identified.
Subpart 1 Mechanical engineering
To determine if activities associated with

machinery and equipment are principal hazards,
it is necessary to consider the following:
>> how plant, equipment or installations might
feasibly fail and the likely consequences
96 Application
This subpart applies to any mining
operation where 1 or more principal hazards
have been identified that may involve
hazards or controls of a mechanical type.
of any such failure (ie structural support
Subpart 2 Electrical engineering
collapse)
99 Application
>> the type of fuel or energy used to power

plant, equipment or installations used at
This subpart applies to(1) Any mining operation where 1 or more
the site (ie electricity, gas, petroleum)
principal hazards have been identified
>> what the possible consequence of a loss
that may involve hazards or controls of
control situation would be (ie mechanical
an electrical type.
failure leading to uncontrolled release of

hazardous substances or energy sources)
>> the hazards relating to moving parts
been identified that may involve hazards or
(ie draw-in hazards, nip points,
controls of a mechanical type, the SSE must
entanglement hazards)
ensure there is a mechanical engineering
>> the hazards relating to suspended parts

>> the hazards relating to surfaces (that is
very hot or very cold).
If the degree of hazard is not clear the advice
of a specialist mechanic, designer, engineer
or the machinery or equipments original
manufacturer should be sought.
A risk assessment must be completed when
developing the mechanical engineering PCP.
The risk assessment must include the matters
prescribed in regulation 97 of the Regulations.
150
Where one or more principal hazards have
control plan.
Where one or more principal hazards have
been identified that may involve hazards or
controls of an electrical type, the SSE must
ensure there is an electrical engineering
control plan.
The mechanical engineering control plan
must contain information detailed in
regulation 98 of the Regulations.
In summary, regulation 98 includes:
Develop the mechanical engineering and
>> the standards of engineering practice to
electrical engineering control plans in the
be followed throughout the life cycle of
context of the whole health and safety
the mechanical plant and installations
management system. It should not be
>> the safe operation of conveyors, winding

systems mobile plant and dredges
>> the safety of plant and installations
>> fitting appropriate fire suppression
and shut-down systems
>> fitting appropriate heat detection
and automatic trip sensors
developed in isolation from other plans,

processes and procedures that rely on the
control plans as a control. This will ensure gaps
and overlaps in information and procedures
are identified and used in the implementation
of suitable controls to minimise the likelihood
of potential risks and impacts.
Machinery and equipment may also constitute
>> rollover and falling object protection
a fire or explosion principal hazard. Therefore, a
>> seatbelts and other restraints
PHMP for Fire or Explosion may also be required
>> protective canopies
(refer to regulation 85 of the Regulations).
>> safe storage and use of pressurised fluids
>> means for the prevention, detection
content of principal control plans, and their
and suppression of fires on mobile plant

and conveyors.
The electrical engineering control must
contain information detailed in regulation
100 of the Regulations. In summary, regulation
100 includes:
>> prevention of harm from electricity sources
>> prevention of fires being started by
electricity
>> prevention of unintentional starting of
electrical plant
>> fitting electrical safeguards
>> competencies required for workers
carrying out electrical work
>> the reliability of plant and installations
used in monitoring hazard controls and
communication systems
>> a maintenance management system
>> safe work practices for working on high
voltage installations
>> any other requirements of the Regulations
in relation to the safety management
of electrical plant and installations and
electrical engineering practices
>> the requirements of regulations made
under the Electricity Act 1992.
interdependencies with other management

and controls plans, processes and procedures
see WorkSafes Guidance for a Hazard
Management System for Mines.
CHOOSING AND BUYING

MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT
12.4
The greatest opportunity to ensure machinery

and equipment is safe is when new machinery
or equipment is being scoped, designed and
purchased. All operators should specify their
expectations for achieving safety standards.
The designer, manufacturer, supplier and
employer have obligations under the HSE Act
and the Health and Safety in Employment
Regulations 1995 and should work together
to manage issues such as:
>> how the machine or equipment is used
in the workplace
>> risk levels and standards required
>> type of guarding based on work patterns
>> who will provide, install and commission
the machinery or equipment
>> integration with other machinery
or equipment
>> the working environment in which the
machinery or equipment will operate
151
>> any hazardous exposures arising from
You need to know what the hazards are
use of the plant or equipment such as
with your machinery and equipment in order
noise or fumes
to do something about them. The first step
>> who will train and supervise the operators

>> operations and maintenance procedures
>> intrusive maintenance and internal
inspections required
>> potential blockages or out of the ordinary
situations
>> how isolation from hazardous energy
can be achieved.
Where the machinery or equipment is
being designed and manufactured in-house,
you take on the responsibilities set out in
regulations 66 and 67 of the Health and
Safety in Employment Regulations 1995.
You (the designer) must have health and
safety, including relevant standards, in
mind when developing design concepts
and throughout the design process.
If newly purchased machinery or equipment
is not safe because of the way it has been
designed, constructed, supplied or installed,
you must stop using it until this has been
fixed. Contact the manufacturer or supplier
(or installer if relating to the installation)
to resolve the issue.
in the hazard management process is to

identify hazards anything that can injure
or harm someone.
Do a workplace inspection to identity all
machinery and equipment used. Include
common items that may not normally be
thought of as machines. Also consider
how other workplace items such as steps
or platforms can affect the use of machinery
and equipment.
Once youve identified all machinery and
equipment, you can identify their hazards.
You can identify hazards using physical
inspection, task analysis, process analysis,
guidance and standards, hazard and
operability analysis (HAZOP) and accident
investigation analysis.
For more detailed information on identifying,
assessing and controlling hazards see the
WorkSafe Safe Use of Machinery Best Practice
Guidelines.
12.6
SITING OF MACHINERY
As a general rule, activities such as crushing

and screening are noisy and dusty, so are sited
EXISTING MACHINERY
OR EQUIPMENT
12.5
With changes in technology and cost of

solutions over time, measures to eliminate
value of the activities. Some noisy and dusty

processes may need to be housed to control
these effects.
or isolate a hazard may become practicable.
The safety of workers in the processing
You should continue to assess significant
area is paramount. Traffic should be routed
hazards in order to determine whether
around the machinery wherever possible and
there are other methods to control them.
machinery should be sited away from hazards
For example, replace a machine with a
(ie rock falls, overhead power lines).
newer machine that eliminates the hazard.
Services, including electricity, air and water
You should also routinely review systems,
should be included in a site layout plan,
procedures and standards to reflect changes
particularly when placed underground.
in technology and best practice.
152
away from boundaries to lessen the nuisance
12.7
Even if your machinery may not be classified
ACCESS ROUTES
Machinery, including mobile crushers, often

have areas where access at height is required
to carry out routine operations, undertake
maintenance or access control rooms.
This section deals with permanent (or fixed)
access requirements (ie access to control
rooms). For temporary access see section 16.1.
a building under the Building Act, WorkSafe

recommends you follow the requirements
of the Building Act.
For more detailed information on access
routes, including detailed diagrams of
dimensions and construction requirements
for stairs, ladders, ramps, barriers and access
ways, see the MBIE Building Programme
Where a structure is a building under
Compliance Document for NewZealand
the Building Act 2004, you must provide
Building Code Clause D1 Access Routes
reasonable and adequate access to enable
and Compliance Document for NewZealand
safe and easy movement of people .
Building Code Clause F4 Safety from Falling.
Access routes must, among other things:
Refer to NZS/AS 1657 for more information.
64
>> have adequate activity space

>> be free from dangerous obstructions
and from any projections likely to cause
an obstruction
>> have a safe cross fall, and safe slope
in the direction of travel
>> have adequate slip-resistant walking
surfaces under all conditions of normal use
12.8
GUARDING
The fundamental principles of guarding

machinery are covered in the WorkSafe Safe
Use of Machinery Best Practice Guidelines,
and Ergonomics of Machine Guarding Guide.
More information is available on the machinery
fact sheets on WorkSafes Safe Use of
>> include stairs to allow access to upper floors
Machinery page at worksafe.govt.nz.
>> not have isolated steps (ie single steps).
Where elimination of a hazard is not
Have landings of appropriate dimensions

where a door opens from or onto a stair,
ramp or ladder so that the door does not
create a hazard64.
Access routes must also have stair treads
and ladders which:
>> provide adequate footing
>> have uniform rise within each flight
and for consecutive flights
>> have stair treads with a leading edge
that can be easily seen.
practicable, guarding is an effective isolation

control provided the guards are the correct
ones, and they remain in place.
This section provides additional guidance
on effective guarding on fixed and mobile
processing plant typically found in quarries
and mines. It is not intended to be a
comprehensive list and you may determine
other types of guarding are more suited to the
particular circumstances at your site.
Perimeter fencing (or area guards), although
commonly used at extractive sites, does not
Access routes must also have handrails which:
meet the minimum requirements of AS 4024.1
>> are smooth, reachable and graspable
Series where workers require access within
to provide support and to assist with
the perimeter while the machinery is running.
movement along a stair or ladder
In these situations fixed guards should be
>> be of adequate strength and rigidity as

required by Clause B1 Structure of the
used to guard individual nip points and

entanglement hazards.
Building Code.
64
Building Code
153
Examples of fixed guards include:
Figure 67: Example of panel type guards on dryer
Panel type guards secured to fixed uprights

Figure 64: Example of fixed close-fitted guard
enclosure on direct drive electric motors
may be suitable for large rotating cylinders

such as screens, dryers and trommels. The
minimum height of the guard should be
2700mm. Access gates should be interlocked
unless access is required less than once per
shift, in which case a locked gate can be
used (must require a tool to open).
Figure 65: Example of totally enclosing sheet

metal guard which are suitable for vibrating units
with additional guards over the associated shafts
and couplings
Figure 68: Example of close fitted guards on batch
feeder belts
Batch feeder belts (while generally slower)

have the same hazards as a normal conveyor.
The feeder and all associated nip points should
Figure 66: Example of panel mesh guards on
fines dewaterer
Fines dewaterers use slowly rotating scraper
be enclosed within suitable guards fitted along

the full length of the feeder. Guards should be
provided on the underside to prevent access
to tail and head drums.
blades to extract the finer particles. In addition

to a sheet metal guard on the main dewatering
section, a mesh guard should be provided
around the trough of the scraper blade
section. This should be fitted high enough to
avoid workers falling into the trough or being
able to reach the scraper blades and be at
least 2.7 metres above ground level.
Figure 69: Example of close fitted guards on
vee-belt drive
154
Vee-belt drives are commonly used on various

items of plant. Open mesh guards help with
efficient cooling of the vee-belts and pulleys
and allow vee-belt tension to be visually
checked without removal of the guard.
The guard should fully enclose the front
and back as required to prevent access.
Figure 71: Example of hinged access panel guard

bolted shut
Figure 70: As with vee belt drives, a fixed guard

totally enclosing the drive is suitable for primary
jaw crusher drives. Alternatively guarding fitted
around existing structures may be suitable
Figure 72: Example of steel man-grid on elevated

feed hopper
Figure 73: Example of steel man-grid on ground

feed hopper
Steel grids, with sufficient strength to

withstand any anticipated loads, should be
provided in the top of all ground feed hoppers
and easily accessible elevated feed hoppers.
This is to prevent unauthorised or inadvertent
entry. The exception is with primary hoppers
155
or where products of a large dimension are
Where a moving part cannot be eliminated,
being processed which may obstruct the grid.
and workers are exposed to potential contact,
Fitting grids on elevated hoppers may

encourage people to walk on them next to
an unprotected edge. Appropriate access
in-running nip guards are practicable

isolation controls.
prevention measures should be incorporated
Hazardous trap points may occur at the
in the design (eg barriers).
following locations:
Provision should be made to enable drivers
>> power transmission moving parts
at ground feed hoppers to release tail gate
>> head and tail end pulleys
latches from a position of safety.
>> bend, snub and take-up pulleys
12.8.1CONVEYOR GUARDING
>> carrying and return idlers beneath feed

hoppers, skirt plates and where the lift of
Most serious accidents and fatalities with
the belt has been restricted as well as at
conveyors result from the machinery, and
convex curves (brow position)
associated in-running nip-points, not being

adequately guarded.
>> roller assemblies for conveyor belt tracking

>> idlers accessible to people such as from
A wide variety of mechanical motions and
crossovers or underpasses, maintenance
actions on a conveyor system will present
or storage areas or cleaning areas and
hazards to the worker. These can include the
transition idlers adjacent to pulleys
movement of rotating parts, moving belts,

meshing gears, and any parts that impact
>> drive drums.
or shear. These different types of hazardous
The following pages outline possible guarding
mechanical motions and actions are basic
for conveyor belt parts in operation, including:
in varying combinations to nearly all
>> power transmission moving parts
machines, and recognising them is the
>> belts
first step toward protecting workers from

the hazards they present.
On a conveyor, in-running nip points are
dangerous trapping points at the line of
contact between the rotating drum or pulley
>> upper and lower strands in a straight run

>> curved zone (brow positions)
>> head and tail drums and transition zones
>> gravity take up units
(cylinders) and the moving conveyor belt on
>> fixed obstacles
the in-running side of the cylinder. A similar
>> skirt boards.
point on the out-running side of the cylinder

where the conveyor belt exits is not the
dangerous location unless the conveyor
It also provides general information on the

use of nip guards.
can be reversed.
POWER TRANSMISSION MOVING PARTS
Even smooth, slowly rotating cylinders can
Hazards associated with power transmission
grip clothing, and through skin contact alone
moving parts include the drive shaft, shaft
force an arm, hand or body into a dangerous
end, sprocket, pulley, chain, drive belt and
position. Frequently the machine is running too
gear coupling. Possible consequences include
fast, or is too powerful to allow the person to
drawing-in and crushing and entanglement
stop the machine or pull the body part out. This
of a loose piece of clothing in a protruding
can result in severe friction burns, amputation
moving part.
or significant (including fatal) crushing injuries.
156
fitting fixed barrier guards and additional
If a hazard is less than 2700 mm from the

ground or working platform fixed barrier
guards should be fitted.
BELT
If the belt is in good condition possible
4mm
consequences of contact (depending on the

speed and belt characteristics) include friction
burns or abrasion and impact with the belt.
150m
Install hazard controls in accordance with risk

assessment results.
If the belt is not in good condition or there is
evidence of a damaged belt splice, drawing-
Figure 75: Bottom idler nip guard
in, burns, and lacerations may be possible.

Change the belt splice design or manufacturer
if this is an ongoing problem. Otherwise
maintain the belt and belt splice according
CURVED ZONE (BROW POSITIONS)

In-running nips will be present between the
to the manufacturers specifications.
belt and rollers in the curved zone with a
UPPER AND LOWER STRANDS IN A
barrier guard and, where required, additional
STRAIGHT RUN
nip-point guards.
An in-running nip will be present between:

>> the upper strand and the pulleys under
the hopper
>> the upper strand and the pulleys under
the skirt-board or skirt
>> the upper strand and support rollers
>> the upper strand and return rollers
>> the lower strand and scrapers.
The following diagrams show suggested
guarding in these areas.
possible drawing-in consequence. Fit a fixed
HEAD AND TAIL DRUMS AND

TRANSITION ZONE
In-running nips with a possible drawing-in
hazard are present:
>> between the belt and drums
>> at the junction between two conveyors
>> between the drum and fixed support
brackets
>> between the upper strand and the load
carrying rollers in the transition zone.
Entanglement hazards also exist where the
shaft is exposed. A fixed barrier guard and
additional nip-point guards should be fitted.
Figure 74: Plate type guard
157
Figure 76: Example of head drum guards
Head drums which may become accessible

by climbing stockpiles should be guarded.
Alternatively stockpile heights should be strictly
maintained to below 2700 mm in accordance
with AS 4024.1 Series reach distances.
Figure 78: Example of perimeter guarding

on gravity take-up points
FIXED OBSTACLES
Fixed obstacles which are not part of the
conveyor can result in a person being trapped
between the load and the fixed object.
Examples of fixed objects are:
>> posts
>> walls
>> tunnel entrances
>> associated fixed equipment
(ie metal detectors)
Figure 77: Example of tail drum guard
GRAVITY TAKE-UP UNITS
>> large bulk loads (ie boulders).

In accordance with risk assessment results,
consider fixed guards and deterrent devices.
Conveyor gravity take-up units should be
The objective is to keep the body, arms and
enclosed with mesh panels which prevent
legs away from the crushing area. The type of
access to moving parts within the structure.
guard and its dimensions will depend on the
This prevents the risk of the gravity take-up
body part at risk of being trapped and the
weight falling to ground level in the event of
weight of the load. The guard itself must
the belt, chains or ropes breaking. All panels
not create a drawing-in or trapping area.
should be secured so they require a tool for

removal, or be interlocked.
SKIRT BOARDS
You must ensure conveyors are designed,
installed and used in such a way that no one
is struck by falling objects65. The use of skirt
boards can limit the amount of material that
falls from conveyors (refer Figure 79).
65
158
The Regulations, regulation 124 (1) (c)
Install skirt boards or other protective devices at:
the risks of hair or clothing being drawn in.
>> Loading and transfer areas. It is
Therefore, the risk assessment should take into
recommended that the skirt boards be
account that the drawing-in effect increases
at least two and a half times longer than
with the diameter of the rollers, their roughness,
the belt is wide, to allow the material
their rotational velocity and the clothing or PPE
to settle down.
worn (ie gloves).
>> Areas that have unusual features, such

as magnets, crushers, and grizzlies.
>> Places where people pass under the belt.
>> Areas where maintenance, clean-up,
or inspection activities are frequently
performed.
In situations where fixed skirts are fitted above
conveyor idlers, a trap point exists between
the idler and the belt. Panels of guards should
be fitted to prevent access to the trap points
associated with the skirts of the conveyor
(refer Figure 79).
To limit the risks of pinching, abrasion and

burns, the clearance between the nip guard
and the cylinder or belt should be as small
as possible (maximum 4 mm). The angle
between the guard and the tangent to the
cylinder or between the guard and the belt
should be 90 or slightly larger.
Nip guards are particularly suitable for cylinders,
drums and rollers with a smooth and full end
disc. They can be used with a smooth, flat or
troughed belt, if they follow the profile of the
belt, and the belt is tight and does not vibrate.
Where there are other machine hazards that
require guarding (eg head drums with exposed
rotating shafts), nip guards should be used in
addition to fixed or inter-locked barrier guards.
DRAWING-IN ZONES
All in-running nips create hazardous zones
(also called drawing-in zones) whose depth
(p) varies with the diameter of the drums
Figure 79: Example of skirting guards
or pulleys (cylinders). The safety distance

(sd) should be measured in relation to the
GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE USE
accessible end of this drawing-in zone (called
OF NIP GUARDS
the perimeter of the drawing-in zone) and
Nip guards prevent access to the in-running
not in relation to the axis of the cylinder.
nips drawing-in zone. Where practicable, the
In the case of two cylinders in contact the
nip guards should fill the drawing-in zone as
shape of the drawing-in zone is the angle
much as possible and should be sufficiently
that becomes even more acute when the
rigid not to increase the clearance between
cylinder radii is large. The hazardous zone
the guard and the cylinders or the belt.
is the angle between the two cylinders and
However, nip guards do not protect against
is 12 mm in height.
the risk of pinching between the guard and
The perimeter of drawing-in zone (p1 or p2)
the cylinder or belt, and residual risks of
is determined by the 12 mm distance and the
abrasion or burns may remain. In addition, they
diameter of the cylinders.
do not provide appropriate protection against
159
In the case of a cylinder in contact with a
Determined by the height of the nip
triangle that becomes even more acute when
in relation to the activities that could
the cylinder radius is large. The danger zone
be performed at that location and the
consists of the triangle between the cylinder
separating distance between the nip-point
and the belt and is 12 mm in height.
and the likely position of workers that
In the case of two cylinders not in contact, or a

cylinder close to a stationary object, the depth
of the drawing-in zone varies in relation to:
>> the diameter of the cylinders, and
might make contact with it.

ADDITIONAL IN-RUNNING NIP GUARDS
From time to time access is required behind
barrier guards or fixed guards, for the purpose
>> the gap between the cylinders, or
of maintenance and cleaning of conveyor
>> the gap between the cylinder and the
systems.
stationary object.
This results in potential exposure of workers
The depth of the drawing-in zone can then be
to nip points. In addition guards are often
zero (p = 0). The perimeter of the drawing-
left off at positions where they have to be
in zone can be confused with the axis of the
frequently removed.
cylinders if the gap is greater than 12 mm.

IDLER ROLLER NIP HAZARDS ON HEAVY
Previous initiatives have involved emergency

stop cables interlinked with guards.
DUTY BELT CONVEYORS
However, as these are not as effective as
There is also a significant risk of injury posed
nip guards fitting directly at nip points
by nip-point force on heavy-duty conveyor
(in addition to any other guards required)
top and bottom idler rollers and the generally
WorkSafe holds the view that these should
increased accessibility of nip-points due to
be fitted, where practicable.
greater width of idler rollers (particularly

bottom idler rollers).
The two main factors to consider when
undertaking a risk assessment are:
>> Degree of hazard (likely severity of injury):
MAINTAINING NIP GUARDS

Nip guards are essential safety devices
and they must be maintained in effective
working order. They should be subjected to
a suitable scheme of inspection, examination
Determined largely by the pressure
and maintenance. Each nip guard should be
between the belt and the idler roller.
individually identified in such a scheme to
For example, if the stationary conveyor
ensure its location is known, and each has
belt cannot be lifted off the idler by a
its own record of inspection, examination
person using one hand, it is likely nip
and maintenance.
guards will need to be installed.
160
>> Likelihood of access to the nip-point:
belt, the drawing-in zone has the shape of a
Two-handed starting devices are a cycleinitiation method that requires constant,

simultaneous pressure from each hand on
Slot for
top belt
two separate controls to move the cutting

knife. If the operator removes either hand
Plough on the
bottom belt
from either of the controls, the blades will

stop immediately. Two-handed starting
devices are essential where fixed guards are
Figure 80: Tail drum return nip guard
not practicable (eg where the operator needs

to feed blocks of stone into the cutting area)
and operating controls are close to the knife.
A suitable guard should be fitted to the side
of the guillotine opposite to the controls
where workers may reach into the hazardous
area. Guillotines which rely on someone
picking or pushing the stone after being cut
should be fitted with a drop side or conveyor.
This is so the stone is fed away from the
hazardous area. Alternatively a suitable
tool should be provided (refer Figure 83).
Figure 81: Head drum nip guard
12.8.2STONE GUILLOTINE GUARDING
Figure 82: Stone guillotine with fixed guards
Stone guillotines (or stone cutters) with

unguarded cutting knives can cause
amputations and other serious injuries.
Examples of machine guarding methods
include barrier guards, two-handed starting
devices, remote-operator controls and
electronic safety devices (eg light curtains).
More detailed information is available from
the WorkSafe Safe Use of Machinery Fact
Sheets on the WorkSafe website.
Using machine-guarding methods that
eliminate worker access to the cutting
knife (called the point of operation) is
the preferred method of hazard control
(refer Figure 82).
Figure 83: Example of two-handed starting device

and drop side extraction
161
12.8.3STONE SAW GUARDING

Stone saws range from sophisticated
equipment capable of cutting large slabs
Fixed guards or two-handed operator controls

such as those outlined for stone guillotines
may be suitable for smaller saws.
of stone and intricate designs to smaller
Remote-operator controls force the operator
machines capable of simple cuts. Regardless
to remain at a safe distance from the hazard
of the size of the saw an operator may be in
point (refer Figure 86). Hold-to run controls
close proximity to the hazardous area when
should be used for remote-operator controls.
operating and suitable guarding or controls
The machine should run down in the time it
should be in place.
would take someone to reach the hazardous
For larger saws the use of perimeter fences

and interlocked gates would prevent
inadvertent access and the operator from
working in close proximity to the equipment.
area when the operator removes their finger

or hand from the control. Suitable controls
must be in place to stop anyone else entering
the hazardous area.
Fixed guards alone might not be feasible as

access is required for loading and unloading
the stone. The following would all offer a high
standard of protection:
>> A perimeter fence and interlocked guards,
such as manually-actuated sliding access
gates (refer Figure 84). The interlocked
guards should be fitted with a locking
device so the guard remains closed and
locked until any risk of injury from the
hazardous machine has passed. This
should allow for the rundown time of
the saw blade.
Figure 84: Stone saw with gate at access points
>> Electro-sensitive protective equipment

such as light curtains at the front of the
enclosure. When used in conjunction with
a braking system to stop the movement
before access to dangerous parts
occurs. Alternatively the saw head could
immediately return to a home position
with a local guarding enclosure (refer
Figure 85).
>> Local retracting guards around the circular
saw blade and pressure sensitive edges
on the saw head and traversing table. This
would have to be in conjunction with fast
stopping times of the head and saw blade.
Guards may be extended to serve as noise
enclosures. Local exhaust ventilation systems
may be integral with the guard where
appropriate.
162
Figure 85: Stone saw with light curtains at access points
Figure 87: Example of remote greasing points
12.9
CONVEYORS
12.9.1ANTI-RUN BACK DEVICE AND

Figure 86: Remote operation controls on stone saw
CONTROLLED BRAKING ON CONVEYORS

Any inclined conveyor has the potential
12.8.4GUARDING AND MAINTENANCE
to either run back (where the direction of

the material is up) or run-away (where the
Where maintenance requires normal guarding
direction of the material is down). These
to be removed then additional measures
situations can be prevented by installing an
will be needed to prevent danger from the
anti-run back device (or sprag clutch) and
mechanical, electrical and other hazards
controlled braking systems.
that may be exposed. This is also necessary

if access is required inside existing guards.
There should be clear company rules on what
isolation procedures are required, and in what
circumstances (eg some cleaning of mixing
machinery may require isolation, even though
it might not be considered a maintenance task).
Tensioning, tracking, lubrication and other
maintenance is usually done while equipment
For more detailed information on anti-run

back devices and controlled braking systems
see AS/NZS 4024 Safety of Machinery
Part 3610: Conveyors General Requirements
or AS/NZS 4024 Safety of Machinery
Part 3611: Conveyors Belt Conveyors for
Bulk Materials Handling.
12.9.2CONVEYOR CROSSOVERS AND
is running. To eliminate the risk of injury, rods
UNDERPASSES
and nuts should protrude out beyond the
As well as the guarding requirements outlined
guards. Consider grouping the lubrication

points for access outside the guards (refer
Figure 87).
in section 12.8 you must provide safe crossing

points where a conveyor may be crossed66.
Crossing over or under conveyors should be
Consider manual handling when removing
prohibited except where safe passageways
guards for maintenance to be carried out.
are provided.
Lifting attachments on guards may be required.

