1.

PEREGRINA ASTUDILLO vs. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF

PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION
(PHHC), RAMON P. MITRA, SALUD O. MITRA

AQUlNO, J.: Mitra on December 28, 1957 applied, in behalf of his minor
son, Ramon Mitra Ocampo, for the purchase of Lot 16, Block E-155 of the
East Avenue Subdivision of the PHHC in Piahan, Quezon City.
His application was approved and after payment of the purchase price, a
transfer certificate of title was issued to him.
The lot in question is acqually in the possession of Astudillo. She
constructed thereon a residential house. She admits that she has been
squatting on the said lot "uninterruptedly since 1957 up to the present.
She filed with the administrative investigating committee of the PHHC a
request, praying for the cancellation of the award to Congressman Mitra
and asking the committee to recommend that it be re-awarded to her. No
action was taken on that request.
Peregrina filed in the lower court her aforementioned petition questioning
the legality of the award of Lot 16 to Mitra. She asked that Lot 16 be sold
to her.
The Court of First Instance the petition on the grounds that she is a mala
fide squatter.
Issue: whether Peregrina Astudillo has a cause of action to annul the sale
of Lot 16 to Mitra and to compel the PHHC board to award that lot to her.
Held: None. She has no cause of action to impugn the award to Mitra and
to require that she be allowed to purchase the lot. As a squatter, she has
no possessory rights over Lot 16. In the eyes of the law, the award to Mitra
did not prejudice her since she was bereft of any rights over the said lot
which could have been impaired by that award.
She was not entitled to sue Mitra and the PHHC for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention of a wrong. Those respondents did
not commit any delict or wrong in violation of her rights because, in the
first place, she has no right to the lot. Not being principally or subsidiarily
bound in the contract of sale between Mitra and the PHHC, she is not
entitled to ask for its annulment.
Peregrina invokes the PHHC charter which provides that the PHHC should
acquire buildings so as to provide "decent housing for those who may be
unable otherwise to provide themselves therewith" and that it should
acquire large estates for their resale to bona fide occupants.

Those provisions do not sustain her action in this case. They do not justify
her act of squatting on a government-owned lot and then demanding that
the lot be sold her because she does not yet own a residential lot and
house. She is not a bona fide occupant of Lot 16.
The State is committed to promote social justice and to maintain adequate
social services in the field of housing. But the State's solicitude for the
destitute and the have-nots does not mean that it should tolerate
usurpations of property, public or private.
"In carrying out its social readjustment policies, the government could not
simply lay aside moral standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters,
and intruders, unmindful of the lawful and unlawful origin and character of
their occupancy. Such a Policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of
attaining their just solution"
2.

SSS EMPLOYEES VS CA. 175 SCRA 686

CORTES,J:. SSS filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that the officers and members of SSSEA staged an
illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing
non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to
return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the
SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that
a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the
strikers are ordered to return to work; that the SSSEA be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the
union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the
old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of
union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and
holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6)
months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other
regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of
P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of
the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair
labor practices.
ISSUE: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS)
have the right to strike.
HELD: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to

self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful

concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law"
[Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in
understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government
employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the
formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to
strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
employees in the civil service are denominated as "government
employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No.
1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R.
Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the
case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

3.

People vs. Leachon, G.R. No. 108725-26

Purisima, J.: On August 7, 1990, pursuant to the Resolution of the MTC

San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the Provincial Prosecutor filed two separate
information for violation of P. D. 772, otherwise known as the AntiSquatting Law, against Noli Hablo, Edmundo Mapindan and Diego Escala
before the RTC.
The cases proceeded to trial. On August 18, 1992, almost a year after the
prosecution had rested, the respondent Judge issued an Order dismissing
the said cases motu proprio on the ground of "lack of jurisdiction."
From the aforesaid order of dismissal, petitioners appealed to this Court
via a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, which was referred
to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. On December 24, 1992, the
CA came out with a decision reversing the appealed Order of dismissal,
ordering continuation of trial.
On January 19, 1993, instead of conducting the trial, the respondent judge
dismissed the cases motu proprio, once more, opining that P.D. 772 is
rendered obsolete and deemed repealed by Sections 9 and 10, Article XIII
of the 1987 Constitution, which provide that "urban or rural poor dwellers
shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance
with law and in a just and humane manner."
Petitioners MR denied led to this instant petition.

