TheEndofHistory?

By:FrancisFukuyamaJournal:TheNationalInterest1989
In watching the flow of events over the past decade or so, it is hard to avoid the feeling that
something very fundamental has happened in world history. The past year has seen a flood of
articlescommemoratingtheendoftheColdWar,andthefactthat"peace"seemstobebreaking
outinmanyregionsoftheworld.Mostoftheseanalyseslackanylargerconceptualframeworkfor
distinguishingbetweenwhatisessentialandwhatiscontingentoraccidentalinworldhistory,and
are predictably superficial. If Mr. Gorbachev were ousted from the Kremlin or a new Ayatollah
proclaimed the millennium from a desolate Middle Eastern capital, these same commentators
wouldscrambletoannouncetherebirthofaneweraofconflict.
Andyet,allofthesepeoplesensedimlythatthereissomelargerprocessatwork,aprocessthat
givescoherenceandordertothedailyheadlines.Thetwentiethcenturysawthedevelopedworld
descendintoaparoxysmofideologicalviolence,asliberalismcontendedfirstwiththeremnantsof
absolutism,thenbolshevismandfascism,andfinallyanupdatedMarxismthatthreatenedtolead
totheultimateapocalypseofnuclearwar.Butthecenturythatbeganfullofselfconfidenceinthe
ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to
whereitstarted:nottoan"endofideology"oraconvergencebetweencapitalismandsocialism,
asearlierpredicted,buttoanunabashedvictoryofeconomicandpoliticalliberalism.
ThetriumphoftheWest,oftheWesternidea,isevidentfirstofallinthetotalexhaustionofviable
systematicalternativestoWesternliberalism.Inthepastdecade,therehavebeenunmistakable
changes in the intellectual climate of the world's two largest communist countries, and the
beginningsofsignificantreformmovementsinboth.Butthisphenomenonextendsbeyondhigh
politicsanditcanbeseenalsointheineluctablespreadofconsumeristWesterncultureinsuch
diversecontextsasthepeasants'marketsandcolortelevisionsetsnowomnipresentthroughout
China, thecooperativerestaurantsand clothingstoresopened inthe pastyearinMoscow,the
BeethovenpipedintoJapanesedepartmentstores,andtherockmusicenjoyedalikeinPrague,
Rangoon,andTehran.
WhatwemaybewitnessingisnotjusttheendoftheColdWar,orthepassingofaparticularperiod
ofpostwarhistory,buttheendofhistoryassuch:thatis,theendpointofmankind'sideological
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human
government.ThisisnottosaythattherewillnolongerbeeventstofillthepagesofForeignAffair's
yearlysummariesofinternationalrelations,forthevictoryofliberalismhasoccurredprimarilyin
therealmofideasorconsciousnessandisasyetincompletein.therealormaterialworld.But
therearepowerfulreasonsforbelievingthatitistheidealthatwillgovernthematerialworldin
the long run. To understand how this is so, we must first consider some theoretical issues
concerningthenatureofhistoricalchange.

THENOTIONoftheendofhistoryisnotanoriginalone.ItsbestknownpropagatorwasKarlMarx,
whobelievedthatthedirectionofhistoricaldevelopmentwasapurposefulonedeterminedbythe
interplayofmaterialforces,andwouldcometoanendonlywiththeachievementofacommunist
utopiathatwouldfinallyresolveallpriorcontradictions.Buttheconceptofhistoryasadialectical
process with a beginning, a middle, and an end was borrowed by Marx from his great German
predecessor,GeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel.
Forbetterorworse,muchofHegel'shistoricismhasbecomepartofourcontemporaryintellectual
baggage. The notion that mankind has progressed through a series of primitive stages of
consciousnessonhispathtothepresent,andthatthesestagescorrespondedtoconcreteforms
ofsocialorganization,suchastribal,slaveowning,theocratic,andfinallydemocraticegalitarian
societies, has become inseparable from the modern understanding of man. Hegel was the first
philosopher to speak the language of modern social science, insofar as man for him was the
productofhisconcretehistoricalandsocialenvironmentandnot,asearliernaturalrighttheorists
would have it, a collection of more or less fixed "natural" attributes. The mastery and
transformationofman'snaturalenvironmentthroughtheapplicationofscienceandtechnology
wasoriginallynotaMarxistconcept,butaHegelianone.Unlikelaterhistoricistswhosehistorical
relativismdegeneratedintorelativismtoutcourt,however,Hegelbelievedthathistoryculminated
inanabsolutemomentamomentinwhichafinal,rationalformofsocietyandstatebecame
victorious.
ItisHegel'smisfortunetobeknownnowprimarilyasMarx'sprecursor;anditisourmisfortune
thatfewofusarefamiliarwith Hegel'sworkfrom directstudy,but onlyasit hasbeenfiltered
throughthedistortinglensofMarxism.InFrance,however,therehasbeenanefforttosaveHegel
fromhisMarxistinterpretersandtoresurrecthimasthephilosopherwhomostcorrectlyspeaks
to our time. Among those modern French interpreters of Hegel, the greatest was certainly
AlexandreKojve,abrilliantRussianmigrwhotaughtahighlyinfluentialseriesofseminarsin
Parisinthe1930sattheEcolePractiquedesHautesEtudes.WhilelargelyunknownintheUnited
States, Kojve had a major impact on the intellectual life of the continent. Among his students
rangedsuch future luminariesasJeanPaulSartre ontheLeft andRaymondArononthe Right;
postwarexistentialismborrowedmanyofitsbasiccategoriesfromHegelviaKojve.
KojvesoughttoresurrecttheHegelofthePhenomenologyofMind,theHegelwhoproclaimed
historytobeatanendin1806.ForasearlyasthisHegelsawinNapoleon'sdefeatofthePrussian
monarchyattheBattleofJenathevictoryoftheidealsoftheFrenchRevolution,andtheimminent
universalizationofthestateincorporatingtheprinciplesoflibertyandequality.Kojve,farfrom
rejectingHegelinlightoftheturbulenteventsofthenextcenturyandahalf,insistedthatthelatter
hadbeenessentiallycorrect.TheBattleofJenamarkedtheendofhistorybecauseitwasatthat
pointthatthevanguardofhumanity(atermquitefamiliartoMarxists)actualizedtheprinciplesof
the French Revolution. While there was considerable work to be done after 1806 abolishing
slaveryandtheslavetrade,extendingthefranchisetoworkers,women,blacks,andotherracial
minorities,etc.thebasicprinciplesoftheliberaldemocraticstatecouldnotbeimprovedupon.
Thetwoworldwarsinthiscenturyandtheirattendantrevolutionsandupheavalssimplyhadthe
effectofextendingthoseprinciplesspatially,suchthatthevariousprovincesofhumancivilization
werebroughtuptothelevelofitsmostadvancedoutposts,andofforcingthosesocietiesinEurope
andNorthAmericaatthevanguardofcivilizationtoimplementtheirliberalismmorefully.