For more detailed information on maintenance
and repairs, including isolation and tag out,
see section 17.
66
The Regulations, regulation 124 (1) (d)
163
Access routes (as defined by the Building Act
12.9.3PRE-START WARNINGS
2004) must maintain a minimum of 2.1 metres
ON CONVEYOR BELTS
clearance overhead . However, where people

67
can reach into moving parts the clearance

overhead should be a minimum of 2.7 metres68
in accordance with AS 4024.1 Series.
Pre-start warnings must be provided on

conveyor belts to address any hazard when
they are started69.
On overland conveyor systems, the devices
124 Conveyor belts
should be placed at the transfer, loading, and
(1) The mine operator must ensure that,
discharge points and those points where
where a conveyor belt or belts are used
workers are normally stationed. Warning signs
at the mining operation, the conveyor
stating conveyor may start without warning
belt or belts are:
should be strategically placed along overland
(c) designed, installed, and used in

such a way that will protect any
person near or travelling under a
conveyor belt form being struck by
a falling objects or objects:
(d) designed, installed, and used in
such a way that will address the
hazards arising from the interaction
between people and the conveyor
belt. This must include provision for
the safe crossing of conveyor belts,
where they may be crossed:
Whenever conveyors pass adjacent to,
or over, work areas, roadways or other
conveyors where it is reasonably foreseeable

that people may gain access.
For more information on pre-start warning
systems see section 12.11.
12.9.4RECLAIM TUNNELS
The nature of reclaim tunnel operations
means the presence of people in the tunnel is
normally only required on an infrequent and
irregular basis. Loading operations are usually
remotely activated and control room operators
may not expect workers to be in the reclaim
tunnel which can lead to hazardous situations.
Workers should only enter the reclaim tunnel
to inspect, clean or maintain the system when
passageways, protective guards should be
effective safe systems of work are in place.
installed. The guards should be designed
Reclaim tunnels may be a confined space
to catch and hold any load or material that
entry (see section 16.1.4).
may fall off or become dislodged from the

conveyor (for more information on conveyor
skirt boards see 12.8.1).
Where conveyors are operated in tunnels, pits
and similar enclosures, ample room should be
provided to allow safe access and operating
space for all workers.
12.10
EMERGENCY STOPS
Emergency stops, including pull wire

emergency stops, should not be used as a
substitute for guards. They are only a backup
for other control measures. Emergency stops
should be in red with a yellow background
where practical and signs should be erected
for easy identification (refer Figure 88).
Compliance Document for NZ Building Code Clause D1: Access Routes

AS/NZS 4024.3610 C2.1 (currently draft)
69
67
68
164
Do not use emergency stops to lock-out the plant or equipment because the actuators can
separate from the contacts. If this happens, the control will show the plant is off but it is
actually on.
Emergency stops should:
>> be prominent and clearly and durably marked
>> be immediately accessible to each user of the plant or equipment
>> have red handles, bars, push buttons or pull cords (labels can also be used)
>> not be affected by electrical or electronic circuit failure.
Mine operators must fit an emergency stop system that can be activated at any accessible point
along the length of a conveyor belt70.
For more detailed information on emergency stop controls see the WorkSafe Best Practice
Guidelines for the Safe Use of Machinery and AS/NZS 4024 Safety of Machinery: Part 1604:
Design of controls, interlocks and guarding Emergency stop Principles for design.
Figure 88: Emergency stop with signage (photo courtesy of Fulton Hogan Miner Rd Quarry
and NZ Steel Taharoa)
12.11
PRE-START WARNING SYSTEMS
Pre-start warning systems should be provided on machinery where sudden, unexpected

operation could cause serious or fatal injuries to those who may be close to the machinery.
Because mines and quarry processing areas can be noisy and spread out it will normally be
appropriate to provide both visual and acoustic prestart warnings that work in conjunction
with one another.
70
165
Acoustic signals should:
Standards, with a focus on the adoption
>> sound for long enough before the plant
of international Standards
or equipment starts to provide adequate

warning to anyone who may be in a
position of risk
>> loud enough so they can be heard in the
area they are providing a warning for
>> be at a level higher than the ambient
noise without being excessive or painful
>> be clearly different from any other
warning signals or alarms.
Visual signals (eg flashing lights) should
be placed so people close to the plant or
equipment will have the best opportunity
management systems (SMSs)

>> provide for offences including infringement
offences.
The amendments to the Electricity (Safety)
Regulations 2010 in December 2013
complement the Regulations. They improve
design requirements, periodic assessment and
verification of safety requirements, specific
requirements relating to Prescribed Electrical
Work (PEW), design, maintenance and day
to day operations.
to see it. You may need multiple visual
It is important any electricians you use to
signals depending on the set-up of your
perform electrical work are familiar with the
plant and whether or not an acoustic
Electricity (Safety) Regulations 2010 and they
signal will be sufficient to provide warning.
certify all work they perform. One particularly
Where visual signals are used they should
important document is AS/NZS 3007:2013
be of a suitable brightness and colour
Electrical equipment in mines and quarries
contrast to the background.
Surface installations and associated processing
For more detailed information on acoustic

and visual signals see AS/NZS 4024 Part
plant. Make sure all electricians are familiar

with this Standard.
1904: Design, controls, actuators and
Mobile and relocatable equipment at alluvial
signals Indication, marking and actuation
mines and quarries must be assessed yearly
Requirements for visual, auditory and
against AS/NZS 3007 by a qualified mining
tactile signals.
electrical inspector71.
12.12
ELECTRICITY
The Electricity (Safety) Regulations 2010:

>> state the generic rules and requirements
use and all connections, switches and cables

must conform to the Electricity (Safety)
Regulations 2010.
As a general rule:
to be electrically safe and unsafe
(a) Use Residual Current Devices (RCDs).

(b) Electrical substations should be kept clean
use of works, installations, fittings and
and not used as stores. They should be
appliances
kept locked with access to authorised
>> provide for installations to be designed

and installed under AS/NZS 3007
workers only.
(c) All equipment should be part of the
Electrical equipment in mines and
electrical maintenance and inspection
quarries Surface installations and
scheme.
associated processing plant

>> define certification and documentation
required for all electrical works
>> set out in schedules all of the applicable
71
Machinery must be properly grounded before
about electrical safety, and what is deemed

>> deal with the design, construction and
166
>> define requirements relating to safety
Electrical (Safety) Regulations 2010, regulation 78D
(d) Batteries should be treated with caution.

Manufacturers instructions should be
followed for maintenance and precautions
to be taken (ie PPE).
(e) Dust accumulations can have a serious
Flexible cords are prone to damage because
effect on the safe functioning of electrical
they are often outdoors in operational
equipment. Make sure housekeeping
areas and can be subject to falling material,
procedures are in place.
repetitive use, movement, vibration and
(f) All electrically powered equipment
extremes of weather. Regardless of the date of
should be capable of being isolated.
the tag all flexible cords should be examined
The isolation points should be clearly
before being plugged in and used. Consider
labelled and means of isolation provided
any shock or tingle as a warning of a potential
(see section 17.2).
safety problem. If this occurs immediately
(g) Where the operators have been properly

trained it may be appropriate to access
some electrical equipment for the
switch off, isolate and remove the cable

and do not be use it again until tested by
a competent electrician.
purposes of resetting trips. In these cases

it may be permissible to open cabinet
doors provided the equipment inside is
properly shrouded to prevent inadvertent
access or arc flash.
(h) Switchboards should be securely locked
at all times. Where wiring is damaged it
should be reported immediately. Water
should not be allowed to accumulate in
switch boards or switch rooms.
(i) Underground cables and pipes should
be accurately located on a site plan and
identified before digging.
For more detailed information on safety
around underground cables and pipes see
the WorkSafe Approved Code of Practice
for Excavations for Shafts and Foundations.
Figure 89: Flexible cords with tags
12.12.1FLEXIBLE CORDS
Flexible cords must have a current tag issued
12.12.2TRAILING CABLES
in accordance with AS/NZS 3760 In-service
Safe systems of working with trailing cables
safety inspection and testing of electrical
should include meeting the NewZealand
equipment .
Electricity (Safety) Regulations 2010 and
72
A flexible cable or cord (for supply purposes)

is one that has one end connected to a plug
with pins designed to engage with a socket
AS/NZS 3007 Electrical equipment in mines

and quarries Surface installations and
associated processing plant.
outlet, and the other end either:
These safe systems of working with trailing
>> connected to terminals within the
cables should also include:
equipment, or
>> fitted with a connector designed to
72
>> Regular inspections including in-situ visual

inspection by machine operators and
engage with an appliance inlet fitted
regular documented safety assessments
to the equipment.
(at least annually).
Electricity (Safety) Regulations 2010, regulation 26
167
>> Route criteria including support measures

(where applicable), methods and
heights for crossings, location of cables
in proximity to roadways, protection
measures required where it is necessary
for vehicle crossings and so on.
>> Methods for relocation of cables and
provision of adequate equipment to
perform the task such as cable reelers
or relocators.
>> Defined methods for manual handling and
provision of adequate mechanical lifting
aids to eliminate manual handling sprains
and strains. Equipment to separate and join
plugs should be sought.
>> Regular inspection, maintenance and
testing performed on substation earth
systems including earth mats, earth
impedance and earth connection points,
protection relays and trip batteries.
>> Provision of unique clear identifiers for
each cable and trailing cable plug and
substation outlet.
>> Defined standards for the circumstances
12.13 CRANES AND LIFTING

EQUIPMENT
Where there is a crane on site, you must
comply with the HSE (Pressure Equipment,
Cranes and Passenger Ropeways) Regulations
1999 and should comply with the Approved
Code of Practice for Cranes. Fixed cranes
includes gantry cranes, overhead hoists,
monorail systems, davit arms or fixed lifting
points. The structures supporting the crane
must be certified by a chartered professional
engineer with respect to design, construction
and non-destructive testing, as relevant.
The structure certificate issued must specify:
(1) design standards referenced
(2) maximum permissible safe working load
and any load limitations or conditions
(3) details of equipment that may be used
on the certified structure73.
Items of mobile plant, not originally designed
as a crane used for load-lifting incidental to
their principal function are exempt from the
Health and Safety in Employment (Pressure
under which trailing cable protection relays
Equipment, Cranes, and Passenger Ropeways)
can be reset and power re-energised onto a
Regulations 1999. This is subject to the
cable where the relay has indicated a fault
following conditions as applicable:
to be present.
>> Developing, implementing, monitoring
and reviewed systems of high voltage
switching, access and authorisation.
>> Minimising direct handling of energised
cables. Anyone required to directly handle
energised trailing cables should wear
insulating gloves covered by leather outer.
(1) Lifting points and equipment used for

rigging loads are to be certified by a
Chartered Professional Engineer; and
(2) In the case of hydraulic excavators with
an operating weight of 12 tonne or more
the following additional conditions apply:
(a) The equipment is not to be modified
to make it operate as a crane other
Training should be provided in the above
than the provision of a lifting point;
and in trailing cable hazard awareness for all
and
people required to work with them. Workers

associated with relevant tasks should be
(b) Hose burst protection valves are

required; and
consulted in relation to the development of

the systems and standards mentioned above.
73
168
Note: Some equipment is exempt from this requirement. Refer to Notice of Exemption for Equipment under the Health
and Safety in Employment (Pressure Equipment, Cranes, and Passenger Ropeways) Regulations 1999, NewZealand
Gazette, No 188, page 4517, 17 December 2009
(c) Operators and ground support

personnel are to be adequately
trained as required by section 13
of the HSE Act; and
(d) Operations are to be carried out
in accordance with the Approved
Code of Practice for Load-lifting
Rigging; and
(e) The equipment is to have a loading
chart available to operators74.
All sites should develop a safe system of work
for the use and management of all lifting
equipment in accordance with the WorkSafe
Approved Code for Practice for Load-lifting
Rigging. This includes but is not limited to:
>> Every lifting appliance and item of loose
gear shall be clearly and permanently
marked with its WLL by stamping, or where
this is impracticable or not recommended,
by other suitable means. Also, a unique
identifying numbering system to clearly
identify individual items should be used.
>> Visual inspection prior to and after use.
>> Examination by a competent person
regularly depending on frequency, use,
and environmental conditions but not
exceeding 12 months.
>> A register should be kept for lifting
equipment. The register should show
the date of the last recorded examination
or test, and any alterations.
74
Notice of Exemption for Equipment under the Health and Safety in Employment (Pressure Equipment, Cranes, and
Passenger Ropeways) Regulations 1999, NewZealand Gazette, No. 61, page 1784, 3 June 2010
169
PART D
13/
WORKER
FACILITIES
IN THIS SECTION:
13.1 Washing facilities
13.2 Toilets
13.3 Drinking water
13.4 Facilities for employees
who become ill at work
13.5 Facilities for changing and
storing clothes
13.6 Facilities for meals
170
SECTION 13.0 // WORKER FACILITIES
You must provide suitable and sufficient numbers of

facilities to make sure the health and safety of everyone
at the site. Facilities are those that are necessary for the
well-being of your workers, such as washing, toilet, rest
and changing facilities, and somewhere clean to eat and
drink during breaks.
Keep all facilities in a clean and sanitary condition.
Facilities must comply with the Building
Act 2004, Building Code, Health and Safety
in Employment Regulations 1995 and local
authority bylaws as appropriate.
For more detailed information on facilities see:
>> WorkSafe Guidelines for the Provision of
Facilities and General Safety in Commercial
and Industrial Premises.
>> Guidelines for the Provision of Facilities
and General Safety in Forestry Work.
Facilities should be as near as practicable to

the work, but may be off-site if transport is
provided. Facilities should not be so remote
as to discourage their use by workers.
Toilets must be kept clean and tidy, and be
convenient to workers76.
13.3
DRINKING WATER
An adequate supply of wholesome drinking

water77 must be readily available, and
should be clearly labelled as drinking water.
A common drinking container should not be
13.1
WASHING FACILITIES
used. Containers for drinking water should be

kept clean and protected from contamination.
Cold water, cleansing agents and suitable

hand drying facilities must be provided at
all work sites75.
Where chemicals are being handled, mixed
or applied, showers or suitable cleaning
agents may be needed. Additional emergency
showers may also be required (refer to the
safety data sheet).
13.2
FACILITIES FOR EMPLOYEES

WHO BECOME ILL AT WORK
13.4
Rest facilities, or if necessary, transport to

home or medical assistance for employees
who become ill at the place of work must
be provided78.
TOILETS
Toilets must be provided in accordance

with the Building Act 2004, Building Code
and Health and Safety in Employment
Regulations 1995.
75
76
77
78
Health and Safety in Employment Regulations 1995, regulation 4 (2) (b)

Health and Safety in Employment Regulations 1995, regulations 4 (1), 4 (2) (a) and 9
171
FACILITIES FOR CHANGING

AND STORING CLOTHES
13.5
You must provide an area where workers can

change, in privacy, clothes that become wet or
contaminated at work79. Adequate clean space
should be provided so workers can store
clothes not used at work where appropriate.
13.6
FACILITIES FOR MEALS
You must provide facilities for workers to have

meals and rest periods in reasonable comfort
and sheltered from the weather80. Any facility
used for shelter and meal purposes must not
be used for the storage of tools, materials or
petroleum products.
Suitable rubbish disposing facilities should
also be available.
79
80
172
Health and Safety in Employment Regulations 1995, regulations 5 (2) (b) and 5 (2) (c)
Health and Safety in Employment Regulations 1995, regulation 4 (2) (k)
PART D
14/
SITE SECURITY
AND PUBLIC
SAFETY
IN THIS SECTION:
14.1 Access to sites
14.2 Barriers
14.3 Signage
173
You must consider ways in which working the site may

create a risk not only to workers but to the public.
This section describes how to manage site
Barriers are appropriate where it is reasonably
access and other areas that may pose a
foreseeable that members of the public,
danger to the public.
including children, are likely to trespass on
From a health and safety perspective, it is
the site, and could suffer injury if they did so.
good practice to divert public rights of way
The type of barrier required depends on
around mines or quarries. Where it is not
the risks. In a rural area, where risk of public
possible, precautions should be implemented,
access is low, hedges, trenches and mounds
based on a detailed risk assessment of the
may be enough. In areas where there is
route and the area around the site. The
evidence of persistent trespass which places
precautions should be reviewed regularly.
them at significant risk, substantial fences

may be required.
14.1
ACCESS TO SITES
Access to sites should be controlled to make

sure unauthorised persons cannot travel to a
location where they may be at risk from site
Workers should be encouraged to report cases

of trespass or evidence that people have been
on the site. They should also be told what
action to take if they discover trespassers.
operations . This is particularly important for

81
sites where there are sales to the public or

in residential areas. Control measures may
include signage, automated barrier arms or
worker controlled areas (eg a weighbridge
operator).
14.2
BARRIERS
Providing and maintaining suitable barriers

around the site to discourage trespass may
be appropriate. Trespass means entry to the
site without express or implied permission.
81
174
HSE Act, sections 15 and 16
14.3
SIGNAGE
Suitable signs warning people of the possible

hazards at the site should be erected at entry
points and, where necessary, along boundaries
(refer Figure 90 and Figure 91). Any signs
should be maintained in a legible condition.
SECTION 14.0 // SITE SECURITY AND PUBLIC SAFETY
Figure 90: Examples of signage warning of hazards
Figure 91: Example of sign at gate
175
PART D
15/
WORKER
HEALTH
IN THIS SECTION:
15.1 Worker health principal
hazards and control plan
15.8 Hours of work and fatigue
15.2 Worker health monitoring
15.10 Ultraviolet radiation
15.3 Noise
15.4 Vibration
15.5 Breathable hazards
15.6 Working in extremes of
temperature
15.7 Manual handling and lifting
176
15.9 Psychosocial hazards

15.11 Contaminated land
15.13 Drugs and alcohol
15.14 Personal protective
equipment (PPE)
SECTION 15.0 // WORKER HEALTH
Managing the health and wellbeing of your workers

is an important part of being a good employer. It also
pays dividends in terms of increased productivity,
reduced sick leave, improved staff morale, and loyalty.
>> identify and manage risks to workers
long-term health
>> monitor workers health
>> protect workers from specific hazards
including vibration, dust, fumes, ultraviolet
radiation, and chemical or biological
hazards
>> help workers handle the physical and
mental pressures of work safely
>> provide appropriate personal protective
equipment (PPE).
Ineffective workplace health hazard
management is responsible for significantly
higher levels of injury and death than
workplace accidents. Within the context of
occupational health, effective management
is achieved by ensuring relevant health
hazards are identified and, as a key objective,
eliminated at source. It is only appropriate
to control health hazards by reducing the
>> have the necessary capability both

through access to equipment and
technology, and the managerial skills
to make sure good systems are in place
>> be motivated to take action to control
exposures to health hazards and
reduce risk.
15.1 WORKER HEALTH PRINCIPAL
HAZARDS AND CONTROL PLAN
To determine whether there are principal
hazards that may have long-term effects
on mine workers health, it is necessary to
consider situations workers may be exposed
including, but not limited to:
>> the materials, substances or fumes
workers may be exposed to, and the likely
consequences of any such exposure (ie
coal dust, silica dust, diesel particulates,
welding fumes, chemicals and so on)
>> the type of tasks undertaken (eg work
likelihood of harm when elimination is not
outdoors, working in extremes of
practicable. Personal Protective Equipment
temperature, manual handling), and the
(PPE) is the lowest form of control and should
place in which they are undertaken
be a last resort.
For controls to be effective, managers,
workers and their representatives should:
>> have easily accessible information on
the nature of a health hazard and how
it can be controlled and monitored. This
information must be updated as knowledge
>> the equipment or tools being used and

how workers interact with them (eg noise
and vibration)
>> the length of time workers may be exposed
to any potentially hazardous material,
fumes, substances or situations
>> the hours of work (including travel time
on new health hazards becomes known,
to and from sites, and shift work),
and new techniques for managing them
sleep disruption, sleep deprivation
are developed
and individual workload

>> the influence drugs or alcohol may
have on a worker.
177
You cannot accurately assess the risk of some

hazards without undertaking scientific testing
or measurement by a competent person.
This includes checking that relevant exposure
standards are not being exceeded (eg by using
noise meters to measure noise levels, and dust
deposition meters to measure airborne dust).
Extractive sites should undertake workplace and
individual monitoring for the following hazards:
affect the health of workers.

The worker health control plan must also
set out:
>> development of strategies to deal with the
consumption of drugs or alcohol
>> a process for obtaining urgent medical
treatment for mine workers where required.
>> dust (including diesel particulates)
The worker health control plan should be
>> noise
developed in the context of the whole health
>> vibration
>> welding fumes and gases (where applicable).
and safety management system, and not in

isolation from other plans, processes and
procedures that rely on the control plan. This
If the degree of hazard or risk is not clear, the
will ensure gaps and overlaps in information
advice of an occupational health, occupational
and procedures are identified and used in
hygiene or occupational medical specialist
the implementation of suitable controls to
should be sought.
minimise the likelihood and potential risks
If there are principal hazards relating to worker

health at a mining operation, the SSE must
and impacts.
the mining operation. This must comply with
15.2 WORKER HEALTH

MONITORING
regulations 107 and 108 of the Regulations.
When using minimisation hazard controls,
The worker health control plan must contain
you must monitor employees exposure to the
information detailed in regulation 108 of the
hazard (work environment monitoring) and,
Regulations. In summary, the worker health
with employees informed consent, monitor
control plan must address how the following
their health in relation to the hazard82.
hazards will be monitored and controlled:
To make sure personal health information
>> noise and vibration
is kept private; manage disclosure of health
>> dust, diesel particulates and fumes
monitoring information. Typically, the
ensure there is a principal control plan for
>> working in extremes temperatures

and humidity
>> changes in atmospheric pressure
occupational health practitioner will provide a

summary of health monitoring results that do
not identify or disclose any individual. These
summarised results can be used to determine
>> manual handling and lifting
whether health hazard controls are achieving
>> hours of work, and fatigue
the desired level of protection.
>> psychosocial hazards (stress, bullying
Offer and pay for medical examinations
and violence)
>> ultraviolet and ionising radiation
>> biological hazards
82
178
>> any other hazard that may adversely
HSE Act, section 10(2)(e)
to each worker at the following times:

1. immediately before the worker starts
work (pre-employment medical)
2. immediately before the worker stops
resumes. Situations may also exist when the
more than 12 months old (exit medical)
longer exposure time is a key factor in noise
3. periodically throughout their employment
Much can be achieved by careful design and
done annually but this is dependent on
maintenance of equipment and possibly by
Consult with workers before choosing a

medical practitioner or nurse to carry out
the health monitoring (or medicals). Health
monitoring must establish the level of health
of workers as it relates to the work they are
carrying out at the time84.
You must make records of health monitoring
available to WorkSafe on request. Such records
must not identify or disclose any individual
unless first obtaining the workers consent85.
Records of health monitoring must be kept:
>> for at least 30 years after the monitoring
took place in the case of any hazard that
is known to have a cumulative or delayed
effect (ie noise induced hearing loss or
respirable dust exposure)
>> for at least 7 years after the monitoring
took place or until the worker stops
working at the site, whichever is the later
In the case of all other hazards.
15.3
NOISE
You must take all practicable steps to ensure

workers are not exposed to noise levels above
85 dB(A) LAeq,8h and a peak noise level of 140
dB Lpeak. This is regardless of whether they are
wearing a personal hearing protection device.
The 85 dB(A) exposure limit is based on an
8-hour working day, it is highly likely extractive
operations will need to take into account
extended shifts in any noise assessment.
This is due to the longer period of time a
person is exposed to potentially hazardous
noise, and the shorter time the persons
84
85
exposure exceeding the exposure limits.
and no less than every 5 years (usually

medical practitioner advice)83.
83
ears have to recover before noise exposure
working at the site if their last medical is
changing work practices.

Methods for reducing exposure include:
(a) using low noise machinery many extractive
sites equipped with modern machinery
and vehicles achieve noise exposures
below workplace exposure standards
(b) reducing sound radiating surfaces (eg
using mesh guards instead of plate metal)
(c) vibration isolation (eg operators cabins
and vehicle cabs)
(d) using sound absorbing linings (eg in
vehicle cabs and engine cover linings)
(e) using exhaust silencers (eg on pneumatic
drill rigs and vehicle engines)
(f) using enclosures around equipment
(eg to control noise in workshops)
(g) using noise refuges for workers
(eg a cabin at the control console of
crushing and screening equipment)
(h) maintenance (eg replace defective
silencers and repair broken windows
in vehicle cabs).
Such measures may be used alone or
in combination. The list is not exhaustive
and other techniques may be applicable.
Many effective solutions are low cost.
Personal protective equipment (PPE)
(ear protectors) should only be used as
an interim solution. It may be used longterm when all other reasonably practicable
measures have been taken but have not,
in themselves, achieved adequate noise
reduction. Reducing noise exposure is
the main objective.
The Regulations, regulation 128(1)

The Regulations, regulation 128(4)(a)
179
For more detailed information on noise control
You can reduce and control vibration
methods see the WorkSafe Approved Code
exposure by:
of Practice for the Management of Noise in
>> maintaining plant, equipment and vehicles
the Workplace. This includes information

on workplace exposure standards, work
environment monitoring, health monitoring
and personal protective equipment (PPE).
>> reducing speed

>> designing and constructing machinery
and vehicles to lessen vibration emission
>> maintaining roadways and other vehicle
15.4
VIBRATION
There are two types of vibration which may

cause harm to workers. Whole body vibration
(WBV) and hand-arm vibration (HAV).
WBV is the vibration and shock you feel
when you sit or stand on a vehicle or machine
travelling over rough ground or along a road.
It can also be the vibration when you work
near powerful machinery such as a rock
crusher. Shocks can occur, for example,
when driving over bumps or potholes.
Exposure to WBV at low levels is unlikely on
its own to cause injury, but it can aggravate
existing back injuries which may cause pain.
Effects of long-term exposure to WBV include:
>> disorders of the joint and muscle disorders,
especially the spine
>> cardiovascular, respiratory, endocrine
and metabolic changes
>> digestive system problems
>> reproductive damage in women
>> vision or balance impairment
>> discomfort and interference with activities.
HAV is the vibration and shock transmitted to
your hands and arms when using handheld
powered tools or equipment which vibrates
while in operation.
HAV can cause hand-arm vibration syndrome
(HAVS) and carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS)
which can be debilitating. The risk of
180
operating areas
>> purchasing or replacing hand-held tools
with ones with less vibration emission
>> purchasing or replacing machinery or
vehicles with ones with less vibration
emission
>> reducing time spent using hand-held tools
or driving
>> organising work and designing
workstations to avoid uncomfortable
postures and the need for high manual
effort to grip, push or pull equipment
>> providing personal protective equipment
(eg gloves).
15.5
BREATHABLE HAZARDS
15.5.1RESPIRABLE DUST
One of the health risks from working at an
extractive site is the exposure to fine dust,
containing particles that may lead to chronic
and possibly fatal lung disease. Respirable
dust does not have to be visible or irritating
to seriously impact on health.
Workers may be exposed to fine dust from:
Hand-operated drills used mainly for drilling
small diameter holes in monumental stone
quarrying these can be used for explosives,
plug and feathers or hydraulic splitters.
Drilling rigs used mainly for drilling holes
for blasting, exploration or ground support.
developing HAVS or CTS depends on the
Crushing or milling: Compressive-type
length of time a person is exposed for and
crushers produce dust but do not themselves
the magnitude of the vibration.
induce excessive air movement, although
moving materials do and dust, either from
Traffic on haul roads kicking up dust into the
the materials or the actual crushing process,
air. Fully enclosed cabs and watering of haul
becomes airborne. Impact-type crushing
roads can help control this hazard.
machines involve a rotating part which acts

as a fan and generates considerable air
movement. With this type of high-reduction
crushing, considerable quantities of airborne
dust are generated.
Screens used to extract or reject
specific-sized material from the feed
product. Screening equipment creates dust
by degradation, and the action also affects
the release of dust in the material.
Conveyors, feeders and loading used to
transfer product from one position to another.
Dust is released from the transfer points
Other activities including stacking, cleaning

(especially when using brooms) and driving
are a source of dust. You may need to assess
personal dust exposure during these activities.
Hazard controls must include reduction
at source. For example:
>> dust collectors on drills and dust
suppression sprays and other dust
collection equipment
>> water applied directly to the drill
tip and water supply to saws
>> screen hoods
and can be aggravated if not enclosed and
>> encapsulation
protected from wind.
>> extraction systems
Heating or drying of rock fragments inevitably
>> integral units
causes large emissions of airborne dust, unless
>> stockpile dampening.
exhaust gases are fully treated.
Control measures must be maintained in an
Bagging dry materials, particularly powders,
effective state, in efficient working order and
and bag damage. Bagging products while
in good repair. Where engineering controls are
damp does not present any dust problems.
implemented, thorough examinations and tests
Portable hand-operated saws generally used

in monumental stone and slate quarries for
the cutting of stone and for the creation of
slits so wedges can be used for splitting.
Static saws: a wide range of saw types are
used for cutting blocks or stone and slate into
selected sizes. Most saw blades are diamond
tipped and use water for cooling. The water
also acts as dust suppression.
Splitting or dressing takes place at
monumental stone and slate quarrying
operations. Some splitting involves drilling
small diameter holes and using plug and
feathers, or hydraulic splitters. Using chisels
for splitting and dressing of slate creates dust
in the replacing operators breathing zone and
the hand dressing of stone (masonry work)
also creates dust emissions.
should be carried out regularly.