ISSUE: WoN respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in

dismissing the criminal cases for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law, and in
declaring the said law as repugnant to the provisions of the 1987
Constitution.
HELD: Every legislative act attaches the presumption of constitutionality.
Unless otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged
unconstitutional by this Court, a law will always be presumed valid and the
first and fundamental duty of the court is to apply the law. It is also a basic
rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored
unless it is manifest that such is the legislative intent. P. D. 772 enjoys this
presumption of constitutionality. At the time the respondent Judge
rendered the questioned Decision and issued the orders of dismissal in
1993, Presidential Decree No. 772, Anti-Squatting Law, was still effective.
Neither has this Court declared its unconstitutionality, notwithstanding the
social justice provision of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, specifically
on urban land reform and housing.
Nevertheless, the Court holds that the respondent judge did not err in so
construing the aforecited constitutional provision. Under the Constitution,
what makes the eviction and demolition of urban or rural poor dwellers
illegal or unlawful is when the same are not done in accordance with law
and in a just and humane manner.
However, respondent Judge erred in predicating the validity or legality of
eviction on the existence of a resettlement plan and area. The
constitutional requirement that the eviction and demolition be in
accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane manner does not
mean that the validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on
the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by the
government. What is meant by "in accordance with law" and "just and
humane manner" is that the person to be evicted be accorded due process
or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or
possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the
landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the
occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is
done; and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary
loss of or damage to properties.
Precisely, the enactment of an anti-squatting law affords the alleged
"squatters" the opportunity to present their case before a competent court
where their rights will be amply protected and due process strictly
observed. By filing the proper information in court, complainants have
complied with the first requirement of due process, that is, the opportunity
for the accused to be heard and present evidence to show that his or her
occupation or possession of the property is not against the will or without
the consent of the landowner and is not tainted by the use of force,
intimidation, threat or by the taking advantage of the absence of or
tolerance by the landowners.

Furthermore, what gives impetus to P. D. 772 is the constitutional mandate

that - "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." Far from contravening, P. D. 772 conforms with the 1987
Constitution, in that it protects the rights of a property owner against
unlawful and illegal intrusion.
It should likewise be noted that a constitutional question will not be
decided unless it is properly raised in appropriate cases. Before the court
can assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question, the following
requisites must first be met: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy, including a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial
determination; (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper
party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be
necessary for the resolution of the case.
In the case at bar, the respondent Judge dismissed subject cases motu
proprio, after the prosecution had rested the same and without giving the
three accused an opportunity to present their evidence. What is more,
there is no showing that the issue of constitutionality of P. D. 772 was ever
posed by the accused. Consequently, such an issue cannot be given due
course for the simple reason that it was not raised by the proper party at
the earliest opportunity.
But the foregoing antecedent facts and proceedings notwithstanding, the
petition cannot now prosper because on October 27, 1997, Republic Act
No. 8368, entitled "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772 Entitled
Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts" was enacted. Section 3 of
the said Act provides that "all pending cases under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this
Act."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
4.

Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, PT & T, vs.

National Labor Relations Commission and Grace de Guzman,
respondents.

FACTS: Grace de Guzman was initially hired by PT & T as a reliever as a

"Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed period in place of an employee
who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever Agreement, her
employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the
agreed period. Her services were again engaged as a reliever which was
likewise terminated pursuant to the Reliever Agreement. She was finally
asked to join the company as a probationary employee, the probationary
period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished
her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil
status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a
few months earlier. When PT & T supposedly learned about the same later,
its branch supervisor in Baguio City, sent Grace a memorandum requiring

her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded

about the company's policy of not accepting married women for
employment. Unsatisfied of her explanation, PT & T dismissed her from
employment. She then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor
Abiter. At the preliminary conference, Grace volunteered the information,
and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties,
that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections.
She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of PT & T.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Grace and declared that she already
gained the status of a regular employee and was illegally dismissed. The
Labor Arbiter ordered her reinstatement with backwages it being apparent
that she had been discriminated against on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company rules. The NLRC affirmed the
Labor Arbiters decision with the modification that Grace de Guzman
deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature
of her acts which should not be condoned. PT & Ts motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Grace de Guzmans dismissal was justified.
HELD: No. There are numerous laws which support and command the
State to ensure equal treatment and employment opportunities for both
men and women. The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights
between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life,
provides a gamut of protective provisions.
Art. 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by
reason of the marriage of a female employee. In the case at bar, PT & T's
policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right
against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and
by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to PT & T's assertion that it
dismissed Grace from employment on account of her dishonesty, the
record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved
principally because of the company's policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in PT & T, and not merely because of her
supposed acts of dishonesty.
Verily, Grace's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT & T
could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was
moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a
permanent job in a stable company. While loss of confidence is a just cause
for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on
an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the
employer's caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge
for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.
In the present controversy, PT & T's expostulations that it dismissed Grace,
not because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact.

