Dear Readers,

Here, we are offering an analysis of impact of nationalism on the formulation of foreign

policy. This theme has been subject to many debates and writing, yet, it seems that there
is a lack of explanation of theoretical genesis of the perverted Bosnian-Herzegovinian
nationalism that invents and establishes ethno-nationalist criteria for the purpose of
explaining and preserving itself. Its practical realisation is what we live in our everyday
life in all the visible and invisible crisis it generates.
What makes this analysis even more valuable is the fact that it fully reveals these paradoxes
in the domain of foreign policy, where they are shrewdly disguised behind the alleged
elitism, forged on the flames of the Dayton status quo and seasoned with its ethnosubjects political correctness.
We can argue that the analysis offered is one of the pioneer attempts to define, at least
theoretically, to which of modern national paradoxes the nationalism of BiH belongs. Here,
the analysis not only offers specific answers to this very question, but, more importantly,
clearly and systematically identifies the ways in which ethno-nationalism in BiH prevents
- at a practical level - the formulation of foreign policy, and why it permanently reduces
it to mere foreign affairs.
In a systematically structured paper that brings down the issue to its essential parameters,
it would be easy for readers to find for themselves the answer to question: why BiH is
incapable of adapting its foreign relations to global and regional changes, and why it is
faced with the threat - if it continues along this path - with a permanent status quo which
would annul totally its foreign-policy personality and subjectivity.
We would like to use this opportunity to thank the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Sarajevo
Office, for all the support and confidence.

Sincerely
FPI BH

Impact of Nationalism on
Foreign Policy Formulation

CONTENTS

Introduction
7 Nation And Nationalism: Definitions And Concepts
10 Nationalism And International Relations Theory
11 Nationalism And Foreign Policy Formulation
21 Conclusion

Three basic lines of thought can be identified in understanding the concept of nation:
nationalist - characterising nations as timeless and primordial; perennialist - arguing that
nations have existed for a long time, but take different forms over the time; and concepts
that see nations as entirely modern and constructed. At the beginning, the nationalist
concept was used to mobilise public support in the erosion of the socialist system of
values, and to impose a different, primarily divisive, view of society, which found fertile
ground in the ethnic diversity of BiH. However, it abused the vacuum thus created and
imposed the concept of nation as a social axiom, which cannot be and should not be
challenged. That way, nationalism has been decontextualised, stripped of its theoretical
definition and scientific connotations, transformed into a pure political variable, a pragmatic
political tool. It moulds into institutional shapes created by the claustrophobic Dayton
arrangements, which take the concepts of nations and nationalism for granted, as given
axioms, which represent constitutive elements of this society, without any questioning
of their origins and future, or their impact on the society as a whole. This paper intends
to place nations and nationalism in their wider theoretical framework, for the purpose
of examining their relationship with theories of international relations, and effects on
foreign policy formulation in BiH. We will thus examine and analyse the relationship
and interaction between two seemingly distinct areas of political science, international
relations and nationalism.
Both areas of study are fairly young, but went their separate ways due to an artificially
strict delineation between the internal and external affairs of a state. As a result, more
authors started to argue that, if nationalism continues to be studied autonomously, it will
simply restrict International Relations to foreign policy analysis, national security and
strategic studies.1 However, in the past century, nationalism proved to be a powerful
force for disorder both within states and in inter-state relations.2 It thus undermined
this strict delineation at both a theoretical and practical level and showed that it has a
substantial, compelling and consequential impact on international affairs.
While examining different theoretical concepts of nations and nationalism, we will make
a distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism, and focus on the latter, which is
particular, but not exclusive, to the states of former Yugoslavia.3 Our focus will be the
reasons and origins of the delineation between the two academic disciplines. Commenting
on the central treatment, which the nation-state received in the early theories of International
Relations, realism and liberalism in particular, Michael Sullivan, for example, argues
that nationalism is both a threat to and justification of the division of humanity into
separate sovereign states.4 However, as international relations theories moved away
1

Poole, Ross. Nation and identity.

Pettman, Jan Jindy. Nationalism and after.
http://staff.bath.ac.uk/ecsda/EU10616/Pettman%20on%20Nationalism.pdf

The governance structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are unique in their complexity. As a result of the Dayton and
Washington Peace Agreements, BiH has a State Government (referred to as BiH), two Entity Governments (Federation of
BiH and Republika Srpska) and Brcko District. The Federation of BiH consists of 10 cantons and 80 municipalities, whereas
Republika Srpska consists of 60 municipalities. As a result of the complexity of BiH governance structures and its constitutional
arrangements, the state level is very weak and decentralized, whilst the entities, and cantons to a certain extent, are highly
centralized. One of the main arguments of this study is that structures designed on equitable distribution of power between
different nations/ethnicities provide channels for nationalism to permeate and influence the states policies.

Sullivan, Michael. Nationalism and International Relations Theory, in The Australian Journal of Politics and

from traditionalist theories and began to deconstruct the actors and processes that
shape world affairs, non-state actors, soft interests5, and the meta-politics, such as
that of identity and nationalism, came to the fore. This instigated a question about the
relationship between the two - can nationalism and international relations theories engage
productively to explain world affairs, but also to explain each other?
Bosnia and Herzegovinas heterogeneous ethnic composition and the nature of governance
structures put in place by the Dayton Peace Agreement have created a non-functional
division of labour along ethnic lines. This institutional division represents a medium
for channelling nationalist discontent, which has become a dominant feature of almost
every aspect of state activity, including the formulation and implementation of foreign
policy priorities. The weak and powerless state structures created by the Dayton Peace
Agreement are often denied their statehood by politicians supposedly representing that
very state. As such, BiH does not resemble the classic realist model of a nation-state. Its
internal structures and political dynamics have become particularly influential on foreign
policy-making and as a result, political leaders are finding it more difficult to maintain
a coherent set of priorities in foreign policy, and more difficult to articulate a single
national interest.6 Indeed, this reflects very negatively on the definition of a unified set
of foreign policy priorities. It will, therefore, be argued that for those reasons, Bosnia
and Herzegovina is deprived of a foreign policy, and instead, only engages in foreign
relations.7

Nation And Nationalism: Definitions And Concepts

We will begin with a theoretical characterisation of different aspects of nations and
nationalism: nations occurrence in time, their sociological and political basis, and
theoretical coherence. Ernest Gellner, who was considered to be one of the most important
scholars of nationalism, refrains from formal definitions of a nation, and rather opts for
looking at what culture does8, His study is rather focused on the process through which
nations come to being, and their relationship with the state, neither of which are seen
as universal necessities. Moreover, Gellner clearly states that nations and states are
not the same contingency, although nationalism holds that they were destined for each
other; that either without the other is incomplete,9 and constitutes a tragedy. He
places nationalism at the point of the transition from the agro-literate to the industrial
stage of human history and claims that Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to
self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.10
History, Vol. 43, No. 1, February 1997.
Nye, Joseph. Redefining the National Interest, in Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999, pp. 23 24.

