INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

PEOPLE V. POMAR 46 PHIL 440 NOVEMBER 3, 1924

Whether or not Section 13 and 15 of Act 3071 constitutes a valid exercise of the police power of the state.

The accused who was the manager and person in charge of a tobacco factory, employed a woman named Macaria Fajardo
as cigar-maker, whom he granted vacation leave for the reason of her pregnancy. However the accused unlawfully failed
to pay the sum of eighty pesos (P80) to which she was entitled as her regular wages during her leave corresponding to
thirty days before and thirty days after delivery and confinement as mandated by Section 13 of Act. 3071. Sec 15 of the
same act punishes whoever violates the said provisions to a fine or imprisonment. The said Act was promulgated in the
exercise of its supposed police power to safeguard the health of pregnant women and to ensure reasonable support
before and after delivery.

The provisions of section 13 of Act No. 3071 were held unconstitutional and void for it violates the constitutional right to
liberty of the employer and employee in accordance to their own terms. Section 13 creates a term or condition in every
contract made by every person, firm, or corporation with any woman who may, during the course of her employment,
become pregnant, and a failure to include in said contract the terms fixed to a fine and imprisonment. The constitution of
the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty and one of his liberties is the liberty to contract.

ERMITA MALATE HOTEL V. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA 20 SCRA 849 JULY 31, 1967

Whether or not Ordinance 4760 is a valid exercise of the police power of the local government?

Ermita Malate Hotel filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of the due process
clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also vague, indefinite and
uncertain, and likewise alleged the invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination. Ordinance
No. 4760 has the following provisions:

1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby
in open view;
2. 2. Prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
3. 3. Usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
4. 4. Making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every twenty four (24) hours; and
5. 5. Cancellation of license for subsequent violation.

The ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely
enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not
only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the LGU
concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting
duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.

NOBLE V. CITY OF MANILA 67 PHIL 1 DECEMBER 28, 1938

Whether or not the City of Manila has the right to exercise to expropriate the property of Noble.

Under a contract entered into between Jose Syquia and the City of Manila, the parties agreed that Mr. Syquia shall lease
the building to the City, after the construction thereof, for a period of not more than three years, at a monthly rental of
P600, payable within the first five days of every month following. And that the City shall buy the building from Mr. Syquia
within three years from the occupancy thereof for P46,600. Under the amended contract between Jose Syquia and the
City of Manila, the parties agreed, among others, that the City of Manila shall buy the school building within the said
period of three (3) years according to the price stipulated in the contract: Provided, however, That, if at the end of three
years, the City of Manila, for any reason, shall be unable to pay the stipulated sales price, the contract of lease of the land
and of the building Annex, shall be deemed extended for the same period, and so on successively. The terms and
conditions of the contract of October 18, 1926 are kept alive and confirmed, as forming a part of this amended contract,
except as it is incompatible therewith. Under the terms of transfers made in conformity with the City, all the rights of
Syquia flowing from his contract with the city, were fully transferred, first, to Sandoval, and, thereafter, to Noble.
The then mayor of the city, Tomas Earnshaw, proposed to Vicente Noble that, in order to comply with the rules of
accounting then existing, the contract be amended in the sense that, the lease be made renewable every year, instead of
every three years, and for this purpose it was agreed, that it be renewable from year to year until the leased building is
purchased in accordance with the original contract of July 22, 1927. The City of Manila failed to pay the stipulated rent
corresponding to the month of February, 1934, and following, whereupon Vicente Noble, on April 10, 1934, filed the
complaint which gave rise to this case, wherein he asks that the city be ordered to purchase the building for the price of
P46,600, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint. The City of Manila prayed by way of cross-complaint
that the lease of the building by the city be rescinded and set aside and that the same be expropriated. The contract
between the parties, in so far as it refers to the purchase of the building, is in force, not having been revoked by the
parties or by judicial decision. This being the case, the city being bound to buy the building at an agreed price, under a
valid and subsisting contract, and the plaintiff being- agreeable to its sale, the expropriation thereof, as sought by the
defendant, is baseless. Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or by
the lack of any agreement as to the price. Expropriation, as a manifestation of the right of eminent domain of the state
and as a limitation upon private ownership, is based upon the consideration that it should not be an obstacle to human
progress and to the development of the general welfare of the community. In the circumstances of the present case,
however, the expropriation would depart from its own purposes and turn out to be an instrument to repudiate
compliance with obligations legally and validly contracted.

REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS 383 SCRA 211

Whether the private respondents are entitled for the return of their expropriated property?

The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos,
predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area. The national government failed
to pay to herein private respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision being assailed. The Bulacan
RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on
the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for the implementation thereof. In the meantime, President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State
University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the
Philippine carabao. This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid, and
no action was taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit
the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late
Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court.

