G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965 Emmanuel Pelaez, The Auditor General

G.R. No.
L-23825 December 24, 1965
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
From September 4 to October 29, 1964, the President of the Philippines issued several executive orders creating 33 new
municipalities, claiming authority under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. On November 10, 1964, Vice
President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action, seeking a writ of prohibition to stop the Auditor General from
approving expenditures related to these new municipalities. Pelaez argued that the executive orders were invalid, as
Section 68 had been implicitly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and represented an undue delegation of legislative
power. The respondent argued that the action was premature and that not all necessary parties, particularly the officials
of the new municipalities, had been included. Some mayors of municipalities affected by the executive orders
intervened, as the new municipalities had taken away barrios from their jurisdictions.
From September 4 to October 29, 1964, the President of the Philippines issued several executive orders creating 33 new
municipalities, claiming authority under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. On November 10, 1964, Vice
President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action, seeking a writ of prohibition to stop the Auditor General from
approving expenditures related to these new municipalities. Pelaez argued that the executive orders were invalid, as
Section 68 had been implicitly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and represented an undue delegation of legislative
power. The respondent argued that the action was premature and that not all necessary parties, particularly the officials
of the new municipalities, had been included. Some mayors of municipalities affected by the executive orders
intervened, as the new municipalities had taken away barrios from their jurisdictions.
The passage argues that while the administrative task of adjusting boundaries between municipalities may fall
under executive functions, the authority to create municipalities is a legislative function. Citing U.S. case law, it
emphasizes that creating municipal corporations is a "strictly legislative function" and cannot be assumed by
other branches of government. Municipal corporations, such as cities or towns, are "creatures of statutes,"
meaning they are established solely through legislation.
While Congress may delegate authority to another branch of government for executing or administering laws,
this delegation must meet two requirements to uphold the principle of separation of powers:
1. The law must be complete in itself and clearly state the policy to be implemented.
2. It must provide clear standards or limits for the delegate to follow.
Without these safeguards, the delegate would essentially create or alter the law, which undermines the
legislative power and the separation of powers. The absence of such a statutory framework would enable the
delegate to act beyond their authority, disrupting the balance of power and compromising the foundations of the
republican system.
Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would
bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and
privilege of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for the
creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that the
issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such
discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no
more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as
provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the
same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal
council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may
see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote,
set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently
unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary
action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no
more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its
officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau,
or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations
would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over
the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does
not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power
over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the
process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that
which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as part
of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent
adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.
the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.

G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965 Emmanuel Pelaez, The Auditor General

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G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965 Emmanuel Pelaez, The Auditor General

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G.R. No.

L-23825 December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

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