5
6

Ibid. p. 25.

Fawn, Rick (ed). Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies. London: Franc Cass, 2004. p. 21.

Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 6-7.

The state has certainly emerged without the help of the nation. Some nations have certainly emerged without the blessings of
their own state. Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 6-7.

10

Ibid.

However, Benedict Anderson argues that the drawback of this formulation is that Gellner
assimilates invention to fabrication and falsity, rather than to imagining and
creation.11 This imagining is explained in Andersons definition of a nation as an
imagined political community, born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution
were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.12
He reveals three paradoxes in the way nations are comprehended today:
The objective modernity of nations to the historians eye vs. their subjective
antiquity in the eyes of nationalists.
The formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept (in the modern
world everyone can, should, will have a nationality, as he or she has a gender)
vs. the irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations.
The political power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and even
incoherence.13
Anthony Smith identifies other perspectives that Gellners approach fails to account for,
namely the passions generated by nationalism.14 Smith argues that nationalism draws
on the pre-existing history of the group and attempts to fashion this history into a sense
of common identity and shared history. Smith asserts that many nationalisms are based on
historically flawed interpretations of past events and tend to overly mythologize small,
inaccurate parts of their history.15 Nationalism, according to Smith, does not require that
members of a nation should all be alike, only that they should feel an intense bond of
solidarity to the nation and other members of their nation. A sense of nationalism can
inhabit and be produced from whatever dominant ideology exists in a given environment:
it can build on pre-existing kinship, religious and belief systems.
Smiths definition of nation as a named human population sharing an historic territory,
common myths, and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy
and common legal rights and duties for all members16 is criticized by Tamir for mixing
together reasons for the emergence of a nation (a shared historic territory, a common
economy, and a common legal system) with the results (sharing myths and historical
memories).17 For Tamir, a nation is a community whose members share feelings of
fraternity, substantial distinctiveness, and exclusivity, as well as beliefs in a common
ancestry and continuous genealogy.18
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso Editions, 1983.
p. 35.

11

12

Benedict Anderson sees nations as imagined communities because of a deep, horizontal comradeship dependent on joint
imagining of this belonging. Ibid. p.12.

13

Anderson, Benedict. The New World Disorder, in New Left Review. No. 193, May/June 1992.

14

Why should so many have fought and died for their nation, when nationalism was only a tool created by the elites for the sole
purpose of economic gain and economic cohesion?. A. Smith. Nationalism and Modernism. London and New York: Routledge,
1998, p. 74

15

Ibid.

16

Ibid, p. 14.

17

Quoted in Barrington, Lowell W. Nation and nationalism: the misuse of key concepts in political science, in Political
Science & Politics, 1 December 1997, p. 424.

18

Ibid. 425.

The importance of perpetuating the perceived historical lineage of a nation for the purpose
of preserving its contemporary legacy is further explained by Ernest Renan, who holds that
a nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things constitute this soul or spiritual principle.
One lies in the past, one in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy
of memories; the other is present - day consent to live together, the will to perpetuate the
value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form. Renan therefore argues
that a nation is a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one
has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future.19
However, Eric Hobsbawm reasserts Gellners elements of artefact, invention and
social engineering which enters into the making of nations.20 He also stresses another
important dimension of a nation its modernity. He does not regard the nation as
neither a primary nor an unchanging social entity, but as belonging exclusively to a
particular, and historically recent, period. This argument therefore leads us to identifying
the smallest common denominator of all the above theories, used for the purpose of
our argument21: modernity of nations, absence of intrinsic and inherent sociological and
political roots (which can be constructed, imagined, or fabricated through the perpetual
revival of the idea of belonging to a nation), and theoretical incoherence in explaining the
ethnic nationalism.
Liah Greenfeld provides a definition for the distinction between ethnic nationalism
and its other fraternal forms, characterized by its view of nationality as determined
genetically, entirely independent of the individual volition, and thus inherent.22 Elements
of this kind of nationalism, which finds it hard to prove national distinctiveness in terms
of the language, culture, tradition, or even statehood, and thus relies heavily on religious
distinctiveness and ethnic origins are evident in the contemporary nationalism that exist
in BiH. The void created by the dissolution of the socialist system of values was filled
by nationalist ideologies in an abrupt and violent manner, and the notion of a nation was
given gradually the second and third dimension, until it became one of the predominant
features, and eventually a constituent part of the BiH society, culture, and state. The
process through which it was possible to turn a vague notion into a definitive reality is
what is defined here as nationalism. This relationship between nation and nationalism was
also recognized by Hobsbawm who states that nations as a natural, God-given way of
classifying men, as an inherent political destiny, are a myth, whereas nationalism, which
sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents
them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality.23
19

20

Renan, Ernest. What is a Nation? in Eley, Geoff and Suny, Ronald Grigor, ed. 1996. Becoming National: A Reader. New York
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996: pp. 41 55.
Hobsbawm, Eric J. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992, p. 65.

21

Other definitions of a nation further strengthen some elements that can be distilled as common to all those outlined here. E. Renan
does not regard the nation as a neither primary nor as an unchanging social entity and believes that it belongs exclusively to
a particular, and historically recent, period. Miroslav Hroch sees the nation not as an eternal category, and as a combination
of several kinds of objective relationships and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness. Barrington, Lowell W.
Nation and nationalism: the misuse of key concepts in political science, in Political Science & Politics, 1 December 1997.