This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the
tedium of propositions which confuse through less than candid arguments.
Indeed, PT & T glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against
married women, both on the aspects of qualification and retention, which
compelled Grace to conceal her supervenient marriage. It was, however,
that very policy alone which was the cause of Grace's secretive conduct
now complained of. It is then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he
who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Finally, PT & T's collateral insistence on the admission of Grace that she
supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to
dismiss her from employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. The
fact is that she was dismissed solely because of her concealment of her
marital status, and not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of
company funds. That the labor arbiter would thus consider PT & T's
submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought, just to
bolster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of experience
in labor cases. Grace, it must be observed, had gained regular status at
the time of her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on
January 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of
150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September
2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary
period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was
done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure. On the other
hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were undoubtedly
those of a regular employee, even if the same were for fixed periods, as
she performed activities which were essential or necessary in the usual
trade and business of PT & T.
Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women
but just against married women. And, where the employer discriminates
against married women, but not against married men, the variable is sex
and the discrimination is unlawful. Upon the other hand, a requirement
that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a
"bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular
requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a
general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the
workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects
an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.
PT & T's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of
the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of
stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it
likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to
deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by
all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.
Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that PT & T's policy
against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law
relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage. In the final reckoning,

the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by PT & T PT & T
is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation
of the nation. That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect,
disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the
laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required.

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY (EPZA) vs. CHR

FACTS: P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of
land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Processing
Zone" (CEPZ). For purposes of development, the area was divided into
Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was bought by Filoil Refinery
Corporation. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to the EPZA. Before
EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered
the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission
from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To convince the intruders to depart
peacefully, EPZA, paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who
accepted the same and signed quitclaims.
However, the land remained occupied by the intruders. As a result, EPZA
started to demolish the works constructed on the said land. Private
respondents, who are farmers, filed in the Commission a verified complaint
for violation of their human rights. They alleged that on March 20, 1991,
Engr. Damondamon, EPZA Project Engineer, accompanied by his
subordinates and members of the 215th PNP Company, brought a bulldozer
and a crane to level the area occupied by the private respondents who
tried to stop them by showing a copy of a letter from the Office of the
President of the Philippines ordering postponement of the bulldozing.
However, the letter was crumpled and thrown to the ground by a member
of Damondamon's group who proclaimed that: "The President in Cavite is
Governor Remulla!"
Acting on the complaint, the CHR issued an Order of injunction
commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP Company and Governor Remulla and
their subordinates to desist from committing further acts of demolition,
terrorism, and harassment until further orders from the Commission and to
appeal before the Commission. Two weeks later, the same group
accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again bulldozed the area. They
allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their
firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air. CHR issued
another Order of Injunction. EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the
Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and
temporary restraining orders. On August 16, 1991, the Commission denied
the motion. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Does the CHR have the power to issue a writ of injunction?

HELD: No. As earlier ruled in the case of CARIO VS. CHR, the CHR is not
a court of justice and it is not even a quasi-judicial body.
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
law". It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in
the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a
preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper
courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a
court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a
writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any
court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of
the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by
the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any
action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58,
Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is
available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or
protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other
purpose.

5.

PEOPLE v. DULAY (2012)

EDUCATION digests
1.

TABLARIN v. GUTIERREZ
31 July 1987 | Feliciano, J;

FACTS:
Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira,
and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into colleges or schools of
medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take
or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
required by the Board of Medical Education (BME) and administered by the
Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of
applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up
or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the RTC-NCR a Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of
DECS, the BME and the CEM from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985),
dated 23 August 1985 , which established a uniform admission test (NMAT)
as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for
admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school
year 1986-1987, and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as
a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future.
After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial
court denied said petition. The NMAT was conducted and administered as
previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action
for Certiorari with SC to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the
petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical
colleges contravenes the Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of
education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or
unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224
and 5946, known as the Medical Act of 1959 defines its basic objectives
to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b)
the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision,
control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The
Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain
minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools.
The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality
education accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to
enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education
accessible to all who qualify under fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements. The regulation of the practice of

medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable

method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to
regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine.
Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to
practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have
long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.
Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements
for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.

2. MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner,

vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JASPER BRIONES, JEROME GOMEZ,
RELLY CARPIO, ELIZABETH VALDEZCO, JOSE MARI RAMOS,
CAMILLE PORTUGAL, JOEL TAN and GERALD GARY RENACIDO,
respondents. (Kapunan, J)
Facts: The contents of the September-October issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of
Miriam Colleges school paper (Chi-Rho) and its magazine (Ang Magasing
Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho) were allegedly described as "obscene," "vulgar,"
"indecent," "gross," "sexually explicit," "injurious to young readers," and
devoid of all moral values by some members of the Miriam College.
Following their publication, the members of the editorial board, and Relly
Carpio, author of Libog (all students of Miriam College), received a letter
signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College Discipline Committee
informing them that letters of complaint were filed against them and were
forwarded to the Discipline Committee for inquiry and investigation.
They were required to submit a written statement in answer to the charges
before the initial date of the hearing.
None of the students submitted their respective answers. They instead
requested Dr. Sevilla to transfer the case to the Regional Office of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) which under Rule XII
of DECS Order No. 94, Series of 1992, supposedly had jurisdiction over the
case.
The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte.
Thereafter, the Discipline Board, after a review of the Discipline
Committee's report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the students
(suspension, expulsion, withholding of graduation privileges, etc).
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has power to suspend or dismiss
respondent students.
Held:
Yes. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions
of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or

interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for
some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic
freedom" encompass the freedom to determine for itself on academic
grounds:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Who may teach,

What may be taught,
How it shall be taught, and
Who may be admitted to study.

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the
third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot
function in an atmosphere of anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational
institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of
an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational
environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally
necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property.
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a
necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling
discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline
the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."
Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop
discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.
All educational institutions shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster
love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of
national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the
rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values,
develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and
creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and
promote vocational efficiency.
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more
evident than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the
freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has
the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon
whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the
withholding of graduation privileges.
While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to
freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and
to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is
subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.

Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State's power
to regulate educational institution:

unanimously resolved to close the school effective at the end of the first
semester of this school year, 1987-88.

The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private

institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable
supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.

The teachers, students and their parents, a representative of the DECS and
the school administration, thereafter, held a series of dialogues to persuade
CMCI to open the school for one more semester or until the end of the
school year. An agreement was prepared by the DECS but CMCCI wanted
to include a written stipulation binding the students and their parents to
hold no more strikes, rallies, or demonstrations until the end of the school
year. Since the latter did not sign the agreement, the school did not
reopen.

As may be gleaned from the above provision, such power to regulate is

subject to the requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution
allows merely the regulation and supervision of educational institutions,
not the deprivation of their rights.
The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to
suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules
and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational
environment conducive to learning.[58] That power, like the power to
suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution.
We
therefore rule that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the
cases filed against respondent students.

3.

GO v. COLEGIO SAN JUAN DE LETRAN

4.

Capitol Medical Center, Inc. & Dr. Clemente vs. Court of

Appeals

FACTS: Petitioner herein, Capitol Medical Center, Inc. (CMCI), a hospital

corporation, organized, opened, and operated the Capitol Medical Center
College (CMCC) beside its hospital, in Quezon City.
In 1987, halfway through the first semester, the college faculty, led by the
Dean of Nursing, demanded that they be granted vacation and sick leave
privileges similar to those enjoyed by hospital personnel. Negotiations
were conducted but no agreement was reached between the faculty and
the school administration, headed by the president, Dr. Thelma NavaretteClemente, who was concurrently also the chairman of the CMCI Board.
The rift between the administration and the faculty aggravated. The school
administration scheduled the holding of the final semestral examinations
on October 14 to 19, 1987, but the teachers defiantly and unilaterally
"postponed" them. On the scheduled dates for the examinations, the
students joined their teachers in a noisy demonstration in front of the
hospital. As the demonstrations disturbed the peace and quiet of the
hospital and fearful of possible subversive action by hostile student nurses
which might endanger the safety and lives of the patients in the hospital,
an emergency special meeting was held by the CMCI Board and it