15.5.2DIESEL PARTICULATES
In 2012 the International Agency for Research
on Cancer (IARC) found sufficient evidence to
conclude diesel engine exhaust is carcinogenic
to humans. The physical properties of diesel
engine exhaust means it can accumulate in an
enclosed space where there is insufficient rate
or quality of ventilating air.
Most extractive sites are likely to use diesel
engines. Workers near diesel powered
equipment may be exposed to diesel emissions
or diesel particulate matter. Confined spaces,
workshops or when working in deep pits where
temperature inversions can cause exhaust
fumes to be trapped in the pit are particularly
at risk.
181
To be successful in reducing and controlling

the hazards associated with diesel engine
exhaust a whole of site approach is required.
This will require co-ordination of expertise
and a high level of process discipline in many
functions including:
>> management
Legionnaires disease (legionellosis) is a

type of pneumonia caused by the legionella
bacteria which may be found in water
systems. Infection is caused by inhaling fine
water droplets containing the viable bacteria.
There is no evidence to suggest that mining
>> maintenance
and quarrying present a heightened risk of
>> engineering and ventilation
exposure to legionella compared to other
>> training
>> supply and procurement.
Engineering controls are the most effective
strategy for reducing the exposure to diesel
emissions and diesel particulate matter.
Administration controls, including changes
to the way work tasks are performed and
personal protective equipment may also
be required.
15.5.3WELDING AND GAS CUTTING FUMES
industries. However, large quantities of water

can be used at extractive sites for dust
suppression and processing.
Risk factors include water, growth temperature
range of 20C to 45C, nutrients (ie biofilm
or algae, rust and scale) and aerosol, spray or
mist. Mines and quarry water supplies typically
use non-mains supply sourced from bore
holes or lagoons. It is usually recycled and
prone to contamination by process dust and
environmental material such as soil and plant
material. Stored water in tanks or pipes maybe
Welding fumes are a complex mixture of
stagnant for periods and in warm weather the
metallic oxides, silicates and fluorides. Fumes
temperature may rise above 20C.
are formed when a metal is heated above its

boiling point and its vapours condense into
very fine particles (solid particulates).
Welding gases are gases used or produced
during the welding and cutting processes.
Examples are shielding gases, gases
produced by the decomposition of fluxes,
from the interaction of ultraviolet light, high
temperatures with gases or vapours in the air.
Exposure to welding gases and fumes can be
fatal. You cannot rely on the sense of smell to
detect any of these hazards. Some cannot be
smelt at all and the sense of smell can become
insensitive to those odours it can detect.
Further information on welding hazards is
outlined in section 16.1.5.
182
15.5.4LEGIONNAIRES DISEASE
The following water systems are likely to

include the risk factors described above.
However, this list is not exhaustive:
>> water being sprayed on to material
by fogging cannons or directional
misting units
>> water being sprayed on to materials
for wet suppression of dust at transfer
or discharge points
>> water being sprayed on to roads for wet
suppression of dust using water bowsers
or fixed sprays
>> use of hoses to clean areas of hard
standing around processing plant and
site buildings
>> water spray from vehicles or wheel washers
For more detailed information on welding
>> use of water as part of the production
safety, including methods of fume control,
process such as barrel washers, wet
see the WorkSafe guidance Health and Safety
scrubbers, and cooling of cutting blades
in Welding.
on saws
>> water curtains for dust control such as for

dimensional stone cutting and processing
>> emergency showers.
MANUAL HANDLING
AND LIFTING
15.7
Manual handling can result in serious back
Appropriate control methods should focus on
injuries, musculoskeletal disorders, acute
limiting the conditions that encourage growth.
injuries (eg sprains and strains) and injuries
By applying simple, low cost measures the
sustained through slips, trips and falls.
potential for growth and thereby the potential

for exposure can be significantly reduced and
appropriately controlled.
WORKING IN EXTREME
TEMPERATURES
15.6
Assess the manual handling tasks undertaken

at your site and determine whether they
are necessary. If they are, and you cannot
eliminate manual handling by providing
suitable lifting equipment, then you should
make the task as easy as possible for everyone
Working in very cold and very hot temperatures
involved and reduce the time people are
can be hazardous to a persons health.
required to do it.
Excessive exposure to heat is referred to as
For many manual handling tasks there may
heat stress and excessive exposure to cold

is referred to as cold stress.
be a number of control options that appear

feasible. Some of the control options may
In a very hot environment, the most serious
need to be trialled and evaluated before they
issue is heat stroke which can be fatal. Heat
are finally implemented (to identify whether
exhaustion and fainting (syncope) are less
they are appropriate for that particular work
serious and can affect a persons ability
system). This trialling can be relatively quick
to work.
and informal, or may need to be formal and
In very cold temperatures, the most

serious issue is hypothermia (or dangerous
extensive, to get the best solution possible.
Another serious effect of cold exposure
HOURS OF WORK
AND FATIGUE
is frostbite or freezing of the exposed
Fatigue is a physical and mental state caused
extremities such as fingers, toes, nose and
by a range of influences. It reduces a persons
ear lobes.
capabilities to an extent that may impair their
Victims of heat stroke and hypothermia are
strength, speed, reaction time, coordination,
overcooling of the body) which can be fatal.
15.8
unable to notice the symptoms, so their
decision making or balance.
survival depends on co-workers ability to
A level of fatigue is a natural response to the
identify symptoms and seek immediate
mental and physical effort of everything we
medical help.
do. Normally, good quality sleep reverses the
Where workers are, or could be, required
imbalance, allowing the body and the brain to
to work in extreme temperatures you must

implement controls to eliminate or minimise
the risks.
For more detailed information on working
in extremes of temperature see WorkSafes
Guidelines for the Management of Work in
Extremes of Temperature.
recover. However, long working hours, working

with intense mental or physical effort, or
working during some or all of the natural time
for sleep can all cause excessive fatigue.
Workers may work extended hours for long
periods of time. Night shifts are also possible
as are strenuous physical activities. Travelling
183
to and from the worksite can add hours to
in a reasonable time. But, when a stressful
the working day, as sites can be in remote
situation is ongoing or severe or has the
locations.
potential to cause mental or physical illness,
Preventing fatigue begins with careful

planning of tasks and their scheduling.
then it becomes a concern. In these cases the

HSE Act requires the situation to be managed.
Tasks should be designed so extreme
Work related stress is not an illness, but can
exertion (mental and physical) are avoided
lead to increased problems with ill health, if it
and there is sufficient recovery time available.
is prolonged or particularly intense. Examples
Working hours should be agreed which

provide all workers adequate opportunity
to manage fatigue, including:
>> regular rest breaks
>> meal breaks
>> a daily or nightly sleep period
>> shared driver responsibilities.
are heart disease, raised blood pressure,

regular headaches, back pain, gastrointestinal
disturbances and various minor illnesses.
Psychological effects can be anxiety and
depression.
You should take proactive steps to make work
healthy, build morale, identify and deal with
stressors, and talk with workers.
Meal and rest breaks for employees must,

at a minimum, comply with Part 6D of the
Employment Relations Act 2000.
15.9
PSYCHOSOCIAL HAZARDS
Psychosocial hazards for the purposes of

this guidance include stress, bullying and
violence. Stress can be a reaction to bullying
and violence. Violence may also result in
physical harm.
Violence is a hazard that may be encountered
at work. It can occur suddenly, without notice
or provocation. It may cause mental and
physical pain and suffering and may result in
permanent disability or even death.
Bullying affects people physically and mentally,
resulting in increased stress levels, decreased
emotional wellbeing, reduced coping strategies
and lower work performance.
We all experience stress at different times,
to varying degrees. When we feel that
work is leading to concrete, achievable and
worthwhile goals, we almost always rise to the
occasion, even with severe difficulties. Where
there are urgent deadlines, work overload,
poor relationships or other stressors, we
mostly cope if there is a return to normal
184
15.10
ULTRAVIOLET RADIATION
Short term exposure to the sun can result in

sunburn and eye injuries. Prolonged exposure
to sunlight is a well-established cause of skin
cancer, including melanoma. It is the ultraviolet
(UV) radiation component of sunlight which
is harmful. Even on cloudy days, the UV level
may be sufficient to be harmful. Long-term
effects on the eye include damage to the
cornea, and formation of cataracts.
The risk of skin cancer is higher for outdoor
workers because of their prolonged sun
exposure. Intense periods of exposure to the
sun appear to be the most significant factor
for melanoma. While people with certain skin
types may be at greater risk, it is important
that everyone protects their skin from
prolonged exposure to solar UV radiation.
Workers may be exposed to non-ionising
radiation from arc welding. People working
near welding operations are at risk of arc
eye, a painful condition.
You must ensure the risk posed by exposure to
UV radiation is reduced. In some instances, this
may be achieved by simply changing the time
of day when a task is carried out. Where this is
not practicable, protection should be provided
Information, training, and supervision on the
including working undercover and providing
hazards associated with mercury should be
personal protective equipment.
given to workers on site.
15.11
CONTAMINATED LAND
Redevelopment of contaminated land,

which may be associated with opencast
mining or quarrying, can result in exposure
to contaminants. The health effects, control
measures and surveillance required will
depend on the nature of the contaminants
encountered. Specific advice from an
occupational medical specialist should be
sought before redevelopment commences.
15.12
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
For more detailed information see:

>> Safety Data Sheets for precautions and
other hazardous substance information.
>> WorkSafe Workplace Exposure Standards
(WES).
>> Territorial authority plans (regional or
district councils) for environmental
standards.
>> USA Department of Labor Mine Safety
and Health Administration (MSHA) Best
Practices section of the Controlling
Mercury Hazards in Gold Mining: A best
practices toolbox for hazard controls.
Hazards associated with hazardous substances

depend on the type of substance and the
environment in which it is being used.
You should change processes to eliminate
exposure to hazardous substances, or replace
them with safer alternatives. Refer to the
Safety Data Sheet (SDS) for the precautions
required for each individual substance.
15.12.1MERCURY
Mercury can be present in precious and base
metal ore and is produced as a by-product of
gold and silver processing. Mercury is a very
toxic cumulative poison which can affect the
brain, the central nervous system and the
reproductive system. It can be absorbed by
inhalation, ingestion and through the skin.
Mercury poisoning can result from both
acute and chronic exposures. It is critical
to recognise that exposure to mercury can
be without warning and workers may not
know the extent to which they have been
contaminated. Personal, environmental and
biological monitoring should be done to
determine the exposure hazard and evaluate
symptoms, as necessary.
15.13
DRUGS AND ALCOHOL
People may be under the influence of alcohol

or drugs while at work. Workers have a duty to
take all practicable steps to ensure their own
safety, and alcohol and drugs may affect their
ability to do this. This applies whether they are
injected, inhaled or taken orally. The increased
availability of stronger over the counter legal
medication and other prescription medication
means the risk of drug-impaired performance
by workers may be increasing. The abuse of
drugs or alcohol can be on-site or off-site,
such as heavy drinking the night before a
day shift.
All operations, large and small, can benefit
from an agreed drug and alcohol policy,
applying to all workers. Such a policy should
form part of your organisations overall health
and safety policy. A written drug or alcohol
policy has many advantages, including leaving
less room for misunderstanding. Key elements
of a drug or alcohol policy include:
>> a statement on why the policy exists and
who it applies to
185
>> who is responsible for enforcing the policy

>> a definition of drug or alcohol misuse
>> how the operation expects workers
to behave
>> statements that make it clear how absence
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE
EQUIPMENT (PPE)
15.14
PPE should only be considered as a hazard

control where you have not been able to
eliminate or isolate the hazard. PPE should
for treatment and rehabilitation will be
always be used in conjunction with a
recorded. Examples include sick leave,
documented safe system of work.
recognition that relapses may occur and

how these will be dealt with, and how the
policy will be reviewed and consulted on
>> a statement on confidentiality so workers
can be assured a drug or alcohol problem
will be treated in strict confidence, subject
to law
>> a description of support available to
workers who have a drug or alcohol
problem
>> a commitment to providing workers with
general information about the effects of
drugs or alcohol
>> the circumstances in which disciplinary
action will be taken.
The policy should also outline site rules for
workplace events where alcohol is being
served. This may include:
Employers must provide all appropriate

PPE to employees and make sure it is used
correctly, inspected, and maintained to fulfil
its protective function and workers are trained
in its correct use86.
Where the following types of PPE are required
the specifications and use of these are
detailed below:
15.14.1HIGH-VISIBILITY CLOTHING
High visibility clothing should comply with
AS/NZS 4602.1 High visibility safety garments
Part 1: Garments for high risk applications
or any other Standard embodying the same
or more stringent criteria.
High visibility clothing should be worn on
the outside of other clothing and not cause
additional hazards (eg entanglement).
>> approving any event where alcohol may

be served
>> carefully managing alcohol consumption
Workers engaged in extractive operations
>> designating drivers or providing transport
should wear protective footwear which provides
if travel is needed after an event

>> ensuring non-alcoholic refreshments
and food are available
foot and ankle support, traction and protection

appropriate to the task they perform.
Where footwear requires protective toe
>> keeping work vehicle keys safe
caps they should comply with AS/NZS 2210.1
>> making sure workers do not work after
Safety, protective and occupational footwear
the event if theyre still affected by alcohol

(including the next day where relevant).
It is an offence to supply alcohol to anyone
under 18 without parental consent.
86
186
15.14.2SAFETY FOOTWEAR
HSE Act, sections 10 (2) (b) and 19 (a)
Guide to selection, care and use or any

other Standard embodying the same or more
stringent criteria.
When fitted, laces should be securely tied
at all times.
15.14.3SAFETY HELMETS
Safety helmets should comply with
AS/NZS 1801 Occupational protective helmets.
Helmets should be inspected regularly
for damage and deterioration.
Helmets should be replaced immediately
if damaged, or three years after the issue
date (if recorded), or in accordance with the
manufacturers specifications. Where the issue
date is not recorded the helmet should be
and ancillary equipment and AS/NZS 1891.3

Industrial fall-arrest systems and devices
Part 3: Fall-arrest devices, or any other
Standard embodying the same or more
stringent criteria.
Fall arrest systems should never be used
as a primary hazard control.
Develop a rescue plane before using a harness
system. It is critical that a suspended worker
can be promptly rescued.
replaced three years after the manufacture date
A worker suspended in a harness can develop
which is moulded into the peak of the helmet.
suspension intolerance. This is a condition
15.14.4HEARING PROTECTION
in which blood pooling in the legs can lead

to loss of consciousness, renal failure and,
Hearing protectors should comply with
in extreme cases, death.
AS/NZS 1270 Acoustics Hearing protectors,
For more information refer to section 6.5
or any other Standard embodying the same
of WorkSafes Best Practice Guidelines for
Working at Height in New Zealand.
15.14.5EYE PROTECTION
15.14.8RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE DEVICES
Eye protection should comply with AS/NZS
Respiratory protective devices used when
1337.1 Personal eye protection Eye and face
there is potential for harm to persons exposed
protectors for occupational applications, or
to dust, fumes, gases or chemicals should
any other Standard embodying the same
comply with AS/NZS 1715 Selection, use
and maintenance of respiratory protective
People who wear prescription glasses can
equipment and AS/NZS 1716 Respiratory
have these made to comply with the above

standard, or alternatively safety glasses or
goggles that can be fitted over prescription
glasses are available.
15.14.6GLOVES
protective devices, or any other Standard

embodying the same or more stringent criteria.
15.14.9HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE HANDLING
Personal protective clothing should be worn
during the handling, mixing and application
Gloves should comply with AS/NZS 2161.2
of chemicals or other hazardous substances.
Occupational protective gloves, AS/NZS 2161.3
The protective clothing to be worn should
Occupational protective gloves Protection
comply with the instructions detailed on the
against mechanical risks or any other Standard
manufacturers safety data sheet (SDS) for
embodying the same or more stringent criteria.
the specific substance being used.
15.14.7FALL ARREST SYSTEMS AND DEVICES

Fall arrest systems and devices should
comply with AS/NZS 1891.1 Industrial fallarrest systems and devices Part 1: Harness
187
PART D
16/
PREVENTING
FALLS FROM
HEIGHT
IN THIS SECTION:
16.1 Climbing on or off vehicles
16.2 Access and egress to heavy
vehicle working areas
16.3 Covering loads
16.4 Access to fixed plant and
machinery
16.5 Portable ladders
16.6 Working near highwalls
or faces
188
SECTION 16.0 // PREVENTING FALLS FROM HEIGHT
Many falls from height are caused by a failure to plan and

organise work properly. Start by planning a safe approach.
This section describes how to prevent falls when:
>> climbing on or off vehicles
>> working around heavy vehicles
>> covering loads
>> accessing machinery
>> using ladders
(3) If neither elimination nor isolation are

practicable, steps should be taken to
minimise the likelihood of any harm
resulting. This may include use of safety
harnesses or other types of fall restraint
or fall arrest systems.
For more detailed information on preventing
>> working near highwalls or faces.
falls from height see the WorkSafe Best
There is a reasonably good understanding in
Practice Guidelines for Working at Height.
the extractives industry that if the distance

of a possible fall is greater than 3 metres, all
practicable steps must be taken to prevent any
fall from occurring. The HSE Act requires steps
to be taken to prevent the fall from occurring
if there is any chance of harm resulting, even
if a possible fall is less than 3 metres.
CLIMBING ON OR
OFF VEHICLES
16.1
Access to heavy vehicles should be by a wellconstructed ladder or steps. Ladders or steps

should be well built, properly maintained and
securely fixed. Where steps or ladders extend
Regulation 21 of the Health and Safety in
to the ground, the use of interlock systems
Employment Regulations 1995 is the source
is required to prevent the vehicle moving
of the often-quoted 3 metre rule. It is
or starting until the ladder or step has been
mistakenly believed that no further action is
correctly stowed.
needed where a person could fall less than

3 metres. That belief is wrong and ignores
the overall duties in the HSE Act.
Avoid using suspended steps wherever

practicable. If they cannot be avoided, use
rubber or cable suspension ladders, not
Where the hazard of a fall exists you must
ladders made of chains. Ladders and steps
consider, in this order:
should slope inward towards the top if this is
(1) Whether the job can be done without
reasonably practicable. They should not slope
exposing a person to the hazard
outwards towards the top.
(eliminate). In some cases elimination may
Rungs or steps on vehicles should:
be achieved at the design and purchasing

stages. For example, maintenance activities
able to be carried out at ground level.
(2) If elimination is not practicable, steps
should be taken to isolate people from
the hazard. This can be achieved using
safe working platforms, guardrail systems,
>> be level and comfortable to use

>> have a slip-resistant surface
>> not allow, for example, mud, grease,
or oil to build up dangerously (eg grating
could be used to allow things to pass
through a step).
elevated work platforms, scaffolds or

mobile scaffolds.
189
The first rung or step should be close enough

to the ground to be easily reached ideally
about 40 cm and never more than 70 cm.
Place ladders or steps as close as possible
to the part of the vehicle requiring access.
Opening (and holding open) a cab door on
a vehicle should not force a driver to break
the three point hold rule or to move to an
unsafe position.
Vehicle owners should consider retrofitting
safer access ways to eliminate the risk of
falling (refer Figure 92 and Figure 93).
ACCESS AND EGRESS TO

HEAVY VEHICLE WORKING AREAS
16.2
Wherever practicable, use walkways. Walkways

should be made of slip-resistant grating (with
enough space for mud or oil to pass through
the grate and away from the walkway surface)
or another slip-resistant material.
To prevent thrown mud from making them
slippery, position walkways, steps, ladders,
and handrails away from wheels if possible.
Top and middle guard rails may be needed
to protect people when they are standing
or crouching. Consider collapsible rails.
Vehicle owners should consider fitting
guardrails if they are not already present
(refer Figure 94). If features are retrofitted
to existing vehicles, the alterations should
not affect the structural integrity of the
vehicle or the visibility of the operator.
Figure 92: A stairway and platform were retrofitted

to this haul truck to increase driver access and
egress safety (photo courtesy of Newmont Waihi
and MacMahon)
Figure 94: Guardrails were retrofitted to this

excavator to protect workers accessing the top
of the machine for maintenance purposes (photo
courtesy of NZ Steel, Taharoa)
16.3
COVERING LOADS
Loads must be covered whenever there is

Figure 93: This excavator has a good access system,
with platforms, guardrails, kick plates and ladder.
The ladder is interlocked so the vehicle cannot be
started without the ladder being raised (photo
courtesy of Newmont Waihi and MacMahon)
87
190
a risk of load shedding due to wind action

or movement when travelling on a public
road87. Covering loads or removing covers
can be hazardous, especially when carried
The Truck Loading Code specialised requirements (Loose bulk loads)
out manually. You must consider the risks
>> Regularly check covers are in good
associated with load covering and take
condition, and replace when necessary.
effective measures to make sure covering and
Visually check straps and ropes used for
uncovering loads is done as safely as possible.
pulling and securing the cover.
Consider the types of loads and vehicle, how
>> Regularly inspect, repair and maintain
often covering or uncovering happens and other
covering mechanisms, platforms, gantries
specific characteristics of the workplace.
and fall-arrest equipment (like harnesses
There are several but some options are
and lanyards).
better than others. A method of covering
>> During loading, unloading and covering,
and uncovering that does not involve getting
consider vehicles used by workers of more
on to the vehicle or even touching the cover
than one company shared workplaces and
should be the first choice.
arrange for suitable controls to be followed
A hierarchy of solutions may look something

like this:
>> leaving the load uncovered if it is safe
to do so
>> using automated or mechanical covering
systems which dont require people to go
up on the vehicle (refer Figure 95)
>> using manual covering systems which
by everyone concerned.
>> Ropes, straps and covers can snap or rip.
The driver should avoid leaning backwards
when pulling the cover tight.
>> Park vehicles on level ground, with their
parking brakes on and the ignition key
removed.
>> Cover vehicles before leaving the site.
dont require people to go up on the
However it is done, carry out covering and
vehicle (refer Figure 96)
uncovering in designated places, away from
>> using work platforms to provide safe
passing vehicles and pedestrians and, where
access to carry out covering from the
possible, sheltered from strong winds and
platform without having to access the
bad weather.
load (refer Figure 97)

>> using gantry or harness systems to prevent
or arrest a fall (refer Figure 98).
Consider the following points whatever
method of covering is used:
>> Do not overload the vehicle and try to load
evenly to avoid the need for trimming.
Load evenly along the length of the vehicle
(not in peaks) or use a loader to pat down
the load to flatten peaks.
>> Train and instruct staff on safe systems of
work (and provide refresher training where
Figure 95: Automated covering system
necessary). Supervise and monitor covering

and uncovering activities.
191
ACCESS TO FIXED PLANT

AND MACHINERY
16.4
For information on access to fixed plant

and machinery see section 12.7.
For information on preventing falls while
undertaking maintenance on fixed plant
and machinery see section 17.1.1.
16.5
PORTABLE LADDERS
Portable ladders should comply with

AS/NZS 1892.1 Portable ladders metal or
any other Standard embodying the same
Figure 96: Manual covering system
All portable ladders should have their safe

working load certified by the manufacturer
and be inspected prior to every use for
any damage.
Portable ladders should be used for low-risk
and short-duration tasks. The user should
maintain three points of contact with a ladder
or stepladder to reduce the likelihood of
slipping and falling. Ladders and stepladders
do not offer fall protection and therefore
should be the last form of work access
equipment to be considered.
Figure 97: Platform covering system
For more information on ladders and

stepladders see WorkSafe Best Practice
Guidelines for Working at Height in
NewZealand.
WORKING NEAR HIGHWALLS

OR FACES
16.6
Any person who works on or near the edges

of faces or highwalls has the potential to fall.
Typically these are the driller, shot-firer and
person carrying out the daily inspection.
Other people potentially working on or near
edges are surveyors, engineers, explosives
truck workers, planners, geologists,
geotechnical engineers and fencers.
Figure 98: Overhead gantry harness system
192
A hierarchy of control is:

>> A windrow, a fence or other physical barrier
capable of supporting a persons weight if
they fall against it should be in place along
the edge (refer Figure 99).
>> If a barrier is not practicable, you should
determine a distance from the edge that is
safe to work and demarcate this area with
a fence (ie para-webbing fence or warratah
wire type fencing). The safe distance
>> a minimum height of one metre

(for pedestrian protection only)
>> regularly inspected and maintained.
Workers should be trained in the appropriate
selection and use of harnesses before
starting work. Make sure workers are closely
supervised until assessed as competent.
Vehicles should not be parked under high
walls, due to the hazard of rock falls.
should be a minimum of two metres

(refer Figure 100).
When installing or removing any barrier
other than a windrow, provide a travel
restraint system such as a harness. Connect
this harness to a fixed position that restricts
workers ability to work outside the safe area
(refer Figure 101).
A risk assessment should be carried out to
establish a safe system of work for any person
Figure 99: Example of a pedestrian windrow
likely to be in a position where they may fall

from a face. Consider the geology and stability
of the face, the ground conditions, weather,
lighting equipment being used, the need
to adjust burdens, marking hold positions
and profiling.
Windrows are preferable to other less
substantial barriers but may hide cracks
or signs of instability along the edge
2m
(refer figure 99). Windrows should be:

>> constructed only after inspection of the
area below. Faces need to be inspected
for faults, change in appearance, loose
surface, evidence of falling rocks, water
seepage, joints and cracks
>> constructed a metre or two from the
Figure 100: Example of non-weight supportive

barriers
edge where possible so any cracks or

deterioration of the edge can be seen
>> constructed from suitable material
to avoid trip hazards
193
2m
Figure 101: Example of fall restraint system
194
PART D
17/
MAINTENANCE
AND REPAIRS
IN THIS SECTION:
17.1 Common hazards when
undertaking maintenance
17.2 Isolation and lockout of energy
17.3 Permit to work systems
17.4 Inspecting and servicing
vehicles
17.5 Hazardous substance storage
17.6 Blocked crushers or hoppers
195
Tasks such as maintenance, repairs, servicing, clearing

blockages and cleaning can be dangerous. Workers can
be fatally or seriously injured if they dont manage the
risks carefully.
>> identify and manage common hazards
including falls, energy sources, confined
spaces and equipment for welding or
cutting
>> isolate equipment and use safe lockout and
permit procedures to keep workers safe
>> inspect and service vehicles safely
>> prevent and clear blockages in crushers
or hoppers.
railings or guardrails
>> integrity of holding vessels (ie tanks,
hoppers)
>> integrity of lifting equipment (ie chains,
strops, hooks, gantry cranes, lifting eyes,
quick hitches)
>> signage and other warning devices
(ie lights, alarms).
Mine operators must ensure a competent
You must establish a maintenance and
person examines any machinery that has
inspection programme to ensure equipment
been stopped for the preceding 24 hours
and machinery is safe to use. Maintenance
or longer before it is started. In addition the
and inspection programmes should take
mine operator must ensure a competent
into account:
person examines every accessible area of the
(a) the operational environment the

machinery or vehicles are being used in,
particularly where subject to corrosion
or rot
(b) the original equipment manufacturers
recommendations.
Maintenance and inspection programmes
should take into account the whole of
the machinery or vehicles including, as
appropriate:
>> the structure of the machinery (bracing,
supports)
>> safety features (ie emergency stops,
guarding, emergency equipment, props)
88
89
196
>> integrity of walkways, stairs, ladders,

site. Include every area containing barriers,

machinery and surface infrastructure at least
weekly and every area where a worker, is or
will be, before every shift and during shifts
as required88. A written procedure must be
included in the health and safety management
system setting out:
>> what will be examined
>> when it will be examined
>> how findings will be recorded
>> how findings will be actioned89.
For more detailed information on inspection
and maintenance of machinery, including safe
systems of work, see the WorkSafe Best Practice
Guidelines for the Safe Use of Machinery.
SECTION 17.0 // MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS
COMMON HAZARDS WHEN

UNDERTAKING MAINTENANCE
17.1
Undertaking maintenance activities (including

cleaning) can potentially expose workers (and
17.1.2FALLS OF HEAVY ITEMS

Heavy items sometimes have to be moved,
or get disturbed, during maintenance work.
If one of these falls, the results can be fatal.
others) to significant hazards. The following
Incidents can include:
five hazards merit particular attention.
>> the failure of lifting equipment
17.1.1FALLS FROM HEIGHT
>> inappropriate lifting and slinging practices
Maintenance work often involves using

access equipment to reach raised sections of
machinery or vehicles. Eliminating the need
to access machinery or vehicles at height by
careful design is the most effective control.
Where elimination is not practicable, and
>> inadequate supports or supports not

resting on level or firm ground
>> incorrectly estimating the weight or centre
of gravity of the load
>> rocks falling from trap points on mobile
plant or the headboards of haul trucks.
frequent access is required, platforms,
If a heavy item has to be moved or temporarily
walkways, stairways and ladders that comply
supported during maintenance work, it is
with the Building Code should be provided.
crucial the risks are assessed and a plan
Where infrequent access is required suitable
of action is properly thought through.
temporary access equipment with adequate
The people responsible for the maintenance
barriers or fall restraint systems should
work shouldn't presume that things will be
be used.
okay, that others will know what to do, or the
For more detailed information on platforms,

walkways, stairways and ladders see the
Department of Building and Housing
Building Code Clause D1 Access Routes and
right equipment will necessarily be available.