22

Leah Greenfeld defines a nation as a collective individual, endowed with a will and interest of its own, which are independent of
and take priority over the wills and interests of human individuals within the nation. Ibid.

23

Ibid.

Nationalism And International Relations Theory

That reality needs to be placed in the context of international relations theories in
order to examine which theories of international relations account for the influence of
nationalism on a states conduct in international affairs. Ross Poole argues that realism
and liberalism in International Relations have been challenged in recent years over their
reluctance to transcend an inside/outside disciplinary divide which isolates them from a
growing number of world order issues.24 However, some attempts have been made by
both realism and liberalism to capture nationalisms evident capacity to transcend to the
outside world, but, as it will be demonstrated further below, because of their insistence
on traditionalist actors of inter-national affairs, they still fail to integrate nationalism as a
process that shapes states international behaviour.
Michael Sullivans description of the traditional realist attempt to recognize the problem
of the impact of nationalism on world order, demonstrates this point: realism seeks to
contain nationalism within the existing distribution of territorial borders, so that it does not
upset a stable balance of power among so called Great Powers.25 However, the absence
of the Cold War and great powers leaves an academic vacuum in realist theories, in
which emerging actors, namely intra-, inter-, and cross-state actors, have not been taken
into account and identified as alternatives to the traditional ones. In that respect, Sullivan
argues that realism is unable, either to mount a persuasive critique of nationalism as an
ideology, or to prescribe changes in the conduct of international relations that minimize
the forces of imperialism, ancient or modern.26
Liberal theories, which seek to promote a more orderly world, with an emphasis on
human freedom, also fail to give an adequate explanation of nationalisms impact on
international affairs. The liberalist solution to the problem of nationalism lies in the
spread of the conditions and processes which contribute to what Mueller calls the
obsolescence of war.27 However, as Gellner rightly contends, tensions between
liberalism and nationalism emerged and increased as one moved from West to East, and
as the relevance of ethnic nationalism increases. Ignatieff partly tries to moderate this
tension by making a distinction between rational (civic) and irrational (ethnic) forms of
nationalism. However, as Sullivan puts it, the former is consistent with liberal discourse,
whilst the latter systematically undermines it28, Although, Ignatieffs distinction does
not absolve liberalism from weakness to account for ethnic nationalism, his distinction
is nonetheless considered credible and useful.
From a constructivist perspective, the central issue in the post-Cold War world is how
different groups conceive their identities and interests.29 Although power is not irrelevant,
24

R. Poole, op. cit.

25

Sullivan, Michael. Nationalism and International Relations Theory, in The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 43,
No. 1, February 1997.

26

Ibid.

27

Ibid.

28

Ibid.

29

Walt, Stephen M. International relations One World, Many Theories, in Foreign Policy, 22 March 1998.

10

constructivism emphasises how ideas and identities are created, how they evolve,
and how they inform interests.30 Constructivists contend that agents and structures
are mutually constituted31, and that understanding how actors develop their interests
is crucial to explaining various international phenomena. Constructivism is therefore
considered to be an analytical framework best suited to explain the impact of nationalism
in international affairs. This is primarily true in the case of the unit-level constructivism,
which concentrates on the relationship between domestic social and legal norms, and the
identities and interests of states.32 However, as Anderson points out, even constructivist
explanations of nationalism leave us with a question why should so many be prepared to
kill or die for a nation their grandparents had never heard of?33
We can see that as International Relations theories move to deconstruct the actors and
process that shape world affairs, the politics of identity and nationalism come to the
fore. As the alleged delineation of the two disciplines is undermined, it becomes more
evident that the two disciplines can productively attempt to explain world affairs and each
other. However, such an effort requires considerable distancing from the traditionalist
approaches to international relations, realism and liberalism in particular.

Nationalism And Foreign Policy Formulation

Taking the approach prescribed by constructivism, we bring the nexus between nationalism
and international relations, identified at the theoretical level, into the realm of practical
foreign policy-making. Kenneth Thompson and Roy Macridis deem ideology to be the
dominant form of study of foreign policy34, and define national identity as one of the
determinants of post-communist foreign policies. Therefore, expressions of nationalism
could be considered ideological. However, our argument is that nationalism is neither a
full substitute for political ideology nor synonymous with it. Even though it is difficult
to consider ethnic nationalism as a substitute for ideology, this chapter argues that it has
nevertheless abused the vacuum created by the absence of an adequate foreign policy
ideology, to deeply penetrate governance structures in BiH and influence its foreign
policy formulation. Political ideologies must be more broadly based than nationalism and
be able to answer more questions and provide wider guidance, particularly in countries
which are vulnerable to weak internal structures and struggle to form unified policies. The
implication is that their foreign policy is driven not solely by its institutional structures
(as would be explained by realism) but also by the domestic political patterns, which in
the case of BiH, work against the formulation of a consolidated foreign policy. According
to Deborah Gerner, the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy-making includes
the values, national character, political culture, and historical traditions of a society, its
structural attributes, etc.35
30

Walt, Stephen. International Relations: one world, many theories. in Foreign Policy, 22 Match 1998.

31

Burchill, Scott; Linklater, Andrew. Theories of International Relations. London: Palgrave, 2001, p. 197.

32

Ibid, p. 200.

33

Anderson, Benedict. The New World Disorder, in New Left Review. No. 193, May/June 1992.

34

R. Fawn, op. cit. p. 6.

35

Deborah Gerner, in Neack, Laura; Hay, Jeanne A. K.; J. Haney, Patrick. Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its