At all events, petitioner has a valid point in emphasizing the "public nature" of the expropriated property. Respondents
questioned the right of PIA to transfer ownership of a portion of the property to the Bulacan State University even while
the just compensation due the heirs had yet to be finally settled.

The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any
property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it
requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and
as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its
scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property
the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under
a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property
whenever the public interest so requires it. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for
the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the
condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts
title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. The
constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property,
broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time
of the actual taking by the government.

CITY OF MANILA V. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA 40 PHIL 349

Whether the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation?

The City of Manila filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public
improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.
The Chinese Community of Manila, on the other hand, alleged, among others, that no necessity existed for said
expropriation. The lower court ruled that there wasno necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in
question. The City of Manila therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it has the authority to
expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the
land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the
expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land
involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to
render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public
character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. The
general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a
particular case. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or
entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question which the courts have the right to inquire into. The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the
necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is purely legislative and not judicial, arises generally in the
wisdom and propriety of the legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the
question of the right to exercise it in a particular case. By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of
restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes
designated by the law.

REPUBLIC V. LA ORDEN DE PP. BENEDICTINOS 1 SCRA 646

Whether the Courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to
determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefore.

To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda street, the Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga street
from its junction with Mendiola street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to
buy a portion of approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de
Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation that owns the San Beda College, a private educational institution situated on
Mendiola street. Not having been able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted
the present expropriation proceedings. On May 27, 1957 the trial court, upon application of the Government—
hereinafter referred to as appellant—issued an order fixing the provisional value of the property in question at
P270,000.00 and authorizing appellant to take immediate possession thereof upon depositing said amount. The deposit
having been made with the City Treasurer of Manila, the trial court issued the corresponding order directing the Sheriff of
Manila to place appellant in pos&ession of the property aforesaid. On June 8, 1957, as directed by the Rules of Court, the
herein appellee, in lieu of an answer, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the following grounds:

"I. That the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to public use and therefore is not subject to
expropriation.

"II. That there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation.

"III. That the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different site which would entail less expense to the
Government and which would not necessitate the expropriation of a property dedicated to education.

"IV. That the present action filed by the plaintiff against the defendant is discriminatory.

"V. That the herein plaintiff does not count with sufficient funds to push through its project of constructing the proposed
Azcarraga Extension and to allow the plaintiff to expropriate defendant's property at this time would be only to
needlessly deprive the latter of the use of its property."

The government filed a written opposition to the motion to dismiss (Record on Appeal, pp. 30-37) while appellee filed a
reply thereto (Id., pp. 38-48). On July 29, 1957, without receiving evidence upon the questions of f act arising from the
complaint, the motion to dismiss and the opposition thereto filed, the trial court issued the appealed order dismissing the
case. The appealed order shows that the trial court limited itself to deciding the point of whether or not the
expropriation of the property in question is necessary (Rec. on Ap., p. 50) and, having arrived at the conclusion that such
expropriation was not of extreme necessity, dismissed the proceedings.
It is to be observed that paragraph IV of the complaint expressly alleges that appellant needs, among other properties, the
portion of appellee's property in question for the purpose of constructing the Azcarraga street extension, and that
paragraph VII of the same complaint expressly alleges that, in accordance with Section 64 (b) of the Revised
Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines had authorized the acquisition, thru condem-nation proceedings, of
the aforesaid parcel of land belonging to appellee, as evidenced by the third indorsement dated May 15, 1957 of the
Executive Secretary, Office of the President of the Philippines, a copy of which was attached to the complaint as Annex "C"
and made an integral part thereof. In denial of these allegations appellee's motion to dismiss alleged that there is no
necessity for the proposed expropriation" Thus, the question of fact decisive of the whole case arose.

It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for public use and upon payment of just
compensation; that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine
necessity therefor of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the
exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine necessity therefore. Upon the
other hand, it does not need extended argument to show that whether or not the proposed opening of the Azcarraga
extension is a necessity in order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on Legarda St, is a question of fact dependent not
only upon the facts of which the trial court very liberally took judicial notice but also upon other factors that do not
appear of record and must, therefore, be established by means of evidence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
parties should have been given an opportunity to present their respective evidence upon these factors and others that
might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved, namely, the need to open the
extension of Azcarraga street to ease and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda street. WHEREFORE, the appealed order
of dismissal is set aside and the present case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with
this decision.

REPUBLIC V. PLDT 26 SCRA 620 JANUARY 27, 1969

Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement.

The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers through one of its branches,
the Bureau of Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public service corporation holding a franchise to install
operates and maintains a telephone system. After its creation, the Bureau of Telecommunication set up its own
government telephone system by utilizing its own appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the
PLDT to enable the government offices to call privately. BOT entered into an agreement with the RCA communications
for joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local residents. PLDT
complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their agreement since the BOT had used trunk lines only
for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public in competition with the business
of PLDT.

The Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may
require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. It is unquestionable that real
property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and
services to allow interservice connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In -either case private
property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit.