These lifts, or the use of temporary supports
may be 'one offs' and will inevitably require
more knowledge and skill than routine
production tasks.
Make sure:
Building Code Clause F4 Safety from Falling.
>> everyone involved in maintenance
Note: The Compliance Document for

NewZealand Building Code Clause D1 Access
understands the risks

>> an assessment of the risks (including the
Routes (NZBC D1) specifies AS/NZS 1657 as
risk of disturbing something inadvertently)
an acceptable solution for fixed platforms,
is completed and a plan of action decided
walkways, stairways and ladders for access
on, before a heavy item is moved or
routes for service and maintenance personnel.
temporarily supported
Provision in AS/NZS 1657 may exceed the

requirements of NZBC D1.
For more information on preventing falls from
height see section 16.
>> there is someone competent to provide

advice on safe slinging and on safe working
practices for work involving heavy loads
>> any equipment used to lift or support
a heavy load is suitable and (where
necessary) has been inspected and tested
by a competent person
197
>> heavy items are not left unsecured where
For more detailed information see,
they may tip over, fall or slip, and no-one
AS 2865 Confined Spaces and WorkSafe
works under suspended loads
Safe Working in a Confined Space.
>> equipment is thoroughly cleaned with

any loose material removed before
maintenance activities commence.
17.1.3ENERGY SOURCES OR STORED
ENERGY
17.1.5WELDING AND GAS CUTTING

Welding can have acute, chronic and long-term
hazards to health and safety. These can act
quickly or may show up only in the long term.
WorkSafe has adopted the following
Isolation and lock out arrangements,
documents, published by the Welding
and in some cases permits to work, are
Technical Institute of Australia (WTIA), as
essential to enable maintenance work
its main sources of advice about health and
to be conducted safely.
safety in welding:
Before any maintenance work is undertaken
>> Health and Safety in Welding 2004
you should:
>> isolate the power or energy source (usually,
but not exclusively, electrical energy)
>> apply an isolation device and a sign
Technical Note 7 (TN7).

>> Fume Minimisation Guidelines (FMG).
WorkSafes Health and Safety in Welding
publication summarises some of the main
to indicate that maintenance work
points in the relevant sections of both the
is in progress
above publications.
>> dissipate any stored energy (eg hydraulic

or pneumatic power
In addition, the Welding Health and Safety

Assessment Tool is available on the WorkSafe
>> test and verify isolation is correctly applied.
website (www.business.govt.nz/worksafe/).
For more detailed information on isolation
The tool is a detailed assessment to assist
systems, see section 17.2.
in auditing workplaces where electric or gas

welding or cutting is carried out. The aim of
17.1.4CONFINED SPACE ENTRY

A confined space is a place which is
substantially (though not always entirely)
enclosed, and where there is a risk of death
essential elements of welding or cutting safe

practice so that workplace participants may
decide where improvements are required.
or serious injury from hazardous substances
Oxygen under pressure and oil or grease
or dangerous conditions (eg lack of oxygen).
can react violently, causing fire and explosions.
These can include tanks, load out bins, reclaim
Do not allow oxygen under pressure and oil
tunnels, crushers, and poorly ventilated rooms.
or grease to come into contact.
You should minimise the time that tasks are
Welding hazards include:
undertaken in the confined space. This may be

achieved by partially dismantling machinery or
undertaking work outside the confined space
before entry.
Where confined space entry is required,
WorkSafe accepts AS 2865 Confined Spaces
198
the audit is to lead a discussion through the
Fires and explosions: These are an everpresent hazard with many welding processes.
Burns: Welding causes items to become hot,
creating a risk of burns and fires from hot
metal and welding spatter.
as the current state of knowledge on confined
Fumes: Fumes generated by different welding
space entry work.
processes may range from being of nuisance
value to highly toxic. Health effects can occur
Suffocation can result. For more detailed
very soon after exposure (eg exposure to
information on confined space entry see
cadmium fumes can be fatal within hours)
section 17.1.4.
or may not result until after many years.

Fume control requires appropriate ventilation
equipment and may require advice from
a specialist.
Radiation: Arc flash is a well-known hazard

of welding. Standard precautions (PPE)
should be used to prevent eye and skin
exposure for the worker and others in the
Electric shock: Welding processes that use
vicinity. Reflecting surfaces make exposure
electricity pose both obvious and subtle
to radiation more likely. For more information
hazards of electric shock which can be fatal.
on PPE requirements see Health and Safety
Take standard precautions, as explained in
in Welding.
the WorkSafe Health and Safety in Welding

publication, when using welding equipment.
Expert assistance can be needed in some
circumstances to identify subtle hazards.
Appropriate equipment selection, set-up
and maintenance is important and may
require specialist advice to ensure safety.
Compressed gases: Compressed gases in
cylinders pose a number of hazards. Safe
use methods are outlined in TN7 section 5.
Hazardous substances: Hazardous substances
used during some welding processes can
require highly specialised methods of control
(eg extremely toxic hydrofluoric acid).
Use a specialist in these situations.
Toxic gases: Precautions for preventing toxic
gases from causing harm are outlined in TN7
sections 5 and 10. Toxic gases may be:
>> used in or generated by the process
(eg acetylene, ozone, nitrogen oxides,
carbon monoxide)
>> generated when coatings on metal surfaces
are heated (eg galvanised steel, epoxy
resins, degreasing agents, paint)
>> generated when the arc flash and some
degreasing chemicals or paints react
(eg phosgene or phosphine).
Heat stress: Working for long periods in

hot environments can lead to distress and
in an extreme, fatal heat stroke. Specialist
advice must be sought if welders work in hot
environments (see TN7 section 23). For more
information on heat stress see section 15.6.
Dust: Associated processes (grinding) may
generate hazardous levels of dust. For more
information on dust see section 15.5.
Noise and vibration: Noise and vibration
levels during some welding processes
can be high and should be controlled or
appropriate hearing protection should be
worn. For more information on noise and
vibration see sections 15.3 and 15.4.
Manual handling: Some welding processes
may involve heavy or repetitive handling.
For more detailed information on manual
handling see section 15.7.
Specific processes: Several processes are
discussed in TN7:
>> plasma cutting
>> brazing and soldering
>> thermal lancing.
Providing health and safety information and
advice on welding and cutting processes
Suffocation: Inert gases used during welding
can be complex. There are many subtleties
can flood an area and lower its oxygen
and traps for the unwary or inexperienced.
content, especially in confined spaces.
Specialist advice may be required.
199
17.2
ISOLATION AND LOCKOUT

OF ENERGY
the system cannot be started up without the
Energy isolation is much more than putting
WHY LOCKOUT AND TAG OUT
a lock and tag on a switch. To effectively isolate
ARE IMPORTANT
workers from energy you need to know what
Safety devices such as guards or guarding
energy is, and how it can be safely isolated

on specific machinery and vehicles.
devices are installed on systems to maintain

worker safety while these systems are
More information on isolation and lockout
being operated. When performing non-
of energy can be found in Appendix N:
routine activities these safety devices may
Isolation and lockout of energy. This includes
be removed but there must be alternative
information on the following:
methods in place to protect workers from
>> What are types of energy?

>> Energy isolation procedures.
>> Is lockout and energy control the same thing?
17.2.1LOCKOUT AND TAG OUT SYSTEMS
Lockout and tag out systems are the placement
of a lock and tag on an energy-isolating device.
They indicate that the energy-isolated device
the increased risk of injury of exposure to

the accidental release of energy. Non-routine
activities include maintenance, repair, set-up,
or the removal of jams or misaligned feeds.
The main method used and recommended
to protect workers from risk of harm in these
cases is the use of a lockout and tag out
procedure (LOTO).
is not to be operated until removal of the lock
A LOTO procedure will prevent:
and tag in accordance with an established
>> contact with a hazard while performing
procedure.
Lockout is the isolation of energy from the
system (a machine, equipment or process)
which physically locks the system in a safe
mode. The locking device (or lockout device)
can be any device that has the ability to secure
the energy-isolating device in a safe position
(ie lock and hasp).
Tag out is the labelling process that is used
when lockout is required. The process of
tasks that require removal, by-pass, or

deactivation of safe guarding devices
>> unintended release of hazardous energy
(stored energy)
>> unintended start-up or motion of
machinery, equipment or processes.
LOCKOUT PROCEDURES AND WORK
INSTRUCTIONS
The written lockout procedure should identify:
tagging out a system involves attaching or
>> what needs to be done
using an indicator (usually a standardised
>> when it needs to be done
label) that includes the following information:
>> the tools available to do it
>> Why the lockout and tag out is required
>> who is supposed to do it
(eg repair or maintenance).

>> The date and time the lock and tag was
attached.
>> The name of the authorised person who
attached the lock and tag to the system.
200
authorised persons knowledge.
>> who needs to be notified.

Work instructions should identify how the
lockout process is to be carried out in a stepby-step process including how stored energy
is controlled and de-energised, how isolation
Only the authorised person who put the
can be verified, and how and where lockout
lock and tag onto the system is allowed to
devices are installed. Work instructions should
remove them. This procedure helps to ensure
be machine, equipment or process specific
and include pictures or images of what is
people to carry out specific work at
being described.
a specific site at a certain time. It also
There should be one lockout procedure, and

as many sets of work instructions as required,
depending on the number of systems that
require lockout.
For more information on lockout systems and
isolation procedures, including responsibilities,
see the WorkSafe Best Practice Guidelines for
Safe Use of Machinery.
sets out the main precautions needed

to complete the job safely.
17.3.1WHEN ARE PERMIT-TO-WORK
SYSTEMS REQUIRED?
Consider permit-to-work systems whenever
the intention is to carry out particularly
hazardous work. PTW systems should not be
applied to all activities, experience has shown
For more detailed information on writing
their overall effectiveness may be weakened.
health and safety documents, see WorkSafes
Permits-to-work are not normally required for
Writing Health and Safety Documents for your
controlling general visitors to site or routine
Workplace.
maintenance tasks in non-hazardous areas.
17.3
PERMIT TO WORK SYSTEMS
A Permit to Work (PTW) system is a formal
Permit-to-work systems are normally

considered most appropriate to:
>> non-production work (ie intrusive
documented process used to manage work
maintenance, repair, inspection, testing,
identified as significantly hazardous by making
alteration, construction, dismantling,
sure all safety measures are in place before
adaption, modification or cleaning)
work starts.
>> non-routine operations
A PTW system is also a way to communicate
>> jobs where two or more individuals or
between site management, plant supervisors,
groups need to co-ordinate activities
operators and those who carry out the
to complete the job safely
hazardous work. Essential features of a PTW
>> jobs where there is a transfer or work
system are:
and responsibilities from one group
>> clear identification of who may authorise
to another (ie shift changeovers).
particular jobs (and any limits to their

authority) and who is responsible for
specifying the necessary precautions
>> training and instruction in the issue, use
and closure of permits
>> monitoring and auditing to make sure the
system works as intended
>> clear identification of the types of work
considered hazardous
>> clear and standardised identification of
More specially, the following are examples

of types of jobs where permits could be
considered:
>> work of any type where heat is used or
generated (eg by welding, flame cutting,
grinding) and work which may generate
sparks or other sources of ignition
>> work which may involve breaking
containment of a flammable, toxic or other
dangerous substance or pressure system,
tasks, risk assessments, permitted task
and work involving the use of hazardous or
duration and supplemental or simultaneous
dangerous substances, including explosives
activity and control measures.

The terms permit to work, permit or work
permit refer to the paper or electronic
>> work on high voltage electrical equipment

or other electrical equipment which may
give rise to danger
certificate or form used to authorise certain
201
>> entry and work within confined spaces
Vehicle Maintenance
>> pressure testing
>> condition of cab protection devices
>> work affecting evacuation, escape or

rescue systems
>> condition of tailgates
>> work at height
>> condition of hydraulic pipes and hoses
>> any other potentially high-risk operation.
>> fluid levels
17.3.2PERMIT TO WORK SYSTEM PROCESS

For more information on the permit to work
system process, please see Appendix O:
Permit to work system process.
INSPECTING AND SERVICING

VEHICLES
17.4
Vehicles at extractive sites work in harsh

environments and require effective maintenance
to avoid developing defects. Establish a
programme of daily visual checks (or pre-start
checks), regular inspections and servicing
schedules according to the original vehicle
manufacturers instructions, and the risks
associated with the use of each vehicle.
Inspections and maintenance should include,
where appropriate:
Vehicle Control
>> functional checks on the vehicle

>> other accessories such as quick hitches.
Where vehicles are hired, determine who is
responsible for maintenance and inspection
during the hire period and make this clear
to all parties.
Put in place a safe system of work that
addresses issues such as safely blocking the
vehicle and its attachments, isolating stored
energy (ie gravity) and preventing the vehicle
from inadvertently being started. When using
jacks they should be rested upon suitable load
bearing substrata. Raised objects should be
lowered wherever practicable (eg excavator
or loader buckets).
Determine a procedure to address defects
where they are found in vehicles or attachments.
Such procedures could include:
>> recording defects when completing daily
>> braking systems
visual checklists (pre-start inspections)
>> steering
scheduled inspections, daily visual
>> tyres, including condition and pressures
checklists and maintenance logs
>> safety devices such as interlocks.

Driver Safety
>> establishing protocols for safety critical

defects (when a vehicle should be removed
from operation, time frames to fix specific
>> seats and seat belts
defects and so on). For example, how deep
>> mirrors, cameras and other visibility aids
does a cut in the tyre need to be before
>> lights and indicators
they should be replaced?
>> warning signals

>> windscreen washers and wipers
>> firefighting equipment.
202
(such as ROPS and FOPS)
>> a system to isolate vehicles when safety

critical defects are found. For example
keys or other starting devices removed
and secured until repairs are started.
MAINTENANCE UNDER HYDRAULICALLY
It should be ensured that:
RAISED PARTS OF VEHICLES
>> the driver tests the brakes at the start
Many vehicles use hydraulics to raise, lift or
of every shift (pre-start inspection),
move material or parts of the vehicle (eg truck
including the park brake and foot brake
trays, front end loader buckets, excavator

booms and drilling rigs). These raised parts
have stored energy and you must provide
supports or other devices to prevent raised
parts dropping or being lowered while workers
are under them90.
>> the condition of brake system components

is monitored according to OVMs
recommendations, reducing the likelihood
of catastrophic failure and ensuring they
continue to function as intended
>> brake system performance is tested
Consider:
according to OVMs recommendations
>> removing the elevated part before other
in both static and dynamic situations
maintenance work takes place (eliminate
>> drivers and maintenance workers can
the hazard)
>> fitting a restraining system to the
elevated part
>> fitting the tray or bucket with a built-in prop
>> ensuring restraining system controls are
clearly marked and shrouded or protected
from accidental operation
>> fitting hydraulic cylinders with over
centre valves.
access OVM operating and maintenance

manuals at site as appropriate
>> braking system repair, monitoring,
inspection and testing records are readily
available at site
>> drivers and maintenance workers are
trained in the relevant aspects of braking
systems
>> safety critical aspects of vehicle operation,
including emergency braking systems,
BRAKE TESTING
retarders and other controls available in the
A suitable inspection scheme should be in
event of engine failure (eg accumulators),
place to ensure brakes are in good condition
are incorporated into driver training and
at all times. This is often combined with other
assessment processes, with appropriate
maintenance work.
input from competent maintenance
Electronic brake testing equipment is available

to regularly and accurately measure brake
performance (eg an electronic system may be
permanently fitted in a haul truck). This will
show deficiencies in the brake system before
they become a problem. The site Health and
workers
>> operating and brake maintenance practices
for contractors vehicles are not inferior to
the vehicle maintenance practices adopted
by site*
>> contractors vehicles are not allowed to
Safety Management System should require
operate on site unless maintenance and
operation, monitoring and maintainance of
testing records are checked to verify the
brake systems according to original vehicle
integrity of brake systems*
manufacturer (OVM) recommendations, as

a minimum.
>> brake maintenance, including processes

used for contractors vehicles, is regularly
audited for effectiveness*
90
Regulation 15 of the Health and Safety in Employment Regulations 1995
* Note: A contractor is a person engaged (other than as an employee) to undertake work at the site, not a customer
203
>> if OVM manuals are unobtainable (eg due
OVM recommendations. It only indicates the
to the age of vehicle), prepare manuals
brakes were effective at the time of testing.
so effective brake system operation and

maintenance strategies can be established.
Use people with appropriate skills and
technical expertise to facilitate the process.
Brake system maintenance strategies
Correct brake system functioning depends
on the condition of system components,
which in turn depends on the quality of the
maintenance. Any brake system maintenance
strategy should focus on detecting and
rectifying a defect before it results in a loss
of brake function.
Brake system maintenance strategies
should initially be based on the original
vehicle manufacturer (OVM) recommended
maintenance programs, and on condition
monitoring, inspection and testing schedules.
OVM stipulated operating procedures and
repair techniques help make sure brake system
integrity is not compromised.
The OVM information should be stored,
maintained, updated and be readily accessible
by relevant workers, whether it is in hard copy,
electronic copy, or on-line based systems.
Hazard identification and risk assessment
aimed at improving brake system reliability
should consider anything that could affect the
safe operation of vehicles. This could include
site conditions, maximum loads, operating
speeds, operating grades, effects of heat fade,
component failure, and loss of pressure.
Controls needed may include more frequent
component inspections for wear or damage,
and regular brake performance verification
techniques. These could include Dynamic
Brake Testing (DBT), electronic brake test
equipment and thermographic temperature
profiling, to detect poor performance.
Note that a positive DBT result doesnt
necessarily verify brake system integrity or
confirm the system has been maintained to
204
In introducing a DBT program, the risk

assessment to determine appropriate controls
should consider, but not be limited to:
>> OVM consultation on any deviations from
the stated recommendations
>> applying relevant brake performance
testing standards or appropriate industry
practice
>> site facilities and limitations relating to
surface, space, and controlling vehicles
in case of brake failure during testing
>> variations in test methodology and
acceptance criteria for different vehicle
types and categories (for more detailed
information see AS 2958.1-1995 Earthmoving machinery Safety Wheeled
machines Brakes)
>> reliability of the DBT test instruments
>> applicability and integrity of the standards,
procedures and methods used to interpret
the results
>> training and competency of workers
conducting the tests.
Industrial trucks and load shifting equipment
(forklifts, mobile cranes)
Inherent instability and lack of traction of
forklifts and cranes, particularly on ramps and
slopes, present a challenging risk management
task. Operators should understand the brake
system design limitations and that brake
system monitoring, inspection, testing and
maintenance are appropriate for the risks in
particular applications.
The Australian Standard AS 2359.13-2005
Powered industrial trucks Brake performance
and component strength provides guidance
on methods for assessing and testing the
performance and components of brakes fitted
to industrial trucks with rated capacities up to,
and including, 50 tonnes.
Safe forklift operation on gradients largely
oil and other debris, which can be propelled
depends on the type, size and design of the
by the air. Suitable eye protection should
forklift. Ask the OVM if youre unsure of the
always be worn.
braking systems performance capabilities.
Suitable overalls or other substantial clothing
For more detailed guidance on requirements
will protect the skin from light particles and
for the operation, maintenance, repair
debris, provided they are not blown at a
and modification of industrial trucks see
high velocity. However, overalls cannot offer
WorkSafe Approved Code of Practice for
protection against high-velocity air at close
Training Operators and Instructors of Powered
range. Particles can be blown through overalls
Industrial Lift Trucks (Forklifts). Also see the
and skin and into the body. Air can be blown
supporting document Safety Code for Forklift
into the bloodstream, causing swelling and
Truck Operators: Front Loading Forklift Trucks.
intense pain, particularly if any cuts, punctures
17.4.2TYRE SAFETY
The purpose of this section is to describe some
of the hazards associated with tyres in service.
or sores are present, making entry easier. The

air can be carried to the small blood vessels
of the brain, lungs or heart, resulting in death.
Workers should not use compressed air to
There is also guidance and preventative
dust themselves down.
measures to avoid or minimise those hazards
All pressure gauges and control devices
when working with tyres or combating tyre
should be checked against a master pressure
fires, explosions and potential explosions.
gauge at regular intervals or immediately
This section deals with these hazards
after any heavy impact or other damage.
separately, but care should be taken to ensure
Compressed air hand tools should be
overlapping areas are adequately dealt with
maintained and checked regularly.
in operating procedures.
Compressors and associated equipment such
WORKING WITH TYRES

Four major hazards when working with tyres:
as air-receivers should be regularly inspected

in accordance with a schedule of planned
maintenance to make sure they meet legal
>> compressed air
requirements91 and are safe to use.
>> manual handling
Manual handling of heavy objects
>> exploding or disintegration of wheels
The tyre and wheel assemblies of large
and tyres
vehicles are usually too heavy to be manually
>> noise.
handled safely.
Lack of training or experience in the handling
The safe handling of many loads encountered
and maintenance of wheel and tyre assemblies
in the fitting and maintenance of large
(especially with bead lock systems) can
earthmoving tyres and wheel assemblies
increase risks.
can only be undertaken using specialist tyre-
Compressed air
The eyes are particularly at risk when
compressed air is in use, both from highvelocity air and from particles of dust, metal,
91
handling equipment. Special attachments

may be required on standard handling
equipment (eg fork lifts) to deal appropriately
with large tyres and wheels.
Health and Safety in Employment (Pressure Equipment, Cranes, and Passenger Ropeways) Regulations 1999
205
Exploding wheels and tyres
Noise from steel impacting on concrete floors
Large tyres and wheel assemblies are heavy
can be reduced with special floor surfaces or
objects, but when they explode they are
mats. Any residual noise must be dealt with
thrown violently by the force of the escaping
by restricting the operators exposure. Where
compressed air. An exploding wheel is a high-
noise exposure cannot practicably be further
speed projectile that can kill or seriously injure
reduced, hearing protection must be provided
anyone in its path.
and its use must be enforced.
Divided wheel, split-rim and locking-rim wheel
For more detailed information on noise
and tyre assemblies are especially likely to
management see the WorkSafe Approved
explode if poorly maintained, incorrectly fitted,
Code of Practice for Worker Health in the
or if assembled or disassembled while inflated.
Extractives Industry.
The most common faults are:
TYRE SAFETY CAGES AND
>> over-inflation
EXCLUSION ZONES
>> removal of split-rim fastening nuts instead
It is strongly recommended all tyres,
of wheel fastening nuts

>> failure to ensure correct seating of split
rims or tyre beads
>> the use of damaged parts, or replacement
a suitable restraint.
Tyres on split-rim and detachable-ange
wheels should be contained by a cage
parts with lower strength than the original
guard, or other suitable restraining device,
equipment.
when being inated after being dismantled
Non-original after-market nuts and bolts and

other fixings could be inadequate.
It is essential to deflate tyres before wheel
removal to ensure removing the wrong nuts
does not result in a serious or fatal accident.
or repaired.
Tyres that have a large volume, or are inated
to high pressures, should be contained by
a cage guard or other restraining device
when being inated, after being repaired
or otherwise removed from the wheel.
All off-road vehicles should have a
This includes truck, forklift or earthmoving
maintenance system in place for rims and
plant tyres.
wheels in accordance with AS 4457.1 Earth

Moving Machinery Off-the-road wheels, rims
and tyres Maintenance and repair Wheel
assemblies and rim assemblies.
Noise
Hearing damage can affect tyre fitters just as
easily as other at-risk occupations. Causes of
noise-induced hearing loss are compressed
air blowing freely, noise from impact wrenches
and wheel parts and tools dropping on
concrete workshop floors. Engineering
solutions to manage excessive noise are
preferred. The selection of air-tools for their
noise-level characteristics should form part
of the purchasing system.
206
including small units, be inflated within
If restraints are not available, a suitable system

of work is to be used (eg inflating from behind
a barrier).
Most car or light vehicle wheels and tyres are
strongly constructed and have small internal
air volume. They therefore do not require
high pressures. Such tyres pose minimal risk
to the service person and, if correct tting
procedures are adhered to, problems would
not normally be expected. However, some
light vehicles have divided wheels that require
cage inflation. In general, inflate light vehicle
tyres with the jaws of the tyre-tting machine
restraining the wheel.
FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS OF TYRES
information can be found on a products
IN SERVICE
safety data sheet (SDS).
Mechanisms of tyre fires and explosions
>> The accidental use of an incorrect ination
The primary cause of tyre fires is the
medium (eg LPG or other explosive gases)
application of heat to the tyre, or development
through contaminated air supply or other
of heat within the tyre structure by one or
means.
more mechanisms. The same primary causes
>> Carbon dust given off from pyrolysis of
can result in a violent explosion of the tyre
the tyre liner. This dust can auto-ignite at
under some circumstances.
temperatures as low as 200C, the lowest
Heat can be conducted through the rim base

to the bead area of the tyre where a small
quantity of rubber can be pyrolysed. The
auto-ignition temperature of any material

likely to be encountered in a tyre.
>> Low ash point fuels and solvents can be
gases given off in the process can be ignited
absorbed by tyre rubber. This can increase
by the continued application of heat. An
the likelihood of a tyre catching re where
explosion could originate from the point of
a heat source is introduced, increase the
heating, with the ame fronts travelling around
seriousness of any re that does eventuate,
the tyre in opposite directions and causing
or both.
a rupture where they meet.
A tyre explosion can occur even where no re
A temperature rise sufcient to cause
is visible. Smoking tyres or brakes should be
problems can be generated by other sources
treated as a potential tyre explosion and the
of heat, such as:
vehicle isolated accordingly.
>> electrical earthing through the tyre as
Prevention of tyre fires
a result of lightning strike or power-line

contact
>> wheel component heating through misuse
of brakes or electric-wheel motor problems
>> internal tyre damage as a result of
excessive speed, road camber deciencies
and ply separation.
A uninated tyre may explode in the same
manner as an inated tyre if sufcient heat
is applied to it.
Other factors that can increase the likelihood
of a re or explosion are:
>> The auto-ignition temperatures of different
types of bead lubricants and other
introduced materials vary widely. Before
any material is introduced into the tyre
air chamber, its auto-ignition temperature
should be checked, and if the gure is
To prevent tyre fires you should:

>> ensure correct inflation of all tyres and
check on a daily basis
>> ensure no hot work is undertaken around
the wheels and rims
>> make sure trucks are not overloaded
>> consider installing on-board tyre pressure
and temperature sensors.
Prevention of tyre explosions
To prevent tyre explosions consider
implementing the options listed below:
>> Nitrogen inflation: nitrogen inflation will
significantly reduce tyre explosions.
>> Inhibiting agents: Consider the use of fire
inhibiting agents and fireproof coatings
on the inner surface of the tyre.
>> Earthing vehicles: Consider earthing
lower than that for the tyre liner or bead,
vehicles against lighting strikes so the
it should not be used. Auto-ignition
tyres do not provide the earthing path.
207
COMBATING TYRE FIRES AND POTENTIAL
>> a foreign body in the crusher feed
EXPLOSIONS
or discharge chamber, obstructing
If a vehicle catches fire or a heat source is
the feed material.
recognised and there is a potential for a tyre

explosion, you should immediately establish a
17.5.1PREVENTION
prohibited zone of at least 300 metres around
Every effort should be made to prevent
the radius of the vehicle. The prohibited zone
oversize material or tramp metal entering
should remain in place for at least 24 hours
the crusher feed hopper, by:
following the removal of the heat source.
>> designing any site blast to achieve
An emergency crew should remain in

attendance during this period.
For more detailed information on vehicle fires
see section 11.9.7.
BLOCKED CRUSHERS
OR HOPPERS
17.5
Clearing blocked crushers or hoppers can
optimum rock fragmentation

>> training and instructing the loader driver
not to load oversize material
>> using sizing bars or grids on crusher feeds
>> following the manufacturers
recommendations on the rate,
presentation of feed and crusher settings
>> instituting a programme of good
be very hazardous and many plant operators
housekeeping to prevent scrap steel
have been killed carrying out this task.
entering into shovel buckets
Blockage incidents can be greatly reduced

by supplying material that is sized to match
the primary opening.
>> ensuring the bucket size is appropriate

to the capacity of the crusher
>> regular inspection of metal parts (eg
Preventing of oversize feed material starts at
bucket teeth, dumper wear plates and
the face, with good fragmentation. Removing
drilling components) to make sure they
oversize material before delivery to the plant
are unlikely to break off and enter the
and vigilant control of the crusher feeder, will
crusher feed
make blockages less likely.
>> the strategic placing of electrical magnets
Causes of crusher blockages can be grouped
or the installation of metal detectors to
under two main headings:
prevent tramp metal from entering the
Stalling, due to:

>> electrical or mechanical failure
>> material jammed in the chamber causing
an overload
>> overfeeding material
>> entry of tramp metal or wood
>> accumulation of material in the crash box
>> accumulation of fine material in the
crusher
>> the use of level indicators for feed control
>> maintenance of drive systems
>> removal and adequate cleaning of the
discharge chute.
A properly designed crushing operation
should not need any person to be present
on the crusher access platform during
normal crushing operations.
crusher discharge chute.