11

Therefore, we can see that different theories have made a case that nationalist identities
of political actors have influence on the definition of their political interests, and interests
have an impact on the formation of state policies. Here we shall merely outline some of
the policies which resulted from such channelling of the identities and interests of foreign
policy actors, specifically of BiH foreign ministers since its independence.
To the outside world, Silajdi represented an acceptable personification of a new state.
Probably the most charismatic of all ministers of former republics of SFRY at the time,
he understood international politics and was known for his sharp style. Silajdi did not
waste time on international acclaim, and openly showed sympathy towards American
politics in the Balkans. Foreign policy thus reflected the Ministers personality and style.
As a result, what was left behind him was a strong charisma, but also a complete disorder
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Ljubijanki sought international protection for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He
successfully drew American attention and interest to BiH, but also to other countries such
as Iran. He took a number of steps to bring some order into the Ministry and create a more
serious institution, to move it away from randomness and ad hoc reactions to international
politics, primarily by giving a central role as well as support to the Department for analysis
and planning.
With American citizenship and direct accountability to President Izetbegovi, airbegovi
did not feel responsible for or accountable to BiH institutions. He created a deliberate gap
between himself and the Ministry, did not feel the need to use it nor had he any interest
in making it work, and thus created space for foreign policy-making to be the complete
prerogative of the President.
Prli was the first minister after Dayton. After his political adventure with Herceg-Bosna,
he made an attempt to represent BiH in a proper way, supporting European principles
unreservedly. It was during his mandate that the tri-partite parallelism was created, with
the creation of positions of two deputies, who ensured ethnic equality, but also replicated
the vision of the Presidency as created in Dayton. This principle was almost immediately
applied to all BiH embassies abroad, where deputy ambassadors were appointed with the
same purpose, which was, in essence, the channelling of the so-called national protection
at all levels of foreign affairs: protocolar, diplomatic, contractual or consular. The parallel
channels imposed a system of communication in which everyone informed their own.
This was considered politically correct, justified, and the only thing possible. The Ministry
was thus entangled by nationalism at all levels; it was disabled by deliberate procedural
and formal issues it created, often characterized by hyper-regulation in the most basic
and simple affairs. It was during this mandate that a large number of people were brought
into the Ministry without any of the professional criteria or qualities required by the
diplomatic service.

Second Generation. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1995, p. 21.

12

Lagumdijas mandate was characterized by a strong and influential connection

between the Presidency and himself in the role of Minister of Foreign Affairs and also
Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Thus encouraged by this institutionalized closer
cooperation, he made an attempt to subdue the national in the diplomatic service
by professionalizing it, and developing more dynamic relations with neighbouring
and other European countries, while keeping close connections with the US. This
professionalisation of service, coupled with insistence on policies of substance that
replaced the insistence on Dayton forms, produced a perceptible decrease in national
tensions within the Ministry, and a more positive competitiveness and professional
atmosphere at all levels. However, this effort remained constrained by a short mandate
and could only expand as far as the internal state structure allowed. There was thus not
enough time or space for this reform to take root and to result in a unified diplomatic
service and an equally unified foreign policy.
Without a similar pressure and insistence on professionalisation and unified foreign policy
from inside or outside, Ivani paralysed even further the bureaucratic structure, which
resulted in a faint and disoriented diplomatic service. In order not to create any turmoil
and satisfy all sides, the Ministry entrenched the national division, which re-produced
three inert, passive and reactionary foreign policies.
Such analysis of the actors influence on foreign policy might constitute one segment
of Roy Macridis classical definition of foreign policy evaluation, which involves the
assessment of the goals of a given country; analysis of various predicaments that seem
to endanger these goals; an examination of the instrumentalities (policies) pursued to
alleviate the predicaments; a careful examination of the manner in which such policies
were formulated, with regard to both the predicament involved and the manner in
which the policy was to be implemented; an account of the major governmental organs
responsible for the implementation of a policy; a careful examination of the availability of
alternate means and instrumentalities; and finally, an assessment that is, did the policy
as formulated and implemented bring about the desired goals?36
However, an assessment of the influence of internal nationalisms on foreign policy
formulation calls for a distinctive methodology of foreign policy analysis, which
explores aspects outside the classical methods prescribed by Macridis. Although goals,
predicaments, instruments, actors, structures, and processes of foreign policy formulation
will be dealt with in this paper, we will argue that because Bosnia and Herzegovina
does not resemble the classic realist model of a nation-state37, its structural weakness
and insecurity make internal nationalisms particularly influential on its foreign policy.
BiH foreign policy structures mirror its constitutional tri-partite arrangement38, and thus
36

Macridis, Roy C (ed.). Foreign Policy in World Politics. New Jersey: Prantice Hall, 1992, p. 6.

37

One of the results of the Dayton Peace Agreement are weak and powerless state structures, whose statehood is often denied by
politicians supposedly representing that very state.

38

A study by the Foreign Policy Initiative of BiH describes this arrangement as: the total triple parallelism which came into
existence not only in the organisation of diplomatic network but in the manner in which it functioned as well (diplomatic missions
were opened according to completely simple and sometimes caricature - like archaically conceived historical affiliation to
certain countries, regions and civilizations.. Dizdarevic, Zlatko. BiH Diplomacy: Reality and Needs, in Foreign Policy
Analysis. Sarajevo: Foreign Policy Initiative, 2006.

13

constitute channels that allow nationalist policies of individual ethnic groups to permeate,
influence and determine the states foreign policy.
Joe Hagan39 asserts that this relationship is complex because leaders pursue dual domestic
political games and, then, respond with alternative strategies with divergent foreign policy
effects.40 As a result, foreign policy must be adjusted, so that it imposes fewer domestic
political costs.41
This tension between the external gains and perceived internal losses is particularly
evident in the case of a key foreign policy priority the integration of BiH into European
structures. A survey conducted by the PULS agency in 2004, showed that 88% of BiH
citizens were in favour of BiH accession to the EU, and so claim the majority of its
politicians. For BiH citizens, accession to EU has a symbolic meaning, representing a
stable economic, secure and democratic framework. The EU framework represents as
a set of values to which BiH should subscribe, to which it should strive. In essence, it
is a framework of ideological values, qualitative aspirations of the society. Since EU
standards and values are integrationist in nature, their ideological basis collides with the
exclusivist nature of ethnic nationalism. This ideological collision is most evident in
cases when politicians act contrary to the aspirations of the society and subdue foreign
policy priorities to some narrower domestic interests. For example, throughout his
election campaign, the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska (RS) Milorad Dodik, opposed
police reform, which is one of the six EU key conditions. His argument was that the
police reform went against Serb interests, which would not be adequately protected if the
RS police structures were dismantled. He has been quoted to as saying: If the road to
Europe means an end to Republika Srpska, we shall then say: Goodbye, Europe!42
We can see that even if European integration is a foreign policy priority around which
there is the largest degree of public consensus, it is only acceptable as long as it does not
collide with the national interests of individual groups, or if it does not generate unwanted
domestic political losses. It also indicates that even though there may be consensus about
European integration, there is still no consensus about the state of BiH itself. Because of
that, EU integrations as an ideological foreign policy framework are not potent enough
to take precedence over nationalism as a predominant foreign policy ideology.
This also imposes significant difficulties in the implementation of BiH foreign policy,
primarily because of the structural/organizational particularisation along ethnic lines of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even though one of the principles of statehood accepted
in Dayton was that state organized on the basis of the new Constitution inherits all
the statehood attributes of the independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
implementation of the Dayton Agreement reversed this process and fragmented BiH
statehood at a practical level. The ethnic principle, which was introduced by the Dayton
Hagan, Joe: Basic approaches for gauging the magnitude and direction of the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy:
characteristics of opposition, political system structure, characteristics of the decision setting. L. Neack, J. Hay, J.H. Patrick, op. cit.