Thestatethatemergesattheendofhistoryisliberalinsofarasitrecognizesandprotectsthrough
asystemoflawman'suniversalrighttofreedom,anddemocraticinsofarasitexistsonlywiththe
consentofthegoverned.ForKojve,thissocalled"universalhomogenousstate"foundreallife
embodimentinthecountriesofpostwarWesternEuropepreciselythoseflabby,prosperous,self
satisfied,inwardlooking,weakwilledstateswhosegrandestprojectwasnothingmoreheroicthan
thecreationoftheCommonMarket.[3]Butthiswasonlytobeexpected.Forhumanhistoryand
theconflictthatcharacterizeditwasbasedontheexistenceof"contradictions":primitiveman's
questformutualrecognition,thedialecticofthemasterandslave,thetransformationandmastery
of nature, the struggle for the universal recognition of rights, and the dichotomy between
proletarian and capitalist. But in the universal homogenous state, all prior contradictions are
resolvedandallhumanneedsaresatisfied.Thereisnostruggleorconflictover"large"issues,and
consequentlynoneedforgeneralsorstatesmen;whatremainsisprimarilyeconomicactivity.And
indeed,Kojve'slifewasconsistentwithhisteaching.Believingthattherewasnomoreworkfor
philosophersaswell,sinceHegel(correctlyunderstood)hadalreadyachievedabsoluteknowledge,
Kojveleftteachingafterthewarandspenttheremainderofhislifeworkingasabureaucratin
theEuropeanEconomicCommunity,untilhisdeathin1968.
To his contemporaries at midcentury, Kojve's proclamation of the end of history must have
seemedlikethetypicaleccentricsolipsismofaFrenchintellectual,comingasitdidontheheelsof
WorldWarIIandattheveryheightoftheColdWar.TocomprehendhowKojvecouldhavebeen
soaudaciousastoassertthathistoryhasended,wemustfirstofallunderstandthemeaningof
Hegelianidealism.
II
FOR HEGEL, the contradictions that drive history exist first of all in the realm of human
consciousness, i.e. on the level of ideas not the trivial election year proposals of American
politicians,butideasinthesenseoflargeunifyingworldviewsthatmightbestbeunderstoodunder
therubricofideology.Ideologyinthissenseisnotrestrictedtothesecularandexplicitpolitical
doctrinesweusuallyassociatewiththeterm,butcanincludereligion,culture,andthecomplexof
moralvaluesunderlyinganysocietyaswell.
Hegel'sviewoftherelationshipbetweentheidealandtherealormaterialworldswasanextremely
complicatedone,beginningwiththefactthatforhimthedistinctionbetweenthetwowasonly
apparent. He did not believe that the real world conformed or could be made to conform to
ideological preconceptions of philosophy professors in any simpleminded way, or that the
"material" world could not impinge on the ideal. Indeed, Hegel the professor was temporarily
thrownoutofworkasaresultofaverymaterialevent,theBattleofJena.ButwhileHegel'swriting
andthinkingcouldbestoppedbyabulletfromthematerialworld,thehandonthetriggerofthe
gun was motivated in turn by the ideas of liberty and equality that had driven the French
Revolution.
ForHegel,allhumanbehaviorinthematerialworld,andhenceallhumanhistory,isrootedina
priorstateofconsciousnessanideasimilartotheoneexpressedbyJohnMaynardKeyneswhen
he said that the views of men of affairs were usually derived from defunct economists and
academicscribblersofearliergenerations.Thisconsciousnessmaynotbeexplicitandselfaware,
asaremodernpoliticaldoctrines,butmayrathertaketheformofreligionorsimpleculturalor

moralhabits.Andyetthisrealmofconsciousnessinthelongrunnecessarilybecomesmanifestin
thematerialworld,indeedcreatesthematerialworldinitsownimage.Consciousnessiscauseand
not effect, and can develop autonomously from the material world; hence the real subtext
underlyingtheapparentjumbleofcurrenteventsisthehistoryofideology.
Hegel'sidealismhasfaredpoorlyatthehandsoflaterthinkers.Marxreversedthepriorityofthe
realandtheidealcompletely,relegatingtheentirerealmofconsciousnessreligion,art,culture,
philosophyitselftoa"superstructure"thatwasdeterminedentirelybytheprevailingmaterial
modeofproduction.YetanotherunfortunatelegacyofMarxismisourtendencytoretreatinto
materialistorutilitarianexplanationsofpoliticalorhistoricalphenomena,andourdisinclinationto
believe in the autonomous power of ideas. A recent example of this is Paul Kennedy's hugely
successfulTheRiseandFalloftheGreatPowers,whichascribesthedeclineofgreatpowersto
simpleeconomicoverextension.Obviously,thisistrueonsomelevel:anempirewhoseeconomy
isbarelyabovethelevelofsubsistencecannotbankruptitstreasuryindefinitely.Butwhethera
highlyproductivemodernindustrialsocietychoosestospend3or7percentofitsGNPondefense
ratherthanconsumptionisentirelyamatterofthatsociety'spoliticalpriorities,whichareinturn
determinedintherealmofconsciousness.
ThematerialistbiasofmodernthoughtischaracteristicnotonlyofpeopleontheLeftwhomaybe
sympathetictoMarxism,butofmanypassionateantiMarxistsaswell.Indeed,thereisontheRight
whatonemightlabeltheWallStreetJournalschoolofdeterministicmaterialismthatdiscountsthe
importance of ideology and culture and sees man as essentially a rational, profitmaximizing
individual.Itispreciselythiskindofindividualandhispursuitofmaterialincentivesthatisposited
asthebasisforeconomiclifeassuchineconomictextbooks.Onesmallexamplewillillustratethe
problematiccharacterofsuchmaterialistviews.
MaxWeberbeginshisfamousbook,TheProtestantEthicandtheSpiritofCapitalism,bynotingthe
differenteconomicperformanceofProtestantandCatholiccommunitiesthroughoutEuropeand
America,summedupintheproverbthatProtestantseatwellwhileCatholicssleepwell.Weber
notes that according to any economic theory that posited man as a rational profitmaximizer,
raising the piecework rate should increase labor productivity. But in fact, in many traditional
peasantcommunities,raisingthepieceworkrateactuallyhadtheoppositeeffectofloweringlabor
productivity:atthehigherrate,apeasantaccustomedtoearningtwoandonehalfmarksperday
foundhecouldearnthesameamountbyworkingless,anddidsobecausehevaluedleisuremore
thanincome.Thechoicesofleisureoverincome,orofthemilitaristiclifeoftheSpartanhoplite
overthewealthoftheAtheniantrader,oreventheasceticlifeoftheearlycapitalistentrepreneur
over that of a traditional leisured aristocrat, cannot possibly be explained by the impersonal
workingofmaterialforces,butcomepreeminentlyoutofthesphereofconsciousnesswhatwe
havelabeledherebroadlyasideology.Andindeed,acentralthemeofWeber'sworkwastoprove
thatcontrarytoMarx,thematerialmodeofproduction,farfrombeingthe"base,"wasitselfa
"superstructure" with roots in religion and culture, and that to understand the emergence of
moderncapitalismandtheprofitmotiveonehadtostudytheirantecedentsintherealmofthe
spirit.
As we look around the contemporary world, the poverty of materialist theories of economic
development is all too apparent. The Wall Street Journal school of deterministic materialism
habituallypointstothestunningeconomicsuccessofAsiainthepastfewdecadesasevidenceof