Bridging, due to:
>> oversize feed material
BRIDGED CRUSHERS
>> excessive clay or other fines in the crushing
The preferred method of clearing a
cavity, preventing small material passing

through the crusher
208
17.5.2CLEARING BLOCKAGES
bridged crusher is by using a hydraulic arm.
The hydraulic arm may be permanently
>> clearing the area of all workers
mounted, or an excavator fitted with a static
>> notifying the site manager of the stalled
pick or a hydraulic hammer. Where the arm is

operated remotely (eg by radio control) closed
circuit television (CCTV) is an invaluable tool
in assisting the operator.
Depending on the risk assessment result,
clearing out a bridging blockage with a
hydraulic arm or similar may be carried out
with or without the crusher still operating.
Prohibited zones should be established in
case of fly-rock.
crusher
>> isolating power to the crusher and
associated plant
>> undertaking risk assessment for clearing
the blockage
>> implementing hazard controls.
CLEARING BLOCKED CONE CRUSHERS
Many cone crushers are fitted (or can be
retrofitted) with tramp metal hydraulic release
When hydraulic arms are not available, and it
systems or hydraulic assisted upper concave
is necessary for a worker to enter the crusher
removal, to prevent or eliminate hazards
to position hooks or slings, the crusher and
associated with blocked cone crushers.
feeder must be stopped, isolated and lockedout in accordance with the manufacturers
or suppliers instructions and safe working
practices (refer section 17.2).
For cone crushers that do not have these

systems, follow the guidelines in sections
17.5.2.1 and 17.5.2.2 above.
Other options (which require more specialist
HAZARD OF ENTRAPMENT AT HOPPERS
expertise and competence) include: gas or
There is the potential for an accident if anyone
chemical expansion and hydraulic ramp plates.
attempts to walk on the material that has
Other options considered should be subject
been dumped into a hopper. The hazards
to a detailed and thorough risk assessment.
are that they may be drawn into the feeding
The crusher should be shut off and isolated

before considering the use of bars and hand
hammers. Bars should never be used on or
near a crusher while it is running.
material, or, if the material is hung up, they

may be drawn in when the material breaks
free. The material in the hopper may look solid,
but there may be a hidden void where it has
bridged over the feeder. Anyone walking on
Consider the risk of large pieces of feed material
the material is at risk of being engulfed if
moving and causing trap or crush injuries.
the bridged-over material collapses.
Do not use wedges due to the risk of them
Mechanical devices should be provided
becoming a projectile (this has caused
(eg vibrators or air cannons) during normal
fatalities in the past).
operations so people are not required to
STALLED CRUSHERS
enter or work where they are exposed to

entrapment by the caving or sliding of
A stalled crusher should be treated as
materials. Where people are required to
possibly being jammed with tramp metal
enter or work near the hopper:
or wood, which could be ejected with fatal

consequences. Safe systems of work should
be issued to plant operators detailing what
>> provide platforms or staging

>> stop supply and discharge of material
to do in the event of a crusher stalling which
>> lock and tag out equipment
should include:
>> implement working at height procedures

as required.
209
PART D
18/
EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
IN THIS SECTION:
18.1 What is an emergency,
and what are my duties?
18.2 Keep it simple, and
proportionate to the size
of the operation
18.3 All emergency management
plans should be based on
the coordinated incident
management system
18.4 Assess potential emergencies
18.5 Identify needs, and confirm
capability requirements
18.6 Make the plan
18.7 Test, practise and review
the plan
210
SECTION 18.0 // EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
An emergency occurs when there is an unexpected

event that requires urgent action to protect the health,
safety and wellbeing of workers or other people.
Every operation, whether covered by the Regulations
or the Act must have an emergency plan.
(iii) mine shafts and winding systems
>> the process for developing an
(iv) roads and other vehicle operating areas
emergency plan
>> the key questions to answer in
emergency planning
>> how to respond to an emergency
>> what to do after the emergency plan
is developed.
WHAT IS AN EMERGENCY,
AND WHAT ARE MY DUTIES?
18.1
(v) tips, ponds, and voids

(vi) air quality
(vii) fire or explosion
(viii) explosives
(ix) gas outbursts
(x) spontaneous combustion in
underground coal mining
operations; and
(b) any other hazard at the mining operation
An emergency is an unplanned or unexpected
that has been identified by the site senior
event that requires immediate action to
executive under regulation 66 as a hazard
protect the health, safety and wellbeing of
that could create a risk of multiple fatalities
people. Emergencies occur when controls to
in a single accident, or a series of recurring
hazards fail, putting workers or other people
accidents at the mining operation.
at an immediate risk of harm. Reestablishment

of controls, or use of emergency management
controls, is urgently required before somebody
Operations that identify principal hazards

should follow the Regulations.
is harmed. Section 6 (e) of the Act requires
For lone workers, Section 17 of the Act places
employers to develop procedures for dealing
a duty on self-employed people to ensure that
with emergencies that may arise while
no action or inaction of the self-employed
employees are at work.
person while at work harms the self-employed
Part 4, subpart 4 of the Regulations states

that where one or more principal hazards are
identified, operations must have an Emergency
person or any other person. Where there is

potential for an emergency, this should include
the development of an emergency plan.
Management Principal Control Plan. A principal
When developing an emergency plan, the
hazard is defined in Regulation 65 of the
work should be undertaken with a realistic
Regulations as:
view that an emergency will likely occur in
(a) any hazard arising at any mining operation
the near or distant future. Every site must
that could create a risk of multiple fatalities
plan for these events. A good emergency
in a single accident or a series of recurring
plan should be developed using a risk
accidents at the mining operation in
based process. Following the process below
relation to any of the following:
will enable operations to answer the right
(i)
ground or strata instability
(ii) inundation and inrush of any substance
questions in order to develop a plan that

is relevant to their specific operation:
211
ASSESS POTENTIAL EMERGENCIES

What events could occur at the operation or close
by that would require immediate action to protect
the health, safety and wellbeing of workers or
other people?
How can the operation respond to each

identified emergency?
MAKE THE PLAN

What elements
of an emergency
response can
be planned in
advance?
Who should be
consulted when
developing the
plan?
How will relevant

parts of the
plan be made
accessible to
workers in the
event of an
emergency?
How can the

operations
infrastructure
be prepared
in advance for
an emergency
response?
How can
advanced
planning be
relayed to
workers within the
operation?
IDENTIFY NEEDS AND CONFIRM CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

What resources will the
operation need to respond to
the identified emergencies?
What training is needed

for workers for general
emergency response purposes,
and what extra training is needed
for designated personnel
to competently undertake
their duties?
What actions or positions will

require a designated role or
position in an emergency?
TEST, PRACTICE, AND REVIEW THE PLAN

How will the
emergency plan
be tested for
effectiveness?
How often will

exercises occur?
What types of
exercises will the
operation need
to conduct?
How will areas

for improvement
be identified?
Who will review

or audit the
emergency plan
and how often will
this happen?
Table 9: Developing an emergency plan
18.2
KEEP IT SIMPLE, AND PROPORTIONATE TO THE SIZE OF THE OPERATION
In order for an emergency plan to be effective, it should be kept as simple as possible, and
proportionate to the size and scope of the operation. Larger operations and operations that
carry principal hazards will require more complex plans, more trained personnel and more on
site equipment than small operations or lone workers. Regardless of the size of the plan or the
operation, the actions for workers to take in an emergency should be accessible and easy to follow.
In small operations, having the basics of emergency management in place should be sufficient.
In larger operations and operations with principal hazards, there will be a greater need for a
larger emergency plan.
212
However large or small, an emergency plan
It should be noted however, that it will take
should be accessible, and understood by the
longer for emergency services to arrive on site
workers that must activate it, or follow it in an
when using a personal locator beacon, so good
emergency. This can be done by developing
hazard management is critical.
procedures for actions that should be taken

in an emergency, and keeping them in a single
place, visible to all workers and emergency
services. It can be helpful to include workers
who have had experience in emergency work
as they can help identify emergencies and the
response procedures needed.
18.2.1LONE WORKERS AND SMALL
OPERATIONS
The operator at this operation, a lone worker,

has an emergency station set up with first aid
kit and buoyancy aid (refer Figure 102). It is
visible to emergency services on entry to the
site and contains the equipment necessary
for immediate response to surrounding
hazards that is not kept inside the digger cab.
This operator also carries a personal locator
beacon with him to communicate in the event
of an emergency. For the size and scope of
Small operations and lone workers/operators
this operation, the emergency station is fit
have different needs to larger operations
for purpose.
as there are not enough workers on site to

manage an emergency in the same manner
as larger operations. Taking the following
actions could be sufficient:
1. notifying emergency services of location
and entry point to site
2. providing GPS coordinates to emergency
services and New Zealand Mines Rescue
Service
3. providing adequate means of
communication
4. maintaining up to date first aid certificates
and providing adequate first aid material
including bandages, splints, blankets and
Figure 102: Example emergency station Photo

supplied by New Zealand Petroleum and Minerals
cage stretcher
5. setting out a suitable place to land
a helicopter
6. providing a list of essential phone
numbers to request assistance.
18.3 ALL EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT PLANS SHOULD
BE BASED ON THE COORDINATED
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Lone workers should be aware that nobody
Sometimes, emergencies can escalate from
will be on site to summon emergency services
a minor, site level incident to a large multi-
in the event they become injured or trapped.
agency emergency response. At other
Where there is no service for mobile phones,
times, the incident may be so serious that
personal locator beacons could be carried
a large multi-agency response is required
when working on site to be activated in the
immediately. A large response uses the
event of an emergency. This will enable distress
Coordinated Incident Management System
signal to be received by emergency services.
(CIMS). This system is best supported when
213
operators base their entire emergency
18.4.1WHAT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO
management plan on this system.
CAUSE HARM AT THE OPERATION?
18.3.1WHAT IS CIMS?
Regulation 54 states that a risk appraisal must

be undertaken in order to identify hazards.
CIMS is an emergency response system
This is commonly known as a broad brush
that describes:
risk assessment. A good risk appraisal should
>> how New Zealand agencies coordinate,
uncover all hazards on the site and in close
command, and control their response
proximity. Operators should look not only at
to an incident of any scale
the hazards on site, but also in the surrounding
>> how the response can be structured

>> the relationships between the respective
CIMS functions and
>> the relationships between the levels
of response.
CIMS can expand or shrink to fit any type
of emergency. However, it is easier for CIMS
environment. For example, if an operation was

situated in a bushy area, there may be a risk
of a forest fire, or flooding if the operation
is close to a river. Operators should also
look at other risk assessments and incident
investigations that have been completed.
18.4.2WHATS THE WORST THAT
to support large scale emergencies when
CAN HAPPEN?
the fundamental principles are used in the
Following a risk appraisal, Regulation 55
emergency management plan. A copy of the
states that the hazards identified in the risk
CIMS Green Book, which details the principles
appraisal should be assessed to determine
of CIMS, can be obtained from the Ministry of
the inherent risk of harm. This means that
Civil Defence and Emergency Management
operators should be asking themselves
website www.civildefence.govt.nz
what the worst case scenario could be when

assessing each hazard. Following identification
ASSESS POTENTIAL
EMERGENCIES
18.4
Section 7 of the Act places a duty on

employers to ensure there are effective
methods in place for the systematic
identification of hazards, whether new or
existing, and assessment to determine whether
they are significant hazards. All operators
should take the same approach, set out in the
of the worst case scenario, operators should

determine how that may affect workers or
other people in the vicinity of the operation
and how they may need to respond to prevent
or minimise damage. If the controls for the
hazard fail, and urgent action is required to
protect the health, safety and wellbeing of
workers or other people, an emergency plan
for that hazard is required.
Regulations. This is because this systematic
Greater focus should be placed on hazards
process is the correct method in order for all
that have the potential to result in a fatality, or
duty holders to discharge their obligations.
a permanent injury. However an even greater
Lone workers/operators should also follow

the process laid out in the Regulations as
good practice.
level of focus should be placed on principal

hazards that have been identified by way of
developing a Principal Hazard Management
Plan for each principal hazard. In the event
that principal hazards have been identified,
214
an Emergency Management Principal Control
18.5.2WHAT ACTIONS OR POSITIONS
Plan should be developed in accordance with
WILL REQUIRE A DESIGNATED ROLE OR
Regulations 104 and 105. See the Approved
POSITION IN AN EMERGENCY?
Code of Practice for Emergency Readiness in

Mining Operations for further information on
developing Emergency Management Principal
Control Plans.
The most commonly identified role for an

emergency is that of a first aid provider,
such as a first aider in smaller operations,
or a more highly qualified medic in larger
Once potential emergencies have been
operations. All operators, regardless of the
identified, they should be assessed for the
size or the hazards they carry, should have
most practical response, having regard to the
one of these. In small operations, this could
resource and capability within the operation,
be a person with a workplace first aid
as well as the size of the operation.
certificate. In some of the larger operations,

there can be paramedics or workers trained
IDENTIFY NEEDS,
AND CONFIRM CAPABILITY
REQUIREMENTS
in pre hospital emergency care.
Following the risk appraisal and risk
workers who are operating in areas with a
18.5
assessment, in which potential emergencies

and responses have been identified, operators
Some operations will need people who are

trained to extinguish fires. These could be
high risk of fire, or other workers who can
extinguish the fire while the worker from
should assess what they need to do in order
that area escapes safely.
to make the identified responses viable. This
A worker may also be needed to ensure
includes identifying the necessary equipment
all workers are evacuated from the area
and infrastructure, what certain people or
of danger by accounting for people.
positions will be required to do in the case

of each emergency and ensuring they are
trained to be able to carry out those duties.
18.5.1WHAT RESOURCES WILL THE
OPERATION NEED TO RESPOND TO
EMERGENCIES?
Resources include:
>> the equipment that will be required in
Operators should consider designating

appropriate workers to communicate with
families, to secure the site to prevent public
access, and to communicate with emergency
services until their arrival. In the event of large
scale emergencies, where the emergency
services are a significant distance from the
operation, incident controllers, and other
experts may be required to commence a
order to respond to emergencies, such
CIMS based emergency operation ahead
as fire extinguishers
of their arrival.
>> the written material that should be

provided to workers, such as procedures
and duty cards
>> the people that will be required including
emergency services
>> for operations with principal hazards,
the infrastructure that will be necessary
to carry out a full scale, multi-agency
response.
18.5.3WHAT TRAINING IS NEEDED FOR

WORKERS FOR GENERAL EMERGENCY
RESPONSE PURPOSES, AND WHAT EXTRA
TRAINING IS NEEDED FOR DESIGNATED
PERSONNEL TO COMPETENTLY CARRY OUT
THEIR DUTIES?
Having assessed what resource and positions
are required, the next step is to ensure the
215
appropriate workers are trained in the use of
step as front line workers often have good
the equipment and how to competently fulfil
knowledge of hazards. Their point of view
their roles. This is a critical element to ensuring
may inform the development of the plan.
the success of an emergency plan.
emergency services must be consulted. With
required for an emergency that is not
regard to surface operations, emergency
ordinarily a part of a workers day, will need
services to be consulted are the New Zealand
to be provided in the form of training. For
Fire Service, the New Zealand Police, and the
example, a first aider will need to be trained
ambulance provider for the region in which the
in first aid. A person working in an area where
operation is situated. Operators should also
there are fire extinguishers provided for a
consult New Zealand Mines Rescue Service
first response will need to be trained in their
as a matter of good practice.
use. An incident controller or other specialist

providing advice to emergency services will
need CIMS training. Lone workers may also
require training in effective use of personal
locator beacons.
Consulting with emergency services can

assist with planning in advance. For example,
emergency services will be made aware of
the presence of the operation in the area, its
hazards, its capability, its GPS location and
Other training may be required in an informal
Police will likely wish to know what mobile
setting, such as training workers on how
phone coverage is available. If there is none,
to quickly and effectively secure the site,
Police will then know they will need to bring
and who they should allow to come on
in a mobile cell tower in the event of a large
site in the event of an emergency. Another
scale emergency. In having consulted with
form of informal training is how to raise
emergency services, a significant amount of
the alarm when there is an emergency, and
planning in advance has already been done.
what information needs to be provided to
Emergency services can also offer advice for
emergency services during a 111 call.
further planning that should be undertaken.
18.6
MAKE THE PLAN
Once the key elements of the emergency

plan have been developed during the risk,
capability and resource assessments, they
will need to be brought together with
further information in a formal emergency
management plan.
18.6.1WHO SHOULD BE CONSULTED
WHEN DEVELOPING THE PLAN?
Workers should always be consulted when
developing an emergency plan. As an
emergency plan is a part of the wider health
and safety management system, operators
are obligated under section 19B of the Act
to consult with workers. This is an important
216
Regulation 104 of the Regulations states that
A good rule to follow is that any knowledge
18.6.2WHAT ELEMENTS OF AN EMERGENCY

RESPONSE CAN BE PLANNED IN ADVANCE?
If something can happen during an emergency
that can be anticipated and planned for, the
plan should be made. The only aspects of
emergency that cannot be planned for are the
unexpected events that happen at the time.
There are very few aspects of an emergency
that cannot be planned for. Regulation 105 (1)
provides minimum requirements for what must
be addressed in an Emergency Management
Principal Control Plan:
The coordination and control of emergencies.
The plan should set out the incident control
arrangements which should be as simple as
possible. There should be a single person in
overall charge of operations this will normally
be the manager but other arrangements may
travel and the time it will take them
also be possible and should be considered.
to respond in an emergency.
The plan needs to provide for who will be
A procedure to ensure prompt notification
assigned roles if people are not available.
of all relevant emergency services and the
Also consider what other resources may
Mines Rescue Trust Plans should list the
be needed in order to effectively manage
details of all relevant emergency services, the
emergency situations. This plan should be
mine rescue trust and any other specialist
able to support CIMS principles in case a
emergency response personnel. Details should
larger response is required.
include phone numbers and where relevant,
The people (or positions) at the site who will

have responsibilities in relation to emergencies
and the detail of those responsibilities.
These will vary with the circumstances of the
roles within an organisation. Names are only

appropriate where there is some certainty
the most up to date information is always
available.
site and the results of the risk assessment.
The events that trigger the activation of
These functions may include, but are not
the plan. These events come from the
limited to:
identification and assessment of potential
>> coordinating the emergency response,

alerting and liaising with rescue or
emergency personnel, and regulator
personnel (eg Specialist Health and Safety
Inspectors, from WorkSafe, regional council
staff, district council staff)
>> accounting for people at the site at the
time of the incident and
>> control of emergency supplies
>> provision and maintenance of facilities
for rescue personnel where required and
providing plans and other information to
rescue personnel as required
emergencies. Examples of events that would

trigger the activation of the emergency plan
could include: vehicle collision, rock fall,
the presence of smoke or fire, or a medical
emergency. One of the more obvious and
well known activation triggers is upon hearing
a worker shout emergency, emergency,
emergency!.
The plan should be immediately activated and
workers should be trained, and empowered to
do so with confidence. It is easy to deescalate
a large emergency once further information
comes to hand, but it is impossible to bring
back the ten to fifteen minutes of lost time
>> providing transport of casualties, rescue
that can ultimately save lives. Therefore, it is
workers and supplies where required
better to have a false alarm than a slow start,
>> operation of communication systems
or no alarm at all.
>> informing and consulting with worker
The use of communication systems in
representatives and next of kin where

required
>> communication with the media where
required
>> fire wardens and site emergency response
teams.
The availability of the Mines Rescue Trust and
other emergency services to respond to an
emergency: Operations should consider the
distance emergency services will need to
emergencies. Determine how and what

communication systems are used in an
emergency. This can include:
>> clearing radio channels,
>> ending all non-essential phone calls,
>> communication black-outs,
>> the availability of additional communication
devices (eg satellite phones and the
communication systems of the Police).
217
Good communications are of paramount
The means to locate and account for people in
importance in an emergency, particularly in
the event of an emergency. Operators should
remote areas and for lone workers. Suitable
have a system in place to accurately account
communication equipment might range from
for and locate all workers or visitors in the
alarms to more sophisticated public address
event of an emergency. This is good practise
or closed-circuit television systems. Radios or
for all quarry and alluvial mine operators, and
telephones can enable rapid communication
a legal requirement for other mine operators
if they are carefully positioned. They may, for
as defined in section 19M of the Health and
example, be fitted to mobile plant or backup
Safety in Employment (Mining Operations
service vehicles, or issued to appropriate
and Quarrying Operations) Regulations 2013.
individuals. Electrical systems, radios or
Sign in registers, worker tag boards or radio
mobile telephones may be unsuitable where
frequency identification (RFID) tags are
explosives are in use, or where there is a risk
some of the ways operators could locate and
of an explosive atmosphere.
account for people. A suitable system will
The giving of timely notice, information and

warnings to anyone potentially affected,
including the people nominated as next
of kin by workers. Consider:
>> Developing a call tree so the right people
are notified at the right time.
>> Determining how and when next of kin will
be notified. This may be dependent on the
severity of casualties and the location of
the next of kin. Notification could be via
support services (Police).
>> Determining how and when neighbouring
properties will be contacted.
>> Determining how and when status updates
will be communicated.
depend on the size of the operation or site,

the number of workers, the frequency of
visitors, working times and shifts, and the
risks that may be present.
Evacuation in an emergency, including the
conditions that will prompt withdrawal
when there is an imminent risk of harm.
Operators should determine what responses
are necessary to ensure all people escape
safely and when evacuation is necessary.
Evacuation may include first response,
self-escape, aided escape or aided rescue.
For example a person in a confined space
may be able to self-escape or may require
aided rescue. Prompt withdrawal, for
example, may include where smoke alarms
As a part of the general health and safety
are activated, when ground movement has
management system, emergency contact
been detected, or when weather warnings
details for all workers should be prepared
are issued. Operators should also determine
and kept up to date through regular reviews.
the hazards produced as a result of the
Measures to be taken to isolate an area

affected by an emergency. Measures will be
dependent on the type of emergency. Some
emergency that workers self-escaping and

self-rescuing may face and what responses
are necessary to affect their escape or rescue.
examples include barriers to block access to
Appropriate transportation from the site.
unsafe areas or posting sentries at the gate
You should include in your plan the provision
to stop vehicles entering an area. Others may
and method for removing all people on site
include pre-planning the development of fire
to a designated suitable, safe area. This may
breaks to prevent fires from spreading into
include visitors and members of the public.
surrounding areas during an emergency.
Note that walking is a limited option as this

plan should include the transport of casualties.
218
First aid arrangements including first-aid
While operations covered by this guidance
equipment, facilities, services and the
may not fall under the Regulations, this is the
workers who are qualified to provide first
minimum that all operations should address
aid. Measures will be dependent on the
in their emergency plan, as a matter of
type of incident and the availability and
good practise. Smaller operations and lone
response times of emergency services.
workers may be unable to fulfil all of these
One way to identify the first aid needs of
requirements. The requirements laid down
the site is to complete a Workplace First
in 18.2.1 as a minimum are sufficient for
Aid Needs Assessment. WorkSafes First
these operations.
Aid for Workplaces, A Good Practice Guide

has a sample assessment. An example of
some of the equipment that may be needed
is when providing first aid to casualties in
large vehicles. It can be difficult to remove
casualties from height and if attempts are
made to remove them from the vehicles prior
to treating them, this can cause significant
delays in providing treatment and in some
cases, lower the likely survival rate. Having a
detachable basket that can be attached to
mobile plant for the provision of first aid to
drivers of large earthmoving equipment and
other mobile plant may be an effective option.
Provision for all aspects of firefighting,
Suitable equipment to respond to identified

emergencies should be made available for
use, so that the plan can be successfully
implemented in the event of an emergency.
The choice of emergency equipment will
depend on the emergencies that have been
identified, the complexity of the site, and the
distance from emergency services. Examples
of the type of rescue and emergency
equipment which may be required include:
>> breathing apparatus (for confined
space entry)
>> ropes
>> ladders (rigid or rope)
including adequate compatible firefighting
>> tripods, winches
equipment, procedures for firefighting and
>> tools (ie pickaxe, crowbar, shovel, cutters)
training workers in firefighting. Firefighting
>> stretchers and blankets
equipment should be strategically positioned

and be of a suitable type for the potential
fires that could occur. For example a fire
>> buoyancy aids (ie lifejackets or lifebuoys)

>> rescue boats
extinguisher capable of fighting fuel fires
>> chemical spill kit
should be positioned in all vehicles.
>> fire extinguishers
PHMPs are required to include a description of
>> fire hose reels
the emergency preparedness for the principal
>> bush fire kits
hazard. It is recommended all relevant
>> first aid supplies
information is recorded in the Emergency