39

40

Hagan, Joe, p. 118

41

Ibid. 124.

42

Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, DANI Magazine, 9 June 2006, p. 11.

14

Agreement, but was not prescribed by it as an axiom of state organization, took its root
through some almost banal practices. The BiH Ministry of Foreign Affairs was one of those
institutions, which initially failed to preserve and protect the statehood attributes it had
inherited. In order to pursue the unwritten rule on national equity introduced after Dayton,
and for the sake of higher goals of national political correctness, the ethnic principle
was accepted as the primary criteria on the selection of diplomatic (and ALL OTHER)
staff. A number of staff who were hired mainly during the war, and were to a large degree,
but still not exclusively, Bosniak, had to be made redundant in order to level the national
quotas which were abruptly introduced. On the other hand, a number of Serbs, sufficient
to cover the S quota, were literally brought from Pale every morning on a bus, and in
a similar manner a number of H cadres suddenly appeared in the Ministry. Needless to
say, none of the three quotas were filled through any merit based on a publicly open
selection process. From that moment, diplomatic positions were chosen and allocated
on the principle of the so-called national key rather than based on any professional
qualities. Since then, the Ministry has always had an organizational chart with B S and
C positions across all rankings, which are filled by using first and foremost the national
criteria. This ethno-cratic inertia established a reverse principle of political correctness
in the sense that if one post is allocated to a representative of a certain nationality, the
other two nationalities do not interfere or show any interest in the selection of staff for
that post. Such a structure is subject to the national identities of individual diplomats and
excludes any possibility of the development of a unified professional structure.
This non-functional division of labour along ethnic lines represents a medium for
transcending and channelling the nationalist interests and discontent of individual staff
into the conduct of foreign affairs. From the point of view of the constructivist theory,
ideas, beliefs and values exert an influence and shape political actions, and in that way they
acquire structural characteristics and eventually shape those structures. Political actors and
structures thus become mutually constitutive43 nationalist ideas and ideology create
ethnocratic structures, which then serve to sustain the ethnic principle and nationalist
ideas, and project them on to policies. Bosnia and Herzegovinas heterogeneous ethnic
composition was thus institutionalised after the Dayton Agreement through practices
which sought to undermine its inherited statehood. The projection of the ethnic principle
on the state structures made them weak and powerless, based on the tri-partite ethnic
parallelism, which was replicated in designing the diplomatic network as well - the
diplomatic hierarchy is not built in accordance with the functional principle, but with
a purely national one; heads of diplomatic missions are first of all selected for posts
allocated to their nationality, the principle is then applied to all other embassy staff until
sufficient equity is reached, which in most cases includes the technical staff as well; in
return, the loyalty of the heads of diplomatic missions continues to rest with their ethnic
or party bosses, to whom they often report, based on ethnic rather than functional lines,
opening parallel channels, relying on one-sided sources, creating structures in which the
minister, his deputy and general secretary operate as parallel ministers. Diplomatic
missions are left to operate independently from the functional lines of the Ministry, and
the quality of the work of individual missions depends on the agility of individual heads
43

Christian Reus Smit. Theories of International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan. Basingstoke: 2005.

15

of missions, their ambitions, or the lack thereof. Therefore, in order to maintain and
justify the structures created through this process, actors pursue practices which follow
the same principles of division and exclusivity, which allows nationalism to monopolise
the ideological sphere of foreign policy making.
Working in that spirit, it is often the case that during visits of the BiH official delegations,
Bosniak politicians are accompanied only by Bosniak staff of BiH diplomatic mission
in the host country, regardless of whether they are usually responsible for that subject
area or whether it falls into their portfolio (Croats by Croat staff, Serb politicians by
Serb diplomatic staff). There are also cases in which certain heads of missions give
diplomatic staff of their own nationality a more privileged status in terms of some benefits
(use of leave, health insurance, travel compensations, etc.), which further antagonizes
representatives of other nationalities and deepens the already existing national divisions
inside the diplomatic service. In reaction to this under-privileged status, the other staff
turn to representatives of their own nationality in the Ministry, report to them on a formal
and informal basis, usually bypassing the head of the mission, and further strengthening
the parallel structures. In such an atmosphere of distrust, information sharing inside a
diplomatic mission is limited to a minimum, all of which reflects very negatively on the
operability, functionality, efficiency and quality of work of the diplomatic network as a
whole. Diplomatic staff are often used purely as tourist guides or even just drivers
of the visiting delegations, without providing any advice, background or briefing on the
substance of the visits. Communication between the Ministry and missions is very limited
and apart from advance notices of different visits, there is little joint preparation and
coordination in terms of the organization of those visits, or their follow-up. The only
exemptions to the rule are cases where individual staff feel responsible and accountable,
which is then reflected in their more substantial involvement in the organization of certain
meetings or events. However, these are only individual and arbitrary exemptions, which
cannot rely on the system for support nor are they in any way embedded in the system.
Another important element, which needs to be taken into account is the place which
the international community in BiH has had in shaping state policies. If we look at the
state-building process from Dayton to date, it is a notorious fact that the international
community has invested billions of dollars and a vast amount of effort and time in
building the capacity of state institutions. In the majority of cases, this effort was not
limited to technical or material assistance, but, in fact, went as far as determining the
outlook of those institutions, their roles and responsibilities, choice of staff and even
management structures, and ultimately, had considerable impact on the policy making.
As a result, different laws and policies were drafted in international institutions, primarily
international financial institutions and OHR, and in some cases, were imposed by the
High Representatives as well. The only exception to this rule has been the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Apart from some technical assistance, which mainly assisted (more or
less successfully) in building the civil service capacity, the international community has
had little insight into the matters of foreign policy making. This was probably a deliberate
intention, a need to draw a line where the influence of international community had to be
constrained. It can be assumed that it was based on an internationally accepted principle
that a complete proof that one country is a protectorate is its inability to formulate and
16