ESTOPPEL; the principle that precludes a person from asserting something contrary to what is implied by a previous
action or statement of that person or by a previous pertinent judicial determination.
SECRETARY OF FINANCE V. ORO 593 SCRA 14 JULY 15, 2009

Whether the Secretary of Finance can order the re-assessment of vessel MV/Haruna.

On November 24, 1992, the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) authorized the importation of one (1) unit vessel
M/V “HARUNA”; ex: Shin Shu Maru No. 8, under a Bareboat Charter, for a period of five (5) years from its actual delivery
to the charterer. The original parties to the bareboat charter agreement were Haruna Maritime S.A., represented by Mr.
Yoji Morinaga of Panama, and Mr. Guerrero G. Dajao, proprietor and manager of Glory Shipping Lines, the charterer.

On December 29, 1992, the Department of Finance (DOF), in its 1st Indorsement, allowed the temporary registration of
the M/V “HARUNA” and its tax and duty-free release to Glory Shipping Lines, subject to the conditions imposed by
MARINA.
The Bureau of Customs (BOC) also required Glory Shipping Lines to post a bond in the amount equal to 150% of the
duties, taxes and other charges due on the importation, conditioned on the re-exportation of the vessel upon termination
of the charter period, but in no case to extend beyond the year 1999. Unknown to the Collector of the Port of Mactan,
Glory Shipping Lines had already offered to sell the vessel M/V “HARUNA” to the respondent in October 1994. In fact, the
respondent already applied for an Authority to Import the vessel with MARINA on October 21, 1994, pegging the
proposed acquisition cost of the vessel at P1,100,000.00. MARINA granted this request through a letter dated December
5, 1994, after finding that the proposed acquisition cost of the vessel reasonable, taking into consideration the vessel’s
depreciation due to wear and tear. On December 2, 1994, Haruna Maritime S.A. and Glory Shipping Lines sold the M/V
“HARUNA” to the respondent without informing or notifying the Collector of the Port of Mactan. In his September 1998
Decision,5 the Collector of the Port of Mactan ordered the forfeiture of the vessel in favor of the Government, after finding
that both Glory Shipping Lines and the respondent acted fraudulently in the transaction. The Cebu District Collector,
acting on the respondent’s appeal, reversed the decision of the Collector of the Port of Mactan in his December 1, 1998
decision, concluding that while there appeared to be fraud in the sale of the vessel M/V “HARUNA” by Haruna Maritime
S.A. and Glory Shipping Lines to the respondent, there was no proof that the respondent was a party to the fraud.

Petitioner: The petitioner mainly argues that the CA committed a reversible error when it held that the assessment of the
Customs Collector of the Port of Manila had become final and conclusive on all parties pursuant to Sections 1407 and
1603 of the TCCP. According to the petitioner, these provisions cannot limit the authority of the Secretary of Finance or
the Commissioner of Customs to assess or collect deficiency duties; in the exercise of their supervisory powers, the
Commissioner and the Secretary may at any time direct the re-assessment of dutiable articles and order the collection of
deficiency duties. Even assuming that Sections 1407 and 1603 of the TCCP apply to the present case, the petitioner posits
that the one-year limitation14 set forth in these provisions presupposes that the return and all entries, as passed upon
and approved by the Collector, reflect the accurate description and value of the imported article. Where the article was
misdeclared or undervalued, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until a deficiency assessment has been issue
and settled in full. Lastly, the petitioner claims that the respondent, being a direct and actual party to the importation,
should have ensured that the imported article was properly declared and assessed the correct duties.

Respondent: The respondent, on the other hand, claims that the appraisal of the Collector can only be altered or modified
within a year from payment of duties, per Sections 1407 and 1603 of the TCCP; it is only when there is fraud or protest or
when the import entry was merely tentative that settlement of duties will not attain finality. The petitioner’s allegation
that there was misdeclaration or undervaluation of the vessel is not supported by the evidence and is contrary to the
findings of the District Collector of the Port of Cebu, which the petitioner himself affirmed in his 4th Indorsement dated
January 8, 1999. Moreover, the records show that the value of the vessel was properly declared by the respondent at
P1,100,000.00, pursuant to the appraisal of the MARINA.

