Ganzon vs. CA

GANZON vs.
CA
200 SCRA 271
FACTS:
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in
number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them,
abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable
violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on
August 11, 1988 to last until October 11, 1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and Ganzon again asked for a
postponement to September 26, 1988. On September 26, 1988, both parties were present, together with
their respective counsel. Ganzon sought for a postponement which was denied. He was again ordered
suspended.
ISSUE:
We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the
Presidents alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.
RULING:
It is Ganzons et al. argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials.
According to Ganzon, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units
and second, by deleting the phrase 21 as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of
control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the
Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component
units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Ganzon et al. submit that the deletion (of as may be provided by law) is significant, as their
argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is provided by law and (2) hence, no law may
provide for it any longer.
It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local
Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code.
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution,
in deleting the phrase as may be provided by law intend to divest the President of the power to
investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections
62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional
language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative
as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our
opinion that the omission (of as may be provided by law) signifies nothing more than to underscore local
governments autonomy from congress and to break Congress control over local government affairs.
The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all
authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
Ganzon, et al. are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which
allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, this Court had occasion to discuss the scope
and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the
power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that
the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning
and extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: In administration law
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement
it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government
officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without
doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular
law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations.
The Court does not believe that Ganzon, et al. can rightfully point to the debates of the
Constitutional Commission to defeat the Presidents powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are
by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of
removal from the President, Commissioner Blas Ople would not.
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local
Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, supervision and removal are not incompatible terms and
one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new
Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force
and effect.
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization.
NOTE: The successive suspensions of the Mayor, however, were declared invalid by the Supreme Court.

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