3. CUENCO vs.

FERNAN
Facts: Atty. Miguel Cuenco, a former Member of the
Philippine House of Representatives from the province
of Cebu prayed for judgment ordering the disbarment of
Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, Chairman of the Third
Division of the SC.
Vito Borromeo died without any forced heirs, but left
behind extensive properties. A petition for probate of a
one-page document purportedly the last will and
testament of the decedent was filed with the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu. Those instituted under
said will as the sole heirs of the late Vito Borromeo were
Fortunate, Tomas and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo.
The probate court declared the will to be a forgery. That
decision became final after being affirmed by the SC. In
the intestacy proceedings that ensued, nine (9)
individuals were declared by the trial court as the rightful
successors to the decedent Vito Borromeo's estate.
During the course of the intestacy proceedings, several
petitions were filed with this Court by the parties involved
therein. Five of these petitions were consolidated. The
Third Division of the Court, through Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., rendered a Decision in the consolidated
petitions.
Cuenco requested that he be given more time within
which to file a motion for reconsideration of the Judge
Gutierrez decision in the consolidated petitions. This
request was granted by the Court's Third Division with
the Warning, however, that no further extensions of time
would be allowed.
The Court, sitting en banc dismissed for lack of merit the
two administrative charges filed by Cuenco and Estenzo,
respectively, against Judge Francisco P. Burgos, the
former trial judge at the Vito Borromeo intestate estate
proceedings.
Cuenco alleged that:
(1) That Fernan, appeared as counsel for the three (3)
instituted heirs (Fortunato, Tomas and Amelia) and
despite having already accepted his appointment as an
Associate Justice of the Court, "continues to be counsel
for the instituted heirs;'
(2) That Fernan "had exerted personal efforts to assign
the Vito Borromeo proceedings to his Office as
Chairman of the Third Division to enable him to influence

the decision or the outcome of the Vito Borromeo

proceedings "
(3) That Fernan "has operated his Office in Cebu City as
a Star Chamber to fabricate fake and fictitious heirs of
Vito Borromeo,"
(4) ThatFernan has 'practically abolished and crippled
the legitimate functions of the Court of Appeals in CA.
knowingly (sic) that the claims for attorney's fees of
movant Miguel Cuenco and Judge Fernando Ruiz are
pending in the Court of Appeals,' thereby 'render[ing]
impossible the payment of Miguel Cuenco's attorney's
fees for his services rendered to the Vito Borromeo
Estate.
(5) That Mr. Justice Fernan's strong and unyielding
determination to collect big sums of money in payment
of his legal services rendered to his clients' had induced
the Honorable Justice, as Chairman of the Court's Third
Division, to unduly influence the Members thereof into
dismissing Cuencos administrative complaint against
Judge Burgos
(6) That Fernan "had wilfully, persistently, stubbornly and
systematically violated his Oath of Office as a lawyer
which imposes upon him the duty not to delay any man
for money or malice."
Ruling: (1) There is nothing in the record of the Vito
Borromeo estate proceedings and Cuenco has failed
to point to anything therein to indicate that Fernan
had appeared as counsel in such proceedings
representation of instituted heirs and claimants. Mr.
Justice Fernan did enter his appearance. The record,
however, reveals that Mr. Justice Fernan withdrew as
such counsel as. Cuenco has submitted nothing at all to
support his accusation that Fernan "continues to be
counsel for the instituted heirs." It is entirely clear that
Mr. Justice Fernan's professional involvement in such
special Proceedings had ceased long before his
appointment to the SC.
(2) Prior to the appointment of Mr. Justice Fernan to the
Court, the aforementioned five (5) consolidated petitions
had already been assigned for preliminary study to Mr.
Justice Gutierrez, Jr. The subsequent designation of Mr.
Justice Fernan as Chairman of the Court's Third Division
and the assignment of Mr. Justice Gutierrez along with
three other Members of the Court to said Third Division,
after the 1987 Constitution went into effect, were
determined and carried out by the Chief Justice in
accordance with the time-honored procedures followed
by the Court in those matters and were, thus,