the viability of free market economics, with the implication that all societies would see similar
development were they simply to allow their populations to pursue their material selfinterest
freely.Surelyfreemarketsandstablepoliticalsystemsareanecessarypreconditiontocapitalist
economicgrowth.ButjustassurelytheculturalheritageofthoseFarEasternsocieties,theethic
ofworkandsavingandfamily,areligiousheritagethatdoesnot,likeIslam,placerestrictionson
certain forms of economic behavior, and other deeply ingrained moral qualities, are equally
importantinexplainingtheireconomicperformance.Andyettheintellectualweightofmaterialism
issuchthat notasinglerespectablecontemporarytheoryof economicdevelopmentaddresses
consciousnessandcultureseriouslyasthematrixwithinwhicheconomicbehaviorisformed.
FAILUREtounderstandthattherootsofeconomicbehaviorlieintherealmofconsciousnessand
culture leads to the common mistake of attributing material causes to phenomena that are
essentially ideal in nature. For example, it is commonplace in the West to interpret the reform
movementsfirstinChinaandmostrecentlyintheSovietUnionasthevictoryofthematerialover
the ideal that is, a recognition that ideological incentives could not replace material ones in
stimulatingahighlyproductivemoderneconomy,andthatifonewantedtoprosperonehadto
appealtobaserformsofselfinterest.Butthedeepdefectsofsocialisteconomieswereevident
thirtyorfortyyearsagotoanyonewhochosetolook.Whywasitthatthesecountriesmovedaway
fromcentralplanningonlyinthe1980s'Theanswermustbefoundintheconsciousnessofthe
elitesandleadersrulingthem,whodecidedtooptforthe"Protestant"lifeofwealthandriskover
the"Catholic"pathofpovertyandsecurity.Thatchangewasinnowaymadeinevitablebythe
materialconditionsinwhicheithercountryfounditselfontheeveofthereform,butinsteadcame
aboutastheresultofthevictoryofoneideaoveranother.
ForKojve,asforallgoodHegelians,understandingtheunderlyingprocessesofhistoryrequires
understanding developments in the realm of consciousness or ideas, since consciousness will
ultimatelyremakethematerialworldinitsownimage.Tosaythathistoryendedin1806meant
thatmankind'sideologicalevolutionendedintheidealsoftheFrenchorAmericanRevolutions:
whileparticularregimesintherealworldmightnotimplementtheseidealsfully,theirtheoretical
truth is absolute and could not be improved upon. Hence it did not matter to Kojve that the
consciousnessofthepostwargenerationofEuropeanshadnotbeenuniversalizedthroughoutthe
world; if ideological development had in fact ended, the homogenous state would eventually
becomevictoriousthroughoutthematerialworld.
I have neither the space nor, frankly, the ability to defend in depth Hegel's radical idealist
perspective.TheissueisnotwhetherHegel'ssystemwasright,butwhetherhisperspectivemight
uncovertheproblematicnatureofmanymaterialistexplanationsweoftentakeforgranted.This
isnottodenytheroleofmaterialfactorsassuch.Toaliteralmindedidealist,humansocietycan
bebuiltaroundanyarbitrarysetofprinciplesregardlessoftheirrelationshiptothematerialworld.
Andinfactmenhaveproventhemselvesabletoendurethemostextremematerialhardshipsin
thenameofideasthatexistintherealmofthespiritalone,beitthedivinityofcowsorthenature
oftheHolyTrinity.
Butwhileman'sveryperceptionofthematerialworldisshapedbyhishistoricalconsciousnessof
it,thematerialworldcanclearlyaffectinreturntheviabilityofaparticularstateofconsciousness.
Inparticular,thespectacularabundanceofadvancedliberaleconomiesandtheinfinitelydiverse
consumer culture made possible by them seem to both foster and preserve liberalism in the

political sphere. I want to avoid the materialist determinism that says that liberal economics
inevitablyproducesliberalpolitics,becauseIbelievethatbotheconomicsandpoliticspresuppose
an autonomous prior state of consciousness that makes them possible. But that state of
consciousnessthatpermitsthegrowthofliberalismseemstostabilizeinthewayonewouldexpect
attheendofhistoryifitisunderwrittenbytheabundanceofamodernfreemarketeconomy.We
might summarize the content of the universal homogenous state as liberal democracy in the
politicalspherecombinedwitheasyaccesstoVCRsandstereosintheeconomic.
III
HAVE WE in fact reached the end of history? Are there, in other words, any fundamental
"contradictions"inhumanlifethatcannotberesolvedinthecontextofmodernliberalism,that
would be resolvable by an alternative politicaleconomic structure? If we accept the idealist
premiseslaidoutabove,wemustseekananswertothisquestionintherealmofideologyand
consciousness.Ourtaskisnottoanswerexhaustivelythechallengestoliberalismpromotedby
everycrackpotmessiaharoundtheworld,butonlythosethatareembodiedinimportantsocialor
politicalforcesandmovements,andwhicharethereforepartofworldhistory.Forourpurposes,
itmattersverylittlewhatstrangethoughtsoccurtopeopleinAlbaniaorBurkinaFaso,forweare
interestedinwhatonecouldinsomesensecallthecommonideologicalheritageofmankind.
Inthepastcentury,therehavebeentwomajorchallengestoliberalism,thoseoffascismandof
communism.Theformersawthepoliticalweakness,materialism,anomie,andlackofcommunity
of the West as fundamental contradictions in liberal societies that could only be resolved by a
strong state that forged a new "people" on the basis of national exclusiveness. Fascism was
destroyedasalivingideologybyWorldWarII.Thiswasadefeat,ofcourse,onaverymateriallevel,
butitamountedtoadefeatoftheideaaswell.Whatdestroyedfascismasanideawasnotuniversal
moral revulsion against it, since plenty of people were willing to endorse the idea as long as it
seemedthewaveofthefuture,butitslackofsuccess.Afterthewar,itseemedtomostpeople
thatGermanfascismaswellasitsotherEuropeanandAsianvariantswereboundtoselfdestruct.
Therewerenomaterialreasonwhynewfascistmovementscouldnothavesprungupagainafter
thewarinotherlocales,butforthefactthatexpansionistultranationalism,withitspromiseof
unendingconflictleadingtodisastrousmilitarydefeat,hadcompletelylostitsappeal.Theruinsof
theReichchancelleryaswellastheatomicbombsdroppedonHiroshimaandNagasakikilledthis
ideologyonthelevelofconsciousnessaswellasmaterially,andalloftheprofascistmovements
spawned by the German and Japanese examples like the Peronist movement in Argentina or
SubhasChandraBose'sIndianNationalArmywitheredafterthewar.
Theideologicalchallengemountedbytheothergreatalternativetoliberalism,communism,was
far more serious. Marx, speaking Hegel's language, asserted that liberal society contained a
fundamentalcontradictionthatcouldnotberesolvedwithinitscontext,thatbetweencapitaland
labor,andthiscontradictionhasconstitutedthechiefaccusationagainstliberalismeversince.But
surely,theclassissuehasactuallybeensuccessfullyresolvedintheWest.AsKojve(amongothers)
noted,theegalitarianismofmodernAmericarepresentstheessentialachievementoftheclassless
societyenvisionedbyMarx.Thisisnottosaythattherearenotrichpeopleandpoorpeopleinthe
UnitedStates,orthatthegapbetweenthemhasnotgrowninrecentyears.Buttherootcausesof
economicinequalitydonothavetodowiththeunderlyinglegalandsocialstructureofoursociety,
which remains fundamentally egalitarian and moderately redistributionist, so much as with the