An important factual circumstance that the CTA and the CA appear to have completely overlooked is that the vessel first
entered the Philippines through the Port of Mactan and it was the Collector of the Port of Mactan who first acquired
jurisdiction over the vessel when he approved the vessel’s temporary release from the custody of the BOC, after Glory
Shipping Lines filed Ordinary Re-Export Bond No. C(9) 121818. When this re-export bond expired on March 22, 1994,
Glory Shipping Lines filed a letter dated May 10, 1994 guaranteeing the renewal of the re-export bond on or before May
20, 1994, otherwise the duties, taxes and other charges on the vessel would be paid. Therefore, when May 20, 1994 came
and went without the renewal of the vessel’s re-export bond, the obligation to pay customs duties, taxes and other
charges on the importation in the amount of P1,296,710.00 arose and attached to the vessel. Undoubtedly, this lien was
never paid by Glory Shipping Lines, thus it continued to exist even after the vessel was sold to the respondent. Section 1204 of
the TCCP in this regard states:

“Section 1204. Liability of Importer for Duties.—Unless relieved by laws or regulations, the liability for duties, taxes,
fees and other charges attaching on importation constitutes a personal debt due from the importer to the government
which can be discharged only by payment in full of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges legally accruing. It also
constitutes a lien upon the articles imported which may be enforced while such articles are in custody or subject to the
control of the government.” As defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, a lien is a claim or charge on property for payment of
some debt, obligation or duty.

In this particular instance, the obligation is a tax lien that attaches to imported goods, regardless of ownership.
Consequently, when the respondent bought the vessel from Glory Shipping Lines on December 2, 1994, the obligation to
pay the BOC P1,296,710.00 as customs duties had already attached to the vessel and the non-renewal of the re-export
bond made this liability due and demandable. The subsequent transfer of ownership of the vessel from Glory Shipping
Lines to the respondent did not extinguish this liability.
Therefore, while it is true that the respondent had already paid the customs duties assessed by the Collector of
the Port of Manila, this payment did not have the effect of extinguishing the lien given the tax lien that had
attached to the vessel and the fact that what had been paid was different from what was owed. From the point of
amount alone, the customs duties paid to the Collector at the Port of Manila only amounted to P149,989.00, while the lien
which had attached to the vessel based on the unpaid assessment by the Collector of the Port of Mactan amounted to
P1,296,710.00. Finally, we deem it necessary to reiterate our pronouncement in Chevron Philippines v. Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs,27 where we discussed the importance of tariff and customs duties in the following manner:

“Taxes are the lifeblood of the nation. Tariff and customs duties are taxes constituting a significant portion of the public
revenue which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been ordained to perform for the welfare of its
constituents. Hence, their prompt and certain availability is an imperative need and they must be collected without
unnecessary hindrance.” In keeping with this and other cited rulings, we find in favor of the petitioner and uphold his
order for the re-assessment of the value of the vessel based on the entered value, which in this case should follow the
unpaid assessment made by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Mactan.

COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. PETRON CORPORATION 668 SCRA 735 MARCH 21, 2012

Whether the governemnt is not estopped from collecting taxes due to mistakes of its agents.

Whether the doctrine of “non-applicability of estoppel to the government” apply in this case.

Estoppel; Estoppel does not apply to the government, especially on matters of taxation. Taxes are the nation’s lifeblood
through which government agencies continue to operate and with which the State discharges its functions for the welfare of
its constituents.—We recognize the well-entrenched principle that estoppel does not apply to the government, especially on
matters of taxation. Taxes are the nation’s lifeblood through which government agencies continue to operate and with which
the State discharges its functions for the welfare of its constituents. As an exception, however, this general rule cannot be
applied if it would work injustice against an innocent party.

For the taxable years of 1995-1998, Petron Corp paid its tax liabilities with the Tax Credit Certificates (TCC) it received
from different BOI-registered companies as consideration for the delivery of petroleum products to these companies.
Petron’s acceptance and use of the TCCs has been continuously approved by the Department of Finance as well as the BIR
Collection Program Division through its surrender and subsequent issuance of Tax Debit Memos (TDMs). In a post-audit
conducted by the DOF, it was found out that the TCCs issued to the TCC transferors were fraudulently obtained and
fraudulently transferred to Petron. Thus, the TCCs and TDMs issued to Petron were cancelled by the DOF.
Now, the CIR issued an assessment against Petron for deficiency excise taxes for the taxable years 1995-1998, inclusive of
surcharges and interests, on the ground that the TCCs which Petron used to pay its taxes were cancelled and therefore
has the effect of nonpayment of taxes. The CIR also alleged that Petron has the intent to evade its taxes, thus making the
returns it filed fraudulent. In the stipulation of facts between the parties, one of the judicial admissions was that Petron
never participated in the procurement and issuance of the TCCs to its transferors. Also, before the CTA En Banc, it was
held that Petron was an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.
We deny CIR’s petition for lack of merit. As a general rule, the principle of estoppel does not apply to the government,
especially on matters of taxation. Taxes are the nation’s lifeblood through which government agencies continue to
operate and with which the State discharges its functions for the welfare of its constituents. The exception however is
that this rule cannot be applied it if it would work injustice against an innocent party. Petron has not been proven to have
had any participation in or knowledge of the CIR’s allegation of fraudulent transfer and utilization of the TCCs. Petron’s
status as an innocent purchaser for value has been established and even stipulated upon by the CIR. Petron was thereby
amply protected from the adverse findings subsequently made by the DOF agency.