project an independent and autonomous foreign policy. This may have informed OHRs
policy not to interfere into the matters of foreign policy making.
The Ministry and policies it produced, thus became a prerogative of domestic political
dynamics and processes, which could be another reason why there has been a status quo
for over a decade. The Ministry has not conducted any transformations of its internal
structure or the diplomatic network since 1996, while at the same time the world has
witnessed tectonic changes, a decline of the international system based on nation-states
and an erosion of inter-national, inter-state and other relations. New state and non-state
actors have appeared on the stage, the meaning of power and powerful countries has
acquired completely new dimensions, as has the multilateral nature of the international
system. The centers of power are hard to identify, they are outside formal structures and
their actors cannot be negotiated with. They are informed by interests and driven by
ideologies, which are not necessarily rational and do not refrain from the use of force to
achieve their goals. The world academia and literature has not spared words and pages to
try and describe this system, to de-construct it, to explain it, help their governments and
institutions to better understand in which system they operate and how to respond to it.
However, driven by their narrow, exclusivist interests, which primarily seek to maintain
the structural, institutional, and substantial status quo, the policy actors in BiH managed to
ignore the world outside their horizon. As a result, the structures responsible for the conduct
and formulation of BiH foreign policy have not been able to respond to new environments
with adequate policies. The rigid structure of the MFA, its diplomatic network and actors,
the policies they produce, all have continued to operate in an international vacuum,
which they created themselves.
For the past ten years at least, the Ministry has more or less preserved its archaic structure
with a classical division of responsibilities based on bilateral, multilateral and general
affairs. Concepts such as public diplomacy or political and strategic analysis have found
no place in that structure or system of policy formulation. Neither are there separate
departments, which would serve only the highest foreign policy priorities, such as EU
and NATO integrations, which should be built and professionally developed in order to
represent a knowledgeable core and pool of professionals, who could circulate between
the Ministry and relevant missions, and provide support and substantive liaison with other
institutions which deal with those issues. The existing Department for Analysis is also
not adequately integrated into the overall structure of the Ministry, neither is it consulted
at any stage of policy-formulation. It is inadequately equipped in terms of resources and
generally left to its own devices, isolated from the formal decision-making process and
policy formulation. The Ministry coordinates poorly with the Presidency at the stage of
foreign policy design, the determination of priorities and the means of achieving them.
The Presidency itself has parallel structures, in which every one of the three members
have their own foreign policy advisor, and they operate in isolation from each other, with
a high degree of distrust. There is no team or department in the Presidency, which would
closely observe the activities of the Ministry, ensure coordination in terms of the design
of joint goals and priorities, adequate strategy and the means of their implementation.
The result is a complete absence of a foreign policy strategy, which would take into
account the current affairs in the world and region, different theoretical perspectives
17

which offer more insight into the conduct of international affairs, which would accurately
define BiHs place in that picture, create a political and pragmatic balance between the
expectations of our international partners and the pursuit of our own interests, identify
different actors and their roles in this process, provide clear advice and direct the conduct of
BiH foreign policy. Instead, what we have had for the past ten years is a document which,
in very scarce terms, defines principles and guidelines of foreign policy. In 1996, such
a document was produced in two places, Pale and Sarajevo, each having their own view
of the world and BiH itself. The document produced on Pale, for example, emphasizes
the role of entities in the conduct of external affairs, equalizing their status with that of
the state44. Furthermore, it states that due to the fact that BiH consists of three peoples,
it will act in the direction of development of relations and cooperation of the Bosniak
people with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and cooperation of the Serb and
Croat people with multilateral, cultural and other activities of the Christian countries
and peoples.45 The document produced in Sarajevo, on the other hand, emphasizes the
state-building (dravotvorna) role of the Ministry, aimed at reintegrating and preserving
BiH within its internationally recognised borders46. Both documents are excellent
illustrations of the process through which identities (one nationalist, one unitary), inform
the interests of their actors (one seeking to preserve the autonomous position of the entity,
and the other attempting to reverse that process by integrating both entities into a state
through the conduct of its foreign policy). Independent of each other, both inform the
foreign policies of the political centers they represent, and as such, produce the resulting
divergent foreign policies. However, we can also see from the Pale example, to what
extent the nationalist view of the world tries to limit the perspective of a state policy.
Furthermore, the document produced on Pale, in the example quoted here, went as far as
to attempt to project a reductionist perspective on the conduct of the international affairs
of foreign states as well. Their ideological division along religious lines is prescribed
as a principle, and demands to be imposed on the foreign countries of the corresponding
religious affiliations, which would presumably have to adapt to it and respond along the
same lines- an effort so imprudent that it deserves no further analysis.
However, some progress was made in 1997 when a single document was produced47,
with a modest list of common/joint priorities, but with a strong reservation from the
Serb side bracketed next to one of the most important international obligations of BiH
cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. A draft of this document is also intertwined with
references to Bosniak or Serb demands; for example, the preamble stating committed
to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of BiH, and determined
to develop as a modern democratic state was marked as a Bosniak proposal. On
the other hand, reference to entities throughout the document is marked as the Serb
proposal.

44

Osnovni pravci spoljnopolitike aktivnosti, Pale, 1996.

45

Ibid.

46

Sastanak rukovodstva MVP-a sa efovima DKP-a, Sarajevo, August 1996.

47

Temeljni pravci vansjkopolitikih aktivnosti BiH, prijedlog. Sarajevo, listopad 1997.