culturalandsocialcharacteristicsofthegroupsthatmakeitup,whichareinturnthehistorical
legacyofpremodernconditions.ThusblackpovertyintheUnitedStatesisnottheinherentproduct
ofliberalism,butisratherthe"legacyofslaveryandracism"whichpersistedlongaftertheformal
abolitionofslavery.
Asaresultoftherecedingoftheclassissue,theappealofcommunisminthedevelopedWestern
world,itissafetosay,islowertodaythananytimesincetheendoftheFirstWorldWar.Thiscan
bemeasuredinanynumberofways:inthedecliningmembershipandelectoralpullofthemajor
Europeancommunistparties,andtheirovertlyrevisionistprograms;inthecorrespondingelectoral
successofconservativepartiesfromBritainandGermanytotheUnitedStatesandJapan,which
areunabashedlypromarketandantistatist;andinanintellectualclimatewhosemost"advanced"
members no longer believe that bourgeois society is something that ultimately needs to be
overcome.ThisisnottosaythattheopinionsofprogressiveintellectualsinWesterncountriesare
not deeply pathological in any number of ways. But those who believe that the future must
inevitablybesocialisttendtobeveryold,orverymarginaltotherealpoliticaldiscourseoftheir
societies.
0NE MAY argue that the socialist alternative was never terribly plausible for the North Atlantic
world,andwassustainedforthelastseveraldecadesprimarilybyitssuccessoutsideofthisregion.
ButitispreciselyinthenonEuropeanworldthatoneismoststruckbytheoccurrenceofmajor
ideologicaltransformations.SurelythemostremarkablechangeshaveoccurredinAsia.Duetothe
strengthandadaptabilityoftheindigenousculturesthere,Asiabecameabattlegroundforavariety
ofimportedWesternideologiesearlyinthiscentury.LiberalisminAsiawasaveryweakreedinthe
periodafterWorldWarI;itiseasytodaytoforgethowgloomyAsia'spoliticalfuturelookedas
recentlyastenorfifteenyearsago.Itiseasytoforgetaswellhowmomentoustheoutcomeof
Asianideologicalstrugglesseemedforworldpoliticaldevelopmentasawhole.
ThefirstAsianalternativetoliberalismtobedecisivelydefeatedwasthefascistonerepresented
by Imperial Japan. Japanese fascism (like its German version) was defeated by the force of
Americanarmsin the Pacificwar,andliberaldemocracywas imposed on Japan by avictorious
United States. Western capitalism and political liberalism when transplanted to Japan were
adaptedandtransformedbytheJapaneseinsuchawayastobescarcelyrecognizable.[12]Many
Americans are now aware that Japanese industrial organization is very different from that
prevailing in the United States or Europe, and it is questionable what relationship the factional
maneuveringthattakesplacewiththegoverningLiberalDemocraticPartybearstodemocracy.
Nonetheless,theveryfactthattheessentialelementsofeconomicandpoliticalliberalismhave
beensosuccessfullygraftedontouniquelyJapanesetraditionsandinstitutionsguaranteestheir
survivalinthelongrun.MoreimportantisthecontributionthatJapanhasmadeinturntoworld
history by following in the footsteps of the United States to create a truly universal consumer
culturethathasbecomebothasymbolandanunderpinningoftheuniversalhomogenousstate.
V.S.NaipaultravelinginKhomeini'sIranshortlyaftertherevolutionnotedtheomnipresentsigns
advertisingtheproductsofSony,Hitachi,andJVC,whoseappealremainedvirtuallyirresistibleand
gavethelietotheregime'spretensionsofrestoringastatebasedontheruleoftheShariah.Desire
foraccesstotheconsumerculture,createdinlargemeasurebyJapan,hasplayedacrucialrolein
fostering the spread of economic liberalism throughout Asia, and hence in promoting political
liberalismaswell.

Theeconomicsuccessoftheothernewlyindustrializingcountries(NICs)inAsiafollowingonthe
exampleofJapanisbynowafamiliarstory.WhatisimportantfromaHegelianstandpointisthat
politicalliberalismhasbeenfollowingeconomicliberalism,moreslowlythanmanyhadhopedbut
withseeminginevitability.Hereagainweseethevictoryoftheideaoftheuniversalhomogenous
state.SouthKoreahaddevelopedintoamodern,urbanizedsocietywithanincreasinglylargeand
welleducatedmiddleclassthatcouldnotpossiblybeisolatedfromthelargerdemocratictrends
aroundthem.Underthesecircumstancesitseemedintolerabletoalargepartofthispopulation
thatitshouldberuledbyananachronisticmilitaryregimewhileJapan,onlyadecadeorsoahead
ineconomicterms,hadparliamentaryinstitutionsforoverfortyyears.Eventheformersocialist
regime in Burma, which for so many decades existed in dismal isolation from the larger trends
dominatingAsia, wasbuffetedinthepastyearbypressures to liberalizebothits economyand
politicalsystem.ItissaidthatunhappinesswithstrongmanNeWinbeganwhenaseniorBurmese
officer went to Singapore for medical treatment and broke down crying when he saw how far
socialistBurmahadbeenleftbehindbyitsASEANneighbors.
BUTTHEpoweroftheliberalideawouldseemmuchlessimpressiveifithadnotinfectedthelargest
andoldestcultureinAsia,China.ThesimpleexistenceofcommunistChinacreatedanalternative
poleofideologicalattraction,andassuchconstitutedathreattoliberalism.Butthepastfifteen
years have seen an almost total discrediting of MarxismLeninism as an economic system.
Beginning with the famous third plenum of the Tenth Central Committee in 1978, the Chinese
Communistpartysetaboutdecollectivizingagricultureforthe800millionChinesewhostilllivedin
thecountryside.Theroleofthestateinagriculturewasreducedtothatofataxcollector,while
production of consumer goods was sharply increased in order to give peasants a taste of the
universalhomogenousstateandtherebyanincentivetowork.ThereformdoubledChinesegrain
outputinonlyfiveyears,andintheprocesscreatedforDengXiaopingasolidpoliticalbasefrom
whichhewasabletoextendthereformtootherpartsoftheeconomy.EconomicStatisticsdonot
begintodescribethedynamism,initiative,andopennessevidentinChinasincethereformbegan.
Chinacouldnotnowbedescribedinanywayasaliberaldemocracy.Atpresent,nomorethan20
percentofitseconomyhasbeenmarketized,andmostimportantlyitcontinuestoberuledbya
selfappointedCommunistpartywhichhasgivennohintofwantingtodevolvepower.Denghas
madenoneofGorbachev'spromisesregardingdemocratizationofthepoliticalsystemandthere
is no Chinese equivalent of glasnost. The Chinese leadership has in fact been much more
circumspectincriticizingMaoandMaoismthanGorbachevwithrespecttoBrezhnevandStalin,
andtheregimecontinuestopaylipservicetoMarxismLeninismasitsideologicalunderpinning.
Butanyonefamiliarwiththeoutlookandbehaviorofthenewtechnocraticelitenowgoverning
ChinaknowsthatMarxismandideologicalprinciplehavebecomevirtuallyirrelevantasguidesto
policy,andthatbourgeoisconsumerismhasarealmeaninginthatcountryforthefirsttimesince
the revolution. The various slowdowns in the pace of reform, the campaigns against "spiritual
pollution"andcrackdownsonpoliticaldissentaremoreproperlyseenastacticaladjustmentsmade
intheprocessofmanagingwhatisanextraordinarilydifficultpoliticaltransition.Byduckingthe
questionofpoliticalreformwhileputtingtheeconomyonanewfooting,Denghasmanagedto
avoidthebreakdownofauthoritythathasaccompaniedGorbachev'sperestroika.Yetthepullof
theliberalideacontinuestobeverystrongaseconomicpowerdevolvesandtheeconomybecomes
moreopentotheoutsideworld.Therearecurrentlyover20,000Chinesestudentsstudyinginthe
U.S.andotherWesterncountries,almostallofthemthechildrenoftheChineseelite.Itishardto