circumstances of pure coincidence. Justice Gutierrez

brought the Vito Borromeo estate cases (and all other
pending cases previously assigned to him) along with
him to the Third Division of the Court when the third
Division was organized in accordance with procedures
agreed upon by the Court en banc. Mr. Justice Fernan
inhibited himself from participating in the deliberations on
the Vito Borromeo estate cases and, in fact, did not take
part in the resolution thereof; this was made explicit by
the annotation appearing beside his signature: "No part
I appeared as counsel for one of the parties". This
express statement on the record has been totally
ignored by complainant Cuenco.
(3) Justice Fernan could not have fabricated fake and
fictitious heirs Vito Borromeo." The Court is unable to
see how Justice Fernan could have had any control or
influence over the actions of the instituted heirs when
said heirs claimed rights of ownership over the
aforementioned thirteen (13) parcels of land and sought
to exclude them from the estate of the decedent.
(4) The "legitimate functions" of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. No. 08093 where complainant Cuenco has
filed a claim for payment of attorney's fees have not
been abolished and crippled" by the mere fact that the
maximum amounts, expressed in a percentage of the
market value of the distributive shares received from the
estate, of attorney's fees had been determined and set
by the SC. The Court is unable to see how payment of
Cuenco's attorney's fees for services rendered in the
Vito Borromeo estate case has been "rendered
impossible;' while final settlement of the decedent's
estate may have to be awaited, payment of such fees
may nevertheless be expected in due course.

written Appearance and Motion to Withdraw as Counsel

and stressed that he had ceased a long time ago to act
as counsel for the two Borromeos mentioned earlier and
that he did not in any way take part in the deliberations
and decision.
By a telegram, Cuenco asked for leave to file a
"Clarificatory Memorandum based on official court
records already filed in Supreme Court before and after
Honorable Fernan was appointed Justice of the
Supreme Court. The Court granted Cuencos leave to file
a "Clarificatory Memorandum" within a non-extendible
period of ten (1 0) days from notice thereof. To date, no
memorandum has been filed by complainant Cuenco.
The Court received from Cuenco a telegram, where it
appears that Cuenco believes that he is preparing a
memorandum addressing, not the administrative
charges he has preferred against Justice Fernan, but
rather the merits of the consolidated petitions. There
appears no reason therefore why the Court should
entertain this second request of complainant Cuenco.
There is another reason why the complaint for
disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the
Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the
Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may
be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI
[2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of
a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency,
would in effect be to circumvent and hence to ran afoul
of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court
may be removed from office only by impeachment for
and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2)
of the Constitution.
5. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. CA

(5) Cuenco charged Judge Burgos with "gross

incompetence and manifest negligence" for allegedly
having intentionally delayed settlement of the estate of
the late Vito Borromeo. The SC, having found that the
delay complained of was caused by several factors
beyond the control of respondent judge, dismissed that
complaint for lack of merit.
(6) There is no in the record, other than the
undocumented assertions of complainant Cuenco, that
would suggest that Mr. Justice Fernan has violated his
oath of office as a lawyer. Cuenco has offered not a
shred of evidence to support his serious accusations
against Mr. Justice Fernan.
Justice Fernan made a statement to the Court en
banc and embodied that in a Memorandum given to the
Members of the Court that he invited attention to his

Facts: The case had its inception when twenty-two

officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two
directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of
allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed
the following:
1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona;
2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James
Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and
3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the
P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees.
The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615
and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316,
were dismissed.

Thereupon, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before

this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari
under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules.
Issue: Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable
officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution?
Ruling: The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations
thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all
indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an
impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into
account the commentaries of the leading legal
luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on
whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable.
All of them agree in unison that the impeachable officers
enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986
Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the
Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The
impeachable officers are the President of the
Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the
Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2)
The list is exclusive and may not be increased or
reduced
by
legislative
enactment.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally
prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute
grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance
in office.Hence, the moment he is no longer in office
because of his removal, resignation, or permanent
disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution
in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative
investigation from proceeding against the private
respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner,
the formers retirement benefits have been placed on
hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
8. CORONA vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of
temporary restraining order (TRO) andwrit of preliminary
injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court,
Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case
initiatedby the respondent Members of the House of
Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by
respondent Senate of thePhilippines.
The present petition was filed arguing that the
Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it:
(1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed
by respondent Representatives which complaint is
constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable
cause;
(2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of
the complaint which, aside from being a hodgepodge of

multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law,

much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion
and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the retention of
Par. 2.3 is correct, the ruling of the Impeachment Court
to retain Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of
evidence under Par. 2.3, as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and
therefore its earlier resolution was nothing more than
a hollow relief, bringing no real protection to petitioner;
(3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of
alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which
violates petitioners right to due process because first,
Art. II does not mention graft and corruption or
unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for impeachment,
and second, it is clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the
Constitution that graft and corruption is a separate
and distinct ground from culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust; and
(4) issued the subpoena for the production of petitioners
alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution
despite the same being the result of an illegal act (fruit
of the poisonous tree) considering that those documents
submitted by the prosecution violates the absolute
confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No.
6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act) whichis also
penalized under Sec. 10 thereof.
Issue: Had the constitutional issues raised in this case
been mooted out?
Ruling: more than the required majority vote of the
Senator-Judges had concluded the impeachment trial
with the conviction of petitioner. Petitioner immediately
accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his
office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in
the process of screening applicants and nominees, and
the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a
new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period
from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC.
Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner
had been mooted by supervening events and his own
acts. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic
when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so
that a determination thereof would be without practical
use and value. In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled
to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition.
9. PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: two separate information for violation of Section
3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were
filed with the Sandiganbayan against Efren L. Alas. The
charges emanated from the alleged anomalous
advertising contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity
as President and Chief Operating Officer of the
Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong

Buhay Publishing Company, which purportedly caused

damage and prejudice to the government.
The respondent court ruled that PPSB was a private
corporation and that its officers, particularly herein
respondent Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. Indeed, it is the basic thrust of Republic Act
as well as PD No. 1606 as amended by PD No. 1486
and RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249 that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over public officers
unless private persons are charged with them in the
commission of the offenses.
The records disclosed that while PPSB is a subsidiary of
the Philippine Postal Corporation which is a government
owned corporation, the same is not created by a special
law. It was organized and incorporated under the
Corporation Code, which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 68. It
was registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Under its Articles of Incorporation the
purpose for which said entity is formed was primarily for
business.
Likewise, a scrutiny of the seven (7) secondary purposes
of the corporation points to the conclusion that it exists
for business. Obviously, it is not involved in the
performance of a particular function in the exercise of
government power. Thus, its officers and employees are
not covered by the GSIS and are under the SSS law,
and actions for reinstatement and backwages are not
within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
but by the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
[Jurisprudence:

(1) The Civil Service now covers only government

owned or controlled corporations with original or
legislative charters, those created by an act of Congress
or by special law, and not those incorporated under and
pursuant to a general legislation. The Highest Court
categorically ruled that the Civil Service does not include
government-owned or controlled corporation which are
organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or
controlled corporation under the general corporation law.
(2) The test in determining whether a government-owned
or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service
Law is the manner of its creation such that government
corporation created by special charter are subject to its
provision while those incorporated under the general
corporation law are not within its coverage.

(3) By government-owned or controlled corporation with

original charter we mean government-owned or
controlled corporation created by a special law and not
under the Corporation Code of the Philippines. While a
public officer has been ruled, as a person whose duties
involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of
the function of government.]
Clearly, on the basis of the foregoing pronouncements of
the Supreme Court, the accused herein cannot be
considered a public officer. Thus, this Court may not
exercise jurisdiction over his act.
Dissatisfied, the People, through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed this petition arguing, in
essence, that the PPSB was a government-owned or
controlled corporation as the term was defined under
Section 2(13) of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Likewise, in further defining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, RA 8249 did not make a distinction as
to the manner of creation of the government-owned or
controlled corporations for their officers to fall under its
jurisdiction. Hence, being President and Chief Operating
Officer of the PPSB at the time of commission of the
crimes charged, respondent Alas came under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations organized
and incorporated under the Corporation Code for
purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
Ruling: Section 2(13) of EO 292 defines governmentowned or controlled corporations as follows:
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined Unless the specific
words of the text or the context as a whole or a particular
statute, shall require a different meaning:
government owned or controlled corporations refer to
any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the government directly or indirectly or through
its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as
in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least
51% of its capital stock: provided, that government
owned or controlled corporations maybe further
categorized by the department of the budget, the civil
service commission and the commission on audit for the
purpose of the exercise and discharge of their respective

powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to

such corporations.
From the foregoing, PPSB fits the bill as a governmentowned or controlled corporation, and organized and
incorporated under the Corporation Code as a subsidiary
of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PHILPOST). More
than 99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB
belongs to the government while the rest is nominally
held by its incorporators who are/were themselves
officers of PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was
expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of the Postal Service
Act of 1992, for purposes of, among others, to
encourage and promote the virtue of thrift and the habit
of savings among the general public, especially the
youth and the marginalized sector in the countryside and
to facilitate postal service by receiving collections and
making payments, including postal money orders.
It is not disputed that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters whenever charges of graft and
corruption are involved. However, a question arises
whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
same officers in government-owned or controlled
corporations organized and incorporated under the
Corporation Code in view of the delimitation provided for
in Article IX-B Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution
which states that:
SEC. 2. (1) The Civil Service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
It should be pointed out however, that the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan is separate and distinct from the
Civil Service Commission. The same is governed by
Article XI, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that the present anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise
its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by
law. This provision, in effect, retained the jurisdiction of
the anti-graft court as defined under Article XIII, Section
5 of the 1973 Constitution which mandated its creation,
thus:

Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special

court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft
and corrupt practices and such other offense committed
by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation
to their office as may be determined by law. (Italics ours)
Congress, pursuant to its authority vested under the
1987 Constitution, enacted RA 7975 maintaining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations without any distinction
whatsoever. Thereafter, on February 5, 1997, Congress
enacted RA 8249, which preserved the subject provision:
The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, has consistently refrained from making
any distinction with respect to the manner of their
creation.
The deliberate omission clearly reveals the intention of
the legislature to include the presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of both types of corporations
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever
they are involved in graft and corruption. Had it been
otherwise, it could have simply made the necessary
distinction. But it did not.
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when
the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. Corollarily, Article XI Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution, on the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman (the
governments prosecutory arm against persons charged
with graft and corruption), includes officers and
employees of government-owned or controlled.
11. GONZALES vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Congress; power to determine modes of removal from
office of public officers; must be consistent with the core
constitutional principle of independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The intent of the framers of the
Constitution in providing that all other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment in the second sentence of
Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from
extending the more stringent rule of removal only by
impeachment to favoured public officers. Contrary to the
implied view of the minority, in no way can this provision
be regarded as blanket authority for Congress to provide

for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the manner

and cause of removal are left to congressional
determination, this must still be consistent with
constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the
right to procedural and substantive due process; the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the
principle of separation of powers; and the principle of
checks and balances. The authority granted by the
Constitution to Congress to provide for the manner and
cause of removal of all other public officers and
employees does not mean that Congress can ignore the
basic principles and precepts established by the
Constitution.
12. UY vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 105965-70.
August 9, 1999], petitioner Uy, who was Deputy
Comptroller of the Philippine navy and designated as
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership was
charged with estafa through falsification of official
documents and violation of RA 3019. The petitioner filed
a motion to quash, arguing that the Sandiganbayan had
no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor had no
authority to file the offense.
The court ruled that :
(1) It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which
has jurisdiction to try petitioner since he was a regular
officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell
squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War mentioned
in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850, Providing for the trial by
courts-martial of members of the Integrated National
Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courtsmartial over members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines
(2) As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the
petitioner does not fall within the rank requirement
stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus,
exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the
regular courts , as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which
states that In cases where none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the
Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the

corresponding information/s against petitioner in the

regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in
fact appeared to be a partial motion for reconsideration
was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor
filed, which was denied.
The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed
by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling
in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated
February 22, 2000.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecutory power of
the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no
authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction
of regular courts.
Ruling: No. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all
criminal cases involving public officers and employees,
not only those within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts as well. The power to investigate and to
prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary
and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any
public officer or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient . The
law does not make a distinction between cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable
by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any
illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad
enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public
officers and employees during their tenure of office.
The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to
investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by
public officers and employees. The prosecution of
offenses committed by public officers and employees is
one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman.
In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed
the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more
active and effective agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office.
Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating
the Office of the Ombudsman then (to be known as the
Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued
subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the
Office of the Ombudsman was already vested with the
power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal
cases before the Sandiganbayan and even the regular
courts.