Hence, 15 students and parents purporting to represent the 900 students

of the CMCC filed a class suit against CMCC and petitioner Dr. Clemente, in
the RTC of Quezon City praying for the reopening of the CMCC. A writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was granted and directed the defendants
to reopen the school and allow plaintiffs students to enroll in their
respective courses. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of
the above order but it was denied. CMCI filed a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction in the CA and the latter issued a restraining order
and directed the respondents to comment on the petition. The CA then
held that the petitioners had no right to suddenly close the school for the
enrollment of the students created a binding contract between them and
the school for the latter to continue operating until the former shall have
finished their courses. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the reopening of CMC.
HELD: YES, the CA erred in ordering that the school be reopened.
Breach of Contract.
The suit filed against CMCI was based on the
obligation of CMCI to enroll students and educate them until they finish
their respective courses. The CA erred in this light. The contract between
the college and a student who is enrolled and pays the fees for a semester,
is for the entire semester only, not for the entire course. The law does not
require a school to see a student through to the completion of his course.
If the school closes or is closed by proper authority at the end of a
semester, the student has no cause of action for breach of contract against
the school.
But even if it can be supposed that the enrollment of a student creates an
implied "binding contract" with the school to educate him for the entire
course, since a contract creates reciprocal rights and obligations, the
obligation of the school to educate a student would imply a corresponding
obligation on the part of the student to study and obey the rules and
regulations of the school. When students breach that supposed contract by
refusing to attend their classes, preferring to take to the streets to mount

a noisy demonstration against their school, the latter may cancel the
contract and close its doors. Its action would neither be arbitrary nor
unfair.

Two separate petitions for Mandamus were filed with the RTC Quezon City.
The courts granted the petition and ordered the enrollment of the subject
children.

The irony for the school in this case is that it was forced to close by
student action, and is now being forced to reopen by student action also,
assisted by the lower court. We cannot sanction the order of the lower
court which gave aid and comfort to the students who paralyzed the
operation of the school by their mass actions forcing it to shut down
altogether. We cannot approve a situation which would place a school at
the mercy of its students.

While the cases were pending, the children were allowed to continue their
studies. However during, the enrollment period of the school year 1989,
enrollment was refused in the first year high school of Carmella Ang See,
Micheal Robert Ang, Karen Gay Dipasupil and Vonette Uy of the group that
the school was under no legal duty to still accept them in the high school
after graduating them from the elementary courses.

We, therefore, hold that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in
compelling the CMCC to reopen and re-admit the striking students for
enrollment in the second semester of their courses. Since their contracts
with the school were terminated at the end of the first semester of 1987,
and as the school has already ceased to operate, they have no "clear legal
right" to reenroll and the school has no legal obligation to reopen and
readmit them.

5.

Julia Tan and James Tan v Court of Appeals

FACTS: Julia Tan is an 84 year old widow who is the Principal of Grace
Christian High School (the school); Petitioner Tan is the Administrative
Consultant.
The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) approved the
application of the schools tuition fee increase by 15% for the school year
1986-87. Meanwhile a group of parents whose children were enrolled in
the school, were alarmed despite the periodic fee increases and academic
standards and physical facilities of the school; they formed the Grace
Christian High school Parents-Teachers Association (Association)
From February 23 to March 5 1987, the association, petitioners included,
staged a rally outside the school gates. Banners and placards critical of the
schools administration were set up. The already adversarial relation
between the school and the association deteriorated when the
administrators heard several preschool students chanting slogans against
the school and its teachers.
Because of this, petitioners were individually and personally informed
through a letter by the principal that, as they were severely critical of the
schools policies, it would be best for all concerned if their children enrolled
in some other school. Petitioners felt that their children were being singled
out. They proceeded to the MECS for advise. MECS advised the school to
enroll petitioners children, but the school refused.