On the issue of estoppel, petitioner contends that the TCCs, which the Center had continually approved as payment for
respondent’s excise tax liabilities, were subsequently found to be void. Thus, the CIR insists that the government is not
estopped from collecting from Petron the excise tax liabilities that had accrued to the latter as a result of the voidance of
these TCCs. Petitioner argues that the State should not be prejudiced by the neglect or omission of government employees
entrusted with the collection of taxes. We are not persuaded by the CIR’s argument. Given the circumstances, the CIR’s
invocation of the non-applicability of estoppel in this case is misplaced. In the light of the main ruling in this case, we
affirm the CTA En Banc Decision finding Petron to be an innocent transferee for value of the subject TCCs. Consequently,
the Tax Returns it filed for the years 1995 to 1998 are not considered fraudulent.
CITY OF MANILA V. JUDGE LAGUIO 455 SCRA 308 APRIL 12, 2005

Whether or not the ordinance is unconstitutional.

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of
operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a
motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the lower court impleading as defendants,
herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council
of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled– AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of
respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower
court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive
exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of
commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires
and therefore null and void. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established.
A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements: COPPPU
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting
as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met:
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from
the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights, a violation of the due process clause. The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and
protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the
Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council’s police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof
were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s social ills can be achieved through
means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses “allowed” under the
Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the
enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not
in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease
in Manila. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the
community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be
punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked
assumption. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead
impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even
impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental
interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental right to liberty and
property. All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its
operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be
forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
JMM PROMOTIONS AND MANAGEMENT INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS 260 SCRA 319 AUGUST 5, 1996

Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.

Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other
destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which
later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal
POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artist’s Record Book which a
performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines
assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and
deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor
of EIAC.
The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power. Police power concerns
government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden
rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public
welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women
was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3.
Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to “high risk” destinations, a measure
which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of
screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to
only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be
gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY V. ERICTA 122 SCRA 759

Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property.

An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation of establishment of private cemeteries
in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity
burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park,
contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a
valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the
benefit of the public.
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires
payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just
compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be
taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the police
power of the state.

UNITED STATES V. TORIBIO 15 PHIL 85 JANUARY 26, 1910

Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power.

Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of Bohol. The trial court of
Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal
treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for
agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption. The respondent counters by stating that what the Act
is:

(1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal
treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his
carabao in his dwelling,

(2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing
for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives
them of the enjoyment of their private property.

It is a valid exercise of police power of the state. The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and
penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the
permit provided for in section 30. Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote
the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive
other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. The
Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of Toribio it will defeat the purpose of the law. The police
power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private property by police
regulation can be justified, The Supreme Court think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by
the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that
power. The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain. The
said law does not constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as a mere regulation for the
consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare and public interest. Appropriation of private
property to public use- These provisions held not to constitute an appropriation of private interests to a “public use” so as
to bring them within the principles of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain and t oentitle the owners to
compensation, being no more than a just restraint of an injurious private us of property.

TAXICAB OPERATORS V. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION 117 SCRA 597

A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by
Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners’ constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree
No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners’
constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators,
who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place
in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No.
77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of
model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are
roadworthy and fit for operation. As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State,
in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also
regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando “the necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that
their interests are disregarded”.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, AND SPORTS V. SAN DIEGO 180 SCRA 533 DECEMBER 21, 1989

Whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The
petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the
petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule.

He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. In his original
petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an
arbitrary exercise of the police power. This Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to
limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a
medical education. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of
achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the
quality of medical education in the country." Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method. No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a
person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only
inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his
interest.

LIM V. JUDGE PACQUING G.R. NO. 115044 JANUARY 27, 1995

Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games
and Amusements Board (GAB). The Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled “An
Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain
And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes.” Presidential
Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled “Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local
Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog
Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing
franchises and permits issued by local governments. The Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-
Alai. The government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which
expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by
local governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it should be remembered
that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is, more importantly, a mere privilege specially in
matters which are within the government’s power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power.
Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare.
ACEBEDO OPTICAL V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 100152 MARCH 31, 2000
Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police power.
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local
optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically
made Acebedo dependent upon prescriptions or limitations to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo basically is not
allowed to practice optometry within the city (but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however acquiesced to the said
conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was
subsequently suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The
local optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and
that the imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions were entered upon
by the city in its proprietary function hence the permit is actually a contract.
NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter being
within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be
given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the
mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances
otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege –
estoppel does not apply.
BINAY V. DOMINGO G.R. NO. 92389 SEMPTEMBER 11, 1991
Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare clause
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance
to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the
unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution.
Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program.
However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation
thereof for the reason, among others, (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety,
etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only;
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized
government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex.
Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is inherent
in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a
valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. Municipal
governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to
"enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and promote general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein.
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES 234 SCRA 255 JULY 20, 1994
Whether the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic
organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in
several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was
this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of
Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On
March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement

No. Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and
other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are
in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to
enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and
the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
BELTRAN V.SECRETARY OF HEALTH G.R. NO. 133640 NOVEMBER 25, 2005
Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power

Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly registered
non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks. Public respondent Secretary of Health is
being sued in his capacity as the public official directly involved and charged with the enforcement and implementation
of RA 7719 or the National Blood Service Act. Section 7 of RA 7719 provides phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said provision on the ground, among others, that such represents undue
delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the state.