believethatwhentheyreturnhometorunthecountrytheywillbecontentforChinatobethe
onlycountryinAsiaunaffectedbythelargerdemocratizingtrend.Thestudentdemonstrationsin
BeijingthatbrokeoutfirstinDecember1986andrecurredrecentlyontheoccasionofHuYao
bang'sdeathwereonlythebeginningofwhatwillinevitablybemountingpressureforchangein
thepoliticalsystemaswell.
WhatisimportantaboutChinafromthestandpointofworldhistoryisnotthepresentstateofthe
reformorevenitsfutureprospects.ThecentralissueisthefactthatthePeople'sRepublicofChina
cannolongeractasabeaconforilliberalforcesaroundtheworld,whethertheybeguerrillasin
some Asian jungle or middle class students in Paris. Maoism, rather than being the pattern for
Asia'sfuture,becameananachronism,anditwasthemainlandChinesewhoinfactweredecisively
influencedbytheprosperityanddynamismoftheiroverseascoethnicstheironicultimatevictory
ofTaiwan.
ImportantasthesechangesinChinahavebeen,however,itisdevelopmentsintheSovietUnion
theoriginal"homelandoftheworldproletariat"thathaveputthefinalnailinthecoffinofthe
MarxistLeninist alternative to liberal democracy. It should be clear that in terms of formal
institutions, notmuch haschanged in thefouryearssinceGorbachevhascometo power:free
marketsandthecooperativemovementrepresentonlyasmallpartoftheSovieteconomy,which
remainscentrallyplanned;thepoliticalsystemisstilldominatedbytheCommunistparty,which
has only begun to democratize internally and to share power with other groups; the regime
continues to assert that it is seeking only to modernize socialism and that its ideological basis
remains MarxismLeninism; and, finally, Gorbachev faces a potentially powerful conservative
oppositionthatcouldundomanyofthechangesthathavetakenplacetodate.Moreover,itishard
tobetoosanguineaboutthechancesforsuccessofGorbachev'sproposedreforms,eitherinthe
sphereofeconomicsorpolitics.Butmypurposehereisnottoanalyzeeventsintheshortterm,or
tomakepredictionsforpolicypurposes,buttolookatunderlyingtrendsinthesphereofideology
andconsciousness.Andinthatrespect,itisclearthatanastoundingtransformationhasoccurred.
migrs from the Soviet Union have been reporting for at least the last generation now that
virtuallynobodyinthatcountrytrulybelievedinMarxismLeninismanylonger,andthatthiswas
nowheremoretruethanintheSovietelite,whichcontinuedtomouthMarxistslogansoutofsheer
cynicism.ThecorruptionanddecadenceofthelateBrezhneveraSovietstateseemedtomatter
little,however,foraslongasthestateitselfrefusedtothrowintoquestionanyofthefundamental
principlesunderlyingSovietsociety,thesystemwascapableoffunctioningadequatelyoutofsheer
inertiaandcouldevenmustersomedynamismintherealmofforeignanddefensepolicy.Marxism
Leninismwaslikeamagicalincantationwhich,howeverabsurdanddevoidofmeaning,wasthe
onlycommonbasisonwhichtheelitecouldagreetoruleSovietsociety.
WHAT HAS happened in the four years since Gorbachev's coming to power is a revolutionary
assaultonthemostfundamentalinstitutionsandprinciplesofStalinism,andtheirreplacementby
otherprincipleswhichdo not amount toliberalismpersebutwhose onlyconnectingthreadis
liberalism. This is most evident in the economic sphere, where the reform economists around
Gorbachevhavebecomesteadilymoreradicalintheirsupportforfreemarkets,tothepointwhere
somelikeNikolaiShmelevdonotmindbeingcomparedinpublictoMiltonFriedman.Thereisa
virtual consensus among the currently dominant school of Soviet economists now that central
planningandthecommandsystemofallocationaretherootcauseofeconomicinefficiency,and