18

In 1998, a list of priorities, which could be described as the smallest common denominator
was produced and adopted by the Presidency48, but it remained at that level of sophistication
almost until 2001 when the government changed. The process of development of a new
platform in 2001 was more democratic involving wider layers of society, different parts
of the country and resulted in a more comprehensive document, which unfortunately again
was limited to priorities.49 However, the document did not produce the desired results in
terms of drafting of any regulations, primarily the Law on Foreign Affairs, there was no
necessary reorganisation within the foreign policy institutions based on this document,
particularly in the BiH Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and no process of continuous policy
design resulted from it.
This slow and ineffective evolution of the main policy document, which had barely
progressed since the immediate aftermath of Dayton, illustrates how in the absence of
alternative ideological grounds, the entrenched nationalist ideas and values, which have
been institutionalized and are channelled through Dayton structures, in effect shape
political (in)action. We can thus see how values are projected onto a discourse, which
conditions their outcome a deficient and inarticulate policy document.
Another way of locating where different interest and values rest is through the views of
the public. A public opinion survey conducted by the PULS agency, regarding positions
on NATO membership, showed that more than half of respondents are in favour of NATO
membership, but this ranges from over 70% support in the Federation of BiH to just
30% support in the RS. The same pattern can be seen in the breakdown by political party
affiliations, which correspond quite closely to the ethnic affiliation of respondents - security
related effects offered by NATO are most important for Bosniaks, while Serbs present
the strongest resistance to BiH accession to NATO, due to historical-emotional factors,
arising from still fresh memories of the military campaign and air strikes against Bosnian
Serb positions in 1995, and the NATO force intervention in Kosovo and bombardment of
towns in Serbia in 1999.50
Besides the general positions, there are also specific examples of policy clashes between
different actors/institutions, which illustrate the institutional voids and lack of consistent
policy, which again allow the nationalist interests to inform the discourse. According to
Nezavisne Novine, on January 15th 2007, the Minister of Civil Affairs Mr. Safet Halilovi
sent a letter to the FBiH Minster of the Interior informing him that the bilateral Agreement
on dual citizenship with Serbia has not been in effect since Montenegro proclaimed
independence from the State Community with Serbia. This position was confronted by a
different interpretation of the Agreement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by
the then Minister, Mladen Ivani. Again, without examining the evidence, and without
investigating this within the institutional structures of the state government, Dr. Silajdi a
member of BiH Presidency, decided to step in and voice his support for Minister Halilovi
through the media. Since then, the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs followed
48

The Basic Foreign Policy Principles and Activities of BiH, Adopted by the Presidency of BiH at its session on 17 February 1998.

49

Opi pravci i prioriteti za provoenje vanjske politike Bosne i Hercegovine, Predsjednitvo BiH, 2001.

50

Sarajlic-Maglic, Denisa; Vuletic, Davor. Readiness for Stabilisation and Capacity for EU Association, in Foreign Policy
Analysis. Sarajevo: Foreign Policy Initiative, 2006.

19

suit and sent a note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia informing him of the
abolishment of the Agreement on Dual Citizenship, which sparked off a furious reaction
from the President of the RS Government, Milorad Dodik, and other Serb politicians,
who questioned responsibility of the Minister51 and called for his removal. On the other
hand, there were very negative reactions from the Serbian side, which highlighted the
inconsistencies in BiH foreign policy making. Throughout this debate, there seems to
have been no process of analysis of the effects of such a policy on bilateral relations
between BiH and Serbia, nor have they been placed in the context of the overall foreign
policy interests of the state. Foreign policy actors often have a number of options for how
they react to a certain issue, and their interests inform the choices they make. Their choice
of a policy is presented through their discourse, which is in many cases an illustration of
their original interests rather than a balanced and rational policy choice. According to
Morgan and Palmer, policies are tools that states use to get what they want52, or in this
case what they do not want.
Identities and ideas inform agents of foreign policy and constitute their positions and
actions. Because the permeability of foreign policy structures through nationalist ideas
and values, the profile of a countrys diplomacy is constructed by the nationalist interests
of political actors, who shift and adjust the focus and direction of foreign policy relative
to their own ideas and values. We will look into another blatant example that appeared
recently with the divergent positions of two members of BiH Presidency, Mr. Neboja
Radmanovi and Dr. Haris Silajdi, with regards to election results in Serbia.
Radmanovi congratulated the President of Serbia, Mr. Boris Tadi, on the successful
conduct of the elections, adding that it represents another step in the democratisation of
Serbia53. Silajdi, on the other hand, stated his concern regarding the fact that radical
forces gained most support from the citizens of Serbia, claiming that the international
community should examine their relations towards the nationalist heritage in Serbia,
which obviously does not cease to exist 54. In the lack of any effort to converge views
and discuss the issue within the institutional framework of the Presidency, this divergence
of views escalated in a TV duel broadcast on PBS news in which the two members of the
Presidency confronted each other in an almost infantile performance arguing back and
forth over the video link whether they would officially visit Serbia55 after the elections.
The discussion was conducted in an inflammatory manner, further pushing apart the
already divergent positions, but also highlighting the importance of discourse in the
process of the construction of a policy. The constructivist theory pays close attention to
the prevailing discourse, because discourse reflects beliefs and interests, and establishes
norms of behaviour. Discourse has the capacity to shape how political actors define
themselves and their interests, and thus modifies their behaviour, which eventually
results in the formation of a policy.56 In this particular case, the discourse used by Dr.
51

TV Hayat, February 27th, 2007. Premijer RS traie odgovornost Alkalaja zbog note o ukidanju dvojnog dravljanstva

52

Glenn Palmer and T. Clifton Morgan. A Theory of Foreign Policy, Princeton University Press.

53

Agencija Beta, 22nd January 2007.

54

Ibid.

55

BHT1 news at 22.00, 23 January 2007.

56

Stephen M Walt, International relations: One world, many theories, Foreign Policy, Washington, 1998.

20

Silajdi shows that his own interests have the potential to prevail over one of the foreign
policy priorities, defined as promotion of cooperation with neighbouring countries Republic Croatia (RC) and Serbia and Montenegro, on the basis of common interest and
principles of equality, mutual respect .57 In the absence of an underlying foreign policy
ideology, and instead of adequate policy planning and strategy development, the state
foreign policy is thus tailored in private offices and in very close circles, without essential
information and data analyses and often without a basic knowledge of the issue, in most
cases announced and even discussed in media appearances. It is thus deprived from one
of its most important dimensions, its ability to project and protect the state interests in the
outside world.