Petitions dismissed. The court upholds the validity of RA 7719. The promotion of public health is a fundamental
obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. RA 7719 was enacted in the
exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. Police power of the state is
validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the
interference of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought
to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals Police power is the State authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Thus, persons may be
subject to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to its
fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.

DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORG V. PHIL BLOOMING MULLS CO. 51 SCRA 189 JUNE 5, 1973
What did the SC mean when it mentions “hierarchy of rights”, “preferred position?”
Do life and property enjoy identical protection from the Constitution?
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to
express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. After learning about the planned mass
demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting,
the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike
against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression,
freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. The company asked them to cancel the
demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This
was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the
rally. A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to
participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate , otherwise, they would be
dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually
dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. The lower
court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their
motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.

No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.
Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space
to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost
thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression
and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." The
freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute
when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom
we shall be governed.”
SIMON JR. V. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 229 SCRA 117 JANUARY 5, 1994
What is human right? What is a civil right? What is a political right?
Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a fine for contempt.

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls
and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and
ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's
jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority
should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the
rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business".

Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carenderia cannot fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights".

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or more specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be
understood to include those that relate to an individual’s social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus
seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

“Civil Rights”, defined.—The term “civil rights,” has been defined as referring—“(to) those (rights) that belong to every
citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or
administration of government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of
contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state
or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil
action.”

“Political Rights”, explained.—Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the
right of petition and, in general, the right appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES V. GLAXO WELLCOME 438 SCRA 343 SEPTEMBER 17, 2004
Whether or Not Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not
holding that said policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner Pedro Tecson was hired on Oct. 25, 1995 by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. as a medical
representative. He was assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. Upon his
employment, Tecson signed an employment contract, wherein he agreed, among others, to study and abide by existing
company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies; and if management found that such relationship posed a possible
conflict of interest, to resign from the company. On September, 1998 Tecson married Bettsy, an employee of a rival
pharmaceutical firm Astra Pharmaceuticals as the branch coordinator. The relationship, including the subsequent
marriage, dismayed Glaxo. On January 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy had given rise
to a conflict of interest. Negotiations ensued, with Tecson adverting to his wife's possible resignation from Astra, and
Glaxo making it known that they preferred to retain his services owing to his good performance. Yet no resolution came
to pass. In September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer to Glaxo's milk division, but his application was denied in view
of Glaxo's "least-movement-possible" policy. Then in November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-
Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. Tecson
sought Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to Glaxo’s Grievance Committee. Glaxo,
however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer order. Tecson
defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the Nat’l. Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo’s policy was valid. Glaxo's policy on
relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo's right to
transfer Tecson to another sales territory. This decision was assailed by petitioners before the Court of Appeals and the
Court, but for nothing.
The record shows that Tecson was cognizant about the policy imposed by Glaxo company, upon signing the contract, he voluntarily set his hands
to follow the said policies. Albeit employees are free to cultivate relationships w/ and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company
merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships. After Tecson
married Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve the conflict . Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its employ
because of his satisfactory performance and suggested that his wife would be the one to resign instead. Glaxo likewise
acceded to his repeated requests for more time to resolve the conflict of interest. When the problem could not be
resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that
handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned him to
another area where his home province, Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting Tecson’s transfer, Glaxo even
considered the welfare of Tecson’s family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the
part of Glaxo. Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a competitior
company is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
Same; Same; The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.—The
challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously
suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those
acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the
equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. The only
exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or
involved in the wrongful private conduct. Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this case.
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment
becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.
CAUNCA V. SALAZAR 82 PHIL 851 JANUARY 1, 1949
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance
payment it gave
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was
employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has
already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer
to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense
from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no
power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of
the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from
one place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if
not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered
exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is
entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or
physical coercion.

WHAT “PROPERTY” INCLUDES?

GSIS V. MONTESCLAROS 434 SCRA 441 JULY 14, 2004

Whether or not there is a violation of the due process clause.
Milagros assails unconstitutionality of section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process and equal protection clause.
When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship pension. GSIS denied claim, it said surviving spouse
has no right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three
years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.
There is denial of due process when it outrightly denies the claim for survivorship. There is outright confiscation of
benefits due the surviving spouse without giving her an opportunity to be heard. There is also violation of equal
protection. A proviso requiring certain number of years of togetherness in marriage before the employee’s death is valid
to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gains.
Here, it is 3 years before pensioner qualified for the pension. Under this, even if the dependent spouse married the
pensioner more than 3 years before the pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship
pension if the marriage took place within 3 years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of prohibition is
vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended.
Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected
by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate
payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided
under the terms of the public employees’ pension statute. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without
due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard.
CORONA V. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHIL 283 SCRA 31 DECEMBER 12, 1997
Whether PPA-AO-04-92 is constitutional.