thatiftheSovietsystemisevertohealitself,itmustpermitfreeanddecentralizeddecisionmaking
withrespecttoinvestment,labor,andprices.Afteracoupleofinitialyearsofideologicalconfusion,
theseprincipleshavefinallybeenincorporatedintopolicywiththepromulgationofnewlawson
enterpriseautonomy,cooperatives,andfinallyin1988onleasearrangementsandfamilyfarming.
Thereare,ofcourse,anumberoffatalflawsinthecurrentimplementationofthereform,most
notablytheabsenceofathoroughgoingpricereform.Buttheproblemisnolongeraconceptual
one:Gorbachevandhislieutenantsseemtounderstandtheeconomiclogicofmarketizationwell
enough, but like the leaders of a Third World country facing the IMF, are afraid of the social
consequencesofendingconsumersubsidiesandotherformsofdependenceonthestatesector.
Inthepoliticalsphere,theproposedchangestotheSovietconstitution,legalsystem,andparty
rules amount to much less than the establishment of a liberal state. Gorbachev has spoken of
democratizationprimarilyinthesphereofinternalpartyaffairs,andhasshownlittleintentionof
endingtheCommunistparty'smonopolyofpower;indeed,thepoliticalreformseekstolegitimize
andthereforestrengthentheCPSU'Srule.[13]Nonetheless,thegeneralprinciplesunderlyingmany
ofthereformsthat the"people"shouldbetrulyresponsiblefortheirown affairs,thathigher
politicalbodiesshouldbeanswerabletolowerones,andnotviceversa,thattheruleoflawshould
prevailoverarbitrarypoliceactions,withseparationofpowersandanindependentjudiciary,that
thereshouldbelegalprotectionforpropertyrights,theneedforopendiscussionofpublicissues
andtherightofpublicdissent,theempoweringoftheSovietsasaforuminwhichthewholeSoviet
peoplecanparticipate,andofapoliticalculturethatismoretolerantandpluralisticcomefroma
sourcefundamentallyalientotheUSSR'sMarxistLeninisttradition,eveniftheyareincompletely
articulatedandpoorlyimplementedinpractice.
Gorbachev's repeated assertions that he is doing no more than trying to restore the original
meaning of Leninism are themselves a kind of Orwellian doublespeak. Gorbachev and his allies
haveconsistentlymaintainedthatintrapartydemocracywassomehowtheessenceofLeninism,
andthatthevariouslibera1practicesofopendebate,secretballotelections,andruleoflawwere
allpartoftheLeninistheritage,corruptedonlylaterbyStalin.Whilealmostanyonewouldlook
goodcomparedtoStalin,drawingsosharpalinebetweenLeninandhissuccessorisquestionable.
TheessenceofLenin'sdemocraticcentralismwascentralism,notdemocracy;thatis,theabsolutely
rigid,monolithic,anddisciplineddictatorshipofahierarchicallyorganizedvanguardCommunist
party,speakinginthenameofthedemos.AllofLenin'sviciouspolemicsagainstKarlKautsky,Rosa
Luxemburg, and various other Menshevik and Social Democratic rivals, not to mention his
contemptfor"bourgeoislegality"andfreedoms,centeredaroundhisprofoundconvictionthata
revolutioncouldnotbesuccessfullymadebyademocraticallyrunorganization.
Gorbachev'sclaimthatheisseekingtoreturntothetrueLeninisperfectlyeasytounderstand:
havingfosteredathoroughdenunciationofStalinismandBrezhnevismastherootoftheUSSR's
presentpredicament,heneedssomepointinSoviethistoryonwhichtoanchorthelegitimacyof
theCPSU'Scontinuedrule.ButGorbachev'stacticalrequirementsshouldnotblindustothefact
thatthedemocratizinganddecentralizingprincipleswhichhehasenunciatedinboththeeconomic
and political spheres are highly subversive of some of the most fundamental precepts of both
MarxismandLeninism.Indeed,ifthebulkofthepresenteconomicreformproposalswereputinto
effect,itishardtoknowhowtheSovieteconomywouldbemoresocialistthanthoseofother
Westerncountrieswithlargepublicsectors.

TheSovietUnioncouldinnowaybedescribedasaliberalordemocraticcountrynow,nordoI
thinkthatitisterriblylikelythatperestroikawillsucceedsuchthatthelabelwillbethinkableany
time in the near future. But at the end of history it is not necessary that all societies become
successful liberal societies, merely that they end their ideological pretensions of representing
different and higher forms of human society. And in this respect I believe that something very
important has happened in the Soviet Union in the past few years: the criticisms of the Soviet
systemsanctionedbyGorbachevhavebeensothoroughanddevastatingthatthereisverylittle
chanceofgoingbacktoeitherStalinismorBrezhnevisminanysimpleway.Gorbachevhasfinally
permitted people to say what they had privately understood for many years, namely, that the
magicalincantationsofMarxismLeninismwerenonsense,thatSovietsocialismwasnotsuperior
totheWestinanyrespectbutwasinfactamonumentalfailure.Theconservativeoppositionin
theUSSR,consistingbothofsimpleworkersafraidofunemploymentandinflationandofparty
officialsfearfuloflosingtheirjobsandprivileges,isoutspokenandmaybestrongenoughtoforce
Gorbachev's ouster in the next few years. But what both groups desire is tradition, order, and
authority;theymanifestnodeepcommitmenttoMarxismLeninism,exceptinsofarastheyhave
invested much of their own lives in it. For authority to be restored in the Soviet Union after
Gorbachev'sdemolitionwork,itmustbeonthebasisofsomenewandvigorousideologywhich
hasnotyetappearedonthehorizon.
IFWEADMITforthemomentthatthefascistandcommunistchallengestoliberalismaredead,are
thereanyotherideologicalcompetitorsleft?Orputanotherway,aretherecontradictionsinliberal
societybeyondthatofclassthatarenotresolvable?Twopossibilitiessuggestthemselves,thoseof
religionandnationalism.
The rise of religious fundamentalism in recent years within the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim
traditionshasbeenwidelynoted.Oneisinclinedtosaythattherevivalofreligioninsomeway
atteststoabroadunhappinesswiththeimpersonalityandspiritualvacuityofliberalconsumerist
societies.Yetwhiletheemptinessatthecoreofliberalismismostcertainlyadefectintheideology
indeed,aflawthatonedoesnotneedtheperspectiveofreligiontorecognizeitisnotatallclear
thatitisremediablethroughpolitics.Modernliberalismitselfwashistoricallyaconsequenceofthe
weaknessofreligiouslybasedsocietieswhich,failingtoagreeonthenatureofthegoodlife,could
notprovideeventheminimalpreconditionsofpeaceandstability.Inthecontemporaryworldonly
Islamhasofferedatheocraticstateasapoliticalalternativetobothliberalismandcommunism.
ButthedoctrinehaslittleappealfornonMuslims,anditishardtobelievethatthemovementwill
takeonanyuniversalsignificance.Otherlessorganizedreligiousimpulseshavebeensuccessfully
satisfiedwithinthesphereofpersonallifethatispermittedinliberalsocieties.
The other major "contradiction" potentially unresolvable by liberalism is the one posed by
nationalismandotherformsofracialandethnicconsciousness.Itiscertainlytruethataverylarge
degreeofconflictsincetheBattleofJenahashaditsrootsinnationalism.Twocataclysmicworld
wars in this century have been spawned by the nationalism of the developed world in various
guises,andifthosepassionshavebeenmutedtoacertainextentinpostwarEurope,theyarestill
extremelypowerfulintheThirdWorld.Nationalismhasbeenathreattoliberalismhistoricallyin
Germany, and continues to be one in isolated parts of "posthistorical" Europe like Northern
Ireland.