ISSUE: WON the students who graduated from the elementary

department of the school has a right to enroll in the high school
department of the same school.
HELD: NO. Our ruling the related case of Yap Chin Fah v CA states It is
true that private schools, unlike public utilities and other private
corporations whose businesses impinge on the public interest- are subject
to reasonable regulation and supervision of the State. At the same time,
however, private school have the right to establish reasonable rules and
regulations for the admission, discipline, and promotion of students; this
right extents as well as to parent-teacher associations, as parents are
under social and moral obligation to assist and cooperate with the school.
On the other hand, where relations between parents and students with the
teachers and administrators have deteriorated to the level here exhibited,
a private school may, in the interest of the student body and the faculty
and management as a whold, require the affected children to be enrolled
elsewhere. The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly
educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the
circumstances of this case, the school is forced to admit petitioners
children and to reintegrate them to the student body.
No thinking person can dispute the fact that our country is suffering from
the effects of a serious deterioration of academic and other standards in
our educational system. This court is disturbed by the big number of
candidates taking the bar examination who after 6 year in the elementary
grades, 4 in high school, and 8 in college appear to be functionally semiilliterate judging from the answers they give to bar examination questions.
The same is true of other disciplines, professions and occupations. A
drastic upgrading of educational standards, especially in the elementary
and high school levels is imperative.
It is for the above reason that government should uphold and encourage
schools and collages which endeavor to maintain the highest standard of
education. Educators who insist on high standards and who enforce
reasonable rules of discipline deserve support from courts of justices and
other branches of government.

6. U.P. Board of Regents vs. William

J. Mendoza
FACTS: William Margaret Celine is an Indian citizen and a holder of a
Philippine Visitors visa; she enrolled in the doctoral program in
Anthropology of the University of the Philippines-Diliman. After completing
the course work required in her doctoral program, she worked on her
dissertation entitled Tamil influences in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines. The department of Anthropology after going over her
dissertation noticed several plagiarisms in her work, none the less; she
was allowed to make her oral defense. The Panelist approved her
dissertation with the exception of one panelist; subject to the condition
that she makes the necessary acknowledgement to those plagiarize articles
she copied to her dissertation. She was allowed to graduate but her after
which, she was stripped off her degree after the board made a ruling to
her case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the board of regents has the right to remove her
doctorate degree
HELD: Yes. The constitution provides that academic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. It is a freedom granted to
institutions of higher learning which is thus given a wide sphere of
authority certainly extending to the choice of students. If such institution
of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it
certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and
distinctions of being graduates.

7. CAGAYAN CAPITOL COLLEGE V. NLRC

G.R. Nos. 90010-11
September 14, 1990
FACTS:
Private respondents Villegas and Pagapong were teachers on a probational
basis of the petitioner college.
In their position paper, private respondents Villegas and Pagapong alleged
that they were dismissed by petitioners without valid grounds and that
they were deprived of their constitutional right to due process and security
of tenure. They also raised the issue of non-compliance with presidential
decrees and wage orders pertaining to the payment of emergency cost of
living allowance and their basic salary, including non-payment of their
shares in tuition fee increases under PD 451.
Petitioners, on the other hand, filed their position paper and supplemental
manifestations wherein they denied that private respondents were illegally
dismissed. They maintained that the private respondents alleged

employment contracts on a probation basis expired and that the same

were not renewed because their performances were considered
unsatisfactory while they were on probation. Petitioners further contended
that private respondents, as probationary employees, did not qualify for
tenureship as their services on probation, upon evaluation, did not reach
the standard prescribed for probationary employees. Petitioners also
denied that private respondents are entitled to backwages, since they were
not illegally dismissed and asserted that they have been paid their wages,
allowances and their shares in tuition fee increases and that they were not
entitled to moral damages and attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents were illegally dismissed.
HELD: NO.
There is no question that private respondents were probationary teachers.
Thus, they are covered by the policy instructions issued by the Department
of Labor and Employment that the probationary employment of
professional instructors and teachers shall be subject to the standards
established by the Department of Education and Culture.
There is no question that private respondents have been employed for
three (3) consecutive years as teachers at petitioners' college and on a full
time basis. However, they do not automatically become permanent unless
it is shown that their services during the probationary period were
satisfactory.
The contention of respondents that upon termination of the three-year
probationary period the teacher automatically becomes permanent is not
quite correct. It must be conditioned on the compliance with the third
requisite that the services of said teacher during the probationary period
was satisfactory.
The employer is the one who is to set the standards and determine
whether or not the services of an employee are satisfactory. It is the
prerogative of an employer to determine whether or not the said standards
have been complied with. In fact, it is the right of the employer to shorten
the probationary period if he is impressed with the services of the
employees.
This prerogative of a school to provide standards for its teachers and to
determine whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance
with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy which give
educational institution the right to choose who should teach.