IN ISSUING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO. 04-92), LIMITING THE TERM OF APPOINTMENT OF
HARBOR PILOTS TO ONE YEAR SUBJECT TO YEARLY RENEWAL OR CANCELLATION. ON AUGUST 12, 1992,
RESPONDENTS UNITED HARBOUR PILOTS ASSOCIATION AND THE MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, THROUGH CAPT.
ALBERTO C. COMPAS, QUESTIONED PPA-AO NO. 04-92. ON DECEMBER 23, 1992, THE OP ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING
THE PPA TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO NO. 04-92ON. MARCH 17, 1993, THE OP,
THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C. CORONA, DISMISSED THE
APPEAL/PETITION AND LIFTED THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED EARLIER. RESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION WITH PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN STARK DISREGARD OF RESPONDENTS' RIGHT
AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE SUPREME COURT SAID THAT IN ORDER
TO FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF THIS PROVISION, TWO CONDITIONS MUST CONCUR, NAMELY, THAT THERE IS A
DEPRIVATION AND THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE WITHOUT PROPER OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS A
GENERAL RULE, NOTICE AND HEARING, AS THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, ARE
ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY EXERCISES ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION. IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND HEARING. THERE IS NO
DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A PROFESSION HAS TAKEN ON THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT. IT IS READILY
APPARENT THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 UNDULY RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ENJOY THEIR
PROFESSION BEFORE THEIR COMPULSORY RETIREMENT. Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the
adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby “relevant government agencies” and
the pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment.
Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case of
Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, where it declared that “(a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in
due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence
of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.”

Same; Same; Ships and Shipping; Pilotage; Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right.—There is
dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Even petitioner Corona recognized this
when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that “(t)he exercise of one’s profession falls within the constitutional
guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process.” He merely
expressed the opinion that “(i)n the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful
interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby, and that “PPA-AO 04-
92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession.”

Same; Same; Ships and Shipping; Pilotage; Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right.—There is
no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Even petitioner Corona recognized
this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that “(t)he exercise of one’s profession falls within the constitutional
guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process.” He merely
expressed the opinion that “(i)n the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful
interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby, and that “PPA-AO 04-
92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession.” Pilotage is the act of
conducting a vessel from the high seas into a port. Usually, pilotage is conducted within a two-mile area offshore to an
assigned berthing area and vice versa.

CENTURY TEXTILE MILLS V. NLRC 161 SCRA 528 MAY 25, 1988

Whether or not reinstatement is always available

According to Rodolfo Marin (a factory co-worker of private respondent Calangi), at around 12:15 AM on June 4, 1983 and
within company premises, he chanced upon Gatchie Torrena (a machine operator at petitioner's factory) and noticed the
latter mixing some substance with the drinking water contained in a pitcher from which Meliton and Santos regularly
drank. Before anyone could take a drink from the pitcher, Marin reported what he had observed to Meliton who, in turn,
informed Santos of the same. Soon after, Meliton and Santos took possession of the pitcher of water and filed a formal
report of the incident with company management. The contents of the pitcher were subsequently analyzed by chemists at
the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City who found the presence of a toxic chemical
(formaldehyde) therein. Private respondent Calangi filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch,
National Capital Region, of the then Ministry of Labor and Employment. Among other things, private respondent alleged
in his complaint that prior to his preventive suspension, neither the company nor any of its officers furnished him with a
copy of their charges, nor afforded him the opportunity to answer the same and defend himself. In a Decision dated
August 16, 1984, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the private respondents’ complaint. The Labor Arbiter found that not only
was the evidence against private respondent Calangi overwhelming and sufficient enough to justify his dismissal, but that
the private respondent failed inexplicably to deny or controvert the charges against him.

No. In view of the finding of the illegal dismissal in this case, petitioner Corporation is liable to private respondent Calangi
for payment of the latter's back wages for three years, without qualification and deduction. Considering the
circumstances, however, the Court believes that reinstatement of private respondent to his former position--or to any
other equivalent position in the company will not serve the both interests of the parties involved. Petitioner Corporation
should not be compelled to take back into fold an employee who, at least in the minds of his employers, poses a
significant threat to the lives and safety of company workers. Consequently, we hold that private respondent should be
given his separation pay in lieu of such reinstatement. The amount of separation pay shall be equivalent to the private
respondent's one-half month's salary for every year of service, to be computed from December 13, 1974 (date of first
employment) until June 10, 1986 (three years after date of illegal dismissal).