Management Principal Control Plan, with a
reference in the PHMP, to ensure only the most
up to date information is followed in the event
of an emergency.
Further to the minimum requirements in
Regulation 105 (1), all parts of the emergency
plan that require a worker to take action should
have a corresponding procedure indicating the
steps and actions that must be taken.
>> self-rescuers
>> a mobile generator to power emergency
lighting
>> lifting and cutting equipment such as
hydraulic props, hardwood wedges in
various sizes, lifting bags and cylinders,
pneumatic pick
>> resuscitation equipment
>> defibrillator
219
>> detachable personnel basket for large

earthmoving equipment
>> lifting hoops
>> a sanitary area designated for the provision
of first aid, such as a first aid room.
Rescue and emergency equipment should
be subject to appropriate inspection to make
sure it is always ready for use. Where rescue
equipment is provided, enough people should
be trained to use it without endangering
the emergency services. Where there is a risk

of fire, there should be enough room for at
least three fire appliances and several other
emergency vehicles to park.
In remote areas it may be faster for emergency
services to respond with a helicopter. An area
for a helicopter to land should be planned
for and passed to emergency services during
consultation.
themselves or others. Training in rescue
Important: Dont forget the back-up plan.
equipment should be specific to the type
Sometimes the best procedures fail and it
of emergency (eg confined space rescue,
is important to have a back-up plan in the
heights rescue, use of a fire extinguisher).
event that this happens. A good example
Regulation 125 states that Mine Operators

must ensure there are adequate and
appropriate means available at the site to
deal with any crush injuries and to rescue
a trapped or injured person. Regulation 127
states Mine Operators must ensure that
suitable resuscitation equipment is available
and people trained to use the equipment are
available at the site at all times. A procedure
must be in place for workers to raise the alarm
when resuscitation equipment is required.
Larger operations that use more advanced
medical personnel should consult them as
to the most suitable equipment, and whether
they are trained to use it. If not, training
should be provided.
Means of escape should be taken into account
when designing both fixed and mobile
workplaces. An alternative exit should always
be provided in mobile equipment. These can
be purpose built hatches or windows that can
be easily removed or broken with a special
tool. Fire extinguishers should also be provided
on equipment where there is a risk of fire.
220
a person waiting at the site entrance to direct
of this is fires on mobile plant such as large

trucks. These are known to carry an elevated
risk of fire, so many operations use a built in
fire suppression system. However, these do
not always properly extinguish the fire, so a
fire extinguisher is usually provided to finish
the job. In the event that the fire extinguisher
does not work, there is a procedure in place
to withdraw workers and other people from
the area and let the fire burn out. When
developing procedures, operators should
always ask the question if it fails, then what?
18.6.3HOW WILL RELEVANT PARTS OF THE
PLAN BE MADE ACCESSIBLE TO WORKERS
IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY?
Emergency response and evacuation plans
are normally designed as a grab and go
procedure detailing specific actions to be
taken in emergency scenarios. Emergency
response and evacuation plans may also
include signage and bullet point procedures
placed in appropriate areas, such as doorways
or close to areas where immediate response
is required. These should be kept as simple
Well-constructed and maintained roadways
as possible, and should contain checklists of
allow emergency vehicles easier access.
tasks in the order in which they should be
These vehicles are generally made for road
carried out. They should also be accessible
use and are not suited to difficult terrain.
to the workers who have to use them. This
In an emergency, it can be helpful to have
can be done by designating a specific area
as an emergency area where all emergency
All procedures that have been developed
procedures and rescue equipment are kept
and the equipment required for emergency
(aside from equipment that is fixed in specific
response should be placed in an area that is
areas for immediate response). And keeping
easy for all workers on the site and emergency
duplicates close to the areas where immediate
services entering the site to find. This could
response will be required.
become a designated emergency station.
For larger operations the use of TARPs may

be appropriate.
For smaller operations an emergency
response plan flipchart (a set of simple forms
that can help you identify and manage your
emergency procedures) is available from the
Fire extinguishers should be placed where

they will be needed, for example inside trucks
and on barges.
Further copies of response procedures should
be placed close to the area in which they will
be needed.
Environmental Protection Authority (EPA).
When consulting with Police, they may
Phone 0800 376 234 or email hsinfo@epa.
advise what preparation they would like to
govt.nz to order a free copy or download
see undertaken for a large scale emergency
a pdf version from www.business.govt.nz/
response. Ideally this would be a room for
worksafe/information-guidance/all-guidance-
around 15 people with good communication
items/emergency-procedures.
systems and a lot of whiteboard space. This
Most workers may only need to be able to

leave their workplace and go to a designated
place of safety in the event of an emergency.
Section 12 (1) (a) of the HSE Act states
is called the incident control point. However

in small operations, not all sites will have
infrastructure that enables this. Advice given
from Police should be taken in these situations.
employers must inform workers on what to
Further site preparations should be marked
do if an emergency arises. This should be
out on a site map that shows the safe forward
an integral part of training at all operations,
point, inner and outer perimeters of the
and should be included in site inductions for
operation. The outer perimeter basically marks
workers and other people.
out the site. The inner perimeter marks out the
The SSE must, and alluvial mine and quarry

operators should, ensure emergency
area that is particularly hazardous, that only

the rescue/recovery team should cross.
management control plans are regularly tested
A staging area where emergency services
using practice drills and involving relevant
can muster and be briefed should also be
emergency services (eg the Fire Service,
marked out. This should be between the inner
St Johns, Mines Rescue Trust and company
and outer perimeters, and not so close to
rescue services). Regular testing should be at
the incident control point as to disrupt the
least every three months. More regular testing
incident management team.
may be needed, as identified through the

assessment processes.
18.6.4HOW CAN THE MINING OPERATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE BE PREPARED IN
ADVANCE FOR AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE?
In larger operations, first aid equipment should

be strategically placed on the site to ensure it
is easily accessible. All emergency equipment
should be marked out on a map of the site and
adequate signage to indicate where specific
equipment is kept (such as the defibrillator if
Preparing the site is merely an extension of
one will be made available) should be placed
section 18.5.2 where it is stated that if it can
around the site.
be planned for, the plan should be made.
221
Figure 103 shows a common incident at
that may need to be filled. It also tests the
quarrying, mining and alluvial mining operations.
effectiveness of the plan.
Operators should determine the worst case

scenario resulting from an emergency of
this nature and develop their response plans
around minimising harm from there.
Every component should be tested for

effectiveness. For larger operations, this
means that there should be an exercise
that involves the notification of families,
accounting for people in the operation and
notifying all managers on or off site of the
emergency. If there are any areas of the plan
that are deemed ineffective, the appropriate
amendments should be made and tested
again in the next exercise.
Testing should be carried out using realistic
scenarios based on the hazards identified
and planned for, with further events if it could
reasonably be expected that further issues will
arise during an emergency.
Figure 103: Vehicle overturn emergency
18.7.2HOW OFTEN WILL EXERCISES OCCUR

AND WHAT TYPES OF EXERCISES WILL
TEST, PRACTISE AND REVIEW

THE PLAN
18.7
An emergency management plan cannot be

said to be effective until every component
of the plan is tested in a practical sense.
This can be done using a series of exercises,
which also assists with ensuring the plan is
Regulation 106 (1) (b) of the Regulations states

that the SSE must ensure workers are provided
with training in the emergency management
control plan and that the provision of this
training is recorded. This is an important aspect
of emergency planning in any operation.
regularly practised, however the plan should
Practice drills are essential so everyone knows
be practised regularly once it is said to be
what to do in an emergency. This includes
effective. When the plan has been tested and
contractors employed at the site. In the case
practised, or when new hazards arise on site,
of contractors employed on short contracts,
the plan should be reviewed. It should also
visitor training may be more appropriate.
be audited on an annual basis to ensure it
Such contractors should be accompanied at
has been reviewed at times it should have.
all times by a person who has appropriate
The plan should also be reviewed following
emergency training.
any emergency that occurs on the site.
Exercises should happen at minimum, on a
18.7.1HOW WILL THE EMERGENCY PLAN

BE TESTED FOR EFFECTIVENESS?
222
THE OPERATION NEED TO CONDUCT?
quarterly basis in order to develop a second

nature response in workers on the site.
Exercises should be both anticipated for the
Regulation 106 states that the emergency
purpose of training, and conducted without
plan must be tested regularly using practice
the prior knowledge of workers for the
drills, and involving emergency services. This
purpose of experience. Dont forget to add
enables the emergency services to provide
variety into exercises, so that all aspects of
advice on any gaps in training or in the plan
the emergency plan can be tested.
The most likely scenarios, and life preserving,
This should be done on a set basis, such as
escape and rescue scenarios should be
annually. This should be the person with the
exercised more frequently. Where a worker
highest statutory position on site, such as the
may be required to take action to save their
quarry manager or the SSE.
own life or others, this should be a key area of

concentration. Other aspects of the emergency
plan should be exercised regularly, but not at
the expense of the lifesaving components.
Each emergency plan should be reviewed

after each exercise, when new hazards are
identified. In accordance with Regulation
94, emergency plans must also be reviewed
The aspects of an emergency plan that
after real emergencies prior to operations
will always be used, such as contacting
recommencing. This should be the person
all managers both on and off the site, and
responsible for developing the emergency
accounting for people, should be practised
management plan, in consultation with
during all exercises.
the person who would normally audit the
18.7.3HOW WILL AREAS FOR

IMPROVEMENT BE IDENTIFIED?
plan. When there are significant changes to

emergency plans, further consultation with
emergency services may be required.
Nobody has a perfect plan. Gaps will always
Understanding and enacting the emergency
be identified in emergencies. Gaps and areas
plan that has been developed for the
for improvement can be identified using
operation could save your life and the lives
post-exercise debriefs where workers and
of others.
managers can all state what they saw going

well, and what didnt go so well. Observers
from emergency services can also be used
to provide advice. One of the key factors in
identifying areas for improvement is not to
jump to blaming the worker when something
goes wrong.
Often, it can be a case of the procedure not
being written simply enough, or equipment
being unavailable, or in the wrong place.
Training can also be a factor. Identifying these
issues will enable the plan to be reviewed
with a view to improving it for retesting at
a later stage.
18.7.4WHO WILL REVIEW OR AUDIT THE
EMERGENCY PLAN AND HOW OFTEN WILL
THIS HAPPEN?
All plans need to be reviewed and audited on
a regular basis. Each emergency management
plan should contain a section identifying the
person or position that will audit the plan, to
ensure it is compliant, it addresses all potential
emergencies on the site and it is practical.
223
PART D
19/
WORKER
PARTICIPATION
224
SECTION 19.0 // WORKER PARTICIPATION
You must provide opportunities for workers to participate

effectively in ongoing processes to improve health and
safety. Use a worker participation system to manage
this process.
For quarries and alluvial mines, a worker
>> the legal requirements for worker
participation system must be developed
participation
>> good-practice guidelines for putting
an effective system in place.
if there are 30 or more employees, or an

employee (or a union) requests one be
developed. Where agreement cannot be
made on an employee participation system,
Reasonable opportunities must be provided
the default system set out in section 19D and
for employees to participate effectively
Schedule 1A of the HSE Act applies.
in improving health and safety at work.

For a mining operation (opencast mines)
this includes all mine workers, not just
The default system requires that an election

for a health and safety representative is held.
employees. The worker participation
WorkSafe considers it good practice to:
system must be a documented system.
>> implement a documented system for
The HSE Act does not require you to adopt
worker participation based on good faith
a particular system. In fact, there is a clear
and a clear commitment to health and
expectation that you and your workforce
safety outcomes
(and unions representing any employees),
>> have at least one health and safety
will, in good faith, work out the systems and
committee for every location or site and
processes that best suit the workplaces
that each committee focus on safety
particular circumstances. This collaboration
critical aspects of the mining or quarrying
should provide the best opportunities for
operation
workers to participate effectively in health

and safety.
For mining operations, where a worker
participation system is not in place within
the prescribed time periods in section 19U
of the HSE Act, the default system of
Schedule 3 of the Regulations applies.
If one or more mine workers request a
>> have effective, empowered and informed

site health and safety representatives that
are trained under the HSE Act.
If a site health and safety representative
or committee makes a health and safety
recommendation to the employer it must
be adopted or a written statement provided
setting out the reasons for not adopting it.
health and safety representative, at least

one must be included as part of the worker
participation system.
225
PART D
20/
TRAINING AND
SUPERVISION
IN THIS SECTION:
20.1 Identify skills, knowledge
or competencies
20.2 Induction training
20.3 Training workers
20.4 Supervision
20.5 Use of contractors
20.6 Training Records
226
SECTION 20.0 // TRAINING AND SUPERVISION
Everyone working at the site must be competent for

the work they are required to do, or be supervised by
competent workers. They, and their managers, need
to know the limits of their competence.
People might need extra training for some
>> identify the skills, knowledge or
processes and machinery.
competencies your workers need

>> train workers when they start work and
when they need to learn new skills
>> keep records to prove what training
you have provided.
You must train or supervise workers so
they can do their work safely.
The employer or person in control of the
workplace must tell workers about the
hazards of the work and what they need
to do to stay safe.
Training helps people share knowledge and
develop skills. It can help influence behaviours
and improve health and safety.
This guidance does not cover formal

qualifications required by the Regulations.
This provides more detailed information on
the role or management, and requirements
in relation to roles, responsibilities and
competencies of people employed at mines,
quarries or alluvial mines.
IDENTIFY SKILLS,
KNOWLEDGE OR COMPETENCIES
20.1
There are a number of ways in which you

can determine the competencies needed for
particular jobs. These include:
>> risk assessments and hazard identification
processes
A training programme should:
>> personal performance reviews
>> identify what skills, knowledge or
>> health and safety audits or inspections
competencies workers need to do

particular tasks
>> have an induction to show new workers
around the site and tell them about hazards
and safety procedures
>> provide ways to train workers for
example, use external training providers
or do on the job instruction
>> make sure people only do work if theyre
trained or properly supervised
>> keep records of workers training and
>> analysis of accident investigations and

near-miss reports
>> competencies specified by vehicle or
equipment manufacturers
>> national qualifications framework
>> recommendations in Codes of Practice,
Guidelines or Standards
>> those required by the law.
By comparing the competencies needed with
those which people already have, managers
instruction, and identify which job they
can determine what additional skills are
can and cant do.
required and how these can be achieved, for

example through training and coaching.
227
20.2
INDUCTION TRAINING
20.4
SUPERVISION
Give suitable induction training to everyone
You must have a skilled worker closely
who is new to a site, or has been absent for
supervise new or untrained workers until
an extended period of time. This is particularly
they can work safely.
important for those who are new to the industry.

Induction should be job and site-specific.
Induction should include relevant aspects of
your health and safety policy, the health and
safety management system, risk assessments,
the arrangements for first aid, fire, evacuation,
safe systems of work and so on.
20.3
TRAINING WORKERS
Education and training can be in-house or
Mine workers who do not require a

certificate of competence or who have
not achieved unit standards specified
by WorkSafe must be accompanied
(supervised) at all times by a mine worker
who has achieved the unit standards, or
has received equivalent training, or holds a
certificate of competence, and has at least
12 months experience working at the same
kind of mining operation92.
a formal programme. The aim is make sure

each person and the team as a whole can
operate safely.
When they have finished training, get them to
explain and demonstrate their understanding.
Even if a new worker has excellent
qualifications and experience, always assess
their competence to work on your site.
20.5
USE OF CONTRACTORS
Mines or quarries may use contractors to

undertake some or all of the activities on
site. The requirement to provide training and
supervision and ensure competency to use
plant and equipment applies equally to both
in-house and contracted workers. You must
Further training is likely to be needed whenever:
fully induct contractors on your companys
>> someone takes on substantial new
processes and make sure the contractors
responsibilities
>> there is a significant change in work
equipment or systems of work.
Skills decline if they are not used regularly
and refresher training should be provided
as necessary to make sure continued
competence in skills that are not often used
(ie confined space training).
It can be useful to involve experienced workers
follow safe working practices.

selection and management of contractors
see A Principals Guide to Contracting to
Meet the Health and Safety in Employment
Act 1992 and its summary Health and Safety
in Contracting Situations.
20.6
TRAINING RECORDS
in training as they are often best placed to
You should keep training records as part of
understand the risks involved in their work.
your health and safety management system.
Take care, however, to ensure bad habits are
This could include copies of external training
not passed on.
provider certificates, in-house or on-the-job

training records, attendance lists and drivers
licences.
92
228
21/
GLOSSARY
229
TERM
DEFINITION
Affected person
(for LOTO)
Is a worker whose job requires them to operate a system, or work in an area

in which servicing or maintenance is being performed under LOTO
Alluvial mine
operator
Has the meaning given in regulation 3 of the Regulations
Alluvial mining
operation
Has the meaning given in section 19L of the HSE Act
ANFO
An explosive material consisting of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil
Angle of repose
The angle of repose is the angle at which the material rests when simply
dumped in a pile. This angle will vary somewhat depending on the size and
shape of the constituent particles, how the material is dumped (eg how far it
is dropped) and the amount of moisture in the material when it is dumped
Approved Handler
Has the meaning given in regulation 3 of the Hazardous Substances (Class 1-5)
Regulations
Authorised person
(for LOTO)
Is an individual who is qualified to control hazardous energy sources because of

their knowledge, training and experience and has been given authority to apply
LOTO
Back-break
Rock broken beyond the limits of the last row of holes in a blast
Batter
The portion of a slope between benches (see Figure 2 on page 20)
Bench Benching
A safety feature to catch any rocks or reeling material that falls from the high
walls above.
A horizontal ledge from which holes are drilled vertically down into the material
to be blasted.
Benching is a process of excavating where a slope is worked in steps or lifts
230
Building
Has the meaning given in sections 8 and 9 of the Building Act 2004
Building Code
The Building Code set out in Schedule 1 of the Building Regulations 1992
Competent person
Has the meaning given in regulation 3 of the Regulations and, in general, means
a person who has the relevant knowledge, experience, and skill to carry out a
task and who has a relevant qualification or certificate
Confined space
A confined space is a place which is substantially (though not always entirely)

enclosed, and where there is a risk of death or serious injury from hazardous
substances or dangerous conditions (ie lack of oxygen). These can include
storage tanks, silos, reaction vessels, enclosed drains and sewers, open topped
chambers, ductwork and poorly ventilated rooms
Contractor
Has the meaning given in section 2 of the HSE Act and means, in general, a
person engaged other than as an employee to undertake work at the site
Control
An action taken that eliminates, isolates or minimises a hazard
Crest
The top edge of a slope or batter where the ground levels out
SECTION 21.0 // GLOSSARY
TERM
DEFINITION
Dam
Has the meaning given in section 7 of the Building Act 2004 being
dam
(a) means an artificial barrier, and its appurtenant structures, that
(i) is constructed to hold back water or other fluid under constant pressure
so as to form a reservoir; and
(ii ) is used for the storage, control, or diversion of water or other fluid; and
(b) includes
(i) a flood control dam; and
(ii) a natural feature that has been significantly modified to function as a
dam; and
(iii) a canal; but
(c) does not include a stopbank designed to control floodwaters
De-energisation
De-energising
De-energise
De-energisation is the process used to disconnect and isolate a system from a

source of energy in order to prevent the release of that energy. By de-energising
the system, you are eliminating the chance the system could inadvertently,
accidentally or unintentionally cause harm to a person through movement,
or the release of heat, light or sound
Document Control
The systems by which records are kept, including the allocation of responsibility
to specific staff members
Emergency drill
A process of testing training, relating to emergency events, which is repeated

from time to time
Emergency
(emergency event,
emergencies)
An unplanned event that is not controlled where there is a threat to life or the
health and safety of people at or outside the operation
Employer
Has the meaning given in section 2 of the HSE Act
Face
The surface where extraction is advancing. May also be referred to as pit face
or working face.
FRAS
Fire resistant anti-static
Freeboard
(for dams)
The distance between normal reservoir level and the top of the dam
Freeboard
(for vessels)
The distance between the waterline and the main deck or weather deck of a ship
or between the level of the water and the upper edge of the side of a small boat
Haul vehicles
Vehicles used to haul product or material from the place of extraction to the
processing plant, stockpile or tip
Hazard
Has the meaning given in section 2 of the HSE Act
Hazard assessment
The overall process of analysing and evaluating the hazard
Hazard control
Refer to control
Hazard
management
The culture, processes and structures that are directed towards the effective
management of potential injury, illness, damage or loss
Hazardous
substance
Has the meaning given in HSNO
231
TERM
DEFINITION
Site Health
and Safety
Representative
Has the meanings given in section 19L of the HSE Act
Heavy vehicles
Includes haul trucks, loaders, scrapers, dozers, water trucks, graders, low
loaders, cable reelers, draglines, shovels, backhoes, drills and like equipment.
Heavy vehicles are those that transport or extract materials, overburden or
reject material
HSNO
Includes both the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 and
regulations made under that Act
Inter-ramp slope
A succession of batters between two access ramp sections (or between a ramp
section and floor or crest)
Intrusive
maintenance
Maintenance that requires interruption to the process. It usually requires

shutdown, isolation of hazardous energy, LOTO, opening or disassembly
Large dam
Has the meaning given in section 7 of the Building Act 2004 being large dam
means a dam that has a height of 4 or more metres and holds 20 000 or more
cubic metres volume of water or other fluid
Light vehicles
Includes wheel mounted light and medium duty vehicles of various sizes which
are primarily used in the transportation of people, supplies, tools and fuel or
lubricants. They include but are not limited to lube trucks, utes, SUVs, vans
used as worker transporters, tyre mounted cranes, and forklifts, and so on
LOTO
Lockout and Tag out
Maritime Rules
Maritime Rules made under the Maritime Transport Act 1994
Mineral
Has the meaning given in section 19L of the HSE Act being a naturally occurring
inorganic substance beneath or at the surface of the earth, and:
a. includes metallic minerals, non-metallic minerals, and precious stones; and
b. does not include clay, coal, gravel, limestone, sand or stone
Mining operation
Has the meaning given in section 19L of the HSE Act
Mine operator
Has the meaning given in regulation 3 of the Regulations being:

a. has the meaning given in section 19L of the HSE Act; and
b. in relation to a particular mining operation, means the mine operator
for that mining operation
232
Misfire
When a blast does not fire correctly, or one or more blast holes do not fire
Mobile plant (for

the purpose of this
guidance)
Means plant that is not a light vehicle, haul truck or water tanker. For example
bulldozer, excavator, loader, scraper and so on
Monitor
To check, supervise, observe or record the progress of an activity or procedure

regularly in order to make sure it is being carried out
MOSS
Maritime Operator Safety System
TERM
DEFINITION
Near Miss
An event that has the potential to cause injury or illness if circumstances,

such as the interval of time of the event, were different
Non-intrusive
maintenance
Maintenance tasks that do not require process interruption, machinery

or equipment shutdown, LOTO, entry or disassembly
OHS
Occupational Health and Safety
Opencast coal
mining operation
Opencast
metalliferous mining
operation
Overall slope
The full height of a slope from the toe to the crest which may comprise several
batters separated by benches (see Figure 3 on page 31)
Overburden (mines)
In mining overburden (also called waste or spoil) is the material that lies above
an area of economic interest. It is most commonly the rock, soil, and vegetation
above a coal seam or ore body
Overburden
(quarries)
In quarrying overburden is the material that lies above the intended quarry site.
It is most commonly the top-soil, sub-soil and vegetation
PCP
Principal Control Plan
Person in charge (in

relation to HSNO)
Person in charge has the meaning given in regulation 3 of the Hazardous

Substances (Class 1-5) Regulations being:
In relation to a place, a hazardous substance location, a transit depot, or a place
of work, means a person who is:
>> The owner, lessee, sub-lessee, occupier, or person in possession of the place, or
deport, or any part of it; or
>> Any other person who, at the relevant time, is in effective control or possession
of the relevant part of the place, location, or depot
Personal protective
equipment or
clothing
Safety apparel, protective devices and equipment that protect the health and
safety of an individual person
PHMP
Principal Hazard Management Plan
Policy
Statement by a site (or company) of its commitment, intentions and principles

in relation to its overall health and safety performance
Powder factor
The amount of explosive used per unit of rock. Also called Explosive Loading
Factor
PPE
Personal protective equipment
Pre-start check
A safety checklist that is undertaken prior to first use of machinery or vehicles

for that day or shift
Principal
Has the meaning in section 2 of the HSE Act a person who or that engages any
person (other than an employee) to do any work for gain or reward
233
234
TERM
DEFINITION
Principal control
plan
Means a plan required under regulation 92 of the Regulations
Principal hazard
Has the meaning given in regulation 65 of the Regulations. While alluvial mines
and quarries are not legally required to appraise risks to determine principal
hazards, for the purposes of this guidance we have described risks where
multiple fatalities could occur as a principal hazard
Principal hazard
management plan
Means a plan required under regulation 66 of the Regulations
Procedure
A set of instructions, rules or a step-by-step description of whats to be done

and by whom
Prohibited zone
Zone or area where people are not allowed such as at the bottom of a working
tip face, the loading zone around vehicles
Pyrolysis
Chemical decomposition of compounds caused by high temperatures
Quarrying operation
Has the meaning given in section 19N of the HSE Act
Quarry operator
Restricted area or
restricted access
Area or zone where people or vehicles are not allowed unless certain conditions
are met. For example, entry to an electrical switchboard room may be restricted
to maintenance personnel under a permit to work; light vehicles may be
restricted to entering a vehicle operating area when traffic has been stopped
Review
Checking to see whether goals have been achieved, and to assess what need
to be done in future
Riprap
A layer of large quarried stone, precast blocks, bags of cement, or other

suitable material, generally placed on the slope of an embankment or along
a watercourse as protection against wave action, erosion, or scour. Riprap is
usually placed by dumping or other mechanical methods, and in some cases is
hand placed. It consists of rock pieces of relatively large size, as distinguished
from a gravel blanket
Roads
A road is a constructed travel way between designated locations designed to

accommodate the vehicles that operate at a site. It includes all thoroughfares
used by heavy or light vehicles, and any roads used by the public within the
site boundaries
Safe Work
Procedure
A written instruction that sets out how an activity is to be undertaken at an

operation. It can be used for training or observing activities for monitoring
or review. Also known as Safe Work Methods Statement, Standard Operating
Procedures, Work Method Statement or Task Analysis
SDS
Safety Data Sheet
Serious harm
Has the meaning in section 2 of the HSE Act death or an injury that is defined
in Schedule 1 of the HSE Act
Shotfirer
The competent person in charge of, and responsible for, the loading and firing
of a blast
TERM
DEFINITION
Site
A place of work where extractive operations (mining and quarrying) and/or

associated activities are carried out
Sleep time
In relation to explosive use, sleep time is defined as the time between charging
and firing the shot
SOP
Standard operating procedure
Standard operating
procedure
Documented, often step-by-step, processes by which workers can perform each

task or aspect of the operation
Stockpile
Material placed, usually on a temporary basis, that is recovered and replaced
SWL
See WLL
SWP
Safe work procedure
Tip
May include an overburden tip or waste material tip of a permanent nature.

Often called waste dumps or waste rock stacks
Toolbox meeting
Formal or informal meeting held between workers, usually at the place the work
is undertaken (around the toolbox) and usually before a shift or a specific job
starts. Sometimes referred to as a tailgate meeting
Tourist mining
operation
Has the meaning in section 19L of the HSE Act
Tree-felling
Has the meaning in regulation 2 of the Health and Safety in Employment

Regulations 1995. For the purpose of this guidance paragraph (b) (ii) is the
aspect of the definition likely to apply. That is felling trees by manual or
mechanical means for the purpose of land clearance
Vehicle
Self-propelled equipment or plant used for the carriage of goods, material or

people for operational requirements. May include heavy vehicles, light vehicles
or mobile plant
Vehicle operating
areas
Other vehicle operating areas are all areas on or at a site where operations
involve the use of vehicles other than roads. For example, tip points, stockpiles
or loading areas. It includes any vehicle operating areas used by the public
within the site boundaries
235
TERM
DEFINITION
Soils and very

weak rock

Term
specimen
Unconfined
uniaxial
compressive
strength qu
(MPa)
Point load
strength Is(50)
(MPa)
Very weak
Crumbles under firm

blows with point of
geological hammer.
Can be peeled by a
pocket knife.
15
<1
Extremely
weak (also
needs
additional
description
in soil
terminology)
Indented by thumb
nail or other lesser
strength terms used
for soils
<1

Stronger rock

Term
specimen
Unconfined
uniaxial
compressive
strength qu
(MPa)
Point load
strength Is(50)
(MPa)
Extremely
strong
Can only be chipped with

geological hammer
>250
>10
Very strong
Requires many blows of

geological hammer to break it
100 250
5 10
Strong
Requires more than one blow

of geological hammer to
fracture it
50 100
25
Moderately
strong
Cannot be scraped or peeled

with a pocket knife. Can be
fractured with single firm blow
of geological hammer
20 50
12
Weak
Can be peeled by a pocket

knife with difficulty. Shallow
indentations made by firm
blow with point of geological
hammer
5 20
<1
236
TERM
DEFINITION
WLL
Means the working load limit, the maximum working load designed by the
manufacturer. This term is now used instead of SWL (safe working limit)
Work Instruction
SOP
See Standard Operating Procedure
Worker
(for the purposes
of this guidance)
A person who works at the site. May include, but not limited to, employer,
employees, workers, contractors, sub-contractors, specialists and consultants
Worker
participation
A system for the participation of workers in health and safety matters,

as described in Part 2A and Part 2B of the HSE Act
Working bench
The level on which the excavator is sitting on or the trucks are running on
237
22/
REFERENCES
238
SECTION 22.0 // REFERENCES
GROUND CONTROL REFERENCES

>> Girard J. M. (September 2012). Assessing
and monitoring open pit mine highwalls.
WA, Australia. Sourced from www.cdc.gov/
niosh/mining.
>> Jakubec. J. and Esterhuizen, G. S. Use
of the mining rock mass rating (MRMR)
classification: Industry experience. Sourced
from stacks.cdc.gov.
NEWZEALAND PUBLICATIONS
>> Department of Building and Housing
Building Code Clause D1 Access Routes
and Compliance Document for
NewZealand Building Code Clause
F4 Safety from Falling.
>> Maritime NewZealand Barge Stability
Guidelines.
>> Ministry of Consumer Affairs NewZealand
Electrical Code of Practice for Electrical
Safe Distances (NZECP 34:2001).
>> NewZealand Geotechnical Society
Inc. Field Description of Soil and Rock:
Guideline for the Field Classification
and Description of Soil and Rock for
Engineering Purposes.
>> NewZealand Transport Agency (NZTA)
The official NewZealand Truck
Loading Code.
>> Approved Code of Practice for Managing

Hazards to Prevent Major Industrial
Accidents.
>> Approved Code of Practice for Operator
Protective Structures on Self-Propelled
Mobile Mechanical Plant.
>> Approved Code of Practice for the
Management of Noise in the Workplace.
>> Approved Code of Practice for Training
Operators and Instructors of Powered
Industrial Lift Trucks (Forklifts).
>> Best Practice Guidelines for the Safe
use of Machinery.
>> Best Practice Guidelines for Working
at Height.
>> Ergonomics of Machine Guarding Guide.
>> Fact Sheet: A Hazard Management System
for Mining Operations.
>> First Aid for Workplace, A Good Practice
Guide.
>> Guidance for a Hazard Management
System for Mines.
>> Writing Health and Safety Documents
for your Workplace.
>> Guide to Developing Safety Management
Systems for the Extractives Industry.
>> Guide to Health and Safety in Welding.
>> Guidelines for the Management of Work
in Extremes of Temperature.
>> NZTA Heavy Vehicle Stability Guide.
>> Health and Safety in Contracting Situations.
>> NZTA Ministry of Transport Signs and
>> Principals Guide to Contracting to meet
Markings Manual (MOTSAM).