Conclusion
Unfortunately, some of the examples presented here, show that foreign policy makers often
dismiss the use of information, theories, analyses, and fail to make a link between theory
and policy. We have made an attempt to deconstruct the formulation of foreign policy
of BiH through the use of theory and tools of foreign policy analyses. The constructivist
approach taken here, proved to be useful in the context of analyses of BiH foreign policy,
since it showed how nationalist ideas can shape, but also erode foreign policy. They
have potential to be mobilized to create and sustain parallel structures and actors, whose
political interests are thus pursued. Constructivists argue that material structures acquire
meaning through the structure of ideas and values in which they are embedded58. We can
therefore conclude that as long as the interests of individual ethnic groups are able to
penetrate and dominate the structures of foreign-policy making, it will not be possible to
identify unified state interests and a foreign policy that results from it. The main reason
for this is the fact that there is no consensus inside BiH about its statehood. Individual
national groups represented by nationalist politicians project divergent interests on to
state policies. The nationalist nature of those interests, which are essentially exclusivist,
inhibit the formation of a unified ideology and serve the purpose of disintegrationist
interests, which preserve the status quo in order to thwart any state-building potential
of BiH foreign policy. Such a situation might provoke a conclusion that the status quo
is the only option on the horizon, since anything else would require profound structural
changes.
However, such changes would bring into question the already established ethno-cratic
principles and positions, primarily the role and structure of the BiH Presidency, which has
a prerogative for the formulation of foreign policy. Its tri-partite structure is continuously
replicated in the definition of three or more foreign polices, and as long as it is in place,
this Dayton structure will continue to make it difficult to formulate a unified foreign
policy.

57

General directions and priorities for implementation of foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, BiH presidency 2003.

58

Wendt, A. Constructing International Politics, International Security, 1995.

21

Nationalism thus has a compelling impact on the conduct of international relations, at

both a theoretical and practical level. We have demonstrated through a review of various
academic works that nationalism can be seen as a reality based on the mythological and
notional sense of belonging to a nation, which is a modern phenomenon. If we put the
practical foreign policy formulation in BiH into the theoretical context described earlier
in this paper, we can see that from a realist point of view, BiH foreign policy obviously
lacks stable and functional structures, institutions capable of designing and implementing
a foreign policy and actors who would abide by it without any reservations.
From a liberalist perspective, foreign policy should promote values, which are in essence
non-chauvinistic and non-exclusionary. Unfortunately, this is completely contrary to the
values promoted by ethnic nationalism and represents the main point of contention
between those theories and foreign policies, which take nationalism as their predominant
ideology. Liberal theories contend that nationalism can undermine state sovereignty
from within, and that is exactly the paradox of BiH foreign policy. On the one hand,
foreign policy should integrate the state and society, it should be a pillar of the statebuilding process. On the other hand, nationalism, which has penetrated its structures
and imposed itself as a replacement of foreign policy ideology, has exactly the opposite
effect.
The constructivist approach centers ideology at the core of foreign policy formulation.
It draws attention to the internal, domestic determinant of state policies and enables the
explanation of variations of identity and interests, and policies of a state that result from
them. This approach is particularly useful for the study of the way in which Bosnia and
Herzegovina, a multi-ethnic state with equally multi-ethnic, joint institutions, engages
in foreign affairs. In the absence of stable structures and values, ideology should position
itself as an element of stability and continuum, because ideology represents a set of core
values that are untouchable and not debatable.59 As such, ideology should project itself
and justify a certain socio-political order.60 In the absence of such a set of untouchable,
unified principles, what is projected onto BiH foreign policy as a representation of its
socio-political order is nationalism. Nationalism assumes the role of an ideology. By
placing itself at the core of BiH foreign policy formulation, nationalism is well positioned
to expand into other areas where there is a vacuum institutional structures, political
interests and identities. The purpose of nationalism is to turn a constructed and
imagined idea of nation into reality. The reality which it creates in the form of a foreign
policy is thus also false and flawed, because it is created on the basis of a constructed
interest, which is exclusivist and divisive by nature. By permeating the foreign policy,
nationalism makes it disintegrationist, a reflection of the internal tri-partite arrangement,
which disables its statehood attributes. BiH foreign policy is suspended, immobilized,
and projects to the outside world an extremely distorted picture of the state. In fact, three
pictures are projected, each representing individual nationalist interests, each representing
a separate constituency. Taken together, the three pictures are reflections of the existing
internal parallelisms, which can only create policies based on the smallest common
denominators, which are hypocritical to say the least. To the outside world, this internal
59

Fawn, Rick. Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies. p. 3.

60

Ibid.

22

hypocrisy reveals states deficiencies and weaknesses. This produces a lack of trust of the
international actors, who can barely recognize BiH as a serious partner.
So in spite of the fact that one of the intentions of the Dayton Agreement was to preserve
the legacy of BiH as a state, the ethnic principle which became the raison detre of the
post-Dayton BiH, institutionalized the subjective category of nation into reality. Those
who subscribe to realist approaches use this newly acquired dimension of nations in order
to impose the view that only this reality can explain BiH. They claim that anything else,
which does not take nations as given, is an escape from reality. In doing so, they create
an atmosphere of realist hopelessness and despair, in which nations as social axioms are
not challenged, and are taken for granted.
However, this paper has attempted to deconstruct that perceived reality and to identify
a need for the formulation of a unified, comprehensive, and substantive foreign policy,
which would determine the position of the state on priority political, economical, security
and all other international issues. In order to achieve that, the first requirement would be:
to secure a maximum level of professionalism, which would ensure a minimum
of dignified international representation.
Secondly, different theories which explain international relations should be
taken into account, which would help inform BiH foreign policy about the world
today, and its place in it.
And, as a third requirement, BiH should have a foreign policy strategy, which
would mediate diverse nationalist interests into non-hypocritical policies over
which there exists a general consensus. Such a strategy should seek to thwart
the poisoning of political consensus by nationalist policies and formulate a
single foreign policy that would represent the interests of the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, rather than its parts.
Otherwise, BiH will continue to merely engage in foreign relations, in a purely reactive
and pragmatic manner.

23