INSTANCES WHERE A SUBJECT IS NOT PROTECTED PROPERTY

CHAVEZ V. ROMULO 431 SCRA 534 JUNE 9, 2004
Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property?
GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the issuance of Permit to Carry
Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR. Ebdane issued guidelines banning carrying firearms outside of residence.
Petitioner, Francisco Chaves requested DILG to reconsider the implementation. The request was denied. Hence the
petition for prohibition and injunction against Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane.
The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere statutory creation. In a more
emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that: “Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.” In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they
proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms
outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of
firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.
A Permit to Carry Firearms Outside Residence (PTCFOR) does not constitute a property right protected under our
Constitution.—In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident
from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that “the Chief of Constabulary
may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of
firearms to carry them outside of residence.” Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR
does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution.
MIRASOL V. DPWH 490 SCRA 318 JUNE 8, 2006
Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles is unconstitutional.
Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles at the toll way on
the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure to provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of
motorcycles plying the highways. Respondent avers that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles
and that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations.

No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state.
The sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness, not exact definition and scientific formulation. It is evident
that assailed regulation does not impose unreasonable restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures designed to
ensure public safety.

The test of constitutionality of a police power measure is limited to an inquiry on whether the restriction imposed on
constitutional rights is reasonable, and not whether it imposes a restriction on those rights.—Consider Section 3(g) of AO
1, which prohibits the conduct of rallies inside toll ways. The regulation affects the right to peaceably assemble. The
exercise of police power involves restriction, restriction being implicit in the power itself. Thus, the test of
constitutionality of a police power measure is limited to an inquiry on whether the restriction imposed on constitutional
rights is reasonable, and not whether it imposes a restriction on those rights. The right to travel does not mean the right
to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way.—A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the
fastest access to certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and
safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. The right to travel
does not entitle a person to the best form of transport or to the most convenient route to his destination. The
obstructions found in normal streets, which petitioners complain of (i.e., potholes, manholes, construction barriers, etc.),
are not suffered by them alone.

WHEN A RIGHT IS VESTED, WHEN POSSESSION IS JUST TOLERATED.

ESPINOCILLA V. BAGONG TANYAG HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION INC. 529 SCRA 654 AUGUST 9, 2007
Whether or not the petitioners were deprived of their property without due process of law.

Under the Community Mortgage Program, BATAHAI could obtain a loan from NHMFC to purchase the land from its
owners and subdivide it among its member-beneficiaries, subject to the supervision and guidance of the National
Housing Administration. In turn, each member-beneficiary would pay amortizations of the loan to BATAHAI. Under the
BATAHAI Code of Policies, each beneficiary is entitled to only one lot. Petitioners, however, wanted to claim the vacant
lots adjacent to theirs on which vacant lots they planted crops or put up fences and other improvements. Following the
conduct of the structural survey, it was recommended that some houses or structures would be relocated to make way
for the construction of roads under a schematic plan selected by a majority of the BATAHAI members. A Pahayag was
posted containing the list of BATAHAI members who had not complied with the NHMFC requirements, and calling for
compliance therewith. etitioners alleged that respondents subdivided the lots which they have been occupying since
1978 without their knowledge and consent, reassigned the lots without observing due process of law, omitted or deleted
their names from the January 3, 1993 certified list of prospective beneficiaries, and unlawfully replaced three BATAHAI
directors. The records of the case show that petitioners had had more than sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard
before they were delisted as prospective beneficiaries. Before respondents issued the questioned November 25, 1991 list
of prospective beneficiaries, sufficient notices were posted informing petitioners of the need to submit the documents
required by the NHMFC. Even after petitioners were delisted as beneficiaries, respondents set new deadlines for
petitioners to submit the requirements, sending each of them letters reminding them of the consequences of non-
compliance therewith. Petitioners argue, however, that the HIGC Hearing Officer found that they showed their consistent
interest to acquire the lots and pay the cost of acquisition to BATAHAI as soon as the re-subdivided lots be reverted to
their original sizes.

At all events, the due process guarantee cannot be invoked when no vested right has been acquired. The period during
which petitioners occupied the lots, no matter how long, did not vest them with any right to claim ownership since it is a
fundamental principle of law that acts of possessory character executed by virtue of license or tolerance of the owner, no
matter how long, do not start the running of the period of acquisitive prescription. It bears recalling that BATAHAI was
formed precisely to enable the Bagong Tanyag settlers, including petitioners, to purchase the lots they were occupying.
The invocation does not help their cause. Petitioners obstinancy in not complying with the BATAHAI and NHMFC
requirements had delayed the release of the loan to BATAHAI to the detriment of the other BATAHAI members who, like
petitioners, are also urban poor dwellers but who complied with the requirements and even agreed to be relocated in
case the construction of roads for the common interest required the demolition of their houses or structures. To grant the
petition would, instead of promoting, defeat social justice.