>> NZTA Traffic Control Devices Manual
(TCDM).
>> NZTA Code of Practice for Temporary
Traffic Management (COPTTM).
WORKSAFE PUBLICATIONS
>> Approved Code of Practice for Excavations
the Health and Safety in Employment

Act 1992.
>> Safe Working in a Confined Space.
>> Safety Code for Forklift Truck Operators:
Front Loading Forklift Trucks.
>> Welding Health and Safety
Assessment Tool.
>> Workplace Exposure Standards.
for Shafts and Foundations.

>> Approved Code of Practice for Load-lifting
Rigging.
239
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
>> Coalpro and Quarries National Joint
Advisory Committee (QNJAC) Traffic
Management in Quarries.
>> Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
Approved Code of Practice (ACOP) and
Guidance for Health and Safety at Quarries.
>> HSE ACOP and Guidance Safe use of
Work Equipment.
>> HSE HSG136 An Employers Guide to
Workplace Transport Safety.
>> HSE HSG144 The Safe use of Vehicles
on Construction Sites.
>> HSE Safe Maintenance Guidance:
Falls of Heavy Items, Isolations and Permit
to Work, and Hazards during Maintenance.
>> Health and Safety Executive Northern
Ireland (HSENI) Guidance Document:
Face Edge Protection.
>> HSENI Guidance Document: Geotechnical
Appraisal and Assessment.
>> HSENI Toolbox Talk: Inspections of
Sand Faces.
>> Hurwitz D.S Backing collisions: A Study
of Drivers Eyes and Backing Behaviours
using Combined Rear-view Camera and
Sensor Systems.
>> Institut de echerch Robert-Sauv en sant
et en scurit du travail (IRSST) RG-490
>> National Institute of Safety and Health

(NIOSH) Final Report: Blind Area StudyLarge Mining Equipment Blind Area
Diagrams for Selected Mining Vehicles,
John Steele, 2006.
>> NSW Trade and Investment Mine Safety
Operations Branch (NSW Trade and
Investment) MDG28 Safety Requirements
for Coal Stockpiles and Reclaim Tunnels.
>> NSW Trade and Investment MDG 1010:2011
Minerals Industry Safety and Health Risk
Management Guideline.
>> Quarries National Joint Advisory
Committee (QNJAC) Toolbox Talk: Drilling
and Blasting The Post-blast Inspection.
>> QNJAC Toolbox Talk: Inspections of
Rock Faces.
>> Queensland Government Department
of Employment, Economic Development
and Innovation Safety Alert No. 44 V2
Prevention and Management of Blast
Fumes (March 2011).
>> Queensland Department of Mines and
Energy H&S Division Safety Bulletin
(SB 6): Handling & Management of
Surface Trailing Cables.
>> Queensland Department of Mines and
Energy Guidance Note QGN10 Handling
Explosives in Surface Mines and Quarries.
>> Queensland Government Mines
A Users Guide to Conveyor Belt Safety,
Inspectorate Safety Bulletin No. 101:
Protection for Danger Zones (chapter 2.6).
Brake System Maintenance Rubber
>> IRSST RG-597 Prevention of Mechanical

Hazards (chapter 6).
>> US Department of Labour Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA) Number
Tyred Vehicles.
>> Safe Work Australia (SWA) Draft Code of
Practice: Ground Control in Open Pit Mines.
>> US Department of Labour Occupational
PH01-I-6: Dump-point Inspection Handbook.
S&H Administration (OSHA) Safety and
>> MSHA Accident Prevention Program Safety
Health Information Bulletin SHIB 01-25-
Idea: Work Boat Safety AP2002-S047.

>> MSHA PH99-I-4: Haul Road Inspection
Handbook.
>> MSHA Controlling Mercury Hazard in Gold
mining: A Best Practices Toolbox.
2013: Hazards of Operating Unguarded

Stone Cutters and Splitters in Landscaping
and Other Worksites.
>> Welding Technical Institute of Australia
(WTIA) Health and Safety in Welding 2004
Technical Note 7 (TN7).
240
SECTION 22.0 // REFERENCES
>> WTIA Fume Minimisation Guide (FMG).

>> Western Australia Department of Mines
>> AS 2359.2-2013 Powered industrial

trucks Operations.
and Petroleum (DMP) Guideline Open Pit
>> AS 2865-2009 Confined Spaces.
Mining through Underground Workings.
>> AS 2958.1-1995 Earth-moving machinery
>> DMP Safety Bulletin No 65: Design and

Operation of Dredges on Ponds.
>> DMP Tyre Safety, Fires and Explosions
Guideline.
>> WorkSafe Victoria Guidance Note:
Preventing Falls from Quarry Faces.
>> WorkSafe Victoria Safety Alert: Preventing
Mobile Plant Fires.
WEBSITE LINKS
>> WorkSafes emergency procedure flipchart
www.business.govt.nz/worksafe
>> Information on drivers medical
nzta.govt.nz/resources/results.
html?catid=53
>> Information on HSNO requirements
www.business.govt.nz/worksafe
>> Information on inspecting small
dams, constructing small dams
or the Building Code
www.dbh.govt.nz/small-dams-guidance
>> Information on maritime law and
associated requirements
www.maritime.govt.nz
>> Information on ratio/grade conversions
www.1728.com
>> Information on transport law and road
signs and markings www.nzta.govt.nz
>> NIOSH Final Report: Blind Area Study
Safety Wheeled machines Brakes.

>> AS 4024.1-2006 Series Safety of machinery.
>> AS 4457.1-2007 Earth Moving Machinery
Off-the-road wheels, rims and tyres
Maintenance and repair Wheel assemblies
and rim assemblies.
>> AS/NZS 1270:2002 Acoustics Hearing
protectors.
>> AS/NZS 1337.1:2010 Personal eye protection
Eye and face protectors for occupational
applications.
>> AS/NZS 1657:1992 Fixed platforms,
walkways, stairways and ladders. Design,
construction and installation.
>> AS/NZS 1715:2009 Selection, use and
maintenance of respiratory protective
equipment.
>> AS/NZS 1716:2012 Respiratory protective
devices.
>> AS/NZS 1801:1997 Occupational protective
helmets.
>> AS/NZS 1892.1:1996 Portable ladders
Part 1: Metal.
>> AS/NZS 2161.2:2005 Occupational
protective gloves General requirements.
>> AS/NZS 2161.3:2005 Occupational
protective gloves Protection against
mechanical risks.
>> AS/NZS 2210.1:2010 Safety, protective and
Large Mining Equipment Blind area
occupational footwear Guide to selection,
diagrams for selected mining vehicles.
care and use.
STANDARDS
>> AS 2187.2-2006 Explosives Storage
and Use Part 2: Use of explosives.
>> AS 2359.13-2005 Powered industrial
trucks Brake performance and
>> AS/NZS 2801:2008 Clothing for protection

against heat and flame General
recommendations for selection, care and
use of protective clothing.
>> AS/NZS 2906:2001 Fuel containers
Portable Plastics and metal.
component strength.
241
>> AS/NZS 3007:2013 Electrical equipment in

mines and quarries Surface installations
and associated processing plant.
>> AS/NZS 3760:2010 In-service safety
inspection and testing of electrical
equipment.
>> AS/NZS 4602.1:2011 High visibility safety
garments Part 1: Garments for high risk
applications.
>> AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management
Principles and Guidelines.
>> ASTM F852-08 Standard Specification
for Portable Gasoline Containers for
Consumer Use.
>> NZS 5823:1989 Specification for buoyancy
aids and marine safety harnesses and lines.
>> SA/SNZ HB 436:2013 Risk management
guidelines Companion to AS/NZS ISO
31000:2009.
>> SA/SNZ HB 89:2013 Risk Management
Guidelines on risk assessment techniques.
LEGISLATION
>> The Building Act 2004.
>> Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2008.
>> The Building Regulations 1992
(Building Code).
>> Electricity Act 1992.
>> Electricity (Safety) Regulations 2010.
>> Employment Relations Act 2000.
>> Hazardous Substances and New Organisms
Act 1996 (HSNO).
>> Hazardous Substances (Classes 1 to 5
Controls) Regulations 2001.
>> Hazardous Substances (Disposal)
Regulations 2001.
242
>> Hazardous Substances (Identification)

Regulations 2001.
>> Hazardous Substances (Packaging)
Regulations 2001.
>> Hazardous Substances (Tracking)
Regulations 2001.
>> Hazardous Substances (Fireworks, Safety,
Ammunition, and Other Explosives
Transfer) Regulations 2003.
>> Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992.
>> Health and Safety in Employment (Mining
Operations and Quarrying Operations)
Regulations 2013.
>> Health and Safety in Employment
Regulations 1995.
>> Health and Safety in Employment (Pressure
Equipment, Cranes and Passenger
Ropeways) Regulations 1999.
>> Fire Service Act 1975.
>> Fire Safety and Evacuation of Building
Regulations 2006.
>> The Land Transport Act 1998.
>> The Land Transport Act 1998 Land
Transport Rule: Vehicle Lighting 2004
(Rule 32005).
>> Maritime Transport Act 1994.
>> Maritime Transport Act 1994 Maritime
Rules.
23/
APPENDICES
IN THIS SECTION:
23.1 Appendix A: Ratio
to percentage grade
conversion
23.8 Appendix H: Retaining

type structures
23.2 Appendix B: Issuing permit

to work certificates
23.10 Appendix J: Traction
23.3 Appendix C: Field data

collection
23.4 Appendix D: Geological
models
23.5 Appendix E: Types of
analysis
23.6 Appendix F: Batters and
final bench design
23.7 Appendix G: Rock bolting
systems
23.9 Appendix I: Culverts

23.11 Appendix K: Windrows
23.12 Appendix L: Monitoring
methods
23.13 Appendix M: Instrument
data
23.14 Appendix N: Isolation and
lockout of energy
23.15 Appendix O: Permit to work
system process
243
244
APPENDIX A: RATIO TO PERCENTAGE GRADE CONVERSION
Source: www.1728.com
For example, a "1 in 4" slope is a 25% grade.
The numbers in the red show the angle expressed as a ration and a grade.
The green numbers on the right are angles in degrees.
23.1
1:12 8.33%
1:14 7.14%
1:16 6.25%
1:20 5%
1:25 4%
1:35 2.86%
1:50 2%
1:100 1%
1:8 12.50%
1:9 11.11%
1:10 10%
1:7 14.29%
1:6 16.67%
1:5 20%
10
1:4.5 22.22%
1:4 25%
15
1:3.5 28.57%
1:3 33.33%
= 1:2.75 = 36.4%
20
>> Respiratory protective

equipment (RPE)
>> Temperature
normalisation
>> Rescue equipment
>> Low or cryogenic

temperature
>> Toxic or flammable

residues
>> Flame cutting
>> Grinding
>> Fire blanket

>> Toxic or flammable gas
and oxygen monitor
>> Sand
>> Sand bucket
>> Atmosphere analysis

>> Material removal or
steaming out
>> Inert gas purging
>> Post work checks
>> Flammable residues
>> Rubber lined vessels
>> Explosive dusts
>> Hose reel
>> Fire extinguishers
>> Fire extinguishers

>> Remove materials or
cover with fire blanket
>> Combustible liquids or

solids
>> Brazing
>> Soldering

monitor
>> Spill containment
>> Vacuum
Hot Work
>> RPE
>> High pressure
>> Flammable gases or

liquids
>> Gloves
>> De-pressurising
>> Cryogenic liquids
>> Spill clean-up kit
>> Ear protection
>> Inert gas plugging

liquids
>> Helmet
>> Visor or safety glasses
>> Physical isolation

steaming out
>> Toxic or corrosive gases

or liquids
>> Resuscitator
>> Physical isolation
>> High temperature
>> Standby people
>> Breathing apparatus
>> Fresh air supply
>> Safety harness and hoist

and oxygen monitor
SOME EQUIPMENT
TO CONSIDER

steaming out
SOME PRECAUTIONS
TO CONSIDER
>> Forced ventilation
Pipework and Vessels
Confined Space Entry
TYPE OF PERMIT (OR

CERTIFICATE)

liquids
>> Toxic or corrosive gases
>> Welding
Working on or breaking into

pipelines or pressure vessels
>> Oxygen deficiency
Entry into a vessel, sump,

pit or other confined space
>> Oxygen enrichment
POSSIBLE HAZARDS
APPENDIX B: ISSUING PERMIT TO WORK CERTIFICATES
WORK TO BE DONE
23.2
SECTION 23.0 // APPENDICES
245
246
>> Disconnecting or isolating

emergency systems
(eg alarms, automatic
extinguisher systems)
>> Construction work
>> Installation projects
>> Demolition
>> One-off work with

hazardous substances
>> Asbestos removal
Examples:
Digging or excavating
(other than extraction
of product)
Repair or maintenance of
powered machinery
>> Fragile roof
Work at height (injury from

falling possible)
>> Clear and cordon off

ground beneath work area
>> Vehicle movement
>> Stored energy dissipated
>> Stored energy eg

eccentric shafts
To be identified
>> Overhead cables
>> Drains or sewers
>> Compressed air
>> Solvent or corrosive pipes
>> Water mains
>> Gas pipes
>> Electric cables
>> Underground services
Special
Digging or Excavation
>> Specialist lockout devices
>> Warning notices (tags)
>> Moving parts
Specialist advice may be

needed
To be identified
To be identified

and oxygen monitor
>> Provide shoring in

trenches
>> Underground cable

detector
>> Locate and identify

underground services
>> Warning notices (tags)
>> Circuit tester

>> Personal padlocks
>> Gas
>> Switches locked off
>> Elevated work platform
>> RPE

and oxygen monitor
>> Safety harness and fixing
>> Edge protection
>> Crawl boards
>> Scaffolding
SOME EQUIPMENT
TO CONSIDER
>> Electrical isolation
>> Electricity
>> Weather conditions
>> Stop emissions
>> Soft ground
>> Provide safe access and

place of work
>> Isolate and lock off power

to overhead electrics
SOME PRECAUTIONS
TO CONSIDER
Electrical and Machinery

Isolation
Work at Heights
TYPE OF PERMIT (OR

CERTIFICATE)
>> Chimney or exhaust stack

emissions
>> Electricity
>> Overhead lines
POSSIBLE HAZARDS
WORK TO BE DONE
APPENDIX C: FIELD DATA

COLLECTION
Use a competent person to develop an
There are several tools and techniques available
events that led to the formation of the ore
23.3
for field data collection. These include:

>> Surface geophysical data collection
accurate, well-understood geological model.

This requires an understanding of geological
body, regional and local structure, lithology,
topography, morphology and regional stress
methods provide initial identification of
field as well as geotechnical requirements
major lithological units and structural
for slope design.
features, such as fracture zones.

>> Downhole geophysics or logging provides
THE STRUCTURAL MODEL
data that can be used to determine
The purpose of the structural model is to
lithological boundaries, structures and
describe the orientation and spatial distribution
the in situ mechanical, physical and
of the structural defects (discontinuities) that
chemical properties of the rock mass.
are likely to affect the stability of slopes.
>> Core drilling enables an adequate

understanding of the subsurface
The defects can be divided into two groups:

>> large structural features such as folds
conditions for input to geotechnical
and faults that are widely spaced and
design. The number of boreholes required
continuous along strike and dip across
will depend on:
the entire site (major structures)
the level and reliability of already
>> closely spaced joints, cleavage and
available geological and geotechnical
faults that typically do not extend for
information
more than two or three benches or
the complexity of site geology

the size and operating life of the
quarry or mine.
batters (minor structures).

Use a competent person to develop
structural models.
Core samples retrieved from boreholes can be
The structural model can be developed using
logged using direct observation, or downhole
computer based 3D modelling tools. Ideally,
cameras and digital photography.
the major and minor structures are recorded
>> Field testing: Geotechnical data collection

from exposed rock can be carried out using
3D digital photogrammetric techniques.
>> Laboratory testing: Rock samples can be
tested in a laboratory to determine intact
rock properties.
APPENDIX D: GEOLOGICAL
MODELS
23.4
23.4.1THE GEOLOGICAL MODEL

The purpose of the geological model is to
show a three dimensional (3D) visualisation of
the materials present. Different material types
in at least two separate overlays. This allows

efficient assessment of their combined effect
as well as individual effects on the stability of
the slope.
ROCK MASS MODEL
A rock mass model shows the engineering
properties of the rock mass made up of
various material types and structural defects.
The rock mass properties include the intact
pieces of rock, the structures that cut through
the rock and the rock mass itself. These
properties govern the performance of the
slope and therefore the design approach.
often have different strength characteristics,

which affect the process of slope design.
247
In a slope constructed in stronger rock, failure
It is therefore important to develop a good
can occur along geologic structures which are
hydrogeological model early on. This allows
considered pre-existing planes of weakness
effective control measures to be designed
in otherwise solid rock. In relatively weak
and implemented. Preliminary data required
materials (ie weathered or soft rock) failure
for the development of the hydrogeological
can occur through the intact material or
model can be obtained from boreholes drilled
along geologic structures. In some situations
for resource evaluation and geotechnical site
(in strong rocks as well as in weak materials)
investigations. However, purpose designed
failure could occur partly along geological
drilling and testing programs are required for
structures and partly through intact rock
the hydrogeological characterisation of the
material. It is therefore important to determine
rock mass.
the engineering properties of:

>> intact rock or soil
>> structural features
>> the rock mass in the various geological units.
HYDROGEOLOGICAL MODEL
The presence of groundwater in a slope can
have significant negative effects on stability.
Use a competent person to carry out

hydrogeological modelling.
For more information on groundwater and
surface water control see section 3.5.5.
APPENDIX E: TYPES
OF ANALYSIS
23.5
In the case of sites excavated within weak
Basic types of analysis are:
materials (eg clay or completely weathered
Rock Mass Rating (RMR) and Mining Rock
rock) pore pressures play a significant role
Mass Rating (MRMR) Classification Systems:
in stability. High pore pressures reduce the
At early stages of site development, if data
effective stresses and simultaneously reduce
is limited and the geotechnical model has
the shear strength of both soil or rock material
not been fully developed. Here empirical
and rock mass. High water pressures also
approaches based on rock mass classification
reduce the shear strength of structural defects
methods such as RMR and MRMR can be used
in un-weathered strong rock. This leads to
for preliminary slope design. These methods
structurally controlled instability.
are largely based on qualitative studies of rock
Groundwater (depending on chemistry) can

contribute to corrosion of ground support
and reinforcement, if used as a method of
mass failures and are only considered useful

for initial assessment of failure through the
rock mass (Jakkubec J. and Esterhuizen).
slope stabilisation. This would significantly
Kinematic analysis of structurally controlled
reduce their effectiveness.
failures: The analysis of removability of rock
Groundwater can also create saturated

conditions and lead to water ponding within
an excavation which can lead to unsafe
conditions. Other problems that could result
from saturated conditions or standing water
include loss of access to all or part of the
blocks from the slope without referring to the

forces that cause them to move. It is based
on stereographic projections and is mainly
applied to batter designs. It may also be used
for large scale slope design, if anticipated
failure is controlled by structures.
excavation, difficulties in using explosives
Limit equilibrium analysis: A two-dimensional
and reduced efficiency in the equipment
method of analysis widely used for the
used at the site.
determining Factor of Safety against rotational

shear failure in soil slopes. It can be applied to
248
assess structurally controlled kinematically
The height of batters should be determined
unstable rock block and wedges in batter and
on an individual basis, based on past
inter-ramp scale. It can also be used to assess
extraction conditions of the seam or area,
against failure through rock material or rock
and sound engineering practices.
mass in batter, inter-ramp and overall slopes.

The major limitations of limit equilibrium
FINAL BENCH SPACING
analysis are that it assumes the unstable
Benches perform two important functions.
mass can be characterised by solid blocks
First, they provide stability to a slope by
and it cannot represent either deformation
increasing the safety factor. Where a slope
or displacement of the failing rock mass.
contains numerous discontinuities (joint sets,
Numerical analysis: Numerical analysis is

based on numerical modelling tools such as
finite element and distinct element methods.
It can overcome some of the limitations of
limit equilibrium analysis as it can model
complex rock masses and the deformation
and displacement of the failing mass. This
analysis is useful for the assessment of both
bedding planes, and so on) providing benches

at select spacings can increase the stability of
the slope. Second, where rilling rock and dirt
are a problem, benches can be used to keep
these materials from falling into working
areas. As such, whether the bench can do
these is one of the factors used to determine
bench spacing.
inter-ramp and overall slopes in large opencast
Where bench spacing has been decreased to a
mines or quarries.
minimum and rill material is still not contained

(smaller size material) you must determine if
APPENDIX F: BATTERS AND

FINAL BENCH DESIGN
23.6
BATTER HEIGHT AND REACH
a significant hazard is present. Material only

falling at the base of the batter may not be a
hazard, as it does not affect a travel or work
area. However, work near the batter should
The maximum height of a batter should be
be considered when considering if there is
based on stability and should not exceed the
a hazard.
safe reach of the equipment available to clean

(scale) the face, unless special precautions are
taken. These precautions could include:
>> blasting practices that shoot the face clean
>> using mobile plant or equipment capable
If the configuration of the batter or techniques

being used do not keep material from falling
into the excavation where workers are exposed,
changes to the ground control methods will
be necessary. Providing a bench or additional
of working a safe distance from the toe
benches in the slope, widening bench widths,
while removing material to the toe
modifying blasting techniques, changing the
>> using mobile plant or equipment to clean

the face from the top edge
>> excavating the batter face in lifts from top
to bottom to allow to allow for cleaning
immediately above the work area
>> providing a buffer (ie a windrow or ditch)
of sufficient size to capture any potentially
hazardous rock falls.
orientation of mining or extraction, and more

effective cleaning methods are some of the
changes to consider.
FINAL BENCH WIDTHS
The width of benches should be determined
by three factors:
>> The bench should be wide enough to stop
potentially hazardous rock falls and contain
any material that falls from the wall above
the bench. This is unless other controls are
in place (ie rock fences).
249
>> Extended exposure of the wall can cause
passive reinforcing which need some ground
Cleaning may be needed to maintain
displacement for activation.
the benchs effectiveness. If you are

cleaning benches the bench width should
accommodate any equipment used on
the bench. Safe access to the bench must
be provided.
>> Bench widths should allow for adequate
drainage, as described in section 3.5.5.
When designing bench widths the likelihood
of achieving the design width should be
considered. Even with good blasting and
excavation control, the design may not be
achieved. The width that can practically be
achieved depends on the amount of backbreak occurring along the crest during
excavation. Back-break from blasting can
extend into the bench as much as 3 metres.
Presplitting can reduce back-break if the
holes are spaced close enough, and plugged
as near the top of the hole as possible. This
reduces the amount of stemming. Explosive
contractors or suppliers may offer other
techniques that could be used to handle
back-break problems.
APPENDIX G: ROCK BOLTING

SYSTEMS
23.7
Rock bolts are tensioned once anchorage is

achieved, to actively set up a compressive
force into the surrounding rock. This axial
force increases the shear capacity and is
generated by pre-tensioning of the bolt. In
essence, rock bolts start to support the rock
as soon as they are tensioned.
Commercially available rock bolts include
cone and shell, grouted and chemically (resin)
anchored rebar.
Cable bolting is an established technique used

extensively for reinforcement of the rock mass
adjacent to surface excavations. They can be
tensioned or un-tensioned, and may be fully
or partially grouted. Thread-bar rock anchors
or multi-strand tendon cable anchors can be
used where higher loads are required.
Shear pins are reinforcement bars or larger
steel, concrete or post sections that may be
grouted in situ. They are designed to be placed
perpendicular to a particular discontinuity and
to act mainly in shear. The support provided by
the shear pin is equal to the shear strength of
the steel bar and possibly the cohesion of the
rock/concrete surface.
Although shear pins are mainly installed
perpendicular to the potential slide plane,
there are some other applications. These can
involve horizontal installations to provide
shear support to blocks defined by flat-lying
underground workings intersecting the pit
wall, or unstable clay seams within an eroded
rock wall.
Mesh, where bolting alone is insufficient
and support is required for small fractured
material, welded or arc mesh secured to the
rock bolts, dowels or cable bolts is a suitable
form of support. Usually a 100 x 100 mm
mesh is used, but the size is determined by
the desired bag strength. The use of mesh in
very blocky ground reduces the potential for
unravelling and can be a very useful ground
support method.
W strapping is used to connect the collars of
rock bolts. They are nominally 2-3 mm thick
and 200-300 mm wide, and can be bolted to
Rock dowels can be used instead of rock
follow the contours of the rock face. Support
bolts, when installation of support can be
tension can be exerted between bolt sets
carried out very close to the excavated face or
through the strap.
in anticipation of stress changes that will occur
250
at a later excavation stage. Rock dowels are
rilling material to accumulate on the bench.
APPENDIX H: RETAINING
TYPE STRUCTURES
23.8
23.9
APPENDIX I: CULVERTS
Unless the culverts lead to additional
Gabion walls are a traditional effective
diversionary ditching, provide water run-outs
and practical means of stabilising cuts and
to reduce the velocity to where the water is
slopes. As they apply a surcharge load to the
non-erosive. On shallow slopes (less than 10%)
underlying pit wall, they must be installed
with limited water flows (<0.5 m/s), this can
upwards from a location where there is strong
be done with vegetated outflow areas. Energy
enough rock for a suitable foundation.
dissipaters (riprap or tipped rock) may be
Stacked tyres are an alternative to gabions,
required where flow rates are higher.
and may be simpler and cheaper to install.
Provide and maintain good drainage to ensure
Each stack of tyres should be filled and
low water levels in the road fill in areas of
secured.
a naturally occurring high water table (eg
Reinforced earth retaining walls are gravity
swamps or watercourses).
structures consisting of alternating layers of
Temporary in-pit roads with high ground water
granular backfill and reinforcing strips with a
levels can be improved by placing gravel or
modular precast concrete facing. Because of
rockfill over the area, or by installing pumping
their high load-carrying capacity, reinforced
wells to lower the water table. Pumping wells
earth is ideal for very high or heavy-loaded
may be cost effective if it also reduces the
retaining walls.
water level in, and improves the stability of,
Tied-back walls generally comprise a
the working area.
concrete wall, often reinforced with mesh or
Make drainage features large enough, and
reinforcement bars tied back into the rock
space them apart so they can deal with the
wall using cable bolts, or rock bolts in smaller
greatest expected demands on them.
structures. These walls are particularly suited

to mining applications where they can be
constructed progressively as the benches are
mined, using cable bolting meshing and a
shotcrete application.
Steel sheet piling is often used in soft soils and
tight spaces. They are made out of steel, vinyl,
fibreglass or plastic sheet piles driven into
the ground and can require a tie-back anchor
dead man tied by a cable or a rod. For more
detailed information on shoring methods see
the WorkSafe Approved Code of Practice for
Excavations and Shafts for Foundations.
While it is raining or right after it rains, is a good

time to check drainage is working properly.
23.10
APPENDIX J: TRACTION
The forces required for accelerating, turning,

or stopping vehicles are caused by the friction
generated between the tyres and the road
pavement. The amount of friction available
varies with different road pavements and is
indicated by a friction coefficient, which is a
measure of how well the tyre grips the road
pavement.
The friction coefficient indicates how much
of the total weight of the vehicle can be
generated as a force between the tyre and
the road pavement. The higher this force,
the better the grip on the road and the more
control the driver has in climbing, steering,
and stopping.
251
Table 8 shows some typical friction coefficients
prevent tyres from locking up, so the available
for a variety of road pavements. Notice the
friction stays at the higher values. Brakes stop
significant differences in values varying from
the wheel, but it's the grip between tyre and
concrete (0.9) down to ice, which can be
road pavement that stops the vehicle.
practically zero. The value of 0.9 for rubber

tyres on concrete means 90% of the weight on
a tyre is available as braking force (presuming
that the brake components themselves can
provide this much braking force).
23.11
APPENDIX K: WINDROWS
One way for a windrow to provide restraint

is for the windrow to deflect the tyre, and
re-direct the vehicle back onto the road. To do
PAVEMENT
MATERIAL
DRY
WET
Clay
0.60 0.90
0.10 0.30
Concrete
0.90
0.60 0.80
Gravel road, firm
0.50 0.80
0.30 0.60
Gravel road, loose
0.20 0.40
0.30 0.50
Ice
0.00
0.00
Sand, loose
0.10 0.20
0.10 0.40
Snow, packed
0.10 0.40
0.00
this, make the windrow material firm, and the

inside slope as nearly vertical as possible (a
Table 10: Typical values for the coefficient of friction

between rubber tyres and various road surfaces
These different values show why it is so

important drivers adjust their speed to suit
the road conditions. All other factors being
equal, it will take a longer distance to stop
when the traction values are low. If the friction
slope of greater than 40 is recommended92).