But it is not clear that nationalism rep resents an irreconcilable contradiction in the heart of
liberalism.Inthefirstplace,nationalismisnotonesinglephenomenonbutseveral,rangingfrom
mild cultural nostalgia to the highly organized and elaborately articulated doctrine of National
Socialism.Onlysystematicnationalismsofthelattersortcanqualifyasaformalideologyonthe
levelofliberalismorcommunism.Thevastmajorityoftheworld'snationalistmovementsdonot
haveapoliticalprogrambeyondthenegativedesireofindependencefromsomeothergroupor
people,anddonotofferanythinglikeacomprehensiveagendaforsocioeconomicorganization.
Assuch,theyarecompatiblewithdoctrinesandideologiesthatdooffersuchagendas.Whilethey
mayconstituteasourceofconflictforliberalsocieties,thisconflictdoesnotarisefromliberalism
itselfsomuchasfromthefactthattheliberalisminquestionisincomplete.Certainlyagreatdeal
oftheworld'sethnicandnationalisttensioncanbeexplainedintermsofpeopleswhoareforced
toliveinunrepresentativepoliticalsystemsthattheyhavenotchosen.
While it is impossible to rule out the sudden appearance of new ideologies or previously
unrecognizedcontradictionsinliberalsocieties,then,thepresentworldseemstoconfirmthatthe
fundamental principles of sociopolitical organization have not advanced terribly far since 1806.
Manyofthewarsandrevolutionsfoughtsincethattimehavebeenundertakeninthenameof
ideologies which claimed to be more advanced than liberalism, but whose pretensions were
ultimately unmasked by history. In the meantime, they have helped to spread the universal
homogenousstatetothepointwhereitcouldhaveasignificanteffectontheoverallcharacterof
internationalrelations.
IV
WHATAREtheimplicationsoftheendofhistoryforinternationalrelations?Clearly,thevastbulk
oftheThirdWorldremainsverymuchmiredinhistory,andwillbeaterrainofconflictformany
yearstocome.Butletusfocusforthetimebeingonthelargerandmoredevelopedstatesofthe
worldwhoafterallaccountforthegreaterpartofworldpolitics.RussiaandChinaarenotlikelyto
jointhedevelopednationsoftheWestasliberalsocietiesanytimeintheforeseeablefuture,but
supposeforamomentthatMarxismLeninismceasestobeafactordrivingtheforeignpoliciesof
thesestatesaprospectwhich,ifnotyethere,thelastfewyearshavemadearealpossibility.How
willtheoverallcharacteristicsofadeideologizedworlddifferfromthoseoftheonewithwhichwe
arefamiliaratsuchahypotheticaljuncture?
Themostcommonanswerisnotverymuch.Forthereisaverywidespreadbeliefamongmany
observersofinternationalrelationsthatunderneaththeskinofideologyisahardcoreofgreat
power national interest that guarantees a fairly high level of competition and conflict between
nations.Indeed,accordingtooneacademicallypopularschoolofinternationalrelationstheory,
conflictinheresintheinternationalsystemassuch,andtounderstandtheprospectsforconflict
onemustlookattheshapeofthesystemforexample,whetheritisbipolarormultipolarrather
thanatthespecificcharacterofthenationsandregimesthatconstituteit.Thisschoolineffect
appliesaHobbesianviewofpoliticstointernationalrelations,andassumesthataggressionand
insecurity are universal characteristics of human societies rather than the product of specific
historicalcircumstances.
Believers in this line of thought take the relations that existed between the participants in the
classical nineteenth century European balance of power as a model for what a deideologized

contemporaryworldwouldlooklike.CharlesKrauthammer,forexample,recentlyexplainedthatif
asaresultofGorbachev'sreformstheUSSRisshornofMarxistLeninistideology,itsbehaviorwill
reverttothatofnineteenthcenturyimperialRussia.[16]Whilehefindsthismorereassuringthan
thethreatposedbyacommunistRussia,heimpliesthattherewillstillbeasubstantialdegreeof
competition and conflict in the international system, just as there was say between Russia and
BritainorWilhelmineGermanyinthelastcentury.Thisis,ofcourse,aconvenientpointofviewfor
peoplewhowanttoadmitthatsomethingmajorischangingintheSovietUnion,butdonotwant
toacceptresponsibilityforrecommendingtheradicalpolicyredirectionimplicitinsuchaview.But
isittrue?
Infact,thenotionthatideologyisasuperstructureimposedonasubstratumofpermanentgreat
power interest is a highly questionable proposition. For the way in which any state defines its
nationalinterestisnotuniversalbutrestsonsomekindofpriorideologicalbasis,justaswesaw
thateconomicbehaviorisdeterminedbyapriorstateofconsciousness.Inthiscentury,stateshave
adoptedhighlyarticulateddoctrineswithexplicitforeignpolicyagendaslegitimizingexpansionism,
likeMarxismLeninismorNationalSocialism.
THEEXPANSIONISTandcompetitivebehaviorofnineteenthcenturyEuropeanstatesrestedonno
lessidealabasis;itjustsohappenedthattheideologydrivingitwaslessexplicitthanthedoctrines
ofthetwentiethcentury.Foronething,most"liberal"Europeansocietieswereilliberalinsofaras
theybelievedinthelegitimacyofimperialism,thatis,therightofonenationtoruleoverother
nationswithoutregardforthewishesoftheruled.Thejustificationsforimperialismvariedfrom
nationtonation,fromacrudebeliefinthelegitimacyofforce,particularlywhenappliedtonon
Europeans,totheWhiteMan'sBurdenandEurope'sChristianizingmission,tothedesiretogive
people of color access to the culture of Rabelais and Moliere. But whatever the particular
ideological basis, every "developed" country believed in the acceptability of higher civilizations
rulingloweronesincluding,incidentally,theUnitedStateswithregardtothePhilippines.Thisled
toadriveforpureterritorialaggrandizementinthelatterhalfofthecenturyandplayednosmall
roleincausingtheGreatWar.
TheradicalanddeformedoutgrowthofnineteenthcenturyimperialismwasGermanfascism,an
ideologywhichjustifiedGermany'srightnotonlytoruleovernonEuropeanpeoples,butoverall
nonGerman ones. But in retrospect it seems that Hitler represented a diseased bypath in the
generalcourseofEuropeandevelopment,andsincehisfierydefeat,thelegitimacyofanykindof
territorial aggrandizement has been thoroughly discredited.[17] Since the Second World War,
Europeannationalismhasbeendefangedandshornofanyrealrelevancetoforeignpolicy,with
theconsequencethatthenineteenthcenturymodelofgreatpowerbehaviorhasbecomeaserious
anachronism. The most extreme form of nationalism that any Western European state has
mustered since 1945 has been Gaullism, whose selfassertion has been confined largely to the
realmofnuisancepoliticsandculture.Internationallifeforthepartoftheworldthathasreached
theendofhistoryisfarmorepreoccupiedwitheconomicsthanwithpoliticsorstrategy.
ThedevelopedstatesoftheWestdomaintaindefenseestablishmentsandinthepostwarperiod
havecompetedvigorouslyforinfluencetomeetaworldwidecommunistthreat.Thisbehaviorhas
been driven, however, by an external threat from states that possess overtly expansionist
ideologies,andwouldnotexistintheirabsence.Totakethe"neorealist"theoryseriously,one
wouldhavetobelievethat"natural"competitivebehaviorwouldreassertitselfamongtheOECD

stateswereRussiaandChinatodisappearfromthefaceoftheearth.Thatis,WestGermanyand
France would arm themselves against each other as they did in the 193Os, Australia and New
Zealand would send military advisers to block each others' advances in Africa, and the U.S.
Canadianborderwouldbecomefortified.Suchaprospectis,ofcourse,ludicrous:minusMarxist
Leninistideology,wearefarmorelikelytoseethe"CommonMarketization"ofworldpoliticsthan
thedisintegrationoftheEECintonineteenthcenturycompetitiveness.Indeed,asourexperiences
indealingwithEuropeonmatterssuchasterrorismorLibyaprove,theyaremuchfurthergone
thanwedowntheroadthatdeniesthelegitimacyoftheuseofforceininternationalpolitics,even
inselfdefense.
TheautomaticassumptionthatRussiashornofitsexpansionistcommunistideologyshouldpickup
wheretheczarsleftoffjustpriortotheBolshevikRevolutionisthereforeacuriousone.Itassumes
thattheevolutionofhumanconsciousnesshasstoodstillinthemeantime,andthattheSoviets,
whilepickingupcurrentlyfashionableideasintherealmofeconomics,willreturntoforeignpolicy
viewsacenturyoutofdateintherestofEurope.ThisiscertainlynotwhathappenedtoChinaafter
itbeganitsreformprocess.Chinesecompetitivenessandexpansionismontheworldscenehave
virtuallydisappeared:BeijingnolongersponsorsMaoistinsurgenciesortriestocultivateinfluence
indistantAfricancountriesasitdidinthe1960s.Thisisnottosaythattherearenottroublesome
aspects to contemporary Chinese foreign policy, such as the reckless sale of ballistic missile
technologyintheMiddleEast;andthePRCcontinuestomanifesttraditionalgreatpowerbehavior
initssponsorshipoftheKhmerRougeagainstVietnam.Buttheformerisexplainedbycommercial
motivesandthelatterisavestigeofearlierideologicallybasedrivalries.ThenewChinafarmore
resemblesGaullistFrancethanpreWorldWarIGermany.
Therealquestionforthefuture,however,isthedegreetowhichSovieteliteshaveassimilatedthe
consciousnessoftheuniversalhomogenousstatethatispostHitlerEurope.Fromtheirwritings
andfrommyownpersonalcontactswiththem,thereisnoquestioninmymindthattheliberal
Soviet intelligentsia rallying around Gorbachev have arrived at the endofhistory view in a
remarkablyshorttime,dueinnosmallmeasuretothecontactstheyhavehadsincetheBrezhnev
erawiththelargerEuropeancivilizationaroundthem."Newpoliticalthinking,"thegeneralrubric
for their views, describes a world dominated by economic concerns, in which there are no
ideological grounds for major conflict between nations, and in which, consequently, the use of
militaryforcebecomeslesslegitimate.AsForeignMinisterShevardnadzeputitinmid1988:
Thestrugglebetweentwoopposingsystemsisnolongeradeterminingtendencyofthepresentday
era.Atthemodernstage,theabilitytobuildupmaterialwealthatanacceleratedrateonthebasis
offrontrankingscienceandhighleveltechniquesandtechnology,andtodistributeitfairly,and
throughjointeffortstorestoreandprotecttheresourcesnecessaryformankind'ssurvivalacquires
decisiveimportance.[18]
Theposthistoricalconsciousnessrepresentedby"newthinking"isonlyonepossiblefutureforthe
SovietUnion,however.TherehasalwaysbeenaverystrongcurrentofgreatRussianchauvinism
in the Soviet Union, which has found freer expression since the advent of glasnost. It may be
possibletoreturntotraditionalMarxismLeninismforawhileasasimplerallyingpointforthose
who want to restore the authority that Gorbachev has dissipated. But as in Poland, Marxism
Leninismisdeadasamobilizingideology:underitsbannerpeoplecannotbemadetoworkharder,
and its adherents have lost confidence in themselves. Unlike the propagators of traditional

MarxismLeninism, however, ultranationalists in the USSR believe in their Slavophile cause

passionately,andonegetsthesensethatthefascistalternativeisnotonethathasplayeditselfout
entirelythere.
TheSovietUnion,then,isataforkintheroad:itcanstartdownthepaththatwasstakedoutby
WesternEuropefortyfiveyearsago,apaththatmostofAsiahasfollowed,oritcanrealizeitsown
uniquenessandremainstuckinhistory.Thechoiceitmakeswillbehighlyimportantforus,given
theSovietUnion'ssizeandmilitarystrength,forthatpowerwillcontinuetopreoccupyusandslow
ourrealizationthatwehavealreadyemergedontheothersideofhistory.
V
THEPASSINGofMarxismLeninismfirstfromChinaandthenfromtheSovietUnionwillmeanits
deathasalivingideologyofworldhistoricalsignificance.Forwhiletheremaybesomeisolatedtrue
believersleftinplaceslikeManagua,Pyongyang,orCambridge,Massachusetts,thefactthatthere
isnotasinglelargestateinwhichitisagoingconcernunderminescompletelyitspretensionsto
being in the vanguard of human history. And the death of this ideology means the growing
"CommonMarketization"ofinternationalrelations,andthediminutionofthelikelihoodoflarge
scaleconflictbetweenstates.
Thisdoesnotbyanymeansimplytheendofinternationalconflictperse.Fortheworldatthat
point would be divided between a part that was historical and a part that was posthistorical.
Conflictbetweenstatesstillinhistory,andbetweenthosestatesandthoseattheendofhistory,
wouldstillbepossible.Therewouldstillbeahighandperhapsrisinglevelofethnicandnationalist
violence, since those are impulses incompletely played out, even in parts of the posthistorical
world.PalestiniansandKurds,SikhsandTamils,IrishCatholicsandWalloons,ArmeniansandAzeris,
willcontinuetohavetheirunresolvedgrievances.Thisimpliesthatterrorismandwarsofnational
liberation will continue to be an important item on the international agenda. But largescale
conflictmustinvolvelargestatesstillcaughtinthegripofhistory,andtheyarewhatappeartobe
passingfromthescene.
Theendofhistorywillbeaverysadtime.Thestruggleforrecognition,thewillingnesstoriskone's
lifeforapurelyabstractgoal,theworldwideideologicalstrugglethatcalledforthdaring,courage,
imagination,andidealism,willbereplacedbyeconomiccalculation,theendlesssolvingoftechnical
problems,environmentalconcerns,andthesatisfactionofsophisticatedconsumerdemands.In
theposthistoricalperiodtherewillbeneitherartnorphilosophy,justtheperpetualcaretakingof
the museum of human history. I can feel in myself, and see in others around me, a powerful
nostalgiaforthetimewhenhistoryexisted.Suchnostalgia,infact,willcontinuetofuelcompetition
andconflictevenintheposthistoricalworldforsometimetocome.EventhoughIrecognizeits
inevitability,IhavethemostambivalentfeelingsforthecivilizationthathasbeencreatedinEurope
since1945,withitsnorthAtlanticandAsianoffshoots.Perhapsthisveryprospectofcenturiesof
boredomattheendofhistorywillservetogethistorystartedonceagain.
THEEND