When cutting the inside slope to steepen the
windrow, make sure enough material is initially
placed so once the windrow is cut, the base
width is still adequate. Make the base width at
least the width the windrow would have been
if both its outside and inside slopes were at
the materials angle of repose. Maintain a full
base width to serve the function of keeping
vehicles back from the edge (refer 5.3.9).
Windrows constructed of broken rock mixed
with bonding materials will normally offer
restraint due to the interlocking and frictional
resistance of the rock pieces. If a windrow is
too loose, it will provide little restraint and
the vehicle may plough straight through it.
If a windrow is firm, but is not steep on the
roadway side, the vehicle could ride up and
coefficient is reduced by half the stopping
over it (refer 5.3.9).
distance is doubled once the brakes are
A windrow can also impede the passage of a
applied. Friction values also affect steering
vehicle by a combination of the tyre sinking
ability. Reduce speed when traction is low.
into and raising up as it climbs the windrow
The road pavement coefficients given in Table
material. The vehicle may get bogged down
10 are the maximum values for the conditions

indicated. Maximum tyre grip occurs when
the tyre is still rolling and just before the tyre
would lockup and slide. Once a tyre locks up
and goes into a skid, the available friction is
reduced. This reduction can be as much as
50% under poor road conditions. This is why
as it plows through. But to effectively impede

a vehicle in this way, a windrow generally
needs to be larger than axle height. In general
the finer the material used, and the less effort
that is made in compacting and shaping a
windrow, the larger the windrow should be
to provide similar restraint.
antilock brakes are of such benefit. They help
92
252
Source: Source: Stecklein, G. L. (1981) Haul road berm and guardrail design study and demonstration (US Bureau of Mines),
Restraint system recommendation, p160

Because of the large size and weight of some

vehicles, the typical axle-height berms cannot
Angle of
repose
be relied on, by themselves, to completely

stop a vehicle except at low speeds. Windrows
much larger than axle-height are required
to completely stop a vehicle for all possible
a
conditions of speed and impact. Tests have

shown a windrow needs to be constructed to
a height 3 times the axle height for vehicles
under 85 tonnes and 4 times the axle height

for vehicles over 85 tonnes to stop a runaway
vehicle. This is based on a vehicle contacting
the windrow at 48 kilometres at a 30 degree
Figure 105: Suitable windrow the width of the

windrow is as wide as the normal angle of repose
angle of contact93.
The amount of restraint offered by a
windrow depends on the conditions under
Water channel
which the vehicle impacts it. The greater

the vehicle speed, or the more head-on the
vehicle contacts the windrow; the larger the

windrow has to be. For this reason, use larger
than typical windrows in areas where it is
a
reasonable to expect more adverse conditions,
such as where vehicles would have more

speed or would contact the windrow head-on.
a = half
thethe
wheel
height
= half
wheel
height
Ana example
would
be
Direction of Travel
Figure 106: Unsuitable windrow curved slopes
where there is a curve at
the bottom of a grade. In such cases, increase
Mid-axle high to the largest

equipment that uses that road
windrow size or consider other provisions,

such as runaway lanes or double windrows
Tyre
Sinkage
(refer 5.3.10).
Axle
height
Angle of
repose
85 tonne < 3 times axle height
85 tonne > 4 times axle height
Figure 107: Study on windrow size to offer

definite
a = halfrestraint
the wheel height
a = half the
Make roads wide enough so windrows are

constructed
firmheight
foundation that is
a = halfon
the awheel
level with the roadway. If the road width is

Figure 104: Suitable windrow firm material big
enough to absorb the vehicle's momentum with a
steepened inside slope
inadequate and a portion of the windrow

extends over the hillside, the windrow will
be more likely to give way when hit and offer
little restraint (refer Figure 108).
93
Water
channel
Source: Stecklein, G. L. (1981) Haul road berm and guardrail design study and demonstration (US
Bureau
of Mines)
a
253
a
APPENDIX L: MONITORING
METHODS
23.12
Windrow
Carriage way
VISUAL INSPECTION
Hillside
A basic element of a slope movement

monitoring program should be visual
inspection by a competent person, combined
with observation by all workers. Maintain this
Windrow
Hillside
qualitative, but extremely important aspect

Carriage way
of the program throughout the life of the
Angle of
repose
operation.
Workers are required to report rock falls, and
be involved in the slope inspection process
a
Figure 108: Windrow constructed on firm foundation
Leave
gaps
in theheight
windrow or other drainage
a = half
the wheel
systems provided where necessary, to allow
and in a regular detailed inspection process.

Any visual monitoring program should be
supported by instrumentation to provide a
quantitative basis for defining any movement.
drainage of surface water. Make sure any gaps
Develop and implement a procedure for the
are not wide enough for a vehicle to pass
regular inspection of faces above every place
through. Design them so a vehicles wheel
of work and every road used by workers94.
cannot be trapped at an angle leading away
This is good practise for all quarry and alluvial
from the travelling direction (see Figure 109).
mine operators, and a legal requirement for

other mine operators as defined in section
Water channel
19M of the Health and Safety in Employment

(Mining Operations and Quarrying Operations)
Regulations 2013.
The procedure must ensure:
>> A competent person examines every area
a
Direction of Travel
of the site where a worker is present, or is

expected to be present, before every shift
and at suitable times during the shift.
>> Every accessible area of the site (including
Figure 109: Suitable windrow gaps in windrow

for drainage
areas containing barriers, machinery and

infrastructure) is examined at least weekly.
It must also ensure that written procedures
are available for workers, setting out:
>> What will be examined?
>> When they will be examined?
>> How inspections will be recorded?
>> How findings will be actioned?
94
254
Practical information and advice on actions
TERRESTRIAL GEODETIC SURVEYS
to be taken when defects are identified
The most reliable and complete measurements
may include:
associated with initial movement can be
>> if it is safe to work below and above a face
obtained from conventional geodetic survey
>> if there is any loose material on the face
techniques, using precise theodolite and
>> if there is potential for instability

>> whether maintenance is required to
the face prior to commencing work
>> when further advice is required such
as from the geotechnical specialist.
electro-optic distance measuring (EDM)

combinations or total stations. These systems
can be installed by survey workers, generally
with survey equipment in regular use at a site.
Primary monitoring points should be surveyed
at regular intervals, consistent with the type
SURFACE EXTENSOMETERS AND
of rock and expected rates of movement.
CRACK MONITORING
Surveillance monitoring frequencies vary
If evidence of movement is detected from

visual inspection, the first step in increasing
the monitoring program might be simple crack
monitoring. Results of visual inspections and
from weekly to quarterly depending on

conditions such as the stage of mining or
extraction, mining or extraction rate, changes
in piezometric surface and climatic variations.
crack monitoring are a useful guide when
The individual aspects of a typical system are:
selecting additional secondary monitoring
>> Control points for the system should
points for detailed survey assessments.

Crack monitoring techniques typically consist of:
>> regular detailed mapping of location,
depth, width of cracks, rate of extension
and opening
>> installation of targets on opposite sides
of cracks to monitor rates of opening
>> installation of surface (wireline)
extensometers
>> installation of picket lines or line of targets
that can be monitored using theodolites
or precise levels to detect changes in
alignment, location of elevation along a
given crack or the crest of the slope.
consist of the instrument stations near

the crest of a slope and reference stations
located away (100 metres to 3 kilometres)
from mining or quarrying activities.
Control points are usually established
by conducting a first-order survey,
using conventional survey techniques
such as triangulation, trilateration or
triangulateration, or GPS.
>> GPS is much more efficient, accurate
and less labour-intensive than the
conventional survey techniques when
used for control surveys, especially when
the network covers a relatively large
area. The main requirements are that
Surface extensometers for monitoring local
the system used picks up variances and
wall movement or tip movement can be easily
good quality equipment.
constructed and provide a rugged practical
>> The stability of instrument stations can
system of monitoring that can be inspected
be checked by resurveying the control
and interpreted regularly by operational
network or reference stations each time
workers. They can also be equipped with
the instrument station is used. Make sure
automatic devices such as lights or sirens
reference stations are observed regularly.
to provide warning of excessive movement.

More sophisticated units can provide real-time
indication of movement to remote locations
(ie offices) through a telemetric link.
Plot and assess data from the survey after

each set of readings. If movement is detected,
monitoring frequency of secondary points
255
will depend on the size of the failure and
It is important that radar is not the sole
movement rates and could be hourly to
basis for monitoring. Further, it is essential
weekly. For more detailed information on
to maintain a degree of conservatism in
data analysis see section 7.4.
determining when to withdraw workers from
For more detailed information on surveying

see the Approved Code of Practice for
Surveying.
GPS STATIONS
Global positioning systems (GPS) based on
satellites orbiting the earth can be used for realtime positioning at any location 24 hours a day
in any weather. The positioning is accomplished
through the use of timing signals transmitted
by the satellites to ground receivers.
below a moving slope, even if it is being

monitored by radar. Even small rock falls
resulting from the deformation can have
serious safety consequences and may not
be detected by radar.
SUBSURFACE TECHNIQUES
Costs of subsurface techniques are greater
than those for surface instrumentation. These
costs can be modest, if available drilling
equipment is used and workers perform the
installation after instruction from specialists
With two or more receivers working
or the instrument supplier. Inclinometers and
simultaneously in a so-called differential
TDR cables, for example, give very valuable
mode, you can measure relative positions
and precise information on the locations
(3D coordinate differences) between the
of deep-seated slide surfaces, and on rates
receivers. This will have an accuracy of a few
of movement without which remedial work
millimetres to about 20 mm over distances
cannot be adequately planned.
up to several kilometres.
Unlike conventional survey techniques (ie
those using EDM, total stations and levels)
GPS does not require a direct line of sight
between survey stations. GPS is not affected
by local atmospheric conditions when the
GPS baseline length is within 1 km, so GPS
is usually more efficient and accurate, and
requires less labour than conventional survey
techniques. Therefore, GPS has been adopted
as the general surveying technique at many
extractive sites. The advantages also make
it an ideal tool for setting up control surveys
for slope monitoring.
MICRO-SEISMIC MONITORING
Routine real-time micro-seismic monitoring
in the opencast environment can provide 3D
data where rock breakage or movement is
occurring. This data can be used to enhance
surface monitoring systems in identifying
potential instability and the associated
failure mode. The technique is commonly
used in underground mining operations
and has recently been applied in opencast
environments.
MONITORING OF GROUNDWATER PRESSURE
If the slope design is based on achieving
RADAR
a given future pore pressure profile, it is
Where more extensive areas of movement are
important year-by-year pore pressure targets
detected, radar enables real-time monitoring
are developed to ensure depressurisation is
of the movements to help ensure workers
occurring at the desired rate.
below the slope are kept safe. Radar units
Include piezometer installations in the most
used in conjunction with geodetic surveying
critical areas for slope performance in the
can effectively provide real-time warning of
final slope design. Target pressures are then
movements and accelerations.
developed for each piezometer, for each year

of operation.
256
The components of a groundwater monitoring
Data processing and presentation depends
system could include:
on the specific monitoring system. For
>> data acquisition systems
surveillance monitoring and for small slopes
>> piezometers
>> horizontal drain flows
it can often be performed with standard

spreadsheet packages. More comprehensive
monitoring programs may require commercial
>> dewatering well discharges
survey reduction and geographic information
>> monitoring of slope conditions.
system (GIS) programs.
23.13
DATA
APPENDIX M: INSTRUMENT
PROCESSING AND PRESENTATION

OF INSTRUMENTATION DATA
The primary aim of data processing and
presentation is a rapid assessment of
information to detect changes that require
immediate action. A secondary function is
to summarise and present the data to show
trends and compare observed with predicted
behaviour, so that any necessary action can
be initiated.
INTERPRETATION OF
INSTRUMENTATION DATA
Monitoring programs have failed because
the data generated was never used. If there
is a clear sense of purpose for a monitoring
program, this will guide the data interpretation.
Aim early data interpretation at determining
the accuracy of the monitoring system.
For example, atmospheric changes may
result in diurnal variations of several times
the manufacturers quoted accuracy for
EDM and total station units. This is common
particularly in climates where there are
Present monitoring data in a format that
significant temperature differences between
is easy to read and identifies problem
day and night or climates where temperature
areas quickly.
inversions can develop in a pit overnight.
Determine responsibility for processing and
Filter out these survey accuracy variations
presentation of instrumentation data during

the planning phase. This should be under
the direct control of a competent person
as part of the interpretation process, either

by setting wider bands before alarms are
triggered or by putting emphasis on readings
on site, or in special cases, consultants
taken at the same time of the day.
who have immediate 24-hour access to the
The purpose of subsequent data interpretation
data. Time required for these tasks can be
is to correlate the instrument readings with
underestimated, resulting in the accumulation
other factors (cause and effect relationships)
of unprocessed data and failure to take
and to study the deviation of the readings
appropriate action. Similarly, experienced
from the predicted behaviour. By its very
geotechnical engineers may use much of
nature, interpretation of data is a labour-
their time supporting monitoring systems
intensive activity and no technique has yet
instead of delegating these responsibilities
been developed for complete automatic
to technicians. This may mean they neglect
interpretation.
the required technical analysis to minimise or

manage the impacts of potential slope failures.
The time required for data processing and
presentation is usually similar to, and may
even exceed, the time required to collect data.
257
RESPONDING TO DATA VARIATIONS

Interpretation of data from movement
monitoring systems primarily involves
assessing the onset of changes in the
movement rate. This is generally reflected
by acceleration but, where a slope is already
moving, deceleration may also occur.
If the material does fail, the site should have
The reporting procedure in the event of

any TARP should be clearly defined and
understood by all. Slope failures very rarely
occur without some warning, and all workers
need to be able to recognise potential hazards
and act accordingly. It is recommended
TARPs also include actions to be taken where
monitoring systems or instruments are no
longer operational (ie breakdowns).
a pre-planned response to the movement.

This can be achieved through the use of
trigger points or trigger action responses
(TARPS) established for each monitoring
method. A typical system of trigger points
might be as follows:
>> The initial trigger point would be if the
movement rate is double the survey
accuracy from the last reading. In this case
the reading should be repeated as soon
as possible. If the reading is proven correct,
additional readings should be taken at
an increased frequency.
>> The second trigger point would be if
the movement rate doubles over two
consecutive readings. In this case, the
area of the moving prisms should be
inspected. If the cause of movement
cannot be determined, reduce extraction
or mining in the area or suspend it and
increase the reading frequency. Until the
situation has been fully investigated,
After each set of data has been interpreted,

report conclusions in the form of an interim
monitoring report, and submit this to workers
responsible for implementing remedial actions.
At the very least, supply management with a
monthly summary report of the results from
the monitoring program, even if no movement
is detected. A final report of the monitoring
program is often required, and a technical
paper may be prepared.
23.14 APPENDIX N: ISOLATION
AND LOCKOUT OF ENERGY
In this section, the term energy refers to
anything that can provide power to a system
to allow it to perform work. The term system
refers to machinery, equipment or processes.
22.14.1TYPES OF ENERGY
continued acceleration of movement
The term energy includes any electrical,
should require closure of the pit floor
mechanical, pneumatic, chemical, thermal or
below the moving area.
gravitational energy. Some energy sources are
>> If an increase in movement greater than

four times the survey error is recorded
for any reading, when there has been
no previous accelerations noted on a
258
REPORTING CONCLUSIONS
obvious, such as electricity, heat in a furnace,

or something that might fall. Others may
be hidden hazards, such as air pressure in a
system or a tightly wound spring.
prism, clear the area below the movement
Electrical energy is the most common form of
immediately until the point has been
energy used in workplaces. It can be available
resurveyed. If the reading is confirmed,
live through power lines or it can be stored, for
keep the area clear until the situation has
example, in batteries or capacitors. Electricity
been investigated.
can harm people in one of three ways:
1. by electric shock
Mechanical energy is the energy contained in an
2. by secondary injury (eg burn)
item under tension. For instance, a spring that
3. by exposure to an electric arc.

Hydraulic potential energy is the energy
is compressed or coiled will have stored energy

which will be released in the form of movement
when the spring expands. The release of
stored within a pressurised liquid. When
mechanical energy may result in an individual
under pressure, the fluid can be used to move
being crushed or struck by the object.
heavy objects, machinery, or equipment.

Examples include braking systems in vehicles
or hydraulic lifting arms. When hydraulic
energy is released in an uncontrolled manner,
individuals may be crushed or struck by
moving machinery, equipment or other items.
Pneumatic potential energy is the energy
Understand that all of these energy types can

be considered as either the primary energy
source, or as residual or stored energy (energy
that can reside or remain in the system). The
primary energy source is the supply of power
that is used to perform work. Residual or
stored energy is energy within the system
stored within pressurised air. Like hydraulic
that is not being used, but when released
energy, when under pressure, air can be used
it can cause work to be done.
to move heavy objects and power equipment.

Examples include spraying devices, power
washers, or machinery. When pneumatic
energy is released in an uncontrolled manner,
individuals may be crushed or struck by
moving machinery, equipment of other items
(ie hoses).
Chemical energy is the energy released when
For example, when you close a valve on a

pneumatic (air) or hydraulic (liquid) powered
system, you have isolated the system from
its primary energy source. However, there is
still residual energy stored in any air or liquid
that remains in the system. In this example,
removing the residual energy would include
bleeding out the liquid, or venting out the air.
a substance undergoes a chemical reaction.
Until this residual energy is removed from the
The energy is normally released as heat,
system, there is a potential hazard.
but could be released in other forms, such

as pressure. A common result of hazardous
chemical reaction is fire or explosion.
Radiation energy is energy from
Control of energy includes isolating the system

from its primary power source and removing
the residual energy.
electromagnetic sources. This energy
22.14.2IS LOCKOUT AND ENERGY CONTROL
covers all radiation from visible light, lasers,
THE SAME THING?
microwave, infra-red, ultraviolet, and x-rays.

Radiation energy can cause injuries ranging
from skin and eye damage to cancer.
Gravitational potential energy is the energy
related to the mass of an object and its
distance from the ground. The heavier an
object is, and the further it is from the ground,
the greater its gravitational potential energy.
The terms lockout and isolation are sometimes

used interchangeably, but they are not the
same thing.
Energy isolation is a broad term describing
the use of procedures, techniques, designs
and methods to protect workers from injury
due to the inadvertent release of energy.
For example, a 1 kilogram (kg) weight held
Lockout is the placement of a lock or tag on
2 metres above the ground will have greater
an energy-isolating device in accordance with
gravitational potential energy than a 1 kg
an established procedure. It indicates the
weight held 1 metre above the ground.
energy-isolating device is not to be operated
259
until removal of the lock or tag. Therefore,
Perform a task analysis: A task analysis is
lockout is one way in which energy control
performed by examining all the intended uses
can be achieved.
of the system from the perspective of both the
22.14.3ENERGY ISOLATION PROCEDURES

In most cases, equipment or systems will have
safety devices built in. These safety devices
include guards and safeguarding devices to
steps required to accomplish the task. Include

any tasks related to any possible misuse of
the system in this analysis. When performing
the task analysis, at a minimum, consider the
protect workers during normal operations.
following categories:
However, during maintenance or repairs,
>> machine or process start up
these devices may have to be removed or
>> programming of any machinery PLCs
by-passed. In these situations, an energy

isolation procedure is needed. Energy isolation
procedures may be part of a Permit to Work
system (refer section 17.3).
Energy isolation procedures are used to
maintain worker safety by preventing:
>> unintended release of stored energy
>> unintended start-up
>> commissioning
>> all modes of operation
>> Interlinked processes such as conveyors,
crushers, screens
>> operational maintenance such
as replacement of GET (ground
engaging tools)
>> normal and unscheduled stoppages
>> unintended motion
(control failure or jam) and restart and
>> contact with a hazard when guards
emergency stoppages and restart
are removed or safety devices have

been by-passed or removed.
Developing and implementing energy isolation
>> fault-finding and troubleshooting, planned

and unplanned maintenance and repair,
cleaning and housekeeping.
procedures involves 5 steps:
Perform a risk appraisal and risk assessment:
Gather information: Gather documentation
Based on the information from the first two
from the manufacturer or designer of the

system about:
>> Where energy isolating devices are located
and procedures for their use.
>> Step-by-step procedures for servicing
or maintaining the system.
>> How to safely address malfunctions, jams,
misfeeds or other planned and unplanned
interruptions in operations.
>> How to install, move, and remove any
or all parts of the system safely.
This information will help you to understand
how the system was intended to be used, and
will provide you with recommendations on
how the tasks can be performed safely.
260
manufacturer and the user. List all tasks and
steps, perform a risk appraisal and assessment

of how workers will be interacting with the
system. Outline where possible hazards are,
and what the associated risk of each hazard is.
Examples include:
>> a hydraulic hose releases pressurised
fluid when it is removed for maintenance
purposes
>> a barrier or guard has been removed
or by-passed
>> an interlocked gate closes when a
worker is in the hazardous area
>> a conveyor moves when a blockage
is cleared.
Implement controls: The controls required will

follow what hazards and risks were identified
during the appraisal and assessment.
The energy-isolating device can be a manually
operated disconnect switch, a circuit breaker,
a line valve, or a block. Push buttons, selection
switches and other circuit control switches
are not considered energy-isolating devices.
In most cases, energy-isolating devices will
APPENDIX O: PERMIT
TO WORK SYSTEM PROCESS
23.15
An example of a PTW process is:

Step 1 Highlight Potential Hazards: Workers
guided by the Supervisor identify potential
hazards and implement all necessary safety
measures according to the PTW requirements.
Work is not permitted to start until Stage 4.
have loops or tabs which can be locked
Step 2 Application for Permit: The
to a stationary item in a safe position
Supervisor (or Permit Receiver) applies for
(de-energised position).
permission to start work on a prescribed form.

The supervisor then submits the application
of the PTW to the Authorised Person (or
Permit Issuer) only when all the conditions
in the PTW have been fulfilled. The Receiver
has to indicate in the PTW that risk assessment
was conducted for the task and the safety
measures to be implemented.
Step 3 Evaluation of Permit: The Permit
Issuer evaluates and verifies that all safety
conditions specified in the PTW have been
fulfilled and adequate. They may also
Figure 110: Example of an energy-isolating

manually operated disconnect switch with a loop
for securing a lockout device (photo courtesy
of NZ Steel, Taharoa)
recommend additional measures in the PTW
It is good practice to have a process that
Only when all safety requirements stated in
uniquely identifies all parts of a system
the PTW are fulfilled, will the Permit Issuer
including switches, cables, piping and
endorse the PTW form and, if required,
valves. This allows workers to check they are
forward the permit to the authorised manager.
isolating the right energy-isolation device

when applying isolation procedures and lock
out tag out systems. Make all items readily
identifiable and referenced on system plans
or diagrams. Permanently label key items of
equipment with formal, simple, easily visible
and unambiguous labelling wherever mistakes
when necessary. They need to inspect the work

location where the PTW has been applied for
with the Receiver during this process.
Note: Some companies require an authorised

manager to approve work where the initial risk
score is at a certain level. For example the task
has been risk scored in the High or Extreme
category. If this system is not used, Steps 3
and 4 may be done by the Permit Issuer.
in identification could occur and could result
Step 4 Approval of Permit: The authorised
in significant consequences.
manager (or Permit Issuer) may approve and
Communication, including training:

Communicate and train appropriate workers
on how the procedure works, their role in the
issue the PTW only when they are satisfied that:

>> proper evaluation of risk and hazards for
the work concerned has been conducted
procedures, and what their responsibilities are.
261
>> no incompatible work will be carried

out at the same time and location of the
PTW which may pose a risk to the persons
at work
>> all reasonably practicable safety measures
have been taken and all persons involved
in the work have been informed of the
work hazards under the PTW.
Work is permitted to commence on issue or
approval of the PTW. The supervisor then
posts a copy of the PTW at work location
stated in the PTW. The copy will not be
removed from the work location until the
duration of the PTW has expired or work
stated in the PTW has been completed.
Note: Permit Receivers and Permit Issuers
should not be the same person.
262
Notes
Notes
DISCLAIMER
WorkSafe NewZealand has made every effort to ensure the information contained in this publication is
reliable, but makes no guarantee of its completeness. WorkSafe may change the contents of this guide
at any time without notice.
This document is a guideline only. It should not be used as a substitute for legislation or legal advice.
WorkSafe is not responsible for the results of any action taken on the basis of information in this
document, or for any errors or omissions.
ISBN: 978-0-478-42598-7 (print)
ISBN: 978-0-478-42597-0 (online)
Published: November 2015Current until: 2017
PO Box 165, Wellington 6140, NewZealand
www.worksafe.govt.nz
Except for the logos of WorkSafe, this copyright work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Non-commercial 3.0 NZ licence.
To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/nz/
In essence, you are free to copy, communicate and adapt the work for non-commercial purposes,
as long as you attribute the work to WorkSafe and abide by the other licence terms.
WSNZ_1215_November 2015
265
WorkSafe NewZealand
Level 6
86 Customhouse Quay
PO Box 165
Wellington 6140
Phone: +64 4 897 7699

Fax: +64 4 415 4015
0800 030 040
www.worksafe.govt.nz
@WorkSafeNZ
ISBN: 978-0-478-42598-7 (print)

ISBN: 978-0-478-42597-0 (online)

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TO BE UPDATED TO

Health and Safety at

These good practice guidelines give

HEALTH AND SAFETY AT

How to use this guidance

Scope and application

HAZARD MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Applicable legislation: hazard management in the

The health and safety management system (HSMS)

Identifying hazards and analysing risk

Principal hazard management plans and principal control plans

Responding to hazard reports

Accident recording, notification and investigation

2.10 Hazardous substances

PLANNING FOR EXCAVATION

Appraisal of ground or strata instability principal hazard

Ground or strata instability principal hazard management plan (PHMP)

Ground support and reinforcement systems

PLANNING FOR TIPS, PONDS, VOIDS AND DAMS

Appraisal of tips, ponds and voids principal hazard

Tips, ponds and voids principal hazard management plan (PHMP)

Planning and design criteria for tips

Planning and design criteria for ponds or dams

Construction of a tip or pond

PLANNING FOR ROADS AND VEHICLE OPERATING AREAS 51

Appraisal of roads and other vehicle operating areas

Roads and other vehicle operating areas principal hazard

Design and layout of roads

Hazard management and emergency planning for explosives

Maintaining, transporting and storing explosives

Shot firing safe systems of work

Explosives selection criteria

Drilling, charging and blasting

Minimising blast damage

CONTROLLING GROUND INSTABILITY IN EXCAVATIONS

Planning and design

Excavation control and scaling

Slope movement monitoring programs

Historic underground workings

Working near slopes

TIPPING (OR DUMPING)

Controlling end-tipping risks

General risk controls

Procedures for examining tip heads

Tip maintenance and inspection

Other considerations for stockpiles

Reworking or reshaping tips

Extracting beneath water

WATER OR TAILINGS STORAGE

Inspections and tell-tale signs of distress

10.2 Technical operational review

10.3 Cleaning out ponds

Site access: contractors, visitors and public

Power lines and other overhead structures

Reversing, manoeuvring and parking

Loading floating plant

Loading and storage of large stone slabs or blocks

Safe drivers and vehicles

11.10 Maintenance and repair of roads

9.4 Floating plant and boats